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Canadian town tries to sell whale carcass on eBay
A rotting blue whale lies in shallow water after washing ashore in Trout River, Newfoundland on April 30, 2014, in this handout courtesy of NTV News. A fishing village in easternmost Canada tried on Monday to auction off on eBay a sperm whale carcass that washed up onto its shores. -- FILE PHOTO: REUTERS
May 6, 2014, 6:23 am SGT
http://str.sg/Zw9a
MONTREAL (AFP) - A fishing village in easternmost Canada tried on Monday to auction off on eBay a sperm whale carcass that washed up onto its shores.
By midday, the town of Cape St. George, Newfoundland had received dozens of bids – the highest topping US$2,000 (S$2,500) – before running afoul of the online auction site’s rules and the law.
The 12-metre sperm whale carcass washed ashore about a week ago.
The town of 1,000 residents does not have the means to dispose of the rotting carcass itself, according to the mayor, and Canada’s fisheries department declined to get involved.
Worried that the smell from the rotting carcass would soon become intolerable, the town’s council voted on Sunday to list the whale on eBay, hoping to find a buyer to take it away.
Federal officials “didn’t offer any suggestions about what to do with it, and didn’t offer assistance, they just said ‘You have to get rid of it’, so we decided to list it on eBay,” Mayor Peter Fenwick told AFP.
“Frankly we would sell it for zero if we had to... as long as they take responsibility for removing the whale,” he said, suggesting that its skeleton could be put on display in a museum.
The eBay listing, after gaining notoriety, was soon removed by the online auction website because it is against its rules on not selling animals, alive or dead, an employee told AFP.
At the same time, federal officials contacted the mayor to tell him it is illegal to try to sell the whale carcass.
“We are now at a point where we want to have a look at the regulations and see if there is any way around that,” Mr Fenwick said.
He said he doesn’t want to break the law by “selling a whale illegally,” but added, “we don’t have very much choice because if it sits there, as it starts to rot... it will give off a tremendous stench.”
Coincidentally, two other Newfoundland towns faced similar problems after two endangered blue whales washed up on their shores. One of them began to bloat from a build-up of methane gas inside, threatening to explode its stinking innards on the town of Trout River.
An Ontario museum is sending a team of researchers to collect the pair of whale carcasses this week.
The rare animals’ skeleton and tissue samples will be stored in the museum’s research collection, which will be accessible to researchers worldwide.
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HomeStudy AbroadProgram TypesMasters
International Business Schools Came Out on Top in the QS Global MBA Rankings 2019
By S.A.G.A. on November 22, 2018 Masters
By Megan Brickley
Once again, international schools dominated the QS Global MBA Rankings.
QS provide these comprehensive rankings each year, ranking the universities on these factors:
Employability – 40%
Entrepreneurship and Alumni Outcomes – 15%
Return on Investment – 20%
Thought Leadership – 15%
Class & Faculty Diversity – 10%
Nunzio Quacquarelli, founder of QS, said that their rankings “seek to measure the key measures of Business Schools, whilst also taking into account what matters most to prospective students… Our innovative measurement of strength in entrepreneurship and successful alumni outcomes, provide a fresh length for the growing audience of prospective MBAs.”
The USA dominated the rankings this year, with 51 of the top 100 schools, six of the top 10 and all top three schools are in the USA. The US MBA programs excelled in terms of entrepreneurship, alumni outcomes and thought leadership. The UK is the next best represented, accounting for nine of the top 100 MBA programs. Other than this, MBA providers in Spain, Germany, Hong Kong and Singapore have risen up the ranks in recent years. The top 10 schools are as follows:
1 Stanford United States
2 Harvard United States
3 Penn (Wharton) United States
4 London Business School United Kingdom
5 MIT (Sloan) United States
6 INSEAD France
7 HEC Paris France
=8 Chicago (Booth) United States
=8 IE Business School Spain
10 Columbia United States
According to QS, Stanford Graduate School of Business offers the best MBA program in the world. Founded in 1925, the MBA program has a 7.1% acceptance rate, making it the most exclusive of the Ivy League schools. Stanford offers a two year full-time MBA, as well as several dual degree MBA programs. One of the distinguishing factors of the MBA is the required Global Experience Program, which provides students with valuable overseas experience.
Ranked second and third are Harvard Business School and the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania respectively. The Harvard MBA aims to expose students to real-life challenges within a diverse community. In fact, diversity in the student body is a strong point of the program, with 42% women, 28% ethnic minorities, and 34% international students from 64 countries. The Wharton MBA also values international relations, offering a global consulting practicum, a global immersion program and global modular courses.
These results indicate that, if you are interested in taking an MBA, international schools could be a great option for you. This is particularly true considering that business operates in an increasingly global arena, and having an international network built from the experience of studying abroad is highly valuable in today’s job climate. Thus, through taking your MBA abroad, you not only have the opportunity to attend a top international school, you will also gain the network and soft skills that will set you apart from your peers.
Come along to the Study and Go Abroad Fair to learn from several international universities about their graduate programs, including their MBAs.
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/qs-global-mba-amp-business-masters-rankings-2019-830046349.html
https://qswownews.com/qs-global-mba-rankings-2019/
The lure of an overseas MBA
The great escape: five reasons to study abroad for a master’s
MBAs, like Diamonds, Are Indeed Forever
Discussion1 Comment
Virginia Adams April 26, 2019 12:11 pm
Great article. Thanks https://www.studyandgoabroad.com/
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Home Essays Women's Lost and Returned...
Women's Lost and Returned Souls —— An Analysis of Women's Displacement and Epiphany in O'Connor's Works
Topics: Southern literature, Southern United States, Religion Pages: 25 (9923 words) Published: February 4, 2014
Women's Lost and Returned Souls
—— An Analysis of Women's Displacement and Epiphany
in O'Connor's Works
Yuan LinLin
This paper aims at analyzing certain female characters in Flannery O’Connor’s works from the perspective of feminism. By combining the displacement theory in psychology and the Christian existentialism, it illustrates specific changes and reconstructions realized by female characters before and after the occurrence of displacement as well as the impact on their spiritual world by violence and male intruders. The paper also discusses old Southern ideas and the constraints thrown by the patriarchal society, the estrangement of female characters’ struggling environment and the destruction of their spiritual world. Based on these concerns, this paper will probe into Flannery O’Connor’s feminine and religious views on the displaced souls and their absent identity and it examines her criticism towards the influence by post-war industrial civilization and rationalism on females’ lost souls and belief. This paper is divided into five parts. The very first part is the introduction, which will briefly review former researches on Flannery O’Connor’s works and certain theories as illustrated above. The second part is about female characters’ place and life in the novel. The third part is mainly the demonstration of Flannery O’Connor’s religious and feminie views by analyzing certain female characters’ displacement and accordingly loss. The forth part emphasizes on interpreting their epiphany aroused by the displacement. And the last part is a summary of this paper with a drawn conclusion.
Keywords: feminism; displacement; Christian existentialism; epiphany
1. Introduction4
2．Women's Place and Life6
2.1 Southern Tradition and Women Images in O’Connor’s Works 6 2.2 Women’s Loss of Self-identity9
3．Women's Displacement and Disorientation13
3.1 Displacement by Male Intruders14
3.2 Displacement by Violence17
4. Women’s Epiphany and Change20
4.1 Indifference of Southern Tradition 21
4.2 Reconstruction and Redemption of Souls 23
5．Conclusion 28
Bibliography30
Acknowledgments32
Flannery O’Connor is an American Southern female writer featured by her religious background as a Catholic and Lupus-tangled patient. O’Connor is mostly recognized by her unique writing style with a sense of grotesque and questioning on the female identity. Her works, mainly short stories and novels, owe her a renowned reputation as a liberary prophet of the South, casting an indelible influence on the American literature in the 20th century. O’Connor’s choice on combining feminine viewpoint with her Roman Catholic belief along with the Southern gothic style had won her three-time O’Henry Prize and an American National Book Award in 1972. Southern America, once enjoying its glorious past for centuries long, gave Southern writers like O’Connor the specialty of using gloomy images, twisted protagonists, and unexpected elements, which were conducted under the circumstances of conflicts between the south and the north, the old ideology and the new modern civilization, the long-run moral system and the corrupted religious belief. Given the Southern economic operation mode, O’Connor focused more on the traditional family-oriented life for family value was weighed high in the South. However, she concerned more on its degraded side as the South was defeated in the Civil War with those conservative and rigid conceptions no longer sufficient to shift into a brand new era. In addition to the regional genre, O’Connor also developed her interpretation of God’s grace and revelation in her works by molding female characters as incompetent, insular and powerless compared to the male forces. Previous reviews on O’Connor’s works at home and abroad mainly discussed her role as a member of the Southern literature, a grotesque female writer and a religious...
Bibliography: 1. Caron, T P. 2000, Struggles over the word: Race and religion in O’Connor’s, Faulkner, Hurston, and Wright. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press.
2. Caruso, T C. 2001. Feminism and Flannery O’Connor A Study of the Feminine Grotesque. Indiana University of Pennsylvania.
3. Deborah L. Siegel. 1997, “The Legacy of the Personal: Generating Theory in Feminism 's Third Wave”. Hypatia. Volume 12: 46-75.
4. Displacement(psychology). n.d. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Displacement, Retrieved Mar. 4, 2012 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Displacement_psychology
6. Flannery O’Connor. 1971, The Complete Stories. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
8. Gentry, M B. 1986, Flannery O’Connor’s Religion of the Grotesque. Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi.
10. Kirk, C A. 2007. Critical Companion to Flannery O 'Connor: A Literary Reference to Her Life and Work. Facts on File, Inc.
women's writing Essay
...AMAR JIBAN- RASSUNDARI DEVI Q) How far is the narrator in 'Amar Jiban' critical of patriarchal practices/ social oppression of women in the 19th Century. Most of the works of Women Writing in India date from the late nineteenth century, when reform movements awarded the ‘condition of women’ top billing among the various social and moral concerns of the day. During the social reform movements cultural critics brought many of the ‘crimes’ committed against women to center stage. Purdah, sati, child marriage and the harsh treatment of widows became the public “blot on India’s self respect”,the much publicised injustices signalling the country’s moral decay. But while the reformers denounced specific atrocities perpetrated against women, they were not prepared to blame the underlying social system. In fact the primary concerns of the reform movements were not the primary themes in women’s writings. The excerpt from Pandita Ramabai Saraswati’s book The High Caste Hindu Woman, for example, catalogues not specific problems but the assumptions, customs and conditions of traditional marriage that turned virtually all brides into indentured servants. Even in the writings of many authors who outwardly uphold tarditional values and customs,there is a budding awareness that women suffered unjustly. In the excerpt from Rassundari Devi’s autobiography, the author details her loneliness...
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...Gender and Women’s Studies Essay Assignment Women’s Work and Labor Issues It has been known that throughout many centuries the women’s role was to provide domestic care in the household. During the nineteenth century, modification was in the air and the industrial revolution involved the movement of labor and resources away from agriculture and towards manufacturing industries was in progress. As a result many women were moving from domestic life to the industrial world. The family economy was replaced by a new patriarchy which saw women moving from the small, safe world of family and home-based work to larger factories and sweatshops. Prior to these changes, career options were limited for women. The wife’s work was often alongside her husband, running a plantation or farm and the household. Cooking for the household took a lot of the time out of the day, after the revolution the women’s work was even more as she had to provide prime care for her children and household as well as work. Labor systems divided immigrant workers by ethnicity so that the experience of European ethnic groups would be different from that of non-European ethnic groups. In the middle of the nineteenth century there was an increase in the migration of women from their homelands; which were Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe. They became an essential part...
...Dominique Johnson English 1 A 14 October 2013 The Life of a Women’s Work In my essay, I intend to compare and contrast the poems. Woman by Kishaw Naheed and Woman Work by Maya Angelou. The two poems look at the lives of two Women from different cultures and traditions. Kishwar Naheed is one of the leading poets of Pakistan. Naheed writes about tradition of arranged marriages and the struggles of being a women in her culture. Maya Angelou is a Black American women from Arkansas. Maya writes about the daily struggles of a working class woman in America. In these two poems they are different in culture but similar in the daily struggles as women in a male dominated society. Kishwar Naheed is a very successful woman who takes on the customs and traditions of her Asian background. Throughout the poem she tells of the difficulties that particular problems women faces in her culture. In the poem the first verse “I am not that women” she is angry because people in her religion are acting as if she is a slave.Naheed is arguing against the stereotype of a women being obedient. The second line she says “selling you socks and shoes” this means that she is not the women in the poster half-naked mentioned in verse 5, line 4 she doesn’t want to be associated with women that are doing that to get attention. In line 3 she says “while you roamed free as the breeze, not knowing.” This refers to...
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...Essay title: A Woman’s Beauty: Put-Down or Power Source? Writer: Susan Sontag Essay Summary Worksheet | | | |Summary of paragraphs (sections) |Your own response to paragraph summary | |Be sure to write the number of paragraph or section |(thoughts, questions, agreement, disagreement, etc.) | |In Greek, people believe that beauty is |I agree with this point because inner and outer | |Superiority and that person who has beauty should be perfect. Also, inner beauty |Beauty are matched and almost the same. If an ugly woman is kind, smart, and | |and outer beauty should be matched. So, Socrates, who is very ugly, is an example|attractive, we can regard he as a beautiful woman. However, if a beautiful woman | |of contradiction in the world because in his case, inner and outer beauty didn’t |is very evil, bad, and hot- tempered, we can think of her as an ugly woman. | |match. | | |...
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How Do New York City’s Gun Laws Compare to Those in the Las Vegas Shooting?
The shooting over the weekend in Las Vegas has sparked a debate about gun laws across the country. The shooter reportedly had at least 23 firearms in the room with him when police found him, many of which were legal in the State of Nevada. Not only that, but investigations suggest many of them were legally purchased, and that the shooter passed background checks when he purchased the weapons. Every time there is tragic news, the gun debate erupts across the country. The Queens crime victim injury attorneys Sullivan and Galleshaw are here to answer some questions about New York City’s gun laws, and help us understand whether guns have the same kind of availability in New York as they do in Las Vegas.
Las Vegas Gun Laws Vs. New York City Gun Laws
Since the shooting in Las Vegas, calls for increased gun control have no doubt dominated the political landscape and the nightly news. As it stands in Nevada, the gun laws are quite loose. There, it is legal to purchase and own a handgun and many other firearms without needing a state-issued license or permit. This means that many people can purchase guns without much effort or certification beyond a background check. In addition, Nevada has no additional restrictions (beyond federal regulations) for fully-automatic weapons, .50-caliber rifles, and other weapons typically not found outside a warzone.
In New York State, there are licensing requirements for many guns. While the state does not require a hunting or weapons license for rifles, it does require a permit to own a pistol. Whether these weapons are for hunting or self-defense, New York requires a permit for all handguns. Within New York City, the law is stricter, and requires a permit for long guns and pistols.
New York’s laws for open carry are a bit confusing. There is nothing that explicitly addresses whether openly carrying a rifle is permitted, but most people typically do not carry these guns openly. On the other hand, it is illegal to openly carry a pistol. It is legal to carry a concealed handgun throughout New York State, if you have a permit to do so. These permits are usually only issued to those who prove they have some need for protection, such as security personnel, off-duty police, and victims of crime or abuse.
In New York, there is also a registry of firearms for handguns.
Assault Weapons, Modified Guns, and High Capacity Magazine Laws in NYC
Many news reports initially suggested that the guns used in the Las Vegas shooting may have been fully-automatic weapons. Even in Nevada, which has no laws permitting automatic weapons, fully-automatic weapons are governed by federal law. These laws require permits, licensing, and background checks. However, the line between semi-automatic and fully-automatic weapons is often blurred, and may not always be the most important legal distinction.
The weapons seized in the Las Vegas shooting were reportedly handguns and semi-automatic rifles – all of which are legal in Nevada. The shooter supposedly used long-range scopes, high-capacity magazines, and other devices during the shooting. Many of these rifles were also high-powered, military-style rifles. While Nevada allows many of these items, other states do not.
New York is one of a group of states with an assault weapons ban. In New York State, it is illegal to own an “assault weapon,” unless you already had one when the ban went into effect. “Assault weapons” include many semi-automatic weapons designed for civilian use that share similarities with military weapons. Though these weapons, such as the AR-15, may be semi-automatic, civilian models, New York State has banned their ownership. Seeing these weapons as offensive, rather than defensive, New York has make it illegal to purchase these guns in the state.
The difference between a semi-automatic and a fully-automatic weapon lies in how it fires. When the trigger is pulled on a semi-automatic gun, one bullet fires (or one “burst” of bullets). This means the weapon can only be fired as fast as the operator can pull the trigger. Instead, automatic weapons will continue to fire as long as the trigger is held down. That means these guns can continue to fire until the magazine runs empty.
The Las Vegas shooter reportedly used a device to make a semi-automatic weapon fire faster. With either a trigger crank or a “bump stock” device, the trigger is pulled faster than a human finger usually can fire, allowing even a semi-automatic weapon to fire nearly as fast as an automatic weapon. The ATF confirmed the shooter was indeed using a bump stock. Along with high-capacity magazines, the shooter was able to fire these high-powered assault weapons at long range, and at a high rate of fire, using many rounds. In most states, including New York, these modifying devices may be legal. However, New York does not allow high-capacity magazines, and even bans most guns from having more than 7 bullets in a magazine at a time (unless they are at a shooting range).
New York City Personal Injury Attorneys
The Queens personal injury lawyers at Sullivan and Galleshaw have over 30 years of collective experience in both personal injury and criminal law. Victims of violent crime and accidental injuries may be entitled to compensation for their injuries. For a consultation on your injuries, call our lawyers today at (877) 311-HURT.
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Updated February 5
Maine bill to limit ‘obscene material’ in classrooms draws passionate testimony
Rep. Amy Arata of New Gloucester wants to require teachers to obtain consent from parents before using classroom material with 'obscene content,' but opponents say decisions are best left to local school boards.
AUGUSTA — Lawmakers heard hours of passionate testimony Monday about obscenity, literature and censorship as they considered a proposal to require teachers to notify parents or students before utilizing sexually explicit materials in classrooms.
Bill sponsor Rep. Amy Bradstreet Arata, R-New Gloucester, and her supporters said parents as well as students should have the opportunity to opt out of reading or viewing “obscene materials.” Yet opponents pointed out that parents can already formally challenge a book’s usage with the local school board and compared Arata’s bill to previous attempts to ban works now considered classics of literature.
Kafka on the Shore
Rep. Amy Bradstreet Arata
“Who is going to decide what is obscene? Who is going to police this law in all of our schools across this state?” asked Cathy Potter, a librarian in Falmouth’s public schools. “And are you prepared to prosecute librarians and teachers for putting books in the hands of our students … because this would make it a crime.”
As an example of “the pornographic nature of materials being assigned to students in Maine,” Arata distributed excerpts from “Kafka on the Shore,” which was assigned to her son in the 12th grade. The 2002 book by Japanese author Haruki Murakami has won critical acclaim – including landing on The New York Times’ Top 10 list for 2005 – but contains some explicit descriptions of sexual activity as well as rape.
As originally written, Arata’s bill proposed that public schools be removed from the list of institutions – such as libraries or museums – that are exempt from the law prohibiting the dissemination of obscene materials to minors. That proposal garnered vociferous pushback from educators and others who recalled the moral policing that once led schools or entire states to ban literary classics such as “To Kill a Mockingbird,” “Of Mice and Men” and “The Catcher in the Rye.”
In response, Arata amended her bill to instead require teachers to provide written notice that the book or other materials contained obscene content or depictions of sexual assault. Both the students and their parents/legal guardians would need to provide written consent prior to receiving the materials.
“This common-sense bipartisan bill will give minors and parents the respect and dignity of choosing what is appropriate for them and their family so that they do not have to feel embarrassed, harassed or traumatized,” Arata said. She said the bill “will help make sure that all Maine schools are safe and nurturing environments for our children.”
Supporters the Christian Civic League of Maine, pastors and parents, as well as several survivors of sexual assault warned that graphic depictions or descriptions could further traumatize children who are victims themselves. Others objected to teachers’ selection of certain movies with objectionable material in their classroom curriculum.
Jennifer White of Gray said her then 11-year-old daughter was confused after watching a film in class that included both sexual content and depictions of a man committing suicide with a gun.
“Showing a movie with that type of graphic content and sexually explicit material can cause harm to a child that is not mature enough to handle it, and fifth grade is not mature enough to handle that,” White said. “This is one example of how L.D. 94 can better provide transparency to both children and families.”
But teachers, librarians and associations representing Maine’s school boards and superintendents urged lawmakers to reject a bill that would make it a criminal offense for teachers to teach literary texts that some perceive as obscene.
“The problem is that what is obscene to one person or group may be judged to have artistic or social merit to another,” said Claudette Brassil, a retired English teacher representing the Maine Council for English Language Arts. “Criminalization of literary choices is a detriment to academic freedom. As in the past, contemporary community standards continue to evolve and are influenced by many forces.”
Brassil, a Brunswick resident who taught at Mt. Ararat High School in Topsham, testified that literary works can sometimes provide a platform for students to talk about violence or sexual situations with adults. She also said that she believes children are becoming more willing to speak up to trusted individuals – including teachers – when they are victims of abuse.
Opponents also said the bill was unnecessary because school boards in Maine already have a process through which members of the public can challenge the suitability of educational materials and request a formal review. In fact, Arata used that process to successfully challenge the use of “Kafka on the Shore” in her children’s schools.
“This is a decision that I believe is best handled locally with your school board – people who you elect and most likely represent, as a group, the norms in your community,” said Victoria Wallack, representing both the Maine School Boards Association and the Maine Schools Superintendents Association. “That is where I would go first. I wouldn’t be here at the Legislature trying to change educational policy that is rightfully adopted … by the school board.”
The Criminal Justice and Public Safety Committee is expected to hold a work session on L.D. 94 next Monday.
10-year-old student charged after RSU 9 bomb threat
No more late arrival Wednesdays this year in RSU 73
education, Maine Legislature
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Everything You Need To Know About The Bengali Language
By Remi, published on 28/08/2018 Blog > Languages > Hindi > The Bengali Language In India
The Origins of Bengali
The Bengali Dialects in India
The Bengali Alphabet
Bengali outside of Inda
Bengali is one of the officially recognised languages of the Union of India according to the Eight Schedule of the Indian Constitution.
The Constitution of India took almost three years to be drafted but eventually, on the 26th of January 1950, the first elected Constituent Assembly of India, agreed on it. Each of the members of the Assembly had to sign two copies of the document, one was in Hindi, the second was in English.
From then on, both Hindi and English became the official languages of the India government. But this does not mean that every state of the Union uses these languages to conduct their official business.
Each state was given the possibility to choose amongst one of the 23 officially recognised languages and more often than not, a state has more than one official language. The reason is simple, the Indian population speaks too many languages to only have one official language, even within the same state.
In total, 122 languages are spoken by at least 10,000 people while another 3o languages are spoken by more than 1 million people.
The Marahati language spoken in Bombay, as well as the Tamil dialects and the important Urdu idiom are some of the main languages used in India.
If you dig a bit deeper into India’s past, these figures will come to no surprise. With the first traces of civilisation dating more than 3,000 years back and given that three different empires ruled over the subcontinent for the last 600 years, one can only acknowledge the rich cultural past of India.
“India’s linguistic diversity surprises many Westerners, but there are nearly thirty languages in India with at least a million native speakers. There are more native speakers of Tamil on our planet than of Italian. Likewise, more people speak Punjabi than German, Marathi than French, and Bengali than Russian. There are more Telugu speakers than Czech, Dutch, Danish, Finnish, Greek, Slovak, and Swedish speakers combined.”
– Bob Harris, English music presenter former host of the BBC2 music programme The Old Grey Whistle Test, and co-founder of the magazine Time Out.
To negotiate on the markets of Calcutta, better speak Bengali to get the best price. (by kg.abhi)
£25 £7 £12
Anchal
Tithi
Do you need to find a hindi tutor?
Bengali first emerged in the Eastern part of India and is thought to have diverged from the ancient Indian languages, Sanskrit and Magadhi Prakrit about 3000 years ago.
Proto-Bengali regional dialects evolved to form three language family groups, Bengali-Assamese, Bihari, and Odia.
Despite proto-Bengali being the official language of the Pala Empire for 400 years, the Bengali language only truly developed under the influence of the Sultanate of Bengal. This kingdom was created after the Muslim conquest of the Indian subcontinent during the 14th century.
The Sultanate was formed after a governor of Bengal for the Delhi Sultanate declared the region independent and decided to sit on the throne. Even though the ruling dynasties were Muslims and thus used Persian as a first language, Bengali held an equal place at the Sultanate court and was one of the official languages.
The words Bangal (which late gave Bangladesh) and Bengal (giving Bengali) appeared for the first time after the creation of the eponymous Sultanate.
During the same period, the Bengali language started borrowing words, verbs and linguistic particularities from Persian and Arabic.
The modern form of Bengali emerged during the 19th and 20th century and was based on the dialect spoken in the Nadia region, today part of the Indian state of West Bengal. The vocabulary of the developing language drew most of its words from Magadhi Prakrit and Pali dialects but also borrowed a great deal from Sanskrit, Persian, and Arabic as well as other Asian languages the locals were in contact with.
“I learnt to sing in Bengali, my mother tongue then went on to sing in Hindi, Telugu, Tamil, Gujarati and every possible Indian language.”
– Shreya Ghoshal, Indian playback singer
Mother Teresa, who was beatified for her incredible humanitarian work in Indian and across the world, learn to speak Bengali when she first arrived in Darjeeling in 1929. (by pixelsblue)
Today Bengali is mostly spoken in the Indian states of West Bengal, Tripura, and parts of Assam as well as in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and counts more than 80 million speakers in India only.
Bengali was also recognised as a second official language of the Indian state of Jharkhand, just East of West Bengal.
Important communities of Bengali speakers reside in cities outside of the Bengal region chiefly in Delhi, Mumbai, Varanasi, and Vrindavan.
Chakma is a dialect partly derivative of Bengali, and it is spoken by about 400,000 people in Assam, Tripura, and Mizoram. The Rajbongshi people who are scattered through Bangladesh and India also speak a close relative to Bengali called Rangpuri.
Bengali exhibits an important heteroglossia, meaning that significant variations of the same spoken and written Bengali language can be observed.
Shadhu-bhasha ( meaning the “upright language“) was the formal form of the Bengali language and used long verb inflexions and a vocabulary mainly borrowed from the Pala and Sanskrit languages. It is no longer used and is primarily reserved for some official formalities.
It has been replaced by Cholito-bhasha (meaning the “running language“) which is mostly the colloquial form of Bengali. It is characterised by the use of short verbs and vernacular idioms and has become the standardised form of Bengali.
Essentially, the simple, more accessible and shorter form of Bengali took over the more formal written Bengali during the 19th century thanks to various famous Bengali writers.
But the spoken versions of the language vary from area to area, and some dialects of Bengali such as the one spoken in the Chittagong region of Bangladesh can barely be understood by Standard Colloquial Bengali speakers from Kolkatta.
Even within the same dialects, speakers are more likely to use words from the Sanskrit lexicon if they are Hindu, whereas Muslims will be more likely to pick words from the Persian and Arabic vocabulary.
Bengali is a very adaptive language!
“Bengalis love to celebrate their language, their culture, their politics, their fierce attachment to a city that has been famously dying for more than a century. They resent with equal ferocity the reflex stereotyping that labels any civic dysfunction anywhere in the world ‘another Calcutta.”
– Bharati Mukherjee, American writer and professor emerita in the department of English at the University of California.
The Victoria Memorial is a large marble building in Kolkata, which was built between 1906 and 1921. It is dedicated to the memory of Queen Victoria and is now a museum and tourist destination.
Linguists think that the Bengali alphabet evolved from the Brahmic script about 1000 years ago. The alphasyllabary used in Bengali has letters for consonants, diacritics (or accent) for vowels, and uses a vowel sound (অ ô) for consonants unmarked by another vowel.
This Eastern Nagari script or Bengali-Assamese alphabet is used in all the states which recognise Bengali as their (or one of their) official language: Assam, West Bengal, Tripura. But it is also used in Bangladesh in place of an Arabic-based alphabet even though the country has a population majority of Muslims.
The Eastern Nagari script is always written in cursive from left to right and does not make any distinction between upper case and lower case. All punctuation signs but one have been borrowed from the Roman alphabet, keeping the same usage. The only original Bengali punctuation sign is the downstroke called daṛi (। ) which is the equivalent of a full stop.
The Bengali alphabet contains 11 signs representing nine vowels and two diphthongs as well as 39 signs representing consonants and modifiers.
Bengali is also characterised by a horizontal line linking each sign of the same word together called (মাত্রা) matra similar to the one observed in the Hindi language in the Devanagari script.
“It was the English word she used. It was in English that the past was unilateral; in Bengali, the word for yesterday, kal, was also the word for tomorrow. In Bengali one needed an adjective, or relied on the tense of a verb, to distinguish what had already happened from what would be.”
– Nilanjana Sudeshna “Jhumpa” Lahiri, American author of Indian origin.
As well as being the second most spoken language in India, Bengali is the most spoken language in Bangladesh, making it de facto the national language with 98% of the people being Bengali (or Bangla) native speakers.
Due to migration flux all around the world, Bengali is also spoken by important communities in the Middle East, the United States, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and Italy.
In total, between 250 and 300 million people around the world have been registered tas native Bengali speakers making this language the 7th most spoken language on Earth. For this reason, both the Indian state of West Bengal and Bangladesh have put a motion forward to make Bengali an official language of the United Nations along with Modern Standard Arabic, Traditional Chinese (and Simplified Chinese), British English, French, Russian and Spanish.
The national anthem of both Bangladesh (“Amar Sonar Bangla”) and India (Jana Gana Mana) were written in Bengali.
Jana Gana Mana was written by the poet and polymath Rabindranath Tagore. It was performed for the first time in its Hindi version, in front of the Indian Constituent Assembly, on the 14th of August 1947 at midnight.
Compostion in Bengali
জনগণমন-অধিনায়ক জয় হে ভারতভাগ্যবিধাতা!
পঞ্জাব সিন্ধু গুজরাট মরাঠা দ্রাবিড় উৎকল বঙ্গ
বিন্ধ্য হিমাচল যমুনা গঙ্গা উচ্ছলজলধিতরঙ্গ
তব শুভ নামে জাগে, তব শুভ আশিস[i] মাগে,
গাহে তব জয়গাথা।
জনগণমঙ্গলদায়ক জয় হে ভারতভাগ্যবিধাতা!
জয় হে, জয় হে, জয় হে, জয় জয় জয় জয় হে॥
Thou art, the ruler of our minds, of all people
The dispenser of India’s destiny!
Thy name rouses the heart of Punjab, Sindh, Gujarat
and Maratha, of the Dravida and Odisha
and Bengal; It echoes in the hills of Vindhya and the
Himalayas, and mingles in the music of Ganga and Yamuna
and is chanted by the waves of the Indian sea.
They pray for thy blessings and sing thy praise.
The saving of all people waits in thy hands,
Thou dispenser of India’s destiny.
Victory, Victory, Victory to thee
Do you want to teach hindi lessons?
I love travelling and I am currently wandering through South East Asia and Japan. In between street food markets, I enjoy climbing mountains and scuba diving.
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HIGH QUALITY LATIN TUITION IN FOWEY
Our Latin Tutors in Fowey are all fully-qualified Latin Teachers, who also offer their skills as high quality home tutors. All are subject-specialists, professional, reliable, up-to-date with Examination Boards and the current demands of a changing curriculum. Lessons are taught at your home and are scheduled at your convenience; whether weekdays, evenings or weekends.
Here is a selection of Latin teachers in and around Fowey
Qualified and experienced teacher of Modern Foreign Languages and Humanities. Experienced as Head of French and German. Teaches French and German from Prep and Key Stage 3 through to GCSE, IGCSE A Level and IB. Provides language tuition for adults and businesses, from beginner to advanced levels. Also offers EFL tuition. Teaches Latin, History and EFL from Prep and Key Stage 3 through to GCSE and IGCSE. Supports preparations for School Entrance Examinations and Scholarship. Experienced Head of Careers and offers support for UCAS and University Admissions. PGCE, History, Cambridge University (1977). MA Modern and Medieval Languages, Cambridge University (1972).
Qualified and experienced English, Latin, Classical Civilisation and Maths Teacher, with experience in both the State and Independent sectors, including as Head of Department, currently offering home tuition. Teaches English Language and Literature from Prep and Key Stage 3, through to GCSE, IGCSE and A Level across all the major Exam Boards. Also teaches Latin and Classical Civilisation to GCSE and Maths to Key Stage 3. English Language A-Level Examiner for Edexcel. Extensive experience as new teacher trainer and mentor. QTS, Canterbury Christ Church University College (2008). BA (Hons) Classics and Classical Studies Newcastle University (2001).
Qualified and experienced History, Classical Civilisation, Latin, English and Maths teacher, previously Head of Latin at Winterfold House School and Head of English at Glendower Prep School; currently working as a tutor while studying for an MA in Classical Civilisation. Teaches History and Classical Civilisation from Prep and Key Stage 3 through to GCSE, IGCSE and A level; teaches Latin, English and Maths from Prmary through to Prep and Key Stage 3. Can support home schooling. Provides preparation for Scholarship, 11+ and Independent School Entrance Exams. PGCE, Primary Education, Leeds University (1994). BA (Hons) Classical Civilisation, University of Newcastle upon Tyne (1992).
Qualified and experienced English and Modern Foreign Language Teacher currently working as a freelance tutor and educational consultant. Teaches English Language, English Literature, French and Spanish from Primary and Prep through to GCSE, IGCSE and A level; German, Portuguese and Latin up to Key Stage 3. Provides language tuition for adult learners and businesses, from beginner to advanced levels. Specialisms in 11+, 13+ Common Entrance and Scholarship, EAL, GCSE and A Level Language. Can support Home Schooling. PGCE Secondary Modern Languages, University of Bath (1993). BA (Hons) Modern Languages, University of Sheffield (1991).
Qualified and experienced Languages, Maths, History and RE Teacher, currently a full time tutor. Teaches English (Lit. & Lang.), French, Italian, Spanish, Religious Studies and History from Prep and Key Stage 3 through to GCSE, IGCSE, A Level and IB across all the major exam boards. Also offers Greek to Key Stage 3, and Chinese, German and Latin KS3 to GCSE/IGCSE. PGCE Modern Foreign Languages, University of the West of England (2014) MA Modern Languages, University of Bristol (2012). BA (Hons) Italian and Spanish, University of Bristol (2011).
Qualified and experienced teacher, currently teaching at a local independent school. Teaches Latin, Greek and Classical Civilisation from Prep and Key Stage 3, through to GCSE, IGCSE and A Level across all the major exam boards. MEd Classics, Cambridge University (2014). PGCE Classics, Cambridge University (2010). MA Classics, Edinburgh University (2009).
Find a Latin Tutor in Fowey
"Teachers To Your Home" introduces you to teachers who provide high quality Latin Tuition in Fowey, at your home and convenience. We are the disclosed agent of over 18,000 qualified and experienced teachers, across the UK, who also choose to offer their professional skills as high quality home tutors.
More information for Latin in or around Fowey
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Spilled guts + new friends! Watch the Zombieland pilot RIGHT NOW
@trentlmoore
Tag: Zombieland
Tag: Amazon
The rules of survival, and zombie kills of the week, are all back in the pilot episode for Amazon’s Zombieland series.
Amazon has posted the pilot for its proposed series, based on the hit 2009 film, and the first trailer has also gone live. So, is it any good?
Well, that depends. The effects are a little spotty, and the new cast isn’t bad. But after getting used to the original portrayals in the film, the recasting feels a little awkward. Since most have gone on to be huge stars, that’s a necessary evil, but it will still take some getting used to. The comedy is a bit more slapstick than the movie, and it feels like the writers are trying to make the transition from big-screen dark comedy to a dark sitcom format. It’s a weird mix, but it could work if given the time to develop.
Picking up two weeks after the film, the pilot does a solid job of reintroducing the characters, with Tyler Ross as Columbus, Izabela Vodovic as Little Rock, Maiara Walsh as Wichita and Kirk Ward as Tallahassee. Despite the format change, the pilot definitely maintains the weird Zombieland vibe. All the little fun stuff is still here, and original writers Rhett Reese and Paul Wernick wrote and produced the pilot, along with the film’s producer Gavin Polone.
Zombieland is one of several pilots Amazon is prepping, and the company will seek feedback from viewers to determine which ones actually get a series order. So check out the trailer below and let us know what you think of the show:
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U.S. seeks to build military base near Iraq border with Iran: Lebanese daily
TEHRAN – In an article published by the Lebanese Al Akhbar daily on Tuesday, the writer is of the opinion that the U.S. is seeking to build a military base in Iraq near the border with Iran.
Washington seeks to build military base in the regions where there are the Popular Mobilization Forces in order to limit their scope of the influence, the newspaper said.
Following is an excerpt of the article:
Pentagon spokesman Eric Bahon has said that the U.S. does not intend to remove its military forces from Iraq. He added that there are 5,200 American forces in Iraq which is confirmed by Baghdad.
Pentagon has not announced the actual numbers of U.S. forces in Iraq. Based on the information provided by the Popular Mobilization Forces and Qais Khazali, the secretary general of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, there are over 7,500 U.S. soldiers in ten bases in Iraq.
Mohammad Mohi, the spokesman for Iraq’s Hezbollah Brigades, has said that the U.S. has more than ten military bases in Iraq that five of which are in the Kurdistan region and the U.S. intends to build a new one in the region.
NA/PA
Common Concern of the White House and Riyadh
Iran ‘helpful’ in fight against Daesh in Iraq: Kerry
Iran’s Soleimani very helpful in fight against ISIL: Iraq’s Hakim
Judiciary chief orders immediate punishment for cult rioters
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Second shift for young Anna Maria program
By John Conceison TELEGRAM & GAZETTE STAFF
Entering its second season, there couldn’t be more enthusiasm around the Anna Maria football program.
The AmCats enjoy the mark they’ve made on Sunset Lane, as a practice in full pads at AmCat Field is often the first thing seen on the right-hand side while driving onto campus on a fall afternoon.
For this year’s home opener Sept. 11, Anna Maria’s pep band, which had 10 to 15 members last year, is expected to march out with about 35 musicians, complete with color guard.
“Everyone’s talking about it,” said Nii Quartey, a junior linebacker out of Burncoat High. “It seems everyone around here now is into football.”
The AmCats are still seeking their first varsity victory, but they now do so with a bit more experience. Only one player had been in a college game heading into last season, the inaugural at AMC. There are 23 players with college experience returning for this year’s AmCat opener Friday night at Worcester State.
“Our coaching staff last year were our upperclassmen,” coach Marc Klaiman said. “We’re still young, but we’re not that freshman team.
“The goal last year and the goal this year is the same — to build a program with a solid foundation,” said Klaiman, who’s bringing in full freshman classes and not relying on transfers. “We’re in our second year, and the wins are going to come, but we’re building a real foundation here.”
Sophomore quarterback Santino Simone returns with eight games under his belt. “He has shown he is a fine leader, and he is great for our program,” Klaiman said.
Simone has been challenged by the college game. After operating Mike Pucko’s double-wing running attack at Holy Name High, he was charged with dropping back and throwing much more often in AMC’s pro set, and his development has pleased Klaiman.
And while winning was all Simone did at Holy Name, he has embraced his current role in building a program.
“Last season was tough, but it was a learning experience for everyone, and actually, it was a fun season,” he said. “All seems to be coming together as a team.”
Simone’s prime target is sophomore Domenique Concepcion, a 6-foot, 170-pound end. “He was a real surprise for us last year,” Klaiman said. “He adjusts to the ball in the air as well as anyone I’ve seen. He’s a leaper, not with tremendous breakaway speed, but if the ball’s in the air, he’ll go get it.”
And the coach can’t complain about the AmCats’ kicking game. “He’s perfect,” Klaiman said simply of sophomore Jamal Mitchell, who connected on his only field goal attempt (29 yards) and was 13 of 13 on point-after kicks.
Klaiman is excited about the addition of Vince Sinagra as defensive coordinator. Sinagra, who played in the Canadian Football League and World Football League, is a veteran of 33 coaching seasons, 16 in Division 1.
After playing nine games last year, the AmCats have a 10-game schedule this season, their first as a full-fledged member of the Eastern Collegiate Football Conference.
“I’ve got high hopes,” Concepcion said. “By senior year, we could make a run at the playoffs in our conference. We could only go up from last year, and we’ve made a huge jump already.”
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Gloucester Marathon will showcase city at its best, says race organiser
Gloucester > Sport > Running
Author: Roger Jackson, Posted: Saturday, 5th August 2017, 09:00
The Gloucester Marathon, which incorporates a half marathon, starts at 8am on Sunday
While the runners will obviously be centre stage when the Gloucester Marathon gets under way on Sunday 6th August, this year’s event is not solely about the competitors.
That’s according to race organiser Andrea Maxted-Jones who says the event is a chance to showcase all things good about the city of Gloucester.
“It’s nice to get Gloucester on the sporting map for something other than rugby,” said Andrea. “Gloucester was one of the few cities in this country that didn’t have a marathon and events like this can bring the community together.”
The 26.2-mile route will start and finish in Gloucester Quays and Andrea said a lot of thought had gone into planning the route.
It is the second year that she and her husband Andy, who run TriMax Events together, have organised the race. This year the event incorporates a half marathon for the first time which also starts at the Quays and finishes there as well.
“Gloucester is an up and coming city with the Quays and the Docks area,” said Andrea. “We wanted people coming into the city to see these exciting parts of Gloucester. The marathon route takes the runners past other landmarks in the city – Kingsholm and the cathedral – before going out in the beautiful Cotswolds countryside towards Tewkesbury.”
The crowds, as always, will have a big part to play in the event’s success.
“Family and friends always turn out to support the runners because it’s a big achievement to run a marathon,” said Andrea. “Also people along the route will hopefully support the runners.
“Last year it was about 21 degrees which is quite hot for the runners and the villagers in Sandhurst were cooling them down with hosepipes as they went through!”
This year’s two races have attracted around 1,500 runners and both events will start at 8am.
Last year’ marathon attracted almost 1,000 runners and was won by Steven Way, from Hampshire, in a time of two hours, 29 minutes and 45 seconds.
Copyright © 2019 The Local Answer Limited.
Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this site's author and/or owner is strictly prohibited. Excerpts and links may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to The Local Answer Limited and thelocalanswer.co.uk with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.
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For over a year now, Americans have been up in arms over the Obama administration’s unconstitutional efforts to bribe and bludgeon state governments into surrendering control over K-12 education through the controversial so-called “Common Core” national standards — and the outrage is still growing. A peek beneath the surface, however, reveals that the nationalization of American schools is actually just one component of a much broader global agenda being pushed by the Obama administration, the United Nations, Bill Gates, and others: the globalization of education.
In fact, just this week, an invitation-only conference hosted by former Florida Governor and pro-Common Core ringleader Jeb Bush entitled “Globalization of Higher Education” took place in Texas. Among the attendees: Hillary Clinton, U.S. Education Secretary Arne Duncan, former World Bank President Robert Zoellick, UNESCO officials, university presidents, and more. While higher education appears to be the next target of reformers, the globalization of K-12 schooling is on the verge of completion — at least if the American people do not rise up and stop it.
For decades now, the globalists at UNESCO and other UN outfits have been openly plotting to impose what they sometimes refer to as the “World Core Curriculum” on all of humanity. According to the agency, it is all linked to UN Agenda 21. In addition to gathering up unprecedented amounts of data on everyone, the global “education reform” movement is essentially seeking to instill radical new values in children — turning them into “global citizens” with views inherently at odds with Biblical Christianity — to facilitate the total regimentation of human society. Countless programs and initiatives such as “Education for All” are working toward that goal.
Despite the virtual media blackout, none of it is much of a secret — even in the United States. In fact, Obama’s Education Secretary Arne Duncan even boasts openly that the U.S. Department of Education he leads is “cooperating” with groups such as the United Nations, often dubbed a “dictators’ club,” to “improve” education in America. In a 2010 speech to UNESCO, Duncan even referred to the UN “education” agency as one of the administration’s “global partners” in the effort to globalize schooling as part of the “cradle-to-career education agenda.”
“Today, education is a global public good unconstrained by national boundaries.... It is no surprise that economic interdependence brings new global challenges and educational demands,” Duncan told the globalist UN bureaucrats, boasting of the billions of dollars U.S. taxpayers were being forced to send foreign governments and institutions for “educational reform” abroad. “Our goal for the coming year will be to work closely with global partners, including UNESCO, to promote qualitative improvements and system-strengthening.”
The “education” agenda, of course, has less to do with actually educating children and more to do with promoting globalist political goals and values through indoctrination at school. “Education is still the key to eliminating gender inequities, to reducing poverty, to creating a sustainable planet, and to fostering peace,” Duncan continued, with “sustainability” being UN-speak for central planning and global government. Quoting former South African President Nelson Mandela, Duncan noted that education “is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.”
Unsurprisingly, billionaire UN devotee and population-control zealot Bill Gates — the primary financier of all things Common Core, other than U.S. taxpayers via the federal government — is deeply intertwined with the planetary effort. According to the latest estimates, while his own children attend an elite non-Common Core private school, the Microsoft founder has poured more than $2 billion into creating and promoting the dubious national standards for everyone else. Together with UNESCO, though, Gates is determined to impose the globalist vision of education on children worldwide.
In 2004, for example, on behalf of Microsoft, Gates personally signed a “Cooperation Agreement” with UNESCO to accelerate the globalization of education through information technology and communication. “Together, UNESCO and Microsoft aspire for there to be a quantum leap in the quality of courses and in accelerating their uptake by educationalists ... through the availability of standards, guidelines or benchmarks,” the agreement explains, calling for the creation of a “master curriculum (Syllabus).” “UNESCO will explore how to facilitate content development,” the document states.
After signing the agreement, as reported by Eagle Forum chief Phyllis Schlafly in 2005, UNESCO Director General Koichiro Matsuura gave a speech offering more insight into the plot. Among the goals of the partnership, the UN agency boss explained: “fostering web-based communities of practice including content development and worldwide curricula reflecting UNESCO values.” As the document itself explains, “Microsoft supports the objectives of UNESCO as stipulated in UNESCO's Constitution.” (For more on UNESCO values, see “Common Core and UN Agenda 21: Mass Producing Green Global Serfs.”)
It may or may not be a surprise to many Americans to learn that in a 2011 document about an advanced training program produced by UNESCO’s International Institute for Educational Planning, the would-be global Department of Education, even uses the term “Common Core.” The course outline, which boasts that the UN institute has trained more than 1,500 “education planners and managers” from around the world, adds under the Common Core header: “Educational planners and managers need insight into the effects of demographic shifts, globalization, and social and political change on education.”
“The fourth part of the course presents the main development frameworks, including the ‘new’ international commitments as part of Education for All/ Fast Track Initiative, Poverty Reduction, Millennium Development Goals, and discusses their impact on the role and methods/instruments of educational planning,” continues the document, which essentially outlines the training program being used to put legions of globalized education bureaucrats devoted to UNESCO’s vision in key positions worldwide.
UNESCO’s vision for a truly global education regime under the “World Core Curriculum” goes back decades, too, as its officials openly admit. “In the middle of my life I discovered that the only true, objective education I had received was from the United Nations where the earth, humanity, our place in time and the worth of the human being were the overriding concerns,” wrote the late Robert Muller, former UN assistant secretary general and the architect of the “World Core Curriculum” plot. “So at the request of educators I wrote the World Core Curriculum, the product of the United Nations, the meta-organism of human and planetary evolution.”
He described his planetary Common Core-like scheme as “a curriculum of our universal knowledge which should be taught in all schools of Earth.” One of his chief inspirations, he said, was former UN Secretary-General U Thant, a Marxist radical, whom Muller quotes as saying: “The world will not change and find peace, if there is not a new education.” Another one of Muller’s major inspirations was UN apparatchik and occultist Alice Bailey, who founded the Lucis Trust (formerly Lucifer Publishing Company) and claimed to channel spirits.
UNESCO’s use of the term “Common Core,” too, goes back decades. In 1984, for example — the same year President Ronald Reagan withdrew U.S. participation from the UN agency — the outfit released a 51-page document entitled “A Methodological Guide to the Application of the Notion of Common Core in the Training of Various Categories of Educational Personnel.” That scheme was aimed at training teachers worldwide using the same standards, so that they, in turn, could fan out across the globe to “educate” students all over the world.
Even as far back as the late 1940s, UNESCO was actively promoting the use of education as a means to achieve what its first Secretary General, Julian Huxley, described as “political unification in some sort of world government,” which he claimed was “necessary.” In a 1949 pamphlet on using the classroom to promote “world understanding,” UNESCO said: “As long as the child breathes the poisoned air of nationalism, education in world-mindedness can only produce precarious results.” So, to deal with that, schools should use various means to “combat family attitudes.”
Critics and analysts have slowly started taking notice. “Some have decried Common Core as the nationalization of American education. Far more dangerous, however, is the globalism of Common Core that demotes American values, undermines American constitutional principles and detaches students from their families and faith,” observed Catholic journalist and public speaker Mary Jo Anderson in a piece for Crisis magazine. “Common Core is simply the newest attempt in the decades-old battle (Outcome Based Education, Goals 2000) to impose a U.N. globalist worldview aimed at ‘peace,’ sustainability and economic stability at the expense of freedom.”
Indeed, Common Core represents merely the culmination of decades of quiet efforts by the globalist education establishment to foist its new values for its envisioned new society on the American people. In 1994, for example, Democrat President Bill Clinton signed “The Goals 2000: Educate America Act” foisting “National Standards” on schools across America. Then, Republican President George W. Bush signed the “No Child Left Behind Act” developing national “accountability” schemes to ensure that government schools were teaching what the federal government demanded.
Before the 1960s, of course, the federal government had virtually no role whatsoever in American education. The Constitution specifically prohibits it by not granting any power over education to the national government, and thus, reserving that sphere for the states or the people. Today, however, schools are largely operating under federal control, despite the rhetoric, as they comply with federal mandates to keep the federal funds flowing. Common Core is merely the next step — but almost certainly close to the end game.
Even before UNESCO came on the scene, tyrants and would-be tyrants always understood that controlling education — and the minds of the youth, by extension — was the key to power. From Marx and Stalin to Hitler, all of them knew corrupting children was their path to total domination. Today, Americans are faced with powerful globalist forces determined to shape the views and minds of their children through globalized “education.” And the outcome of this battle will almost certainly determine the future course of humanity.
Alex Newman is a correspondent for The New American, covering economics, education, politics, and more. He can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.. Follow him on Twitter @ALEXNEWMAN_JOU.
Big Business Launches Pro-Common Core Propaganda Blitz
Debunking Myth of Common Core Education as “State Led” (Video)
Achievement of UNESCO's Agenda Stalled by Loss of U.S. Funding
Obama Education Chief Sparks Fury with Common Core Comments
UN Report for Rio+20 Outlines Top-down “Green” World Order
Common Core Architect Now Dumbing Down SAT
New York Revolts Against Common Core
More in this category: « Indiana Replaces Common Core ... With Common Core Common Core and UN Agenda 21: Mass Producing Green Global Serfs »
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2012 Google doodle Archive
Google’s doodle celebrates Ada Lovelace197th birthday
Rebecca Google 2012/12/10
Google’s latest doodle celebrates the 197th birthday of Ada Lovelace, the 19th century mathematician and daughter of romantic poet Lord Byron. The doodle shows Ada Lovelace writing the pioneering computer program with a quill pen seated on a desk and the paper scroll she ...Read More
Today Google’s doodle celebrates 172nd birthday of Auguste Rodin
Today Google’s doodle celebrates 172nd birthday of Auguste Rodin, the French sculptor whose best known works included The Thinker and The Kiss. Rodin, who was born in 1840 and died in 1917, is widely considered the father of modern sculpture. The child of a working-class Parisian family, ...Read More
Google doodles Winsor McCay’s Little Nemo in Slumberland
Today Google paid tribute to American cartoonist and animator Winsor Zenic McCay with an interactive doodle of one of his works, “Little Nemo in Slumberland.” Google’s homepage recreates the adventures of the main fictional character from the illustrator’s comic strips “Little Nemo in Google-land” , which ...Read More
Google doodles Celebrates Niels Bohr`s 127th birthday today
Rebecca Education, Google 2012/10/07
Google celebrates Niels Henrik David Bohr 127th birthday with a atom doodle today. The Google doodle showcases Bohr atomic theory published in 1913. The theory, which became a basis for quantum theory, showed the atom as one with a small nucleus surrounded by electrons that ...Read More
Google doodles Celebrates Maria Montessori’s 142nd birthday
Google is celebrating at Maria Montessori 142nd birthday by special Google doodle on home page today. Dr. Maria Montessori Google Doodle is very colorful and looks like prepared as reflecting her background work. She is the founder of special education system- Montessori Education system. ...Read More
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Three Manchester City players make six-man shortlist for PFA award
Saturday, 20 Apr 2019
(Reuters) - Manchester City's Sergio Aguero, Raheem Sterling and Bernardo Silva have made the six-man shortlist for the Professional Footballers' Association (PFA) Players' Player of the Year award, the organisation said on Saturday.
Premier League leaders Liverpool were represented by centre back Virgil Van Dijk and forward Sadio Mane, while Chelsea winger Eden Hazard completed the list of nominees for the 2018-19 campaign.
Aguero is the league's joint top-scorer with 19 goals and Sterling has found the net 17 times as City aim to become the first team in a decade to defend the English top-flight title.
Van Dijk has transformed Liverpool's defence since joining the club from Southampton in Jan. 2018, and has been key in the Merseyside club keeping 18 clean sheets this season.
Mane was rewarded for his 18 league goals this campaign, while Hazard has been Chelsea's standout performer with 16 goals and 12 assists.
Sterling and Silva are also up for the PFA Young Player of the Year award alongside Liverpool full back Trent Alexander-Arnold, West Ham United midfielder Declan Rice, Manchester United forward Marcus Rashford and Bournemouth midfielder David Brooks.
The winners, voted for by the PFA members, will be announced at the annual awards ceremony on April 28.
(Reporting by Hardik Vyas in Bengaluru; editing by Clare Fallon)
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Star Business Journal
Lampert’s rescue of Sears puts him on the hook for $1.2 billion
By Lauren Coleman-Lochner
Brendan CoffeyBloomberg
Mon., Jan. 9, 2017timer3 min. read
Eddie Lampert is a tough guy, but he’s got a soft spot for Sears Holdings Corp. A billion-dollar soft spot.
Lampert, the Sears president, chief executive officer, top shareholder and, through his hedge fund, owner of about $900 million (all figures U.S.) in Sears debt, has almost single-handedly bought time for his struggling retailer. Transactions just since Christmas include an additional $500 million loan facility (Jan. 4), two letters of credit worth as much as another half-billion (Dec. 29), an agreement to sell Craftsman tools for a total of $900 million and the announcement of 150 more store closings (both Jan. 5).
The seemingly full-time job of keeping Sears, its units and spinoffs afloat now represents $1.16 billion of Lampert’s personal net worth of $3.8 billion, according to an analysis by the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.
As goes Sears, so goes Lampert.
“I don’t think there is any viable path to any sort of profitability,” said analyst Matthew McGinley at Evercore ISI.
