validation_data_irrelevant.json

[
  {
    "question": "Defendant, a w orker in a metal working shop, had long been teasing Vincent. a young colleague. by calling him insulting names and ridiculing him. One dav'Vincent responded to the teasing by picking tip a metal bar and attacking Defendant. Defendant could have escaped from the shop. He parriied the blow with his left arm, and with his right hand struck Vincent a blow on his jaw from which the Young man died.",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nAn essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code \u00a7 707.1 (\u201cA person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.\u201d). \u201cMalice aforethought\u201d is defined as \u201c \u2018a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.\u2019 \u201d Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted).\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death\n\nTo convict for a violation of Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused \u201cso gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]\u201d Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct \u201chas come to be known as \u2018criminal negligence\u2019 \u201d in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires \u201c \u2018acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\nthat the appellant acted intentionally when he started the fire; and that the victim died as a result of both of the appellant's actions. Therefore, the verdicts were not mutually exclusive. Cf. Martinez v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1669, March 2, 2007] --- So.2d ----, ---- (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (opinion on return to remand) (applying Heard and holding that the jury's verdicts were mutually exclusive because a single act cannot be both negligent and reckless). Accordingly, the appellant's argument is without merit, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nSelect from the choices (A-D) the most serious offense of which the defendant could be properly convicted.\nDefendant, a w orker in a metal working shop, had long been teasing Vincent. a young colleague. by calling him insulting names and ridiculing him. One dav'Vincent responded to the teasing by picking tip a metal bar and attacking Defendant. Defendant could have escaped from the shop. He parriied the blow with his left arm, and with his right hand struck Vincent a blow on his jaw from which the Young man died.\n\n (A) Involuntary manslaughter\n (B) Voluntary manslaughter\n (C) Murder\n (D) None of the above\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "None of the above"
    ],
    "id": "mbe_131",
    "retrieved_docs": "An essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code \u00a7 707.1 (\u201cA person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.\u201d). \u201cMalice aforethought\u201d is defined as \u201c \u2018a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.\u2019 \u201d Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted).\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death\n\nTo convict for a violation of Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused \u201cso gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]\u201d Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct \u201chas come to be known as \u2018criminal negligence\u2019 \u201d in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires \u201c \u2018acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\nthat the appellant acted intentionally when he started the fire; and that the victim died as a result of both of the appellant's actions. Therefore, the verdicts were not mutually exclusive. Cf. Martinez v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1669, March 2, 2007] --- So.2d ----, ---- (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (opinion on return to remand) (applying Heard and holding that the jury's verdicts were mutually exclusive because a single act cannot be both negligent and reckless). Accordingly, the appellant's argument is without merit, and we affirm the trial court's judgment."
  },
  {
    "question": "Despondent over losing his job, Wilmont drank all night at a bar. While driving home, he noticed a car following him and, in his intoxicated state, concluded he was being followed by robbers. In fact, a police car was following him on suspicion of drunk driving. In his effort to get away, Wilmont sped through a stop sign and struck and killed a pedestrian. He was arrested by the police. Wilmont is prosecuted for manslaughter. He should be",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nInvoluntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). \u201cTo constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.\u201d Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, \u201ca person can be\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\nAn essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code \u00a7 707.1 (\u201cA person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.\u201d). \u201cMalice aforethought\u201d is defined as \u201c \u2018a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.\u2019 \u201d Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted).\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDespondent over losing his job, Wilmont drank all night at a bar. While driving home, he noticed a car following him and, in his intoxicated state, concluded he was being followed by robbers. In fact, a police car was following him on suspicion of drunk driving. In his effort to get away, Wilmont sped through a stop sign and struck and killed a pedestrian. He was arrested by the police. Wilmont is prosecuted for manslaughter. He should be\n\n (A) acquitted, because he honestly believed he faced an imminent threat of death or severe bodily injury.\n (B) acquitted, because his intoxication prevented him from appreciating the risk he created.\n (C) convicted, because he acted recklessly and in fact was in no danger.\n (D) convicted, because he acted recklessly and his apprehension of danger was not reasonable.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "convicted, because he acted recklessly and his apprehension of danger was not reasonable."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_885",
    "retrieved_docs": "Involuntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). \u201cTo constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.\u201d Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, \u201ca person can be\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\nAn essential element of first-degree murder is malice aforethought. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa Code \u00a7 707.1 (\u201cA person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.\u201d). \u201cMalice aforethought\u201d is defined as \u201c \u2018a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed.\u2019 \u201d Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 49 (citation omitted).\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nD.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571, 578 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also McLaughlin v. State, 586 So.2d 267, 270 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (the element of \u201cextreme indifference to human life\u201d by definition does not apply to the life of the victim, but to human life in general); Gholston v. State, 494 So.2d 876, 883 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (to be reckless, a crime must be directed toward the general public, not toward a particular person); King v. State, 505 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (reckless murder \u201cdiffers from intentional murder in that it results not from a specific, conscious intent to cause the death"
  },
  {
    "question": "Andres conveyed Applewood Farm \"to Bogatz, her heirs and assigns, so long as the premises are used for residential and farm purposes, then to Cohen and his heirs.\" The common law Rule Against Perpetuities, unmodified by statute, is part of the law of the jurisdiction in which Applewood Farm is located. As a consequence of the conveyance, Cohen's interest in Applewood Farm is",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA life tenant can sell his or her life estate in property. See generally Reeside v. Annex Bldg. Ass'n of Balt. City, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72 (1933). The estate as sold becomes an estate pur autre vie (for the life of the original life tenant). Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335, 348 (1875). A life tenant who does not have the power to dispose of the property cannot convey the remainderman's interest, however. Reeside, supra, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72. A remainderman likewise can sell his remainder interest in the property, but cannot convey the life tenant's\n\nAn incorporeal hereditament is \u201c[a]n intangible right in land, such as an easement.\u201d In other contexts, Utah courts have recognized an incorporeal hereditament as an interest in real property. In addressing a case involving a license to prospect and mine ore, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the potential for a mining license to ripen into an incorporeal hereditament and stated: This is not to say that a license is an incorporeal hereditament; it means that the grant was a license as long as it remained executory because it was not in proper form for a conveyance of an incorporeal hereditament.\n\nIt ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law.\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nbe carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.\u201d Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S., at 605, 96 S.Ct., at 2283. See In re Griffths, 413 U.S., at 721-722, 93 S.Ct., at 2854-2855. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand.8\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAndres conveyed Applewood Farm \"to Bogatz, her heirs and assigns, so long as the premises are used for residential and farm purposes, then to Cohen and his heirs.\" The common law Rule Against Perpetuities, unmodified by statute, is part of the law of the jurisdiction in which Applewood Farm is located. As a consequence of the conveyance, Cohen's interest in Applewood Farm is\n\n (A) nothing.\n (B) a valid executory interest.\n (C) a possibility of reverter.\n (D) a right of entry for condition broken.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "nothing."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_965",
    "retrieved_docs": "A life tenant can sell his or her life estate in property. See generally Reeside v. Annex Bldg. Ass'n of Balt. City, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72 (1933). The estate as sold becomes an estate pur autre vie (for the life of the original life tenant). Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 335, 348 (1875). A life tenant who does not have the power to dispose of the property cannot convey the remainderman's interest, however. Reeside, supra, 165 Md. 200, 167 A. 72. A remainderman likewise can sell his remainder interest in the property, but cannot convey the life tenant's\n\nAn incorporeal hereditament is \u201c[a]n intangible right in land, such as an easement.\u201d In other contexts, Utah courts have recognized an incorporeal hereditament as an interest in real property. In addressing a case involving a license to prospect and mine ore, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the potential for a mining license to ripen into an incorporeal hereditament and stated: This is not to say that a license is an incorporeal hereditament; it means that the grant was a license as long as it remained executory because it was not in proper form for a conveyance of an incorporeal hereditament.\n\nIt ripened into an incorporeal hereditament when the licensee entered into enjoyment thereof and made expenditures and improvements. Other jurisdictions hold that revocation will not be allowed in such a case unless the licensee be compensated for his improvements. This language supports a conclusion that the holder of an incorporeal hereditament would be considered the holder of a form of property interest entitling it to compensation under Utah law.\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nbe carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.\u201d Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S., at 605, 96 S.Ct., at 2283. See In re Griffths, 413 U.S., at 721-722, 93 S.Ct., at 2854-2855. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand.8"
  },
  {
    "question": "Supermarket is in a section of town where there are sometimes street fights and where pedestrians are occasionally the victims of pickpockets and muggers. In recognition of the unusual number of robberies in the area, the supermarket posted signs in the store and in its parking lot that read: Warning: There are pickpockets and muggers at work in this part of the city. Supermarket is not responsible for the acts of criminals. One evening, Lorner drove to Supermarket to see about a special on turkeys that Supermarket was advertising. She decided that the turkeys were too large and left the store without purchasing anything. In the parking lot, she was attacked by an unknown man who raped her and then ran away. If Lorner sues Supermarket, the result should be for the",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the\n\na landowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition, which includes providing a safe means of ingress and egress to tenants (see Peralta v. Henriquez, 100 N.Y.2d 139, 144, 760 N.Y.S.2d 741, 790 N.E.2d 1170 [2003]; Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 [1976]; Gallagher v. St. Raymond's R.C. Church, 21 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 289 N.Y.S.2d 401, 236 N.E.2d 632 [1968] ). The scope of such duty is determined \u201c \u2018in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nSupermarket is in a section of town where there are sometimes street fights and where pedestrians are occasionally the victims of pickpockets and muggers. In recognition of the unusual number of robberies in the area, the supermarket posted signs in the store and in its parking lot that read: Warning: There are pickpockets and muggers at work in this part of the city. Supermarket is not responsible for the acts of criminals. One evening, Lorner drove to Supermarket to see about a special on turkeys that Supermarket was advertising. She decided that the turkeys were too large and left the store without purchasing anything. In the parking lot, she was attacked by an unknown man who raped her and then ran away. If Lorner sues Supermarket, the result should be for the\n\n (A) plaintiff, if Supermarket failed to take reasonable steps to protect customers against criminal attack in its parking lot.\n (B) plaintiff, because Supermarket is liable for harm to business invitees on its premises.\n (C) defendant, if the warning signs were plainly visible to Lorner.\n (D) defendant, because the rapist was the proximate cause of Lorner's injuries.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "plaintiff, if Supermarket failed to take reasonable steps to protect customers against criminal attack in its parking lot."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_768",
    "retrieved_docs": "A duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the\n\na landowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition, which includes providing a safe means of ingress and egress to tenants (see Peralta v. Henriquez, 100 N.Y.2d 139, 144, 760 N.Y.S.2d 741, 790 N.E.2d 1170 [2003]; Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 [1976]; Gallagher v. St. Raymond's R.C. Church, 21 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 289 N.Y.S.2d 401, 236 N.E.2d 632 [1968] ). The scope of such duty is determined \u201c \u2018in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999)."