Howard Riefs, a Sears spokesman, said the company, based in Hoffman Estates, Ill., has consistently shown that it “will take actions to adjust our capital structure, generate liquidity and manage our business while meeting all of our financial obligations.” The loan facility and letters of credit were extended “on an arms-length basis and reflect the best terms available to the company,” he said. Lampert’s representatives didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Lampert proved his toughness 14 years ago this month, when he was abducted as he left work at his ESL Investments Inc. hedge fund. The kidnappers used a shotgun to keep him in their clutches for two days before Lampert negotiated his own release and walked by himself to the Greenwich, Conn., police station.
The incident only added to his fame. Lampert, 54, gained Wall Street renown by leading ESL Investments, which began in 1988 with a grubstake of $28 million and grew to become the owner of Kmart Corp., which acquired Sears in 2005.
Merging a pair of troubled retailers didn’t turn out to be a road map for success and Lampert’s strategy wasn’t a big help. He spent less than competitors did on store upkeep, focusing instead on building the retailer’s digital operations and loyalty program.
When Lampert took over as CEO in early 2013, he was the company’s fifth in seven years. The four years since have cemented his status as the face of Sears.
It’s true that many U.S. malls are struggling, along with plenty of retailers that are victims of the historic shift to Internet buying. Macy’s Inc. and Kohl’s Corp. both cut their earnings forecasts this week after a lacklustre holiday season.
But Sears has been losing customers for years.
The company has tried a number of stratagems to remain above water. Spinoffs include Seritage Growth Properties, a real estate investment trust that markets Sears store locations; clothier Lands’ End Inc.; and Sears Hometown and Outlet Stores Inc., which sells appliances and tools.
Last month, Sears posted its biggest quarterly loss in more than four years, bringing the nosedive to $6.3 billion since the beginning of 2013. On Thursday, it said holiday same-store sales declined at least 12 per cent.
The sale of the 90-year-old Craftsman brand to Stanley Black & Decker Inc. was a “stopgap measure” at a disappointing price, according to Bloomberg Intelligence analyst Noel Hebert.
Lampert is “clearly trying to avoid the inevitable” Sears bankruptcy, according to McGinley.
Hebert, however, says the key might be Lampert’s current approach — Sears surviving in a smaller form.
Lampert’s net worth, tied up as it is with Sears, may need to survive in a smaller form, too.
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How a drought in China may have helped spark the Arab Spring
By Raveena AulakhEnvironment Reporter
Tues., March 5, 2013timer3 min. read
Drought in eastern China. A shortage of wheat. An uprising in Egypt.
On the face of it, the three don’t seem related. But two years after revolutions swept through the Arab world, a new study argues that climate change played a significant role in the Arab Spring.
The study — The Arab Spring and Climate Change — doesn’t claim climate change triggered the Arab revolutions but makes a persuasive case that interplay between climate change, food prices and politics is a hidden stressor that helped fuel the revolutions.
The series of essays open with Princeton scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter’s argument that consequences of climate change are “stressors that can ignite a volatile mix of underlying cause that erupt into revolution.”
The essays were jointly produced by the Centre for American Progress and the Centre for Climate and Security in Washington.
The connection between the Chinese drought of 2010 and the Egyptian uprising is compelling.
Two years ago, protests at Tahrir Square in Cairo kept millions around the world glued to their TV sets, others followed them on social media, making it one of the most closely watched uprisings.
The Egyptians were fed up with Hosni Mubarak’s autocratic regime, wanted to get rid of him.
It was a bit more complicated, argues Troy Sternberg, a geographer at Oxford University.
He writes that a once-in-a-century winter drought in China — with record-breaking heat waves or floods in other key wheat-growing countries and an abnormally wet season in Canada — reduced global wheat supply and sent prices skyrocketing, including in Egypt, the world’s largest wheat importer.
Higher wheat prices affected the cost and availability of bread in Egypt, influenced citizen protests and indirectly led to regime change, says Sternberg.
Numbers tell this story: “Bread provides one-third of the caloric intake in Egypt, a country where 38 per cent of income is spent on food,” Sternberg notes.
Global food prices peaked at an all-time high in March 2011, after Mubarak was toppled.
Interestingly, the world’s top nine wheat importers are in the Middle East and “seven had political protests resulting in civilian deaths in 2011,” pointed out Sternberg, who calls the drought the “localized hazard that became global.”
In Syria, for instance, Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell, founding directors of Centre for Climate and Security, note that from 2006 to 2011, up to 60 per cent of Syria’s land experienced the worst long-term drought ever recorded there; there were massive crop failures and herders in the north-east lost about 85 per cent of their livestock.
It came at a time when the country’s population was exploding and the United Nations reported that more than 800,000 Syrians lost their livelihoods as a result of the droughts, which led to a massive exodus of farmers and herders to cities, eventually fuelling unrest.
The future looks grim, too, the authors argue.
In Libya, where Moammar Gadhafi was ousted and killed in 2011, climate projections indicate that its “drought days” per year will go up from 100 to more than 200.
It’s not hard to see how these conditions multiply the threats already facing the country’s new government, says Slaughter.
The climate change-security connection is not new but Andrew Guzman, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and author of Overheated, the Human Cost of Climate Change, a recently released book, says the link is one that can no longer be overlooked.
Climate change is happening everywhere and it is happening fast, he points out.
“We will have more droughts, more floods and they will be more severe,” Guzman says. Historically, big droughts were far apart, maybe as much as a 100 years between two. “Now, they happen often and they have global impact.”
Future conflicts, says Guzman, will be caused by or become worse because of climate change.
Egypt, China, Libya, Climate Change
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“Please keep Fred's wife, Mrs. Rose Sheheen, and the entire Sheheen family in your thoughts and prayers,” Seawright said.
The crash is under investigation by the S.C. Highway Patrol, said Lance Cpl. David Jones. It occurred about 2:30 p.m. Monday on S.C. 97 at Sailing Club Road in Kershaw County.
A 2000 Lexus, driven by a Rock Hill woman, was traveling south on S.C. 97. Fred Sheheen was driving a 1997 Isuzu pickup truck north.
The vehicles hit when Sheheen attempted to make a left turn, Jones said, adding the Rock Hill woman also was transported to a hospital.
Higher education, arts advocate
Fred Sheheen graduated from Duke University in the late 1950s. After graduating, he worked as a reporter for The Charlotte Observer, covering civil-rights issues. In the 1960s, he worked as an aide to S.C. Gov. Donald Russell.
Sheheen was head of the state agency that oversees public colleges and universities, the Commission on Higher Education, from 1987 to 1997. At the commission, Sheheen helped craft policies to provide equality for blacks attending S.C. colleges and universities.
During part of his tenure, his brother Bob, a Camden Democrat, was speaker of the S.C. House of Representatives. Fred’s son Vincent later was elected to the S.C. House and state Senate, and, in 2010 and 2014, he was the Democratic nominee for governor.
State Rep. Laurie Slade Funderburk, D-Kershaw, said Monday that Fred Sheheen was the most energetic person she knew. He was a supporter of arts, and very active in local affairs and civic affairs, Funderburk said, adding Sheheen recently made a speech at a Kershaw County Democratic Women’s event, talking about how much he loved his country.
Sheheen was probably the strongest head of the Commission on Higher Education that the state has had, said Sen. John Courson, R-Richland. citing Sheheen’s intellect and communication skills. “He was aggressive without being abrasive,” said Courson, a higher education advocate.
Sheheen also was on the executive board of UNITED 2000, which was dedicated to bringing the Confederate flag down from the State House.
Cassie Cope: 803-771-8657, @cassielcope
Fred Sheheen
The former head of the state Commission on Higher Education died Monday, at age 79, in an auto accident.
‘Dedication to public service was unsurpassed’
“The university and the state of South Carolina have suffered a tremendous loss with the passing of Fred Sheheen. Fred’s dedication to public service was unsurpassed. ... (H)e was dedicated to making South Carolina a better place today than it was yesterday.”
— Bob Oldendick, director of the Institute for Public Service and Policy Research at the University of South Carolina
‘A champion for all that is right’
“Fred Sheheen was one of the best of the best ... as it relates to humanity, the arts, bringing people together. He was a champion for all that is right in this world. His death will be a loss that we will feel not only in Camden and Kershaw County but throughout the state.”
— Kristin Cobb, executive director of the Fine Arts Center of Kershaw County
‘Incredible human being’
“He was an incredible human being and a tremendous advocate for higher education in South Carolina.”
— Senate Minority Leader Nikki Setzler, D-Lexington
Iraqi refugees still worry about family at home, but are making the most of being in America
George H.W. Bush dead at 94
US. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos is visiting South Carolina Thursday to tour Nephron Pharmaceuticals participate in a pair of roundtables with business leaders and parents of S.C. students.
MORE THE BUZZ
Will Mark Sanford make a 2020 run against Donald Trump? SC GOP says take a hike
Which 2020 Democrat is raising the most cash in SC? The answer could surprise you
USC trustee flips position on vote for Caslen as president
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‘Escape the 1980s’ is Philly’s newest interactive puzzle | The Triangle
‘Escape the 1980s’ is Philly’s newest interactive puzzle
By Sankha Wanigasekara
Traditionally, weekends for teenagers and grown-ups would involve a visit to the movie theater, a Netflix binge, a bout of drinks at a pub or watching Sunday Night Football. Besides the drinking, all these activities require the adult to be a passive observer without having to put an ounce of thought into the endeavor. One might argue that playing Lumosity keeps those brain muscles well-flexed, but memory matrices and mental arithmetic can only take you so far. Luckily, a new solution has presented itself in the form of escape rooms.
Escape the Room is exactly what it sounds like. The primary objective of an escape room is to find a path out of an enclosed space, with most featuring an ambience of terror and suspense. In essence, it is similar to being in an installment of the “Saw” movie franchise. A group of individuals, who can be strangers or friends, enter a room and must sift through codes and clues to exit and see the light of day. Here in Philadelphia, there are several such locations, but the most recent to pop up may be the most intriguing: “Escape the 1980s.”
Located in East Passyunk, this escape room acts as a time machine into the 1980s, starting from the set design and going all the way down to the music. The interior is flushed with color schemes you would find in an Olivia Newton-John music video while cabbage patch kids and vintage board games sit in the lobby. A look at a corner revealed an ancient television coupled with the now extinct Atari game console. Hidden within the escape room was a library of aging Video Home System tapes that surprisingly worked after all these years. The venue could easily pass for a museum honoring the last decade of Generation X. That was the exact ambience that co-founders Elisabeth and Michael Garson were striving for, and Michael had a particularly difficult time locating these artifacts.
“It was a lot of searching on Craigslist, EBay, and I guess it took a bit of travelling as well. One guy owned a closed down video store. I got a third of the videos there, some were carefully selected and we had to pay top dollar,” Michael said.
Escape rooms in general were targeted at the masses. But having the entertainment format focused on one specific time period risked alienating people who were not fortunate enough to live through the decade, depending on one’s attitudes toward trends and fads of the time. According to Elisabeth, though, this was hardly a vulnerability to the business. It in fact turned out to be its greatest strength.
She said, “When I first started this I was like, this is for Gen X, we need something for us! That was my attitude. But we have more millennials than Gen Xers come through this game. They know enough about the 80s, they appreciate it. So our audience is really those two. We have millennials, and Gen Xers, and auxiliary groups, our kids and baby boomers.”
“Escape the 1980s” first graced the Philly population in early September. Like all good things, it won’t last, despite drawing crowds on weekends and even during the week. The issue is an inherent structural problem in the business model, one shared by all organizations in the industry. A particular escape room is merely one game, with permanent rules, clues and codes. A particular individual can only play the game once before spoiling it for himself or herself.
“Escape the 1980s” is no different, as the nature of the game doesn’t change daily. According to Elisabeth, though, there is a solution through the parent company she co-founded, Steel Owl. “Escape the 1980s” has the scope to live on in a different geographic market where people haven’t played the game, just not in Philly. But instead of leaving a vacuum, Elisabeth and Michael would then come up with a new variety of an escape room for the local crowd. In this business, you are only as good as your next idea.
That being said, the ‘80s themed setting should be able to hold out for a while longer against the competition and the entertainment’s constraints, with the owners giving it a maximum of six months. The way Elisabeth described it explains why.
“I love all escape rooms, I love anybody who’s doing one. I think ours is different, but I already said that my bend is to not have mystery, to not have tense, so for me, mine is my favorite one because I feel like it’s a party when you’re inside, and the other ones, if you’re a person who’s really into mystery or scary stuff, that might be a better fit for you, but ours is just flat out fun.”
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Is Bread Still the Staff of Life?
Should your diet include white bread, whole-grain bread—or no bread?
By Jorg Mardian
From the March 2016 Trumpet Print Edition
Bread has been a major staple of the human diet for thousands of years. Today it continues to be the most regularly consumed food in the world. In recent decades, it has also received a lot of bad press because of perceived negative effects on health and, in particular, weight gain.
Is bread a nutritional saboteur that you need to eliminate immediately, or does it have a place in a healthy eating regimen?
Refined Grains Vs. Whole Grains
By now, white bread has a well-earned reputation for its nonexistent and even negative nutritional value. Its refined grains have been stripped of their natural fiber, vitamins and minerals. Because of this, white bread increases your blood sugar and insulin and can lead to weight gain, higher cholesterol, type 2 diabetes and heart disease.
As recently as 15 years ago, 80 percent of bread sold in the United States was white bread. It is still everywhere, especially at restaurants. But things are beginning to change. The Chicago Tribune reported in 2010 that whole-grain bread sales had surpassed those of white bread for the first time. Thanks to education, availability and improved labeling, whole grains have become a top priority with consumers.
So if you are the average consumer, you know to pass on the white bread, but is that all you need to know?
The first step to a healthier diet of bread is to read the labels. When buying bread, look for the first ingredient to be listed as “100 percent whole wheat” or “100 percent whole grain.” This indicates that the bread includes all three parts of the whole grain or kernel—the bran (the outer layer), the germ (the part that germinates) and the endosperm (the inside of the grain, which is mainly starch).
Whole wheat flour is always whole-grain flour in the U.S. Canada has different regulations: There, “whole wheat flour” contains at least 95 percent of the original kernel, whereas “whole-grain whole wheat flour” contains 100 percent.
There is a growing international consensus that something labeled “whole grain” must contain the same relative proportions of starchy endosperm, germ and bran as found in the intact kernel (HealthGrain.org).
According to a study in Cancer Prevention Research, those who eat a healthy diet (with whole grains, fruits, vegetables, fish and healthy oils) have a 36 percent lower risk of death from all disease causes. The average American, however, eats less than one daily serving of whole grains; some studies show that over 40 percent of Americans never eat whole grains. Instead they reach for multigrain, wheat bread, organic flour, bran, wheat germ, unbleached white flour or 100 percent wheat. These breads may be packaged attractively, but they do not guarantee a whole-grain product—or any nutritional value.
Skip the claims on the front label and go straight to the ingredient list to find out the truth. Without this knowledge, you’re eating a product not dissimilar to more obvious sources of refined sugars such as candy and cakes, a product that easily fits the adage: “The whiter the bread, the sooner you’re dead.”
Look Beyond the Grain
Since commercial bread manufacturers have more interest in profit than nutrition, it’s no surprise that, with few exceptions, all commercial breads contain some additives you would not use at home. The ingredient label for a loaf of commercial bread pretending to be “healthy” may include emulsifiers, starch softeners, dough straighteners, relaxers and conditioners, gmo emulsifiers, preservatives, mold inhibitors, artificial food for yeast, and high-fructose corn syrup.
It’s a murderer’s row of chemicals leading to higher risk of heart disease and diabetes, and promoting the inflammatory bowel diseases of ulcerative colitis and Crohn’s disease as well as a group of obesity-related conditions.
Look for bread with a short list of ingredients that are recognizable, pronounceable and healthy.
Now let’s answer the original question: Is bread (even whole-grain bread) so bad that I need to eliminate it altogether? The short answer is no. Most people can still safely eat bread.
Shop in bakeries that specialize in soaked, sprouted or sourdough breads properly prepared. Commercially, you can also buy sprouted breads such as Food for Life 7 Sprouted Grains, Food for Life Ezekiel 4:9, Trader Joe’s Sprouted Whole Wheat Fiber Bread, Shiloh Farms Sprouted 5 Grain Bread (Organic) and Manna Organic Sprouted Multigrain Bread.
Ancient grain breads (spelt, quinoa, amaranth, millet, sorghum) are also packed with nutrients. These might contain some added natural forms of sugar, but won’t be full of anti-nutrients that the body has difficulty absorbing.
One more thing to consider is that bread is an energy food. If you are like many people who do not exercise daily, eating lots of bread (even whole-grain bread) means taking in energy but never using it. In nutritional terms, this means that carbohydrates enter your bloodstream and are stored as cellular energy. But since they are never properly used, you store these excess carbohydrates as body fat.
In short, if you’re the sedentary type, it’s important to watch your portion sizes when incorporating grains into a healthy diet. Don’t have a bagel for breakfast, a sandwich for lunch and pasta for dinner, or insulin will not be able to keep up, and any excess sugar will be stored elsewhere in your body as fat.
It’s important to monitor total diet and lifestyle together. Make sure you incorporate some type of exercise into your week and eat moderate amounts of soaked, sprouted or sourdough breads in a diet rich with vegetables, fruits, legumes, fish, olive oil and other healthy foods. Maintaining your health depends on your making proper choices.
Jorg Mardian is a registered holistic nutritionist.
Copyright © 2019 Philadelphia Church of God, All Rights Reserved.
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Friday, May 31st
vs. Toronto WON(6-13) 7:40PM ET Sportsnet, AT&T Sportsnet
Saturday, June 1st
vs. Toronto WON(2-4) 8:10PM ET Sportsnet, AT&T Sportsnet
Sunday, June 2nd
@ Chicago LOST(3-6) 7:05PM ET NBCSCH, AT&T Sportsnet
@ Chicago LOST(8-9) 7:05PM ET
Thursday, June 6th
@ Chicago WON(3-1) 1:20PM ET NBCSCH, AT&T Sportsnet
@ New York WON(5-1) 6:10PM ET SNY, AT&T Sportsnet
Saturday, June 8th
@ New York LOST(3-5) 6:15PM ET FOX
Sunday, June 9th
@ New York LOST(1-6) 12:10PM ET SNY, AT&T Sportsnet
vs. Chicago WON(5-6) 7:40PM ET NBCSCH, AT&T Sportsnet
vs. Chicago 7:40PM ET WGN, AT&T Sportsnet
vs. Chicago LOST(10-1) 2:10PM ET NBCSCH, MLBN, AT&T Sportsnet
vs. San Diego WON(6-9) 7:40PM ET FSN, AT&T Sportsnet
Friday, June 14th
vs. San Diego LOST(16-12) 7:40PM ET FSN, AT&T Sportsnet
Sunday, June 16th
@ Arizona WON(8-1) 8:40PM ET FSN, AT&T Sportsnet
@ Arizona WON(6-4) 2:40PM ET FSN
Friday, June 21st
@ Los Angeles LOST(2-4) 9:10PM ET SNLA Spanish, SNLA, AT&T Sportsnet
@ Los Angeles LOST(4-5) 6:15PM ET FOX
Sunday, June 23rd
@ San Francisco WON(2-0) 9:05PM ET ESPN, NBC Bay Area, AT&T Sportsnet
@ San Francisco LOST(2-4) 8:45PM ET ESPN, NBC Bay Area, AT&T Sportsnet
@ San Francisco WON(6-3) 2:45PM ET NBC Bay Area
vs. Los Angeles WON(9-13) 7:40PM ET SNLA Spanish, SNLA, AT&T Sportsnet
vs. Los Angeles WON(3-5) 7:15PM ET FOX
vs. Los Angeles LOST(10-5) 2:10PM ET SNLA Spanish, SNLA, AT&T Sportsnet
Tuesday, July 2nd
vs. Houston LOST(9-8) 7:10PM ET AT&T Sportsnet
Wednesday, July 3rd
@ Arizona LOST(0-8) 8:10PM ET FSN, AT&T Sportsnet
Sunday, July 7th
vs. Cincinnati WON(2-3) 7:40PM ET FSN, AT&T Sportsnet
vs. Cincinnati LOST(17-9) 7:10PM ET FSN, AT&T Sportsnet
Sunday, July 14th
vs. Cincinnati WON(9-10) 2:10PM ET FSN, AT&T Sportsnet
vs. San Francisco LOST(2-1) 7:40PM ET
Tuesday, July 16th
vs. San Francisco LOST(8-4) 7:40PM ET NBC Bay Area, AT&T Sportsnet
vs. San Francisco 2:10PM ET NBC Bay Area
@ New York 6:05PM ET MASN, NESN
@ New York 12:05PM ET
Monday, July 22nd
@ Washington 6:05PM ET
Tuesday, July 23rd
@ Cincinnati 5:40PM ET
@ Cincinnati 12:10PM ET
vs. Los Angeles 7:40PM ET
Wednesday, July 31st
Friday, August 2nd
vs. San Francisco 7:40PM ET
Saturday, August 3rd
Sunday, August 4th
Tuesday, August 6th
@ Houston 7:10PM ET
Wednesday, August 7th
Thursday, August 8th
@ San Diego 9:10PM ET
Monday, August 12th
vs. Arizona 7:40PM ET
Tuesday, August 13th
Wednesday, August 14th
vs. Miami 7:40PM ET
@ Arizona 8:40PM ET
Wednesday, August 21st
Thursday, August 22nd
@ St. Louis 6:45PM ET
Friday, August 23rd
vs. Boston 7:40PM ET
vs. Pittsburgh 7:40PM ET
Saturday, August 31st
Sunday, September 1st
Monday, September 2nd
@ Los Angeles 7:10PM ET
Tuesday, September 3rd
Wednesday, September 4th
Friday, September 6th
Saturday, September 7th
Tuesday, September 10th
vs. St. Louis 7:40PM ET
Thursday, September 12th
Friday, September 13th
vs. San Diego 7:40PM ET
Saturday, September 14th
vs. New York 7:40PM ET
Saturday, September 21st
Sunday, September 22nd
@ San Francisco 8:45PM ET
vs. Milwaukee 7:10PM ET
Saturday, February 23rd
@ Arizona WON(7-3) 2:10PM ET
Sunday, February 24th
vs. Seattle LOST(4-2) 2:10PM ET
Monday, February 25th
@ Kansas City WON(12-5) 2:05PM ET
Tuesday, February 26th
vs. Cleveland LOST(5-3) 2:10PM ET
Wednesday, February 27th
vs. Los Angeles LOST(9-7) 2:10PM ET FSN
Thursday, February 28th
@ Los Angeles TIED(7-7) 2:05PM ET MLB
Friday, March 1st
@ Oakland LOST(3-6) 2:05PM ET
Saturday, March 2nd
@ Chicago LOST(6-10) 2:05PM ET MLB
Sunday, March 3rd
vs. San Francisco WON(3-9) 2:10PM ET
Monday, March 4th
@ Texas TIED(4-4) 2:05PM ET
vs. Milwaukee LOST(1-0) 2:10PM ET
Thursday, March 7th
@ Chicago WON(7-5) 2:05PM ET
Friday, March 8th
vs. Texas WON(10-11) 2:10PM ET
Saturday, March 9th
@ Cleveland LOST(1-7) 2:05PM ET
vs. Arizona WON(1-5) 6:10PM ET
vs. Los Angeles LOST(3-1) 3:10PM ET SNLA
@ Arizona LOST(2-5) 4:10PM ET
vs. Oakland WON(3-6) 3:10PM ET
Wednesday, March 13th
vs. Kansas City WON(1-2) 3:10PM ET AT&T Sportsnet
@ Milwaukee LOST(4-5) 3:05PM ET
@ Chicago WON(7-2) 3:05PM ET NBCSCH
vs. Cincinnati WON(3-6) 3:10PM ET MLBN, AT&T Sportsnet
Tuesday, March 19th
@ Los Angeles LOST(7-9) 8:10PM ET MLBN, FSN
vs. Kansas City LOST(8-7) 8:40PM ET FSN, AT&T Sportsnet
Friday, March 22nd
vs. San Diego WON(5-6) 8:40PM ET AT&T Sportsnet
@ San Francisco LOST(4-6) 9:05PM ET NBC Bay Area
Saturday, March 23rd
vs. Chicago WON(6-11) 8:40PM ET MLBN, AT&T Sportsnet
@ Cincinnati WON(4-3) 2:05PM ET
@ Minnesota TIED(5-5) 1:05PM ET FSN
Go Friday Night
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Cars.com Abilene
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February 11, 2013 / 7:24 PM / 6 years ago
Attacks kill 12 in Iraq's Mosul: sources
MOSUL, Iraq (Reuters) - A suicide car bomber and unidentified gunmen killed at least 12 people in the Iraqi city of Mosul on Monday, police and hospital sources said, as sectarian and ethnic tensions build ahead of elections in April.
The bomber drove a vehicle packed with explosives up to a military checkpoint in Mosul, 390 km (240 miles) north of Baghdad, and detonated it, killing eight people and wounding 18, among them soldiers.
“The blast destroyed everything. It looks like there was nothing here before the explosion,” said a policeman at the scene who declined to be identified because he was not authorized to speak to the media.
In a separate incident in Mosul, gunmen using silenced weapons killed the bodyguard of a Kurdish member of the city’s provincial council and three others, police said.
A surge in violence since the withdrawal of U.S. troops in late 2011 is stoking fears of a return to the sectarian strife that killed tens of thousands of Iraqis in 2006 and 2007.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shi’ite Muslim, is facing mass protests by disenchanted Sunnis and is at loggerheads with ethnic Kurds who run their northern region autonomously from Baghdad.
The prospect of provincial elections is hardening the divisions as political leaders appeal to their constituencies with hostile and uncompromising rhetoric.
The conflict in neighboring Syria, where mainly Sunni rebels are fighting to overthrow a leader backed by Shi’ite Iran, is also whipping up sectarian tensions in Iraq and across the wider region.
Reporting by Sufyan Mashhadani; Writing by Isabel Coles; Editing by Kevin Liffey
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Responsible Third Party Statute and Statutes of Repose
By Mike Northrup on March 26, 2009 Posted in Summary Judgment
I’ve wanted to write something about Boenig v. Starnair, Inc. since I first read it because I believe the analysis is incorrect.
This case involves the intersection of the responsible third party statute and a statute of repose.
Boenig sued contractor Pulte in November 2005 for injuries she allegedly sustained when she fell through the attic floor of a home Pulte built. On July 19, 2007, Pulte filed a motion for leave to designate Starnair as a responsible third party. Starnair was a subcontractor that performed the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning installation in the home. On August 23, 2007, Boenig filed her fourth amended petition in which she joined Starnair as a defendant.
Starnair moved for summary judgment in reliance upon the ten-year statute of repose set out in Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.009. The trial court granted the motion and Boenig appealed.
Boenig argued on appeal that the responsible third party statute, Section 33.004(e) is an exception to the statute of limitations bar. Starnair argued that Section 33.004(e)’s reference to limitations should not be expanded to include statutes of repose. Using rules of statutory construction, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reasoned that because the statute of repose was contained in the limitations chapter of the civil practice and remedies code it should be treated as a statute of limitation. Using negative induction, the court further reasoned that because there is nothing in Section 33.004(e) to indicate that it is not applicable to the statute of repose, the court concluded that it must be applicable. The court reversed the summary judgment. For a more detailed reading of the court’s analysis, click on this link.
What stuck out when I read the court’s analysis is that it doesn’t square with the Texas Supreme Court’s characterization of statutes of repose nor does it square with the history behind how the statutes of repose came to be where they are codified today. In Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. 1989), the Texas Supreme Court recites the history of the placement of the statutes of repose and points out that West Publishing Company put them where they are located today, not the legislature. Accordingly, the Johnson Court indicates that the courts should not read anything into the legislature’s intent because of the location of those statutes. Id. at 655 ("[It cannot have the force of law."). In addition, the Johnson Court states its view that a statute of limitation is a "category of repose statute," Id. at 654, but the reverse is not necessarily true. Accordingly, the legislature’s decision to use the term "limitation" in Section 33.004(e) is not an expression of intent to include statutes of repose in the broader sense of the term and would not include Section 16.009.
Tags: judgment, party, repose, responsible, responsible third party, statute, statute of repose, summary, Summary Judgment, third
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Section 13.46
13.45 13.461
Administration department
Aid to families with dependent children (afdc)
Background checks and studies
Boards of health
Chemically dependent persons
Community mental health center boards
Contagious or infectious diseases
Corrections department
Criminal apprehension bureau
Developmentally disabled persons
Family day care homes
Federal agencies and officers
Food stamp program
Food support program
Foreign states
General assistance medical care
Higher education office
Human services boards
Income and franchise taxes
Local social services agencies
Mental illness, persons with
Minnesotacare
Ombudsman for mental health and developmental disabilities
Parties to suits
Peace officers
Personnel records
Probation officers
Regional treatment centers
Residential treatment programs
State nursing homes
Supervised living facilities
Supervised release
Telephone assistance plan
Temporary assistance for needy families (tanf)
Work first program
2018 Subd. 10 Amended 2018 c 182 art 3 s 1
2015 Subd. 2 Amended 2015 c 71 art 2 s 1
2015 Subd. 13 Repealed 2015 c 21 art 1 s 110
2014 Subd. 2 Amended 2014 c 291 art 11 s 1
2012 Subd. 2 Amended 2012 c 290 s 25
2008 Subd. 12 New 2008 c 361 art 7 s 1
2001 Subd. 4 Amended 2001 c 9 art 14 s 1
1999 Subd. 8 Amended 1999 c 99 s 7
1997 Subd. 2 Amended 1997 c 3 s 5
1995 Subd. 10 Amended 1995 c 259 art 1 s 12
13.46 WELFARE DATA.
(a) "Individual" means an individual according to section 13.02, subdivision 8, but does not include a vendor of services.
(b) "Program" includes all programs for which authority is vested in a component of the welfare system according to statute or federal law, including, but not limited to, the aid to families with dependent children program formerly codified in sections 256.72 to 256.87, Minnesota family investment program, temporary assistance for needy families program, medical assistance, general assistance, general assistance medical care, child care assistance program, and child support collections.
(c) "Welfare system" includes the Department of Human Services, local social services agencies, county welfare agencies, private licensing agencies, the public authority responsible for child support enforcement, human services boards, community mental health center boards, state hospitals, state nursing homes, the ombudsman for mental health and developmental disabilities, and persons, agencies, institutions, organizations, and other entities under contract to any of the above agencies to the extent specified in the contract.
(d) "Mental health data" means data on individual clients and patients of community mental health centers, established under section 245.62, mental health divisions of counties and other providers under contract to deliver mental health services, or the ombudsman for mental health and developmental disabilities.
(e) "Fugitive felon" means a person who has been convicted of a felony and who has escaped from confinement or violated the terms of probation or parole for that offense.
(f) "Private licensing agency" means an agency licensed by the commissioner of human services under chapter 245A to perform the duties under section 245A.16.
Subd. 2.General.
(a) Data on individuals collected, maintained, used, or disseminated by the welfare system are private data on individuals, and shall not be disclosed except:
(1) according to section 13.05;
(2) according to court order;
(3) according to a statute specifically authorizing access to the private data;
(4) to an agent of the welfare system and an investigator acting on behalf of a county, the state, or the federal government, including a law enforcement person or attorney in the investigation or prosecution of a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding relating to the administration of a program;
(5) to personnel of the welfare system who require the data to verify an individual's identity; determine eligibility, amount of assistance, and the need to provide services to an individual or family across programs; evaluate the effectiveness of programs; assess parental contribution amounts; and investigate suspected fraud;
(6) to administer federal funds or programs;
(7) between personnel of the welfare system working in the same program;
(8) to the Department of Revenue to assess parental contribution amounts for purposes of section 252.27, subdivision 2a, administer and evaluate tax refund or tax credit programs and to identify individuals who may benefit from these programs. The following information may be disclosed under this paragraph: an individual's and their dependent's names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, income, addresses, and other data as required, upon request by the Department of Revenue. Disclosures by the commissioner of revenue to the commissioner of human services for the purposes described in this clause are governed by section 270B.14, subdivision 1. Tax refund or tax credit programs include, but are not limited to, the dependent care credit under section 290.067, the Minnesota working family credit under section 290.0671, the property tax refund and rental credit under section 290A.04, and the Minnesota education credit under section 290.0674;
(9) between the Department of Human Services, the Department of Employment and Economic Development, and when applicable, the Department of Education, for the following purposes:
(i) to monitor the eligibility of the data subject for unemployment benefits, for any employment or training program administered, supervised, or certified by that agency;
(ii) to administer any rehabilitation program or child care assistance program, whether alone or in conjunction with the welfare system;
(iii) to monitor and evaluate the Minnesota family investment program or the child care assistance program by exchanging data on recipients and former recipients of food support, cash assistance under chapter 256, 256D, 256J, or 256K, child care assistance under chapter 119B, or medical programs under chapter 256B, 256D, or 256L; and
(iv) to analyze public assistance employment services and program utilization, cost, effectiveness, and outcomes as implemented under the authority established in Title II, Sections 201-204 of the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999. Health records governed by sections 144.291 to 144.298 and "protected health information" as defined in Code of Federal Regulations, title 45, section 160.103, and governed by Code of Federal Regulations, title 45, parts 160-164, including health care claims utilization information, must not be exchanged under this clause;
(10) to appropriate parties in connection with an emergency if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the individual or other individuals or persons;
(11) data maintained by residential programs as defined in section 245A.02 may be disclosed to the protection and advocacy system established in this state according to Part C of Public Law 98-527 to protect the legal and human rights of persons with developmental disabilities or other related conditions who live in residential facilities for these persons if the protection and advocacy system receives a complaint by or on behalf of that person and the person does not have a legal guardian or the state or a designee of the state is the legal guardian of the person;
(12) to the county medical examiner or the county coroner for identifying or locating relatives or friends of a deceased person;
(13) data on a child support obligor who makes payments to the public agency may be disclosed to the Minnesota Office of Higher Education to the extent necessary to determine eligibility under section 136A.121, subdivision 2, clause (5);
(14) participant Social Security numbers and names collected by the telephone assistance program may be disclosed to the Department of Revenue to conduct an electronic data match with the property tax refund database to determine eligibility under section 237.70, subdivision 4a;
(15) the current address of a Minnesota family investment program participant may be disclosed to law enforcement officers who provide the name of the participant and notify the agency that:
(i) the participant:
(A) is a fugitive felon fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, for a crime or attempt to commit a crime that is a felony under the laws of the jurisdiction from which the individual is fleeing; or
(B) is violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under state or federal law;
(ii) the location or apprehension of the felon is within the law enforcement officer's official duties; and
(iii) the request is made in writing and in the proper exercise of those duties;
(16) the current address of a recipient of general assistance or general assistance medical care may be disclosed to probation officers and corrections agents who are supervising the recipient and to law enforcement officers who are investigating the recipient in connection with a felony level offense;
(17) information obtained from food support applicant or recipient households may be disclosed to local, state, or federal law enforcement officials, upon their written request, for the purpose of investigating an alleged violation of the Food Stamp Act, according to Code of Federal Regulations, title 7, section 272.1 (c);
(18) the address, Social Security number, and, if available, photograph of any member of a household receiving food support shall be made available, on request, to a local, state, or federal law enforcement officer if the officer furnishes the agency with the name of the member and notifies the agency that:
(i) the member:
(A) is fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, for a crime or attempt to commit a crime that is a felony in the jurisdiction the member is fleeing;
(B) is violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under state or federal law; or
(C) has information that is necessary for the officer to conduct an official duty related to conduct described in subitem (A) or (B);
(ii) locating or apprehending the member is within the officer's official duties; and
(iii) the request is made in writing and in the proper exercise of the officer's official duty;
(19) the current address of a recipient of Minnesota family investment program, general assistance, general assistance medical care, or food support may be disclosed to law enforcement officers who, in writing, provide the name of the recipient and notify the agency that the recipient is a person required to register under section 243.166, but is not residing at the address at which the recipient is registered under section 243.166;
(20) certain information regarding child support obligors who are in arrears may be made public according to section 518A.74;
(21) data on child support payments made by a child support obligor and data on the distribution of those payments excluding identifying information on obligees may be disclosed to all obligees to whom the obligor owes support, and data on the enforcement actions undertaken by the public authority, the status of those actions, and data on the income of the obligor or obligee may be disclosed to the other party;
(22) data in the work reporting system may be disclosed under section 256.998, subdivision 7;
(23) to the Department of Education for the purpose of matching Department of Education student data with public assistance data to determine students eligible for free and reduced-price meals, meal supplements, and free milk according to United States Code, title 42, sections 1758, 1761, 1766, 1766a, 1772, and 1773; to allocate federal and state funds that are distributed based on income of the student's family; and to verify receipt of energy assistance for the telephone assistance plan;
(24) the current address and telephone number of program recipients and emergency contacts may be released to the commissioner of health or a local board of health as defined in section 145A.02, subdivision 2, when the commissioner or local board of health has reason to believe that a program recipient is a disease case, carrier, suspect case, or at risk of illness, and the data are necessary to locate the person;
(25) to other state agencies, statewide systems, and political subdivisions of this state, including the attorney general, and agencies of other states, interstate information networks, federal agencies, and other entities as required by federal regulation or law for the administration of the child support enforcement program;
(26) to personnel of public assistance programs as defined in section 256.741, for access to the child support system database for the purpose of administration, including monitoring and evaluation of those public assistance programs;
(27) to monitor and evaluate the Minnesota family investment program by exchanging data between the Departments of Human Services and Education, on recipients and former recipients of food support, cash assistance under chapter 256, 256D, 256J, or 256K, child care assistance under chapter 119B, or medical programs under chapter 256B, 256D, or 256L;
(28) to evaluate child support program performance and to identify and prevent fraud in the child support program by exchanging data between the Department of Human Services, Department of Revenue under section 270B.14, subdivision 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), without regard to the limitation of use in paragraph (c), Department of Health, Department of Employment and Economic Development, and other state agencies as is reasonably necessary to perform these functions;
(29) counties operating child care assistance programs under chapter 119B may disseminate data on program participants, applicants, and providers to the commissioner of education; or
(30) child support data on the parents and the child may be disclosed to agencies administering programs under titles IV-B and IV-E of the Social Security Act, as provided by federal law. Data may be disclosed only to the extent necessary for the purpose of establishing parentage or for determining who has or may have parental rights with respect to a child, which could be related to permanency planning.
(b) Information on persons who have been treated for drug or alcohol abuse may only be disclosed according to the requirements of Code of Federal Regulations, title 42, sections 2.1 to 2.67.
(c) Data provided to law enforcement agencies under paragraph (a), clause (15), (16), (17), or (18), or paragraph (b), are investigative data and are confidential or protected nonpublic while the investigation is active. The data are private after the investigation becomes inactive under section 13.82, subdivision 5, paragraph (a) or (b).
(d) Mental health data shall be treated as provided in subdivisions 7, 8, and 9, but are not subject to the access provisions of subdivision 10, paragraph (b).
For the purposes of this subdivision, a request will be deemed to be made in writing if made through a computer interface system.
Subd. 3.Investigative data.
(a) Data on persons, including data on vendors of services, licensees, and applicants that is collected, maintained, used, or disseminated by the welfare system in an investigation, authorized by statute, and relating to the enforcement of rules or law are confidential data on individuals pursuant to section 13.02, subdivision 3, or protected nonpublic data not on individuals pursuant to section 13.02, subdivision 13, and shall not be disclosed except:
(1) pursuant to section 13.05;
(2) pursuant to statute or valid court order;
(3) to a party named in a civil or criminal proceeding, administrative or judicial, for preparation of defense; or
(4) to provide notices required or permitted by statute.
The data referred to in this subdivision shall be classified as public data upon submission to an administrative law judge or court in an administrative or judicial proceeding. Inactive welfare investigative data shall be treated as provided in section 13.39, subdivision 3.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision in law, the commissioner of human services shall provide all active and inactive investigative data, including the name of the reporter of alleged maltreatment under section 626.556 or 626.557, to the ombudsman for mental health and developmental disabilities upon the request of the ombudsman.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and section 13.39, the existence of an investigation by the commissioner of possible overpayments of public funds to a service provider is public data during an investigation.
Subd. 4.Licensing data.
(a) As used in this subdivision:
(1) "licensing data" are all data collected, maintained, used, or disseminated by the welfare system pertaining to persons licensed or registered or who apply for licensure or registration or who formerly were licensed or registered under the authority of the commissioner of human services;
(2) "client" means a person who is receiving services from a licensee or from an applicant for licensure; and
(3) "personal and personal financial data" are Social Security numbers, identity of and letters of reference, insurance information, reports from the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, health examination reports, and social/home studies.
(b)(1)(i) Except as provided in paragraph (c), the following data on applicants, license holders, and former licensees are public: name, address, telephone number of licensees, date of receipt of a completed application, dates of licensure, licensed capacity, type of client preferred, variances granted, record of training and education in child care and child development, type of dwelling, name and relationship of other family members, previous license history, class of license, the existence and status of complaints, and the number of serious injuries to or deaths of individuals in the licensed program as reported to the commissioner of human services, the local social services agency, or any other county welfare agency. For purposes of this clause, a serious injury is one that is treated by a physician.
(ii) When a correction order, an order to forfeit a fine, an order of license suspension, an order of temporary immediate suspension, an order of license revocation, an order of license denial, or an order of conditional license has been issued, or a complaint is resolved, the following data on current and former licensees and applicants are public: the substance and investigative findings of the licensing or maltreatment complaint, licensing violation, or substantiated maltreatment; the record of informal resolution of a licensing violation; orders of hearing; findings of fact; conclusions of law; specifications of the final correction order, fine, suspension, temporary immediate suspension, revocation, denial, or conditional license contained in the record of licensing action; whether a fine has been paid; and the status of any appeal of these actions.
(iii) When a license denial under section 245A.05 or a sanction under section 245A.07 is based on a determination that the license holder or applicant is responsible for maltreatment under section 626.556 or 626.557, the identity of the applicant or license holder as the individual responsible for maltreatment is public data at the time of the issuance of the license denial or sanction.
(iv) When a license denial under section 245A.05 or a sanction under section 245A.07 is based on a determination that the license holder or applicant is disqualified under chapter 245C, the identity of the license holder or applicant as the disqualified individual and the reason for the disqualification are public data at the time of the issuance of the licensing sanction or denial. If the applicant or license holder requests reconsideration of the disqualification and the disqualification is affirmed, the reason for the disqualification and the reason to not set aside the disqualification are public data.
(2) Notwithstanding sections 626.556, subdivision 11, and 626.557, subdivision 12b, when any person subject to disqualification under section 245C.14 in connection with a license to provide family day care for children, child care center services, foster care for children in the provider's home, or foster care or day care services for adults in the provider's home is a substantiated perpetrator of maltreatment, and the substantiated maltreatment is a reason for a licensing action, the identity of the substantiated perpetrator of maltreatment is public data. For purposes of this clause, a person is a substantiated perpetrator if the maltreatment determination has been upheld under section 256.045; 626.556, subdivision 10i; 626.557, subdivision 9d; or chapter 14, or if an individual or facility has not timely exercised appeal rights under these sections, except as provided under clause (1).
(3) For applicants who withdraw their application prior to licensure or denial of a license, the following data are public: the name of the applicant, the city and county in which the applicant was seeking licensure, the dates of the commissioner's receipt of the initial application and completed application, the type of license sought, and the date of withdrawal of the application.
(4) For applicants who are denied a license, the following data are public: the name and address of the applicant, the city and county in which the applicant was seeking licensure, the dates of the commissioner's receipt of the initial application and completed application, the type of license sought, the date of denial of the application, the nature of the basis for the denial, the record of informal resolution of a denial, orders of hearings, findings of fact, conclusions of law, specifications of the final order of denial, and the status of any appeal of the denial.
(5) The following data on persons subject to disqualification under section 245C.14 in connection with a license to provide family day care for children, child care center services, foster care for children in the provider's home, or foster care or day care services for adults in the provider's home, are public: the nature of any disqualification set aside under section 245C.22, subdivisions 2 and 4, and the reasons for setting aside the disqualification; the nature of any disqualification for which a variance was granted under sections 245A.04, subdivision 9; and 245C.30, and the reasons for granting any variance under section 245A.04, subdivision 9; and, if applicable, the disclosure that any person subject to a background study under section 245C.03, subdivision 1, has successfully passed a background study. If a licensing sanction under section 245A.07, or a license denial under section 245A.05, is based on a determination that an individual subject to disqualification under chapter 245C is disqualified, the disqualification as a basis for the licensing sanction or denial is public data. As specified in clause (1), item (iv), if the disqualified individual is the license holder or applicant, the identity of the license holder or applicant and the reason for the disqualification are public data; and, if the license holder or applicant requested reconsideration of the disqualification and the disqualification is affirmed, the reason for the disqualification and the reason to not set aside the disqualification are public data. If the disqualified individual is an individual other than the license holder or applicant, the identity of the disqualified individual shall remain private data.
(6) When maltreatment is substantiated under section 626.556 or 626.557 and the victim and the substantiated perpetrator are affiliated with a program licensed under chapter 245A, the commissioner of human services, local social services agency, or county welfare agency may inform the license holder where the maltreatment occurred of the identity of the substantiated perpetrator and the victim.
(7) Notwithstanding clause (1), for child foster care, only the name of the license holder and the status of the license are public if the county attorney has requested that data otherwise classified as public data under clause (1) be considered private data based on the best interests of a child in placement in a licensed program.
(c) The following are private data on individuals under section 13.02, subdivision 12, or nonpublic data under section 13.02, subdivision 9: personal and personal financial data on family day care program and family foster care program applicants and licensees and their family members who provide services under the license.
(d) The following are private data on individuals: the identity of persons who have made reports concerning licensees or applicants that appear in inactive investigative data, and the records of clients or employees of the licensee or applicant for licensure whose records are received by the licensing agency for purposes of review or in anticipation of a contested matter. The names of reporters of complaints or alleged violations of licensing standards under chapters 245A, 245B, 245C, and applicable rules and alleged maltreatment under sections 626.556 and 626.557, are confidential data and may be disclosed only as provided in section 626.556, subdivision 11, or 626.557, subdivision 12b.
(e) Data classified as private, confidential, nonpublic, or protected nonpublic under this subdivision become public data if submitted to a court or administrative law judge as part of a disciplinary proceeding in which there is a public hearing concerning a license which has been suspended, immediately suspended, revoked, or denied.
(f) Data generated in the course of licensing investigations that relate to an alleged violation of law are investigative data under subdivision 3.
(g) Data that are not public data collected, maintained, used, or disseminated under this subdivision that relate to or are derived from a report as defined in section 626.556, subdivision 2, or 626.5572, subdivision 18, are subject to the destruction provisions of sections 626.556, subdivision 11c, and 626.557, subdivision 12b.
(h) Upon request, not public data collected, maintained, used, or disseminated under this subdivision that relate to or are derived from a report of substantiated maltreatment as defined in section 626.556 or 626.557 may be exchanged with the Department of Health for purposes of completing background studies pursuant to section 144.057 and with the Department of Corrections for purposes of completing background studies pursuant to section 241.021.
(i) Data on individuals collected according to licensing activities under chapters 245A and 245C, data on individuals collected by the commissioner of human services according to investigations under chapters 245A, 245B, and 245C, and sections 626.556 and 626.557 may be shared with the Department of Human Rights, the Department of Health, the Department of Corrections, the ombudsman for mental health and developmental disabilities, and the individual's professional regulatory board when there is reason to believe that laws or standards under the jurisdiction of those agencies may have been violated or the information may otherwise be relevant to the board's regulatory jurisdiction. Background study data on an individual who is the subject of a background study under chapter 245C for a licensed service for which the commissioner of human services is the license holder may be shared with the commissioner and the commissioner's delegate by the licensing division. Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, the identity of a reporter of alleged maltreatment or licensing violations may not be disclosed.
(j) In addition to the notice of determinations required under section 626.556, subdivision 10f, if the commissioner or the local social services agency has determined that an individual is a substantiated perpetrator of maltreatment of a child based on sexual abuse, as defined in section 626.556, subdivision 2, and the commissioner or local social services agency knows that the individual is a person responsible for a child's care in another facility, the commissioner or local social services agency shall notify the head of that facility of this determination. The notification must include an explanation of the individual's available appeal rights and the status of any appeal. If a notice is given under this paragraph, the government entity making the notification shall provide a copy of the notice to the individual who is the subject of the notice.
(k) All not public data collected, maintained, used, or disseminated under this subdivision and subdivision 3 may be exchanged between the Department of Human Services, Licensing Division, and the Department of Corrections for purposes of regulating services for which the Department of Human Services and the Department of Corrections have regulatory authority.
Subd. 5.Medical data; contracts.
Data relating to the medical, psychiatric, or mental health of any individual, including diagnosis, progress charts, treatment received, case histories, and opinions of health care providers, that are maintained, used, or disseminated by any agency to the welfare system is private data on individuals and will be available to the data subject, unless the private health care provider has clearly requested in writing that the data be withheld pursuant to sections 144.291 to 144.298. Data on individuals that is collected, maintained, used, or disseminated by a private health care provider under contract to any agency of the welfare system are private data on individuals, and are subject to the provisions of sections 13.02 to 13.07 and this section, except that the provisions of section 13.04, subdivision 3, shall not apply. Access to medical data referred to in this subdivision by the individual who is the subject of the data is subject to the provisions of sections 144.291 to 144.298. Access to information that is maintained by the public authority responsible for support enforcement and that is needed to enforce medical support is subject to the provisions of section 518A.41.
Subd. 6.Other data.
Data collected, used, maintained, or disseminated by the welfare system that are not data on individuals are public pursuant to section 13.03, except the following data:
(a) investigative data classified by section 13.39;
(b) welfare investigative data classified by section 13.46, subdivision 3; and
(c) security information classified by section 13.37, subdivision 2.
Subd. 7.Mental health data.
(a) Mental health data are private data on individuals and shall not be disclosed, except:
(1) pursuant to section 13.05, as determined by the responsible authority for the community mental health center, mental health division, or provider;
(2) pursuant to court order;
(3) pursuant to a statute specifically authorizing access to or disclosure of mental health data or as otherwise provided by this subdivision; or
(4) with the consent of the client or patient.
(b) An agency of the welfare system may not require an individual to consent to the release of mental health data as a condition for receiving services or for reimbursing a community mental health center, mental health division of a county, or provider under contract to deliver mental health services.
(c) Notwithstanding section 245.69, subdivision 2, paragraph (f), or any other law to the contrary, the responsible authority for a community mental health center, mental health division of a county, or a mental health provider must disclose mental health data to a law enforcement agency if the law enforcement agency provides the name of a client or patient and communicates that the:
(1) client or patient is currently involved in an emergency interaction with the law enforcement agency; and
(2) data is necessary to protect the health or safety of the client or patient or of another person.
The scope of disclosure under this paragraph is limited to the minimum necessary for law enforcement to respond to the emergency. Disclosure under this paragraph may include, but is not limited to, the name and telephone number of the psychiatrist, psychologist, therapist, mental health professional, practitioner, or case manager of the client or patient. A law enforcement agency that obtains mental health data under this paragraph shall maintain a record of the requestor, the provider of the information, and the client or patient name. Mental health data obtained by a law enforcement agency under this paragraph are private data on individuals and must not be used by the law enforcement agency for any other purpose. A law enforcement agency that obtains mental health data under this paragraph shall inform the subject of the data that mental health data was obtained.
(d) In the event of a request under paragraph (a), clause (4), a community mental health center, county mental health division, or provider must release mental health data to Criminal Mental Health Court personnel in advance of receiving a copy of a consent if the Criminal Mental Health Court personnel communicate that the:
(1) client or patient is a defendant in a criminal case pending in the district court;
(2) data being requested is limited to information that is necessary to assess whether the defendant is eligible for participation in the Criminal Mental Health Court; and
(3) client or patient has consented to the release of the mental health data and a copy of the consent will be provided to the community mental health center, county mental health division, or provider within 72 hours of the release of the data.
For purposes of this paragraph, "Criminal Mental Health Court" refers to a specialty criminal calendar of the Hennepin County District Court for defendants with mental illness and brain injury where a primary goal of the calendar is to assess the treatment needs of the defendants and to incorporate those treatment needs into voluntary case disposition plans. The data released pursuant to this paragraph may be used for the sole purpose of determining whether the person is eligible for participation in mental health court. This paragraph does not in any way limit or otherwise extend the rights of the court to obtain the release of mental health data pursuant to court order or any other means allowed by law.
Subd. 8.Access for auditing.
To the extent required by state or federal law, representatives of federal, state, or local agencies shall have access to data maintained by public or private community mental health centers, mental health divisions of counties, and other providers under contract to deliver mental health services which is necessary to achieve the purpose of auditing. Public or private community mental health centers, mental health divisions of counties, and other providers under contract to deliver mental health services shall not permit this data to identify any particular patient or client by name or contain any other unique personal identifier.
Subd. 9.Fraud.
In cases of suspected fraud, in which access to mental health data maintained by public or private community mental health centers or mental health divisions of counties and other providers under contract to deliver mental health services is necessary to a proper investigation, the county board or the appropriate prosecutorial authority shall refer the matter to the commissioner of human services. The commissioner and agents of the commissioner, while maintaining the privacy rights of individuals and families, shall have access to mental health data to conduct an investigation. Upon deeming it appropriate as a result of the investigation, the commissioner shall refer the matter to the appropriate legal authorities and may disseminate to those authorities whatever mental health data are necessary to properly prosecute the case.
Subd. 10.Responsible authority.
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, the responsible authority for each component of the welfare system listed in subdivision 1, clause (c), shall be as follows:
(1) the responsible authority for the Department of Human Services, state hospitals, and nursing homes is the commissioner of the Department of Human Services;
(2) the responsible authority of a county welfare agency is the director of the county welfare agency;
(3) the responsible authority for a local social services agency, human services board, or community mental health center board is the chair of the board;
(4) the responsible authority of any person, agency, institution, organization, or other entity under contract to any of the components of the welfare system listed in subdivision 1, clause (c), is the person specified in the contract; and
(5) the responsible authority of the public authority for child support enforcement is the head of the public authority for child support enforcement.
(b) A responsible authority shall allow another responsible authority in the welfare system access to data classified as not public data when access is necessary for the administration and management of programs, or as authorized or required by statute or federal law.
Subd. 11.Nursing home appraisals.
Names, addresses, and other data that could identify nursing homes selected as part of a random sample to be appraised by the Department of Human Services in its rate setting process are classified as protected nonpublic data until the sample has been completed.
Subd. 12.Child care resource and referral programs.
This subdivision applies to data collected by child care resource and referral programs under section 119B.19. Data collected under section 119B.19 are not licensing data under subdivision 4. Data on unlicensed family child care providers are data on individuals governed by subdivision 2. In addition to the disclosures authorized by this section, the names and addresses of unlicensed family child care providers may be disclosed to the commissioner of education for purposes of promoting and evaluating school readiness.
Subd. 13.Family, friend, and neighbor grant program.
This subdivision applies to data collected by family, friend, and neighbor (FFN) grantees under section 119B.232. Data collected under section 119B.232 are data on individuals governed by subdivision 2. The commissioner may disclose private data collected under this section to early childhood care and education experts at the University of Minnesota to evaluate the impact of the grants under subdivision 2 on children's school readiness and to evaluate the FFN grant program. The commissioner may disclose the names and addresses of FFN caregivers to the commissioner of education for purposes of promoting and evaluating school readiness.