  },
  {
    "question": "In preparation for a mountain-climbing expedition, Alper purchased the necessary climbing equipment from Outfitters, Inc., a retail dealer in sporting goods. A week later, Alper fell from a rock face when a safety device he had purchased from Outfitters malfunctioned because of a defect in its manufacture. Thereafter, Rollins was severely injured when he tried to reach and give assistance to Alper on the ledge to which Alper had fallen. Rollins's injury was not caused by any fault on his own part. If Rollins brings an action against Outfitters, Inc., to recover damages for his injuries, will Rollins prevail?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nUnder the rescue doctrine, an actor is usually liable for injuries sustained by a rescuer attempting to help another person placed in danger by the actor's negligent conduct. The question here is whether an actor is liable for injuries sustained by a person who is trying to rescue the actor from his own negligence. The answer is yes.\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nthat the appellant acted intentionally when he started the fire; and that the victim died as a result of both of the appellant's actions. Therefore, the verdicts were not mutually exclusive. Cf. Martinez v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1669, March 2, 2007] --- So.2d ----, ---- (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (opinion on return to remand) (applying Heard and holding that the jury's verdicts were mutually exclusive because a single act cannot be both negligent and reckless). Accordingly, the appellant's argument is without merit, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.\n\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\nConsequential damages\u201d cover all losses that are reasonably foreseeable to the actor, even if they do not result inevitably from the act complained of. See John Hetherington & Sons v. William Firth Co., 210 Mass. 8, 21, 95 N.E. 961 (1911); Smethurst, supra 148 Mass. at 265, 19 N.E. 387; H. L. Oleck, supra s 17. For example, consequential damages in an action based on contract or warranty may include personal *113 injuries caused by the breach. G.L. c. 106, s 2-715. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 583-589, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nIn preparation for a mountain-climbing expedition, Alper purchased the necessary climbing equipment from Outfitters, Inc., a retail dealer in sporting goods. A week later, Alper fell from a rock face when a safety device he had purchased from Outfitters malfunctioned because of a defect in its manufacture. Thereafter, Rollins was severely injured when he tried to reach and give assistance to Alper on the ledge to which Alper had fallen. Rollins's injury was not caused by any fault on his own part. If Rollins brings an action against Outfitters, Inc., to recover damages for his injuries, will Rollins prevail?\n\n (A) No, unless Outfitters could have discovered the defect by a reasonable inspection of the safety device.\n (B) No, because Rollins did not rely on the representation of safety implied from the sale of the safety device by Outfitters.\n (C) Yes, unless Alper was negligent in failing to test the safety device.\n (D) Yes, because injury to a person in Rollins's position was foreseeable if the safety device failed.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "Yes, because injury to a person in Rollins's position was foreseeable if the safety device failed."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_656",
    "retrieved_docs": "Under the rescue doctrine, an actor is usually liable for injuries sustained by a rescuer attempting to help another person placed in danger by the actor's negligent conduct. The question here is whether an actor is liable for injuries sustained by a person who is trying to rescue the actor from his own negligence. The answer is yes.\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nthat the appellant acted intentionally when he started the fire; and that the victim died as a result of both of the appellant's actions. Therefore, the verdicts were not mutually exclusive. Cf. Martinez v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1669, March 2, 2007] --- So.2d ----, ---- (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (opinion on return to remand) (applying Heard and holding that the jury's verdicts were mutually exclusive because a single act cannot be both negligent and reckless). Accordingly, the appellant's argument is without merit, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.\n\n\u201c \u2018Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and without fault of the obligated party, which event makes performance of the obligation impossible or highly impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, \u00b6 12, 232 P.3d 1081 (emphases omitted) (quoting Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 261 (1981) (\u201cWhere, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which\n\nConsequential damages\u201d cover all losses that are reasonably foreseeable to the actor, even if they do not result inevitably from the act complained of. See John Hetherington & Sons v. William Firth Co., 210 Mass. 8, 21, 95 N.E. 961 (1911); Smethurst, supra 148 Mass. at 265, 19 N.E. 387; H. L. Oleck, supra s 17. For example, consequential damages in an action based on contract or warranty may include personal *113 injuries caused by the breach. G.L. c. 106, s 2-715. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 583-589, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973)."
  },
  {
    "question": "If the Attorney General signs the indictment, the strongest argument Green could urge as a defense is that",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nUnited States, 282 U.S. 344, 352\u2013354, 51 S.Ct. 153, 156\u2013157, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), we held that the independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 591\u2013599, was an inferior officer. In reaching that conclusion, we relied on several factors: that the independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attorney General), that she performed only limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited. 487 U.S., at 671\u2013672,\n\nthe President's Powers Article II of the Constitution contains the vesting clause, which states: \"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.\" This has historically been interpreted to mean that the President is the head of the Executive Branch, but that he is still subject to limits within that Branch (i.e. if the President fires members of the Executive Branch, Congress would have oversight and would be able to investigate the firings.) Some scholars, however, have interpreted the Vesting Clause under a much stronger lens, finding that the President has full power over\n\nThe political question doctrine \u201c \u2018excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.\u2019 \u201d Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). The doctrine applies where, \u201c[p]rominent on the surface\u201d of the case is: [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or\n\n2, cl. 2. 5678As we recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125, 96 S.Ct. 612, 685, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of \u201cetiquette or protocol\u201d; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128\u2013131, 96 S.Ct., at 686\u2013688; Weiss, supra, at 183\u2013185, 114 S.Ct., at 763\u2013765 (SOUTER, J., concurring); Freytag\n\n804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nGreen is cited for contempt of the House of Representatives after she refused to answer certain questions posed by a House Committee concerning her acts while serving as a United States Ambassador. A federal statute authorizes the Attorney General to prosecute contempts of Congress. Pursuant to this law, the House directs the Attorney General to begin criminal proceedings against Green. A federal grand jury indicts Green, but the Attorney General refuses to sign the indictment.\nIf the Attorney General signs the indictment, the strongest argument Green could urge as a defense is that\n\n (A) Green may refuse to answer the questions if she can demonstrate that they are unrelated to matters upon which Congress may legislate\n (B) the House may question Green only on matters pertaining to the expenditure of funds appropriated by Congress\n (C) only the Senate may question Green on matters that relate to the performance of her duties\n (D) Congress may not ask questions relating to the performance of duties executed by an officer of the executive branch\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "Green may refuse to answer the questions if she can demonstrate that they are unrelated to matters upon which Congress may legislate"
    ],
    "id": "mbe_200",
    "retrieved_docs": "United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352\u2013354, 51 S.Ct. 153, 156\u2013157, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), we held that the independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 591\u2013599, was an inferior officer. In reaching that conclusion, we relied on several factors: that the independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher officer (the Attorney General), that she performed only limited duties, that her jurisdiction was narrow, and that her tenure was limited. 487 U.S., at 671\u2013672,\n\nthe President's Powers Article II of the Constitution contains the vesting clause, which states: \"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.\" This has historically been interpreted to mean that the President is the head of the Executive Branch, but that he is still subject to limits within that Branch (i.e. if the President fires members of the Executive Branch, Congress would have oversight and would be able to investigate the firings.) Some scholars, however, have interpreted the Vesting Clause under a much stronger lens, finding that the President has full power over\n\nThe political question doctrine \u201c \u2018excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.\u2019 \u201d Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 432 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). The doctrine applies where, \u201c[p]rominent on the surface\u201d of the case is: [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or\n\n2, cl. 2. 5678As we recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125, 96 S.Ct. 612, 685, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of \u201cetiquette or protocol\u201d; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches. See id., at 128\u2013131, 96 S.Ct., at 686\u2013688; Weiss, supra, at 183\u2013185, 114 S.Ct., at 763\u2013765 (SOUTER, J., concurring); Freytag\n\n804(b)(3). Statements that are not inculpatory are not admissible pursuant to this rule even if they are part of a generally inculpatory statement or narrative. United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600\u201301). However, these rules cannot be applied except in the context of specific evidence."
  },
  {
    "question": "Assume for this question only that the court denied the motion to suppress the jewelry. Yancey moves to suppress the use of the statement Yancey made to his parents. The that best argument for excluding it would be",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nConsensual searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment \u201cbecause it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.\u201d Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). In order for a consensual search to be valid, consent must actually be given (either express or implied), and the person giving consent must have (actual or apparent) authority to do so. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 185-86, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990).\n\n291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. But neither the Fourth Amendment nor \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to deter future violations by the State. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2426; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Accordingly, exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. See 291 Kan. at 492, 242 P.3d 1186.\n\nintent, knowledge, fraud, or illicit sexual relations. Circumstantial evidence must do more than raise a suspicion. It must amount to proof. There must be some reasonable connection between the facts proved and the fact at issue. A fact cannot be established by circumstantial evidence where there is direct, uncontradicted, reasonable, and unimpeached evidence that the fact does not exist. In some instances, circumstantial evidence may outweigh or be more satisfactory or convincing than direct or positive testimony. Circumstantial evidence cannot be based on mere speculation, guess, or conjecture; it must justify an inference of probability as distinguished from possibility. The\n\nTo prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, \u2013\u2013\u2013 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nThe police suspected that Yancey, a 16-year-old high school student, had committed a series of burglaries. Two officers went to Yancey's high school and asked the principal to call Yancey out of class and to search his backpack. While the officers waited, the principal took Yancey into the hall where she asked to look in his backpack. When Yancey refused, the principal grabbed it from him, injuring Yancey's shoulder in the process. In the backpack, she found jewelry that she turned over to the officers. The officers believed that the jewelry had been taken in one of the burglaries. They arrested Yancey, took him to the station, and gave him Miranda warnings. Yancey asked to see a lawyer. The police called Yancey's parents to the station. When Yancey's parents arrived, the police asked them to speak with Yancey. They put them in a room and secretly recorded their conversation with a concealed electronic device. Yancey broke down and confessed to his parents that he had committed the burglaries. Yancey was charged with the burglaries.\nAssume for this question only that the court denied the motion to suppress the jewelry. Yancey moves to suppress the use of the statement Yancey made to his parents. The that best argument for excluding it would be\n\n (A) Yancey was in custody at the time the statement was recorded.\n (B) the police did not comply with Yancey's request for a lawyer.\n (C) once Yancey had invoked his right to counsel, it was improper for the police to listen to any of his private conversations.\n (D) the meeting between Yancey and his parents was arranged by the police to obtain an incriminating statement.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "the meeting between Yancey and his parents was arranged by the police to obtain an incriminating statement."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_892",
    "retrieved_docs": "Consensual searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment \u201cbecause it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.\u201d Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). In order for a consensual search to be valid, consent must actually be given (either express or implied), and the person giving consent must have (actual or apparent) authority to do so. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 185-86, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990).\n\n291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. But neither the Fourth Amendment nor \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to deter future violations by the State. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2426; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496, 242 P.3d 1186. Accordingly, exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. See 291 Kan. at 492, 242 P.3d 1186.\n\nintent, knowledge, fraud, or illicit sexual relations. Circumstantial evidence must do more than raise a suspicion. It must amount to proof. There must be some reasonable connection between the facts proved and the fact at issue. A fact cannot be established by circumstantial evidence where there is direct, uncontradicted, reasonable, and unimpeached evidence that the fact does not exist. In some instances, circumstantial evidence may outweigh or be more satisfactory or convincing than direct or positive testimony. Circumstantial evidence cannot be based on mere speculation, guess, or conjecture; it must justify an inference of probability as distinguished from possibility. The\n\nTo prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, \u2013\u2013\u2013 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence."
  },
  {
    "question": "A federal statute with inseverable provisions established a new five-member National Prosperity Board with broad regulatory powers over the operation of the securities, banking, and commodities industries, including the power to issue rules with the force of law. The statute provides for three of the board members to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They serve seven-year terms and are removable only for good cause. The other two members of the board were designated in the statute to be the respective general counsel of the Senate and House of Representatives Committees on Government Operations. The statute stipulated that they were to serve on the board for as long as they continued in those positions. Following all required administrative procedures, the board issued an elaborate set of rules regulating the operations of all banks, securities dealers, and commodities brokers. The Green Light Securities Company, which was subject to the board's rules, sought a declaratory judgment that the rules were invalid because the statute establishing the board was unconstitutional. In this case, the court should rule that the statute establishing the National Prosperity Board is",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nCircuit Court judges and Supreme Court justices and choosing the chief justice. These nominations must be confirmed by the Senate. While the President usually has broad appointment powers, subject to Senate approval, there are some limitations. In National Labor Relations Board v. SW General Inc. (2017), the Supreme Court found that the \"Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 [FVRA], which prevents a person who has been nominated to fill a vacant office requiring presidential appointment and Senate confirmation from performing the duties of that office in an acting capacity, applies to anyone performing acting service under the FVRA.\" Further, the\n\nPresident is constitutionally allowed to make recess appointments when Senate is not in session (which means that such appointments are not subject to Senate approval until the end of the session). However, In National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, the Supreme Court found that \"for purposes of the clause, the Senate is in session whenever it indicates that it is, as long as \u2013 under its own rules \u2013 it retains the capacity to transact Senate business.\" As such, the Senate can claim to always be in session, therefore preventing the President from making any recess appointments. Executive Orders\n\nThe Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.\n\nof deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen.\n\nPowers Act attempted to define when and how the President could send troops to battle by adding strict time frames for reporting to Congress after sending troops to war, in addition to other measures, however it has not had much effect (see \"War Powers Resolution\" section in the Commander in Chief Powers article). Nominations The President is responsible for nominating candidates for the head positions of government offices. The President will typically nominate cabinet officials and secretaries at the beginning of his or her presidency and will fill vacancies as necessary. In addition, the President is responsible for nominating Federal\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nA federal statute with inseverable provisions established a new five-member National Prosperity Board with broad regulatory powers over the operation of the securities, banking, and commodities industries, including the power to issue rules with the force of law. The statute provides for three of the board members to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They serve seven-year terms and are removable only for good cause. The other two members of the board were designated in the statute to be the respective general counsel of the Senate and House of Representatives Committees on Government Operations. The statute stipulated that they were to serve on the board for as long as they continued in those positions. Following all required administrative procedures, the board issued an elaborate set of rules regulating the operations of all banks, securities dealers, and commodities brokers. The Green Light Securities Company, which was subject to the board's rules, sought a declaratory judgment that the rules were invalid because the statute establishing the board was unconstitutional. In this case, the court should rule that the statute establishing the National Prosperity Board is\n\n (A) unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards having broad powers that are quasi-legislative in nature, such as rulemaking, must be appointed by Congress.\n (B) unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II.\n (C) constitutional, because the necessary and proper clause authorizes Congress to determine the means by which members are appointed to boards created by Congress under its power to regulate commerce among the states.\n (D) constitutional, because there is a substantial nexus between the power of Congress to legislate for the general welfare and the means specified by Congress in this statute for the appointment of board members.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "B",
      "unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_1078",
    "retrieved_docs": "Circuit Court judges and Supreme Court justices and choosing the chief justice. These nominations must be confirmed by the Senate. While the President usually has broad appointment powers, subject to Senate approval, there are some limitations. In National Labor Relations Board v. SW General Inc. (2017), the Supreme Court found that the \"Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 [FVRA], which prevents a person who has been nominated to fill a vacant office requiring presidential appointment and Senate confirmation from performing the duties of that office in an acting capacity, applies to anyone performing acting service under the FVRA.\" Further, the\n\nPresident is constitutionally allowed to make recess appointments when Senate is not in session (which means that such appointments are not subject to Senate approval until the end of the session). However, In National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, the Supreme Court found that \"for purposes of the clause, the Senate is in session whenever it indicates that it is, as long as \u2013 under its own rules \u2013 it retains the capacity to transact Senate business.\" As such, the Senate can claim to always be in session, therefore preventing the President from making any recess appointments. Executive Orders\n\nThe Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.\n\nof deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen.\n\nPowers Act attempted to define when and how the President could send troops to battle by adding strict time frames for reporting to Congress after sending troops to war, in addition to other measures, however it has not had much effect (see \"War Powers Resolution\" section in the Commander in Chief Powers article). Nominations The President is responsible for nominating candidates for the head positions of government offices. The President will typically nominate cabinet officials and secretaries at the beginning of his or her presidency and will fill vacancies as necessary. In addition, the President is responsible for nominating Federal"
  },
  {
    "question": "According to a statute of the state of Kiowa, a candidate for state office may have his name placed on the official election ballot only if he files with the appropriate state official a petition containing a specified number of voter signatures. Roderick failed to get his name placed on the state ballot as an independent candidate for governor because he failed to file a petition with the number of voter signatures required by state statute. In a suit against the appropriate state officials in federal district court, Roderick sought an injunction against the petition signature requirement on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Which of the following, if established, constitutes the strongest argument for Roderick?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIf we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nTo prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, \u2013\u2013\u2013 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).\n\nto safeguard the interests of its citizens. Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 108 Ill.2d 1, 23, 90 Ill.Dec. 908, 483 N.E.2d 226 (1985). Put differently, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed: \u201cOne whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter.\u201d Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357, 28 S.Ct. 529, 531\u201332, 52 L.Ed. 828, 832 (1908). Furthermore, the police power \u201cis not limited to health, morals\n\nThe Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.\n\nThe Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This court interprets \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which specifically addresses searches and seizures, as providing the same protection. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 498, 242 P.3d 1186. Warrantless searches are considered unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent, search incident to lawful arrest, stop and frisk, probable cause plus exigent circumstances, the emergency doctrine, inventory searches, plain view or feel, and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses. State v. Fitzgerald, *235 286 Kan. 1124,\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nAccording to a statute of the state of Kiowa, a candidate for state office may have his name placed on the official election ballot only if he files with the appropriate state official a petition containing a specified number of voter signatures. Roderick failed to get his name placed on the state ballot as an independent candidate for governor because he failed to file a petition with the number of voter signatures required by state statute. In a suit against the appropriate state officials in federal district court, Roderick sought an injunction against the petition signature requirement on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Which of the following, if established, constitutes the strongest argument for Roderick?\n\n (A) Compliance with the petition signature requirement is burdensome.\n (B) The objectives of the statute could be satisfactorily achieved by less burdensome means.\n (C) Because of the petition signature requirement, very few independent candidates have ever succeeded in getting on the ballot.\n (D) The motivation for the statute was a desire to keep candidates off the ballot if they did not have strong support among voters.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "B",
      "The objectives of the statute could be satisfactorily achieved by less burdensome means."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_973",
    "retrieved_docs": "If we determine that a statute treats similarly situated individuals differently, we then evaluate the statute under an equal protection analysis. To determine whether a statute violates equal protection, we will either apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 550, 242 P.3d 876 (2010). Which test applies depends on the classification and rights involved: Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. \u201cStrict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.\u201d Intermediate scrutiny applies only if the statute implicates both an important right and\n\nTo prove intentional vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. York v. City of St. Gabriel, 89 F.Supp.3d 843, 850, 864 (M.D. La. 2015); Backus v. S. Carolina, 857 F.Supp.2d 553, 567 (D.S.C.), summ. aff'd, \u2013\u2013\u2013 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013, 133 S.Ct. 156, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012).\n\nto safeguard the interests of its citizens. Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 108 Ill.2d 1, 23, 90 Ill.Dec. 908, 483 N.E.2d 226 (1985). Put differently, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed: \u201cOne whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter.\u201d Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357, 28 S.Ct. 529, 531\u201332, 52 L.Ed. 828, 832 (1908). Furthermore, the police power \u201cis not limited to health, morals\n\nThe Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.\n\nThe Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This court interprets \u00a7 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which specifically addresses searches and seizures, as providing the same protection. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 498, 242 P.3d 1186. Warrantless searches are considered unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent, search incident to lawful arrest, stop and frisk, probable cause plus exigent circumstances, the emergency doctrine, inventory searches, plain view or feel, and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses. State v. Fitzgerald, *235 286 Kan. 1124,"
  },
  {
    "question": "Dart is charged with the statutory offense of \"knowingly violating a regulation of the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board\" and specifically that he knowingly violated regulation number 345-90 issued by the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. That regulation prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to any person under the age of 18 and also prohibits the sale of any alcoholic beverage to a person over the age of 17 and under the age of 22 without the presentation of such person's driver's license or other identification showing the age of the purchaser to be 18 or older. The evidence showed that Dart was a bartender in a tavern and sold a bottle of beer to a person who was 17 years old and that Dart did not ask for or see the purchaser's driver's license or any other identification. Which of the following, if found by the jury, would be of the most help to Dart?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nTo convict for a violation of Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused \u201cso gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]\u201d Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct \u201chas come to be known as \u2018criminal negligence\u2019 \u201d in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires \u201c \u2018acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge\n\nmaking a truly informed and intelligent decision concerning the proposed medical procedure.\u201d Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 359 (citing Cowman, 329 N.W.2d at 425, 427); accord Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 31 (\u201cThat duty is shaped, not by what the medical community would deem material, but by the patient's need for information sufficient to make a truly informed and intelligent decision.\u201d). Several exceptions to the patient rule's disclosure requirement exist that are not applicable to this case. Generally, to succeed on a claim of informed consent, the plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) The existence of a material risk [or information] unknown\n\nor from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\ncircumstances of this case, Instructor created an unreasonable risk of harm, increased the risk inherent in competitive ballroom dancing, or was otherwise unreasonable in his acts and omissions is a question for the trier of fact.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDart is charged with the statutory offense of \"knowingly violating a regulation of the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board\" and specifically that he knowingly violated regulation number 345-90 issued by the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. That regulation prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to any person under the age of 18 and also prohibits the sale of any alcoholic beverage to a person over the age of 17 and under the age of 22 without the presentation of such person's driver's license or other identification showing the age of the purchaser to be 18 or older. The evidence showed that Dart was a bartender in a tavern and sold a bottle of beer to a person who was 17 years old and that Dart did not ask for or see the purchaser's driver's license or any other identification. Which of the following, if found by the jury, would be of the most help to Dart?\n\n (A) The purchaser had a driver's license that falsely showed his age to be 21.\n (B) Dart had never been told he was supposed to check identification of persons over 17 and under 22 before selling them alcohol.\n (C) Dart did not know that the regulations classified beer as an alcoholic beverage.\n (D) Dart mistakenly believed the purchaser to be 24 years old.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "Dart mistakenly believed the purchaser to be 24 years old."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_799",
    "retrieved_docs": "To convict for a violation of Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused \u201cso gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]\u201d Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct \u201chas come to be known as \u2018criminal negligence\u2019 \u201d in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires \u201c \u2018acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge\n\nmaking a truly informed and intelligent decision concerning the proposed medical procedure.\u201d Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 359 (citing Cowman, 329 N.W.2d at 425, 427); accord Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 31 (\u201cThat duty is shaped, not by what the medical community would deem material, but by the patient's need for information sufficient to make a truly informed and intelligent decision.\u201d). Several exceptions to the patient rule's disclosure requirement exist that are not applicable to this case. Generally, to succeed on a claim of informed consent, the plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) The existence of a material risk [or information] unknown\n\nor from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\ncircumstances of this case, Instructor created an unreasonable risk of harm, increased the risk inherent in competitive ballroom dancing, or was otherwise unreasonable in his acts and omissions is a question for the trier of fact."