1979 c 328 s 15; 1980 c 603 s 23; 1980 c 615 s 34; 1981 c 311 s 39; 1982 c 545 s 8,24; 1983 c 15 s 1; 1983 c 312 art 8 s 1; 1984 c 436 s 19-24; 1984 c 579 s 1-5; 1984 c 640 s 32; 1984 c 654 art 5 s 58; 1985 c 293 s 1,2; 1985 c 298 s 13-17; 1986 c 337 s 1; 1986 c 444; 1987 c 333 s 22; 1987 c 351 s 8-11; 1987 c 352 s 1; 1988 c 598 s 3; 1989 c 209 art 1 s 4; art 2 s 2; 1989 c 282 art 5 s 1; 1989 c 351 s 6; 1990 c 568 art 3 s 1; 1990 c 573 s 6,7; 1991 c 292 art 5 s 1; 1993 c 171 s 1; 1993 c 351 s 8-10; 1994 c 483 s 1; 1994 c 488 s 8; 1994 c 618 art 1 s 10,11; 1994 c 630 art 11 s 2; 1994 c 631 s 31; 1994 c 636 art 4 s 2; 1995 c 178 art 3 s 1; 1995 c 212 art 3 s 59; 1995 c 229 art 4 s 1; 1995 c 257 art 1 s 1; 1995 c 259 art 1 s 10-12; 1996 c 412 art 1 s 1; 1996 c 440 art 1 s 13; 1997 c 85 art 4 s 1,2; 1997 c 203 art 6 s 1; 1Sp1997 c 3 s 5; 1998 c 371 s 2; 1998 c 397 art 11 s 3; 1999 c 99 s 7; 1999 c 107 s 66; 1999 c 159 s 1,; 1999 c 205 art 1 s 1; 1999 c 227 s 22; 1999 c 241 art 9 s 1; 1999 c 245 art 7 s 1; 2000 c 260 s 87,90; 2000 c 311 art 6 s 1; 2000 c 343 s 4; 2001 c 178 art 2 s 4; 1Sp2001 c 9 art 10 s 66; art 14 s 1; 2002 c 375 art 1 s 2-4; 2002 c 379 art 1 s 113; 2003 c 15 art 1 s 33; 2003 c 130 s 12; 1Sp2003 c 14 art 1 s 106; 2004 c 206 s 52; 2004 c 290 s 7-9; 2005 c 10 art 1 s 6; 2005 c 56 s 1; 2005 c 107 art 2 s 60; 2005 c 163 s 40; 2005 c 164 s 29; 1Sp2005 c 4 art 1 s 1; 1Sp2005 c 7 s 28; 2006 c 280 s 46; 2007 c 112 s 1,2; 2007 c 147 art 2 s 1; art 10 s 15; 2008 c 361 art 7 s 1,2; 2009 c 142 art 1 s 3,4; 2009 c 163 art 2 s 1; 2012 c 216 art 15 s 1-3; 2012 c 290 s 25-29
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CRIMES; EXPUNGEMENT; VICTIMS
CHAPTER 609. CRIMINAL CODE
Headnote
609.001 MS 2006 [Renumbered 15.001]
609.01 NAME AND CONSTRUCTION.
609.015 SCOPE AND EFFECT.
609.02 DEFINITIONS.
609.025 JURISDICTION OF STATE.
609.03 PUNISHMENT WHEN NOT OTHERWISE FIXED.
609.031 [Repealed, 1983 c 331 s 11]
609.033 MAXIMUM PENALTIES; MISDEMEANORS.
609.0331 MAXIMUM PENALTIES; PETTY MISDEMEANORS.
609.0332 MAXIMUM PENALTY; PETTY MISDEMEANOR ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS.
609.034 MAXIMUM PENALTY; ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS.
609.0341 MAXIMUM FINES FOR GROSS MISDEMEANORS; FELONIES.
609.035 CRIME PUNISHABLE UNDER DIFFERENT PROVISIONS.
609.04 CONVICTION OF LESSER OFFENSE.
609.041 PROOF OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS.
609.045 FOREIGN CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL.
609.05 LIABILITY FOR CRIMES OF ANOTHER.
609.055 CAPABILITY OF CHILDREN TO COMMIT CRIME.
609.06 AUTHORIZED USE OF FORCE.
609.065 JUSTIFIABLE TAKING OF LIFE.
609.066 AUTHORIZED USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY PEACE OFFICERS.
609.075 INTOXICATION AS DEFENSE.
609.08 DURESS.
609.085 SENDING WRITTEN COMMUNICATION.
609.09 COMPELLING TESTIMONY; IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION.
609.092 JUVENILE PETTY OFFENDERS; USE OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE.
609.093 [Repealed, 2013 c 108 art 3 s 48]
609.095 LIMITS OF SENTENCES.
609.10 SENTENCES AVAILABLE.
609.101 SURCHARGE ON FINES, ASSESSMENTS; MINIMUM FINES.
609.102 LOCAL CORRECTIONAL FEES; IMPOSITION BY COURT.
609.104 FINE AND SURCHARGE COLLECTION.
609.105 SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT.
609.1055 OFFENDERS WITH SERIOUS AND PERSISTENT MENTAL ILLNESS; ALTERNATIVE PLACEMENT.
609.106 HEINOUS CRIMES.
609.107 MANDATORY PENALTY FOR CERTAIN MURDERERS.
609.108 Subdivisions renumbered, repealed, or no longer in effect
609.1095 INCREASED SENTENCES FOR CERTAIN DANGEROUS AND REPEAT FELONY OFFENDERS.
609.11 MINIMUM SENTENCES OF IMPRISONMENT.
609.115 PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION.
609.117 DNA ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN OFFENDERS REQUIRED.
609.118 FINGERPRINTING REQUIRED.
609.119 [Repealed, 2005 c 136 art 12 s 12]
609.12 PAROLE OR DISCHARGE.
609.125 SENTENCE FOR MISDEMEANOR OR GROSS MISDEMEANOR.
609.13 CONVICTIONS OF FELONY OR GROSS MISDEMEANOR; WHEN DEEMED MISDEMEANOR OR GROSS MISDEMEANOR.
609.131 CERTIFICATION OF MISDEMEANOR AS PETTY MISDEMEANOR.
609.132 CONTINUANCE FOR DISMISSAL.
609.135 STAY OF IMPOSITION OR EXECUTION OF SENTENCE.
609.1351 PETITION FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT.
609.1352 [Repealed, 1998 c 367 art 6 s 16]
609.14 REVOCATION OF STAY.
609.145 CREDIT FOR PRIOR IMPRISONMENT.
609.15 MULTIPLE SENTENCES.
609.153 INCREASED PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN MISDEMEANORS.
609.16 [Repealed, 1978 c 723 art 1 s 19]
609.165 RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS; POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION.
ANTICIPATORY CRIMES
609.17 ATTEMPTS.
609.175 CONSPIRACY.
HOMICIDE; BODILY HARM; SUICIDE
609.18 DEFINITION.
609.185 MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.
609.19 MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
609.195 MURDER IN THE THIRD DEGREE.
609.20 MANSLAUGHTER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.
609.205 MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
609.21 Subdivisions renumbered, repealed, or no longer in effect
609.2111 DEFINITIONS.
609.2112 CRIMINAL VEHICULAR HOMICIDE.
609.2113 CRIMINAL VEHICULAR OPERATION; BODILY HARM.
609.2114 CRIMINAL VEHICULAR OPERATION; UNBORN CHILD.
609.215 SUICIDE.
609.22 [Repealed, 1979 c 258 s 25]
CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON
609.221 ASSAULT IN THE FIRST DEGREE.
609.222 ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
609.223 ASSAULT IN THE THIRD DEGREE.
609.2231 ASSAULT IN THE FOURTH DEGREE.
609.2232 CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR ASSAULTS COMMITTED BY STATE PRISON INMATES.
609.2233 FELONY ASSAULT MOTIVATED BY BIAS; INCREASED STATUTORY MAXIMUM SENTENCE.
609.224 ASSAULT IN THE FIFTH DEGREE.
609.2241 KNOWING TRANSFER OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASE.
609.2242 DOMESTIC ASSAULT.
609.2243 SENTENCING; REPEAT DOMESTIC ASSAULT.
609.2244 PRESENTENCE DOMESTIC ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS.
609.2245 FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION; PENALTIES.
609.2246 [Repealed, 2013 c 43 s 32]
609.2247 DOMESTIC ASSAULT BY STRANGULATION.
609.226 HARM CAUSED BY DOG.
609.227 DANGEROUS ANIMALS DESTROYED.
609.228 GREAT BODILY HARM CAUSED BY DISTRIBUTION OF DRUGS.
609.229 CRIME COMMITTED FOR BENEFIT OF GANG.
609.23 MISTREATMENT OF PERSONS CONFINED.
609.231 MISTREATMENT OF RESIDENTS OR PATIENTS.
609.232 CRIMES AGAINST VULNERABLE ADULTS; DEFINITIONS.
609.2325 CRIMINAL ABUSE.
609.233 CRIMINAL NEGLECT.
609.2335 FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION OF VULNERABLE ADULT.
609.2336 DECEPTIVE OR UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES; ELDERLY OR DISABLED VICTIMS.
609.234 FAILURE TO REPORT.
609.235 USE OF DRUGS TO INJURE OR FACILITATE CRIME.
609.24 SIMPLE ROBBERY.
609.245 AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
609.25 KIDNAPPING.
609.251 DOUBLE JEOPARDY; KIDNAPPING.
609.255 FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
609.26 DEPRIVING ANOTHER OF CUSTODIAL OR PARENTAL RIGHTS.
609.265 ABDUCTION.
CRIMES AGAINST UNBORN CHILDREN
609.266 DEFINITIONS.
609.2661 MURDER OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE.
609.2662 MURDER OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
609.2663 MURDER OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE THIRD DEGREE.
609.2664 MANSLAUGHTER OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE.
609.2665 MANSLAUGHTER OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
609.267 ASSAULT OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE.
609.2671 ASSAULT OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
609.2672 ASSAULT OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE THIRD DEGREE.
609.268 INJURY OR DEATH OF UNBORN CHILD IN COMMISSION OF CRIME.
609.269 EXCEPTION.
609.2691 OTHER CONVICTIONS NOT BARRED.
CRIMES OF COMPULSION
609.27 COERCION.
609.275 ATTEMPT TO COERCE.
609.28 INTERFERING WITH RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE.
SEXUAL AND LABOR TRAFFICKING CRIMES
609.282 LABOR TRAFFICKING.
609.283 UNLAWFUL CONDUCT WITH RESPECT TO DOCUMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF LABOR OR SEX TRAFFICKING.
609.284 LABOR OR SEX TRAFFICKING CRIMES; DEFENSES; CIVIL LIABILITY; CORPORATE LIABILITY.
609.293 SODOMY.
609.294 BESTIALITY.
609.31 LEAVING STATE TO EVADE ESTABLISHMENT OF PATERNITY.
609.321 PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING; DEFINITIONS.
609.322 SOLICITATION, INDUCEMENT, AND PROMOTION OF PROSTITUTION; SEX TRAFFICKING.
609.3232 PROTECTIVE ORDER AUTHORIZED; PROCEDURES; PENALTIES.
609.324 PATRONS; PROSTITUTES; HOUSING INDIVIDUALS ENGAGED IN PROSTITUTION; PENALTIES.
609.3241 PENALTY ASSESSMENT AUTHORIZED.
609.3242 PROSTITUTION CRIMES COMMITTED IN SCHOOL OR PARK ZONES; INCREASED PENALTIES.
609.3243 LOITERING WITH INTENT TO PARTICIPATE IN PROSTITUTION.
609.325 DEFENSES.
609.326 EVIDENCE.
609.33 DISORDERLY HOUSE.
609.34 FORNICATION.
609.342 CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT IN THE FIRST DEGREE.
609.343 CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
609.344 CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT IN THE THIRD DEGREE.
609.345 CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT IN THE FOURTH DEGREE.
609.3451 CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT IN THE FIFTH DEGREE.
609.3452 [Renumbered 609.3457]
609.3453 CRIMINAL SEXUAL PREDATORY CONDUCT.
609.3455 DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS; LIFE SENTENCES; CONDITIONAL RELEASE.
609.3456 USE OF POLYGRAPHS FOR SEX OFFENDERS ON PROBATION OR CONDITIONAL RELEASE.
609.3457 SEX OFFENDER ASSESSMENT.
609.3461 [Renumbered 609.117]
609.347 EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT CASES.
609.3471 RECORDS PERTAINING TO VICTIM IDENTITY CONFIDENTIAL.
609.348 MEDICAL PURPOSES; EXCLUSION.
609.349 VOLUNTARY RELATIONSHIPS.
609.35 COSTS OF MEDICAL EXAMINATION.
609.351 APPLICABILITY TO PAST AND PRESENT PROSECUTIONS.
609.352 SOLICITATION OF CHILDREN TO ENGAGE IN SEXUAL CONDUCT; COMMUNICATION OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT MATERIALS TO CHILDREN.
609.353 JURISDICTION.
CRIMES AGAINST THE FAMILY
609.355 BIGAMY.
609.36 ADULTERY.
609.3641 [Repealed, 1985 c 286 s 24]
609.365 INCEST.
609.375 NONSUPPORT OF SPOUSE OR CHILD.
609.3751 DISCHARGE AND DISMISSAL.
609.377 MALICIOUS PUNISHMENT OF CHILD.
609.378 NEGLECT OR ENDANGERMENT OF CHILD.
609.3785 UNHARMED NEWBORNS LEFT AT A SAFE PLACE; AVOIDANCE OF PROSECUTION.
609.379 PERMITTED ACTIONS.
609.38 STAYED SENTENCE.
CRIMES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
609.385 TREASON.
609.39 MISPRISION OF TREASON.
609.395 STATE MILITARY FORCES; INTERFERING WITH, OBSTRUCTING, OR OTHER.
609.396 UNAUTHORIZED PRESENCE AT CAMP RIPLEY.
609.40 FLAGS.
609.405 [Repealed, 1987 c 10 s 1]
609.41 FALSE TAX STATEMENT.
CRIMES AFFECTING PUBLIC
OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE
609.42 BRIBERY.
609.425 CORRUPTLY INFLUENCING LEGISLATOR.
609.43 MISCONDUCT OF PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE.
609.435 OFFICER NOT FILING SECURITY.
609.44 PUBLIC OFFICE; ILLEGALLY ASSUMING; NONSURRENDER.
609.445 FAILURE TO PAY OVER STATE FUNDS.
609.45 PUBLIC OFFICER; UNAUTHORIZED COMPENSATION.
609.455 PERMITTING FALSE CLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENT.
609.456 REPORTING TO STATE AUDITOR AND LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR REQUIRED.
609.46 [Repealed, 1983 c 359 s 151]
609.465 PRESENTING FALSE CLAIMS TO PUBLIC OFFICER OR BODY.
609.466 MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FRAUD.
609.47 INTERFERENCE WITH PROPERTY IN OFFICIAL CUSTODY.
609.475 IMPERSONATING OFFICER.
CRIMES AGAINST THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
609.48 PERJURY.
609.485 ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.
609.486 COMMISSION OF CRIME WHILE WEARING OR POSSESSING BULLET-RESISTANT VEST.
609.487 FLEEING PEACE OFFICER; MOTOR VEHICLE; OTHER.
609.49 RELEASE, FAILURE TO APPEAR.
609.491 FAILURE TO APPEAR; PETTY MISDEMEANOR.
609.493 SOLICITATION OF MENTALLY IMPAIRED PERSONS.
609.494 SOLICITATION OF JUVENILES.
609.495 AIDING AN OFFENDER.
609.496 CONCEALING CRIMINAL PROCEEDS.
609.497 ENGAGING IN BUSINESS OF CONCEALING CRIMINAL PROCEEDS.
609.4971 WARNING SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION.
609.4975 WARNING SUBJECT OF SURVEILLANCE OR SEARCH.
609.498 TAMPERING WITH WITNESS.
609.50 OBSTRUCTING LEGAL PROCESS, ARREST, OR FIREFIGHTING.
609.501 FUNERAL OR BURIAL SERVICE; PROHIBITED ACTS.
609.502 INTERFERENCE WITH DEAD BODY; REPORTING.
609.504 DISARMING PEACE OFFICER.
609.505 FALSELY REPORTING CRIME.
609.5051 CRIMINAL ALERT NETWORK; FALSE OR MISLEADING INFORMATION PROHIBITED.
609.506 PROHIBITING GIVING PEACE OFFICER FALSE NAME.
609.507 FALSELY REPORTING CHILD ABUSE.
609.508 FALSE INFORMATION TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.
609.51 SIMULATING LEGAL PROCESS.
609.515 MISCONDUCT OF JUDICIAL OR HEARING OFFICER.
THEFT AND RELATED CRIMES
609.52 THEFT.
609.521 POSSESSION OF SHOPLIFTING GEAR.
609.523 RETURN OF STOLEN PROPERTY TO OWNERS.
609.525 BRINGING STOLEN GOODS INTO STATE.
609.526 PRECIOUS METAL AND SCRAP METAL DEALERS; RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY.
609.527 IDENTITY THEFT.
609.528 POSSESSION OR SALE OF STOLEN OR COUNTERFEIT CHECK; PENALTIES.
609.529 MAIL THEFT.
609.53 RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY.
609.531 FORFEITURES.
609.5311 FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY ASSOCIATED WITH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.
609.5312 FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY ASSOCIATED WITH DESIGNATED OFFENSES.
609.5313 FORFEITURE BY JUDICIAL ACTION; PROCEDURE.
609.5314 ADMINISTRATIVE FORFEITURE OF CERTAIN PROPERTY SEIZED IN CONNECTION WITH A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES SEIZURE.
609.5315 DISPOSITION OF FORFEITED PROPERTY.
609.5316 SUMMARY FORFEITURES.
609.5317 REAL PROPERTY; SEIZURES.
609.5318 FORFEITURE OF VEHICLES USED IN DRIVE-BY SHOOTINGS.
609.5319 FINANCIAL INSTITUTION SECURED INTEREST.
609.532 ATTACHMENT OF DEPOSITED FUNDS.
609.535 ISSUANCE OF DISHONORED CHECKS.
609.54 EMBEZZLEMENT OF PUBLIC FUNDS.
609.541 PROTECTION OF LIBRARY PROPERTY.
609.545 MISUSING CREDIT CARD TO SECURE SERVICES.
609.546 MOTOR VEHICLE TAMPERING.
609.551 RUSTLING AND LIVESTOCK THEFT; PENALTIES.
609.552 UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE OF ANIMALS.
DAMAGE OR TRESPASS TO PROPERTY
609.561 ARSON IN THE FIRST DEGREE.
609.562 ARSON IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
609.563 ARSON IN THE THIRD DEGREE.
609.5631 ARSON IN THE FOURTH DEGREE.
609.5632 ARSON IN THE FIFTH DEGREE.
609.5633 USE OF IGNITION DEVICES; PETTY MISDEMEANOR.
609.564 EXCLUDED FIRES.
609.5641 WILDFIRE ARSON.
609.576 NEGLIGENT FIRES; DANGEROUS SMOKING.
609.582 BURGLARY.
609.583 SENTENCING; FIRST BURGLARY OF DWELLING.
609.585 DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
609.586 POSSESSION OF CODE-GRABBING DEVICES; PENALTY.
609.59 POSSESSION OF BURGLARY OR THEFT TOOLS.
609.591 DAMAGE TO TIMBER OR WOOD PROCESSING AND RELATED EQUIPMENT.
609.592 POSSESSION OF TIMBER DAMAGE DEVICES.
609.593 DAMAGE OR THEFT TO ENERGY TRANSMISSION OR TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.
609.594 DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OF CRITICAL PUBLIC SERVICE FACILITIES, UTILITIES, AND PIPELINES.
609.595 DAMAGE TO PROPERTY.
609.596 KILLING OR HARMING PUBLIC SAFETY DOG.
609.597 ASSAULTING OR HARMING POLICE HORSE; PENALTIES.
609.599 EXPOSING DOMESTIC ANIMALS TO DISEASE.
609.60 [Repealed, 1989 c 5 s 18]
609.605 TRESPASS.
609.6055 TRESPASS ON CRITICAL PUBLIC SERVICE FACILITY; UTILITY; OR PIPELINE.
609.606 UNLAWFUL OUSTER OR EXCLUSION.
609.611 INSURANCE FRAUD.
609.612 EMPLOYMENT OF RUNNERS.
609.615 DEFEATING SECURITY ON REALTY.
609.62 DEFEATING SECURITY ON PERSONALTY.
609.621 PROOF OF CONCEALMENT OF PROPERTY BY OBLIGOR OF SECURED PROPERTY.
FORGERY AND RELATED CRIMES
609.625 AGGRAVATED FORGERY.
609.63 FORGERY.
609.631 CHECK FORGERY; OFFERING FORGED CHECK.
609.632 COUNTERFEITING OF CURRENCY.
609.635 OBTAINING SIGNATURE BY FALSE PRETENSE.
609.64 RECORDING, FILING OF FORGED INSTRUMENT.
609.645 FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS.
609.65 FALSE CERTIFICATION BY NOTARY PUBLIC.
609.651 STATE LOTTERY FRAUD.
609.652 FRAUDULENT DRIVERS' LICENSES AND IDENTIFICATION CARDS; PENALTY.
609.655 [Repealed, 1976 c 112 s 2]
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC SAFETY AND HEALTH
609.66 DANGEROUS WEAPONS.
609.661 PENALTY FOR SET GUNS; SWIVEL GUNS.
609.662 SHOOTING VICTIM; DUTY TO RENDER AID.
609.663 DISPLAY OF HANDGUN AMMUNITION.
609.665 SPRING GUNS.
609.666 NEGLIGENT STORAGE OF FIREARMS.
609.667 FIREARMS; REMOVAL OR ALTERATION OF SERIAL NUMBER.
609.668 EXPLOSIVE AND INCENDIARY DEVICES.
609.669 CIVIL DISORDER.
609.67 MACHINE GUNS AND SHORT-BARRELED SHOTGUNS.
609.671 ENVIRONMENT; CRIMINAL PENALTIES.
609.672 PERMISSIVE INFERENCE; FIREARMS IN AUTOMOBILES.
609.675 EXPOSURE OF UNUSED REFRIGERATOR OR CONTAINER TO CHILDREN.
609.68 UNLAWFUL DEPOSIT OF GARBAGE, LITTER, OR LIKE.
609.681 UNLAWFUL SMOKING.
609.684 ABUSE OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES.
609.685 SALE OF TOBACCO TO CHILDREN.
609.6855 SALE OF NICOTINE DELIVERY PRODUCTS TO CHILDREN.
609.686 FALSE FIRE ALARMS; TAMPERING WITH OR INJURING FIRE ALARM SYSTEM.
PUBLIC MISCONDUCT OR NUISANCE
609.687 ADULTERATION.
609.688 ADULTERATION BY BODILY FLUID.
609.705 UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.
609.71 RIOT.
609.712 REAL AND SIMULATED WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
609.713 THREATS OF VIOLENCE.
609.714 CRIMES COMMITTED IN FURTHERANCE OF TERRORISM.
609.715 PRESENCE AT UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.
609.72 DISORDERLY CONDUCT.
609.735 CONCEALING IDENTITY.
609.74 PUBLIC NUISANCE.
609.745 PERMITTING PUBLIC NUISANCE.
609.746 INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY.
609.7475 FRAUDULENT OR OTHERWISE IMPROPER FINANCING STATEMENTS.
609.748 HARASSMENT; RESTRAINING ORDER.
609.749 STALKING; PENALTIES.
609.7495 PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE WITH SAFE ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE.
609.75 GAMBLING; DEFINITIONS.
609.755 GAMBLING; MISDEMEANOR.
609.76 GAMBLING; GROSS MISDEMEANOR; FELONY.
609.761 OPERATIONS PERMITTED.
609.762 FORFEITURE OF GAMBLING DEVICES, PRIZES AND PROCEEDS.
609.763 LAWFUL GAMBLING FRAUD.
CRIMES AGAINST REPUTATION
609.765 CRIMINAL DEFAMATION.
609.77 FALSE INFORMATION TO NEWS MEDIA.
CRIMES RELATING TO COMMUNICATIONS
609.774 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS; KIDNAPPINGS.
609.775 DIVULGING TELEPHONE OR TELEGRAPH MESSAGE; NONDELIVERY.
609.776 INTERFERENCE WITH EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS.
609.78 EMERGENCY TELEPHONE CALLS AND COMMUNICATIONS.
609.79 OBSCENE OR HARASSING TELEPHONE CALLS.
609.795 LETTER, TELEGRAM, OR PACKAGE; OPENING; HARASSMENT.
609.80 INTERFERING WITH CABLE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.
609.805 [Repealed, 2007 c 47 s 1; 2007 c 54 art 2 s 19]
CRIMES RELATING TO BUSINESS
609.806 INTERFERING WITH INTERNET TICKET SALES.
609.807 EVENT TICKETS; PROHIBITED ACTS.
609.815 MISCONDUCT OF JUNK OR SECONDHAND DEALER.
609.816 WRONGFUL EMPLOYMENT AT A CHILD CARE CENTER.
609.82 FRAUD IN OBTAINING CREDIT.
609.821 FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FRAUD.
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FRAUD
609.822 RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FRAUD.
MISCELLANEOUS CRIMES
609.825 BRIBERY OF PARTICIPANT OR OFFICIAL IN CONTEST.
609.83 FALSELY IMPERSONATING ANOTHER.
609.849 RAILROAD THAT OBSTRUCTS TREATMENT OF INJURED WORKER.
609.85 CRIMES AGAINST RAILROAD EMPLOYEES AND PROPERTY; PENALTY.
609.851 FALSE TRAFFIC SIGNAL.
609.855 CRIMES INVOLVING TRANSIT; SHOOTING AT TRANSIT VEHICLE.
609.856 USE OF POLICE RADIOS DURING COMMISSION OF CRIME; PENALTIES.
609.857 DISCHARGING A LASER AT AN AIRCRAFT.
CRIMES AGAINST COMMERCE
609.86 COMMERCIAL BRIBERY.
609.87 COMPUTER CRIME; DEFINITIONS.
609.88 COMPUTER DAMAGE.
609.89 COMPUTER THEFT.
609.891 UNAUTHORIZED COMPUTER ACCESS.
609.8911 REPORTING VIOLATIONS.
609.8912 CRIMINAL USE OF ENCRYPTION.
609.8913 FACILITATING ACCESS TO COMPUTER SECURITY SYSTEM.
609.893 TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SERVICES FRAUD; CRIME DEFINED.
609.894 CELLULAR TELEPHONE COUNTERFEITING; CRIMES DEFINED.
609.895 COUNTERFEITED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; PENALTIES.
609.896 CRIMINAL USE OF REAL PROPERTY.
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO)
609.901 CONSTRUCTION OF RACKETEERING PROVISIONS.
609.903 RACKETEERING.
609.904 CRIMINAL PENALTIES.
609.905 CRIMINAL FORFEITURE.
609.907 PRESERVATION OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO FORFEITURE.
609.908 DISPOSITION OF FORFEITURE PROCEEDS.
609.909 ADDITIONAL RELIEF AVAILABLE.
609.910 RELATION TO OTHER SANCTIONS.
609.911 CIVIL REMEDIES.
609.912 NOTICE TO OTHER PROSECUTING AUTHORITIES.
Subdivision 1.Purposes.
This chapter may be cited as the Criminal Code of 1963. Its provisions shall be construed according to the fair import of its terms, to promote justice, and to effect its purposes which are declared to be:
(1) to protect the public safety and welfare by preventing the commission of crime through the deterring effect of the sentences authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted, and their confinement when the public safety and interest requires; and
(2) to protect the individual against the misuse of the criminal law by fairly defining the acts and omissions prohibited, authorizing sentences reasonably related to the conduct and character of the convicted person, and prescribing fair and reasonable postconviction procedures.
[Repealed, 1983 c 216 art 1 s 76]
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.01
Subdivision 1.Common law crimes abolished.
Common law crimes are abolished and no act or omission is a crime unless made so by this chapter or by other applicable statute, but this does not prevent the use of common law rules in the construction or interpretation of the provisions of this chapter or other statute. Crimes committed prior to September 1, 1963, are not affected thereby.
Subd. 2.Applicability.
Unless expressly stated otherwise, or the context otherwise requires, the provisions of this chapter also apply to crimes created by statute other than in this chapter.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.015
Subdivision 1.Crime.
"Crime" means conduct which is prohibited by statute and for which the actor may be sentenced to imprisonment, with or without a fine.
Subd. 2.Felony.
"Felony" means a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than one year may be imposed.
Subd. 2a.
[Repealed, 1999 c 194 s 11]
Subd. 3.Misdemeanor.
"Misdemeanor" means a crime for which a sentence of not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both, may be imposed.
Subd. 4.Gross misdemeanor.
"Gross misdemeanor" means any crime which is not a felony or misdemeanor. The maximum fine which may be imposed for a gross misdemeanor is $3,000.
Subd. 4a.Petty misdemeanor.
"Petty misdemeanor" means a petty offense which is prohibited by statute, which does not constitute a crime and for which a sentence of a fine of not more than $300 may be imposed.
Subd. 5.Conviction.
"Conviction" means any of the following accepted and recorded by the court:
(1) a plea of guilty; or
(2) a verdict of guilty by a jury or a finding of guilty by the court.
Subd. 6.Dangerous weapon.
"Dangerous weapon" means any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great bodily harm, any combustible or flammable liquid or other device or instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm, or any fire that is used to produce death or great bodily harm.
As used in this subdivision, "flammable liquid" means any liquid having a flash point below 100 degrees Fahrenheit and having a vapor pressure not exceeding 40 pounds per square inch (absolute) at 100 degrees Fahrenheit but does not include intoxicating liquor as defined in section 340A.101. As used in this subdivision, "combustible liquid" is a liquid having a flash point at or above 100 degrees Fahrenheit.
Subd. 7.Bodily harm.
"Bodily harm" means physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
Subd. 7a.Substantial bodily harm.
"Substantial bodily harm" means bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily member.
Subd. 8.Great bodily harm.
"Great bodily harm" means bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm.
Subd. 9.Mental state.
(1) When criminal intent is an element of a crime in this chapter, such intent is indicated by the term "intentionally," the phrase "with intent to," the phrase "with intent that," or some form of the verbs "know" or "believe."
(2) "Know" requires only that the actor believes that the specified fact exists.
(3) "Intentionally" means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act performed by the actor, if successful, will cause that result. In addition, except as provided in clause (6), the actor must have knowledge of those facts which are necessary to make the actor's conduct criminal and which are set forth after the word "intentionally."
(4) "With intent to" or "with intent that" means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result.
(5) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of the existence or constitutionality of the statute under which the actor is prosecuted or the scope or meaning of the terms used in that statute.
(6) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of the age of a minor even though age is a material element in the crime in question.
Subd. 10.Assault.
"Assault" is:
(1) an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death; or
(2) the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another.
Subd. 11.Second or subsequent violation or offense.
"Second or subsequent violation" or "second or subsequent offense" means that prior to the commission of the violation or offense, the actor has been adjudicated guilty of a specified similar violation or offense.
[Repealed, 2014 c 263 s 4]
Subd. 15.Probation.
"Probation" means a court-ordered sanction imposed upon an offender for a period of supervision no greater than that set by statute. It is imposed as an alternative to confinement or in conjunction with confinement or intermediate sanctions. The purpose of probation is to deter further criminal behavior, punish the offender, help provide reparation to crime victims and their communities, and provide offenders with opportunities for rehabilitation.
Subd. 16.Qualified domestic violence-related offense.
"Qualified domestic violence-related offense" includes a violation of or an attempt to violate sections 518B.01, subdivision 14 (violation of domestic abuse order for protection); 609.185 (first-degree murder); 609.19 (second-degree murder); 609.221 (first-degree assault); 609.222 (second-degree assault); 609.223 (third-degree assault); 609.2231 (fourth-degree assault); 609.224 (fifth-degree assault); 609.2242 (domestic assault); 609.2245 (female genital mutilation); 609.2247 (domestic assault by strangulation); 609.342 (first-degree criminal sexual conduct); 609.343 (second-degree criminal sexual conduct); 609.344 (third-degree criminal sexual conduct); 609.345 (fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct); 609.377 (malicious punishment of a child); 609.713 (terroristic threats); 609.748, subdivision 6 (violation of harassment restraining order); 609.749 (stalking); 609.78, subdivision 2 (interference with an emergency call); 617.261 (nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images); and 629.75 (violation of domestic abuse no contact order); and similar laws of other states, the United States, the District of Columbia, tribal lands, and United States territories.
Subd. 17.Ammunition.
"Ammunition" means ammunition or cartridge cases, primers, bullets, or propellent powder designed for use in any firearm. Ammunition does not include ornaments, curiosities, or souvenirs constructed from or resembling ammunition or ammunition components that are not operable as ammunition.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.02; 1969 c 735 s 3; Ex1971 c 27 s 42,43; 1977 c 355 s 2; 1979 c 258 s 2,3; 1983 c 274 s 14; 1983 c 331 s 4,5; 1985 c 167 s 1; 1986 c 444; 1987 c 307 s 1,2; 1987 c 329 s 3; 1987 c 384 art 2 s 1; 1989 c 5 s 1,2; 1992 c 571 art 6 s 10; 1993 c 326 art 5 s 6; 1997 c 239 art 9 s 34; 1Sp1997 c 2 s 59,60; 1999 c 194 s 5; 2000 c 488 art 5 s 2,3; 1Sp2001 c 8 art 10 s 7; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 8; 2006 c 260 art 1 s 12; 2007 c 54 art 2 s 2; 2010 c 299 s 14; 2012 c 227 s 1; 2015 c 65 art 3 s 16; 2016 c 126 s 3
A person may be convicted and sentenced under the law of this state if the person:
(1) commits an offense in whole or in part within this state; or
(2) being without the state, causes, aids or abets another to commit a crime within the state; or
(3) being without the state, intentionally causes a result within the state prohibited by the criminal laws of this state.
It is not a defense that the defendant's conduct is also a criminal offense under the laws of another state or of the United States or of another country.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.025; Ex1971 c 27 s 44; 1986 c 444
If a person is convicted of a crime for which no punishment is otherwise provided the person may be sentenced as follows:
(1) If the crime is a felony, to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both; or
(2) If the crime is a gross misdemeanor, to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both; or
(3) If the crime is a misdemeanor, to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or both; or
(4) If the crime is other than a misdemeanor and a fine is imposed but the amount is not specified, to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or to imprisonment for a specified term of not more than six months if the fine is not paid.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.03; 1969 c 735 s 4; 1977 c 355 s 3; 1983 c 331 s 6; 1986 c 444; 2000 c 488 art 5 s 4
Any law of this state which provides for a maximum fine of $700 as a penalty for a misdemeanor shall, on or after August 1, 2000, be deemed to provide for a maximum fine of $1,000.
1983 c 331 s 7; 2000 c 488 art 5 s 5
A law of this state that provides, on or after August 1, 2000, for a maximum penalty of $200 for a petty misdemeanor is considered to provide for a maximum fine of $300.
1987 c 329 s 4; 1992 c 464 art 1 s 49; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 13; 2000 c 488 art 5 s 6
Subdivision 1.Increased fine.
From August 1, 2000, if a state law or municipal charter sets a limit of $200 or less on the fines that a statutory or home rule charter city, town, county, or other political subdivision may prescribe for an ordinance violation that is defined as a petty misdemeanor, that law or charter is considered to provide that the political subdivision has the power to prescribe a maximum fine of $300 for the petty misdemeanor violation.
1987 c 329 s 5; 1991 c 199 art 2 s 1; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 14; 2000 c 488 art 5 s 7
Any law of this state or municipal charter which limits the power of any statutory or home rule charter city, town, county, or other political subdivision to prescribe a maximum fine of $700 or less for an ordinance shall on or after August 1, 2000, be deemed to provide that the statutory or home rule charter city, town, county, or other political subdivision has the power to prescribe a maximum fine of $1,000.
Subdivision 1.Gross misdemeanors.
Any law of this state which provides for a maximum fine of $1,000 or for a maximum sentence of imprisonment of one year or which is defined as a gross misdemeanor shall, on or after August 1, 1983, be deemed to provide for a maximum fine of $3,000 and for a maximum sentence of imprisonment of one year.
Subd. 2.Felonies.
(a) Any law of this state which provides for a maximum fine of $2,000 shall, on or after August 1, 1983, be deemed to provide for a maximum fine of $4,000.
(b) Any law of this state which provides for a maximum fine of $3,000 shall, on or after August 1, 1983, be deemed to provide for a maximum fine of $5,000.
(c) Any law of this state which provides for a maximum fine of $5,000 shall, on or after August 1, 1983, be deemed to provide for a maximum fine of $10,000.
(d) Any law of this state which provides for a maximum fine of $7,000 shall, on or after August 1, 1983, be deemed to provide for a maximum fine of $14,000.
(e) Any law of this state which provides for a maximum fine of $10,000 shall, on or after August 1, 1983, be deemed to provide for a maximum fine of $20,000.
(f) Any law of this state which provides for a maximum fine of $15,000 shall, on or after August 1, 1983, be deemed to provide for a maximum fine of $30,000.
(g) Any law of this state which provides for a maximum fine of $20,000 shall, on or after August 1, 1983, be deemed to provide for a maximum fine of $35,000.
(h) Any law of this state which provides for a maximum fine of $25,000 shall, on or after August 1, 1983, be deemed to provide for a maximum fine of $40,000.
(i) Any law of this state which provides for a maximum fine of $30,000 shall, on or after August 1, 1983, be deemed to provide for a maximum fine of $45,000.
(j) Any law of this state which provides for a maximum fine of $40,000 shall, on or after August 1, 1983, be deemed to provide for a maximum fine of $50,000.
1983 c 331 s 9; 1993 c 326 art 13 s 19
Subdivision 1.Conduct; multiple crimes; chargeable for one offense.
Except as provided in subdivisions 2, 3, 4, and 5, and in sections 609.2114, subdivision 3, 609.251, 609.2691, 609.486, 609.494, 609.585, and 609.856, and Minnesota Statutes 2012, section 609.21, subdivision 1b, if a person's conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them. All the offenses, if prosecuted, shall be included in one prosecution which shall be stated in separate counts.
Subd. 2.Consecutive sentences.
(a) When a person is being sentenced for a violation of a provision listed in paragraph (e), the court may sentence the person to a consecutive term of imprisonment for a violation of any other provision listed in paragraph (e), notwithstanding the fact that the offenses arose out of the same course of conduct, subject to the limitation on consecutive sentences contained in section 609.15, subdivision 2, and except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), and (f).
(b) When a person is being sentenced for a violation of section 171.09, 171.20, 171.24, or 171.30, the court may not impose a consecutive sentence for another violation of a provision in chapter 171.
(c) When a person is being sentenced for a violation of section 169.791 or 169.797, the court may not impose a consecutive sentence for another violation of a provision of sections 169.79 to 169.7995.
(d) This subdivision does not limit the authority of the court to impose consecutive sentences for crimes arising on different dates or to impose a consecutive sentence when a person is being sentenced for a crime and is also in violation of the conditions of a stayed or otherwise deferred sentence under section 609.135.
(e) This subdivision applies to misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor violations of the following if the offender has two or more prior impaired driving convictions as defined in section 169A.03 within the past ten years:
(1) section 169A.20, subdivision 1, 1a, 1b, or 1c, driving while impaired;
(2) section 169A.20, subdivision 2, test refusal;
(3) section 169.791, failure to provide proof of insurance;
(4) section 169.797, failure to provide vehicle insurance;
(5) section 171.09, violation of condition of restricted license;
(6) section 171.20, subdivision 2, operation after revocation, suspension, cancellation, or disqualification;
(7) section 171.24, driving without valid license; and
(8) section 171.30, violation of condition of limited license.
(f) When a court is sentencing an offender for a violation of section 169A.20 and a violation of an offense listed in paragraph (e), and the offender has five or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents, as defined in section 169A.03, within the past ten years, the court shall sentence the offender to serve consecutive sentences for the offenses, notwithstanding the fact that the offenses arose out of the same course of conduct.
[See Note.]
Subd. 3.Exception; firearms offenses.
Notwithstanding section 609.04, a prosecution for or conviction of a violation of section 609.165 or 624.713, subdivision 1, clause (2), is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.
Subd. 4.Exception; arson offenses.
Notwithstanding section 609.04, a prosecution for or conviction of a violation of sections 609.561 to 609.563 or 609.5641 is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct when the defendant is shown to have violated sections 609.561 to 609.563 or 609.5641 for the purpose of concealing any other crime.
For purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, a violation of sections 609.561 to 609.563 or 609.5641 is a crime against the person.
Subd. 5.Exception; fleeing a peace officer.
Notwithstanding subdivision 1, a prosecution or conviction for violating section 609.487 is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct. If an offender is punished for more than one crime as authorized by this subdivision and the court imposes consecutive sentences for the crimes, the consecutive sentences are not a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.
Subd. 6.Exception; criminal sexual conduct offenses.
Notwithstanding subdivision 1, a prosecution or conviction for committing a violation of sections 609.342 to 609.345 with force or violence is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct. If an offender is punished for more than one crime as authorized by this subdivision and the court imposes consecutive sentences for the crimes, the consecutive sentences are not a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.035; 1983 c 139 s 1; 1986 c 388 s 1; 1986 c 444; 1987 c 111 s 1; 1993 c 326 art 4 s 13; 1994 c 615 s 23; 1996 c 408 art 4 s 2,3; 1997 c 239 art 8 s 28,29; 1999 c 194 s 6; 1999 c 216 art 3 s 4-6; 2000 c 311 art 4 s 1; 2000 c 478 art 2 s 4; 1Sp2001 c 8 art 12 s 16; 2007 c 54 art 3 s 14; 2009 c 83 art 2 s 37; 2014 c 180 s 9
NOTE: Subdivision 2, paragraph (f), was found unconstitutional in State v. Blooflat, 671 N.W.2d 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
Subdivision 1.Lesser offense prosecution.
Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both. An included offense may be any of the following:
(1) A lesser degree of the same crime; or
(2) An attempt to commit the crime charged; or
(3) An attempt to commit a lesser degree of the same crime; or
(4) A crime necessarily proved if the crime charged were proved; or
(5) A petty misdemeanor necessarily proved if the misdemeanor charge were proved.
Subd. 2.Conviction; bar to prosecution.
A conviction or acquittal of a crime is a bar to further prosecution of any included offense, or other degree of the same crime.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.04; Ex1971 c 27 s 45
In a criminal prosecution in which the degree of the crime or the penalty for the crime depends, in whole or in part, on proof of the existence of a prior conviction, if the defendant contests the existence of or factual basis for a prior conviction, proof of it is established by competent and reliable evidence, including a certified court record of the conviction.
1988 c 520 s 2
If an act or omission in this state constitutes a crime under both the laws of this state and the laws of another jurisdiction, a conviction or acquittal of the crime in the other jurisdiction shall not bar prosecution for the crime in this state unless the elements of both law and fact are identical.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.045; 1983 c 152 s 1
Subdivision 1.Aiding, abetting; liability.
A person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.
Subd. 2.Expansive liability.
A person liable under subdivision 1 is also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by the person as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the crime intended.
Subd. 3.Abandonment of criminal purpose.
A person who intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures another to commit a crime and thereafter abandons that purpose and makes a reasonable effort to prevent the commission of the crime prior to its commission is not liable if the crime is thereafter committed.
Subd. 4.Circumstances of conviction.
A person liable under this section may be charged with and convicted of the crime although the person who directly committed it has not been convicted, or has been convicted of some other degree of the crime or of some other crime based on the same act, or if the person is a juvenile who has not been found delinquent for the act.
Subd. 5.Definition.
For purposes of this section, a crime also includes an act committed by a juvenile that would be a crime if committed by an adult.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.05; 1986 c 444; 1991 c 279 s 22,23
Subdivision 1.General rule.
Children under the age of 14 years are incapable of committing crime.
Subd. 2.Adult prosecution.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b), children of the age of 14 years or over but under 18 years may be prosecuted for a felony offense if the alleged violation is duly certified for prosecution under the laws and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations or may be designated an extended jurisdiction juvenile in accordance with the provisions of chapter 260B. A child who is 16 years of age or older but under 18 years of age is capable of committing a crime and may be prosecuted for a felony if:
(1) the child has been previously certified on a felony charge pursuant to a hearing under section 260B.125, subdivision 2, or pursuant to the waiver of the right to such a hearing, or prosecuted pursuant to this subdivision; and
(2) the child was convicted of the felony offense or offenses for which the child was prosecuted or of a lesser included felony offense.
(b) A child who is alleged to have committed murder in the first degree after becoming 16 years of age is capable of committing a crime and may be prosecuted for the felony. This paragraph does not apply to a child alleged to have committed attempted murder in the first degree after becoming 16 years of age.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.055; 1992 c 571 art 7 s 12; 1994 c 576 s 45; 1995 c 226 art 3 s 47; 1999 c 139 art 4 s 2
Subdivision 1.When authorized.
Except as otherwise provided in subdivision 2, reasonable force may be used upon or toward the person of another without the other's consent when the following circumstances exist or the actor reasonably believes them to exist:
(1) when used by a public officer or one assisting a public officer under the public officer's direction:
(a) in effecting a lawful arrest; or
(b) in the execution of legal process; or
(c) in enforcing an order of the court; or
(d) in executing any other duty imposed upon the public officer by law; or
(2) when used by a person not a public officer in arresting another in the cases and in the manner provided by law and delivering the other to an officer competent to receive the other into custody; or
(3) when used by any person in resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the person; or
(4) when used by any person in lawful possession of real or personal property, or by another assisting the person in lawful possession, in resisting a trespass upon or other unlawful interference with such property; or
(5) when used by any person to prevent the escape, or to retake following the escape, of a person lawfully held on a charge or conviction of a crime; or
(6) when used by a parent, guardian, teacher, or other lawful custodian of a child or pupil, in the exercise of lawful authority, to restrain or correct such child or pupil; or
(7) when used by a school employee or school bus driver, in the exercise of lawful authority, to restrain a child or pupil, or to prevent bodily harm or death to another; or
(8) when used by a common carrier in expelling a passenger who refuses to obey a lawful requirement for the conduct of passengers and reasonable care is exercised with regard to the passenger's personal safety; or
(9) when used to restrain a person with a mental illness or a person with a developmental disability from self-injury or injury to another or when used by one with authority to do so to compel compliance with reasonable requirements for the person's control, conduct, or treatment; or
(10) when used by a public or private institution providing custody or treatment against one lawfully committed to it to compel compliance with reasonable requirements for the control, conduct, or treatment of the committed person.
Subd. 2.Deadly force used against peace officers.
Deadly force may not be used against peace officers who have announced their presence and are performing official duties at a location where a person is committing a crime or an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.06; 1986 c 444; 1993 c 326 art 1 s 4; 1996 c 408 art 3 s 12; 2002 c 221 s 46; 2013 c 59 art 3 s 16; 2013 c 62 s 28
The intentional taking of the life of another is not authorized by section 609.06, except when necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the actor reasonably believes exposes the actor or another to great bodily harm or death, or preventing the commission of a felony in the actor's place of abode.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.065; 1978 c 736 s 1; 1986 c 444
Subdivision 1.Deadly force defined.
For the purposes of this section, "deadly force" means force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing, or which the actor should reasonably know creates a substantial risk of causing, death or great bodily harm. The intentional discharge of a firearm, other than a firearm loaded with less lethal munitions and used by a peace officer within the scope of official duties, in the direction of another person, or at a vehicle in which another person is believed to be, constitutes deadly force. "Less lethal munitions" means projectiles which are designed to stun, temporarily incapacitate, or cause temporary discomfort to a person. "Peace officer" has the meaning given in section 626.84, subdivision 1.
Subd. 2.Use of deadly force.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 609.06 or 609.065, the use of deadly force by a peace officer in the line of duty is justified only when necessary:
(1) to protect the peace officer or another from apparent death or great bodily harm;
(2) to effect the arrest or capture, or prevent the escape, of a person whom the peace officer knows or has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or attempted to commit a felony involving the use or threatened use of deadly force; or
(3) to effect the arrest or capture, or prevent the escape, of a person whom the officer knows or has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or attempted to commit a felony if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or great bodily harm if the person's apprehension is delayed.
Subd. 3.No defense.
This section and sections 609.06, 609.065 and 629.33 may not be used as a defense in a civil action brought by an innocent third party.
1978 c 736 s 2; 1986 c 444; 2001 c 127 s 1
An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication is not less criminal by reason thereof, but when a particular intent or other state of mind is a necessary element to constitute a particular crime, the fact of intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such intent or state of mind.
Except as provided in section 609.20, clause (3), when any crime is committed or participated in by two or more persons, any one of whom participates only under compulsion by another engaged therein, who by threats creates a reasonable apprehension in the mind of such participator that in case of refusal that participator is liable to instant death, such threats and apprehension constitute duress which will excuse such participator from criminal liability.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.08; 1986 c 444
Subdivision 1.Definition of offense.
When the sending of a letter or other written communication is made an offense, the offense is complete upon deposit of the letter or communication in any official depository of mail or given to another for the purpose of delivery to the receiver.
Subd. 2.Venue.
The offense is committed in both the county in which the letter is so deposited or given and the county in which it is received by the person for whom it is intended.
Subdivision 1.Conditions of immunity.
In any criminal proceeding, including a grand jury proceeding, paternity proceeding, or proceeding in juvenile court, if it appears a person may be entitled to refuse to answer a question or produce evidence of any other kind on the ground that the person may be incriminated thereby, and if the prosecuting attorney, in writing, requests the chief judge of the district or a judge of the court in which the proceeding is pending to order that person to answer the question or produce the evidence, the judge, after notice to the witness and hearing, shall so order if the judge finds that to do so would not be contrary to the public interest and would not be likely to expose the witness to prosecution in another state or in the federal courts.
After complying, and if, but for this section, the witness would have been privileged to withhold the answer given or the evidence produced by the witness, no testimony or other information compelled under the order, or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information may be used against the witness in any criminal case, but the witness may be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for any perjury, false swearing or contempt committed in answering, or in failing to answer, or in producing, or failing to produce, evidence in accordance with the order.
Subd. 2.Testimony required; no use of testimony for prosecution.
In every case not provided for in subdivision 1 and in which it is provided by law that a witness shall not be excused from giving testimony tending to be self-incriminating, no person shall be excused from testifying or producing any papers or documents on the ground that doing so may tend to criminate the person or subject the person to a penalty or forfeiture; but no testimony or other information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except for perjury committed in such testimony.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.09; 1969 c 661 s 1; 1981 c 293 s 1; 1986 c 444
Subdivision 1.First-time juvenile petty offenders; applicability; procedure.
(a) This subdivision applies to a child alleged to be a juvenile petty offender who:
(1) has not been previously adjudicated delinquent or as a petty offender;
(2) has not previously participated in or completed a diversion program for an offense;
(3) has not previously been placed on probation without an adjudication for an offense or received a continuance under section 260B.198, subdivision 7; and
(4) agrees to successfully complete a restorative justice program under this section.
(b) Subject to subdivision 6, the prosecutor shall refer a child described in paragraph (a) to a restorative justice program or provider that has been included on the approved provider list described in subdivision 4. The program or provider shall arrange an appropriate outcome for the matter using restorative justice concepts. The program or provider shall involve the victim of the offense in the proceedings. If the victim is unwilling or unable to proceed, or if there is no identifiable victim, the program or provider shall ensure that someone serves as a proxy for the victim. The program or provider and child, along with other participants, shall agree in writing to an appropriate sanction for the child. The sanction may include any of the dispositions authorized in section 260B.235, if appropriate, along with any other sanctions agreed to.
Subd. 2.Failure to comply.
If a person fails to comply with the settlement agreement, the person shall be referred back to the court for further proceedings.
Subd. 3.Dismissal of charge.
Upon the successful completion by a person of the sanctions agreed to in the settlement agreement, the program or provider shall notify the court and the court shall dismiss the charge against the person.
Subd. 4.Approved list.
The prosecutor shall maintain a list of approved restorative justice programs and providers to which persons may be referred under this section.
Subd. 5.Preference for culturally specific programs.
If a restorative justice program or provider that is tailored in a more culturally specific manner to the person is on the list of approved providers under subdivision 4, and the prosecutor is referring the person to a restorative justice program or provider under this section, the prosecutor shall refer the person to the more appropriate program or provider.
Subd. 6.Exceptions; availability of programs; diversion alternatives; domestic abuse.
This section applies only in jurisdictions where suitable restorative justice programs and providers are available and are able to accept the referral. This section does not apply if a prosecutor has determined that a nonrestorative justice diversion program is more appropriate for the person. In addition, this section does not apply to cases involving domestic violence or domestic assault.
As used in this section, "restorative justice" has the meaning given in section 611A.775. The term also includes Native American sentencing circles.
2009 c 83 art 2 s 38
(a) The legislature has the exclusive authority to define crimes and offenses and the range of the sentences or punishments for their violation. No other or different sentence or punishment shall be imposed for the commission of a crime than is authorized by this chapter or other applicable law.
(b) Except as provided in section 152.18 or 609.375, or upon agreement of the parties, a court may not refuse to adjudicate the guilt of a defendant who tenders a guilty plea in accordance with Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 15, or who has been found guilty by a court or jury following a trial.
(c) Paragraph (b) does not supersede Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 26.04.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.095; 1998 c 367 art 6 s 1; 2001 c 158 s 6
Subdivision 1.Sentences available.
(a) Upon conviction of a felony and compliance with the other provisions of this chapter the court, if it imposes sentence, may sentence the defendant to the extent authorized by law as follows:
(1) to life imprisonment; or
(2) to imprisonment for a fixed term of years set by the court; or
(3) to both imprisonment for a fixed term of years and payment of a fine; or
(4) to payment of a fine without imprisonment or as an intermediate sanction on a stayed sentence; or
(5) to payment of court-ordered restitution in addition to either imprisonment or payment of a fine, or both; or
(6) to payment of a local correctional fee as authorized under section 609.102 in addition to any other sentence imposed by the court.
(b) If the court imposes a fine or orders restitution under paragraph (a), payment is due on the date imposed unless the court otherwise establishes a due date or a payment plan.
Subd. 2.Restitution.
(a) As used in this section, "restitution" includes:
(1) payment of compensation to the victim or the victim's family; and
(2) if the victim is deceased or already has been fully compensated, payment of money to a victim assistance program or other program directed by the court.
"Restitution" includes payment of compensation to a government entity that incurs loss as a direct result of a crime.
(b) When the defendant does not pay the entire amount of court-ordered restitution and the fine at the same time, the court may order that all restitution shall be paid before the fine is paid.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.10; 1978 c 723 art 1 s 13; 1984 c 610 s 1; 1992 c 571 art 11 s 12; 1995 c 244 s 10; 1996 c 408 art 7 s 2; 1997 c 239 art 7 s 16; 2009 c 83 art 2 s 39
Subd. 2.Minimum fines.
Notwithstanding any other law, when a court sentences a person convicted of violating section 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, 609.2231, 609.224, 609.2242, 609.267, 609.2671, 609.2672, 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, or 609.345, it must impose a fine of not less than 30 percent of the maximum fine authorized by law nor more than the maximum fine authorized by law.
The court shall collect the portion of the fine mandated by this subdivision and forward 70 percent of it to a local victim assistance program that provides services locally in the county in which the crime was committed. The court shall forward the remaining 30 percent to the commissioner of management and budget to be credited to the general fund. If more than one victim assistance program serves the county in which the crime was committed, the court may designate on a case-by-case basis which program will receive the fine proceeds, giving consideration to the nature of the crime committed, the types of victims served by the program, and the funding needs of the program. If no victim assistance program serves that county, the court shall forward 100 percent of the fine proceeds to the commissioner of management and budget to be credited to the general fund. Fine proceeds received by a local victim assistance program must be used to provide direct services to crime victims.