  },
  {
    "question": "Loomis, the owner and operator of a small business, encourages \"wellness\" on the part of his employees and supports various physicalfitness programs to that end. Learning that one of his employees, Graceful, was a dedicated jogger, Loomis promised to pay her a special award of $100 if she could and would run one mile in less than six minutes on the following Saturday. Graceful thanked him, and did in fact run a mile in less than six minutes on the day specified. Shortly thereafter, however, Loomis discovered that for more than a year Graceful had been running at least one mile in less than six minutes every day as a part of her personal fitness program. He refused to pay the $100. In an action by Graceful against Loomis for breach of contract, which of the following best summarizes the probable decision of the court?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nUnder the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).\n\nFor a valid modification to exist, there must be mutual assent *822 to the meaning and conditions of the modification and the parties must assent to the same thing in the same sense.... Modification of a contract may be inferred from the attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties.\u201d (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tsionis v. Martens, 116 Conn.App. 568, 577, 976 A.2d 53 (2009). \u201cA modification of an agreement must be supported by valid consideration and requires a party to do, or promise to do, something further than, or different from, that which he is already bound to\n\nAlthough there is no exact definition to determine when a contract is \u2018divisible\u2019 or \u2018entire,\u2019 a contract is generally not severable or divisible when its purpose, terms and nature contemplate that its parts and consideration shall be interdependent and common to each other. Moulds v. James F. Proctor, D.D.S., P.A. (Aug. 16, 1991), Tenn.App., unreported, 1991 WL 137577.\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nUnder the defense of impossibility of performance, a party's breach of its contractual obligation will be excused when \u201cchanged circumstances have rendered the promise vitally different from what reasonably should have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract.\u201d Colo. Performance Corp. v. Mariposa Assocs., 754 P.2d 401, 407 (Colo.Ct.App.1987) (quotation omitted)\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nLoomis, the owner and operator of a small business, encourages \"wellness\" on the part of his employees and supports various physicalfitness programs to that end. Learning that one of his employees, Graceful, was a dedicated jogger, Loomis promised to pay her a special award of $100 if she could and would run one mile in less than six minutes on the following Saturday. Graceful thanked him, and did in fact run a mile in less than six minutes on the day specified. Shortly thereafter, however, Loomis discovered that for more than a year Graceful had been running at least one mile in less than six minutes every day as a part of her personal fitness program. He refused to pay the $100. In an action by Graceful against Loomis for breach of contract, which of the following best summarizes the probable decision of the court?\n\n (A) Loomis wins, because it is a compelling inference that Loomis's promise did not induce Graceful to run the specified mile.\n (B) Loomis wins, because Graceful's running of the specified mile was beneficial, not detrimental, to her in any event.\n (C) Graceful wins, because running a mile in less than six minutes is a significantly demanding enterprise.\n (D) Graceful wins, because she ran the specified mile as requested, and her motives for doing so are irrelevant.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "Graceful wins, because she ran the specified mile as requested, and her motives for doing so are irrelevant."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_778",
    "retrieved_docs": "Under the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).\n\nFor a valid modification to exist, there must be mutual assent *822 to the meaning and conditions of the modification and the parties must assent to the same thing in the same sense.... Modification of a contract may be inferred from the attendant circumstances and conduct of the parties.\u201d (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tsionis v. Martens, 116 Conn.App. 568, 577, 976 A.2d 53 (2009). \u201cA modification of an agreement must be supported by valid consideration and requires a party to do, or promise to do, something further than, or different from, that which he is already bound to\n\nAlthough there is no exact definition to determine when a contract is \u2018divisible\u2019 or \u2018entire,\u2019 a contract is generally not severable or divisible when its purpose, terms and nature contemplate that its parts and consideration shall be interdependent and common to each other. Moulds v. James F. Proctor, D.D.S., P.A. (Aug. 16, 1991), Tenn.App., unreported, 1991 WL 137577.\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nUnder the defense of impossibility of performance, a party's breach of its contractual obligation will be excused when \u201cchanged circumstances have rendered the promise vitally different from what reasonably should have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract.\u201d Colo. Performance Corp. v. Mariposa Assocs., 754 P.2d 401, 407 (Colo.Ct.App.1987) (quotation omitted)"
  },
  {
    "question": "Was the escrow agreement a valid modification?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nId. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (\u201cUCC\u201d), breach of contract damages are available for failure to perform, but not for delivery of nonconforming goods. Id. We believe that the Chilton court makes a definitive distinction between failure to conform and failure to deliver. See id.\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nUnder the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nOn March 1, Computer Programs, Inc. (CP) orally agreed with Holiday Department Store (HDS) to write a set of programs for HDS's computer and to coordinate the programs with HDS's billing methods. A subsequent memo, signed by both parties, provided in its entirety: HDS will pay CP $20,000 in two equal installments within one month of completion if CP is successful in shortening by one-half the processing time for the financial transactions now handled on HDS's Zenon 747 computer; CP to complete by July 1. This agreement may be amended only by a signed writing. On June 6, CP demanded $10,000, saying the job was one-half done. After HDS denied liability, the parties orally agreed that HDS should deposit $20,000 in escrow, pending completion to the satisfaction of HDS's computer systems manager. The escrow deposit was thereupon made. On July 5, CP completed the programs, having used an amount of time in which it could have earned $18,000 had it devoted that time to other jobs. Tests by CP and HDS's computer systems manager then showed that the computer programs, not being perfectly coordinated with HDS's billing methods, cut processing time by only 47%. They would, however, save HDS $12,000 a year. Further, if HDS would spend $5,000 to change its invoice preparation methods, as recommended by CP, the programs would cut processing time by a total of 58%, saving HDS another $8,000 a year. HDS's computer systems manager refused in good faith to certify satisfactory completion. HDS requested the escrow agent to return the $20,000 and asserted that nothing was owed to CP even though HDS continued to use the programs.\nWas the escrow agreement a valid modification?\n\n (A) Yes, because it was the compromise of an honest dispute.\n (B) Yes, because the Statute of Frauds does not apply to subsequent oral modifications.\n (C) No, because it was oral.\n (D) No, because it was not supported by consideration.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "Yes, because it was the compromise of an honest dispute."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_233",
    "retrieved_docs": "Id. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (\u201cUCC\u201d), breach of contract damages are available for failure to perform, but not for delivery of nonconforming goods. Id. We believe that the Chilton court makes a definitive distinction between failure to conform and failure to deliver. See id.\n\nany definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it is not a mirror image of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. However that section still requires a definite expression of acceptance and does not change the basic common law requirement that there must be an objective manifestation of mutual assent. (Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Co. (E.D.Pa.1978), 455 F.Supp. 1150.)\n\nUnder the preexisting duty rule, it is well settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise. Puett v. Walker, 332 Mich. 117, 122, 50 N.W.2d 740 (1952). This rule bars the modification of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do under the terms of the existing agreement. Borg\u2013Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dep't of State, 433 Mich. 16, 22, n. 3, 444 N.W.2d 786 (1989).\n\nTo qualify as a third-party beneficiary, a party must show that it is either a \u201cdonee\u201d or \u201ccreditor\u201d beneficiary of the contract. Id. at 651. A party is a donee beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract, when rendered, is a \u201cpure donation\u201d to that party. Id. On the other hand, a party is a creditor beneficiary if the performance promised in the contract is rendered in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to that party. Id. The legal duty may be an indebtedness, contractual obligation, or other legally enforceable commitment owed to the third party. Id. Based on\n\nunder the doctrine of \u201cpart performance,\u201d which may take an agreement outside of the statute of frauds, **178 there must be an oral agreement that has been partially performed by the party seeking to enforce it, and that agreement must be \u201cclear, certain, and unambiguous\u201d in its terms. Rafferty & Towner, Inc. v. NJS Enterprises, LLC, 224 Or.App. 51, 55, 197 P.3d 55 (2008), rev. den., 347 Or. 42, 217 P.3d 688 (2009). Emmert argued that the alleged agreements did not meet that standard. Furthermore, Emmert asserted, any qualifying \u201cpart performance\u201d must be clearly referable to the contract, and Kazlauskas's"
  },
  {
    "question": "Tess occupied an apartment in a building owned by Len. She paid rent of $125 in advance each month. During the second month of occupancy, Tess organized the tenants in the building as a tenants' association and the association made demands of Len concerning certain repairs and improvements the tenants wanted. When Tess tendered rent for the third month, Len notified her that rent for the fourth and subsequent months would be $200 per month. Tess protested and pointed out that all other tenants paid rent of $125 per month. Thereupon, Len gave the required statutory notice that the tenancy was being terminated at the end of the third month. By an appropriate proceeding, Tess contests Len's right to terminate. If Tess succeeds, it will be because",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\na landowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition, which includes providing a safe means of ingress and egress to tenants (see Peralta v. Henriquez, 100 N.Y.2d 139, 144, 760 N.Y.S.2d 741, 790 N.E.2d 1170 [2003]; Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 [1976]; Gallagher v. St. Raymond's R.C. Church, 21 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 289 N.Y.S.2d 401, 236 N.E.2d 632 [1968] ). The scope of such duty is determined \u201c \u2018in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nA condition, which follows liability on a contract but provides for a contingency which, if it occurs, will defeat a contract already in effect, is a condition subsequent. See Nichols Bros. Investments v. Rector\u2013Phillips\u2013Morse, Inc. and Bill Haupt, 33 Ark.App. 47, 801 S.W.2d 308 (1990) (citing 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts \u00a7 323 (1964)).\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nTess occupied an apartment in a building owned by Len. She paid rent of $125 in advance each month. During the second month of occupancy, Tess organized the tenants in the building as a tenants' association and the association made demands of Len concerning certain repairs and improvements the tenants wanted. When Tess tendered rent for the third month, Len notified her that rent for the fourth and subsequent months would be $200 per month. Tess protested and pointed out that all other tenants paid rent of $125 per month. Thereupon, Len gave the required statutory notice that the tenancy was being terminated at the end of the third month. By an appropriate proceeding, Tess contests Len's right to terminate. If Tess succeeds, it will be because\n\n (A) a periodic tenancy was created by implication\n (B) the doctrine prohibiting retaliatory eviction is part of the law of the jurisdiction\n (C) the $200 rent demanded violates the agreement implied by the rate charged to other tenants\n (D) the law implies a term of one year in the absence of any express agreement\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "B",
      "the doctrine prohibiting retaliatory eviction is part of the law of the jurisdiction"
    ],
    "id": "mbe_284",
    "retrieved_docs": "a landowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition, which includes providing a safe means of ingress and egress to tenants (see Peralta v. Henriquez, 100 N.Y.2d 139, 144, 760 N.Y.S.2d 741, 790 N.E.2d 1170 [2003]; Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 [1976]; Gallagher v. St. Raymond's R.C. Church, 21 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 289 N.Y.S.2d 401, 236 N.E.2d 632 [1968] ). The scope of such duty is determined \u201c \u2018in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nA condition, which follows liability on a contract but provides for a contingency which, if it occurs, will defeat a contract already in effect, is a condition subsequent. See Nichols Bros. Investments v. Rector\u2013Phillips\u2013Morse, Inc. and Bill Haupt, 33 Ark.App. 47, 801 S.W.2d 308 (1990) (citing 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts \u00a7 323 (1964)).\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nsentiment,\u201d Brown v. Frontier Theatres, 369 S.W.2d at 305, the loss in value to her. Because the injury to Likes's property was not intentional or malicious, or even grossly negligent, we need not decide whether mental anguish arising out of property damage may be legally compensable when a heightened degree of misconduct is found. Compare Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117 (stating in dicta that mental anguish is recoverable for \u201cwillful tort, willful and wanton disregard, or gross negligence\u201d), with Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986) (limiting mental anguish for property damage to cases in which the"
  },
  {
    "question": "The National Ecological Balance Act prohibits the destruction or removal of any wild animals located on lands owned by the United States without express permission from the Federal Bureau of Land Management. Violators are subject to fines of up to $1,000 per offense. After substantial property damage was inflicted on residents of the state of Arkota by hungry coyotes, the state legislature passed the Coyote Bounty Bill, which offers $25 for each coyote killed or captured within the state. The Kota National Forest, owned by the federal government, is located entirely within the state of Arkota. Many coyotes live in the Kota National Forest. Without seeking permission from the Bureau of Land Management, Hunter shot several coyotes in the Kota National Forest and collected the bounty from the state of Arkota. As a result, he was subsequently tried in federal district court, convicted, and fined $1,000 for violating the National Ecological Balance Act. Hunter appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals. On appeal, the Court of Appeals should hold the National Ecological Balance Act, as applied to Hunter, to be",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nFederal Preemption When state law and federal law conflict, federal law displaces, or preempts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI., \u00a7 2. Preemption applies regardless of whether the conflicting laws come from legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, or constitutions. For example, the Voting Rights Act, an act of Congress, preempts state constitutions, and FDA regulations may preempt state court judgments in cases involving prescription drugs. Congress has preempted state regulation in many areas. In some cases, such as medical devices, Congress preempted all state regulation. In others, such as labels on prescription drugs,\n\nCongress allowed federal regulatory agencies to set national minimum standards, but did not preempt state regulations imposing more stringent standards than those imposed by federal regulators. Where rules or regulations do not clearly state whether or not preemption should apply, the Supreme Court tries to follow lawmakers\u2019 intent, and prefers interpretations that avoid preempting state laws.\n\ninitiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative\n\nThe Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.\n\nof deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nThe National Ecological Balance Act prohibits the destruction or removal of any wild animals located on lands owned by the United States without express permission from the Federal Bureau of Land Management. Violators are subject to fines of up to $1,000 per offense. After substantial property damage was inflicted on residents of the state of Arkota by hungry coyotes, the state legislature passed the Coyote Bounty Bill, which offers $25 for each coyote killed or captured within the state. The Kota National Forest, owned by the federal government, is located entirely within the state of Arkota. Many coyotes live in the Kota National Forest. Without seeking permission from the Bureau of Land Management, Hunter shot several coyotes in the Kota National Forest and collected the bounty from the state of Arkota. As a result, he was subsequently tried in federal district court, convicted, and fined $1,000 for violating the National Ecological Balance Act. Hunter appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals. On appeal, the Court of Appeals should hold the National Ecological Balance Act, as applied to Hunter, to be\n\n (A) constitutional, because the property clause of Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution authorizes such federal statutory controls and sanctions.\n (B) constitutional, because Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact all laws necessary and proper to advance the general welfare.\n (C) unconstitutional, because Congress may not use its delegated powers to override the Tenth Amendment right of the state of Arkota to legislate in areas of traditional state governmental functions, such as the protection of the property of its residents.\n (D) unconstitutional, because Congress violates the full faith and credit clause of Article IV when it punishes conduct that has been authorized by state action.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "constitutional, because the property clause of Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution authorizes such federal statutory controls and sanctions."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_828",
    "retrieved_docs": "Federal Preemption When state law and federal law conflict, federal law displaces, or preempts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI., \u00a7 2. Preemption applies regardless of whether the conflicting laws come from legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, or constitutions. For example, the Voting Rights Act, an act of Congress, preempts state constitutions, and FDA regulations may preempt state court judgments in cases involving prescription drugs. Congress has preempted state regulation in many areas. In some cases, such as medical devices, Congress preempted all state regulation. In others, such as labels on prescription drugs,\n\nCongress allowed federal regulatory agencies to set national minimum standards, but did not preempt state regulations imposing more stringent standards than those imposed by federal regulators. Where rules or regulations do not clearly state whether or not preemption should apply, the Supreme Court tries to follow lawmakers\u2019 intent, and prefers interpretations that avoid preempting state laws.\n\ninitiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative\n\nThe Supremacy Clause restricts the power of state and local governments to regulate federal offices and officeholders. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.\n\nof deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen."
  },
  {
    "question": "Pedersen's counsel wants to introduce testimony from Sheriff concerning a discussion between Sheriff and Passerby at the police station after the accident, when Passerby excitedly exclaimed, \"Pedersen ran out in the street and was not in the crosswalk!\" Sheriff duly recorded the statement in an official police report. The trial judge should rule Sheriff's oral testimony",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nCarr ran into and injured Pedersen, a pedestrian. With Carr in his car were Wanda and Walter Passenger. Passerby saw the accident and called the police department, which sent Sheriff to investigate. All of these people are available as potential witnesses in the case of Pedersen v. Carr. Pedersen alleges that Carr, while drunk, struck Pedersen who was in a duly marked crosswalk.\nPedersen's counsel wants to introduce testimony from Sheriff concerning a discussion between Sheriff and Passerby at the police station after the accident, when Passerby excitedly exclaimed, \"Pedersen ran out in the street and was not in the crosswalk!\" Sheriff duly recorded the statement in an official police report. The trial judge should rule Sheriff's oral testimony\n\n (A) admissible as a spontaneous utterance\n (B) admissible as based on past recollection recorded\n (C) inadmissible because Passerby has not been shown unavailable as a witness\n (D) inadmissible under the excited utterance exception because it can be a product of reflection and deliberation\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "inadmissible under the excited utterance exception because it can be a product of reflection and deliberation"
    ],
    "id": "mbe_377",
    "retrieved_docs": "The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence generally. See Fed.R.Evid. 401\u201304. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Similarly, unfairly 3 prejudicial or misleading evidence is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As a general matter, hearsay statements are not admissible; however, there are several exceptions to that rule which require the Court to look at each individual statement on a case-by-case basis. See Fed.R.Evid. 801\u201307. Rule 804(b)(3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements against interest made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify at trial, including statements that tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability. Fed.R.Evid.\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\nHearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court statement made by a declarant and offered for the truth of the matter asserted (see Nucci v. Proper, 95 N.Y.2d 597, 602, 721 N.Y.S.2d 593, 744 N.E.2d 128 [2001]; People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995];\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003)."