The minimum fine required by this subdivision is in addition to the surcharge or assessment required by section 357.021, subdivision 6, and is in addition to any sentence of imprisonment or restitution imposed or ordered by the court.
As used in this subdivision, "victim assistance program" means victim witness programs within county attorney offices or any of the following programs: crime victim crisis centers, victim-witness programs, battered women shelters and nonshelter programs, and sexual assault programs.
Subd. 3.Controlled substance offenses; minimum fines.
(a) Notwithstanding any other law, when a court sentences a person convicted of a controlled substance crime under sections 152.021 to 152.025 and 152.0262, it must impose a fine of not less than 30 percent of the maximum fine authorized by law nor more than the maximum fine authorized by law.
(b) The minimum fine required by this subdivision is in addition to the surcharge or assessment required by section 357.021, subdivision 6, and is in addition to any sentence of imprisonment or restitution imposed or ordered by the court.
(c) The court shall collect the fine mandated by this subdivision and forward 70 percent of it to a local drug abuse prevention or intervention program existing or being implemented in the county in which the crime was committed. The court shall forward the remaining 30 percent to the commissioner of management and budget to be credited to the general fund. If more than one drug abuse prevention or intervention program serves the county in which the crime was committed, the court may designate on a case-by-case basis which program will receive the fine proceeds, giving consideration to the community in which the crime was committed, the funding needs of the program, the number of peace officers in each community certified to teach the program, and the number of children served by the program in each community. If no drug abuse prevention or intervention program serves communities in that county, the court shall forward 100 percent of the fine proceeds to the commissioner of management and budget to be credited to the general fund.
(d) The minimum fines required by this subdivision shall be collected as are other fines. Fine proceeds received by a local drug abuse prevention or intervention program must be used to support that program, and may be used for salaries of program staff or peace officers certified to teach the program. The program must report receipt and use of money generated under this subdivision to the state court administrator by January 15 of each year. The state court administrator must make this information available upon request.
(e) As used in this subdivision, "drug abuse prevention or intervention program" and "program" include:
(1) the drug abuse resistance education program described in section 299A.33;
(2) a drug abuse education and prevention program that includes the following components:
(i) instruction for students enrolled in kindergarten through grade six that is designed to teach students to recognize and resist pressures to experiment with controlled substances and alcohol;
(ii) provisions for parental involvement;
(iii) classroom instruction by uniformed law enforcement personnel;
(iv) the use of positive student leaders to influence younger students not to use drugs; and
(v) an emphasis on activity-oriented techniques designed to encourage student-generated responses to problem-solving situations; and
(3) a juvenile court program that:
(i) provides intervention strategies to reduce drug abuse and criminal behavior in juvenile offenders; and
(ii) promotes local drug abuse prevention efforts within the community.
Subd. 4.Minimum fines; other crimes.
Notwithstanding any other law:
(1) when a court sentences a person convicted of a felony that is not listed in subdivision 2 or 3, it must impose a fine of not less than 30 percent of the maximum fine authorized by law nor more than the maximum fine authorized by law; and
(2) when a court sentences a person convicted of a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor that is not listed in subdivision 2, it must impose a fine of not less than 30 percent of the maximum fine authorized by law nor more than the maximum fine authorized by law, unless the fine is set at a lower amount on a uniform fine schedule established by the Judicial Council in consultation with affected state and local agencies. This schedule shall be promulgated not later than September 1 of each year and shall become effective on January 1 of the next year unless the legislature, by law, provides otherwise.
Subd. 5.Waiver prohibited; reduction and installment payments.
(a) The court may not waive payment of the minimum fine required by this section.
(b) If the defendant qualifies for the services of a public defender or the court finds on the record that the convicted person is indigent or that immediate payment of the fine would create undue hardship for the convicted person or that person's immediate family, the court may reduce the amount of the minimum fine to not less than $50. Additionally, the court may permit the defendant to perform community work service in lieu of a fine.
(c) The court also may authorize payment of the fine in installments.
1981 c 360 art 2 s 50; 1983 c 262 art 1 s 6; 1Sp1985 c 13 s 366; 1986 c 442 s 15; 1986 c 444; 1986 c 463 s 2; 1Sp1986 c 1 art 8 s 15; 1987 c 244 s 1; 1987 c 404 s 189; 1989 c 264 s 2; 1989 c 335 art 4 s 99; 1991 c 279 s 24,41; 1991 c 345 art 1 s 106; 1992 c 571 art 4 s 2,3; 1993 c 192 s 105; 1993 c 326 art 4 s 14; art 12 s 8-12,18; art 13 s 20-22; 1995 c 226 art 2 s 8-10; 1996 c 305 art 1 s 119; 1997 c 7 art 2 s 61; 1997 c 239 art 3 s 4; 1998 c 367 art 8 s 10; 2001 c 71 s 1-4; 2003 c 112 art 2 s 50; 1Sp2003 c 2 art 2 s 6; 2005 c 136 art 7 s 21; 2006 c 260 art 5 s 50; 2008 c 277 art 1 s 93; 2009 c 83 art 2 s 40,41; 2009 c 101 art 2 s 109
Subdivision 1.Definition.
As used in this section, "local correctional fee" means a fee for local correctional services established by a local correctional agency under section 244.18.
Subd. 2.Imposition of fee.
When a court places a person convicted of a crime under the supervision and control of a local correctional agency, that agency may collect a local correctional fee based on the local correctional agency's fee schedule adopted under section 244.18.
Subd. 2a.Imposition of correctional fee.
When a person convicted of a crime is supervised by the commissioner of corrections, the commissioner may collect a correctional fee under section 241.272.
1992 c 571 art 11 s 13; 1999 c 111 s 4; 1999 c 216 art 4 s 10; 2006 c 260 art 4 s 13
Subdivision 1.Failure to pay restitution or fine.
(a) Any portion of a fine, surcharge, court cost, restitution, or fee that the defendant fails to pay by the due date may be referred for collection under section 480.15, subdivision 10c. If the defendant has agreed to a payment plan but fails to pay an installment when due, the entire amount remaining becomes due and payable and may be referred for collection under section 480.15, subdivision 10c.
(b) The defendant may contest the referral for collection based on inability to pay by requesting a hearing no later than the due date. The defendant shall be notified in writing at sentencing that under section 480.15, subdivision 10c, the court may refer the case for collection for nonpayment, and collection costs may be added to the amount due. The defendant shall also be notified in writing of the right to contest a referral for collection. The state court administrator shall develop the notice language.
Subd. 2.Fine and surcharge collection.
(a) A defendant's obligation to pay court-ordered fines, surcharges, court costs, restitution, and fees shall survive after the due date for a period set by the Judicial Council.
(b) Any change in the collection period established by the Judicial Council shall be effective on court-ordered fines, surcharges, court costs, restitution, and fees imposed on or after July 1, 2009.
(c) The period relating to a defendant's obligation to pay restitution under paragraph (a) does not limit the victim's right to collect restitution through other means such as a civil judgment.
(d) Nothing in this subdivision extends the period of a defendant's stay of sentence imposition or execution.
Subdivision 1.Sentence to more than one year.
A felony sentence to imprisonment for more than one year shall commit the defendant to the custody of the commissioner of corrections.
[Repealed, 2009 c 83 art 3 s 24]
Subd. 1b.
Subd. 2.Place of confinement.
The commissioner of corrections shall determine the place of confinement in a prison, reformatory, or other facility of the Department of Corrections established by law for the confinement of convicted persons and prescribe reasonable conditions and rules for their employment, conduct, instruction, and discipline within or without the facility.
Subd. 3.Sentence to one year or less.
A sentence to imprisonment for a period of one year or any lesser period shall be to a workhouse, work farm, county jail, or other place authorized by law.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.105; 1985 c 248 s 70; 1Sp1997 c 2 s 61; 1999 c 126 s 10; 1999 c 194 s 7,8; 1Sp2003 c 2 art 5 s 7-9; 2009 c 83 art 3 s 19
When a court intends to commit an offender with a serious and persistent mental illness, as defined in section 245.462, subdivision 20, paragraph (c), to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for imprisonment at a state correctional facility, either when initially pronouncing a sentence or when revoking an offender's probation, the court, when consistent with public safety, may instead place the offender on probation or continue the offender's probation and require as a condition of the probation that the offender successfully complete an appropriate supervised alternative living program having a mental health treatment component. This section applies only to offenders who would have a remaining term of imprisonment after adjusting for credit for prior imprisonment, if any, of more than one year.
1Sp2003 c 2 art 5 s 10
Subdivision 1.Terms.
(a) As used in this section, "heinous crime" means:
(1) a violation or attempted violation of section 609.185 or 609.19;
(2) a violation of section 609.195 or 609.221; or
(3) a violation of section 609.342, 609.343, or 609.344, if the offense was committed with force or violence.
(b) "Previous conviction" means a conviction in Minnesota for a heinous crime or a conviction elsewhere for conduct that would have been a heinous crime under this chapter if committed in Minnesota. The term includes any conviction that occurred before the commission of the present offense of conviction, but does not include a conviction if 15 years have elapsed since the person was discharged from the sentence imposed for the offense.
Subd. 2.Life without release.
The court shall sentence a person to life imprisonment without possibility of release under the following circumstances:
(1) the person is convicted of first-degree murder under section 609.185, paragraph (a), clause (1), (2), (4), or (7);
(2) the person is convicted of committing first-degree murder in the course of a kidnapping under section 609.185, paragraph (a), clause (3); or
(3) the person is convicted of first-degree murder under section 609.185, paragraph (a), clause (3), (5), or (6), and the court determines on the record at the time of sentencing that the person has one or more previous convictions for a heinous crime.
1998 c 367 art 2 s 6; art 6 s 3,15; 2002 c 401 art 1 s 13; 2005 c 136 art 2 s 5; art 17 s 9; 2015 c 21 art 1 s 98
NOTE: Subdivision 2 as applied to juvenile defendants was severed and the previous version of that subdivision revived in Jackson v. State, 883 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 2016).
When a person is convicted of violating section 609.19 or 609.195, the court shall sentence the person to the statutory maximum sentence for the offense if the person was previously convicted of a heinous crime as defined in section 609.106 and 15 years have not elapsed since the person was discharged from the sentence imposed for that conviction. The court may not stay the imposition or execution of the sentence, notwithstanding section 609.135.
1998 c 367 art 6 s 4
(a) As used in this section, the following terms have the meanings given.
(b) "Conviction" means any of the following accepted and recorded by the court: a plea of guilty, a verdict of guilty by a jury, or a finding of guilty by the court. The term includes a conviction by any court in Minnesota or another jurisdiction.
(c) "Prior conviction" means a conviction that occurred before the offender committed the next felony resulting in a conviction and before the offense for which the offender is being sentenced under this section.
(d) "Violent crime" means a violation of or an attempt or conspiracy to violate any of the following laws of this state or any similar laws of the United States or any other state: sections 152.137; 609.165; 609.185; 609.19; 609.195; 609.20; 609.205; 609.2112; 609.2113; 609.2114; 609.221; 609.222; 609.223; 609.228; 609.235; 609.24; 609.245; 609.25; 609.255; 609.2661; 609.2662; 609.2663; 609.2664; 609.2665; 609.267; 609.2671; 609.268; 609.342; 609.343; 609.344; 609.345; 609.498, subdivision 1; 609.561; 609.562; 609.582, subdivision 1; 609.66, subdivision 1e; 609.687; and 609.855, subdivision 5; any provision of sections 609.229; 609.377; 609.378; 609.749; and 624.713 that is punishable by a felony penalty; or any provision of chapter 152 that is punishable by a maximum sentence of 15 years or more; or Minnesota Statutes 2012, section 609.21.
Subd. 2.Increased sentences for dangerous offender who commits third violent crime.
Whenever a person is convicted of a violent crime that is a felony, and the judge is imposing an executed sentence based on a Sentencing Guidelines presumptive imprisonment sentence, the judge may impose an aggravated durational departure from the presumptive imprisonment sentence up to the statutory maximum sentence if the offender was at least 18 years old at the time the felony was committed, and:
(1) the court determines on the record at the time of sentencing that the offender has two or more prior convictions for violent crimes; and
(2) the fact finder determines that the offender is a danger to public safety. The fact finder may base its determination that the offender is a danger to public safety on the following factors:
(i) the offender's past criminal behavior, such as the offender's high frequency rate of criminal activity or juvenile adjudications, or long involvement in criminal activity including juvenile adjudications; or
(ii) the fact that the present offense of conviction involved an aggravating factor that would justify a durational departure under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Subd. 3.Mandatory sentence for dangerous offender who commits third violent felony.
(a) Unless a longer mandatory minimum sentence is otherwise required by law or the court imposes a longer aggravated durational departure under subdivision 2, a person who is convicted of a violent crime that is a felony must be committed to the commissioner of corrections for a mandatory sentence of at least the length of the presumptive sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines if the court determines on the record at the time of sentencing that the person has two or more prior felony convictions for violent crimes. The court shall impose and execute the prison sentence regardless of whether the guidelines presume an executed prison sentence.
Any person convicted and sentenced as required by this subdivision is not eligible for probation, parole, discharge, or work release, until that person has served the full term of imprisonment imposed by the court, notwithstanding sections 241.26, 242.19, 243.05, 244.04, 609.12, and 609.135.
(b) For purposes of this subdivision, "violent crime" does not include a violation of section 152.023 or 152.024.
Subd. 4.Increased sentence for offender who commits sixth felony.
Whenever a person is convicted of a felony, and the judge is imposing an executed sentence based on a Sentencing Guidelines presumptive imprisonment sentence, the judge may impose an aggravated durational departure from the presumptive sentence up to the statutory maximum sentence if the factfinder determines that the offender has five or more prior felony convictions and that the present offense is a felony that was committed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct.
1998 c 367 art 6 s 7; 2005 c 136 art 7 s 16; art 16 s 11,12; 2014 c 180 s 9
Subdivision 1.Commitments without minimums.
All commitments to the commissioner of corrections for imprisonment of the defendant are without minimum terms except when the sentence is to life imprisonment as required by law and except as otherwise provided in this chapter.
[Repealed, 1978 c 723 art 2 s 5]
Any defendant convicted of an offense listed in subdivision 9 in which the defendant or an accomplice, at the time of the offense, used, whether by brandishing, displaying, threatening with, or otherwise employing, a dangerous weapon other than a firearm, shall be committed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than one year plus one day, nor more than the maximum sentence provided by law. Any defendant convicted of a second or subsequent offense in which the defendant or an accomplice, at the time of the offense, used a dangerous weapon other than a firearm, shall be committed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than three years nor more than the maximum sentence provided by law.
Subd. 5.Firearm.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b), any defendant convicted of an offense listed in subdivision 9 in which the defendant or an accomplice, at the time of the offense, had in possession or used, whether by brandishing, displaying, threatening with, or otherwise employing, a firearm, shall be committed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than three years, nor more than the maximum sentence provided by law. Any defendant convicted of a second or subsequent offense in which the defendant or an accomplice, at the time of the offense, had in possession or used a firearm shall be committed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than five years, nor more than the maximum sentence provided by law.
(b) Any defendant convicted of violating section 609.165 or 624.713, subdivision 1, clause (2), shall be committed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than five years, nor more than the maximum sentence provided by law.
Subd. 5a.Drug offenses.
Notwithstanding section 609.035, whenever a defendant is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence for a felony violation of chapter 152, other than a violation of section 152.021, subdivision 2b, clause (1), or a violation of chapter 152 sentenced under section 152.021, subdivision 3, paragraph (c), and is also subject to this section, the minimum sentence imposed under this section shall be consecutive to that imposed under chapter 152.
Subd. 6.No early release.
Any defendant convicted and sentenced as required by this section is not eligible for probation, parole, discharge, or supervised release until that person has served the full term of imprisonment as provided by law, notwithstanding the provisions of sections 242.19, 243.05, 244.04, 609.12 and 609.135.
Subd. 7.Fact finder shall establish.
The question of whether the defendant or an accomplice, at the time of commission of an offense listed in subdivision 9, used a firearm or other dangerous weapon or had in possession a firearm shall be determined by the fact finder at the time of a verdict or finding of guilt at trial or the entry of a plea of guilty based upon the record of the trial or the plea of guilty. The fact finder shall also determine whether the defendant has been convicted of a second or subsequent offense in which the defendant or an accomplice, at the time of commission of an offense listed in subdivision 9, used a firearm or other dangerous weapon or had in possession a firearm.
Subd. 8.Motion by prosecutor.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (b) and (c), prior to the time of sentencing, the prosecutor may file a motion to have the defendant sentenced without regard to the mandatory minimum sentences established by this section. The motion shall be accompanied by a statement on the record of the reasons for it. When presented with the motion, or on its own motion, the court may sentence the defendant without regard to the mandatory minimum sentences established by this section if the court finds substantial and compelling reasons to do so. A sentence imposed under this subdivision is a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.
(b) The court may not, on its own motion or the prosecutor's motion, sentence a defendant without regard to the mandatory minimum sentences established by this section if the defendant previously has been convicted of an offense listed in subdivision 9 in which the defendant used or possessed a firearm or other dangerous weapon.
(c) The court may not, on its own motion or the prosecutor's motion, sentence a defendant without regard to the mandatory minimum sentences established by subdivision 5, if the defendant was convicted of a crime under section 152.021, subdivision 1, or 152.022, subdivision 1, and the person or an accomplice possessed on their person or within immediate reach, or used, whether by brandishing, displaying, threatening with, or otherwise employing, a firearm.
Subd. 9.Applicable offenses.
The crimes for which mandatory minimum sentences shall be served as provided in this section are: murder in the first, second, or third degree; assault in the first, second, or third degree; burglary; kidnapping; false imprisonment; manslaughter in the first or second degree; aggravated robbery; simple robbery; first-degree or aggravated first-degree witness tampering; criminal sexual conduct under the circumstances described in sections 609.342, subdivision 1, clauses (a) to (f); 609.343, subdivision 1, clauses (a) to (f); and 609.344, subdivision 1, clauses (a) to (e) and (h) to (j); escape from custody; arson in the first, second, or third degree; drive-by shooting under section 609.66, subdivision 1e; stalking under section 609.749, subdivision 3, clause (3); possession or other unlawful use of a firearm or ammunition in violation of section 609.165, subdivision 1b, or 624.713, subdivision 1, clause (2), a felony violation of chapter 152; or any attempt to commit any of these offenses.
Subd. 10.Report on criminal cases involving firearm.
Beginning on July 1, 1994, every county attorney shall collect and maintain the following information on criminal complaints and prosecutions within the county attorney's office in which the defendant is alleged to have committed an offense listed in subdivision 9 while possessing or using a firearm:
(1) whether the case was charged or dismissed;
(2) whether the defendant was convicted of the offense or a lesser offense; and
(3) whether the mandatory minimum sentence required under this section was imposed and executed or was waived by the prosecutor or court.
No later than July 1 of each year, beginning on July 1, 1995, the county attorney shall forward this information to the Sentencing Guidelines commission upon forms prescribed by the commission.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.11; 1969 c 743 s 1; 1971 c 845 s 15; 1974 c 32 s 1; 1975 c 378 s 8; 1977 c 130 s 2; 1978 c 723 art 2 s 2; 1979 c 258 s 1; 1981 c 227 s 1-7; 1983 c 274 s 15; 1986 c 351 s 5; 1989 c 290 art 3 s 27,28; 1991 c 279 s 25; 1993 c 326 art 13 s 23; 1994 c 576 s 46; 1994 c 636 art 3 s 5-8; 1996 c 408 art 4 s 4,5; 1997 c 96 s 4; 1998 c 367 art 2 s 4,5; 2006 c 260 art 1 s 13; 2010 c 299 s 14; 2015 c 65 art 3 s 17; 2016 c 160 s 16,17
Subdivision 1.Presentence investigation.
(a) When a defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor, the court may, and when the defendant has been convicted of a felony, the court shall, before sentence is imposed, cause a presentence investigation and written report to be made to the court concerning the defendant's individual characteristics, circumstances, needs, potentialities, criminal record and social history, the circumstances of the offense and the harm caused by it to others and to the community. At the request of the prosecutor in a gross misdemeanor case, the court shall order that a presentence investigation and report be prepared. The investigation shall be made by a probation officer of the court, if there is one; otherwise it shall be made by the commissioner of corrections. The officer conducting the presentence or predispositional investigation shall make reasonable and good faith efforts to contact and provide the victim with the information required under section 611A.037, subdivision 2. Presentence investigations shall be conducted and summary hearings held upon reports and upon the sentence to be imposed upon the defendant in accordance with this section, section 244.10, and the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(b) When the crime is a violation of sections 609.561 to 609.563, 609.5641, or 609.576 and involves a fire, the report shall include a description of the financial and physical harm the offense has had on the public safety personnel who responded to the fire. For purposes of this paragraph, "public safety personnel" means the state fire marshal; employees of the Division of the State Fire Marshal; firefighters, regardless of whether the firefighters receive any remuneration for providing services; peace officers, as defined in section 626.05, subdivision 2; individuals providing emergency management services; and individuals providing emergency medical services.
(c) When the crime is a felony violation of chapter 152 involving the sale or distribution of a controlled substance, the report may include a description of any adverse social or economic effects the offense has had on persons who reside in the neighborhood where the offense was committed.
(d) The report shall also include the information relating to crime victims required under section 611A.037, subdivision 1. If the court directs, the report shall include an estimate of the prospects of the defendant's rehabilitation and recommendations as to the sentence which should be imposed. In misdemeanor cases the report may be oral.
(e) When a defendant has been convicted of a felony, and before sentencing, the court shall cause a sentencing worksheet to be completed to facilitate the application of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. The worksheet shall be submitted as part of the presentence investigation report.
(f) When a person is convicted of a felony for which the Sentencing Guidelines presume that the defendant will be committed to the commissioner of corrections under an executed sentence and no motion for a sentencing departure has been made by counsel, the court may, when there is no space available in the local correctional facility, commit the defendant to the custody of the commissioner of corrections, pending completion of the presentence investigation and report. When a defendant is convicted of a felony for which the Sentencing Guidelines do not presume that the defendant will be committed to the commissioner of corrections, or for which the Sentencing Guidelines presume commitment to the commissioner but counsel has moved for a sentencing departure, the court may commit the defendant to the commissioner with the consent of the commissioner, pending completion of the presentence investigation and report. The county of commitment shall return the defendant to the court when the court so orders.
Subd. 1a.Contents of worksheet.
The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules uniformly applicable to all district courts for the form and contents of sentencing worksheets. These rules shall be promulgated by and effective on January 2, 1982.
Subd. 1c.
Subd. 2.Life imprisonment report.
If the defendant has been convicted of a crime for which a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment is provided by law, the probation officer of the court, if there is one, otherwise the commissioner of corrections, shall forthwith make a postsentence investigation and make a written report as provided by subdivision 1.
Subd. 2a.Sentencing worksheet; sentencing guidelines commission.
If the defendant has been convicted of a felony, including a felony for which a mandatory life sentence is required by law, the court shall cause a sentencing worksheet as provided in subdivision 1 to be completed and forwarded to the Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
For the purpose of this section, "mandatory life sentence" means a sentence under section 609.106, subdivision 2; 609.185; 609.3455; 609.385, subdivision 2; or Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109, subdivision 3, and governed by section 244.05.
Subd. 3.Criminal justice agency disclosure requirements.
All criminal justice agencies shall make available at no cost to the probation officer or the commissioner of corrections the criminal record and other relevant information relating to the defendant which they may have, when requested for the purposes of subdivisions 1 and 2.
Subd. 4.Confidential sources of information.
(a) Any report made pursuant to subdivision 1 shall be, if written, provided to counsel for all parties before sentence. The written report shall not disclose confidential sources of information unless the court otherwise directs. On the request of the prosecuting attorney or the defendant's attorney a summary hearing in chambers shall be held on any matter brought in issue, but confidential sources of information shall not be disclosed unless the court otherwise directs. If the presentence report is given orally the defendant or the defendant's attorney shall be permitted to hear the report.
(b) Any report made under subdivision 1 or 2 shall be provided to counsel for the defendant for purposes of representing the defendant on any appeal or petition for postconviction relief. The reports shall be provided by the court and the commissioner of corrections at no cost to the defendant or the defendant's attorney.
Subd. 5.Report to commissioner or local correctional agency.
If the defendant is sentenced to the commissioner of corrections, a copy of any report made pursuant to this section and not made by the commissioner shall accompany the commitment. If the defendant is sentenced to a local correctional agency or facility, a copy of the report must be provided to that agency or facility.
Subd. 6.Report disclosure prohibited.
Except as provided in subdivisions 4 and 5 or as otherwise directed by the court any report made pursuant to this section shall not be disclosed.
Subd. 7.Stay of imposition of sentence.
If imposition of sentence is stayed by reason of an appeal taken or to be taken, the presentence investigation provided for in this section shall not be made until such stay has expired or has otherwise been terminated.
Subd. 8.Chemical use assessment required.
(a) If a person is convicted of a felony, the probation officer shall determine in the report prepared under subdivision 1 whether or not alcohol or drug use was a contributing factor to the commission of the offense. If so, the report shall contain the results of a chemical use assessment conducted in accordance with this subdivision. The probation officer shall make an appointment for the defendant to undergo the chemical use assessment if so indicated.
(b) The chemical use assessment report must include a recommended level of care for the defendant in accordance with the criteria contained in rules adopted by the commissioner of human services under section 254A.03, subdivision 3. The assessment must be conducted by an assessor qualified under rules adopted by the commissioner of human services under section 254A.03, subdivision 3. An assessor providing a chemical use assessment may not have any direct or shared financial interest or referral relationship resulting in shared financial gain with a treatment provider, except as authorized under section 254A.19, subdivision 3. If an independent assessor is not available, the probation officer may use the services of an assessor authorized to perform assessments for the county social services agency under a variance granted under rules adopted by the commissioner of human services under section 254A.03, subdivision 3.
Subd. 9.Compulsive gambling assessment required.
(a) If a person is convicted of theft under section 609.52, embezzlement of public funds under section 609.54, or forgery under section 609.625, 609.63, or 609.631, the probation officer shall determine in the report prepared under subdivision 1 whether or not compulsive gambling contributed to the commission of the offense. If so, the report shall contain the results of a compulsive gambling assessment conducted in accordance with this subdivision. The probation officer shall make an appointment for the offender to undergo the assessment if so indicated.
(b) The compulsive gambling assessment report must include a recommended level of treatment for the offender if the assessor concludes that the offender is in need of compulsive gambling treatment. The assessment must be conducted by an assessor qualified either under Minnesota Rules, part 9585.0040, subpart 1, item C, or qualifications determined to be equivalent by the commissioner, to perform these assessments or to provide compulsive gambling treatment. An assessor providing a compulsive gambling assessment may not have any direct or shared financial interest or referral relationship resulting in shared financial gain with a treatment provider. If an independent assessor is not available, the probation officer may use the services of an assessor with a financial interest or referral relationship as authorized under rules adopted by the commissioner of human services under section 245.98, subdivision 2a.
(c) The commissioner of human services shall reimburse the assessor for each compulsive gambling assessment at a rate established by the commissioner. To the extent practicable, the commissioner shall standardize reimbursement rates for assessments. The commissioner shall reimburse the assessor after receiving written verification from the probation officer that the assessment was performed and found acceptable.
Subd. 10.Military veterans.
(a) When a defendant appears in court and is convicted of a crime, the court shall inquire whether the defendant is currently serving in or is a veteran of the armed forces of the United States.
(b) If the defendant is currently serving in the military or is a veteran and has been diagnosed as having a mental illness by a qualified psychiatrist or clinical psychologist or physician, the court may:
(1) order that the officer preparing the report under subdivision 1 consult with the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Minnesota Department of Veterans Affairs, or another agency or person with suitable knowledge or experience, for the purpose of providing the court with information regarding treatment options available to the defendant, including federal, state, and local programming; and
(2) consider the treatment recommendations of any diagnosing or treating mental health professionals together with the treatment options available to the defendant in imposing sentence.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.115; 1978 c 723 art 2 s 3; 1979 c 233 s 23,24; 1981 c 312 s 1,2; 1983 c 262 art 2 s 3-5; 1986 c 444; 1987 c 331 s 8; 1988 c 669 s 1; 1989 c 117 s 1; 1990 c 602 art 8 s 1; 1991 c 279 s 26; 1991 c 336 art 2 s 42; 1993 c 339 s 23; 1994 c 636 art 6 s 25; 1997 c 239 art 8 s 30; 1998 c 407 art 8 s 7; 1999 c 126 s 11; 2000 c 468 s 28; 2005 c 136 art 14 s 14; 2007 c 13 art 3 s 37; 2007 c 147 art 8 s 32; art 12 s 12; 2008 c 299 s 18; 2010 c 236 s 1; 2012 c 212 s 7
[Repealed, 1969 c 997 s 3; 1979 c 258 s 25]
Subdivision 1.Upon sentencing.
If an offender has not already done so, the court shall order an offender to provide a biological specimen for the purpose of DNA analysis as defined in section 299C.155 when:
(1) the court sentences a person charged with committing or attempting to commit a felony offense and the person is convicted of that offense or of any offense arising out of the same set of circumstances; or
(2) the juvenile court adjudicates a person a delinquent child who is petitioned for committing or attempting to commit a felony offense and is adjudicated delinquent for that offense or any offense arising out of the same set of circumstances.
The biological specimen or the results of the analysis shall be maintained by the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension as provided in section 299C.155.
Subd. 2.Before release.
The commissioner of corrections or local corrections authority shall order a person to provide a biological specimen for the purpose of DNA analysis before completion of the person's term of imprisonment when the person has not provided a biological specimen for the purpose of DNA analysis and the person:
(1) was initially charged with committing or attempting to commit a felony offense and was convicted of that offense or of any offense arising out of the same set of circumstances, or the person has a past felony conviction in this or any other state; or
(2) is serving a term of imprisonment in this state under a reciprocal agreement although convicted in another state of committing or attempting to commit a felony offense or of any offense arising out of the same set of circumstances if the person was initially charged with committing or attempting to commit a felony offense. The commissioner of corrections or local corrections authority shall forward the sample to the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension.
Subd. 3.Offenders from other states.
When the state accepts an offender from another state under the interstate compact authorized by section 243.1605, the acceptance is conditional on the offender providing a biological specimen for the purposes of DNA analysis as defined in section 299C.155, if the offender was initially charged with committing or attempting to commit a felony offense and was convicted of that offense or of any offense arising out of the same set of circumstances. The specimen must be provided under supervision of staff from the Department of Corrections or a Community Corrections Act county within 15 business days after the offender reports to the supervising agent. The cost of obtaining the biological specimen is the responsibility of the agency providing supervision.
Subd. 4.After supervision expires.
(a) Upon motion of a prosecuting authority, a court shall issue an order to show cause why an offender who should have been ordered or required to provide a biological specimen under this section but did not, should not now be ordered to provide one for the purposes of DNA analysis. This subdivision applies if the offender's sentence or supervision has expired. The prosecuting authority shall provide the court with an affidavit that:
(1) identifies the offender by name and date of birth;
(2) identifies the offender's last known address;
(3) identifies the offender's charged offense, offense of conviction, and date of conviction; and
(4) indicates that the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension database of biological specimens has been searched and the offender has not previously provided a biological specimen for DNA analysis under this chapter.
(b) The order to show cause shall direct the offender to appear before the court within 30 days after the order is served. The prosecutor shall serve the order to show cause upon the offender in the same manner as a civil summons. The offender may avoid appearing before the court by appearing at a place and time designated in the order and voluntarily providing the specimen.
(c) Upon the offender's appearance before the court, and after an opportunity to be heard, the court may issue an order directing the offender to provide the specimen.
(d) If the offender has failed to provide the specimen or appear before the court and the prosecuting authority makes a sufficient showing that the offender was properly served with the order to show cause, the court may issue an order:
(1) requiring the offender to submit the specimen within 30 days from the date of the order at a designated location;
(2) including the designated location's address, telephone number, and regular hours of operation; and
(3) authorizing, if the offender fails or refuses to comply with the order to provide a specimen, a peace officer to detain and bring the offender before the court as soon as practicable to show cause why the specimen should not be obtained.
(e) The local corrections authority shall mail the order in paragraph (d) to the offender's last known address.
1989 c 290 art 4 s 16; 1991 c 232 s 2; 1991 c 285 s 11; 1993 c 326 art 10 s 15; art 13 s 32; 1998 c 367 art 3 s 12,13; art 6 s 15; 1999 c 216 art 3 s 7-9; 1Sp2001 c 8 art 9 s 6; 2005 c 136 art 12 s 9; 2008 c 299 s 19; 2010 c 256 s 1
(a) When a person is convicted of a felony, gross misdemeanor, or targeted misdemeanor, as defined in section 299C.10, subdivision 1, or is adjudicated delinquent for a felony or gross misdemeanor, the court shall order the offender to immediately report to the law enforcement agency responsible for the collection of fingerprint and other identification data required under section 299C.10, regardless of the sentence imposed or executed.
(b) Paragraph (a) does not apply if the person is remanded to the custody of a law enforcement agency or if the identification data was collected prior to the conviction or adjudication for the offense.
(c) A person who fails to obey a court order under paragraph (a) is subject to probation revocation, contempt of court, or any other appropriate remedy.
(d) This section does not limit or restrict any other statutory requirements or local policies regarding the collection of identification data.
1Sp2001 c 8 art 6 s 7
Subdivision 1.Authority; conditions.
A person sentenced to the commissioner of corrections for imprisonment for a period less than life may be paroled or discharged at any time without regard to length of the term of imprisonment which the sentence imposes when in the judgment of the commissioner of corrections, and under the conditions the commissioner imposes, the granting of parole or discharge would be most conducive to rehabilitation and would be in the public interest.
Subd. 2.Parole required after certain term.
If a sentence of more than five years has been imposed on a defendant for a crime authorizing a sentence of not more than ten years, the commissioner of corrections shall grant the defendant parole no later than the expiration of five years of imprisonment, less time granted for good behavior, unless the commissioner determines with or without hearing that the defendant's parole would not be conducive to rehabilitation or would not be in the public interest.
Subd. 3.Parole; commissioner powers.
All sentences to the commissioner of corrections for the imprisonment of the defendant are subject to the laws relating to parole and the powers of the commissioner of corrections, except as modified in subdivisions 1 and 2, and to all other laws relating to persons in said institutions and their imprisonment.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.12; 1973 c 654 s 15; 1975 c 271 s 6; 1983 c 274 s 18; 1986 c 444
(a) Upon conviction of a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor the court, if sentence is imposed, may, to the extent authorized by law, sentence the defendant:
(1) to imprisonment for a definite term; or
(3) to both imprisonment for a definite term and payment of a fine; or
(5) to payment of a local correctional fee as authorized under section 609.102 in addition to any other sentence imposed by the court; or
(6) to perform work service in a restorative justice program in addition to any other sentence imposed by the court.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.125; 1971 c 25 s 91; 1984 c 610 s 2; 1992 c 571 art 11 s 14; 1995 c 244 s 11; 1996 c 408 art 7 s 3; 1997 c 239 art 3 s 6; art 7 s 17; 2009 c 83 art 2 s 43
Subdivision 1.Felony.
Notwithstanding a conviction is for a felony:
(1) the conviction is deemed to be for a misdemeanor or a gross misdemeanor if the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor as defined in section 609.02; or
(2) the conviction is deemed to be for a misdemeanor if the imposition of the prison sentence is stayed, the defendant is placed on probation, and the defendant is thereafter discharged without a prison sentence.
Notwithstanding that a conviction is for a gross misdemeanor, the conviction is deemed to be for a misdemeanor if:
(1) the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a misdemeanor as defined in section 609.02; or
(2) if the imposition of the sentence is stayed, the defendant is placed on probation, and the defendant is thereafter discharged without sentence.
Subd. 3.Misdemeanors.
If a defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor and is sentenced, or if the imposition of sentence is stayed, and the defendant is thereafter discharged without sentence, the conviction is deemed to be for a misdemeanor for purposes of determining the penalty for a subsequent offense.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.13; 1971 c 937 s 21; 1986 c 435 s 6; 1986 c 444; 1993 c 326 art 2 s 10
Except as provided in subdivision 2, an alleged misdemeanor violation must be treated as a petty misdemeanor if the prosecuting attorney believes that it is in the interest of justice that the defendant not be imprisoned if convicted and certifies that belief to the court at or before the time of arraignment or pretrial hearing, and the court approves of the certification motion. Prior to the appointment of a public defender to represent a defendant charged with a misdemeanor, the court shall inquire of the prosecutor whether the prosecutor intends to certify the case as a petty misdemeanor. The defendant's consent to the certification is not required. When an offense is certified as a petty misdemeanor under this section, the defendant is not eligible for the appointment of a public defender.
Subd. 2.Certain violations excepted.
Subdivision 1 does not apply to a misdemeanor violation of section 169A.20; 171.09, subdivision 1, paragraph (g); 171.306, subdivision 6; 609.224; 609.2242; 609.226; 609.324, subdivision 3; 609.52; or 617.23, or an ordinance that conforms in substantial part to any of those sections. A violation described in this subdivision must be treated as a misdemeanor unless the defendant consents to the certification of the violation as a petty misdemeanor.
Subd. 3.Use of conviction for enhancement.
Notwithstanding any other law, a conviction for a violation that was originally charged as a misdemeanor and was treated as a petty misdemeanor under subdivision 1 or the Rules of Criminal Procedure may not be used as the basis for charging a subsequent violation as a gross misdemeanor rather than a misdemeanor.
1987 c 329 s 6; 1992 c 513 art 4 s 48; 1995 c 259 art 3 s 8; 2000 c 478 art 2 s 7; 2010 c 366 s 15; 2012 c 187 art 1 s 71; 2012 c 212 s 8
The decision to offer or agree to a continuance of a criminal prosecution is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion resting solely with the prosecuting attorney.
1994 c 636 art 2 s 15
Subdivision 1.Terms and conditions.
(a) Except when a sentence of life imprisonment is required by law, or when a mandatory minimum sentence is required by section 609.11, any court may stay imposition or execution of sentence and:
(1) may order intermediate sanctions without placing the defendant on probation; or
(2) may place the defendant on probation with or without supervision and on the terms the court prescribes, including intermediate sanctions when practicable. The court may order the supervision to be under the probation officer of the court, or, if there is none and the conviction is for a felony or gross misdemeanor, by the commissioner of corrections, or in any case by some other suitable and consenting person. Unless the court directs otherwise, state parole and probation agents and probation officers may impose community work service or probation violation sanctions, consistent with section 243.05, subdivision 1; sections 244.196 to 244.199; or 401.02, subdivision 5.
No intermediate sanction may be ordered performed at a location that fails to observe applicable requirements or standards of chapter 181A or 182, or any rule promulgated under them.
(b) For purposes of this subdivision, subdivision 6, and section 609.14, the term "intermediate sanctions" includes but is not limited to incarceration in a local jail or workhouse, home detention, electronic monitoring, intensive probation, sentencing to service, reporting to a day reporting center, chemical dependency or mental health treatment or counseling, restitution, fines, day-fines, community work service, work service in a restorative justice program, work in lieu of or to work off fines and, with the victim's consent, work in lieu of or to work off restitution.
(c) A court may not stay the revocation of the driver's license of a person convicted of violating the provisions of section 169A.20.
(d) If the court orders a fine, day-fine, or restitution as an intermediate sanction, payment is due on the date imposed unless the court otherwise establishes a due date or a payment plan.
Subd. 1a.Failure to pay restitution.
If the court orders payment of restitution as a condition of probation and if the defendant fails to pay the restitution in accordance with the payment schedule or structure established by the court or the probation officer, the prosecutor or the defendant's probation officer may, on the prosecutor's or the officer's own motion or at the request of the victim, ask the court to hold a hearing to determine whether or not the conditions of probation should be changed or probation should be revoked. The defendant's probation officer shall ask for the hearing if the restitution ordered has not been paid prior to 60 days before the term of probation expires. The court shall schedule and hold this hearing and take appropriate action, including action under subdivision 2, paragraph (g), before the defendant's term of probation expires.
Nothing in this subdivision limits the court's ability to refer the case to collections under section 609.104 when a defendant fails to pay court-ordered restitution.
Subd. 1c.Failure to complete court-ordered treatment.
If the court orders a defendant to undergo treatment as a condition of probation and if the defendant fails to successfully complete treatment at least 60 days before the term of probation expires, the prosecutor or the defendant's probation officer may ask the court to hold a hearing to determine whether the conditions of probation should be changed or probation should be revoked. The court shall schedule and hold this hearing and take appropriate action, including action under subdivision 2, paragraph (h), before the defendant's term of probation expires.
Subd. 2.Stay of sentence maximum periods.
(a) If the conviction is for a felony other than section 609.2113, subdivision 1 or 2, or 609.2114, subdivision 2, or Minnesota Statutes 2012, section 609.21, subdivision 1a, paragraph (b) or (c), the stay shall be for not more than four years or the maximum period for which the sentence of imprisonment might have been imposed, whichever is longer.
(b) If the conviction is for a gross misdemeanor violation of section 169A.20, 609.2113, subdivision 3, or 609.3451, or for a felony described in section 609.2113, subdivision 1 or 2, or 609.2114, subdivision 2, the stay shall be for not more than six years. The court shall provide for unsupervised probation for the last year of the stay unless the court finds that the defendant needs supervised probation for all or part of the last year.
(c) If the conviction is for a gross misdemeanor not specified in paragraph (b), the stay shall be for not more than two years.
(d) If the conviction is for any misdemeanor under section 169A.20; 609.746, subdivision 1; 609.79; or 617.23; or for a misdemeanor under section 609.2242 or 609.224, subdivision 1, in which the victim of the crime was a family or household member as defined in section 518B.01, the stay shall be for not more than two years. The court shall provide for unsupervised probation for the second year of the stay unless the court finds that the defendant needs supervised probation for all or part of the second year.
(e) If the conviction is for a misdemeanor not specified in paragraph (d), the stay shall be for not more than one year.
(f) The defendant shall be discharged six months after the term of the stay expires, unless the stay has been revoked or extended under paragraph (g), or the defendant has already been discharged.
(g) Notwithstanding the maximum periods specified for stays of sentences under paragraphs (a) to (f), a court may extend a defendant's term of probation for up to one year if it finds, at a hearing conducted under subdivision 1a, that:
(1) the defendant has not paid court-ordered restitution in accordance with the payment schedule or structure; and
(2) the defendant is likely to not pay the restitution the defendant owes before the term of probation expires.
This one-year extension of probation for failure to pay restitution may be extended by the court for up to one additional year if the court finds, at another hearing conducted under subdivision 1a, that the defendant still has not paid the court-ordered restitution that the defendant owes.
Nothing in this subdivision limits the court's ability to refer the case to collections under section 609.104.
(h) Notwithstanding the maximum periods specified for stays of sentences under paragraphs (a) to (f), a court may extend a defendant's term of probation for up to three years if it finds, at a hearing conducted under subdivision 1c, that:
(1) the defendant has failed to complete court-ordered treatment successfully; and
(2) the defendant is likely not to complete court-ordered treatment before the term of probation expires.
Subd. 3.Motor vehicle offense report.
The court shall report to the commissioner of public safety any stay of imposition or execution granted in the case of a conviction for an offense in which a motor vehicle, as defined in section 169.011, subdivision 42, is used.
Subd. 4.Jail as condition of probation.
The court may, as a condition of probation, require the defendant to serve up to one year incarceration in a county jail, a county regional jail, a county work farm, county workhouse or other local correctional facility, or require the defendant to pay a fine, or both. The court may allow the defendant the work release privileges of section 631.425 during the period of incarceration.
Subd. 5.Assaulting spouse stay conditions.
If a person is convicted of assaulting a spouse or other person with whom the person resides, and the court stays imposition or execution of sentence and places the defendant on probation, the court must condition the stay upon the defendant's participation in counseling or other appropriate programs selected by the court.
Subd. 5a.Domestic abuse victims; electronic monitoring; pilot project.
(a) Until a judicial district has adopted standards under section 629.72, subdivision 2a, paragraph (b), governing electronic monitoring devices used to protect victims of domestic abuse, a court within the judicial district, as a condition of a stay of imposition or execution of a sentence, may not order an offender convicted of a crime described in paragraph (b) to use an electronic monitoring device to protect a victim's safety.
(b) This subdivision applies to the following crimes, if committed by the defendant against a family or household member as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2:
(1) violations of orders for protection issued under chapter 518B;
(2) assault in the first, second, third, or fifth degree under section 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, or 609.224; or domestic assault under section 609.2242;
(3) criminal damage to property under section 609.595;
(4) disorderly conduct under section 609.72;
(5) harassing telephone calls under section 609.79;
(6) burglary under section 609.582;
(7) trespass under section 609.605;
(8) criminal sexual conduct in the first, second, third, fourth, or fifth degree under section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, or 609.3451;
(9) terroristic threats under section 609.713;
(10) stalking under section 609.749;
(11) violations of harassment restraining orders under section 609.748;
(12) violations of domestic abuse no contact orders under section 629.75; and
(13) interference with an emergency call under section 609.78, subdivision 2.
(c) The location data associated with the victim and offender are security information as defined in section 13.37. Location data maintained by a law enforcement agency, probation authority, prosecutorial agency, or court services department may be shared among those agencies to develop and monitor conditions of a stayed sentence under this section.
(d) A violation of a location restriction by an offender in a situation involving a victim and offender who are both mobile does not automatically constitute a violation of the conditions of the offender's stayed sentence.
Subd. 6.Preference for intermediate sanctions.
A court staying imposition or execution of a sentence that does not include a term of incarceration as a condition of the stay shall order other intermediate sanctions where practicable.
Subd. 7.Demand of execution of sentence.
An offender may not demand execution of sentence in lieu of a stay of imposition or execution of sentence if the offender will serve less than nine months at the state institution. This subdivision does not apply to an offender who will be serving the sentence consecutively or concurrently with a previously imposed executed felony sentence.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.135; 1971 c 244 s 2; 1976 c 341 s 3; 1977 c 349 s 1; 1977 c 355 s 6; 1978 c 723 art 2 s 4; 1978 c 724 s 1; 1981 c 9 s 2; 1981 c 227 s 8; 1983 c 264 s 9; 1984 c 610 s 3,4; 1985 c 242 s 4; 1986 c 372 s 5; 1986 c 435 s 7-9; 1986 c 444; 1986 c 463 s 3; 1987 c 220 s 1; 1989 c 21 s 3; 1989 c 253 s 1; 1990 c 579 s 3,4; 1991 c 272 s 6; 1991 c 279 s 27,28; 1992 c 570 art 1 s 25; 1992 c 571 art 1 s 10; art 6 s 11,12; 1993 c 326 art 10 s 12,13; art 13 s 24; 1994 c 615 s 24; 1995 c 226 art 2 s 11; 1995 c 259 art 3 s 9,10; 1996 c 408 art 7 s 4; 1997 c 239 art 3 s 7; art 5 s 8,9; 1Sp1997 c 2 s 62; 1998 c 367 art 7 s 10; 1999 c 194 s 9; 2000 c 478 art 2 s 7; 1Sp2003 c 2 art 6 s 5; art 9 s 18; 2007 c 54 art 3 s 14; art 5 s 17; 2009 c 83 art 2 s 44-46; 2014 c 180 s 9; 2014 c 263 s 1; 2014 c 270 s 1
NOTE: The amendment to subdivision 5a by Laws 2014, chapter 263, section 1, expires August 1, 2017. Laws 2014, chapter 263, section 1, the effective date.
When a court sentences a person under section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, 609.3453, or 609.3455, subdivision 3a, the court shall make a preliminary determination whether in the court's opinion a petition under chapter 253D may be appropriate and include the determination as part of the sentencing order. If the court determines that a petition may be appropriate, the court shall forward its preliminary determination along with supporting documentation to the county attorney.
1989 c 290 art 4 s 9; 1992 c 571 art 3 s 7; 1Sp1994 c 1 art 2 s 32; 1998 c 367 art 6 s 15; 2005 c 136 art 4 s 5; 2006 c 260 art 1 s 47; 2013 c 49 s 22
Subdivision 1.Grounds.
(a) When it appears that the defendant has violated any of the conditions of probation or intermediate sanction, or has otherwise been guilty of misconduct which warrants the imposing or execution of sentence, the court may without notice revoke the stay and direct that the defendant be taken into immediate custody.
(b) When it appears that the defendant violated any of the conditions of probation during the term of the stay, but the term of the stay has since expired, the defendant's probation officer or the prosecutor may ask the court to initiate probation revocation proceedings under the Rules of Criminal Procedure at any time within six months after the expiration of the stay. The court also may initiate proceedings under these circumstances on its own motion. If proceedings are initiated within this six-month period, the court may conduct a revocation hearing and take any action authorized under rule 27.04 at any time during or after the six-month period.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 609.135 or any law to the contrary, after proceedings to revoke the stay have been initiated by a court order revoking the stay and directing either that the defendant be taken into custody or that a summons be issued in accordance with paragraph (a), the proceedings to revoke the stay may be concluded and the summary hearing provided by subdivision 2 may be conducted after the expiration of the stay or after the six-month period set forth in paragraph (b). The proceedings to revoke the stay shall not be dismissed on the basis that the summary hearing is conducted after the term of the stay or after the six-month period. The ability or inability to locate or apprehend the defendant prior to the expiration of the stay or during or after the six-month period shall not preclude the court from conducting the summary hearing unless the defendant demonstrates that the delay was purposefully caused by the state in order to gain an unfair advantage.
Subd. 2.Notification of grounds for revocation.
The defendant shall thereupon be notified in writing and in such manner as the court directs of the grounds alleged to exist for revocation of the stay of imposition or execution of sentence. If such grounds are brought in issue by the defendant, a summary hearing shall be held thereon at which the defendant is entitled to be heard and to be represented by counsel.
Subd. 3.Sentence.
If any of such grounds are found to exist the court may:
(1) if imposition of sentence was previously stayed, again stay sentence or impose sentence and stay the execution thereof, and in either event place the defendant on probation or order intermediate sanctions pursuant to section 609.135, or impose sentence and order execution thereof; or
(2) if sentence was previously imposed and execution thereof stayed, continue such stay and place the defendant on probation or order intermediate sanctions in accordance with the provisions of section 609.135, or order execution of the sentence previously imposed.
Subd. 4.Restoration to liberty.
If none of such grounds are found to exist, the defendant shall be restored to liberty under the previous order of the court.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.14; 1984 c 610 s 5,6; 1986 c 444; 1990 c 579 s 5; 1993 c 326 art 10 s 14; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 17
Subdivision 1.Prior imprisonment reduction.
When a person has been imprisoned pursuant to a conviction which is set aside and is thereafter convicted of a crime growing out of the same act or omission, the period of imprisonment to which the person is sentenced is reduced by the period of the prior imprisonment and the time earned thereby in diminution of sentence.
Subd. 2.Reduction for time served before commitment to commissioner.
A sentence of imprisonment upon conviction of a felony is reduced by the period of confinement of the defendant following the conviction and before the defendant's commitment to the commissioner of corrections for execution of sentence unless the court otherwise directs.
Subd. 3.Credit.
When a person is to be committed to the commissioner, the person's probation officer must provide to the court, prior to the sentencing hearing, the amount of time the person has in credit for prior imprisonment. The court must pronounce credit for prior imprisonment at the time of sentencing.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.145; 1978 c 723 art 1 s 14; 1986 c 444; 1Sp2003 c 2 art 5 s 11
Subdivision 1.Concurrent, consecutive sentences; specification requirement.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c), when separate sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant for two or more crimes, whether charged in a single indictment or information or separately, or when a person who is under sentence of imprisonment in this state is being sentenced to imprisonment for another crime committed prior to or while subject to such former sentence, the court in the later sentences shall specify whether the sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively. If the court does not so specify, the sentences shall run concurrently.
(b) When a court imposes sentence for a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor offense and specifies that the sentence shall run consecutively to any other sentence, the court may order the defendant to serve time in custody for the consecutive sentence in addition to any time in custody the defendant may be serving for any other offense, including probationary jail time or imprisonment for any felony offense.
(c) An inmate of a state prison who is convicted of committing an assault within the correctional facility is subject to the consecutive sentencing provisions of section 609.2232.
Subd. 2.Limit on sentences; misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor.
If the court specifies that the sentence shall run consecutively and all of the sentences are for misdemeanors, the total of the sentences shall not exceed one year. If the sentences are for a gross misdemeanor and one or more misdemeanors, the total of the sentences shall not exceed two years. If all of the sentences are for gross misdemeanors, the total of the sentences shall not exceed four years.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.15; 1992 c 571 art 2 s 8; 1993 c 326 art 13 s 26; 1994 c 615 s 25; 1997 c 239 art 3 s 8; art 9 s 35; 1Sp1997 c 2 s 63; 1999 c 194 s 10
Subdivision 1.Application.
This section applies to the following misdemeanor-level crimes: sections 152.093 (manufacture or delivery of drug paraphernalia prohibited); 152.095 (advertisement of drug paraphernalia prohibited); 609.324 (prostitution); 609.3243 (loitering with intent to participate in prostitution);609.546 (motor vehicle tampering); 609.595 (damage to property); and 609.66 (dangerous weapons); misdemeanor-level violations of section 609.605 (trespass); and violations of local ordinances prohibiting the unlawful sale or possession of controlled substances.
Subd. 2.Custodial arrest.
Notwithstanding rule 6.01 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a peace officer acting without a warrant who has decided to proceed with the prosecution of a person for committing a crime described in subdivision 1 may arrest and take the person into custody if the officer has reason to believe the person has a prior conviction for any crime described in subdivision 1.
Subd. 3.Increased penalty.
Notwithstanding the statutory maximum penalty otherwise applicable to the offense, a person who commits a misdemeanor-level crime described in subdivision 1 is guilty of a gross misdemeanor if the court determines at the time of sentencing that the person has two or more prior convictions in this or any other state for any of the crimes described in subdivision 1.
Subd. 4.Notice to complaining witness.
A prosecuting authority who is responsible for filing charges against or prosecuting a person arrested under the circumstances described in subdivision 2 shall make reasonable efforts to notify the complaining witness of the final outcome of the criminal proceeding that resulted from the arrest including, where appropriate, the decision to dismiss or not file charges against the arrested person.
1997 c 239 art 3 s 9; 2006 c 260 art 1 s 14
Subdivision 1.Restoration.
When a person has been deprived of civil rights by reason of conviction of a crime and is thereafter discharged, such discharge shall restore the person to all civil rights and to full citizenship, with full right to vote and hold office, the same as if such conviction had not taken place, and the order of discharge shall so provide.
Subd. 1a.Certain convicted felons ineligible to possess firearms or ammunition.
The order of discharge must provide that a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence, as defined in section 624.712, subdivision 5, is not entitled to ship, transport, possess, or receive a firearm or ammunition for the remainder of the person's lifetime. Any person who has received such a discharge and who thereafter has received a relief of disability under United States Code, title 18, section 925, or whose ability to possess firearms and ammunition has been restored under subdivision 1d, shall not be subject to the restrictions of this subdivision.
Subd. 1b.Violation and penalty.
(a) Any person who has been convicted of a crime of violence, as defined in section 624.712, subdivision 5, and who ships, transports, possesses, or receives a firearm or ammunition, commits a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.
(b) A conviction and sentencing under this section shall be construed to bar a conviction and sentencing for a violation of section 624.713, subdivision 2.
(c) The criminal penalty in paragraph (a) does not apply to any person who has received a relief of disability under United States Code, title 18, section 925, or whose ability to possess firearms and ammunition has been restored under subdivision 1d.
[Repealed, 1999 c 61 s 2]
Subd. 1d.Judicial restoration of ability to possess firearms and ammunition by felon.
A person prohibited by state law from shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving a firearm or ammunition because of a conviction or a delinquency adjudication for committing a crime of violence may petition a court to restore the person's ability to possess, receive, ship, or transport firearms and otherwise deal with firearms and ammunition.
The court may grant the relief sought if the person shows good cause to do so and the person has been released from physical confinement.
If a petition is denied, the person may not file another petition until three years have elapsed without the permission of the court.
Subd. 2.Discharge.
The discharge may be:
(1) by order of the court following stay of sentence or stay of execution of sentence; or
(2) upon expiration of sentence.
This section does not apply to a forfeiture of and disqualification for public office as provided in section 609.42, subdivision 2.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.165; 1973 c 654 s 15; 1975 c 271 s 6; 1978 c 723 art 1 s 15; 1986 c 444; 1987 c 276 s 1; 1994 c 636 art 3 s 9; 1996 c 408 art 4 s 7; 1998 c 376 s 5; 2003 c 28 art 3 s 3-5; 2005 c 83 s 1; 2015 c 65 art 3 s 18
Subdivision 1.Crime defined.
Whoever, with intent to commit a crime, does an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the commission of the crime is guilty of an attempt to commit that crime, and may be punished as provided in subdivision 4.
Subd. 2.Act defined.
An act may be an attempt notwithstanding the circumstances under which it was performed or the means employed to commit the crime intended or the act itself were such that the commission of the crime was not possible, unless such impossibility would have been clearly evident to a person of normal understanding.
Subd. 3.Defense.
It is a defense to a charge of attempt that the crime was not committed because the accused desisted voluntarily and in good faith and abandoned the intention to commit the crime.
Subd. 4.Penalties.
Whoever attempts to commit a crime may be sentenced as follows:
(1) if the maximum sentence provided for the crime is life imprisonment, to not more than 20 years; or
(2) for any other attempt, to not more than one-half of the maximum imprisonment or fine or both provided for the crime attempted, but such maximum in any case shall not be less than imprisonment for 90 days or a fine of $100.
Subdivision 1.To cause arrest or prosecution.
Whoever conspires with another to cause a third person to be arrested or prosecuted on a criminal charge knowing the charge to be false is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Subd. 2.To commit crime.
Whoever conspires with another to commit a crime and in furtherance of the conspiracy one or more of the parties does some overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy may be sentenced as follows:
(1) if the crime intended is a misdemeanor, by a sentence to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $300, or both; or
(2) if the crime intended is murder in the first degree or treason, to imprisonment for not more than 20 years; or
(3) if the crime intended is any other felony or a gross misdemeanor, to imprisonment or to payment of a fine of not more than one-half the imprisonment or fine provided for that felony or gross misdemeanor or both.
Subd. 3.Application of section jurisdiction.
This section applies if:
(1) the defendant in this state conspires with another outside of this state; or
(2) the defendant outside of this state conspires with another in this state; or
(3) the defendant outside of this state conspires with another outside of this state and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is committed within this state by either of them; or
(4) the defendant in this state conspires with another in this state.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.175; 1971 c 23 s 37,38; 1975 c 279 s 1
For the purposes of sections 609.185, 609.19, 609.2661, and 609.2662, "premeditation" means to consider, plan or prepare for, or determine to commit, the act referred to prior to its commission.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.18; 1986 c 388 s 2
(a) Whoever does any of the following is guilty of murder in the first degree and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life:
(1) causes the death of a human being with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the person or of another;
(2) causes the death of a human being while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence, either upon or affecting the person or another;
(3) causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of the person or another, while committing or attempting to commit burglary, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, arson in the first or second degree, a drive-by shooting, tampering with a witness in the first degree, escape from custody, or any felony violation of chapter 152 involving the unlawful sale of a controlled substance;
(4) causes the death of a peace officer, prosecuting attorney, judge, or a guard employed at a Minnesota state or local correctional facility, with intent to effect the death of that person or another, while the person is engaged in the performance of official duties;
(5) causes the death of a minor while committing child abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of child abuse upon a child and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life;
(6) causes the death of a human being while committing domestic abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim or upon another family or household member and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life; or
(7) causes the death of a human being while committing, conspiring to commit, or attempting to commit a felony crime to further terrorism and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.
(b) For the purposes of paragraph (a), clause (4), "prosecuting attorney" has the meaning given in section 609.221, subdivision 2, paragraph (c), clause (4).
(c) For the purposes of paragraph (a), clause (4), "judge" has the meaning given in section 609.221, subdivision 2, paragraph (c), clause (5).
(d) For purposes of paragraph (a), clause (5), "child abuse" means an act committed against a minor victim that constitutes a violation of the following laws of this state or any similar laws of the United States or any other state: section 609.221; 609.222; 609.223; 609.224; 609.2242; 609.342; 609.343; 609.344; 609.345; 609.377; 609.378; or 609.713.
(e) For purposes of paragraph (a), clause (6), "domestic abuse" means an act that:
(1) constitutes a violation of section 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, 609.224, 609.2242, 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, 609.713, or any similar laws of the United States or any other state; and
(2) is committed against the victim who is a family or household member as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2, paragraph (b).
(f) For purposes of paragraph (a), clause (7), "further terrorism" has the meaning given in section 609.714, subdivision 1.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.185; 1975 c 374 s 1; 1981 c 227 s 9; 1986 c 444; 1988 c 662 s 2; 1989 c 290 art 2 s 11; 1990 c 583 s 4; 1992 c 571 art 4 s 5; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 19; 1995 c 244 s 12; 1995 c 259 art 3 s 12; 1998 c 367 art 2 s 7; 2000 c 437 s 5; 2002 c 401 art 1 s 15; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 10; 2014 c 302 s 1
Subdivision 1.Intentional murder; drive-by shootings.
Whoever does either of the following is guilty of murder in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 40 years:
(1) causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of that person or another, but without premeditation; or
(2) causes the death of a human being while committing or attempting to commit a drive-by shooting in violation of section 609.66, subdivision 1e, under circumstances other than those described in section 609.185, paragraph (a), clause (3).
Subd. 2.Unintentional murders.
Whoever does either of the following is guilty of unintentional murder in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 40 years:
(1) causes the death of a human being, without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence or a drive-by shooting; or
(2) causes the death of a human being without intent to effect the death of any person, while intentionally inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily harm upon the victim, when the perpetrator is restrained under an order for protection and the victim is a person designated to receive protection under the order. As used in this clause, "order for protection" includes an order for protection issued under chapter 518B; a harassment restraining order issued under section 609.748; a court order setting conditions of pretrial release or conditions of a criminal sentence or juvenile court disposition; a restraining order issued in a marriage dissolution action; and any order issued by a court of another state or of the United States that is similar to any of these orders.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.19; 1981 c 227 s 10; 1992 c 571 art 4 s 6; 1995 c 226 art 2 s 16; 1996 c 408 art 4 s 8; 1998 c 367 art 2 s 8; 2015 c 21 art 1 s 99
(a) Whoever, without intent to effect the death of any person, causes the death of another by perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life, is guilty of murder in the third degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 25 years.
(b) Whoever, without intent to cause death, proximately causes the death of a human being by, directly or indirectly, unlawfully selling, giving away, bartering, delivering, exchanging, distributing, or administering a controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II, is guilty of murder in the third degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 25 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $40,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.195; 1977 c 130 s 3; 1981 c 227 s 11; 1987 c 176 s 1
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both:
(1) intentionally causes the death of another person in the heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of ordinary self-control under like circumstances, provided that the crying of a child does not constitute provocation;
(2) violates section 609.224 and causes the death of another or causes the death of another in committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor offense with such force and violence that death of or great bodily harm to any person was reasonably foreseeable, and murder in the first or second degree was not committed thereby;
(3) intentionally causes the death of another person because the actor is coerced by threats made by someone other than the actor's coconspirator and which cause the actor reasonably to believe that the act performed by the actor is the only means of preventing imminent death to the actor or another;
(4) proximately causes the death of another, without intent to cause death by, directly or indirectly, unlawfully selling, giving away, bartering, delivering, exchanging, distributing, or administering a controlled substance classified in Schedule III, IV, or V; or
(5) causes the death of another in committing or attempting to commit a violation of section 609.377 (malicious punishment of a child), and murder in the first, second, or third degree is not committed thereby.
As used in this section, a "person of ordinary self-control" does not include a person under the influence of intoxicants or a controlled substance.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.20; 1981 c 227 s 12; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 3; 1986 c 444; 1987 c 176 s 2; 1988 c 604 s 1; 1995 c 244 s 13; 1996 c 408 art 3 s 13
A person who causes the death of another by any of the following means is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both:
(1) by the person's culpable negligence whereby the person creates an unreasonable risk, and consciously takes chances of causing death or great bodily harm to another; or
(2) by shooting another with a firearm or other dangerous weapon as a result of negligently believing the other to be a deer or other animal; or
(3) by setting a spring gun, pit fall, deadfall, snare, or other like dangerous weapon or device; or
(4) by negligently or intentionally permitting any animal, known by the person to have vicious propensities or to have caused great or substantial bodily harm in the past, to run uncontrolled off the owner's premises, or negligently failing to keep it properly confined; or
(5) by committing or attempting to commit a violation of section 609.378 (neglect or endangerment of a child), and murder in the first, second, or third degree is not committed thereby.
If proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall be an affirmative defense to criminal liability under clause (4) that the victim provoked the animal to cause the victim's death.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.205; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1985 c 294 s 6; 1986 c 444; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 5; 1995 c 244 s 14
[Renumbered 609.2112, subd 1]
[Renumbered 609.2111]
(a) For purposes of sections 609.2111 to 609.2114, the terms defined in this subdivision have the meanings given them.
(b) "Motor vehicle" has the meaning given in section 609.52, subdivision 1, and includes attached trailers.
(c) "Controlled substance" has the meaning given in section 152.01, subdivision 4.
(d) "Hazardous substance" means any chemical or chemical compound that is listed as a hazardous substance in rules adopted under chapter 182.
(e) "Qualified prior driving offense" includes a prior conviction:
(1) for a violation of section 169A.20 under the circumstances described in section 169A.24 or 169A.25;
(2) under section 609.2112, subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6); 609.2113, subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6); 2, clauses (2) to (6); or 3, clauses (2) to (6); or 609.2114, subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6); or 2, clauses (2) to (6);
(3) under Minnesota Statutes 2012, section 609.21, subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6); or
(4) under Minnesota Statutes 2006, section 609.21, subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6); 2, clauses (2) to (6); 2a, clauses (2) to (6); 2b, clauses (2) to (6); 3, clauses (2) to (6); or 4, clauses (2) to (6).
1990 c 602 art 4 s 1; 1996 c 442 s 33; 2007 c 54 art 3 s 11; 2014 c 180 s 6,9; 2016 c 109 s 1
Subdivision 1.Criminal vehicular homicide.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a person is guilty of criminal vehicular homicide and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both, if the person causes the death of a human being not constituting murder or manslaughter as a result of operating a motor vehicle:
(1) in a grossly negligent manner;
(2) in a negligent manner while under the influence of:
(i) alcohol;
(ii) a controlled substance; or
(iii) any combination of those elements;
(3) while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more;
(4) while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, as measured within two hours of the time of driving;
(5) in a negligent manner while knowingly under the influence of a hazardous substance;
(6) in a negligent manner while any amount of a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II, or its metabolite, other than marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols, is present in the person's body;
(7) where the driver who causes the collision leaves the scene of the collision in violation of section 169.09, subdivision 1 or 6; or
(8) where the driver had actual knowledge that a peace officer had previously issued a citation or warning that the motor vehicle was defectively maintained, the driver had actual knowledge that remedial action was not taken, the driver had reason to know that the defect created a present danger to others, and the death was caused by the defective maintenance.
(b) If a person is sentenced under paragraph (a) for a violation under paragraph (a), clauses (2) to (6), occurring within ten years of a qualified prior driving offense, the statutory maximum sentence of imprisonment is 15 years.
Subd. 2.Affirmative defense.
It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge under subdivision 1, clause (6), that the defendant used the controlled substance according to the terms of a prescription issued for the defendant in accordance with sections 152.11 and 152.12.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.21; 1983 c 12 s 1; 1984 c 622 s 24; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 4,11; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 6; art 10 s 7; 1990 c 602 art 4 s 1; 1996 c 408 art 3 s 14; 1996 c 442 s 33; 2004 c 283 s 13; 2007 c 54 art 3 s 7,8,10; 2014 c 180 s 4,9; 2014 c 186 s 2; 2016 c 109 s 2
Subdivision 1.Great bodily harm.
A person is guilty of criminal vehicular operation resulting in great bodily harm and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both, if the person causes great bodily harm to another not constituting attempted murder or assault as a result of operating a motor vehicle:
(7) where the driver who causes the accident leaves the scene of the accident in violation of section 169.09, subdivision 1 or 6; or
(8) where the driver had actual knowledge that a peace officer had previously issued a citation or warning that the motor vehicle was defectively maintained, the driver had actual knowledge that remedial action was not taken, the driver had reason to know that the defect created a present danger to others, and the injury was caused by the defective maintenance.
Subd. 2.Substantial bodily harm.
A person is guilty of criminal vehicular operation resulting in substantial bodily harm and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both, if the person causes substantial bodily harm to another as a result of operating a motor vehicle:
A person is guilty of criminal vehicular operation resulting in bodily harm and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both, if the person causes bodily harm to another as a result of operating a motor vehicle:
It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge under subdivisions 1, clause (6); 2, clause (6); and 3, clause (6), that the defendant used the controlled substance according to the terms of a prescription issued for the defendant in accordance with sections 152.11 and 152.12.
1983 c 12 s 1; 1984 c 622 s 25; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 4,11; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 7; art 10 s 7; 1990 c 602 art 4 s 1; 1996 c 408 art 3 s 15,16; 1996 c 442 s 33; 2004 c 283 s 13; 2007 c 54 art 3 s 7,8,10; 2014 c 180 s 5,7,9
Subdivision 1.Death to an unborn child.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a person is guilty of criminal vehicular operation resulting in death to an unborn child and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both, if the person causes the death of an unborn child as a result of operating a motor vehicle:
Subd. 2.Injury to an unborn child.
A person is guilty of criminal vehicular operation resulting in injury to an unborn child and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both, if the person causes the great bodily harm to an unborn child subsequently born alive as a result of operating a motor vehicle:
Subd. 3.Conviction not bar to punishment for other crimes.
A prosecution for or a conviction of a crime under this section relating to causing death or injury to an unborn child is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.
It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge under subdivisions 1, clause (6), and 2, clause (6), that the defendant used the controlled substance according to the terms of a prescription issued for the defendant in accordance with sections 152.11 and 152.12.
1986 c 388 s 3,4; 1989 c 290 art 10 s 7; 1990 c 602 art 4 s 1; 1996 c 408 art 3 s 17,18; 1996 c 442 s 33; 2004 c 283 s 13; 2007 c 54 art 3 s 8,9,10; 2014 c 180 s 8,9; 2016 c 109 s 3
Subdivision 1.Aiding suicide.
Whoever intentionally advises, encourages, or assists another in taking the other's own life may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.
Subd. 2.Aiding attempted suicide.
Whoever intentionally advises, encourages, or assists another who attempts but fails to take the other's own life may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than seven years or to payment of a fine of not more than $14,000, or both.
Subd. 3.Acts or omissions not considered aiding suicide or aiding attempted suicide.
(a) A health care provider, as defined in section 145B.02, subdivision 6, who administers, prescribes, or dispenses medications or procedures to relieve another person's pain or discomfort, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or increase the risk of death, does not violate this section unless the medications or procedures are knowingly administered, prescribed, or dispensed to cause death.
(b) A health care provider, as defined in section 145B.02, subdivision 6, who withholds or withdraws a life-sustaining procedure in compliance with chapter 145B or 145C or in accordance with reasonable medical practice does not violate this section.
Subd. 4.Injunctive relief.
A cause of action for injunctive relief may be maintained against any person who is reasonably believed to be about to violate or who is in the course of violating this section by any person who is:
(1) the spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the person who would commit suicide;
(2) an heir or a beneficiary under a life insurance policy of the person who would commit suicide;
(3) a health care provider of the person who would commit suicide;
(4) a person authorized to prosecute or enforce the laws of this state; or
(5) a legally appointed guardian or conservator of the person who would have committed suicide.
Subd. 5.Civil damages.
A person given standing by subdivision 4, clause (1), (2), or (5), or the person who would have committed suicide, in the case of an attempt, may maintain a cause of action against any person who violates or who attempts to violate subdivision 1 or 2 for compensatory damages and punitive damages as provided in section 549.20. A person described in subdivision 4, clause (4), may maintain a cause of action against a person who violates or attempts to violate subdivision 1 or 2 for a civil penalty of up to $50,000 on behalf of the state. An action under this subdivision may be brought whether or not the plaintiff had prior knowledge of the violation or attempt.
Subd. 6.Attorney fees.
Reasonable attorney fees shall be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff in a civil action brought under subdivision 4 or 5.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.215; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444; 1992 c 577 s 6-9; 1998 c 399 s 37
NOTE: The words "advises" and "encourages" were severed from subdivision 1 as unconstitutional in State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014).
Whoever assaults another and inflicts great bodily harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.
Subd. 2.Use of deadly force against peace officer, prosecuting attorney, judge, or correctional employee.
(a) Whoever assaults a peace officer, prosecuting attorney, judge, or correctional employee by using or attempting to use deadly force against the officer, attorney, judge, or employee while the person is engaged in the performance of a duty imposed by law, policy, or rule may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.
(b) A person convicted of assaulting a peace officer, prosecuting attorney, judge, or correctional employee as described in paragraph (a) shall be committed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than ten years, nor more than 20 years. A defendant convicted and sentenced as required by this paragraph is not eligible for probation, parole, discharge, work release, or supervised release, until that person has served the full term of imprisonment as provided by law, notwithstanding the provisions of sections 241.26, 242.19, 243.05, 244.04, 609.12, and 609.135. Notwithstanding section 609.135, the court may not stay the imposition or execution of this sentence.
(c) As used in this subdivision:
(1) "correctional employee" means an employee of a public or private prison, jail, or workhouse;
(2) "deadly force" has the meaning given in section 609.066, subdivision 1;
(3) "peace officer" has the meaning given in section 626.84, subdivision 1;
(4) "prosecuting attorney" means an attorney, with criminal prosecution or civil responsibilities, who is the attorney general, a political subdivision's elected or appointed county or city attorney, or a deputy, assistant, or special assistant of any of these; and
(5) "judge" means a judge or justice of any court of this state that is established by the Minnesota Constitution.
1979 c 258 s 4; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 8; 1997 c 239 art 3 s 10; 2014 c 302 s 2
Subdivision 1.Dangerous weapon.
Whoever assaults another with a dangerous weapon may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than seven years or to payment of a fine of not more than $14,000, or both.
Subd. 2.Dangerous weapon; substantial bodily harm.
Whoever assaults another with a dangerous weapon and inflicts substantial bodily harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.
1979 c 258 s 5; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1985 c 53 s 1; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 9; 1992 c 571 art 4 s 7
Subdivision 1.Substantial bodily harm.
Whoever assaults another and inflicts substantial bodily harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Subd. 2.Past pattern of child abuse.
Whoever assaults a minor may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both, if the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of child abuse against the minor. As used in this subdivision, "child abuse" has the meaning given it in section 609.185, paragraph (a), clause (5).
Subd. 3.Felony; victim under four.
Whoever assaults a victim under the age of four, and causes bodily harm to the child's head, eyes, or neck, or otherwise causes multiple bruises to the body, is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
1979 c 258 s 6; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 10; 1990 c 542 s 17; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 20; 2015 c 21 art 1 s 100
Subdivision 1.Peace officers.
(a) As used in this subdivision, "peace officer" means a person who is licensed under section 626.845, subdivision 1, and effecting a lawful arrest or executing any other duty imposed by law.
(b) Whoever physically assaults a peace officer is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
(c) Whoever commits either of the following acts against a peace officer is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $6,000, or both: (1) physically assaults the officer if the assault inflicts demonstrable bodily harm; or (2) intentionally throws or otherwise transfers bodily fluids or feces at or onto the officer.
Subd. 2.Firefighters and emergency medical personnel.
Whoever assaults any of the following persons and inflicts demonstrable bodily harm is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $4,000, or both:
(1) a member of a municipal or volunteer fire department or emergency medical services personnel unit in the performance of the member's duties; or
(2) a physician, nurse, or other person providing health care services in a hospital emergency department.
Subd. 2a.Certain Department of Natural Resources employees.
Whoever assaults and inflicts demonstrable bodily harm on an employee of the Department of Natural Resources who is engaged in forest fire activities is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Subd. 3.Correctional employees; prosecuting attorneys; judges; probation officers.
Whoever commits either of the following acts against an employee of a correctional facility as defined in section 241.021, subdivision 1, paragraph (f), against a prosecuting attorney as defined in section 609.221, subdivision 2, paragraph (c), clause (4), against a judge as defined in section 609.221, subdivision 2, paragraph (c), clause (5), or against a probation officer or other qualified person employed in supervising offenders while the person is engaged in the performance of a duty imposed by law, policy, or rule is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $4,000, or both:
(1) assaults the person and inflicts demonstrable bodily harm; or
(2) intentionally throws or otherwise transfers bodily fluids or feces at or onto the person.
Subd. 3a.Secure treatment facility personnel.
(a) As used in this subdivision, "secure treatment facility" includes facilities listed in sections 253B.02, subdivision 18a, and 253D.02, subdivision 13.
(b) Whoever, while committed under chapter 253D, Minnesota Statutes 2012, section 253B.185, or Minnesota Statutes 1992, section 526.10, commits either of the following acts against an employee or other individual who provides care or treatment at a secure treatment facility while the person is engaged in the performance of a duty imposed by law, policy, or rule is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $4,000, or both:
(c) Whoever, while committed under section 253B.18, or admitted under the provision of section 253B.10, subdivision 1, commits either of the following acts against an employee or other individual who supervises and works directly with patients at a secure treatment facility while the person is engaged in the performance of a duty imposed by law, policy, or rule, is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $4,000, or both:
(2) intentionally throws or otherwise transfers urine, blood, semen, or feces onto the person.
(d) The court shall commit a person convicted of violating paragraph (b) to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for not less than one year and one day. The court may not, on its own motion or the prosecutor's motion, sentence a person without regard to this paragraph. A person convicted and sentenced as required by this paragraph is not eligible for probation, parole, discharge, work release, or supervised release, until that person has served the full term of imprisonment as provided by law, notwithstanding the provisions of sections 241.26, 242.19, 243.05, 244.04, 609.12, and 609.135.
(e) Notwithstanding the statutory maximum sentence provided in paragraph (b), when a court sentences a person to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for a violation of paragraph (b), the court shall provide that after the person has been released from prison, the commissioner shall place the person on conditional release for five years. The terms of conditional release are governed by sections 244.05 and 609.3455, subdivision 6, 7, or 8; and Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109.
Subd. 4.Assaults motivated by bias.
(a) Whoever assaults another because of the victim's or another's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability as defined in section 363A.03, age, or national origin may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
(b) Whoever violates the provisions of paragraph (a) within five years of a previous conviction under paragraph (a) is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year and a day or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
Subd. 5.School official.
Whoever assaults a school official while the official is engaged in the performance of the official's duties, and inflicts demonstrable bodily harm, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. As used in this subdivision, "school official" includes teachers, school administrators, and other employees of a public or private school.
Subd. 6.Public employees with mandated duties.
A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who:
(1) assaults an agricultural inspector, occupational safety and health investigator, child protection worker, public health nurse, animal control officer, or probation or parole officer while the employee is engaged in the performance of a duty mandated by law, court order, or ordinance;
(2) knows that the victim is a public employee engaged in the performance of the official public duties of the office; and
(3) inflicts demonstrable bodily harm.
Subd. 7.Community crime prevention group members.
(a) A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who:
(1) assaults a community crime prevention group member while the member is engaged in neighborhood patrol;
(2) should reasonably know that the victim is a community crime prevention group member engaged in neighborhood patrol; and
(b) As used in this subdivision, "community crime prevention group" means a community group focused on community safety and crime prevention that:
(1) is organized for the purpose of discussing community safety and patrolling community neighborhoods for criminal activity;
(2) is designated and trained by the local law enforcement agency as a community crime prevention group; or
(3) interacts with local law enforcement regarding community safety issues.
Subd. 8.Vulnerable adults.
(a) As used in this subdivision, "vulnerable adult" has the meaning given in section 609.232, subdivision 11.
(b) Whoever assaults and inflicts demonstrable bodily harm on a vulnerable adult, knowing or having reason to know that the person is a vulnerable adult, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Subd. 9.Reserve officer.
(1) assaults a reserve officer as defined in section 626.84, subdivision 1, paragraph (e), who is engaged in the performance of official public duties at the direction of, under the control of, or on behalf of a peace officer or supervising law enforcement officer or agency; and
(2) should reasonably know that the victim is a reserve officer engaged in the performance of official public duties of the peace officer, or supervising law enforcement officer or agency.
Subd. 10.Utility and postal service employees and contractors.
(1) assaults an employee or contractor of a utility or the United States Postal Service while the employee or contractor is engaged in the performance of the employee's or contractor's duties;
(2) should reasonably know that the victim is an employee or contractor of a utility or the postal service who is:
(i) performing duties of the victim's employment; or
(ii) fulfilling the victim's contractual obligations; and
(b) As used in this subdivision, "utility" has the meaning given it in section 609.594, subdivision 1, clause (3).
Subd. 11.Transit operators.
(a) A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor if (1) the person assaults a transit operator, or intentionally throws or otherwise transfers bodily fluids onto a transit operator; and (2) the transit operator is acting in the course of the operator's duties and is operating a transit vehicle, aboard a transit vehicle, or otherwise responsible for a transit vehicle. A person convicted under this paragraph may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
(b) For the purposes of this subdivision, "transit operator" means a driver or operator of a transit vehicle that is used to provide any of the following services:
(1) public transit, as defined in section 174.22, subdivision 7;
(2) light rail transit service;
(3) special transportation service under section 473.386, whether provided by the Metropolitan Council or by other providers under contract with the council; or
(4) commuter rail service.
1983 c 169 s 1; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1985 c 185 s 1; 1986 c 444; 1987 c 252 s 9; 1989 c 261 s 1; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 11; 1991 c 121 s 1; 1991 c 279 s 29; 1992 c 571 art 4 s 8; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 21; 1996 c 408 art 3 s 19,20; 1997 c 180 s 5; 1997 c 239 art 9 s 36; 2000 c 441 s 1; 1Sp2003 c 2 art 8 s 8; 2004 c 184 s 1,2; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 11; 2006 c 260 art 1 s 15; 2007 c 13 art 3 s 37; 2011 c 28 s 7; 2011 c 85 s 1,2; 2013 c 49 s 22; 2013 c 96 s 2; 2013 c 133 s 1; 2014 c 302 s 3; 2015 c 23 s 1; 2016 c 93 s 1
If an inmate of a state correctional facility is convicted of violating section 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, 609.2231, or 609.224, while confined in the facility, the sentence imposed for the assault shall be executed and run consecutively to any unexpired portion of the offender's earlier sentence. The inmate is not entitled to credit against the sentence imposed for the assault for time served in confinement for the earlier sentence. The inmate shall serve the sentence for the assault in a state correctional facility even if the assault conviction was for a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor.
A person who violates section 609.221, 609.222, or 609.223 because of the victim's or another person's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability as defined in section 363A.03, age, or national origin is subject to a statutory maximum penalty of 25 percent longer than the maximum penalty otherwise applicable.
Subdivision 1.Misdemeanor.
Whoever does any of the following commits an assault and is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1) commits an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death; or
(2) intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm upon another.
(a) Whoever violates the provisions of subdivision 1 against the same victim within ten years of a previous qualified domestic violence-related offense conviction or adjudication of delinquency is guilty of a gross misdemeanor and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
(b) Whoever violates the provisions of subdivision 1 within three years of a previous qualified domestic violence-related offense conviction or adjudication of delinquency is guilty of a gross misdemeanor and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
Subd. 3.Firearms.
(a) When a person is convicted of a violation of this section or section 609.221, 609.222, or 609.223, the court shall determine and make written findings on the record as to whether:
(1) the defendant owns or possesses a firearm; and
(2) the firearm was used in any way during the commission of the assault.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 609.2242, subdivision 3, paragraph (c), a person is not entitled to possess a pistol if the person has been convicted after August 1, 1992, of assault in the fifth degree if the offense was committed within three years of a previous conviction under sections 609.221 to 609.224, unless three years have elapsed from the date of conviction and, during that time, the person has not been convicted of any other violation of section 609.224. Property rights may not be abated but access may be restricted by the courts. A person who possesses a pistol in violation of this paragraph is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
(a) Whoever violates the provisions of subdivision 1 against the same victim within ten years of the first of any combination of two or more previous qualified domestic violence-related offense convictions or adjudications of delinquency is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
(b) Whoever violates the provisions of subdivision 1 within three years of the first of any combination of two or more previous qualified domestic violence-related offense convictions or adjudications of delinquency is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
1979 c 258 s 7; 1983 c 169 s 2; 1985 c 159 s 1; 1987 c 329 s 7; 1992 c 537 s 1,2; 1992 c 571 art 6 s 13; 1993 c 326 art 2 s 11,12; 1Sp1993 c 5 s 2,3; 1994 c 636 art 3 s 10; 1995 c 229 art 2 s 1; 1995 c 259 art 3 s 13,14; 1996 c 408 art 3 s 21,22; 2000 c 437 s 6,7; 1Sp2001 c 8 art 10 s 8,9; 2006 c 260 art 1 s 16,17; 2011 c 28 s 8
As used in this section, the following terms have the meanings given:
(a) "Communicable disease" means a disease or condition that causes serious illness, serious disability, or death; the infectious agent of which may pass or be carried from the body of one person to the body of another through direct transmission.
(b) "Direct transmission" means predominately sexual or blood-borne transmission.
(c) "A person who knowingly harbors an infectious agent" refers to a person who receives from a physician or other health professional:
(1) advice that the person harbors an infectious agent for a communicable disease;
(2) educational information about behavior which might transmit the infectious agent; and
(3) instruction of practical means of preventing such transmission.
(d) "Transfer" means to engage in behavior that has been demonstrated epidemiologically to be a mode of direct transmission of an infectious agent which causes the communicable disease.
(e) "Sexual penetration" means any of the acts listed in section 609.341, subdivision 12, when the acts described are committed without the use of a latex or other effective barrier.
Subd. 2.Crime.
It is a crime, which may be prosecuted under section 609.17, 609.185, 609.19, 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, 609.2231, or 609.224, for a person who knowingly harbors an infectious agent to transfer, if the crime involved:
(1) sexual penetration with another person without having first informed the other person that the person has a communicable disease;
(2) transfer of blood, sperm, organs, or tissue, except as deemed necessary for medical research or if disclosed on donor screening forms; or
(3) sharing of nonsterile syringes or needles for the purpose of injecting drugs.
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution, if it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that:
(1) the person who knowingly harbors an infectious agent for a communicable disease took practical means to prevent transmission as advised by a physician or other health professional; or
(2) the person who knowingly harbors an infectious agent for a communicable disease is a health care provider who was following professionally accepted infection control procedures.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to be a defense to a criminal prosecution that does not allege a violation of subdivision 2.
Subd. 4.Health Department data.
Data protected by section 13.3805, subdivision 1, and information collected as part of a Health Department investigation under sections 144.4171 to 144.4186 may not be accessed or subpoenaed by law enforcement authorities or prosecutors without the consent of the subject of the data.
1995 c 226 art 2 s 17; 1999 c 227 s 22
Whoever does any of the following against a family or household member as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2, commits an assault and is guilty of a misdemeanor:
Whoever violates subdivision 1 within ten years of a previous qualified domestic violence-related offense conviction or an adjudication of delinquency is guilty of a gross misdemeanor and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
Subd. 3.Domestic assaults; firearms.
(a) When a person is convicted of a violation of this section or section 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, 609.224, or 609.2247, the court shall determine and make written findings on the record as to whether:
(1) the assault was committed against a family or household member, as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2;
(b) If the court determines that the assault was of a family or household member, and that the offender owns or possesses a firearm and used it in any way during the commission of the assault, it shall order that the firearm be summarily forfeited under section 609.5316, subdivision 3.
(c) When a person is convicted of assaulting a family or household member and is determined by the court to have used a firearm in any way during commission of the assault, the court may order that the person is prohibited from possessing any type of firearm for any period longer than three years or for the remainder of the person's life. A person who violates this paragraph is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. At the time of the conviction, the court shall inform the defendant for how long the defendant is prohibited from possessing a firearm and that it is a gross misdemeanor to violate this paragraph. The failure of the court to provide this information to a defendant does not affect the applicability of the firearm possession prohibition or the gross misdemeanor penalty to that defendant.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c), when a person is convicted of a violation of this section or section 609.224 and the court determines that the victim was a family or household member, the court shall inform the defendant that the defendant is prohibited from possessing a firearm for three years from the date of conviction and that it is a gross misdemeanor offense to violate this prohibition. The failure of the court to provide this information to a defendant does not affect the applicability of the firearm possession prohibition or the gross misdemeanor penalty to that defendant.
(e) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c), a person is not entitled to possess a pistol if the person has been convicted after August 1, 1992, or a firearm if a person has been convicted on or after August 1, 2014, of domestic assault under this section or assault in the fifth degree under section 609.224 and the assault victim was a family or household member as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2, unless three years have elapsed from the date of conviction and, during that time, the person has not been convicted of any other violation of this section or section 609.224. Property rights may not be abated but access may be restricted by the courts. A person who possesses a firearm in violation of this paragraph is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
(f) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (b) and (h), when a person is convicted of a violation of this section or section 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, 609.224, or 609.2247 and the court determines that the assault was against a family or household member, the court shall order the defendant to transfer any firearms that the person possesses, within three business days, to a federally licensed firearms dealer, a law enforcement agency, or a third party who may lawfully receive them. The transfer may be permanent or temporary, unless the court prohibits the person from possessing a firearm for the remainder of the person's life under paragraph (c). A temporary firearm transfer only entitles the receiving party to possess the firearm. A temporary transfer does not transfer ownership or title. A defendant may not transfer firearms to a third party who resides with the defendant. If a defendant makes a temporary transfer, a federally licensed firearms dealer or law enforcement agency may charge the defendant a reasonable fee to store the person's firearms and may establish policies for disposal of abandoned firearms, provided such policies require that the person be notified by certified mail prior to disposal of abandoned firearms. For temporary firearms transfers under this paragraph, a law enforcement agency, federally licensed firearms dealer, or third party shall exercise due care to preserve the quality and function of the transferred firearms and shall return the transferred firearms to the person upon request after the expiration of the prohibiting time period imposed under this subdivision, provided the person is not otherwise prohibited from possessing firearms under state or federal law. The return of temporarily transferred firearms to a person shall comply with state and federal law. If a defendant permanently transfers the defendant's firearms to a law enforcement agency, the agency is not required to compensate the defendant and may charge the defendant a reasonable processing fee. A law enforcement agency is not required to accept a person's firearm under this paragraph. The court shall order that the person surrender all permits to carry and purchase firearms to the sheriff.
(g) A defendant who is ordered to transfer firearms under paragraph (f) must file proof of transfer as provided for in this paragraph. If the transfer is made to a third party, the third party must sign an affidavit under oath before a notary public either acknowledging that the defendant permanently transferred the defendant's firearms to the third party or agreeing to temporarily store the defendant's firearms until such time as the defendant is legally permitted to possess firearms. The affidavit shall indicate the serial number, make, and model of all firearms transferred by the defendant to the third party. The third party shall acknowledge in the affidavit that the third party may be held criminally and civilly responsible under section 624.7144 if the defendant gains access to a transferred firearm while the firearm is in the custody of the third party. If the transfer is to a law enforcement agency or federally licensed firearms dealer, the law enforcement agency or federally licensed firearms dealer shall provide proof of transfer to the defendant. The proof of transfer must specify whether the firearms were permanently or temporarily transferred and include the name of the defendant, date of transfer, and the serial number, make, and model of all transferred firearms. The defendant shall provide the court with a signed and notarized affidavit or proof of transfer as described in this section within two business days of the firearms transfer. The court shall seal affidavits and proofs of transfer filed pursuant to this paragraph.
(h) When a person is convicted of a violation of this section or section 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, 609.224, or 609.2247, and the court determines that the assault was against a family or household member, the court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence if the person poses an imminent risk of causing another person substantial bodily harm. Upon a finding of imminent risk, the court shall order that the local law enforcement agency take immediate possession of all firearms in the person's possession. The local law enforcement agency shall exercise due care to preserve the quality and function of the defendant's firearms and shall return the firearms to the person upon request after the expiration of the prohibiting time period, provided the person is not otherwise prohibited from possessing firearms under state or federal law. The local law enforcement agency shall, upon written notice from the person, transfer the firearms to a federally licensed firearms dealer or a third party who may lawfully receive them. Before a local law enforcement agency transfers a firearm under this paragraph, the agency shall require the third party or federally licensed firearms dealer receiving the firearm to submit an affidavit or proof of transfer that complies with the requirements for affidavits or proofs of transfer established in paragraph (g). The agency shall file all affidavits or proofs of transfer received with the court within two business days of the transfer. The court shall seal all affidavits or proofs of transfer filed pursuant to this paragraph. A federally licensed firearms dealer or third party who accepts a firearm transfer pursuant to this paragraph shall comply with paragraphs (f) and (g) as if accepting transfer from the defendant. If the law enforcement agency does not receive written notice from the defendant within three business days, the agency may charge a reasonable fee to store the defendant's firearms. A law enforcement agency may establish policies for disposal of abandoned firearms, provided such policies require that the person be notified via certified mail prior to disposal of abandoned firearms.
Whoever violates the provisions of this section or section 609.224, subdivision 1, within ten years of the first of any combination of two or more previous qualified domestic violence-related offense convictions or adjudications of delinquency is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
1995 c 259 art 3 s 15; 2000 c 437 s 8,9; 1Sp2001 c 8 art 10 s 10,11; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 12; 2006 c 260 art 1 s 18,19; 2013 c 47 s 3; 2014 c 213 s 3
Subdivision 1.Gross misdemeanor.
A person convicted of gross misdemeanor domestic assault under section 609.2242, subdivision 2, shall be sentenced to a minimum of 20 days imprisonment, at least 96 hours of which must be served consecutively. The court may stay execution of the minimum sentence required under this subdivision on the condition that the person sentenced complete anger therapy or counseling and fulfill any other condition, as ordered by the court; provided, however, that the court shall revoke the stay of execution and direct the person to be taken into immediate custody if it appears that the person failed to attend or complete the ordered therapy or counseling, or violated any other condition of the stay of execution. If the court finds at the revocation hearing required under section 609.14, subdivision 2, that the person failed to attend or complete the ordered therapy, or violated any other condition of the stay of execution, the court shall order execution of the sentence previously imposed.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b), in determining an appropriate disposition for felony domestic assault under section 609.2242, subdivision 4, the court shall presume that a stay of execution with at least a 45-day period of incarceration as a condition of probation shall be imposed. If the court imposes a stay of execution with a period of incarceration as a condition of probation, at least 15 days must be served consecutively.
(b) If the defendant's criminal history score, determined according to the Sentencing Guidelines, indicates a presumptive executed sentence, that sentence shall be imposed unless the court departs from the Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to section 244.10. A stay of imposition of sentence under this paragraph may be granted only if accompanied by a statement on the record of the reasons for it.
Subdivision 1.Investigation.
A presentence domestic abuse investigation must be conducted and a report submitted to the court by the corrections agency responsible for conducting the investigation when:
(1) a defendant is convicted of an offense described in section 518B.01, subdivision 2;
(2) a defendant is arrested for committing an offense described in section 518B.01, subdivision 2, but is convicted of another offense arising out of the same circumstances surrounding the arrest; or
(3) a defendant is convicted of a violation against a family or household member of: (a) an order for protection under section 518B.01; (b) a harassment restraining order under section 609.748; (c) section 609.79, subdivision 1; or (d) section 609.713, subdivision 1.
Subd. 2.Report.
(a) The Department of Corrections shall establish minimum standards for the report, including the circumstances of the offense, impact on the victim, the defendant's prior record, characteristics and history of alcohol and chemical use problems, and amenability to domestic abuse programs. The report is classified as private data on individuals as defined in section 13.02, subdivision 12. Victim impact statements are confidential.
(b) The report must include:
(1) a recommendation on any limitations on contact with the victim and other measures to ensure the victim's safety;
(2) a recommendation for the defendant to enter and successfully complete domestic abuse programming and any aftercare found necessary by the investigation, including a specific recommendation for the defendant to complete a domestic abuse counseling program or domestic abuse educational program under section 518B.02;
(3) a recommendation for chemical dependency evaluation and treatment as determined by the evaluation whenever alcohol or drugs were found to be a contributing factor to the offense;
(4) recommendations for other appropriate remedial action or care or a specific explanation why no level of care or action is recommended; and
(5) consequences for failure to abide by conditions set up by the court.
Subd. 3.Corrections agents standards; rules; investigation time limits.
A domestic abuse investigation required by this section must be conducted by the local Corrections Department or the commissioner of corrections. The corrections agent shall have access to any police reports or other law enforcement data relating to the current offense or previous offenses that are necessary to complete the evaluation. A corrections agent conducting an investigation under this section may not have any direct or shared financial interest or referral relationship resulting in shared financial gain with a treatment provider. An appointment for the defendant to undergo the investigation must be made by the court, a court services probation officer, or court administrator as soon as possible.
[Repealed, 1Sp2001 c 8 art 10 s 20]
1996 c 408 art 3 s 24; 1997 c 239 art 7 s 18; 1998 c 367 art 5 s 6,7; 1Sp2001 c 8 art 10 s 12
Except as otherwise permitted in subdivision 2, whoever knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates, in whole or in part, the labia majora, labia minora, or clitoris of another is guilty of a felony. Consent to the procedure by a minor on whom it is performed or by the minor's parent is not a defense to a violation of this subdivision.
Subd. 2.Permitted activities.
A surgical procedure is not a violation of subdivision 1 if the procedure:
(1) is necessary to the health of the person on whom it is performed and is performed by: (i) a physician licensed under chapter 147; (ii) a physician in training under the supervision of a licensed physician; or (iii) a certified nurse midwife practicing within the nurse midwife's legal scope of practice; or
(2) is performed on a person who is in labor or who has just given birth and is performed for medical purposes connected with that labor or birth: (i) by a physician licensed under chapter 147; (ii) a physician in training under the supervision of a licensed physician; or (iii) a certified nurse midwife practicing within the nurse midwife's legal scope of practice.
1994 c 636 art 2 s 22; 1997 c 239 art 3 s 11
(b) "Family or household members" has the meaning given in section 518B.01, subdivision 2.
(c) "Strangulation" means intentionally impeding normal breathing or circulation of the blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of another person.
Unless a greater penalty is provided elsewhere, whoever assaults a family or household member by strangulation is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
2005 c 136 art 17 s 13
Subdivision 1.Great or substantial bodily harm.
A person who causes great or substantial bodily harm to another by negligently or intentionally permitting any dog to run uncontrolled off the owner's premises, or negligently failing to keep it properly confined is guilty of a misdemeanor. A person who is convicted of a second or subsequent violation of this section involving the same dog is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Subd. 2.Dangerous dogs.
If the owner of a dangerous dog, as defined under section 347.50, subdivision 2, has been convicted of a misdemeanor under section 347.55, and the same dog causes bodily injury to a person other than the owner, the owner is guilty of a gross misdemeanor and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
If proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall be an affirmative defense to liability under subdivision 1 or 2 that the victim provoked the dog to cause the victim's bodily harm.
Subd. 4.Harm to service animal caused by dog; crime, mandatory restitution.
(a) As used in this subdivision, "service animal" means an animal individually trained or being trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability.
(b) A person who negligently or intentionally (1) permits the person's dog to run uncontrolled off the person's premises, or (2) fails to keep the person's dog properly confined or controlled; and as a result the dog causes bodily harm to a service animal or otherwise renders a service animal unable to perform its duties, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(c) The court shall order a person convicted of violating this subdivision to pay restitution for the costs and expenses resulting from the crime. Costs and expenses include, but are not limited to, the service animal user's loss of income, veterinary expenses, transportation costs, and other expenses of temporary replacement assistance services, and service animal replacement or retraining costs incurred by a school, agency, or individual. If the court finds that the convicted person is indigent, the court may reduce the amount of restitution to a reasonable level or order it paid in installments.
(d) This subdivision does not preclude a person from seeking any available civil remedies for an act that violates this subdivision.
1985 c 294 s 7; 1988 c 711 s 8; 1989 c 37 s 13; 2004 c 159 s 1,2
When a person has been charged with a violation of section 609.205, clause (4), or 609.226, subdivision 2 or 3, or a gross misdemeanor violation of section 609.226, subdivision 1, the court shall order that the animal which caused the death or injury be seized by the appropriate local law enforcement agency. The animal shall be killed in a proper and humane manner if the person has been convicted of the crime for which the animal was seized. The owner of the animal shall pay the cost of confining and killing the animal. This section shall not preempt local ordinances with more restrictive provisions.
1985 c 294 s 8; 1988 c 711 s 9
Whoever proximately causes great bodily harm by, directly or indirectly, unlawfully selling, giving away, bartering, delivering, exchanging, distributing, or administering a controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.
As used in this section, "criminal gang" means any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, that:
(1) has, as one of its primary activities, the commission of one or more of the offenses listed in section 609.11, subdivision 9;
(2) has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol; and
(3) includes members who individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal activity.
Subd. 2.Crimes.
A person who commits a crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, in association with, or motivated by involvement with a criminal gang, with the intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 3.
Subd. 3.Penalty.
(a) If the crime committed in violation of subdivision 2 is a felony, the statutory maximum for the crime is five years longer than the statutory maximum for the underlying crime. If the crime committed in violation of subdivision 2 is a felony, and the victim of the crime is a child under the age of 18 years, the statutory maximum for the crime is ten years longer than the statutory maximum for the underlying crime.
(b) If the crime committed in violation of subdivision 2 is a misdemeanor, the person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
(c) If the crime committed in violation of subdivision 2 is a gross misdemeanor, the person is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $15,000, or both.
Subd. 4.Mandatory minimum sentence.
(a) Unless a longer mandatory minimum sentence is otherwise required by law, or the court imposes a longer aggravated durational departure, or a longer prison sentence is presumed under the Sentencing Guidelines and imposed by the court, a person convicted of a crime described in subdivision 3, paragraph (a), shall be committed to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for not less than one year plus one day.
(b) Any person convicted and sentenced as required by paragraph (a) is not eligible for probation, parole, discharge, work release, or supervised release until that person has served the full term of imprisonment as provided by law, notwithstanding the provisions of sections 242.19, 243.05, 244.04, 609.12, and 609.135.
1991 c 279 s 30; 1993 c 326 art 13 s 29; 1998 c 367 art 2 s 9-11; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 14
Whoever, being in charge of or employed in any institution, whether public or private, intentionally abuses or ill-treats any person confined therein who is mentally or physically disabled or who is involuntarily confined therein by order of court or other duly constituted authority may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.23; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11
Whoever, being in charge of or employed in any facility required to be licensed under the provisions of sections 144.50 to 144.58, or 144A.02, intentionally abuses, ill-treats, or culpably neglects any patient or resident therein to the patient's or resident's physical detriment may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
1973 c 688 s 9; 1976 c 173 s 60; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444
Subdivision 1.Scope.
As used in sections 609.2325, 609.233, 609.2335, and 609.234, the terms defined in this section have the meanings given.
Subd. 2.Caregiver.
"Caregiver" means an individual or facility who has responsibility for the care of a vulnerable adult as a result of a family relationship, or who has assumed responsibility for all or a portion of the care of a vulnerable adult voluntarily, by contract, or by agreement.
Subd. 3.Facility.
(a) "Facility" means a hospital or other entity required to be licensed under sections 144.50 to 144.58; a nursing home required to be licensed to serve adults under section 144A.02; a home care provider licensed or required to be licensed under sections 144A.43 to 144A.482; a residential or nonresidential facility required to be licensed to serve adults under sections 245A.01 to 245A.16; or a person or organization that exclusively offers, provides, or arranges for personal care assistance services under the medical assistance program as authorized under sections 256B.0625, subdivision 19a, 256B.0651, 256B.0653, and 256B.0654.
(b) For home care providers and personal care attendants, the term "facility" refers to the provider or person or organization that exclusively offers, provides, or arranges for personal care services, and does not refer to the client's home or other location at which services are rendered.
Subd. 4.Immediately.
"Immediately" means as soon as possible, but no longer than 24 hours from the time of initial knowledge that the incident occurred has been received.
Subd. 5.Legal authority.
"Legal authority" includes, but is not limited to:
(1) a fiduciary obligation recognized elsewhere in law, including pertinent regulations;
(2) a contractual obligation; or
(3) documented consent by a competent person.
Subd. 6.Maltreatment.
"Maltreatment" means any of the following:
(1) abuse under section 609.2325;
(2) neglect under section 609.233; or
(3) financial exploitation under section 609.2335.
Subd. 7.Operator.
"Operator" means any person whose duties and responsibilities evidence actual control of administrative activities or authority for the decision making of or by a facility.
Subd. 8.Person.
"Person" means any individual, corporation, firm, partnership, incorporated and unincorporated association, or any other legal, professional, or commercial entity.
"Report" means a statement concerning all the circumstances surrounding the alleged or suspected maltreatment, as defined in this section, of a vulnerable adult which are known to the reporter at the time the statement is made.
Subd. 10.Therapeutic conduct.
"Therapeutic conduct" means the provision of program services, health care, or other personal care services done in good faith in the interests of the vulnerable adult by: (1) an individual, facility or employee, or person providing services in a facility under the rights, privileges, and responsibilities conferred by state license, certification, or registration; or (2) a caregiver.
Subd. 11.Vulnerable adult.
"Vulnerable adult" means any person 18 years of age or older who:
(1) is a resident inpatient of a facility;
(2) receives services at or from a facility required to be licensed to serve adults under sections 245A.01 to 245A.15, except that a person receiving outpatient services for treatment of chemical dependency or mental illness, or one who is committed as a sexual psychopathic personality or as a sexually dangerous person under chapter 253B, is not considered a vulnerable adult unless the person meets the requirements of clause (4);
(3) receives services from a home care provider required to be licensed under sections 144A.43 to 144A.482; or from a person or organization that exclusively offers, provides, or arranges for personal care assistance services under the medical assistance program as authorized under sections 256B.0625, subdivision 19a, 256B.0651 to 256B.0654, and 256B.0659; or
(4) regardless of residence or whether any type of service is received, possesses a physical or mental infirmity or other physical, mental, or emotional dysfunction:
(i) that impairs the individual's ability to provide adequately for the individual's own care without assistance, including the provision of food, shelter, clothing, health care, or supervision; and
(ii) because of the dysfunction or infirmity and the need for assistance, the individual has an impaired ability to protect the individual from maltreatment.
1995 c 229 art 2 s 2; 2009 c 79 art 6 s 19; 2014 c 262 art 4 s 9; art 5 s 6; 2016 c 158 art 1 s 202,203
Subdivision 1.Crimes.
(a) A caregiver who, with intent to produce physical or mental pain or injury to a vulnerable adult, subjects a vulnerable adult to any aversive or deprivation procedure, unreasonable confinement, or involuntary seclusion, is guilty of criminal abuse and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 3.
This paragraph does not apply to therapeutic conduct.
(b) A caregiver, facility staff person, or person providing services in a facility who engages in sexual contact or penetration, as defined in section 609.341, under circumstances other than those described in sections 609.342 to 609.345, with a resident, patient, or client of the facility is guilty of criminal abuse and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 3.
Subd. 2.Exemptions.
For the purposes of this section, a vulnerable adult is not abused for the sole reason that:
(1) the vulnerable adult or a person with authority to make health care decisions for the vulnerable adult under sections 144.651, 144A.44, chapter 145B, 145C, or 252A, or sections 253B.03 or 524.5-101 to 524.5-502, refuses consent or withdraws consent, consistent with that authority and within the boundary of reasonable medical practice, to any therapeutic conduct, including any care, service, or procedure to diagnose, maintain, or treat the physical or mental condition of the vulnerable adult or, where permitted under law, to provide nutrition and hydration parenterally or through intubation; this paragraph does not enlarge or diminish rights otherwise held under law by:
(i) a vulnerable adult or a person acting on behalf of a vulnerable adult, including an involved family member, to consent to or refuse consent for therapeutic conduct; or
(ii) a caregiver to offer or provide or refuse to offer or provide therapeutic conduct;
(2) the vulnerable adult, a person with authority to make health care decisions for the vulnerable adult, or a caregiver in good faith selects and depends upon spiritual means or prayer for treatment or care of disease or remedial care of the vulnerable adult in lieu of medical care, provided that this is consistent with the prior practice or belief of the vulnerable adult or with the expressed intentions of the vulnerable adult; or
(3) the vulnerable adult, who is not impaired in judgment or capacity by mental or emotional dysfunction or undue influence, engages in consensual sexual contact with: (i) a person, including a facility staff person, when a consensual sexual personal relationship existed prior to the caregiving relationship; or (ii) a personal care attendant, regardless of whether the consensual sexual personal relationship existed prior to the caregiving relationship.
(a) A person who violates subdivision 1, paragraph (a), may be sentenced as follows:
(1) if the act results in the death of a vulnerable adult, imprisonment for not more than 15 years or payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both;
(2) if the act results in great bodily harm, imprisonment for not more than ten years or payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both;
(3) if the act results in substantial bodily harm or the risk of death, imprisonment for not more than five years or payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both; or
(4) in other cases, imprisonment for not more than one year or payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
(b) A person who violates subdivision 1, paragraph (b), may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
1995 c 229 art 2 s 3; 1996 c 408 art 10 s 11; 2004 c 146 art 3 s 43
Subdivision 1.Gross misdemeanor crime.
A caregiver or operator who intentionally neglects a vulnerable adult or knowingly permits conditions to exist that result in the abuse or neglect of a vulnerable adult is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. For purposes of this section, "abuse" has the meaning given in section 626.5572, subdivision 2, and "neglect" means a failure to provide a vulnerable adult with necessary food, clothing, shelter, health care, or supervision.
Subd. 1a.Felony deprivation.
A caregiver or operator who intentionally deprives a vulnerable adult of necessary food, clothing, shelter, health care, or supervision, when the caregiver or operator is reasonably able to make the necessary provisions, is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 3 if:
(1) the caregiver or operator knows or has reason to know the deprivation could likely result in substantial bodily harm or great bodily harm to the vulnerable adult; or
(2) the deprivation occurred over an extended period of time.