  },
  {
    "question": "Dobbs, while intoxicated, drove his car through a playground crowded with children just to watch the children run to try to get out of his way. His car struck one of the children, killing her instantly. Which of the following is the best theory for finding Dobbs guilty of murder?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\ndepraved heart murder, or reckless homicide manifesting extreme indifference to human life is intended to embrace those cases where a person has no deliberate intent to kill or injure any particular individual.\u201d Haney v. State, 603 So.2d 368, 399 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), aff'd, 603 So.2d 412 (Ala.1992). Assuming, without deciding, that the jury's verdicts in this case were inconsistent, we conclude that they were not mutually exclusive.1 We have carefully examined the appellant's acts and the offenses for which the jury found him guilty. Based on that review, we find that it was not legally impossible for the State to prove the\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\nInvoluntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). \u201cTo constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.\u201d Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, \u201ca person can be\n\nTo convict for a violation of Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused \u201cso gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]\u201d Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct \u201chas come to be known as \u2018criminal negligence\u2019 \u201d in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires \u201c \u2018acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge\n\n\u201cMurder is the killing of one human being by another with the requisite malevolent state of mind and without justification, excuse, or mitigation.\u201d Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 340, 519 A.2d 735, 736 (1987). The malevolent states of mind that qualify are: (1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to do grievous bodily harm, (3) the intent to do an act under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (depraved heart), or (4) the intent to commit a dangerous felony. Id. The General Assembly has determined that certain murders qualify as murder in the first\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDobbs, while intoxicated, drove his car through a playground crowded with children just to watch the children run to try to get out of his way. His car struck one of the children, killing her instantly. Which of the following is the best theory for finding Dobbs guilty of murder?\n\n (A) Transferred intent\n (B) Felony murder, with assault with a deadly weapon as the underlying felony\n (C) Intentional killing, since he knew that the children were there and he deliberately drove his car at them\n (D) Commission of an act highly dangerous to life, without an intent to kill but with disregard of the consequences\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "D",
      "Commission of an act highly dangerous to life, without an intent to kill but with disregard of the consequences"
    ],
    "id": "mbe_472",
    "retrieved_docs": "depraved heart murder, or reckless homicide manifesting extreme indifference to human life is intended to embrace those cases where a person has no deliberate intent to kill or injure any particular individual.\u201d Haney v. State, 603 So.2d 368, 399 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), aff'd, 603 So.2d 412 (Ala.1992). Assuming, without deciding, that the jury's verdicts in this case were inconsistent, we conclude that they were not mutually exclusive.1 We have carefully examined the appellant's acts and the offenses for which the jury found him guilty. Based on that review, we find that it was not legally impossible for the State to prove the\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\nInvoluntary manslaughter is defined as (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51-52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003). \u201cTo constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.\u201d Id. at 52, 584 S.E.2d at 112. Further, \u201ca person can be\n\nTo convict for a violation of Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B), the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, conduct by an accused \u201cso gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life[.]\u201d Code \u00a7 18.2-36.1(B). 1 Such conduct \u201chas come to be known as \u2018criminal negligence\u2019 \u201d in the context of common law vehicular involuntary manslaughter and requires \u201c \u2018acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury ... and the offender knows or is charged with the knowledge\n\n\u201cMurder is the killing of one human being by another with the requisite malevolent state of mind and without justification, excuse, or mitigation.\u201d Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 340, 519 A.2d 735, 736 (1987). The malevolent states of mind that qualify are: (1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to do grievous bodily harm, (3) the intent to do an act under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (depraved heart), or (4) the intent to commit a dangerous felony. Id. The General Assembly has determined that certain murders qualify as murder in the first"
  },
  {
    "question": "In order to provide funds for a system of new major airports near the ten largest cities in the United States, Congress levies a tax of $25 on each airline ticket issued in the United States. The tax applies to every airline ticket, even those for travel that does not originate in, terminate at, or pass through any of those ten large cities. As applied to the issuance in the United States of an airline ticket for travel between two cities that will not be served by any of the new airports, this tax is",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nIt is conceded that a federal excise tax does not cease to be valid merely because it discourages or deters the activities taxed. Nor is the tax invalid because the revenue obtained its negligible. Appellee, however, argues that the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize only illegal gambling in the states through the guise of a tax measure. As with the above excise taxes which we have held to be valid, the instant tax has a regulatory effect. But regardless of its regulatory effect, the wagering tax produces revenue. As such it surpasses both the narcotics and firearms\n\nFederal Preemption When state law and federal law conflict, federal law displaces, or preempts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI., \u00a7 2. Preemption applies regardless of whether the conflicting laws come from legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, or constitutions. For example, the Voting Rights Act, an act of Congress, preempts state constitutions, and FDA regulations may preempt state court judgments in cases involving prescription drugs. Congress has preempted state regulation in many areas. In some cases, such as medical devices, Congress preempted all state regulation. In others, such as labels on prescription drugs,\n\nCongress allowed federal regulatory agencies to set national minimum standards, but did not preempt state regulations imposing more stringent standards than those imposed by federal regulators. Where rules or regulations do not clearly state whether or not preemption should apply, the Supreme Court tries to follow lawmakers\u2019 intent, and prefers interpretations that avoid preempting state laws.\n\nof deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen.\n\nthe President's Powers Article II of the Constitution contains the vesting clause, which states: \"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.\" This has historically been interpreted to mean that the President is the head of the Executive Branch, but that he is still subject to limits within that Branch (i.e. if the President fires members of the Executive Branch, Congress would have oversight and would be able to investigate the firings.) Some scholars, however, have interpreted the Vesting Clause under a much stronger lens, finding that the President has full power over\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nIn order to provide funds for a system of new major airports near the ten largest cities in the United States, Congress levies a tax of $25 on each airline ticket issued in the United States. The tax applies to every airline ticket, even those for travel that does not originate in, terminate at, or pass through any of those ten large cities. As applied to the issuance in the United States of an airline ticket for travel between two cities that will not be served by any of the new airports, this tax is\n\n (A) constitutional, because Congress has broad discretion in choosing the subjects of its taxation and may impose taxes on subjects that have no relation to the purpose for which those tax funds will be expended.\n (B) constitutional, because an exemption for the issuance of tickets for travel between cities that will not be served by the new airports would deny the purchasers of all other tickets the equal protection of the laws.\n (C) unconstitutional, because the burden of the tax outweighs its benefits for passengers whose travel does not originate in, terminate at, or pass through any of the ten largest cities.\n (D) unconstitutional, because the tax adversely affects the fundamental right to travel.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "constitutional, because Congress has broad discretion in choosing the subjects of its taxation and may impose taxes on subjects that have no relation to the purpose for which those tax funds will be expended."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_675",
    "retrieved_docs": "It is conceded that a federal excise tax does not cease to be valid merely because it discourages or deters the activities taxed. Nor is the tax invalid because the revenue obtained its negligible. Appellee, however, argues that the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize only illegal gambling in the states through the guise of a tax measure. As with the above excise taxes which we have held to be valid, the instant tax has a regulatory effect. But regardless of its regulatory effect, the wagering tax produces revenue. As such it surpasses both the narcotics and firearms\n\nFederal Preemption When state law and federal law conflict, federal law displaces, or preempts, state law, due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI., \u00a7 2. Preemption applies regardless of whether the conflicting laws come from legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, or constitutions. For example, the Voting Rights Act, an act of Congress, preempts state constitutions, and FDA regulations may preempt state court judgments in cases involving prescription drugs. Congress has preempted state regulation in many areas. In some cases, such as medical devices, Congress preempted all state regulation. In others, such as labels on prescription drugs,\n\nCongress allowed federal regulatory agencies to set national minimum standards, but did not preempt state regulations imposing more stringent standards than those imposed by federal regulators. Where rules or regulations do not clearly state whether or not preemption should apply, the Supreme Court tries to follow lawmakers\u2019 intent, and prefers interpretations that avoid preempting state laws.\n\nof deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen.\n\nthe President's Powers Article II of the Constitution contains the vesting clause, which states: \"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.\" This has historically been interpreted to mean that the President is the head of the Executive Branch, but that he is still subject to limits within that Branch (i.e. if the President fires members of the Executive Branch, Congress would have oversight and would be able to investigate the firings.) Some scholars, however, have interpreted the Vesting Clause under a much stronger lens, finding that the President has full power over"
  },
  {
    "question": "Passenger departed on an ocean liner knowing that it would be a rough voyage due to predicted storms. The ocean liner was not equipped with the type of lifeboats required by the applicable statute. Passenger was swept overboard and drowned in a storm so heavy that even a lifeboat that conformed to the statute could not have been launched. In an action against the operator of the ocean liner brought by Passenger's representative, will Passenger's representative prevail?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nTo invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must establish: \u201c(1) the event [was] of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it [was] caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it [was not] due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff\u201d.\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999).\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nUnder the rescue doctrine, an actor is usually liable for injuries sustained by a rescuer attempting to help another person placed in danger by the actor's negligent conduct. The question here is whether an actor is liable for injuries sustained by a person who is trying to rescue the actor from his own negligence. The answer is yes.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nPassenger departed on an ocean liner knowing that it would be a rough voyage due to predicted storms. The ocean liner was not equipped with the type of lifeboats required by the applicable statute. Passenger was swept overboard and drowned in a storm so heavy that even a lifeboat that conformed to the statute could not have been launched. In an action against the operator of the ocean liner brought by Passenger's representative, will Passenger's representative prevail?\n\n (A) Yes, because the ocean liner was not equipped with the statutorily required lifeboats.\n (B) Yes, because in these circumstances common carriers are strictly liable.\n (C) No, because the storm was so severe that it would have been impossible to launch a statutorily required lifeboat.\n (D) No, because Passenger assumed the risk by boarding the ocean liner knowing that it would be a rough voyage.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "C",
      "No, because the storm was so severe that it would have been impossible to launch a statutorily required lifeboat."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_1133",
    "retrieved_docs": "To invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must establish: \u201c(1) the event [was] of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it [was] caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it [was not] due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff\u201d.\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999).\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nUnder the rescue doctrine, an actor is usually liable for injuries sustained by a rescuer attempting to help another person placed in danger by the actor's negligent conduct. The question here is whether an actor is liable for injuries sustained by a person who is trying to rescue the actor from his own negligence. The answer is yes."
  },
  {