A vulnerable adult is not neglected or deprived under subdivision 1 or 1a for the sole reason that:
(1) the vulnerable adult or a person with authority to make health care decisions for the vulnerable adult under sections 144.651, 144A.44, 253B.03, or 524.5-101 to 524.5-502, or chapter 145B, 145C, or 252A, refuses consent or withdraws consent, consistent with that authority and within the boundary of reasonable medical practice, to any therapeutic conduct, including any care, service, or procedure to diagnose, maintain, or treat the physical or mental condition of the vulnerable adult or, where permitted under law, to provide nutrition and hydration parenterally or through intubation; this paragraph does not enlarge or diminish rights otherwise held under law by:
(3) the vulnerable adult, who is not impaired in judgment or capacity by mental or emotional dysfunction or undue influence, engages in consensual sexual contact with: (i) a person including a facility staff person when a consensual sexual personal relationship existed prior to the caregiving relationship; or (ii) a personal care attendant, regardless of whether the consensual sexual personal relationship existed prior to the caregiving relationship.
A person who violates subdivision 1a may be sentenced as follows:
(1) if the conduct results in great bodily harm to the vulnerable adult, imprisonment for not more than ten years or payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both; or
(2) if the conduct results in substantial bodily harm to the vulnerable adult, imprisonment for not more than five years or payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
Subd. 4.Affirmative defenses.
It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution under subdivision 1 or 1a, if proven by a preponderance of evidence, that:
(1) the defendant is an individual employed by a facility or operator and does not have managerial or supervisory authority, and was unable to reasonably make the necessary provisions because of inadequate staffing levels, inadequate supervision, or institutional policies;
(2) the defendant is a facility, an operator, or an employee of a facility or operator in a position of managerial or supervisory authority, and did not knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly permit criminal acts by its employees or agents that resulted in the harm to the vulnerable adult; or
(3) the defendant is a caregiver and failed to perform acts necessary to prevent the applicable level of harm, if any, to the vulnerable adult because the caregiver was acting reasonably and necessarily to provide care to another identified vulnerable adult.
For these affirmative defenses, a defendant bears only the burden of production. A defendant's failure to meet the burden of production does not relieve the state of its burden of persuasion as to all elements of the offense.
1995 c 229 art 2 s 4; 2004 c 146 art 3 s 44; 2012 c 175 s 1; 2013 c 125 art 1 s 85
Whoever does any of the following acts commits the crime of financial exploitation:
(1) in breach of a fiduciary obligation recognized elsewhere in law, including pertinent regulations, contractual obligations, documented consent by a competent person, or the obligations of a responsible party under section 144.6501 intentionally:
(i) fails to use the real or personal property or other financial resources of the vulnerable adult to provide food, clothing, shelter, health care, therapeutic conduct, or supervision for the vulnerable adult;
(ii) uses, manages, or takes either temporarily or permanently the real or personal property or other financial resources of the vulnerable adult, whether held in the name of the vulnerable adult or a third party, for the benefit of someone other than the vulnerable adult; or
(iii) deprives either temporarily or permanently a vulnerable adult of the vulnerable adult's real or personal property or other financial resources, whether held in the name of the vulnerable adult or a third party, for the benefit of someone other than the vulnerable adult; or
(2) in the absence of legal authority:
(i) acquires possession or control of an interest in real or personal property or other financial resources of a vulnerable adult, whether held in the name of the vulnerable adult or a third party, through the use of undue influence, harassment, or duress;
(ii) forces, compels, coerces, or entices a vulnerable adult against the vulnerable adult's will to perform services for the profit or advantage of another; or
(iii) establishes a relationship with a fiduciary obligation to a vulnerable adult by use of undue influence, harassment, duress, force, compulsion, coercion, or other enticement.
Subd. 2.Defenses.
(a) Nothing in this section requires a facility or caregiver to provide financial management or supervise financial management for a vulnerable adult except as otherwise required by law.
(b) If the actor knew or had reason to know that the vulnerable adult lacked capacity to consent, consent is not a defense to a violation of this section.
Subd. 3.Criminal penalties.
A person who violates subdivision 1, clause (1) or (2), item (i), may be sentenced as provided in section 609.52, subdivision 3. A person who violates subdivision 1, clause (2), item (ii) or (iii), may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
Subd. 4.Aggregation.
In any prosecution under this section, the value of the money or property or services received by the defendant within any six-month period may be aggregated and the defendant charged accordingly in applying the provisions of subdivision 3; provided that when two or more offenses are committed by the same person in two or more counties, the accused may be prosecuted in any county in which one of the offenses was committed for all of the offenses aggregated under this subdivision.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in section 627.01, an offense committed under this section may be prosecuted in: (1) the county where any part of the offense occurred; or (2) the county of residence of the victim or one of the victims.
1995 c 229 art 2 s 5; 2009 c 119 s 8; 2013 c 5 s 1,2
(1) "charitable solicitation law violation" means a violation of sections 309.50 to 309.61;
(2) "consumer fraud law violation" means a violation of sections 325F.68 to 325F.70;
(3) "deceptive trade practices law violation" means a violation of sections 325D.43 to 325D.48;
(4) "false advertising law violation" means a violation of section 325F.67;
(5) "disabled person" means a person who has an impairment of physical or mental function or emotional status that substantially limits one or more major life activities;
(6) "major life activities" means functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working; and
(7) "senior citizen" means a person who is 65 years of age or older.
It is a gross misdemeanor for any person to commit a charitable solicitation law violation, a consumer fraud law violation, a deceptive trade practices law violation, or a false advertising law violation if the person knows or has reason to know that the person's conduct:
(1) is directed at one or more disabled persons or senior citizens; and
(2) will cause or is likely to cause a disabled person or a senior citizen to suffer loss or encumbrance of a primary residence, principal employment or other major source of income, substantial loss of property set aside for retirement or for personal or family care and maintenance, substantial loss of pension, retirement plan, or government benefits, or substantial loss of other assets essential to the victim's health or welfare.
Subd. 3.Prosecutorial jurisdiction.
The attorney general has statewide jurisdiction to prosecute violations of this section. This jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the local prosecuting authority responsible for prosecuting gross misdemeanors in the place where the violation was committed.
1997 c 239 art 3 s 12; 2005 c 56 s 1
Any mandated reporter who is required to report under section 626.557, who knows or has reason to believe that a vulnerable adult is being or has been maltreated, as defined in section 626.5572, subdivision 15, and who does any of the following is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1) intentionally fails to make a report;
(2) knowingly provides information which is false, deceptive, or misleading; or
(3) intentionally fails to provide all of the material circumstances surrounding the incident which are known to the reporter when the report is made.
It is a gross misdemeanor for a person who is mandated to report under section 626.557, who knows or has reason to believe that a vulnerable adult is being or has been maltreated, as defined in section 626.5572, subdivision 15, to intentionally fail to make a report if:
(1) the person knows the maltreatment caused or contributed to the death or great bodily harm of a vulnerable adult; and
(2) the failure to report causes or contributes to the death or great bodily harm of a vulnerable adult or protects the mandated reporter's interests.
Whoever administers to another or causes another to take any poisonous, stupefying, overpowering, narcotic or anesthetic substance with intent thereby to injure or to facilitate the commission of a crime may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.235; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11
Whoever, having knowledge of not being entitled thereto, takes personal property from the person or in the presence of another and uses or threatens the imminent use of force against any person to overcome the person's resistance or powers of resistance to, or to compel acquiescence in, the taking or carrying away of the property is guilty of robbery and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.24; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444
Subdivision 1.First degree.
Whoever, while committing a robbery, is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon, or inflicts bodily harm upon another, is guilty of aggravated robbery in the first degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $35,000, or both.
Subd. 2.Second degree.
Whoever, while committing a robbery, implies, by word or act, possession of a dangerous weapon, is guilty of aggravated robbery in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.245; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1988 c 712 s 5; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 23
Subdivision 1.Acts constituting.
Whoever, for any of the following purposes, confines or removes from one place to another, any person without the person's consent or, if the person is under the age of 16 years, without the consent of the person's parents or other legal custodian, is guilty of kidnapping and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 2:
(1) to hold for ransom or reward for release, or as shield or hostage; or
(2) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or
(3) to commit great bodily harm or to terrorize the victim or another; or
(4) to hold in involuntary servitude.
Whoever violates subdivision 1 may be sentenced as follows:
(1) if the victim is released in a safe place without great bodily harm, to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $35,000, or both; or
(2) if the victim is not released in a safe place, or if the victim suffers great bodily harm during the course of the kidnapping, or if the person kidnapped is under the age of 16, to imprisonment for not more than 40 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $50,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.25; 1979 c 258 s 8; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 24
Notwithstanding section 609.04, a prosecution for or conviction of the crime of kidnapping is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed during the time of the kidnapping.
1983 c 139 s 2; 1993 c 326 art 4 s 16
As used in this section, the following term has the meaning given it unless specific content indicates otherwise.
"Caretaker" means an individual who has responsibility for the care of a child as a result of a family relationship, or who has assumed responsibility for all or a portion of the care of a child.
Subd. 2.Intentional restraint.
Whoever, knowingly lacking lawful authority to do so, intentionally confines or restrains someone else's child under the age of 18 years without consent of the child's parent or legal custodian, or any other person without the person's consent, is guilty of false imprisonment and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
Subd. 3.Unreasonable restraint of children.
(a) A parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who intentionally subjects a child under the age of 18 years to unreasonable physical confinement or restraint by means including but not limited to, tying, locking, caging, or chaining for a prolonged period of time and in a cruel manner which is excessive under the circumstances, is guilty of unreasonable restraint of a child and, except as provided in paragraph (b) or (c), may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
(b) If the confinement or restraint results in demonstrable bodily harm, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $4,000, or both.
(c) If the confinement or restraint results in substantial bodily harm, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.255; 1983 c 217 s 2; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444; 1988 c 655 s 1; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 12; 2012 c 175 s 2
Subdivision 1.Prohibited acts.
Whoever intentionally does any of the following acts may be charged with a felony and, upon conviction, may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 6:
(1) conceals a minor child from the child's parent where the action manifests an intent substantially to deprive that parent of parental rights or conceals a minor child from another person having the right to parenting time or custody where the action manifests an intent to substantially deprive that person of rights to parenting time or custody;
(2) takes, obtains, retains, or fails to return a minor child in violation of a court order which has transferred legal custody under chapter 260, 260B, or 260C to the commissioner of human services, a child-placing agency, or the local social services agency;
(3) takes, obtains, retains, or fails to return a minor child from or to the parent in violation of a court order, where the action manifests an intent substantially to deprive that parent of rights to parenting time or custody;
(4) takes, obtains, retains, or fails to return a minor child from or to a parent after commencement of an action relating to child parenting time or custody but prior to the issuance of an order determining custody or parenting time rights, where the action manifests an intent substantially to deprive that parent of parental rights;
(5) retains a child in this state with the knowledge that the child was removed from another state in violation of any of the above provisions;
(6) refuses to return a minor child to a parent or lawful custodian and is at least 18 years old and more than 24 months older than the child;
(7) causes or contributes to a child being a habitual truant as defined in section 260C.007, subdivision 19, and is at least 18 years old and more than 24 months older than the child;
(8) causes or contributes to a child being a runaway as defined in section 260C.007, subdivision 28, and is at least 18 years old and more than 24 months older than the child; or
(9) is at least 18 years old and resides with a minor under the age of 16 without the consent of the minor's parent or lawful custodian.
It is an affirmative defense if a person charged under subdivision 1 proves that:
(1) the person reasonably believed the action taken was necessary to protect the child from physical or sexual assault or substantial emotional harm;
(2) the person reasonably believed the action taken was necessary to protect the person taking the action from physical or sexual assault;
(3) the action taken is consented to by the parent, stepparent, or legal custodian seeking prosecution, but consent to custody or specific parenting time is not consent to the action of failing to return or concealing a minor child; or
(4) the action taken is otherwise authorized by a court order issued prior to the violation of subdivision 1.
The defenses provided in this subdivision are in addition to and do not limit other defenses available under this chapter or chapter 611.
Subd. 2a.Original intent clarified.
To the extent that it states that subdivision 2 creates affirmative defenses to a charge under this section, subdivision 2 clarifies the original intent of the legislature in enacting Laws 1984, chapter 484, section 2, and does not change the substance of this section. Subdivision 2 does not modify or alter any convictions entered under this section before August 1, 1988.
A person who violates this section may be prosecuted and tried either in the county in which the child was taken, concealed, or detained or in the county of lawful residence of the child.
Subd. 4.Return of child; costs.
A child who has been concealed, obtained, or retained in violation of this section shall be returned to the person having lawful custody of the child or shall be taken into custody pursuant to section 260C.175, subdivision 1, clause (2), item (ii). In addition to any sentence imposed, the court may assess any expense incurred in returning the child against any person convicted of violating this section. The court may direct the appropriate county welfare agency to provide counseling services to a child who has been returned pursuant to this subdivision.
A felony charge brought under this section shall be dismissed if:
(a) the person voluntarily returns the child within 48 hours after taking, detaining, or failing to return the child in violation of this section; or
(b)(1) the person taking the action and the child have not left the state of Minnesota; and (2) within a period of seven days after taking the action, (i) a motion or proceeding under chapter 518, 518A, 518B, 518C, or 518D is commenced by the person taking the action, or (ii) the attorney representing the person taking the action has consented to service of process by the party whose rights are being deprived, for any motion or action pursuant to chapter 518, 518A, 518B, 518C, or 518D.
Clause (a) does not apply if the person returns the child as a result of being located by law enforcement authorities.
This subdivision does not prohibit the filing of felony charges or an offense report before the expiration of the 48 hours.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) and subdivision 5, whoever violates this section may be sentenced as follows:
(1) to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $4,000, or both; or
(2) to imprisonment for not more than four years or to payment of a fine of not more than $8,000, or both, if the court finds that:
(i) the defendant committed the violation while possessing a dangerous weapon or caused substantial bodily harm to effect the taking;
(ii) the defendant abused or neglected the child during the concealment, detention, or removal of the child;
(iii) the defendant inflicted or threatened to inflict physical harm on a parent or lawful custodian of the child or on the child with intent to cause the parent or lawful custodian to discontinue criminal prosecution;
(iv) the defendant demanded payment in exchange for return of the child or demanded to be relieved of the financial or legal obligation to support the child in exchange for return of the child; or
(v) the defendant has previously been convicted under this section or a similar statute of another jurisdiction.
(b) A violation of subdivision 1, clause (7), is a gross misdemeanor. The county attorney shall prosecute violations of subdivision 1, clause (7).
Subd. 7.Reporting of deprivation of parental rights.
Any violation of this section shall be reported pursuant to section 626.556, subdivision 3a.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.26; 1967 c 570 s 1; 1979 c 263 s 1; 1984 c 484 s 2; 1984 c 654 art 5 s 58; 1985 c 227 s 1,2; 1986 c 444; 1986 c 445 s 1,2; 1986 c 463 s 4,5; 1987 c 246 s 1-3; 1988 c 523 s 1; 1989 c 290 art 7 s 3,4; 1991 c 285 s 10; 1994 c 631 s 31; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 25,26; 1999 c 86 art 1 s 78; 1999 c 139 art 4 s 2; 2000 c 444 art 2 s 45,46; 2001 c 178 art 1 s 44; 2002 c 379 art 1 s 105; 2005 c 164 s 29; 1Sp2005 c 7 s 28
Whoever, for the purpose of marriage, takes a person under the age of 18 years, without the consent of the parents, guardian, or other person having legal custody of such person is guilty of abduction and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
The definitions in this section apply to sections 609.2114, subdivisions 1 and 2, and 609.2661 to 609.2691:
(a) "Unborn child" means the unborn offspring of a human being conceived, but not yet born.
(b) "Whoever" does not include the pregnant woman.
1986 c 388 s 5; 2007 c 54 art 3 s 14; 2014 c 180 s 9; 2015 c 21 art 1 s 101
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of murder of an unborn child in the first degree and must be sentenced to imprisonment for life:
(1) causes the death of an unborn child with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the unborn child or of another;
(2) causes the death of an unborn child while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence, either upon or affecting the mother of the unborn child or another; or
(3) causes the death of an unborn child with intent to effect the death of the unborn child or another while committing or attempting to commit burglary, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, arson in the first or second degree, tampering with a witness in the first degree, or escape from custody.
Whoever does either of the following is guilty of murder of an unborn child in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 40 years:
(1) causes the death of an unborn child with intent to effect the death of that unborn child or another, but without premeditation; or
(2) causes the death of an unborn child, without intent to effect the death of any unborn child or person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence.
Whoever, without intent to effect the death of any unborn child or person, causes the death of an unborn child by perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human or fetal life, is guilty of murder of an unborn child in the third degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 25 years.
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of manslaughter of an unborn child in the first degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both:
(1) intentionally causes the death of an unborn child in the heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of ordinary self-control under like circumstances;
(2) causes the death of an unborn child in committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor offense with such force or violence that death of or great bodily harm to any person or unborn child was reasonably foreseeable, and murder of an unborn child in the first or second degree was not committed thereby; or
(3) intentionally causes the death of an unborn child because the actor is coerced by threats made by someone other than the actor's coconspirator and which cause the actor to reasonably believe that the act performed by the actor is the only means of preventing imminent death to the actor or another.
1986 c 388 s 9; 1986 c 444
A person who causes the death of an unborn child by any of the following means is guilty of manslaughter of an unborn child in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both:
(1) by the actor's culpable negligence whereby the actor creates an unreasonable risk and consciously takes chances of causing death or great bodily harm to an unborn child or a person;
(2) by shooting the mother of the unborn child with a firearm or other dangerous weapon as a result of negligently believing her to be a deer or other animal;
(4) by negligently or intentionally permitting any animal, known by the person to have vicious propensities or to have caused great or substantial bodily harm in the past, to run uncontrolled off the owner's premises, or negligently failing to keep it properly confined.
If proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall be an affirmative defense to criminal liability under clause (4) that the mother of the unborn child provoked the animal to cause the unborn child's death.
1986 c 388 s 10; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 13
Whoever assaults a pregnant woman and inflicts great bodily harm on an unborn child who is subsequently born alive may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.
Whoever assaults a pregnant woman and inflicts substantial bodily harm on an unborn child who is subsequently born alive may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
As used in this section, "substantial bodily harm" includes the birth of the unborn child prior to 37 weeks gestation if the child weighs 2,500 grams or less at the time of birth. "Substantial bodily harm" does not include the inducement of the unborn child's birth when done for bona fide medical purposes.
1986 c 388 s 12; 1989 c 20 s 1
Whoever does any of the following commits an assault of an unborn child in the third degree and is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1) commits an act with intent to cause fear in a pregnant woman of immediate bodily harm or death to the unborn child; or
(2) intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm on an unborn child who is subsequently born alive.
1986 c 388 s 13
Subdivision 1.Death of unborn child.
Whoever, in the commission of a felony or in a violation of section 609.224, 609.2242, 609.23, 609.231, 609.2325, or 609.233, causes the death of an unborn child is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine not more than $30,000, or both. As used in this subdivision, "felony" does not include a violation of sections 609.185 to 609.2114, 609.221 to 609.2231, or 609.2661 to 609.2665.
Subd. 2.Injury to unborn child.
Whoever, in the commission of a felony or in a violation of section 609.23, 609.231, 609.2325 or 609.233, causes great or substantial bodily harm to an unborn child who is subsequently born alive, is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both. As used in this subdivision, "felony" does not include a violation of sections 609.2112 to 609.2114, 609.221 to 609.2231, or 609.267 to 609.2672.
1986 c 388 s 14; 1995 c 229 art 4 s 17,18; 1995 c 259 art 3 s 16; 2014 c 180 s 9
Sections 609.2661 to 609.268 do not apply to any act described in section 145.412.
Notwithstanding section 609.04, a prosecution for or conviction under sections 609.2661 to 609.268 is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.
Whoever orally or in writing makes any of the following threats and thereby causes another against the other's will to do any act or forbear doing a lawful act is guilty of coercion and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 2:
(1) a threat to unlawfully inflict bodily harm upon, or hold in confinement, the person threatened or another, when robbery or attempt to rob is not committed thereby; or
(2) a threat to unlawfully inflict damage to the property of the person threatened or another; or
(3) a threat to unlawfully injure a trade, business, profession, or calling; or
(4) a threat to expose a secret or deformity, publish a defamatory statement, or otherwise to expose any person to disgrace or ridicule; or
(5) a threat to make or cause to be made a criminal charge, whether true or false; provided, that a warning of the consequences of a future violation of law given in good faith by a peace officer or prosecuting attorney to any person shall not be deemed a threat for the purposes of this section; or
(6) a threat to commit a violation under section 617.261.
(1) to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or both if neither the pecuniary gain received by the violator nor the loss suffered by the person threatened or another as a result of the threat exceeds $300, or the benefits received or harm sustained are not susceptible of pecuniary measurement; or
(2) to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both, if such pecuniary gain or loss is more than $300 but less than $2,500; or
(3) to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both, if such pecuniary gain or loss is $2,500, or more.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.27; 1971 c 23 s 40; 1977 c 355 s 7; 1983 c 359 s 87; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444; 2004 c 228 art 1 s 72; 2016 c 126 s 4
Whoever makes a threat within the meaning of section 609.27, subdivision 1, clauses (1) to (6), but fails to cause the intended act or forbearance, commits an attempt to coerce and may be punished as provided in section 609.17.
Subdivision 1.Interference.
Whoever, by threats or violence, intentionally prevents another person from performing any lawful act enjoined upon or recommended to the person by the religion which the person professes is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Subd. 2.Physical interference prohibited.
A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who intentionally and physically obstructs any individual's access to or egress from a religious establishment. This subdivision does not apply to the exclusion of a person from the establishment at the request of an official of the religious organization.
For purposes of subdivision 2, a "religious establishment" is a building used for worship services by a religious organization and clearly identified as such by a posted sign or other means.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.28; 1971 c 23 s 41; 1986 c 444; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 27
Subdivision 1.Generally.
As used in sections 609.281 to 609.284, the following terms have the meanings given.
Subd. 2.Blackmail.
"Blackmail" means a threat to expose any fact or alleged fact tending to cause shame or to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.
Subd. 3.Debt bondage.
"Debt bondage" means the status or condition of a debtor arising from a pledge by the debtor of the debtor's personal services or those of a person under the debtor's control as a security for debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined.
Subd. 4.Forced labor or services.
"Forced labor or services" means labor or services that are performed or provided by another person and are obtained or maintained through an actor's:
(1) threat, either implicit or explicit, scheme, plan, or pattern, or other action intended to cause a person to believe that, if the person did not perform or provide the labor or services, that person or another person would suffer bodily harm or physical restraint;
(2) physically restraining or threatening to physically restrain a person;
(3) abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process;
(4) knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, or possessing any actual or purported passport or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of another person; or
(5) use of blackmail.
Subd. 5.Labor trafficking.
"Labor trafficking" means:
(1) the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, enticement, provision, obtaining, or receipt of a person by any means, for the purpose of:
(i) debt bondage or forced labor or services;
(ii) slavery or practices similar to slavery; or
(iii) the removal of organs through the use of coercion or intimidation; or
(2) receiving profit or anything of value, knowing or having reason to know it is derived from an act described in clause (1).
Subd. 6.Labor trafficking victim.
"Labor trafficking victim" means a person subjected to the practices in subdivision 5.
2005 c 136 art 17 s 15; 2009 c 137 s 2
Subdivision 1.Individuals under age 18.
Whoever knowingly engages in the labor trafficking of an individual who is under the age of 18 is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $40,000, or both.
Subd. 2.Other offenses.
Whoever knowingly engages in the labor trafficking of another is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.
Subd. 3.Consent or age of victim not a defense.
In a prosecution under this section the consent or age of the victim is not a defense.
2005 c 136 art 17 s 16; 2006 c 260 art 1 s 20
Unless the person's conduct constitutes a violation of section 609.282, a person who knowingly destroys, conceals, removes, confiscates, or possesses any actual or purported passport or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of another person:
(1) in the course of a violation of section 609.282 or 609.322;
(2) with intent to violate section 609.282 or 609.322; or
(3) to prevent or restrict or to attempt to prevent or restrict, without lawful authority, a person's liberty to move or travel, in order to maintain the labor or services of that person, when the person is or has been a victim of a violation of section 609.282 or 609.322;
is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 2.
A person who violates subdivision 1 may be sentenced as follows:
(1) if the crime involves a victim under the age of 18, to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of $20,000, or both; or
(2) in other cases, to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Subdivision 1.Consent or age of victim not a defense.
In an action under this section the consent or age of the victim is not a defense.
Subd. 2.Civil liability.
A labor trafficking victim may bring a cause of action against a person who violates section 609.282 or 609.283. The court may award damages, including punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, and other litigation costs reasonably incurred by the victim. This remedy is in addition to potential criminal liability.
Subd. 3.Corporate liability.
If a corporation or other business enterprise is convicted of violating section 609.282, 609.283, or 609.322, in addition to the criminal penalties described in those sections and other remedies provided elsewhere in law, the court may, when appropriate:
(1) order its dissolution or reorganization;
(2) order the suspension or revocation of any license, permit, or prior approval granted to it by a state agency; or
(3) order the surrender of its charter if it is organized under Minnesota law or the revocation of its certificate to conduct business in Minnesota if it is not organized under Minnesota law.
"Sodomy" means carnally knowing any person by the anus or by or with the mouth.
Subd. 5.Consensual acts.
Whoever, in cases not coming within the provisions of sections 609.342 or 609.344, voluntarily engages in or submits to an act of sodomy with another may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
1967 c 507 s 4; 1977 c 130 s 4; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11
NOTE: The Hennepin County District Court found section 609.293 unconstitutional as applied to private, noncommercial acts by consenting adults in Doe v. Ventura, No. 01-489 (4th Dist. Ct. Hennepin County, May 15, 2001). In Devescovi v. Ventura, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. Minn. 2002), the United States District Court found that, since the decision was not appealed, the Hennepin County District Court decision is binding state law.
Whoever carnally knows a dead body or an animal or bird is guilty of bestiality, which is a misdemeanor. If knowingly done in the presence of another the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000 or both.
1967 c 507 s 5; 1971 c 23 s 42; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444
Whoever with intent to evade proceedings to establish his paternity leaves the state knowing that a woman with whom he has had sexual intercourse is pregnant or has given birth within the previous 60 days to a living child may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $4,000, or both.
For the purposes of sections 609.321 to 609.325, the following terms have the meanings given.
Subd. 2.Business of prostitution.
"Business of prostitution" means any arrangement between or organization of two or more persons, acting other than as prostitutes or patrons, who commit acts punishable under sections 609.321 to 609.324.
Subd. 4.Patron.
"Patron" means an individual who engages in prostitution by hiring, offering to hire, or agreeing to hire another individual to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact.
Subd. 5.Place of prostitution.
"Place of prostitution" means a house or other place where prostitution is practiced.
Subd. 7.Promotes the prostitution of an individual.
"Promotes the prostitution of an individual" means any of the following wherein the person knowingly:
(1) solicits or procures patrons for a prostitute;
(2) provides, leases or otherwise permits premises or facilities owned or controlled by the person to aid the prostitution of an individual;
(3) owns, manages, supervises, controls, keeps or operates, either alone or with others, a place of prostitution to aid the prostitution of an individual;
(4) owns, manages, supervises, controls, operates, institutes, aids or facilitates, either alone or with others, a business of prostitution to aid the prostitution of an individual;
(5) admits a patron to a place of prostitution to aid the prostitution of an individual; or
(6) transports an individual from one point within this state to another point either within or without this state, or brings an individual into this state to aid the prostitution of the individual.
Subd. 7a.Sex trafficking.
"Sex trafficking" means:
(1) receiving, recruiting, enticing, harboring, providing, or obtaining by any means an individual to aid in the prostitution of the individual; or
Subd. 7b.Sex trafficking victim.
"Sex trafficking victim" means a person subjected to the practices in subdivision 7a.
Subd. 8.Prostitute.
"Prostitute" means an individual who engages in prostitution by being hired, offering to be hired, or agreeing to be hired by another individual to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact.
Subd. 9.Prostitution.
"Prostitution" means hiring, offering to hire, or agreeing to hire another individual to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact, or being hired, offering to be hired, or agreeing to be hired by another individual to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact.
Subd. 10.Sexual contact.
"Sexual contact" means any of the following acts, if the acts can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of satisfying the actor's sexual impulses:
(i) the intentional touching by an individual of a prostitute's intimate parts; or
(ii) the intentional touching by a prostitute of another individual's intimate parts.
Subd. 11.Sexual penetration.
"Sexual penetration" means any of the following acts, if for the purpose of satisfying sexual impulses: sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any intrusion however slight into the genital or anal openings of an individual's body by any part of another individual's body or any object used for the purpose of satisfying sexual impulses. Emission of semen is not necessary.
Subd. 12.Public place.
A "public place" means a public street or sidewalk, a pedestrian skyway system as defined in section 469.125, subdivision 4, a hotel, motel, steam room, sauna, massage parlor, shopping mall and other public shopping areas, or other place of public accommodation, a place licensed to sell intoxicating liquor, wine, nonintoxicating malt beverages, or food, or a motor vehicle located on a public street, alley, or parking lot ordinarily used by or available to the public though not used as a matter of right and a driveway connecting such a parking lot with a street or highway.
Subd. 13.Place of public accommodation.
"Place of public accommodation" means a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.
Subd. 14.Prior qualified human trafficking-related offense.
A "prior qualified human trafficking-related offense" means a conviction or delinquency adjudication within the ten years from the discharge from probation or parole immediately preceding the current offense for a violation of or an attempt to violate section 609.322, subdivision 1 (solicitation, inducement, and promotion of prostitution; sex trafficking in the first degree); 609.322, subdivision 1a (solicitation, inducement, and promotion of prostitution; sex trafficking in the second degree); 609.282 (labor trafficking); or 609.283 (unlawful conduct with respect to documents in furtherance of labor or sex trafficking).
1979 c 255 s 1; 1986 c 444; 1987 c 291 s 242; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 19-23; 2009 c 137 s 3-6; 2009 c 170 s 1; 1Sp2011 c 1 art 5 s 1-3
Subdivision 1.Solicitation, inducement, and promotion of prostitution; sex trafficking in the first degree.
(a) Whoever, while acting other than as a prostitute or patron, intentionally does any of the following may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $50,000, or both:
(1) solicits or induces an individual under the age of 18 years to practice prostitution;
(2) promotes the prostitution of an individual under the age of 18 years;
(3) receives profit, knowing or having reason to know that it is derived from the prostitution, or the promotion of the prostitution, of an individual under the age of 18 years; or
(4) engages in the sex trafficking of an individual under the age of 18 years.
(b) Whoever violates paragraph (a) or subdivision 1a may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 25 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $60,000, or both, if one or more of the following aggravating factors are present:
(1) the offender has committed a prior qualified human trafficking-related offense;
(2) the offense involved a sex trafficking victim who suffered bodily harm during the commission of the offense;
(3) the time period that a sex trafficking victim was held in debt bondage or forced labor or services exceeded 180 days; or
(4) the offense involved more than one sex trafficking victim.
Subd. 1a.Solicitation, inducement, and promotion of prostitution; sex trafficking in the second degree.
Whoever, while acting other than as a prostitute or patron, intentionally does any of the following may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $40,000, or both:
(1) solicits or induces an individual to practice prostitution;
(2) promotes the prostitution of an individual;
(3) receives profit, knowing or having reason to know that it is derived from the prostitution, or the promotion of the prostitution, of an individual; or
(4) engages in the sex trafficking of an individual.
Subd. 1b.Exceptions.
Subdivisions 1, paragraph (a), clause (3), and 1a, clause (3), do not apply to:
(1) a minor who is dependent on an individual acting as a prostitute and who may have benefited from or been supported by the individual's earnings derived from prostitution; or
(2) a parent over the age of 55 who is dependent on an individual acting as a prostitute, who may have benefited from or been supported by the individual's earnings derived from prostitution, and who did not know that the earnings were derived from prostitution; or
(3) the sale of goods or services to a prostitute in the ordinary course of a lawful business.
Subd. 1c.Aggregation of cases.
Acts by the defendant in violation of any one or more of the provisions in this section within any six-month period may be aggregated and the defendant charged accordingly in applying the provisions of this section; provided that when two or more offenses are committed by the same person in two or more counties, the accused may be prosecuted in any county in which one of the offenses was committed for all of the offenses aggregated under this subdivision.
1979 c 255 s 2; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 448 s 2; 1992 c 571 art 4 s 9; 1998 c 367 art 2 s 12-14; 2000 c 431 s 2; 1Sp2003 c 2 art 10 s 1; 2009 c 137 s 7
Subdivision 1.Order for protection.
Any parent or guardian who knows or has reason to believe that a person, while acting as other than a prostitute or patron, is inducing, coercing, soliciting, or promoting the prostitution of the parent or guardian's minor child, or is offering or providing food, shelter, or other subsistence for the purpose of enabling the parent or guardian's minor child to engage in prostitution, may seek an order for protection in the manner provided in this section.
Subd. 2.Court jurisdiction.
An application for relief under this section shall be filed in the juvenile court. Actions under this section shall be given docket priority by the court.
Subd. 3.Contents of petition.
A petition for relief shall allege the existence of a circumstance or circumstances described in subdivision 1, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under oath stating the specific facts and circumstances from which relief is sought. The court shall provide simplified forms and clerical assistance to help with the writing and filing of a petition under this section.
Subd. 4.Hearing on application; notice.
(a) Upon receipt of the petition, the court shall order a hearing which shall be held no later than 14 days from the date of the order. Personal service shall be made upon the respondent not less than five days before the hearing. In the event that personal service cannot be completed in time to give the respondent the minimum notice required under this paragraph, the court may set a new hearing date.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a), service may be made by one week published notice, as provided under section 645.11, provided the petitioner files with the court an affidavit stating that an attempt at personal service made by a sheriff was unsuccessful because the respondent is avoiding service by concealment or otherwise, and that a copy of the petition and notice of hearing has been mailed to the respondent at the respondent's residence or that the residence is not known to the petitioner. Service under this paragraph is complete seven days after publication. The court shall set a new hearing date if necessary to allow the respondent the five-day minimum notice required under paragraph (a).
Subd. 5.Relief by the court.
Upon notice and hearing, the court may order the respondent to return the minor child to the residence of the child's parents or guardian, and may order that the respondent cease and desist from committing further acts described in subdivision 1 and cease to have further contact with the minor child. Any relief granted by the court in the order for protection shall be for a fixed period of time determined by the court.
Subd. 6.Service of order.
Any order issued under this section shall be served personally on the respondent. Upon the request of the petitioner, the court shall order the sheriff to assist in the execution or service of the order for protection.
Subd. 7.Violation of order for protection.
(a) A violation of an order for protection shall constitute contempt of court and be subject to the penalties provided under chapter 588.
(b) Any person who willfully fails to return a minor child as required by an order for protection issued under this section commits an act which manifests an intent substantially to deprive the parent or guardian of custodial rights within the meaning of section 609.26, clause (3).
Subdivision 1.Engaging in, hiring, or agreeing to hire minor to engage in prostitution; penalties.
(a) Whoever intentionally does any of the following may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $40,000, or both:
(1) engages in prostitution with an individual under the age of 13 years;
(2) hires or offers or agrees to hire an individual under the age of 13 years to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact; or
(3) hires or offers or agrees to hire an individual who the actor reasonably believes to be under the age of 13 years to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact.
(b) Whoever intentionally does any of the following may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both:
(1) engages in prostitution with an individual under the age of 16 years but at least 13 years;
(2) hires or offers or agrees to hire an individual under the age of 16 years but at least 13 years to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact; or
(3) hires or offers or agrees to hire an individual who the actor reasonably believes to be under the age of 16 years but at least 13 years to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact.
(c) Whoever intentionally does any of the following may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both:
Subd. 1a.Housing unrelated minor engaged in prostitution; penalties.
Any person, other than one related by blood, adoption, or marriage to the minor, who permits a minor to reside, temporarily or permanently, in the person's dwelling without the consent of the minor's parents or guardian, knowing or having reason to know that the minor is engaging in prostitution may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both; except that, this subdivision does not apply to residential placements made, sanctioned, or supervised by a public or private social service agency.
Subd. 2. Prostitution in public place; penalty for patrons.
Whoever, while acting as a patron, intentionally does any of the following while in a public place is guilty of a gross misdemeanor:
(1) engages in prostitution with an individual 18 years of age or older; or
(2) hires, offers to hire, or agrees to hire an individual 18 years of age or older to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact.
Except as otherwise provided in subdivision 4, a person who is convicted of violating this subdivision must, at a minimum, be sentenced to pay a fine of at least $1,500.
Subd. 3.General prostitution crimes; penalties for patrons.
(a) Whoever, while acting as a patron, intentionally does any of the following is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(2) hires, offers to hire, or agrees to hire an individual 18 years of age or older to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision 4, a person who is convicted of violating this paragraph must, at a minimum, be sentenced to pay a fine of at least $500.
(b) Whoever violates the provisions of this subdivision within two years of a previous prostitution conviction for violating this section or section 609.322 is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision 4, a person who is convicted of violating this paragraph must, at a minimum, be sentenced as follows:
(1) to pay a fine of at least $1,500; and
(2) to serve 20 hours of community work service.
The court may waive the mandatory community work service if it makes specific, written findings that the community work service is not feasible or appropriate under the circumstances of the case.
Subd. 4.Community service in lieu of minimum fine.
The court may order a person convicted of violating subdivision 2 or 3 to perform community work service in lieu of all or a portion of the minimum fine required under those subdivisions if the court makes specific, written findings that the convicted person is indigent or that payment of the fine would create undue hardship for the convicted person or that person's immediate family. Community work service ordered under this subdivision is in addition to any mandatory community work service ordered under subdivision 3.
Subd. 5.Use of motor vehicle to patronize prostitutes; driving record notation.
(a) When a court sentences a person convicted of violating this section while acting as a patron, the court shall determine whether the person used a motor vehicle during the commission of the offense and whether the person has previously been convicted of violating this section or section 609.322. If the court finds that the person used a motor vehicle during the commission of the offense, it shall forward its finding along with an indication of whether the person has previously been convicted of a prostitution offense to the commissioner of public safety who shall record the finding on the person's driving record. Except as provided in paragraph (b), the finding is classified as private data on individuals, as defined in section 13.02, subdivision 12, but is accessible for law enforcement purposes.
(b) If the person has previously been convicted of a violation of this section or section 609.322, the finding is public data.
Subd. 6.Prostitution in public place; penalty for prostitutes.
Whoever, while acting as a prostitute, intentionally does any of the following while in a public place is guilty of a gross misdemeanor:
(2) is hired, offers to be hired, or agrees to be hired by an individual 18 years of age or older to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact.
Subd. 7.General prostitution crimes; penalties for prostitutes.
(a) Whoever, while acting as a prostitute, intentionally does any of the following is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(b) Whoever violates the provisions of this subdivision within two years of a previous prostitution conviction for violating this section or section 609.322 is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
1979 c 255 s 4; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 448 s 5,6; 1990 c 463 s 1-4; 1Sp2003 c 2 art 10 s 5; 2004 c 228 art 1 s 72; 2009 c 137 s 8,9; 2009 c 170 s 2-4; 1Sp2011 c 1 art 5 s 4-7; 2015 c 65 art 6 s 11; 2016 c 189 art 4 s 15
(a) When a court sentences an adult convicted of violating section 609.322 or 609.324, while acting other than as a prostitute, the court shall impose an assessment of not less than $500 and not more than $750 for a violation of section 609.324, subdivision 2, or a misdemeanor violation of section 609.324, subdivision 3; otherwise the court shall impose an assessment of not less than $750 and not more than $1,000. The assessment shall be distributed as provided in paragraph (c) and is in addition to the surcharge required by section 357.021, subdivision 6.
(b) The court may not waive payment of the minimum assessment required by this section. If the defendant qualifies for the services of a public defender or the court finds on the record that the convicted person is indigent or that immediate payment of the assessment would create undue hardship for the convicted person or that person's immediate family, the court may reduce the amount of the minimum assessment to not less than $100. The court also may authorize payment of the assessment in installments.
(c) The assessment collected under paragraph (a) must be distributed as follows:
(1) 40 percent of the assessment shall be forwarded to the political subdivision that employs the arresting officer for use in enforcement, training, and education activities related to combating sexual exploitation of youth, or if the arresting officer is an employee of the state, this portion shall be forwarded to the commissioner of public safety for those purposes identified in clause (3);
(2) 20 percent of the assessment shall be forwarded to the prosecuting agency that handled the case for use in training and education activities relating to combating sexual exploitation activities of youth; and
(3) 40 percent of the assessment must be forwarded to the commissioner of health to be deposited in the safe harbor for youth account in the special revenue fund and are appropriated to the commissioner for distribution to crime victims services organizations that provide services to sexually exploited youth, as defined in section 260C.007, subdivision 31.
(d) A safe harbor for youth account is established as a special account in the state treasury.
1986 c 448 s 7; 1990 c 463 s 5; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 28; 1998 c 367 art 2 s 32; art 8 s 11; 1Sp2003 c 2 art 10 s 2; 1Sp2010 c 1 art 14 s 17; 1Sp2011 c 1 art 4 s 7; 2016 c 189 art 15 s 23
(1) "park zone" has the meaning given in section 152.01, subdivision 12a; and
(2) "school zone" has the meaning given in section 152.01, subdivision 14a, and also includes school bus stops established by a school board under section 123B.88, while school children are waiting for the bus.
Subd. 2.Increased penalties.
Any person who commits a violation of section 609.324 while acting other than as a prostitute while in a school or park zone may be sentenced as follows:
(1) if the crime committed is a felony, the statutory maximum for the crime is three years longer than the statutory maximum for the underlying crime;
(2) if the crime committed is a gross misdemeanor, the person is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $4,000, or both; and
(3) if the crime committed is a misdemeanor, the person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
1998 c 367 art 2 s 15; 1998 c 397 art 11 s 3
A person who loiters in a public place with intent to participate in prostitution is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Subdivision 1.No defense; solicited; not engaged.
It shall be no defense to a prosecution under section 609.322 that an individual solicited or induced to practice prostitution or whose prostitution was promoted, did not actually engage in prostitution.
Subd. 2.Consent no defense.
Consent or mistake as to age shall be no defense to prosecutions under section 609.322 or 609.324.
Subd. 3.No defense; prior prostitution.
It shall be no defense to actions under section 609.322 that the individual solicited or induced to practice prostitution, or whose prostitution was promoted, had engaged in prostitution prior to that solicitation, inducement, or promotion.
Subd. 3a.No defense; undercover operative.
The fact that an undercover operative or law enforcement officer was involved in the detection or investigation of an offense shall not be a defense to a prosecution under section 609.324.
It is an affirmative defense to a charge under section 609.324, subdivision 6 or 7, if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is a labor trafficking victim, as defined in section 609.281, or a sex trafficking victim, as defined in section 609.321, and that the defendant committed the acts underlying the charge as a result of being a labor trafficking or sex trafficking victim.
1979 c 255 s 5; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 29; 1998 c 367 art 2 s 32; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 25; 2015 c 65 art 6 s 12,13
The marital privilege provided for in section 595.02 shall not apply in any proceeding under section 609.322.
For the purpose of this section, "disorderly house" means a building, dwelling, place, establishment, or premises in which actions or conduct habitually occur in violation of laws relating to:
(1) the sale of intoxicating liquor or 3.2 percent malt liquor;
(2) gambling;
(3) prostitution as defined in section 609.321, subdivision 9, or acts relating to prostitution; or
(4) the sale or possession of controlled substances as defined in section 152.01, subdivision 4.
Subd. 2.Prohibiting owning or operating disorderly house.
No person may own, lease, operate, manage, maintain, or conduct a disorderly house, or invite or attempt to invite others to visit or remain in the disorderly house. A violation of this subdivision is a gross misdemeanor.
Subd. 3.Mandatory minimum penalties.
(a) If a person is convicted of a first violation of subdivision 2, in addition to any sentence of imprisonment authorized by subdivision 2 which the court may impose, the court shall impose a fine of not less than $300 nor more than $3,000.
(b) If a person is convicted of a second violation of subdivision 2, in addition to any sentence of imprisonment authorized by subdivision 2 which the court may impose, the court shall impose a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $3,000.
(c) If a person is convicted of a third or subsequent violation of subdivision 2, in addition to any sentence of imprisonment authorized by subdivision 2 which the court may impose, the court shall impose a fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $3,000.
Subd. 4.Evidence.
Evidence of unlawful sales of intoxicating liquor or 3.2 percent malt liquor, of unlawful possession or sale of controlled substances, of prostitution or acts relating to prostitution, or of gambling or acts relating to gambling, is prima facie evidence of the existence of a disorderly house. Evidence of sales of intoxicating liquor or 3.2 percent malt liquor between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., while a person is within a disorderly house, is prima facie evidence that the person knew it to be a disorderly house.
Subd. 5.Local regulation.
Subdivisions 1 to 4 do not prohibit or restrict a local governmental unit from imposing more restrictive provisions.
Subd. 6.Pretrial release.
When a person is charged under this section with owning or leasing a disorderly house, the court may require as a condition of pretrial release that the defendant bring an eviction action against a lessee who has violated the covenant not to allow drugs established by section 504B.171.
1967 c 507 s 10; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1985 c 277 s 1; 1989 c 77 s 1; 1991 c 193 s 3; 1991 c 249 s 31; 1999 c 199 art 2 s 33; 2003 c 2 art 2 s 18
When any man and single woman have sexual intercourse with each other, each is guilty of fornication, which is a misdemeanor.
1967 c 507 s 11; 1971 c 23 s 43
For the purposes of sections 609.341 to 609.351, the terms in this section have the meanings given them.
Subd. 2.Actor.
"Actor" means a person accused of criminal sexual conduct.
Subd. 3.Force.
"Force" means the infliction, attempted infliction, or threatened infliction by the actor of bodily harm or commission or threat of any other crime by the actor against the complainant or another, which (a) causes the complainant to reasonably believe that the actor has the present ability to execute the threat and (b) if the actor does not have a significant relationship to the complainant, also causes the complainant to submit.
Subd. 4.Consent.
(a) "Consent" means words or overt actions by a person indicating a freely given present agreement to perform a particular sexual act with the actor. Consent does not mean the existence of a prior or current social relationship between the actor and the complainant or that the complainant failed to resist a particular sexual act.
(b) A person who is mentally incapacitated or physically helpless as defined by this section cannot consent to a sexual act.
(c) Corroboration of the victim's testimony is not required to show lack of consent.
Subd. 5.Intimate parts.
"Intimate parts" includes the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttocks, or breast of a human being.
Subd. 6.Mentally impaired.
"Mentally impaired" means that a person, as a result of inadequately developed or impaired intelligence or a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought or mood, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or to sexual penetration.
Subd. 7.Mentally incapacitated.
"Mentally incapacitated" means that a person under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic, anesthetic, or any other substance, administered to that person without the person's agreement, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration.
Subd. 8.Personal injury.
"Personal injury" means bodily harm as defined in section 609.02, subdivision 7, or severe mental anguish or pregnancy.
Subd. 9.Physically helpless.
"Physically helpless" means that a person is (a) asleep or not conscious, (b) unable to withhold consent or to withdraw consent because of a physical condition, or (c) unable to communicate nonconsent and the condition is known or reasonably should have been known to the actor.
Subd. 10.Position of authority.
"Position of authority" includes but is not limited to any person who is a parent or acting in the place of a parent and charged with any of a parent's rights, duties or responsibilities to a child, or a person who is charged with any duty or responsibility for the health, welfare, or supervision of a child, either independently or through another, no matter how brief, at the time of the act. For the purposes of subdivision 11, "position of authority" includes a psychotherapist.
(a) "Sexual contact," for the purposes of sections 609.343, subdivision 1, clauses (a) to (f), and 609.345, subdivision 1, clauses (a) to (e), and (h) to (o), includes any of the following acts committed without the complainant's consent, except in those cases where consent is not a defense, and committed with sexual or aggressive intent:
(i) the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant's intimate parts, or
(ii) the touching by the complainant of the actor's, the complainant's, or another's intimate parts effected by a person in a position of authority, or by coercion, or by inducement if the complainant is under 13 years of age or mentally impaired, or
(iii) the touching by another of the complainant's intimate parts effected by coercion or by a person in a position of authority, or
(iv) in any of the cases above, the touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the intimate parts, or
(v) the intentional touching with seminal fluid or sperm by the actor of the complainant's body or the clothing covering the complainant's body.
(b) "Sexual contact," for the purposes of sections 609.343, subdivision 1, clauses (g) and (h), and 609.345, subdivision 1, clauses (f) and (g), includes any of the following acts committed with sexual or aggressive intent:
(i) the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant's intimate parts;
(ii) the touching by the complainant of the actor's, the complainant's, or another's intimate parts;
(iii) the touching by another of the complainant's intimate parts;
(iv) in any of the cases listed above, touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the intimate parts; or
(c) "Sexual contact with a person under 13" means the intentional touching of the complainant's bare genitals or anal opening by the actor's bare genitals or anal opening with sexual or aggressive intent or the touching by the complainant's bare genitals or anal opening of the actor's or another's bare genitals or anal opening with sexual or aggressive intent.
"Sexual penetration" means any of the following acts committed without the complainant's consent, except in those cases where consent is not a defense, whether or not emission of semen occurs:
(1) sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal intercourse; or
(2) any intrusion however slight into the genital or anal openings:
(i) of the complainant's body by any part of the actor's body or any object used by the actor for this purpose;
(ii) of the complainant's body by any part of the body of the complainant, by any part of the body of another person, or by any object used by the complainant or another person for this purpose, when effected by a person in a position of authority, or by coercion, or by inducement if the child is under 13 years of age or mentally impaired; or
(iii) of the body of the actor or another person by any part of the body of the complainant or by any object used by the complainant for this purpose, when effected by a person in a position of authority, or by coercion, or by inducement if the child is under 13 years of age or mentally impaired.
Subd. 13.Complainant.
"Complainant" means a person alleged to have been subjected to criminal sexual conduct, but need not be the person who signs the complaint.
Subd. 14.Coercion.
"Coercion" means the use by the actor of words or circumstances that cause the complainant reasonably to fear that the actor will inflict bodily harm upon the complainant or another, or the use by the actor of confinement, or superior size or strength, against the complainant that causes the complainant to submit to sexual penetration or contact against the complainant's will. Proof of coercion does not require proof of a specific act or threat.
Subd. 15.Significant relationship.
"Significant relationship" means a situation in which the actor is:
(1) the complainant's parent, stepparent, or guardian;
(2) any of the following persons related to the complainant by blood, marriage, or adoption: brother, sister, stepbrother, stepsister, first cousin, aunt, uncle, nephew, niece, grandparent, great-grandparent, great-uncle, great-aunt; or
(3) an adult who jointly resides intermittently or regularly in the same dwelling as the complainant and who is not the complainant's spouse.
Subd. 16.Patient.
"Patient" means a person who seeks or obtains psychotherapeutic services.
Subd. 17.Psychotherapist.
"Psychotherapist" means a person who is or purports to be a physician, psychologist, nurse, chemical dependency counselor, social worker, marriage and family therapist, licensed professional counselor, or other mental health service provider; or any other person, whether or not licensed by the state, who performs or purports to perform psychotherapy.
Subd. 18.Psychotherapy.
"Psychotherapy" means the professional treatment, assessment, or counseling of a mental or emotional illness, symptom, or condition.
Subd. 19.Emotionally dependent.
"Emotionally dependent" means that the nature of the former patient's emotional condition and the nature of the treatment provided by the psychotherapist are such that the psychotherapist knows or has reason to know that the former patient is unable to withhold consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration by the psychotherapist.
Subd. 20.Therapeutic deception.
"Therapeutic deception" means a representation by a psychotherapist that sexual contact or sexual penetration by the psychotherapist is consistent with or part of the patient's treatment.
Subd. 21.Special transportation.
"Special transportation service" means motor vehicle transportation provided on a regular basis by a public or private entity or person that is intended exclusively or primarily to serve individuals who are vulnerable adults or disabled. Special transportation service includes, but is not limited to, service provided by buses, vans, taxis, and volunteers driving private automobiles.
Subd. 22.Predatory crime.
"Predatory crime" means a felony violation of section 609.185 (first-degree murder), 609.19 (second-degree murder), 609.195 (third-degree murder), 609.20 (first-degree manslaughter), 609.205 (second-degree manslaughter), 609.221 (first-degree assault), 609.222 (second-degree assault), 609.223 (third-degree assault), 609.24 (simple robbery), 609.245 (aggravated robbery), 609.25 (kidnapping), 609.255 (false imprisonment), 609.498 (tampering with a witness), 609.561 (first-degree arson), or 609.582, subdivision 1 (first-degree burglary).
Subd. 23.Secure treatment facility.
"Secure treatment facility" has the meaning given in sections 253B.02, subdivision 18a, and 253D.02, subdivision 13.
1975 c 374 s 2; 1977 c 130 s 8; 1979 c 258 s 9-11; 1981 c 51 s 1; 1982 c 385 s 1; 1982 c 469 s 9; 1984 c 525 s 3; 1984 c 588 s 5,6; 1985 c 24 s 3,4; 1985 c 286 s 14; 1985 c 297 s 1-5; 1986 c 351 s 6,7; 1986 c 444; 1987 c 198 s 1-3; 1987 c 347 art 1 s 22; 1988 c 413 s 1; 1989 c 290 art 4 s 11; 1993 c 326 art 4 s 17-19; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 30-33; 1995 c 226 art 2 s 18; 1998 c 367 art 3 s 5,6; 2001 c 210 s 21; 2002 c 379 art 1 s 106; 2002 c 381 s 1; 2003 c 118 s 22; 2005 c 56 s 1; 2005 c 136 art 2 s 10,11; 2007 c 54 art 2 s 3; 2009 c 59 art 1 s 5; 2010 c 270 s 1; 2013 c 49 s 22
A person who engages in sexual penetration with another person, or in sexual contact with a person under 13 years of age as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 11, paragraph (c), is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if any of the following circumstances exists:
(a) the complainant is under 13 years of age and the actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense;
(b) the complainant is at least 13 years of age but less than 16 years of age and the actor is more than 48 months older than the complainant and in a position of authority over the complainant. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense;
(c) circumstances existing at the time of the act cause the complainant to have a reasonable fear of imminent great bodily harm to the complainant or another;
(d) the actor is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the complainant to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon and uses or threatens to use the weapon or article to cause the complainant to submit;
(e) the actor causes personal injury to the complainant, and either of the following circumstances exist:
(i) the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish sexual penetration; or
(ii) the actor knows or has reason to know that the complainant is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless;
(f) the actor is aided or abetted by one or more accomplices within the meaning of section 609.05, and either of the following circumstances exists:
(i) an accomplice uses force or coercion to cause the complainant to submit; or
(ii) an accomplice is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the complainant reasonably to believe it to be a dangerous weapon and uses or threatens to use the weapon or article to cause the complainant to submit;
(g) the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant and the complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual penetration. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense; or
(h) the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant, the complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual penetration, and:
(i) the actor or an accomplice used force or coercion to accomplish the penetration;
(ii) the complainant suffered personal injury; or
(iii) the sexual abuse involved multiple acts committed over an extended period of time.
Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 609.3455; or Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109, a person convicted under subdivision 1 may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 30 years or to a payment of a fine of not more than $40,000, or both.
(b) Unless a longer mandatory minimum sentence is otherwise required by law or the Sentencing Guidelines provide for a longer presumptive executed sentence, the court shall presume that an executed sentence of 144 months must be imposed on an offender convicted of violating this section. Sentencing a person in a manner other than that described in this paragraph is a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.
(c) A person convicted under this section is also subject to conditional release under section 609.3455.
Subd. 3.Stay.
Except when imprisonment is required under section 609.3455; or Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109, if a person is convicted under subdivision 1, clause (g), the court may stay imposition or execution of the sentence if it finds that:
(a) a stay is in the best interest of the complainant or the family unit; and
(b) a professional assessment indicates that the offender has been accepted by and can respond to a treatment program.
If the court stays imposition or execution of sentence, it shall include the following as conditions of probation:
(1) incarceration in a local jail or workhouse;
(2) a requirement that the offender complete a treatment program; and
(3) a requirement that the offender have no unsupervised contact with the complainant until the offender has successfully completed the treatment program unless approved by the treatment program and the supervising correctional agent.
1975 c 374 s 3; 1981 c 51 s 2; 1983 c 204 s 1; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1985 c 24 s 5; 1985 c 286 s 15; 1986 c 444; 1989 c 290 art 4 s 12; 1992 c 571 art 1 s 14; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 34; 1995 c 186 s 99; 1998 c 367 art 3 s 7; art 6 s 15; 2000 c 311 art 4 s 2; 2000 c 437 s 10; 2005 c 136 art 2 s 12,13; 2007 c 13 art 3 s 37
A person who engages in sexual contact with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree if any of the following circumstances exists:
(a) the complainant is under 13 years of age and the actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense. In a prosecution under this clause, the state is not required to prove that the sexual contact was coerced;
(b) the complainant is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is more than 48 months older than the complainant and in a position of authority over the complainant. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense;
(d) the actor is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the complainant to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon and uses or threatens to use the dangerous weapon to cause the complainant to submit;
(i) the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual contact; or
(ii) an accomplice is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the complainant to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon and uses or threatens to use the weapon or article to cause the complainant to submit;
(g) the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant and the complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual contact. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense; or
(h) the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant, the complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual contact, and:
(i) the actor or an accomplice used force or coercion to accomplish the contact;
(b) Unless a longer mandatory minimum sentence is otherwise required by law or the Sentencing Guidelines provide for a longer presumptive executed sentence, the court shall presume that an executed sentence of 90 months must be imposed on an offender convicted of violating subdivision 1, clause (c), (d), (e), (f), or (h). Sentencing a person in a manner other than that described in this paragraph is a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.
1975 c 374 s 4; 1979 c 258 s 12; 1981 c 51 s 3; 1983 c 204 s 2; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1985 c 24 s 6; 1985 c 286 s 16; 1986 c 444; 1989 c 290 art 4 s 13; 1992 c 571 art 1 s 15; 1998 c 367 art 3 s 8; art 6 s 15; 2000 c 437 s 11; 2002 c 381 s 2; 2005 c 136 art 2 s 14,15; 2007 c 13 art 3 s 37
A person who engages in sexual penetration with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree if any of the following circumstances exists:
(a) the complainant is under 13 years of age and the actor is no more than 36 months older than the complainant. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant shall be a defense;
(b) the complainant is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is more than 24 months older than the complainant. In any such case if the actor is no more than 120 months older than the complainant, it shall be an affirmative defense, which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, that the actor reasonably believes the complainant to be 16 years of age or older. In all other cases, mistake as to the complainant's age shall not be a defense. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;
(c) the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the penetration;
(d) the actor knows or has reason to know that the complainant is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless;
(e) the complainant is at least 16 but less than 18 years of age and the actor is more than 48 months older than the complainant and in a position of authority over the complainant. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense;
(f) the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant and the complainant was at least 16 but under 18 years of age at the time of the sexual penetration. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense;
(g) the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant, the complainant was at least 16 but under 18 years of age at the time of the sexual penetration, and:
Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense;
(h) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient of the psychotherapist and the sexual penetration occurred:
(i) during the psychotherapy session; or
(ii) outside the psychotherapy session if an ongoing psychotherapist-patient relationship exists.
Consent by the complainant is not a defense;
(i) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a former patient of the psychotherapist and the former patient is emotionally dependent upon the psychotherapist;
(j) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient or former patient and the sexual penetration occurred by means of therapeutic deception. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;
(k) the actor accomplishes the sexual penetration by means of deception or false representation that the penetration is for a bona fide medical purpose. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;
(1) the actor is or purports to be a member of the clergy, the complainant is not married to the actor, and:
(i) the sexual penetration occurred during the course of a meeting in which the complainant sought or received religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort from the actor in private; or
(ii) the sexual penetration occurred during a period of time in which the complainant was meeting on an ongoing basis with the actor to seek or receive religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort in private. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;
(m) the actor is an employee, independent contractor, or volunteer of a state, county, city, or privately operated adult or juvenile correctional system, or secure treatment facility, or treatment facility providing services to clients civilly committed as mentally ill and dangerous, sexually dangerous persons, or sexual psychopathic personalities, including, but not limited to, jails, prisons, detention centers, or work release facilities, and the complainant is a resident of a facility or under supervision of the correctional system. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;
(n) the actor provides or is an agent of an entity that provides special transportation service, the complainant used the special transportation service, and the sexual penetration occurred during or immediately before or after the actor transported the complainant. Consent by the complainant is not a defense; or
(o) the actor performs massage or other bodywork for hire, the complainant was a user of one of those services, and nonconsensual sexual penetration occurred during or immediately before or after the actor performed or was hired to perform one of those services for the complainant.
Except as otherwise provided in section 609.3455, a person convicted under subdivision 1 may be sentenced:
(1) to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to a payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both; or
(2) if the person was convicted under subdivision 1, paragraph (b), and if the actor was no more than 48 months but more than 24 months older than the complainant, to imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.
A person convicted under this section is also subject to conditional release under section 609.3455.
Except when imprisonment is required under section 609.3455; or Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109, if a person is convicted under subdivision 1, clause (f), the court may stay imposition or execution of the sentence if it finds that:
1975 c 374 s 5; 1979 c 258 s 13; 1983 c 204 s 3; 1984 c 588 s 7; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1985 c 24 s 7; 1985 c 286 s 17; 1985 c 297 s 6; 1986 c 351 s 8; 1986 c 444; 1Sp1986 c 3 art 1 s 80; 1987 c 94 s 1; 1989 c 290 art 4 s 14; 1992 c 571 art 1 s 16,17; 1993 c 326 art 4 s 20; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 35; 1998 c 367 art 3 s 9; art 6 s 15; 2000 c 437 s 12; 2001 c 210 s 22; 2002 c 381 s 3; 2005 c 136 art 2 s 16,17; 2007 c 13 art 3 s 37; 2007 c 54 art 2 s 4; 2010 c 270 s 2; 2014 c 259 s 5,6
A person who engages in sexual contact with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree if any of the following circumstances exists:
(a) the complainant is under 13 years of age and the actor is no more than 36 months older than the complainant. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age or consent to the act by the complainant is a defense. In a prosecution under this clause, the state is not required to prove that the sexual contact was coerced;
(b) the complainant is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is more than 48 months older than the complainant or in a position of authority over the complainant. Consent by the complainant to the act is not a defense. In any such case, if the actor is no more than 120 months older than the complainant, it shall be an affirmative defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the actor reasonably believes the complainant to be 16 years of age or older. In all other cases, mistake as to the complainant's age shall not be a defense;
(c) the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual contact;
(f) the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant and the complainant was at least 16 but under 18 years of age at the time of the sexual contact. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense;
(g) the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant, the complainant was at least 16 but under 18 years of age at the time of the sexual contact, and:
(h) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient of the psychotherapist and the sexual contact occurred:
(ii) outside the psychotherapy session if an ongoing psychotherapist-patient relationship exists. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;
(j) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient or former patient and the sexual contact occurred by means of therapeutic deception. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;
(k) the actor accomplishes the sexual contact by means of deception or false representation that the contact is for a bona fide medical purpose. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;
(i) the sexual contact occurred during the course of a meeting in which the complainant sought or received religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort from the actor in private; or
(ii) the sexual contact occurred during a period of time in which the complainant was meeting on an ongoing basis with the actor to seek or receive religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort in private. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;
(n) the actor provides or is an agent of an entity that provides special transportation service, the complainant used the special transportation service, the complainant is not married to the actor, and the sexual contact occurred during or immediately before or after the actor transported the complainant. Consent by the complainant is not a defense; or
(o) the actor performs massage or other bodywork for hire, the complainant was a user of one of those services, and nonconsensual sexual contact occurred during or immediately before or after the actor performed or was hired to perform one of those services for the complainant.
Except as otherwise provided in section 609.3455, a person convicted under subdivision 1 may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to a payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both. A person convicted under this section is also subject to conditional release under section 609.3455.
1975 c 374 s 6; 1976 c 124 s 9; 1979 c 258 s 14; 1981 c 51 s 4; 1983 c 204 s 4; 1984 c 588 s 8; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1985 c 24 s 8; 1985 c 286 s 18; 1985 c 297 s 7; 1986 c 351 s 9; 1986 c 444; 1Sp1986 c 3 art 1 s 81; 1987 c 94 s 2; 1989 c 290 art 4 s 15; 1992 c 571 art 1 s 18,19; 1993 c 326 art 4 s 21; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 36; 1998 c 367 art 3 s 10; art 6 s 15; 2000 c 437 s 13; 2001 c 210 s 23; 2002 c 381 s 4; 2005 c 136 art 2 s 18,19; 2007 c 13 art 3 s 37; 2007 c 54 art 2 s 5; 2010 c 270 s 3
A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fifth degree:
(1) if the person engages in nonconsensual sexual contact; or
(2) the person engages in masturbation or lewd exhibition of the genitals in the presence of a minor under the age of 16, knowing or having reason to know the minor is present.
For purposes of this section, "sexual contact" has the meaning given in section 609.341, subdivision 11, paragraph (a), clauses (i), (iv), and (v), but does not include the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the buttocks. Sexual contact also includes the intentional removal or attempted removal of clothing covering the complainant's intimate parts or undergarments, and the nonconsensual touching by the complainant of the actor's intimate parts, effected by the actor, if the action is performed with sexual or aggressive intent.
A person convicted under subdivision 1 may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to a payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
(a) A person is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than seven years or to payment of a fine of not more than $14,000, or both, if the person violates this section within seven years of:
(1) a previous conviction for violating subdivision 1, clause (2), a crime described in paragraph (b), or a statute from another state in conformity with any of these offenses; or
(2) the first of two or more previous convictions for violating subdivision 1, clause (1), or a statute from another state in conformity with this offense.
(b) A previous conviction for violating section 609.342; 609.343; 609.344; 609.345; 609.3453; 617.23, subdivision 2, clause (2), or subdivision 3; or 617.247 may be used to enhance a criminal penalty as provided in paragraph (a).
1988 c 529 s 2; 1990 c 492 s 1; 1995 c 226 art 2 s 19; 1996 c 408 art 3 s 26,27; 1998 c 367 art 3 s 11; 2014 c 270 s 2; 2015 c 65 art 6 s 14
A person is guilty of criminal sexual predatory conduct if the person commits a predatory crime that was motivated by the offender's sexual impulses or was part of a predatory pattern of behavior that had criminal sexual conduct as its goal.
(a) Except as provided in section 609.3455, the statutory maximum sentence for a violation of subdivision 1 is: (1) 25 percent longer than for the underlying predatory crime; or (2) 50 percent longer than for the underlying predatory crime, if the violation is committed by a person with a previous sex offense conviction, as defined in section 609.3455, subdivision 1.
(b) In addition to the sentence imposed under paragraph (a), the person may also be sentenced to the payment of a fine of not more than $20,000.
(b) "Conviction" includes a conviction as an extended jurisdiction juvenile under section 260B.130 for a violation of, or an attempt to violate, section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, or 609.3453, if the adult sentence has been executed.
(c) "Extreme inhumane conditions" mean situations where, either before or after the sexual penetration or sexual contact, the offender knowingly causes or permits the complainant to be placed in a situation likely to cause the complainant severe ongoing mental, emotional, or psychological harm, or causes the complainant's death.
(d) A "heinous element" includes:
(1) the offender tortured the complainant;
(2) the offender intentionally inflicted great bodily harm upon the complainant;
(3) the offender intentionally mutilated the complainant;
(4) the offender exposed the complainant to extreme inhumane conditions;
(5) the offender was armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the complainant to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon and used or threatened to use the weapon or article to cause the complainant to submit;
(6) the offense involved sexual penetration or sexual contact with more than one victim;
(7) the offense involved more than one perpetrator engaging in sexual penetration or sexual contact with the complainant; or
(8) the offender, without the complainant's consent, removed the complainant from one place to another and did not release the complainant in a safe place.
(e) "Mutilation" means the intentional infliction of physical abuse designed to cause serious permanent disfigurement or permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the functions of any bodily member or organ, where the offender relishes the infliction of the abuse, evidencing debasement or perversion.
(f) A conviction is considered a "previous sex offense conviction" if the offender was convicted and sentenced for a sex offense before the commission of the present offense.
(g) A conviction is considered a "prior sex offense conviction" if the offender was convicted of committing a sex offense before the offender has been convicted of the present offense, regardless of whether the offender was convicted for the first offense before the commission of the present offense, and the convictions involved separate behavioral incidents.
(h) "Sex offense" means any violation of, or attempt to violate, section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, 609.3451, 609.3453, or any similar statute of the United States, this state, or any other state.
(i) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of extreme mental anguish, or extreme psychological or physical abuse, when committed in an especially depraved manner.
(j) An offender has "two previous sex offense convictions" only if the offender was convicted and sentenced for a sex offense committed after the offender was earlier convicted and sentenced for a sex offense and both convictions preceded the commission of the present offense of conviction.
Subd. 2.Mandatory life sentence without release; egregious first-time and repeat offenders.
(a) Notwithstanding the statutory maximum penalty otherwise applicable to the offense, the court shall sentence a person convicted under section 609.342, subdivision 1, paragraph (c), (d), (e), (f), or (h); or 609.343, subdivision 1, paragraph (c), (d), (e), (f), or (h), to life without the possibility of release if:
(1) the fact finder determines that two or more heinous elements exist; or
(2) the person has a previous sex offense conviction for a violation of section 609.342, 609.343, or 609.344, and the fact finder determines that a heinous element exists for the present offense.
(b) A fact finder may not consider a heinous element if it is an element of the underlying specified violation of section 609.342 or 609.343. In addition, when determining whether two or more heinous elements exist, the fact finder may not use the same underlying facts to support a determination that more than one element exists.
Subd. 3.Mandatory life sentence for egregious first-time offenders.
(a) Notwithstanding the statutory maximum penalty otherwise applicable to the offense, the court shall sentence a person to imprisonment for life if the person is convicted under section 609.342, subdivision 1, paragraph (c), (d), (e), (f), or (h), or 609.343, subdivision 1, paragraph (c), (d), (e), (f), or (h); and the fact finder determines that a heinous element exists.
(b) The fact finder may not consider a heinous element if it is an element of the underlying specified violation of section 609.342 or 609.343.
Subd. 3a.Mandatory sentence for certain engrained offenders.
(a) A court shall commit a person to the commissioner of corrections for a period of time that is not less than double the presumptive sentence under the sentencing guidelines and not more than the statutory maximum, or if the statutory maximum is less than double the presumptive sentence, for a period of time that is equal to the statutory maximum, if:
(1) the court is imposing an executed sentence on a person convicted of committing or attempting to commit a violation of section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, or 609.3453;
(2) the fact finder determines that the offender is a danger to public safety; and
(3) the fact finder determines that the offender's criminal sexual behavior is so engrained that the risk of reoffending is great without intensive psychotherapeutic intervention or other long-term treatment or supervision extending beyond the presumptive term of imprisonment and supervised release.
(b) The fact finder shall base its determination that the offender is a danger to public safety on any of the following factors:
(1) the crime involved an aggravating factor that would justify a durational departure from the presumptive sentence under the sentencing guidelines;
(2) the offender previously committed or attempted to commit a predatory crime or a violation of section 609.224 or 609.2242, including:
(i) an offense committed as a juvenile that would have been a predatory crime or a violation of section 609.224 or 609.2242 if committed by an adult; or
(ii) a violation or attempted violation of a similar law of any other state or the United States; or
(3) the offender planned or prepared for the crime prior to its commission.
(c) As used in this section, "predatory crime" has the meaning given in section 609.341, subdivision 22.
Subd. 4.Mandatory life sentence; repeat offenders.
(a) Notwithstanding the statutory maximum penalty otherwise applicable to the offense, the court shall sentence a person to imprisonment for life if the person is convicted of violating section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, or 609.3453 and:
(1) the person has two previous sex offense convictions;
(2) the person has a previous sex offense conviction and:
(i) the fact finder determines that the present offense involved an aggravating factor that would provide grounds for an upward durational departure under the sentencing guidelines other than the aggravating factor applicable to repeat criminal sexual conduct convictions;
(ii) the person received an upward durational departure from the sentencing guidelines for the previous sex offense conviction; or
(iii) the person was sentenced under this section or Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.108, for the previous sex offense conviction; or
(3) the person has two prior sex offense convictions, and the fact finder determines that the prior convictions and present offense involved at least three separate victims, and:
(ii) the person received an upward durational departure from the sentencing guidelines for one of the prior sex offense convictions; or
(iii) the person was sentenced under this section or Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.108, for one of the prior sex offense convictions.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a court may not sentence a person to imprisonment for life for a violation of section 609.345, unless the person's previous or prior sex offense convictions that are being used as the basis for the sentence are for violations of section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, or 609.3453, or any similar statute of the United States, this state, or any other state.
Subd. 5.Life sentences; minimum term of imprisonment.
At the time of sentencing under subdivision 3 or 4, the court shall specify a minimum term of imprisonment, based on the sentencing guidelines or any applicable mandatory minimum sentence, that must be served before the offender may be considered for supervised release.
Subd. 6.Mandatory ten-year conditional release term.
Notwithstanding the statutory maximum sentence otherwise applicable to the offense and unless a longer conditional release term is required in subdivision 7, when a court commits an offender to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for a violation of section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, or 609.3453, the court shall provide that, after the offender has been released from prison, the commissioner shall place the offender on conditional release for ten years.
Subd. 7.Mandatory lifetime conditional release term.
(a) When a court sentences an offender under subdivision 3 or 4, the court shall provide that, if the offender is released from prison, the commissioner of corrections shall place the offender on conditional release for the remainder of the offender's life.
(b) Notwithstanding the statutory maximum sentence otherwise applicable to the offense, when the court commits an offender to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for a violation of section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, or 609.3453, and the offender has a previous or prior sex offense conviction, the court shall provide that, after the offender has been released from prison, the commissioner shall place the offender on conditional release for the remainder of the offender's life.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (b), an offender may not be placed on lifetime conditional release for a violation of section 609.345, unless the offender's previous or prior sex offense conviction is for a violation of section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, or 609.3453, or any similar statute of the United States, this state, or any other state.
Subd. 8.Terms of conditional release; applicable to all sex offenders.
(a) The provisions of this subdivision relating to conditional release apply to all sex offenders sentenced to prison for a violation of section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, or 609.3453. Except as provided in this subdivision, conditional release of sex offenders is governed by provisions relating to supervised release. The commissioner of corrections may not dismiss an offender on conditional release from supervision until the offender's conditional release term expires.
(b) The conditions of release may include successful completion of treatment and aftercare in a program approved by the commissioner, satisfaction of the release conditions specified in section 244.05, subdivision 6, and any other conditions the commissioner considers appropriate. The commissioner shall develop a plan to pay the cost of treatment of a person released under this subdivision. The plan may include co-payments from offenders, third-party payers, local agencies, or other funding sources as they are identified. This section does not require the commissioner to accept or retain an offender in a treatment program. Before the offender is placed on conditional release, the commissioner shall notify the sentencing court and the prosecutor in the jurisdiction where the offender was sentenced of the terms of the offender's conditional release. The commissioner also shall make reasonable efforts to notify the victim of the offender's crime of the terms of the offender's conditional release.
(c) If the offender fails to meet any condition of release, the commissioner may revoke the offender's conditional release and order that the offender serve all or a part of the remaining portion of the conditional release term in prison. An offender, while on supervised release, is not entitled to credit against the offender's conditional release term for time served in confinement for a violation of release.
The provisions of this section do not affect the applicability of Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.108, to crimes committed before August 1, 2005, or the validity of sentences imposed under Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.108.
Subd. 10.Presumptive executed sentence for repeat sex offenders.
Except as provided in subdivision 2, 3, 3a, or 4, if a person is convicted under sections 609.342 to 609.345 or 609.3453 within 15 years of a previous sex offense conviction, the court shall commit the defendant to the commissioner of corrections for not less than three years, nor more than the maximum sentence provided by law for the offense for which convicted, notwithstanding sections 242.19, 243.05, 609.11, 609.12, and 609.135. The court may stay the execution of the sentence imposed under this subdivision only if it finds that a professional assessment indicates the offender is accepted by and can respond to treatment at a long-term inpatient program exclusively treating sex offenders and approved by the commissioner of corrections. If the court stays the execution of a sentence, it shall include the following as conditions of probation:
(1) incarceration in a local jail or workhouse; and
(2) a requirement that the offender successfully complete the treatment program and aftercare as directed by the court.
2005 c 136 art 2 s 21; 2006 c 260 art 1 s 22,23; art 4 s 14; 2007 c 54 art 2 s 6; 2013 c 86 art 3 s 10; 2013 c 96 s 3-5
(a) A court may order as an intermediate sanction under section 609.135 and the commissioner of corrections may order as a condition of release under section 244.05 or 609.3455 that an offender under supervision for a sex offense submit to polygraphic examinations to ensure compliance with the terms of probation or conditions of release.
(b) The court or commissioner may order the offender to pay all or a portion of the costs of the examinations. The fee may be waived if the offender is indigent or if payment would result in an economic hardship to the offender's immediate family.
Subdivision 1.Assessment required.
When a person is convicted of a sex offense, the court shall order an independent professional assessment of the offender's need for sex offender treatment to be completed before sentencing. The court may waive the assessment if: (1) the Sentencing Guidelines provide a presumptive prison sentence for the offender, or (2) an adequate assessment was conducted prior to the conviction. An assessor providing an assessment for the court must be experienced in the evaluation and treatment of sex offenders.
Subd. 1a.Repeat offenders; mandatory assessment.
When a person is convicted of a felony-level sex offense, and the person has previously been convicted of a sex offense regardless of the penalty level, the court shall order a sex offender assessment to be completed by the Minnesota security hospital. The assessment must contain the facts upon which the assessment conclusion is based, with reference to the offense history of the offender or the severity of the current offense, the social history of the offender, and the results of an examination of the offender's mental status unless the offender refuses to be examined. The assessment conclusion may not be based on testing alone. Upon completion, the assessment must be forwarded to the court and the commissioner of corrections. The court shall consider the assessment when sentencing the offender and, if applicable, when making the preliminary determination regarding the appropriateness of a civil commitment petition under section 609.1351.
Subd. 2.Access to data.
Notwithstanding sections 13.384, 13.85, 144.291 to 144.298, 260B.171, 260C.171, or 626.556, the assessor has access to the following private or confidential data on the person if access is relevant and necessary for the assessment:
(1) medical data under section 13.384;
(2) corrections and detention data under section 13.85;
(3) health records under sections 144.291 to 144.298;
(4) juvenile court records under sections 260B.171 and 260C.171; and
(5) local welfare agency records under section 626.556.
Data disclosed under this section may be used only for purposes of the assessment and may not be further disclosed to any other person, except as authorized by law.
Subd. 3.Treatment order.
If the assessment indicates that the offender is in need of and amenable to sex offender treatment, the court shall include in the sentence a requirement that the offender undergo treatment, unless the court sentences the offender to prison.
As used in this section, "sex offense" means a violation of section 609.342; 609.343; 609.344; 609.345; 609.3451; 609.746, subdivision 1; 609.79; or 617.23; or another offense arising out of a charge based on one or more of those sections.
1992 c 571 art 1 s 20; 1999 c 139 art 4 s 2; 1999 c 227 s 22; 2001 c 210 s 24-26; 2004 c 228 art 1 s 66; 2005 c 136 art 3 s 23; art 4 s 11; 2007 c 147 art 10 s 15
Subdivision 1.Victim testimony; corroboration unnecessary.
In a prosecution under sections 609.342 to 609.3451; 609.3453; or Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109, the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated.
Subd. 2.Showing of resistance unnecessary.
In a prosecution under sections 609.342 to 609.3451; 609.3453; or Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109, there is no need to show that the victim resisted the accused.
Subd. 3.Previous sexual conduct.
In a prosecution under sections 609.342 to 609.3451, 609.3453; 609.365; or Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109, evidence of the victim's previous sexual conduct shall not be admitted nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the presence of the jury, except by court order under the procedure provided in subdivision 4. The evidence can be admitted only if the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature and only in the circumstances set out in paragraphs (a) and (b). For the evidence to be admissible under paragraph (a), subsection (i), the judge must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the facts set out in the accused's offer of proof are true. For the evidence to be admissible under paragraph (a), subsection (ii) or paragraph (b), the judge must find that the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the facts set out in the accused's offer of proof are true, as provided under Rule 901 of the Rules of Evidence.
(a) When consent of the victim is a defense in the case, the following evidence is admissible:
(i) evidence of the victim's previous sexual conduct tending to establish a common scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct under circumstances similar to the case at issue. In order to find a common scheme or plan, the judge must find that the victim made prior allegations of sexual assault which were fabricated; and
(ii) evidence of the victim's previous sexual conduct with the accused.
(b) When the prosecution's case includes evidence of semen, pregnancy, or disease at the time of the incident or, in the case of pregnancy, between the time of the incident and trial, evidence of specific instances of the victim's previous sexual conduct is admissible solely to show the source of the semen, pregnancy, or disease.
Subd. 4.Accused offer of evidence.
The accused may not offer evidence described in subdivision 3 except pursuant to the following procedure:
(a) A motion shall be made by the accused at least three business days prior to trial, unless later for good cause shown, setting out with particularity the offer of proof of the evidence that the accused intends to offer, relative to the previous sexual conduct of the victim;
(b) If the court deems the offer of proof sufficient, the court shall order a hearing out of the presence of the jury, if any, and in such hearing shall allow the accused to make a full presentation of the offer of proof;
(c) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that the evidence proposed to be offered by the accused regarding the previous sexual conduct of the victim is admissible under subdivision 3 and that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature, the court shall make an order stating the extent to which evidence is admissible. The accused may then offer evidence pursuant to the order of the court;
(d) If new information is discovered after the date of the hearing or during the course of trial, which may make evidence described in subdivision 3 admissible, the accused may make an offer of proof pursuant to clause (a) and the court shall order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible by the standards herein.
Subd. 5.Prohibiting instructing jury on certain points.
In a prosecution under sections 609.342 to 609.3451; 609.3453; or Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109, the court shall not instruct the jury to the effect that:
(a) It may be inferred that a victim who has previously consented to sexual intercourse with persons other than the accused would be therefore more likely to consent to sexual intercourse again; or
(b) The victim's previous or subsequent sexual conduct in and of itself may be considered in determining the credibility of the victim; or
(c) Criminal sexual conduct is a crime easily charged by a victim but very difficult to disprove by an accused because of the heinous nature of the crime; or
(d) The jury should scrutinize the testimony of the victim any more closely than it should scrutinize the testimony of any witness in any felony prosecution.
Subd. 6.Psychotherapy evidence.
(a) In a prosecution under sections 609.342 to 609.3451; 609.3453; or Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109, involving a psychotherapist and patient, evidence of the patient's personal or medical history is not admissible except when:
(1) the accused requests a hearing at least three business days prior to trial and makes an offer of proof of the relevancy of the history; and
(2) the court finds that the history is relevant and that the probative value of the history outweighs its prejudicial value.
(b) The court shall allow the admission only of specific information or examples of conduct of the victim that are determined by the court to be relevant. The court's order shall detail the information or conduct that is admissible and no other evidence of the history may be introduced.
(c) Violation of the terms of the order is grounds for mistrial but does not prevent the retrial of the accused.
Subd. 7.Effect of statute on rules.
Rule 412 of the Rules of Evidence is superseded to the extent of its conflict with this section.
1975 c 374 s 8; 1984 c 588 s 10; 1985 c 297 s 8; 1986 c 351 s 12; 1986 c 444; 1Sp1986 c 3 art 1 s 72; 1987 c 114 s 1; 1997 c 239 art 5 s 10; 1998 c 367 art 6 s 8-12; 2005 c 136 art 4 s 6; 2007 c 13 art 3 s 37
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, no data contained in records or reports relating to petitions, complaints, or indictments issued pursuant to section 609.322, 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, or 609.3453, which specifically identifies a victim who is a minor shall be accessible to the public, except by order of the court. Nothing in this section authorizes denial of access to any other data contained in the records or reports, including the identity of the defendant.
1984 c 573 s 9; 1985 c 119 s 1; 1986 c 351 s 13; 1Sp1986 c 3 art 1 s 73; 1987 c 331 s 9; 1992 c 571 art 1 s 26; 1993 c 13 art 1 s 49; 2005 c 136 art 4 s 7; 2015 c 65 art 6 s 15
Sections 609.342 to 609.3451; 609.3453; and Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109, do not apply to sexual penetration or sexual contact when done for a bona fide medical purpose.
1975 c 374 s 9; 1981 c 273 s 5; 1986 c 351 s 14; 1998 c 367 art 6 s 13; 2005 c 136 art 4 s 8; 2007 c 13 art 3 s 37
A person does not commit criminal sexual conduct under sections 609.342, clauses (a) and (b), 609.343, clauses (a) and (b), 609.344, clauses (a), (b), (d), (e), and (n), and 609.345, clauses (a), (b), (d), (e), and (n), if the actor and complainant were adults cohabiting in an ongoing voluntary sexual relationship at the time of the alleged offense, or if the complainant is the actor's legal spouse, unless the couple is living apart and one of them has filed for legal separation or dissolution of the marriage. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit or restrain the prosecution for any other offense committed by one legal spouse against the other.
1975 c 374 s 10; 1978 c 772 s 62; 1980 c 544 s 2; 1986 c 351 s 15; 1986 c 444; 2002 c 381 s 5
(a) Costs incurred by a county, city, or private hospital or other emergency medical facility or by a private physician for the examination of a victim of criminal sexual conduct when the examination is performed for the purpose of gathering evidence shall be paid by the county in which the criminal sexual conduct occurred. These costs include, but are not limited to, full cost of the rape kit examination, associated tests relating to the complainant's sexually transmitted disease status, and pregnancy status.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the duties, responsibilities, or liabilities of any insurer, whether public or private. However, a county may seek insurance reimbursement from the victim's insurer only if authorized by the victim. This authorization may only be sought after the examination is performed. When seeking this authorization, the county shall inform the victim that if the victim does not authorize this, the county is required by law to pay for the examination and that the victim is in no way liable for these costs or obligated to authorize the reimbursement.
(c) The applicability of this section does not depend upon whether the victim reports the offense to law enforcement or the existence or status of any investigation or prosecution.
1975 c 374 s 11; 1981 c 273 s 6; 1986 c 351 s 16; 1Sp1986 c 3 art 1 s 75; 2002 c 381 s 6; 2003 c 116 s 3
Except for section 609.347, crimes committed prior to August 1, 1975, are not affected by its provisions.
(a) "child" means a person 15 years of age or younger;
(b) "sexual conduct" means sexual contact of the individual's primary genital area, sexual penetration as defined in section 609.341, or sexual performance as defined in section 617.246; and
(c) "solicit" means commanding, entreating, or attempting to persuade a specific person in person, by telephone, by letter, or by computerized or other electronic means.
Subd. 2.Prohibited act.
A person 18 years of age or older who solicits a child or someone the person reasonably believes is a child to engage in sexual conduct with intent to engage in sexual conduct is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 4.
Subd. 2a.Electronic solicitation of children.
A person 18 years of age or older who uses the Internet, a computer, computer program, computer network, computer system, an electronic communications system, or a telecommunications, wire, or radio communications system, or other electronic device capable of electronic data storage or transmission to commit any of the following acts, with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person, is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 4:
(1) soliciting a child or someone the person reasonably believes is a child to engage in sexual conduct;
(2) engaging in communication with a child or someone the person reasonably believes is a child, relating to or describing sexual conduct; or
(3) distributing any material, language, or communication, including a photographic or video image, that relates to or describes sexual conduct to a child or someone the person reasonably believes is a child.
Subd. 2b.Jurisdiction.
A person may be convicted of an offense under subdivision 2a if the transmission that constitutes the offense either originates within this state or is received within this state.
(a) Mistake as to age is not a defense to a prosecution under this section.
(b) The fact that an undercover operative or law enforcement officer was involved in the detection or investigation of an offense under this section does not constitute a defense to a prosecution under this section.
A person convicted under subdivision 2 or 2a is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years, or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
1986 c 445 s 3; 2000 c 311 art 4 s 3,4; 2007 c 54 art 2 s 7; 2009 c 59 art 1 s 6
NOTE: Subdivision 2a, clause (2), was found unconstitutional in State v. Muccio, 881 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), petition for review granted (Minn. 2016).
A violation or attempted violation of section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, 609.3451, 609.3453, or 609.352 may be prosecuted in any jurisdiction in which the violation originates or terminates.
2000 c 311 art 4 s 5; 2005 c 136 art 4 s 9
In this section "cohabit" means to live together under the representation or appearance of being married.
Subd. 2.Acts constituting.
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of bigamy and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both:
(1) knowingly having a prior marriage that is not dissolved, contracts a marriage in this state; or
(2) contracts a marriage with another in this state with knowledge that the prior marriage of the other is not dissolved; or
(3) marries another outside this state with knowledge that either of them has a prior marriage that has not been dissolved, and then cohabits with the other in this state.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.355; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444
When a married woman has sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband, whether married or not, both are guilty of adultery and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
Subd. 2.Limitations.
No prosecution shall be commenced under this section except on complaint of the husband or the wife, except when such husband or wife lacks the mental capacity, nor after one year from the commission of the offense.
It is a defense to violation of this section if the marital status of the woman was not known to the defendant at the time of the act of adultery.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.36; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 2013 c 59 art 3 s 17
Whoever has sexual intercourse with another nearer of kin to the actor than first cousin, computed by rules of the civil law, whether of the half or the whole blood, with knowledge of the relationship, is guilty of incest and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.365; 1986 c 444
Whoever is legally obligated to provide court-ordered support to a spouse or child, whether or not the child's custody has been granted to another, and knowingly omits and fails to do so is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
Subd. 2.Gross misdemeanor violation.
A person who violates subdivision 1 is guilty of a gross misdemeanor and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both, if:
(1) the violation continues for a period in excess of 90 days but not more than 180 days; or
(2) the person is in arrears in court-ordered child support or maintenance payments, or both, in an amount equal to or greater than six times but less than nine times the person's total monthly support and maintenance payments.
Subd. 2a.Felony violation.
A person who violates subdivision 1 is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both, if:
(1) the violation continues for a period in excess of 180 days; or
(2) the person is in arrears in court-ordered child support or maintenance payments, or both, in an amount equal to or greater than nine times the person's total monthly support and maintenance payments.
Subd. 2b.Attempt to obtain contempt order as prerequisite to prosecution.
A person may not be charged with violating this section unless there has been an attempt to obtain a court order holding the person in contempt for failing to pay support or maintenance under chapter 518 or 518A. This requirement is satisfied by a showing that reasonable attempts have been made at service of the order.
[Repealed, 1997 c 203 art 6 s 93; 1997 c 245 art 1 s 34]
A person who violates this section may be prosecuted and tried in the county in which the support obligor resides or in the county in which the obligee or the child resides.
Subd. 7.Conditions of work release; probation violation.
Upon conviction under this section, a defendant may obtain work release only upon the imposition of an automatic income withholding order, and may be required to post a bond in avoidance of jail time and conditioned upon payment of all court-ordered support owed. Nonpayment of court-ordered support is a violation of any probation granted following conviction under subdivision 2a.
It is an affirmative defense to criminal liability under this section if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the omission and failure to provide court-ordered support were with lawful excuse.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.375; 1971 c 23 s 44; 1971 c 507 s 1; 1976 c 2 s 151; 1981 c 31 s 19; 1993 c 340 s 54,55; 1994 c 630 art 11 s 17-20; 1995 c 257 art 3 s 15; 1997 c 245 art 1 s 31; 2001 c 158 s 7-11; 2004 c 228 art 1 s 72; 2005 c 164 s 29; 1Sp2005 c 7 s 28; 2014 c 242 s 1-3
Subdivision 1.Applicability.
A person is eligible for a discharge and dismissal under this section, if the person:
(1) has not been previously convicted of a felony under the laws of this state or elsewhere;
(2) has not been previously convicted of a violation of section 609.375 or of a similar offense in this state or elsewhere;
(3) has not previously participated in or completed a diversion program relating to a charge of violating section 609.375; and
(4) has not previously been placed on probation without a judgment of guilty for violation of section 609.375.
Subd. 2.Procedure.
For a person eligible under subdivision 1 who is charged with violating section 609.375, the court may after trial or upon a plea of guilty, without entering a judgment of guilty and with the consent of the person, defer further proceedings and place the person on probation upon such reasonable conditions as it may require and for a period not to exceed the maximum sentence provided for the violation. At a minimum, the conditions must require the defendant to:
(1) provide the public authority responsible for child support enforcement with an affidavit attesting to the defendant's present address, occupation, employer, current income, assets, and account information, as defined in section 13B.06; and
(2) execute a written payment agreement regarding both current support and arrearages that is approved by the court.
In determining whether to approve a payment agreement under clause (2), the court shall apply the provisions of chapter 518A consistent with the obligor's ability to pay.
Subd. 3.Violation.
Upon violation of a condition of the probation, including a failure to comply with the written payment agreement approved by the court under subdivision 2, clause (2), the court may enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise provided in law.
Subd. 4.Early dismissal.
The court may, in its discretion, dismiss the proceedings against the person and discharge the person from probation before the expiration of the maximum period prescribed for the person's probation but may do so only if the full amount of any arrearages has been brought current.
Subd. 5.Dismissal; record.
(a) For purposes of this subdivision, "not public" has the meaning given in section 13.02, subdivision 8a.
(b) If during the period of probation the person does not violate any of the conditions of the probation, then upon expiration of the period the court shall discharge the person and dismiss the proceedings against that person. Discharge and dismissal under this subdivision shall be without court adjudication of guilt, but a not public record of it shall be retained by the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension for the purpose of use by the courts in determining the merits of subsequent proceedings against the person. The not public record may also be opened only upon court order for purposes of a criminal investigation, prosecution, or sentencing. Upon request by law enforcement, prosecution, or corrections authorities, the bureau shall notify the requesting party of the existence of the not public record and the right to seek a court order to open it pursuant to this section. The court shall forward a record of any discharge and dismissal under this section to the bureau which shall make and maintain the not public record of it as provided under this section. The discharge or dismissal shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime or for any other purpose.
2001 c 158 s 12; 2005 c 164 s 29; 1Sp2005 c 7 s 28
Subdivision 1.Terms defined.
For the purposes of sections 609.255 and 609.376 to 609.38, the following terms have the meanings given unless specific content indicates otherwise.
Subd. 2.Child.
"Child" means any person under the age of 18 years.
Subd. 3.Caretaker.
"Caretaker" means an individual who has responsibility for the care of a child as a result of a family relationship or who has assumed responsibility for all or a portion of the care of a child.
Subd. 4.Complainant.
"Complainant" means a person alleged to have been a victim of a violation of section 609.255, subdivision 3, 609.377, or 609.378, but need not be the person who signs the complaint.
Subdivision 1.Malicious punishment.
A parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who, by an intentional act or a series of intentional acts with respect to a child, evidences unreasonable force or cruel discipline that is excessive under the circumstances is guilty of malicious punishment of a child and may be sentenced as provided in subdivisions 2 to 6.
If the punishment results in less than substantial bodily harm, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
Subd. 3.Enhancement to a felony.
Whoever violates the provisions of subdivision 2 during the time period between a previous conviction or adjudication for delinquency under this section or sections 609.221 to 609.2231, 609.224, 609.2242, 609.342 to 609.345, or 609.713, and the end of five years following discharge from sentence or disposition for that conviction or adjudication may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of $10,000, or both.
Subd. 4.Felony; child under age four.
If the punishment is to a child under the age of four and causes bodily harm to the head, eyes, neck, or otherwise causes multiple bruises to the body, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of $10,000, or both.
Subd. 5.Felony; substantial bodily harm.
If the punishment results in substantial bodily harm, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Subd. 6.Felony; great bodily harm.
If the punishment results in great bodily harm, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.
1983 c 217 s 4; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1988 c 655 s 2; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 16; 1990 c 542 s 18; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 37; 2000 c 437 s 14
Subdivision 1.Persons guilty of neglect or endangerment.
(a)(1) A parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who willfully deprives a child of necessary food, clothing, shelter, health care, or supervision appropriate to the child's age, when the parent, guardian, or caretaker is reasonably able to make the necessary provisions and the deprivation harms or is likely to substantially harm the child's physical, mental, or emotional health is guilty of neglect of a child and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both. If the deprivation results in substantial harm to the child's physical, mental, or emotional health, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both. If a parent, guardian, or caretaker responsible for the child's care in good faith selects and depends upon spiritual means or prayer for treatment or care of disease or remedial care of the child, this treatment or care is "health care," for purposes of this clause.
(2) A parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who knowingly permits the continuing physical or sexual abuse of a child is guilty of neglect of a child and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
(b) A parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who endangers the child's person or health by:
(1) intentionally or recklessly causing or permitting a child to be placed in a situation likely to substantially harm the child's physical, mental, or emotional health or cause the child's death; or
(2) knowingly causing or permitting the child to be present where any person is selling, manufacturing, possessing immediate precursors or chemical substances with intent to manufacture, or possessing a controlled substance, as defined in section 152.01, subdivision 4, in violation of section 152.021, 152.022, 152.023, 152.024, or 152.0262; is guilty of child endangerment and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
If the endangerment results in substantial harm to the child's physical, mental, or emotional health, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
This paragraph does not prevent a parent, legal guardian, or caretaker from causing or permitting a child to engage in activities that are appropriate to the child's age, stage of development, and experience, or from selecting health care as defined in subdivision 1, paragraph (a).
(c) A person who intentionally or recklessly causes a child under 14 years of age to be placed in a situation likely to substantially harm the child's physical health or cause the child's death as a result of the child's access to a loaded firearm is guilty of child endangerment and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
If the endangerment results in substantial harm to the child's physical health, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
It is a defense to a prosecution under subdivision 1, paragraph (a), clause (2), or paragraph (b), that at the time of the neglect or endangerment there was a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the defendant that acting to stop or prevent the neglect or endangerment would result in substantial bodily harm to the defendant or the child in retaliation.
1983 c 217 s 5; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1989 c 282 art 2 s 199; 1992 c 571 art 4 s 11; 1993 c 326 art 4 s 22; 2002 c 314 s 6; 2005 c 136 art 7 s 21
A person may leave a newborn with an employee at a safe place, as defined in section 145.902, in this state pursuant to section 260C.139, subdivision 4, without being subjected to prosecution for that act, provided that:
(1) the newborn was born within seven days of being left at the safe place, as determined within a reasonable degree of medical certainty;
(2) the newborn is left in an unharmed condition; and
(3) in cases where the person leaving the newborn is not the newborn's mother, the person has the mother's approval to do so.
2000 c 421 s 3; 2012 c 216 art 2 s 3; art 6 s 13
Subdivision 1.Reasonable force.
Reasonable force may be used upon or toward the person of a child without the child's consent when the following circumstance exists or the actor reasonably believes it to exist:
(a) when used by a parent, legal guardian, teacher, or other caretaker of a child or pupil, in the exercise of lawful authority, to restrain or correct the child or pupil; or
(b) when used by a teacher or other member of the instructional, support, or supervisory staff of a public or nonpublic school upon or toward a child when necessary to restrain the child from self-injury or injury to any other person or property.
This section applies to sections 260B.425, 260C.425, 609.255, 609.376, 609.378, and 626.556.
1983 c 217 s 6; 1985 c 266 s 4; 1986 c 444; 1990 c 542 s 19; 1999 c 139 art 4 s 2
For any violation of section 609.255, subdivision 3, 609.377, or 609.378 for which the Sentencing Guidelines establish a presumptive executed sentence, the court may stay imposition or execution of the sentence if it finds that a stay is in the best interest of the complainant or the family unit and that the defendant is willing to participate in any necessary or appropriate treatment. In determining an appropriate sentence when there is a family relationship between the complainant and the defendant, the court shall be guided by the policy of preserving and strengthening the family unit whenever possible.
"Levying war" includes an act of war or an insurrection of several persons with intent to prevent, by force and intimidation, the execution of a statute of the state, or to force its repeal. It does not include either a conspiracy to commit an act of war or a single instance of resistance for a private purpose to the execution of a law.
Any person owing allegiance to this state who does either of the following is guilty of treason against this state and shall be sentenced to life imprisonment:
(1) levies war against this state; or
(2) adheres to the enemies of this state, giving them aid and comfort.
Subd. 3.Testimony required.
No person shall be convicted of treason except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on the person's confession in open court.
Whoever, owing allegiance to this state and having knowledge of the commission of treason against this state, does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make it known to the governor or a judge of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or district court, is guilty of misprision of treason against this state and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.39; 1983 c 247 s 208; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11
Whoever, when the United States is at war, does either of the following may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $35,000, or both:
(1) intentionally makes or conveys false reports or statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of this state; or
(2) intentionally causes or incites insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces of this state, or obstructs the recruiting or enlistment service of this state.
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if the person intentionally and without authorization of the adjutant general enters or is present on the Camp Ripley Military Reservation.
A person is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to not more than five years imprisonment or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both, if:
(1) the person intentionally enters or is present in an area at the Camp Ripley Military Reservation that is posted by order of the adjutant general as restricted for weapon firing or other hazardous military activity; and
(2) the person knows that doing so creates a risk of death, bodily harm, or serious property damage.
1989 c 5 s 3; 1989 c 290 art 7 s 12
In this section "flag" means anything which is or purports to be the Stars and Stripes, the United States shield, the United States coat of arms, the Minnesota state flag, or a copy, picture, or representation of any of them.
Subd. 2.Acts prohibited.
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1) intentionally and publicly mutilates, defiles, or casts contempt upon the flag; or
(2) places on or attaches to the flag any word, mark, design, or advertisement not properly a part of such flag or exposes to public view a flag so altered; or
(3) manufactures or exposes to public view an article of merchandise or a wrapper or receptacle for merchandise upon which the flag is depicted; or
(4) uses the flag for commercial advertising purposes.
Subd. 3.Exceptions.
This section does not apply to flags depicted on written or printed documents or periodicals or on stationery, ornaments, pictures, or jewelry, provided there are not unauthorized words or designs on such flags and provided the flag is not connected with any advertisement.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.40; 1971 c 23 s 45
Whoever, in making any statement, oral or written, which is required or authorized by law to be made as a basis of imposing, reducing, or abating any tax or assessment, intentionally makes any statement as to any material matter which the maker of the statement knows is false may be sentenced, unless otherwise provided by law, to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
As used in sections 609.415 to 609.465, and 609.515,
(1) "Public officer" means:
(a) an executive or administrative officer of the state or of a county, municipality or other subdivision or agency of the state;
(b) a member of the legislature or of a governing board of a county, municipality, or other subdivision of the state, or other governmental instrumentality within the state;
(c) a judicial officer;
(d) a hearing officer;
(e) a law enforcement officer; or
(f) any other person exercising the functions of a public officer.
(2) "Public employee" means a person employed by or acting for the state or a county, municipality, or other subdivision or governmental instrumentality of the state for the purpose of exercising their respective powers and performing their respective duties, and who is not a public officer. Public employee includes a member of a charter commission.
(3) "Judicial officer" means a judge, court commissioner, referee, or any other person appointed by a judge or court to hear or determine a cause or controversy.
(4) "Hearing officer" means any person authorized by law or private agreement to hear or determine a cause or controversy who is not a judicial officer.
(5) "Political subdivision" means a county, town, statutory or home rule charter city, school district, special service district, or other municipal corporation of the state of Minnesota.
Subd. 2.Deemed officer or employee.
A person who has been elected, appointed, or otherwise designated as a public officer or public employee is deemed such officer or employee although the person has not yet qualified therefor or entered upon the duties thereof.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.415; 1983 c 359 s 88; 1986 c 444; 1992 c 592 s 16; 2002 c 352 s 13
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of bribery and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both:
(1) offers, gives, or promises to give, directly or indirectly, to any person who is a public officer or employee any benefit, reward or consideration to which the person is not legally entitled with intent thereby to influence the person's performance of the powers or duties as such officer or employee; or
(2) being a public officer or employee, requests, receives or agrees to receive, directly or indirectly, any such benefit, reward or consideration upon the understanding that it will have such an influence; or
(3) offers, gives, or promises to give, directly or indirectly any such benefit, reward, or consideration to a person who is a witness or about to become a witness in a proceeding before a judicial or hearing officer, with intent that the person's testimony be influenced thereby, or that the person will not appear at the proceeding; or
(4) as a person who is, or is about to become such witness requests, receives, or agrees to receive, directly or indirectly, any such benefit, reward, or consideration upon the understanding that the person's testimony will be so influenced, or that the person will not appear at the proceeding; or
(5) accepts directly or indirectly a benefit, reward or consideration upon an agreement or understanding, express or implied, that the acceptor will refrain from giving information that may lead to the prosecution of a crime or purported crime or that the acceptor will abstain from, discontinue, or delay prosecution therefor, except in a case where a compromise is allowed by law.
Subd. 2.Forfeiture of office.
Any public officer who is convicted of violating or attempting to violate subdivision 1 shall forfeit the public officer's office and be forever disqualified from holding public office under the state.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.42; 1976 c 178 s 2; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444
Whoever by menace, deception, concealment of facts, or other corrupt means, attempts to influence the vote or other performance of duty of any member of the legislature or person elected thereto may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
A public officer or employee who does any of the following, for which no other sentence is specifically provided by law, may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both:
(1) intentionally fails or refuses to perform a known mandatory, nondiscretionary, ministerial duty of the office or employment within the time or in the manner required by law; or
(2) in the capacity of such officer or employee, does an act knowing it is in excess of lawful authority or knowing it is forbidden by law to be done in that capacity; or
(3) under pretense or color of official authority intentionally and unlawfully injures another in the other's person, property, or rights; or
(4) in the capacity of such officer or employee, makes a return, certificate, official report, or other like document having knowledge it is false in any material respect.
Whoever intentionally performs the functions of a public officer without having executed and duly filed the required security is guilty of a misdemeanor.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.435; 1971 c 23 s 46
Whoever intentionally and without lawful right thereto, exercises a function of a public office or, having held such office and the right thereto having ceased, refuses to surrender the office or its seal, books, papers, or other incidents to a successor or other authority entitled thereto may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
Whoever receives money on behalf of or for the account of the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions and intentionally refuses or omits to pay the same to the state or its agency or subdivision entitled thereto, or to an officer or agent authorized to receive the same, may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.445; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 17
Whoever is a public officer or public employee and under color of office or employment intentionally asks, receives, or agrees to receive a fee or other compensation in excess of that allowed by law or where no such fee or compensation is allowed, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.45; 1971 c 23 s 47; 1986 c 444
A public officer or employee who audits, allows, or pays any claim or demand made upon the state or subdivision thereof or other governmental instrumentality within the state which the public officer or employee knows is false or fraudulent in whole or in part, may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Subdivision 1.State auditor; police; firefighters; teachers.
Whenever a public employee or public officer of a political subdivision, charter commission, or local public pension plan governed by sections 424A.091 to 424A.096 or chapter 354A, discovers evidence of theft, embezzlement, unlawful use of public funds or property, or misuse of public funds by a charter commission or any person authorized to expend public funds, the employee or officer shall promptly report to law enforcement and shall promptly report in writing to the state auditor a detailed description of the alleged incident or incidents. Notwithstanding chapter 13 or any other statute related to the classification of government data, the public employee or public officer shall provide data or information related to the alleged incident or incidents to the state auditor and law enforcement, including data classified as not public.
Subd. 2.Legislative auditor.
Whenever an employee or officer of the state, University of Minnesota, or other organization listed in section 3.971, subdivision 6, discovers evidence of theft, embezzlement, or unlawful use of public funds or property, the employee or officer shall, except when to do so would knowingly impede or otherwise interfere with an ongoing criminal investigation, promptly report in writing to the legislative auditor a detailed description of the alleged incident or incidents.
1992 c 592 s 17; 1999 c 99 s 21,23; 2002 c 352 s 14; 2013 c 35 s 1; 2013 c 111 art 5 s 80
Whoever, with intent to defraud, presents a claim or demand, with knowledge that it is false in whole or in part, for audit, allowance or payment to a public officer or body authorized to make such audit, allowance or payment is guilty of an attempt to commit theft of public funds and may be sentenced accordingly.
Any person who, with the intent to defraud, presents a claim for reimbursement, a cost report or a rate application, relating to the payment of medical assistance funds pursuant to chapter 256B, to the state agency, which is false in whole or in part, is guilty of an attempt to commit theft of public funds and may be sentenced accordingly.
Whoever intentionally takes, damages, or destroys any personal property held in custody by an officer or other person under process of law may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
Whoever falsely impersonates a police or military officer or public official with intent to mislead another into believing that the impersonator is actually such officer or official is guilty of a misdemeanor.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.475; 1971 c 23 s 49; 1986 c 444
Whoever makes a false material statement not believing it to be true in any of the following cases is guilty of perjury and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 4:
(1) in or for an action, hearing or proceeding of any kind in which the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath or affirmation;
(2) in any writing which is required or authorized by law to be under oath or affirmation;
(3) in any writing made according to section 358.115;
(4) in any writing made according to section 358.116; or
(5) in any other case in which the penalties for perjury are imposed by law and no specific sentence is otherwise provided.
Subd. 2.Defenses not available.
It is not a defense to a violation of this section that:
(1) the oath or affirmation was taken or administered in an irregular manner; or
(2) the declarant was not competent to give the statement; or
(3) the declarant did not know that the statement was material or believed it to be immaterial; or
(4) the statement was not used or, if used, did not affect the proceeding for which it was made; or
(5) the statement was inadmissible under the law of evidence.
Subd. 3.Inconsistent statements.
When the declarant has made two inconsistent statements under such circumstances that one or the other must be false and not believed by the declarant when made, it shall be sufficient for conviction under this section to charge and the jury to find that, without determining which, one or the other of such statements was false and not believed by the declarant. The period of limitations for prosecution under this subdivision runs from the first such statement.
Whoever violates this section may be sentenced as follows:
(1) if the false statement was made upon the trial of a felony charge, or upon an application for an explosives license or use permit, to imprisonment for not more than seven years or to payment of a fine of not more than $14,000, or both; or
(2) in all other cases, to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.48; 1971 c 845 s 16; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 18; 2010 c 295 s 2; 2014 c 204 s 9
"Escape" includes departure without lawful authority and failure to return to custody following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period.
Whoever does any of the following may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 4:
(1) escapes while held pursuant to a lawful arrest, in lawful custody on a charge or conviction of a crime, or while held in lawful custody on an allegation or adjudication of a delinquent act;
(2) transfers to another, who is in lawful custody on a charge or conviction of a crime, or introduces into an institution in which the latter is confined, anything usable in making such escape, with intent that it shall be so used;
(3) having another in lawful custody on a charge or conviction of a crime, intentionally permits the other to escape;
(4) escapes while in a facility designated under section 253B.18, subdivision 1, pursuant to a court commitment order after a finding of not guilty by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency of a crime against the person, as defined in section 253B.02, subdivision 4a. Notwithstanding section 609.17, no person may be charged with or convicted of an attempt to commit a violation of this clause;
(5) escapes while in or under the supervision of a facility designated under section 246B.01, subdivision 2a; 246B.02; 253B.18, subdivision 1; 253D.07, subdivision 3; or Minnesota Statutes 1992, section 526.10;
(6) escapes while on pass status or provisional discharge according to section 253B.18 or chapter 253D; or
(7) escapes while a civilly committed sex offender in the Minnesota sex offender program as defined in section 246B.01, subdivision 1a, or subject to a court hold order under chapter 253D.