    "question": "The President of the United States recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government through the Secretary of State. Ruritania is governed by a repressive totalitarian government. In an appropriate federal court, Dunn brings a suit against the President and Secretary of State to set aside this action on the ground that it is inconsistent with the principles of our constitutional form of government. Dunn has a lucrative contract with the United States Department of Commerce to provide commercial information about Ruritania. The contract expressly terminates, however, \"when the President recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government.\" Which of the following is the most proper disposition of the Dunn suit by the federal court?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nof deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen.\n\nThe doctrine of separation of powers also places limits on congressional authority to investigate. Congress cannot, under the guise of an investigation, usurp the power of another branch of government. It cannot investigate matters where the means of redress is purely judicial. Nor can Congress investigate matters committed to the President\u2019s discretion. For example, Congress could not undertake an investigation to determine an individual\u2019s entitlement to a pardon because the Constitution granted the pardon power to the President, not Congress. While Congress can investigate conduct that may be criminal, Congress itself lacks the authority to bring criminal charges or otherwise\n\ninitiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative\n\nthe President's Powers Article II of the Constitution contains the vesting clause, which states: \"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.\" This has historically been interpreted to mean that the President is the head of the Executive Branch, but that he is still subject to limits within that Branch (i.e. if the President fires members of the Executive Branch, Congress would have oversight and would be able to investigate the firings.) Some scholars, however, have interpreted the Vesting Clause under a much stronger lens, finding that the President has full power over\n\nthe entire Executive Branch. Under this theory, commonly referred to as the Unitary Executive Theory, any decision that the President makes regarding the Executive Branch would not be subject to any sort of review or oversight (i.e. Congress would not be able to investigate the President's firings of any members of the Executive Branch). While the Supreme Court has not directly embraced or rejected this theory, Justice Alito has made comments which have caused some to think that he endorses the theory: \"The president has not just some executive powers, but the executive power \u2014 the whole thing.\"\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nThe President of the United States recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government through the Secretary of State. Ruritania is governed by a repressive totalitarian government. In an appropriate federal court, Dunn brings a suit against the President and Secretary of State to set aside this action on the ground that it is inconsistent with the principles of our constitutional form of government. Dunn has a lucrative contract with the United States Department of Commerce to provide commercial information about Ruritania. The contract expressly terminates, however, \"when the President recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government.\" Which of the following is the most proper disposition of the Dunn suit by the federal court?\n\n (A) Suit dismissed, because Dunn does not have standing to bring this action.\n (B) Suit dismissed, because there is no adversity between Dunn and the defendants.\n (C) Suit dismissed, because it presents a nonjustifiable political question.\n (D) Suit decided on the merits.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "C",
      "Suit dismissed, because it presents a nonjustifiable political question."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_962",
    "retrieved_docs": "of deciding whether legislation is appropriate, to information gathering on matters of national importance, to oversight of federal departments and executive agencies. As a result, a congressional committee has broad discretion regarding both the scope of its investigation and the relevance of the information it requests. Although congressional authority to investigate is broad, it is not unlimited. Because Congress\u2019s authority to investigate is tied to its authority to legislate, limits on congressional investigations are necessarily linked to the limits on Congress\u2019s constitutional authority. For example, Congress has no general authority to investigate the purely private affair of an ordinary citizen.\n\nThe doctrine of separation of powers also places limits on congressional authority to investigate. Congress cannot, under the guise of an investigation, usurp the power of another branch of government. It cannot investigate matters where the means of redress is purely judicial. Nor can Congress investigate matters committed to the President\u2019s discretion. For example, Congress could not undertake an investigation to determine an individual\u2019s entitlement to a pardon because the Constitution granted the pardon power to the President, not Congress. While Congress can investigate conduct that may be criminal, Congress itself lacks the authority to bring criminal charges or otherwise\n\ninitiate a criminal prosecution. If a congressional investigation uncovers evidence of criminal activity, however, Congress may refer the matter to the Department of Justice for investigation and, potentially, prosecution. Sometimes, the DOJ investigation predates the congressional investigation. No matter which branch of government moves first to investigate, however, the end result is that a congressional investigation often will run parallel to a criminal investigation. As a result, evidence developed in a congressional investigation might be used by the DOJ in its criminal investigation or in a prosecution. Ultimately, nearly any matter can be anchored in some fashion to Congress\u2019s legislative\n\nthe President's Powers Article II of the Constitution contains the vesting clause, which states: \"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.\" This has historically been interpreted to mean that the President is the head of the Executive Branch, but that he is still subject to limits within that Branch (i.e. if the President fires members of the Executive Branch, Congress would have oversight and would be able to investigate the firings.) Some scholars, however, have interpreted the Vesting Clause under a much stronger lens, finding that the President has full power over\n\nthe entire Executive Branch. Under this theory, commonly referred to as the Unitary Executive Theory, any decision that the President makes regarding the Executive Branch would not be subject to any sort of review or oversight (i.e. Congress would not be able to investigate the President's firings of any members of the Executive Branch). While the Supreme Court has not directly embraced or rejected this theory, Justice Alito has made comments which have caused some to think that he endorses the theory: \"The president has not just some executive powers, but the executive power \u2014 the whole thing.\""
  },
  {
    "question": "Damson was short of money. He decided to go into Winston's house to take Winston's silverware and then to sell it. That night, while Winston was away, Damson entered by picking the lock on the front door. He picked up a chest of silverware from the dining room and went out the front door of the house to his car. As he was putting the chest of silverware into the trunk, he had second thoughts and decided that he did not wish to become a thief. He reentered the house and replaced the chest of silverware where he had found it. As he came out of the house the second time, he was arrested by the police, who had been called by a neighbor. Damson is",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nLarceny is the fraudulent and wrongful taking and carrying away the property of another with intent to convert such property to the taker's use without the consent of the owner. Lucero v. Montes, 177 B.R. 325, 331 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1994). ; \u2018[A]n accomplice is one who aids or promotes the perpetrator's crime with knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and an intent to assist in the commission of the target crime....\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018In order to be an accomplice, the witness must be chargeable with the crime as a principal (\u00a7 31) and not merely as an accessory after the fact (\u00a7\u00a7 32,\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\nAccordingly, we hold that, under Virginia law, the asportation element of larceny may be imputed to a defendant who acts through an innocent agent.\n\nthat entry and possession under claim of right, ownership, or title are sufficient. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession \u00a7 72 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 Tiffany, supra, Adverse Possession \u00a7 1147 (distinguishing \u201ccolor of title,\u201d which \u201crefers to asserting title through an instrument that appears to convey title, but in actuality does not,\u201d from \u201cclaim of title,\u201d which more broadly \u201creflect [s] an intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it as one's own\u201d).\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDamson was short of money. He decided to go into Winston's house to take Winston's silverware and then to sell it. That night, while Winston was away, Damson entered by picking the lock on the front door. He picked up a chest of silverware from the dining room and went out the front door of the house to his car. As he was putting the chest of silverware into the trunk, he had second thoughts and decided that he did not wish to become a thief. He reentered the house and replaced the chest of silverware where he had found it. As he came out of the house the second time, he was arrested by the police, who had been called by a neighbor. Damson is\n\n (A) guilty of burglary and larceny.\n (B) guilty of burglary and attempted larceny.\n (C) guilty of burglary but not guilty of any larceny offense.\n (D) not guilty of burglary or any larceny offense.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "guilty of burglary and larceny."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_968",
    "retrieved_docs": "Larceny is the fraudulent and wrongful taking and carrying away the property of another with intent to convert such property to the taker's use without the consent of the owner. Lucero v. Montes, 177 B.R. 325, 331 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1994). ; \u2018[A]n accomplice is one who aids or promotes the perpetrator's crime with knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and an intent to assist in the commission of the target crime....\u2019 [Citation.] \u2018In order to be an accomplice, the witness must be chargeable with the crime as a principal (\u00a7 31) and not merely as an accessory after the fact (\u00a7\u00a7 32,\n\nelements of both offenses because no element of either offense negates an element of the other. Even though reckless murder involves a situation in which the defendant does not intend to kill or injure another person, it does not require that none of his actions be intentional. For example, it does not exclude the possibility that he committed another intentional act, such as setting a fire. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the appellant acted with extreme indifference to human life but did not intend to kill or injure the victim when he threw gasoline around the den;\n\nAccordingly, we hold that, under Virginia law, the asportation element of larceny may be imputed to a defendant who acts through an innocent agent.\n\nthat entry and possession under claim of right, ownership, or title are sufficient. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession \u00a7 72 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 Tiffany, supra, Adverse Possession \u00a7 1147 (distinguishing \u201ccolor of title,\u201d which \u201crefers to asserting title through an instrument that appears to convey title, but in actuality does not,\u201d from \u201cclaim of title,\u201d which more broadly \u201creflect [s] an intention to assert ownership over the property and claim it as one's own\u201d).\n\nThus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: \u201c(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.\u201d Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174."
  },
  {
    "question": "Deeb was charged with stealing furs from a van. At trial, Wallace testified she saw Deeb take the furs. The jurisdiction in which Deeb is being tried does not allow in evidence lie detector results. On cross-examination by Deeb's attorney, Wallace was asked, \"The light was too dim to identify Deeb, wasn't it?\" She responded, \"I'm sure enough that it was Deeb that I passed a lie detector test administered by the police.\" Deeb's attorney immediately objects and moves to strike. The trial court should",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\n\u201cAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded by the trial court if the court determines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.... Of course, [a]ll adverse evidence is damaging to one's case, but it is inadmissible only if it creates undue prejudice so that it threatens an injustice were it to be admitted.... The test for determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will improperly arouse the emotions of the jury.... Reversal is required only whe[n] an abuse of discretion is manifest or whe[n] injustice appears\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\nWhen a witness refuses to answer cross-examination questions necessary to test the witness's direct testimony, that refusal undermines the trier of fact's ability to rely on the witness's direct testimony, and the trial court may strike the witness's testimony.\n\n\u201cIn determining whether the prejudicial effect of otherwise relevant evidence outweighs its probative value, we consider whether: (1) ... the facts offered may unduly arouse the jury's emotions, hostility or sympathy, (2) ... the proof and answering evidence it provokes may create a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues, (3) ... the evidence offered and the counterproof will consume an undue amount of time, and (4) ... the defendant, having no reasonable ground to anticipate the evidence, is unfairly surprised and unprepared to meet it.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 586\u201387, 10 A.3d\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDeeb was charged with stealing furs from a van. At trial, Wallace testified she saw Deeb take the furs. The jurisdiction in which Deeb is being tried does not allow in evidence lie detector results. On cross-examination by Deeb's attorney, Wallace was asked, \"The light was too dim to identify Deeb, wasn't it?\" She responded, \"I'm sure enough that it was Deeb that I passed a lie detector test administered by the police.\" Deeb's attorney immediately objects and moves to strike. The trial court should\n\n (A) grant the motion, because the question was leading.\n (B) grant the motion, because the probative value of the unresponsive testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\n (C) deny the motion, because it is proper rehabilitation of an impeached witness.\n (D) deny the motion, because Deeb's attorney \"opened the door\" by asking the question.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "B",
      "grant the motion, because the probative value of the unresponsive testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_584",
    "retrieved_docs": "\u201cAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded by the trial court if the court determines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.... Of course, [a]ll adverse evidence is damaging to one's case, but it is inadmissible only if it creates undue prejudice so that it threatens an injustice were it to be admitted.... The test for determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will improperly arouse the emotions of the jury.... Reversal is required only whe[n] an abuse of discretion is manifest or whe[n] injustice appears\n\nHowever, prior consistent statements are admissible as non-hearsay if: (1) the individual who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; and (2) the statement is offered in an effort to rebut an express or implied accusation of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication. See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197\u201398; see also \u00a7 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Both conditions must be met for admission of a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay. Harris v. State, 843 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.2003).\n\nWhen a witness refuses to answer cross-examination questions necessary to test the witness's direct testimony, that refusal undermines the trier of fact's ability to rely on the witness's direct testimony, and the trial court may strike the witness's testimony.\n\n\u201cIn determining whether the prejudicial effect of otherwise relevant evidence outweighs its probative value, we consider whether: (1) ... the facts offered may unduly arouse the jury's emotions, hostility or sympathy, (2) ... the proof and answering evidence it provokes may create a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues, (3) ... the evidence offered and the counterproof will consume an undue amount of time, and (4) ... the defendant, having no reasonable ground to anticipate the evidence, is unfairly surprised and unprepared to meet it.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 586\u201387, 10 A.3d\n\npolicy, as well as the relevancy and materiality of the testimony. In the absence of a statute or a valid and binding contractual provision to the contrary, circumstantial evidence is regarded by law as competent to prove any given fact in issue in a civil case and is sometimes as cogent and valuable as direct and positive testimony. Upon the issue of reasonableness of conduct, all the surrounding circumstances become facts material to the case. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish liability where it negates other reasonable causes for injury. Tort claims may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence."
  },
  {
    "question": "Dan entered the police station and announced that he wanted to confess to a murder. The police advised Dan of the Miranda warnings, and Dan signed a written waiver. Dan described the murder in detail and pinpointed the location where a murder victim had been found a few weeks before. Later, a courtappointed psychiatrist determined that Dan was suffering from a serious mental illness that interfered with his ability to make rational choices and to understand his rights and that the psychosis had induced his confession. Dan's confession is",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nA confession is voluntary if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the confession is the product of a rational intellect and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant's free will.\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\nGeneral admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\n\nto safeguard the interests of its citizens. Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 108 Ill.2d 1, 23, 90 Ill.Dec. 908, 483 N.E.2d 226 (1985). Put differently, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed: \u201cOne whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter.\u201d Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357, 28 S.Ct. 529, 531\u201332, 52 L.Ed. 828, 832 (1908). Furthermore, the police power \u201cis not limited to health, morals\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDan entered the police station and announced that he wanted to confess to a murder. The police advised Dan of the Miranda warnings, and Dan signed a written waiver. Dan described the murder in detail and pinpointed the location where a murder victim had been found a few weeks before. Later, a courtappointed psychiatrist determined that Dan was suffering from a serious mental illness that interfered with his ability to make rational choices and to understand his rights and that the psychosis had induced his confession. Dan's confession is\n\n (A) admissible, because there was no coercive police conduct in obtaining Dan's statement.\n (B) admissible, because Dan was not in custody.\n (C) inadmissible, because Dan's confession was a product of his mental illness and was therefore involuntary.\n (D) inadmissible, because under these circumstances, there was no valid waiver of Miranda warnings.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "admissible, because there was no coercive police conduct in obtaining Dan's statement."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_632",
    "retrieved_docs": "A confession is voluntary if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the confession is the product of a rational intellect and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant's free will.\n\nA statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E. 803(3). \u201cPursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a declarant's out-of-court statements demonstrate her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.\u201d Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61.\n\nAxiomatically, and by its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible only those statements that reflect the \u201cdeclarant's then-existing state of mind ... or condition,\u201d Pa.R.E. 803(3), not someone else's state of mind or condition. Nothing in the plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.\n\nGeneral admissibility. Except as provided in par. (b) 2., evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\n\nto safeguard the interests of its citizens. Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 108 Ill.2d 1, 23, 90 Ill.Dec. 908, 483 N.E.2d 226 (1985). Put differently, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed: \u201cOne whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter.\u201d Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357, 28 S.Ct. 529, 531\u201332, 52 L.Ed. 828, 832 (1908). Furthermore, the police power \u201cis not limited to health, morals"
  },
  {
    "question": "Desmond fell while attempting to climb a mountain, and lay unconscious and critically injured on a ledge that was difficult to reach. Pearson, an experienced mountain climber, was himself seriously injured while trying to rescue Desmond. Pearson's rescue attempt failed, and Desmond died of his injuries before he could be reached. Pearson brought an action against Desmond's estate for compensation for his injuries. In this jurisdiction, the traditional common-law rules relating to contributory negligence and assumption of risk remain in effect. Will Pearson prevail in his action against Desmond's estate?",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nTo invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must establish: \u201c(1) the event [was] of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it [was] caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it [was not] due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff\u201d.\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nA duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDesmond fell while attempting to climb a mountain, and lay unconscious and critically injured on a ledge that was difficult to reach. Pearson, an experienced mountain climber, was himself seriously injured while trying to rescue Desmond. Pearson's rescue attempt failed, and Desmond died of his injuries before he could be reached. Pearson brought an action against Desmond's estate for compensation for his injuries. In this jurisdiction, the traditional common-law rules relating to contributory negligence and assumption of risk remain in effect. Will Pearson prevail in his action against Desmond's estate?\n\n (A) Yes, if his rescue attempt was reasonable.\n (B) Yes, because the law should not discourage attempts to assist persons in helpless peril.\n (C) No, unless Desmond's peril arose from his own failure to exercise reasonable care.\n (D) No, because Pearson's rescue attempt failed and therefore did not benefit Desmond.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "C",
      "No, unless Desmond's peril arose from his own failure to exercise reasonable care."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_652",
    "retrieved_docs": "To invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must establish: \u201c(1) the event [was] of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it [was] caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it [was not] due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff\u201d.\n\nFor these reasons, we reaffirm today that damages measured by diminution in value are an adequate and appropriate remedy for negligent harm to real or personal property, and that mental anguish based solely on negligent property damage is not compensable as a matter of law. The proper measure of Likes's damages\u2014although she cannot recover on those claims for which the City has sovereign immunity from suit for property damages\u2014is (1) the loss in market value of her property caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) for those items of small or no market value that \u201chave their primary value in\n\nA duty of reasonable care generally encompasses a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. See Reighard v. Yates, 2012 UT 45, \u00b6\u00b6 29\u201331, 285 P.3d 1168; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, \u00b6 21 & n. 11, 275 P.3d 228. What may be reasonable in one setting may not be reasonable in another. Ordinarily participants cannot reasonably expect instructors or coaches to insulate them from risks inherent in an activity in which they voluntarily engage. See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal.4th 990, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d at 38\u201343 (majority opinion). But whether, under the\n\nThis court has previously recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. \u201c \u2018[W]here the defendant's conduct is actually intended to inflict *655 harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; and the defense [contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional torts.\u2019 \u201d **620 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 873, 881\u201382, 332 N.W.2d 196, 202 (1983), quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 65 (4th ed.1971).\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and"
  },
  {
    "question": "Dan, an eight-year-old, rode his bicycle down his driveway into a busy highway and Driver had to stop her car suddenly to avoid colliding with the bike. Because of the sudden stop, Driver's two-year-old son, Peter, who was sitting on the seat without any restraint, was thrown into the dashboard and injured. Had Peter been properly restrained in a baby car seat, as required by a state safety statute of which his mother was aware, he would not have been injured. In an action brought on Peter's behalf against Dan's parents to recover for Peter's injuries, Peter will",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nor from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was\n\nTo invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must establish: \u201c(1) the event [was] of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it [was] caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it [was not] due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff\u201d.\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nUnder the rescue doctrine, an actor is usually liable for injuries sustained by a rescuer attempting to help another person placed in danger by the actor's negligent conduct. The question here is whether an actor is liable for injuries sustained by a person who is trying to rescue the actor from his own negligence. The answer is yes.\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999).\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nDan, an eight-year-old, rode his bicycle down his driveway into a busy highway and Driver had to stop her car suddenly to avoid colliding with the bike. Because of the sudden stop, Driver's two-year-old son, Peter, who was sitting on the seat without any restraint, was thrown into the dashboard and injured. Had Peter been properly restrained in a baby car seat, as required by a state safety statute of which his mother was aware, he would not have been injured. In an action brought on Peter's behalf against Dan's parents to recover for Peter's injuries, Peter will\n\n (A) not prevail, because parents are not vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their children.\n (B) not prevail, because Peter's injury was attributable to his mother's knowing violation of a safety statute.\n (C) prevail, if Dan's parents knew that he sometimes drove into the highway, and they took no steps to prevent it.\n (D) prevail, if Dan's riding into the highway was negligent and the proximate cause of Peter's injuries.\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "C",
      "prevail, if Dan's parents knew that he sometimes drove into the highway, and they took no steps to prevent it."
    ],
    "id": "mbe_791",
    "retrieved_docs": "or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d See also Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill.App.3d 184, 200, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985). 2To establish negligent parental supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was\n\nTo invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must establish: \u201c(1) the event [was] of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it [was] caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it [was not] due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff\u201d.\n\nSimilarly, proximate cause may be proved by circumstantial evidence even though there is no eyewitness evidence. The law does not require every fact and circumstance which make up a case of negligence to be proved by direct and positive testimony or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Negligence and freedom from contributory negligence may be shown by circumstantial, as well as the conditions and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the incident causing the plaintiff's injury. Similarly, the terms of an oral contract, and the assent of the parties to it, may be shown by the actions of the parties and\n\nUnder the rescue doctrine, an actor is usually liable for injuries sustained by a rescuer attempting to help another person placed in danger by the actor's negligent conduct. The question here is whether an actor is liable for injuries sustained by a person who is trying to rescue the actor from his own negligence. The answer is yes.\n\nThe elements of a products liability claim are that (1) a product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's control; and (3) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n. 3. When products liability is based on a manufacturing-flaw theory, a product is in a defective condition if the user could not have anticipated the danger that the product poses. Id. at 622; see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG \u00a7 75.30 (4th ed.1999)."
  },
  {
    "question": "On the evening of the day of the accident, Walter Passenger wrote a letter to his sister in which he described the accident. When Walter says he cannot remember some details of the accident, Pedersen's counsel seeks to show him the letter to assist him in his testimony on direct examination. The trial judge should rule this",
    "input": "Based on the provided text chunks, answer the following multiple-choice question with 4 possible answers (marked by A, B, C, D) and provide your response in the format:\n            \n            \n            Reasoning: [Step-by-step reasoning supporting your answer.]\n            Answer: [A, B, C, or D] \n\n\n            Ensure that your output contains only these two lines, with no extra text or commentary. You must provide an answer in either A, B, C, or D.\n\nRelevant chunks:\nPast recollection recorded \u201callows a witness with a faded memory to testify from notes or a memorandum that the witness can show was made by her or under her direction while the information was fresh in the witness'[s] memory and reflects that knowledge correctly.\u201d The rule \u201crequires the offering party to prove and the trial judge to find that the witness \u2018has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately\u2019 (taking into account the extent to which the memory can be refreshed from examination of the writing).\u201d Under KRE 803(5), \u201cthe recorded recollection is admissible, but only\n\nafter verification of its accuracy. Even if admitted, \u2018the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.\u2019 \u201d If a party's notes do refresh the party's recollection, \u201cthere is no need to admit the recording into evidence, because the witness will be able to testify from his or her refreshed memory.\u201d\n\nWhen a witness refuses to answer cross-examination questions necessary to test the witness's direct testimony, that refusal undermines the trier of fact's ability to rely on the witness's direct testimony, and the trial court may strike the witness's testimony.\n\nA record created by a third party which is adopted by a business may be admitted under the business record exception to the hearsay rule if certain criteria are met: (1) the record must be procured in the normal course of business; (2) the business must show that it relied on the record; and (3) there must be other circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of the document. Military Rules of Evid., Rule 803(6).\n\nA trial court has discretion to permit leading questions on direct examination when a witness is reluctant, hostile, or overly nervous.\n\nQuestion and Possible Answers:\nCarr ran into and injured Pedersen, a pedestrian. With Carr in his car were Wanda and Walter Passenger. Passerby saw the accident and called the police department, which sent Sheriff to investigate. All of these people are available as potential witnesses in the case of Pedersen v. Carr. Pedersen alleges that Carr, while drunk, struck Pedersen who was in a duly marked crosswalk.\nOn the evening of the day of the accident, Walter Passenger wrote a letter to his sister in which he described the accident. When Walter says he cannot remember some details of the accident, Pedersen's counsel seeks to show him the letter to assist him in his testimony on direct examination. The trial judge should rule this\n\n (A) permissible under the doctrine of present recollection refreshed\n (B) permissible under the doctrine of past recollection recorded\n (C) objectionable because the letter was not a spontaneous utterance\n (D) objectionable because the letter is a self-serving declaration in so far as the witness, Walter, is concerned\n\nReasoning:\n\nAnswer:\n\n",
    "output": [
      "A",
      "permissible under the doctrine of present recollection refreshed"
    ],
    "id": "mbe_381",
    "retrieved_docs": "Past recollection recorded \u201callows a witness with a faded memory to testify from notes or a memorandum that the witness can show was made by her or under her direction while the information was fresh in the witness'[s] memory and reflects that knowledge correctly.\u201d The rule \u201crequires the offering party to prove and the trial judge to find that the witness \u2018has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately\u2019 (taking into account the extent to which the memory can be refreshed from examination of the writing).\u201d Under KRE 803(5), \u201cthe recorded recollection is admissible, but only\n\nafter verification of its accuracy. Even if admitted, \u2018the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.\u2019 \u201d If a party's notes do refresh the party's recollection, \u201cthere is no need to admit the recording into evidence, because the witness will be able to testify from his or her refreshed memory.\u201d\n\nWhen a witness refuses to answer cross-examination questions necessary to test the witness's direct testimony, that refusal undermines the trier of fact's ability to rely on the witness's direct testimony, and the trial court may strike the witness's testimony.\n\nA record created by a third party which is adopted by a business may be admitted under the business record exception to the hearsay rule if certain criteria are met: (1) the record must be procured in the normal course of business; (2) the business must show that it relied on the record; and (3) there must be other circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of the document. Military Rules of Evid., Rule 803(6).\n\nA trial court has discretion to permit leading questions on direct examination when a witness is reluctant, hostile, or overly nervous."
  }
]