For purposes of clauses (1) and (7), "escapes while held in lawful custody" or "escapes while a civilly committed sex offender in the Minnesota sex offender program" includes absconding from electronic monitoring or removing an electronic monitoring device from the person's body.
This section does not apply to a person who is free on bail or who is on parole or probation, or subject to a stayed sentence or stayed execution of sentence, unless the person (1) has been taken into actual custody upon revocation of the parole, probation, or stay of the sentence or execution of sentence, (2) is in custody in a county jail or workhouse as a condition of a stayed sentence, or (3) is subject to electronic monitoring as a condition of parole, probation, or supervised release.
Subd. 3a.Dismissal of charge.
A felony charge brought under subdivision 2, clause (4) shall be dismissed if the person charged voluntarily returns to the facility within 30 days after a reasonable effort has been made to provide written notice to the person that failure to return within 30 days may result in felony charges being filed.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision 3a, whoever violates this section may be sentenced as follows:
(1) if the person who escapes is in lawful custody for a felony, to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both;
(2) if the person who escapes is in lawful custody after a finding of not guilty by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency of a crime against the person, as defined in section 253B.02, subdivision 4a, to imprisonment for not more than one year and one day or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both;
(3) if the person who escapes is in lawful custody for a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, or if the person who escapes is in lawful custody on an allegation or adjudication of a delinquent act, to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both;
(4) if the person who escapes is under civil commitment under section 253B.18, to imprisonment for not more than one year and one day or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both; or
(5) if the person who escapes is under a court hold, civil commitment, or supervision under chapter 253D, Minnesota Statutes 2012, section 253B.185, or Minnesota Statutes 1992, section 526.10, to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
(b) If the escape was a violation of subdivision 2, clause (1), (2), or (3), and was effected by violence or threat of violence against a person, the sentence may be increased to not more than twice those permitted in paragraph (a), clauses (1) and (3).
(c) Unless a concurrent term is specified by the court, a sentence under this section shall be consecutive to any sentence previously imposed or which may be imposed for any crime or offense for which the person was in custody when the person escaped.
(d) Notwithstanding paragraph (c), if a person who was committed to the commissioner of corrections under section 260B.198 escapes from the custody of the commissioner while 18 years of age, the person's sentence under this section shall commence on the person's 19th birthday or on the person's date of discharge by the commissioner of corrections, whichever occurs first. However, if the person described in this clause is convicted under this section after becoming 19 years old and after having been discharged by the commissioner, the person's sentence shall commence upon imposition by the sentencing court.
(e) Notwithstanding paragraph (c), if a person who is in lawful custody on an allegation or adjudication of a delinquent act while 18 years of age escapes from a local juvenile correctional facility, the person's sentence under this section begins on the person's 19th birthday or on the person's date of discharge from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, whichever occurs first. However, if the person described in this paragraph is convicted after becoming 19 years old and after discharge from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the person's sentence begins upon imposition by the sentencing court.
(f) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), any person who escapes or absconds from electronic monitoring or removes an electric monitoring device from the person's body is guilty of a crime and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to a payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both. A person in lawful custody for a violation of section 609.185, 609.19, 609.195, 609.20, 609.205, 609.2112, 609.2113, 609.2114, 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, 609.2231, 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, 609.3451, or civil commitment under chapter 253D, or Minnesota Statutes 2012, section 609.21, and who escapes or absconds from electronic monitoring or removes an electronic monitoring device while under sentence may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to a payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.485; 1969 c 248 s 1; 1971 c 23 s 50; 1982 c 557 s 10; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 385 s 1-3; 1986 c 444; 1988 c 515 s 2,3; 1990 c 499 s 7,8; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 38,39; 1995 c 226 art 2 s 20,21; 1996 c 305 art 1 s 120,121; 1996 c 408 art 3 s 28,29; 1999 c 139 art 4 s 2; 2000 c 441 s 2,3; 2002 c 314 s 7,8; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 26,27; 2006 c 260 art 1 s 24,25; 2009 c 111 s 14,15; 2011 c 76 art 1 s 66; 2011 c 102 art 2 s 3; 2013 c 49 s 22; 2014 c 180 s 9
A person who commits or attempts to commit a gross misdemeanor or felony while wearing or possessing a bullet-resistant vest is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both. Notwithstanding section 609.04, a prosecution for or conviction under this section is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.
As used in this section, "bullet-resistant vest" means a bullet-resistant garment that provides ballistic and trauma protection.
Subdivision 1.Flee; definition.
For purposes of this section, the term "flee" means to increase speed, extinguish motor vehicle headlights or taillights, refuse to stop the vehicle, or use other means with intent to attempt to elude a peace officer following a signal given by any peace officer to the driver of a motor vehicle.
Subd. 2.Peace officer; definition.
For purposes of this section, "peace officer" means:
(1) an employee of a political subdivision or state law enforcement agency who is licensed by the Minnesota Board of Peace Officer Standards and Training, charged with the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of the general criminal laws of the state and who has the full power of arrest, and shall also include the Minnesota State Patrol and Minnesota conservation officers;
(2) an employee of a law enforcement agency of a federally recognized tribe, as defined in United States Code, title 25, section 450b(e), who is licensed by the Minnesota Board of Peace Officer Standards and Training; or
(3) a member of a duly organized state, county, or municipal law enforcement unit of another state charged with the duty to prevent and detect crime and generally enforce criminal laws, and granted full powers of arrest.
Subd. 2a.Motor vehicle; definition.
For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" has the meaning given it in section 169.011, subdivision 42, and includes a snowmobile, as defined in section 84.81, off-road recreational vehicles as defined in section 169A.03, subdivision 16, and motorboats as defined in section 169A.03, subdivision 13.
Subd. 3.Fleeing officer; motor vehicle.
Whoever by means of a motor vehicle flees or attempts to flee a peace officer who is acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty, and the perpetrator knows or should reasonably know the same to be a peace officer, is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years and one day or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
Subd. 4.Fleeing officer; death; bodily injury.
Whoever flees or attempts to flee by means of a motor vehicle a peace officer who is acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty, and the perpetrator knows or should reasonably know the same to be a peace officer, and who in the course of fleeing in a motor vehicle or subsequently by other means causes the death of a human being not constituting murder or manslaughter or any bodily injury to any person other than the perpetrator may be sentenced to imprisonment as follows:
(a) if the course of fleeing results in death, to imprisonment for not more than 40 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $80,000, or both; or
(b) if the course of fleeing results in great bodily harm, to imprisonment for not more than seven years or to payment of a fine of not more than $14,000, or both; or
(c) if the course of fleeing results in substantial bodily harm, to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Subd. 5.Revocation; fleeing peace officer offense.
When a person is convicted of operating a motor vehicle in violation of subdivision 3 or 4, or an ordinance in conformity with those subdivisions, the court shall notify the commissioner of public safety and order the commissioner to revoke the driver's license of the person.
Subd. 6.Fleeing, other than vehicle.
Whoever, for the purpose of avoiding arrest, detention, or investigation, or in order to conceal or destroy potential evidence related to the commission of a crime, attempts to evade or elude a peace officer, who is acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty, by means of running, hiding, or by any other means except fleeing in a motor vehicle, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
1981 c 37 s 2; 1981 c 312 s 4; 1984 c 445 s 2,3; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1984 c 655 art 1 s 78; 1986 c 444; 1988 c 712 s 6; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 19; 1990 c 449 s 1; 1996 c 408 art 3 s 30; 1997 c 226 s 44; 1997 c 239 art 3 s 13; 1Sp1997 c 2 s 64; 2000 c 411 s 1,2; 2000 c 478 art 2 s 7; 1Sp2001 c 8 art 8 s 23; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 28; 2011 c 32 s 1
Subdivision 1.Felony offenders.
(a) A person charged with or convicted of a felony and released from custody, with or without bail or recognizance, who intentionally fails to appear when required after having been notified that a failure to appear for a court appearance is a criminal offense, or after having been released on an order or condition that the releasee personally appear when required with respect to the charge or conviction, is guilty of a crime for failure to appear and may be sentenced to not more than one-half of the maximum term of imprisonment or fine, or both, provided for the underlying crime for which the person failed to appear, but this maximum sentence shall, in no case, be less than a term of imprisonment of one year and one day or a fine of $1,500, or both.
(b) A felony charge under this subdivision may be filed upon the person's nonappearance. However, the charge must be dismissed if the person who fails to appear voluntarily surrenders within 48 hours after the time required for appearance. This paragraph does not apply if the offender appears as a result of being apprehended by law enforcement authorities.
Subd. 1a.Juvenile offenders.
(a) A person who intentionally fails to appear for a juvenile court disposition is guilty of a felony if:
(1) the person was prosecuted in juvenile court for an offense that would have been a felony if committed by an adult;
(2) the juvenile court made findings pursuant to an admission in court or after trial;
(3) the person was released from custody on condition that the person appear in the juvenile court for a disposition in connection with the offense; and
(4) the person was notified that failure to appear is a criminal offense.
(b) A person who violates the provisions of this subdivision is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Subd. 2.Gross misdemeanor and misdemeanor offenders.
A person charged with a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor who intentionally fails to appear in court for trial on the charge after having been notified that a failure to appear for a court appearance is a criminal offense, or after having been released on an order or condition that the releasee personally appear for trial when required with respect to the charge, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
If proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it is an affirmative defense to a violation of subdivision 1, 1a, or 2 that the person's failure to appear in court as required was due to circumstances beyond the person's control.
Subd. 4.Prosecution.
A violation of this section is prosecuted by the prosecuting authority who was responsible for prosecuting the offense in connection with which the person failed to appear in court.
Subd. 5.Reimbursement for costs.
Upon conviction of a defendant for a violation of subdivision 1 or 2, the court may order as part of the sentence that the defendant pay the costs incurred by the prosecuting authority or governmental agency due to the defendant's failure to appear. The court may order this payment in addition to any other penalty authorized by law which it may impose. A defendant shall pay the entire amount of any restitution ordered and fine imposed before paying costs ordered under this subdivision. The order for payment of these costs may be enforced in the same manner as the sentence, or by execution against property. When collected, the costs must be paid into the treasury of the county of conviction.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.49; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444; 1989 c 333 s 4; 1994 c 576 s 47,48; 1998 c 367 art 2 s 16; 1999 c 28 s 1-3
Subdivision 1.Considered guilty plea.
If a person fails to appear in court on a charge that is a petty misdemeanor, the failure to appear is considered a plea of guilty and waiver of the right to trial, unless the person appears in court within ten days and shows that the person's failure to appear was due to circumstances beyond the person's control.
Subd. 2.Notice.
A complaint charging a person with a petty misdemeanor must include a conspicuous notice of the provisions of subdivision 1.
A person is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 2 if the person solicits a mentally impaired person to commit a criminal act.
(a) A person who violates subdivision 1 is guilty of a misdemeanor if the intended criminal act is a misdemeanor, and is guilty of a gross misdemeanor if the intended criminal act is a gross misdemeanor.
(b) A person who violates subdivision 1 is guilty of a felony if the intended criminal act is a felony, and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one-half the statutory maximum term for the intended criminal act or to payment of a fine of not more than one-half the maximum fine for the intended criminal act, or both.
Subd. 3.Definitions.
(1) "mentally impaired person" means a person who, as a result of inadequately developed or impaired intelligence or a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought or mood, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent to commit the criminal act; and
(2) "solicit" means commanding, entreating, or attempting to persuade a specific person.
A person is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 2 if the person is an adult and solicits or conspires with a minor to commit a crime or delinquent act or is an accomplice to a minor in the commission of a crime or delinquent act.
(a) A person who violates subdivision 1 is guilty of a misdemeanor if the intended criminal act is a misdemeanor or would be a misdemeanor if committed by an adult, and is guilty of a gross misdemeanor if the intended criminal act is a gross misdemeanor or would be a gross misdemeanor if committed by an adult.
(b) A person who violates subdivision 1 is guilty of a felony if the intended criminal act is a felony or would be a felony if committed by an adult, and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one-half the statutory maximum term for the intended criminal act or to payment of a fine of not more than one-half the maximum fine for the intended criminal act, or both.
Subd. 3.Multiple sentences.
Notwithstanding section 609.04, a prosecution for or conviction under this section is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.
Notwithstanding any provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, the court may provide that a sentence imposed for a violation of this section shall run consecutively to any sentence imposed for the intended criminal act. A decision by the court to impose consecutive sentences under this subdivision is not a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.
"Solicit" means commanding, entreating, or attempting to persuade a specific person.
Subdivision 1.Definition of crime.
(a) Whoever harbors, conceals, aids, or assists by word or acts another whom the actor knows or has reason to know has committed a crime under the laws of this or another state or of the United States with intent that such offender shall avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment, may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both if the crime committed or attempted by the other person is a felony.
(b) Whoever knowingly harbors, conceals, or aids a person who is on probation, parole, or supervised release because of a felony level conviction and for whom an arrest and detention order has been issued, with intent that the person evade or escape being taken into custody under the order, may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both. As used in this paragraph, "arrest and detention order" means a written order to take and detain a probationer, parolee, or supervised releasee that is issued under section 243.05, subdivision 1; 244.195; or 401.025.
Subd. 3.Obstructing investigation.
Whoever intentionally aids another person whom the actor knows or has reason to know has committed a criminal act, by destroying or concealing evidence of that crime, providing false or misleading information about that crime, receiving the proceeds of that crime, or otherwise obstructing the investigation or prosecution of that crime is an accomplice after the fact and may be sentenced to not more than one-half of the statutory maximum sentence of imprisonment or to payment of a fine of not more than one-half of the maximum fine that could be imposed on the principal offender for the crime of violence. For purposes of this subdivision, "criminal act" means an act that is a crime listed in section 609.11, subdivision 9, under the laws of this or another state, or of the United States, and also includes an act that would be a criminal act if committed by an adult.
Subd. 4.Taking responsibility for criminal acts.
(a) Unless the person is convicted of the underlying crime, a person who assumes responsibility for a criminal act with the intent to obstruct, impede, or prevent a criminal investigation may be sentenced to not more than one-half of the statutory maximum sentence of imprisonment or to payment of a fine of not more than one-half of the maximum fine that could be imposed on the principal offender for the criminal act.
(b) Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to impair the right of any individual or group to engage in speech protected by the United States Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution.
An offense committed under subdivision 1 or 3 may be prosecuted in:
(1) the county where the aiding or obstructing behavior occurred; or
(2) the county where the underlying criminal act occurred.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.495; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444; 1993 c 326 art 4 s 25; 1997 c 239 art 3 s 14; art 9 s 51; 1Sp2001 c 8 art 8 s 24,25; 2002 c 348 s 2; 2006 c 260 art 1 s 26; 2016 c 158 art 1 s 204
A person is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced under subdivision 2 if the person:
(1) conducts a transaction involving a monetary instrument or instruments with a value exceeding $5,000; and
(2) knows or has reason to know that the monetary instrument or instruments represent the proceeds of, or are derived from the proceeds of, the commission of a felony under this chapter or chapter 152 or an offense in another jurisdiction that would be a felony under this chapter or chapter 152 if committed in Minnesota.
A person convicted under subdivision 1 may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years, or to payment of a fine of not more than $100,000, or both.
Subd. 3.Monetary instrument.
For purposes of this section, "monetary instrument" means United States currency and coin; the currency and coin of a foreign country; a bank check, cashier's check, traveler's check, money order, stock, investment security, or negotiable instrument in bearer form or otherwise in the form by which title to the instrument passes upon delivery; gold, silver, or platinum bullion or coins; and diamonds, emeralds, rubies, or sapphires.
Subd. 4.Payment of reasonable attorney fees.
Subdivision 1 does not preclude the payment or receipt of reasonable attorney fees.
A person is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced under subdivision 2 if the person knowingly initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, supervises, or otherwise engages in a business that has as a primary or secondary purpose concealing money or property that was gained as a direct result of the commission of a felony under this chapter or chapter 152, or of an offense committed in another jurisdiction that would be a felony under this chapter or chapter 152 if committed in Minnesota.
A person convicted under subdivision 1 may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000,000, or both.
Whoever, having knowledge that a subpoena has been issued under sections 8.16 and 388.23, and with intent to obstruct, impede, or prevent the investigation for which the subpoena was issued, gives notice or attempts to give notice of the issuance of the subpoena or the production of the documents to a person, may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Subdivision 1.Electronic communication.
Whoever, having knowledge that an investigative or law enforcement officer has been authorized or has applied for authorization under chapter 626A to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, and with intent to obstruct, impede, or prevent interception, gives notice or attempts to give notice of the possible interception to a person, may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Subd. 2.Pen register.
Whoever, having knowledge that an investigative or law enforcement officer has been authorized or has applied for authorization under chapter 626A to install and use a pen register or a trap and trace device, and with intent to obstruct, impede, or prevent the purposes for which the installation and use is being made, gives notice or attempts to give notice of the installation or use to any person, may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Subd. 3.Search warrant.
Whoever, having knowledge that a peace officer has been issued or has applied for the issuance of a search warrant, and with intent to obstruct, impede, or prevent the search, gives notice or attempts to give notice of the search or search warrant to any person, may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Subdivision 1.Tampering with witness in the first degree.
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of tampering with a witness in the first degree and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 1a:
(a) intentionally prevents or dissuades or intentionally attempts to prevent or dissuade by means of force or threats of injury to any person or property, a person who is or may become a witness from attending or testifying at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law;
(b) by means of force or threats of injury to any person or property, intentionally coerces or attempts to coerce a person who is or may become a witness to testify falsely at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law;
(c) intentionally causes injury or threatens to cause injury to any person or property in retaliation against a person who was summoned as a witness at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law, within a year following that trial, proceeding, or inquiry or within a year following the actor's release from incarceration, whichever is later;
(d) intentionally prevents or dissuades or attempts to prevent or dissuade, by means of force or threats of injury to any person or property, a person from providing information to law enforcement authorities concerning a crime;
(e) by means of force or threats of injury to any person or property, intentionally coerces or attempts to coerce a person to provide false information concerning a crime to law enforcement authorities; or
(f) intentionally causes injury or threatens to cause injury to any person or property in retaliation against a person who has provided information to law enforcement authorities concerning a crime within a year of that person providing the information or within a year of the actor's release from incarceration, whichever is later.
Subd. 1a.Penalty.
Whoever violates subdivision 1 may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine not to exceed $10,000.
Subd. 1b.Aggravated first-degree witness tampering.
(a) A person is guilty of aggravated first-degree witness tampering if the person causes or, by means of an implicit or explicit credible threat, threatens to cause great bodily harm or death to another in the course of committing any of the following acts intentionally:
(1) preventing or dissuading or attempting to prevent or dissuade a person who is or may become a witness from attending or testifying at any criminal trial or proceeding;
(2) coercing or attempting to coerce a person who is or may become a witness to testify falsely at any criminal trial or proceeding;
(3) retaliating against a person who was summoned as a witness at any criminal trial or proceeding within a year following that trial or proceeding or within a year following the actor's release from incarceration, whichever is later;
(4) preventing or dissuading or attempting to prevent or dissuade a person from providing information to law enforcement authorities concerning a crime;
(5) coercing or attempting to coerce a person to provide false information concerning a crime to law enforcement authorities; or
(6) retaliating against any person who has provided information to law enforcement authorities concerning a crime within a year of that person providing the information or within a year of the actor's release from incarceration, whichever is later.
(b) A person convicted of committing any act prohibited by paragraph (a) may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.
Subd. 2.Tampering with a witness in the second degree.
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of tampering with a witness in the second degree and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 3:
(a) intentionally prevents or dissuades or intentionally attempts to prevent or dissuade by means of any act described in section 609.27, subdivision 1, clause (3), (4), or (5), a person who is or may become a witness from attending or testifying at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law;
(b) by means of any act described in section 609.27, subdivision 1, clause (3), (4), or (5), intentionally coerces or attempts to coerce a person who is or may become a witness to testify falsely at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law;
(c) intentionally prevents or dissuades or attempts to prevent or dissuade by means of any act described in section 609.27, subdivision 1, clause (3), (4), or (5), a person from providing information to law enforcement authorities concerning a crime; or
(d) by means of any act described in section 609.27, subdivision 1, clause (3), (4), or (5), intentionally coerces or attempts to coerce a person to provide false information concerning a crime to law enforcement authorities.
Subd. 2a.Tampering with a witness in the third degree.
(a) Unless a greater penalty is applicable under subdivision 1, 1b, or 2, whoever does any of the following is guilty of tampering with a witness in the third degree and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 3:
(1) intentionally prevents or dissuades or intentionally attempts to prevent or dissuade by means of intimidation, a person who is or may become a witness from attending or testifying at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law;
(2) by means of intimidation, intentionally influences or attempts to influence a person who is or may become a witness to testify falsely at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law;
(3) intentionally prevents or dissuades or attempts to prevent or dissuade by means of intimidation, a person from providing information to law enforcement authorities concerning a crime; or
(4) by means of intimidation, intentionally influences or attempts to influence a person to provide false information concerning a crime to law enforcement authorities.
(b) In a prosecution under this subdivision, proof of intimidation may be based on a specific act or on the totality of the circumstances.
(a) Whoever violates subdivision 2 is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
(b) Whoever violates subdivision 2a is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Subd. 4.No bar to conviction.
Notwithstanding section 609.035 or 609.04, a prosecution for or conviction of the crime of aggravated first-degree witness tampering is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime.
1976 c 178 s 1; 1983 c 262 art 2 s 6; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1987 c 194 s 1,2; 1995 c 244 s 18; 1997 c 239 art 3 s 15,16; 2010 c 299 s 6,7
Whoever intentionally does any of the following may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 2:
(1) obstructs, hinders, or prevents the lawful execution of any legal process, civil or criminal, or apprehension of another on a charge or conviction of a criminal offense;
(2) obstructs, resists, or interferes with a peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties;
(3) interferes with or obstructs a firefighter while the firefighter is engaged in the performance of official duties;
(4) interferes with or obstructs a member of an ambulance service personnel crew, as defined in section 144E.001, subdivision 3a, who is providing, or attempting to provide, emergency care; or
(5) by force or threat of force endeavors to obstruct any employee of the Department of Revenue while the employee is lawfully engaged in the performance of official duties for the purpose of deterring or interfering with the performance of those duties.
A person convicted of violating subdivision 1 may be sentenced as follows:
(1) if (i) the person knew or had reason to know that the act created a risk of death, substantial bodily harm, or serious property damage; or (ii) the act caused death, substantial bodily harm, or serious property damage; to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both;
(2) if the act was accompanied by force or violence or the threat thereof, and is not otherwise covered by clause (1), to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both; or
(3) in other cases, to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.50; 1969 c 1013 s 1; 1971 c 23 s 51; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444; 1986 c 470 s 18; 1988 c 584 s 1; 1989 c 5 s 4; 1991 c 103 s 1; 1998 c 367 art 2 s 17; 2004 c 228 art 1 s 72; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 29; 2008 c 304 s 1
(a) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the meanings given.
(b) "Family or household" has the meaning given to family or household member in section 518B.01, subdivision 2.
(c) "Funeral ceremony" has the meaning given in section 149A.02, subdivision 18.
(d) "Funeral procession" means two or more motor vehicles that identify themselves by using regular lights and by keeping themselves in close formation, one of which contains the body of a deceased person, enroute to or from a funeral ceremony or a graveside service.
(e) "Graveside service" has the meaning given in section 149A.02, subdivision 24.
(f) "Memorial service" has the meaning given in section 149A.02, subdivision 28.
(g) "Targeted residential picketing" has the meaning given in section 609.748, subdivision 1, paragraph (c), but does not require more than one act or that acts be committed on more than one occasion.
Subd. 2.Crime to disrupt.
(a) Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1) with intent to disrupt a funeral ceremony, graveside service, or memorial service, protests or pickets within 500 feet of the burial site or the entrance to a facility or location being used for the service or ceremony, within one hour prior to, during, or one hour following the service or ceremony;
(2) with intent to disrupt a funeral procession, impedes or attempts to impede a vehicle that is part of the procession;
(3) intentionally blocks or attempts to block access to a funeral ceremony, graveside service, or memorial service; or
(4) knowingly engages in targeted residential picketing at the home or domicile of any surviving member of the deceased person's family or household on the date of the funeral ceremony, graveside service, or memorial service.
(b) Whoever is convicted of a violation of paragraph (a) following a previous conviction for a violation of paragraph (a) or a similar statute from another state or the United States is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Subd. 3.Civil remedy.
A person who violates subdivision 2 is liable to a surviving member of the deceased person's family or household for damages caused by the violation. A surviving member of the deceased person's family or household may also bring an action for injunctive relief and other appropriate relief or remedial compensation. In an action brought under this subdivision, a prevailing plaintiff may recover attorney fees.
Subdivision 1.Concealing evidence.
A person is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced under subdivision 1a if the person interferes with the body or scene of death with intent to:
(1) conceal the body;
(2) conceal evidence; or
(3) otherwise mislead the coroner or medical examiner.
A person convicted under subdivision 1, clause (2) or (3), is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. A person convicted under subdivision 1, clause (1), may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to a payment of a fine of not more than $5,000 or both.
Subd. 2.Failure to report.
(a) A person in charge of a cemetery who has knowledge that the body of a deceased person interred in the cemetery has been unlawfully removed shall:
(1) immediately report the occurrence to local law enforcement authorities; and
(2) inform the next of kin of the deceased person, if known, within three business days of the discovery of the body's removal unless the person making the report has been instructed in writing by law enforcement authorities that informing the next of kin would compromise an active law enforcement investigation.
(b) A person who violates paragraph (a), clause (1) or (2), is guilty of a misdemeanor.
1976 c 257 s 2; 1990 c 402 s 2; 2016 c 175 s 1,2
As used in this section, "defensive device" includes a firearm; a dangerous weapon; an authorized tear gas compound, as defined in section 624.731, subdivision 1; an electronic incapacitation device, as defined in section 624.731, subdivision 1; a club or baton; and any item issued by a peace officer's employer to the officer to assist in the officer's protection.
Subd. 2.Crime described.
Whoever intentionally takes possession of a defensive device being carried by a peace officer or from the area within the officer's immediate control, without the officer's consent while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties, is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 3.
A person who violates this section is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years, payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Subdivision 1.False reporting.
Whoever informs a law enforcement officer that a crime has been committed or otherwise provides information to an on-duty peace officer, knowing that the person is a peace officer, regarding the conduct of others, knowing that it is false and intending that the officer shall act in reliance upon it, is guilty of a misdemeanor. A person who is convicted a second or subsequent time under this section is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Subd. 2.Reporting police misconduct.
(a) Whoever informs, or causes information to be communicated to, a peace officer, whose responsibilities include investigating or reporting police misconduct, that a peace officer, as defined in section 626.84, subdivision 1, paragraph (c), has committed an act of police misconduct, knowing that the information is false, is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced as follows:
(1) up to the maximum provided for a misdemeanor if the false information does not allege a criminal act; or
(2) up to the maximum provided for a gross misdemeanor if the false information alleges a criminal act.
(b) The court shall order any person convicted of a violation of this subdivision to make full restitution of all reasonable expenses incurred in the investigation of the false allegation unless the court makes a specific written finding that restitution would be inappropriate under the circumstances. A restitution award may not exceed $3,000.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.505; 1971 c 23 s 52; 1993 c 326 art 4 s 26; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 30
Whoever uses the criminal alert network under section 299A.61 to disseminate information regarding the commission of a crime knowing that it is false or misleading, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Whoever with intent to obstruct justice gives a fictitious name other than a nickname, or gives a false date of birth, or false or fraudulently altered identification card to a peace officer, as defined in section 626.84, subdivision 1, paragraph (c), when that officer makes inquiries incident to a lawful investigatory stop or lawful arrest, or inquiries incident to executing any other duty imposed by law, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Subd. 2.Name of another; gross misdemeanor.
Whoever with intent to obstruct justice gives the name and date of birth of another person to a peace officer, as defined in subdivision 1, when the officer makes inquiries incident to a lawful investigatory stop or lawful arrest, or inquiries incident to executing any other duty imposed by law, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Subd. 3.Fictitious name; gross misdemeanor.
Whoever in any criminal proceeding with intent to obstruct justice gives a fictitious name, other than a nickname, or gives a false date of birth to a court official is guilty of a misdemeanor. Whoever in any criminal proceeding with intent to obstruct justice gives the name and date of birth of another person to a court official is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. "Court official" includes a judge, referee, court administrator, or any employee of the court.
1987 c 127 s 1; 1988 c 681 s 17; 1989 c 209 art 1 s 45; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 40
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor who:
(1) informs another person that a person has committed sexual abuse, physical abuse, or neglect of a child, as defined in section 626.556, subdivision 2;
(2) knows that the allegation is false or is without reason to believe that the alleged abuser committed the abuse or neglect; and
(3) has the intent that the information influence a child custody hearing.
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if the person informs a financial institution, orally or in writing, that one or more of the person's blank checks or debit cards have been lost or stolen, knowing or having reason to know that the information is false.
Subdivision 1.Acts prohibited.
(1) sends or delivers to another any document which simulates a summons, complaint, or court process with intent thereby to induce payment of a claim; or
(2) prints, distributes, or offers for sale any such document knowing or intending that it shall be so used.
This section does not prohibit the printing, distribution or sale of blank forms of legal documents for use in judicial proceedings.
Whoever does any of the following, when the act is not in violation of section 609.42, is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1) being a judicial or hearing officer, does either of the following:
(a) agrees with or promises another to determine a cause or controversy or issue pending or to be brought before the officer for or against any party; or
(b) intentionally obtains or receives and uses information relating thereto contrary to the regular course of the proceeding; and
(2) induces a judicial or hearing officer to act contrary to the provisions of this section.
(1) "Property" means all forms of tangible property, whether real or personal, without limitation including documents of value, electricity, gas, water, corpses, domestic animals, dogs, pets, fowl, and heat supplied by pipe or conduit by municipalities or public utility companies and articles, as defined in clause (4), representing trade secrets, which articles shall be deemed for the purposes of Extra Session Laws 1967, chapter 15 to include any trade secret represented by the article.
(2) "Movable property" is property whose physical location can be changed, including without limitation things growing on, affixed to, or found in land.
(3) "Value" means the retail market value at the time of the theft, or if the retail market value cannot be ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the theft, or in the case of a theft or the making of a copy of an article representing a trade secret, where the retail market value or replacement cost cannot be ascertained, any reasonable value representing the damage to the owner which the owner has suffered by reason of losing an advantage over those who do not know of or use the trade secret. For a check, draft, or other order for the payment of money, "value" means the amount of money promised or ordered to be paid under the terms of the check, draft, or other order. For a theft committed within the meaning of subdivision 2, clause (5), items (i) and (ii), if the property has been restored to the owner, "value" means the value of the use of the property or the damage which it sustained, whichever is greater, while the owner was deprived of its possession, but not exceeding the value otherwise provided herein. For a theft committed within the meaning of subdivision 2, clause (9), if the property has been restored to the owner, "value" means the rental value of the property, determined at the rental rate contracted by the defendant or, if no rental rate was contracted, the rental rate customarily charged by the owner for use of the property, plus any damage that occurred to the property while the owner was deprived of its possession, but not exceeding the total retail value of the property at the time of rental.
(4) "Article" means any object, material, device or substance, including any writing, record, recording, drawing, sample specimen, prototype, model, photograph, microorganism, blueprint or map, or any copy of any of the foregoing.
(5) "Representing" means describing, depicting, containing, constituting, reflecting or recording.
(6) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
(7) "Copy" means any facsimile, replica, photograph or other reproduction of an article, and any note, drawing, or sketch made of or from an article while in the presence of the article.
(8) "Property of another" includes property in which the actor is co-owner or has a lien, pledge, bailment, or lease or other subordinate interest, property transferred by the actor in circumstances which are known to the actor and which make the transfer fraudulent as defined in section 513.44, property possessed pursuant to a short-term rental contract, and property of a partnership of which the actor is a member, unless the actor and the victim are husband and wife. It does not include property in which the actor asserts in good faith a claim as a collection fee or commission out of property or funds recovered, or by virtue of a lien, setoff, or counterclaim.
(9) "Services" include but are not limited to labor, professional services, transportation services, electronic computer services, the supplying of hotel accommodations, restaurant services, entertainment services, advertising services, telecommunication services, and the supplying of equipment for use including rental of personal property or equipment.
(10) "Motor vehicle" means a self-propelled device for moving persons or property or pulling implements from one place to another, whether the device is operated on land, rails, water, or in the air.
(11) "Motor fuel" has the meaning given in section 604.15, subdivision 1.
(12) "Retailer" has the meaning given in section 604.15, subdivision 1.
Subd. 2.Acts constituting theft.
(a) Whoever does any of the following commits theft and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 3:
(1) intentionally and without claim of right takes, uses, transfers, conceals or retains possession of movable property of another without the other's consent and with intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession of the property; or
(2) with or without having a legal interest in movable property, intentionally and without consent, takes the property out of the possession of a pledgee or other person having a superior right of possession, with intent thereby to deprive the pledgee or other person permanently of the possession of the property; or
(3) obtains for the actor or another the possession, custody, or title to property of or performance of services by a third person by intentionally deceiving the third person with a false representation which is known to be false, made with intent to defraud, and which does defraud the person to whom it is made. "False representation" includes without limitation:
(i) the issuance of a check, draft, or order for the payment of money, except a forged check as defined in section 609.631, or the delivery of property knowing that the actor is not entitled to draw upon the drawee therefor or to order the payment or delivery thereof; or
(ii) a promise made with intent not to perform. Failure to perform is not evidence of intent not to perform unless corroborated by other substantial evidence; or
(iii) the preparation or filing of a claim for reimbursement, a rate application, or a cost report used to establish a rate or claim for payment for medical care provided to a recipient of medical assistance under chapter 256B, which intentionally and falsely states the costs of or actual services provided by a vendor of medical care; or
(iv) the preparation or filing of a claim for reimbursement for providing treatment or supplies required to be furnished to an employee under section 176.135 which intentionally and falsely states the costs of or actual treatment or supplies provided; or
(v) the preparation or filing of a claim for reimbursement for providing treatment or supplies required to be furnished to an employee under section 176.135 for treatment or supplies that the provider knew were medically unnecessary, inappropriate, or excessive; or
(4) by swindling, whether by artifice, trick, device, or any other means, obtains property or services from another person; or
(5) intentionally commits any of the acts listed in this subdivision but with intent to exercise temporary control only and:
(i) the control exercised manifests an indifference to the rights of the owner or the restoration of the property to the owner; or
(ii) the actor pledges or otherwise attempts to subject the property to an adverse claim; or
(iii) the actor intends to restore the property only on condition that the owner pay a reward or buy back or make other compensation; or
(6) finds lost property and, knowing or having reasonable means of ascertaining the true owner, appropriates it to the finder's own use or to that of another not entitled thereto without first having made reasonable effort to find the owner and offer and surrender the property to the owner; or
(7) intentionally obtains property or services, offered upon the deposit of a sum of money or tokens in a coin or token operated machine or other receptacle, without making the required deposit or otherwise obtaining the consent of the owner; or
(8) intentionally and without claim of right converts any article representing a trade secret, knowing it to be such, to the actor's own use or that of another person or makes a copy of an article representing a trade secret, knowing it to be such, and intentionally and without claim of right converts the same to the actor's own use or that of another person. It shall be a complete defense to any prosecution under this clause for the defendant to show that information comprising the trade secret was rightfully known or available to the defendant from a source other than the owner of the trade secret; or
(9) leases or rents personal property under a written instrument and who:
(i) with intent to place the property beyond the control of the lessor conceals or aids or abets the concealment of the property or any part thereof; or
(ii) sells, conveys, or encumbers the property or any part thereof without the written consent of the lessor, without informing the person to whom the lessee sells, conveys, or encumbers that the same is subject to such lease or rental contract with intent to deprive the lessor of possession thereof; or
(iii) does not return the property to the lessor at the end of the lease or rental term, plus agreed-upon extensions, with intent to wrongfully deprive the lessor of possession of the property; or
(iv) returns the property to the lessor at the end of the lease or rental term, plus agreed-upon extensions, but does not pay the lease or rental charges agreed upon in the written instrument, with intent to wrongfully deprive the lessor of the agreed-upon charges.
For the purposes of items (iii) and (iv), the value of the property must be at least $100.
Evidence that a lessee used a false, fictitious, or not current name, address, or place of employment in obtaining the property or fails or refuses to return the property or pay the rental contract charges to lessor within five days after written demand for the return has been served personally in the manner provided for service of process of a civil action or sent by certified mail to the last known address of the lessee, whichever shall occur later, shall be evidence of intent to violate this clause. Service by certified mail shall be deemed to be complete upon deposit in the United States mail of such demand, postpaid and addressed to the person at the address for the person set forth in the lease or rental agreement, or, in the absence of the address, to the person's last known place of residence; or
(10) alters, removes, or obliterates numbers or symbols placed on movable property for purpose of identification by the owner or person who has legal custody or right to possession thereof with the intent to prevent identification, if the person who alters, removes, or obliterates the numbers or symbols is not the owner and does not have the permission of the owner to make the alteration, removal, or obliteration; or
(11) with the intent to prevent the identification of property involved, so as to deprive the rightful owner of possession thereof, alters or removes any permanent serial number, permanent distinguishing number or manufacturer's identification number on personal property or possesses, sells or buys any personal property knowing or having reason to know that the permanent serial number, permanent distinguishing number or manufacturer's identification number has been removed or altered; or
(12) intentionally deprives another of a lawful charge for cable television service by:
(i) making or using or attempting to make or use an unauthorized external connection outside the individual dwelling unit whether physical, electrical, acoustical, inductive, or other connection; or by
(ii) attaching any unauthorized device to any cable, wire, microwave, or other component of a licensed cable communications system as defined in chapter 238. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the electronic video rerecording of program material transmitted on the cable communications system by a subscriber for fair use as defined by Public Law 94-553, section 107; or
(13) except as provided in clauses (12) and (14), obtains the services of another with the intention of receiving those services without making the agreed or reasonably expected payment of money or other consideration; or
(14) intentionally deprives another of a lawful charge for telecommunications service by:
(i) making, using, or attempting to make or use an unauthorized connection whether physical, electrical, by wire, microwave, radio, or other means to a component of a local telecommunication system as provided in chapter 237; or
(ii) attaching an unauthorized device to a cable, wire, microwave, radio, or other component of a local telecommunication system as provided in chapter 237.
The existence of an unauthorized connection is prima facie evidence that the occupier of the premises:
(A) made or was aware of the connection; and
(B) was aware that the connection was unauthorized;
(15) with intent to defraud, diverts corporate property other than in accordance with general business purposes or for purposes other than those specified in the corporation's articles of incorporation; or
(16) with intent to defraud, authorizes or causes a corporation to make a distribution in violation of section 302A.551, or any other state law in conformity with it; or
(17) takes or drives a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner or an authorized agent of the owner, knowing or having reason to know that the owner or an authorized agent of the owner did not give consent; or
(18) intentionally, and without claim of right, takes motor fuel from a retailer without the retailer's consent and with intent to deprive the retailer permanently of possession of the fuel by driving a motor vehicle from the premises of the retailer without having paid for the fuel dispensed into the vehicle.
(b) Proof that the driver of a motor vehicle into which motor fuel was dispensed drove the vehicle from the premises of the retailer without having paid for the fuel permits the factfinder to infer that the driver acted intentionally and without claim of right, and that the driver intended to deprive the retailer permanently of possession of the fuel. This paragraph does not apply if: (1) payment has been made to the retailer within 30 days of the receipt of notice of nonpayment under section 604.15; or (2) a written notice as described in section 604.15, subdivision 4, disputing the retailer's claim, has been sent. This paragraph does not apply to the owner of a motor vehicle if the vehicle or the vehicle's license plate has been reported stolen before the theft of the fuel.
Whoever commits theft may be sentenced as follows:
(1) to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $100,000, or both, if the property is a firearm, or the value of the property or services stolen is more than $35,000 and the conviction is for a violation of subdivision 2, clause (3), (4), (15), or (16), or section 609.2335, subdivision 1, clause (1) or (2), item (i); or
(2) to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both, if the value of the property or services stolen exceeds $5,000, or if the property stolen was an article representing a trade secret, an explosive or incendiary device, or a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II pursuant to section 152.02 with the exception of marijuana; or
(3) to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both, if any of the following circumstances exist:
(a) the value of the property or services stolen is more than $1,000 but not more than $5,000; or
(b) the property stolen was a controlled substance listed in Schedule III, IV, or V pursuant to section 152.02; or
(c) the value of the property or services stolen is more than $500 but not more than $1,000 and the person has been convicted within the preceding five years for an offense under this section, section 256.98; 268.182; 609.24; 609.245; 609.53; 609.582, subdivision 1, 2, or 3; 609.625; 609.63; 609.631; or 609.821, or a statute from another state, the United States, or a foreign jurisdiction, in conformity with any of those sections, and the person received a felony or gross misdemeanor sentence for the offense, or a sentence that was stayed under section 609.135 if the offense to which a plea was entered would allow imposition of a felony or gross misdemeanor sentence; or
(d) the value of the property or services stolen is not more than $1,000, and any of the following circumstances exist:
(i) the property is taken from the person of another or from a corpse, or grave or coffin containing a corpse; or
(ii) the property is a record of a court or officer, or a writing, instrument or record kept, filed or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public officer or office; or
(iii) the property is taken from a burning, abandoned, or vacant building or upon its removal therefrom, or from an area of destruction caused by civil disaster, riot, bombing, or the proximity of battle; or
(iv) the property consists of public funds belonging to the state or to any political subdivision or agency thereof; or
(v) the property stolen is a motor vehicle; or
(4) to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both, if the value of the property or services stolen is more than $500 but not more than $1,000; or
(5) in all other cases where the value of the property or services stolen is $500 or less, to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or both, provided, however, in any prosecution under subdivision 2, clauses (1), (2), (3), (4), and (13), the value of the money or property or services received by the defendant in violation of any one or more of the above provisions within any six-month period may be aggregated and the defendant charged accordingly in applying the provisions of this subdivision; provided that when two or more offenses are committed by the same person in two or more counties, the accused may be prosecuted in any county in which one of the offenses was committed for all of the offenses aggregated under this paragraph.
Subd. 3a.Enhanced penalty.
If a violation of this section creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of bodily harm to another, the penalties described in subdivision 3 are enhanced as follows:
(1) if the penalty is a misdemeanor or a gross misdemeanor, the person is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both; and
(2) if the penalty is a felony, the statutory maximum sentence for the offense is 50 percent longer than for the underlying crime.
Subd. 4.Wrongfully obtained public assistance; consideration of disqualification.
When determining the sentence for a person convicted of theft by wrongfully obtaining public assistance, as defined in section 256.98, subdivision 1, the court shall consider the fact that, under section 256.98, subdivision 8, the person will be disqualified from receiving public assistance as a result of the person's conviction.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.52; 1967 c 178 s 1; Ex1967 c 15 s 1-3; 1971 c 23 s 55; 1971 c 25 s 92; 1971 c 697 s 1; 1971 c 717 s 1; 1971 c 796 s 1; 1971 c 845 s 14; 1975 c 244 s 1; 1976 c 112 s 1; 1976 c 188 s 6; 1977 c 396 s 1; 1978 c 674 s 60; 1979 c 258 s 15; 1981 c 120 s 1; 1981 c 299 s 1; 1983 c 238 s 1; 1983 c 331 s 10; 1984 c 419 s 1; 1984 c 466 s 1; 1984 c 483 s 1; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 5; 1985 c 243 s 7,8; 1986 c 378 s 1; 1986 c 435 s 10; 1986 c 444; 1987 c 254 s 9; 1987 c 329 s 8-10; 1988 c 712 s 7; 1989 c 290 art 7 s 5; 1991 c 279 s 32; 1991 c 292 art 5 s 80; 1992 c 510 art 2 s 14; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 41; 1995 c 244 s 20; 1996 c 408 art 3 s 31,32; 1997 c 66 s 79; 1997 c 239 art 3 s 17; 1998 c 367 art 2 s 18; 1999 c 76 s 1,2; 1999 c 218 s 2; 2004 c 228 art 1 s 72; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 31; 2007 c 54 art 2 s 8,9; 2009 c 119 s 9; 2012 c 173 s 5,6
(a) As used in this section, an "electronic article surveillance system" means any electronic device or devices that are designed to detect the unauthorized removal of marked merchandise from a store.
(b) Whoever has in possession any device, gear, or instrument designed to assist in shoplifting or defeating an electronic article surveillance system with intent to use the same to shoplift and thereby commit theft may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
1975 c 314 s 1; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444; 1Sp2001 c 8 art 8 s 26
Subdivision 1.Photographic record.
Photographs of property, as defined in section 609.52, subdivision 1, over which a person is alleged to have exerted unauthorized control or to have otherwise obtained unlawfully, are competent evidence if the photographs are admissible into evidence under all rules of law governing the admissibility of photographs into evidence. The photographic record, when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the property itself.
Subd. 2.Record of property.
The photographs may bear a written description of the property alleged to have been wrongfully taken, the name of the owner of the property taken, the name of the accused, the name of the arresting law enforcement officer, the date of the photograph, and the signature of the photographer.
Subd. 3.Return of property.
A law enforcement agency which is holding property over which a person is alleged to have exerted unauthorized control or to have otherwise obtained unlawfully may return that property to its owner if:
(1) the appropriately identified photographs are filed and retained by the law enforcement agency;
(2) satisfactory proof of ownership of the property is shown by the owner;
(3) a declaration of ownership is signed under penalty of perjury; and
(4) a receipt for the property is obtained from the owner upon delivery by the law enforcement agency.
Subd. 4.Examination of property.
If the recovered property has a value in excess of $150, then the owner shall retain possession for at least 14 days to allow the defense attorney to examine the property.
Whoever brings property into the state which the actor has stolen outside the state, or received outside of the state knowing it to have been stolen, may be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of section 609.52, subdivision 3. The actor may be charged, indicted, and tried in any county, but not more than one county, into or through which the actor has brought such property.
Subd. 2.Defining stolen property.
Property is stolen within the meaning of this section if the act by which the owner was deprived of property was a criminal offense under the laws of the state in which the act was committed and would constitute a theft under this chapter if the act had been committed in this state.
(1) "precious metal dealer" has the meaning given in section 325F.731, subdivision 2; and
(2) "scrap metal dealer" has the meaning given in section 325E.21, subdivision 1.
Any precious metal dealer or scrap metal dealer or any person employed by a dealer, who receives, possesses, transfers, buys, or conceals any stolen property or property obtained by robbery, knowing or having reason to know the property was stolen or obtained by robbery, may be sentenced as follows:
(1) if the value of the property received, bought, or concealed is $1,000 or more, to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $50,000, or both;
(2) if the value of the property received, bought, or concealed is less than $1,000 but more than $500, to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $25,000, or both;
(3) if the value of the property received, bought, or concealed is $500 or less, to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
Any person convicted of violating this section a second or subsequent time within a period of one year may be sentenced as provided in clause (1).
1989 c 290 art 7 s 6; 2004 c 228 art 1 s 72; 2007 c 54 art 2 s 10
(a) As used in this section, the following terms have the meanings given them in this subdivision.
(b) "Direct victim" means any person or entity described in section 611A.01, paragraph (b), whose identity has been transferred, used, or possessed in violation of this section.
(c) "False pretense" means any false, fictitious, misleading, or fraudulent information or pretense or pretext depicting or including or deceptively similar to the name, logo, Web site address, e-mail address, postal address, telephone number, or any other identifying information of a for-profit or not-for-profit business or organization or of a government agency, to which the user has no legitimate claim of right.
(d) "Identity" means any name, number, or data transmission that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual or entity, including any of the following:
(1) a name, Social Security number, date of birth, official government-issued driver's license or identification number, government passport number, or employer or taxpayer identification number;
(2) unique electronic identification number, address, account number, or routing code; or
(3) telecommunication identification information or access device.
(e) "Indirect victim" means any person or entity described in section 611A.01, paragraph (b), other than a direct victim.
(f) "Loss" means value obtained, as defined in section 609.52, subdivision 1, clause (3), and expenses incurred by a direct or indirect victim as a result of a violation of this section.
(g) "Unlawful activity" means:
(1) any felony violation of the laws of this state or any felony violation of a similar law of another state or the United States; and
(2) any nonfelony violation of the laws of this state involving theft, theft by swindle, forgery, fraud, or giving false information to a public official, or any nonfelony violation of a similar law of another state or the United States.
(h) "Scanning device" means a scanner, reader, or any other electronic device that is used to access, read, scan, obtain, memorize, or store, temporarily or permanently, information encoded on a computer chip or magnetic strip or stripe of a payment card, driver's license, or state-issued identification card.
(i) "Reencoder" means an electronic device that places encoded information from the computer chip or magnetic strip or stripe of a payment card, driver's license, or state-issued identification card, onto the computer chip or magnetic strip or stripe of a different payment card, driver's license, or state-issued identification card, or any electronic medium that allows an authorized transaction to occur.
(j) "Payment card" means a credit card, charge card, debit card, or any other card that:
(1) is issued to an authorized card user; and
(2) allows the user to obtain, purchase, or receive credit, money, a good, a service, or anything of value.
A person who transfers, possesses, or uses an identity that is not the person's own, with the intent to commit, aid, or abet any unlawful activity is guilty of identity theft and may be punished as provided in subdivision 3.
(1) if the offense involves a single direct victim and the total, combined loss to the direct victim and any indirect victims is $250 or less, the person may be sentenced as provided in section 609.52, subdivision 3, clause (5);
(2) if the offense involves a single direct victim and the total, combined loss to the direct victim and any indirect victims is more than $250 but not more than $500, the person may be sentenced as provided in section 609.52, subdivision 3, clause (4);
(3) if the offense involves two or three direct victims or the total, combined loss to the direct and indirect victims is more than $500 but not more than $2,500, the person may be sentenced as provided in section 609.52, subdivision 3, clause (3);
(4) if the offense involves more than three but not more than seven direct victims, or if the total combined loss to the direct and indirect victims is more than $2,500, the person may be sentenced as provided in section 609.52, subdivision 3, clause (2); and
(5) if the offense involves eight or more direct victims; or if the total, combined loss to the direct and indirect victims is more than $35,000; or if the offense is related to possession or distribution of pornographic work in violation of section 617.246 or 617.247; the person may be sentenced as provided in section 609.52, subdivision 3, clause (1).
Subd. 4.Restitution; items provided to victim.
(a) A direct or indirect victim of an identity theft crime shall be considered a victim for all purposes, including any rights that accrue under chapter 611A and rights to court-ordered restitution.
(b) The court shall order a person convicted of violating subdivision 2 to pay restitution of not less than $1,000 to each direct victim of the offense.
(c) Upon the written request of a direct victim or the prosecutor setting forth with specificity the facts and circumstances of the offense in a proposed order, the court shall provide to the victim, without cost, a certified copy of the complaint filed in the matter, the judgment of conviction, and an order setting forth the facts and circumstances of the offense.
Subd. 5.Reporting.
(a) A person who has learned or reasonably suspects that a person is a direct victim of a crime under subdivision 2 may initiate a law enforcement investigation by contacting the local law enforcement agency that has jurisdiction where the person resides, regardless of where the crime may have occurred. The agency must prepare a police report of the matter, provide the complainant with a copy of that report, and may begin an investigation of the facts, or, if the suspected crime was committed in a different jurisdiction, refer the matter to the law enforcement agency where the suspected crime was committed for an investigation of the facts.
(b) If a law enforcement agency refers a report to the law enforcement agency where the crime was committed, it need not include the report as a crime committed in its jurisdiction for purposes of information that the agency is required to provide to the commissioner of public safety pursuant to section 299C.06.
Subd. 5a.Crime of electronic use of false pretense to obtain identity.
(a) A person who, with intent to obtain the identity of another, uses a false pretense in an e-mail to another person or in a Web page, electronic communication, advertisement, or any other communication on the Internet, is guilty of a crime.
(b) Whoever commits such offense may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
(c) In a prosecution under this subdivision, it is not a defense that:
(1) the person committing the offense did not obtain the identity of another;
(2) the person committing the offense did not use the identity; or
(3) the offense did not result in financial loss or any other loss to any person.
Subd. 5b.Unlawful possession or use of scanning device or reencoder.
(a) A person who uses a scanning device or reencoder without permission of the cardholder of the card from which the information is being scanned or reencoded, with the intent to commit, aid, or abet any unlawful activity, is guilty of a crime.
(b) A person who possesses, with the intent to commit, aid, or abet any unlawful activity, any device, apparatus, equipment, software, material, good, property, or supply that is designed or adapted for use as a scanning device or a reencoder is guilty of a crime.
(c) Whoever commits an offense under paragraph (a) or (b) may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in section 627.01, an offense committed under subdivision 2, 5a, or 5b may be prosecuted in:
(1) the county where the offense occurred;
(2) the county of residence or place of business of the direct victim or indirect victim; or
(3) in the case of a violation of subdivision 5a or 5b, the county of residence of the person whose identity was obtained or sought.
In any prosecution under subdivision 2, the value of the money or property or services the defendant receives or the number of direct or indirect victims within any six-month period may be aggregated and the defendant charged accordingly in applying the provisions of subdivision 3; provided that when two or more offenses are committed by the same person in two or more counties, the accused may be prosecuted in any county in which one of the offenses was committed for all of the offenses aggregated under this subdivision.
1999 c 244 s 2; 2000 c 354 s 3; 2003 c 106 s 1-3; 1Sp2003 c 2 art 8 s 9; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 32-36; 2010 c 293 s 2-4
(b) "Direct victim" means any person or entity described in section 611A.01, paragraph (b), from whom a check is stolen or whose name or other identifying information is contained in a counterfeit check.
(c) "Indirect victim" means any person or entity described in section 611A.01, paragraph (b), other than a direct victim.
(d) "Loss" means value obtained, as defined in section 609.52, subdivision 1, clause (3), and expenses incurred by a direct or indirect victim as a result of a violation of this section.
A person who sells, possesses, receives, or transfers a check that is stolen or counterfeit, knowing or having reason to know the check is stolen or counterfeit, is guilty of a crime and may be punished as provided in subdivision 3.
(3) if the offense involves two or three direct victims or the total, combined loss to the direct and indirect victims is more than $500 but not more than $2,500, the person may be sentenced as provided in section 609.52, subdivision 3, clause (3); and
(4) if the offense involves four or more direct victims, or if the total, combined loss to the direct and indirect victims is more than $2,500, the person may be sentenced as provided in section 609.52, subdivision 3, clause (2).
(b) "Mail" means a letter, postal card, package, bag, or other sealed article addressed to another.
(c) "Mail depository" means a mail box, letter box, or mail receptacle; a post office or station of a post office; a mail route; or a postal service vehicle.
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of mail theft and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 3:
(1) intentionally and without claim of right removes mail from a mail depository;
(2) intentionally and without claim of right takes mail from a mail carrier;
(3) obtains custody of mail by intentionally deceiving a mail carrier, or other person who rightfully possesses or controls the mail, with a false representation which is known to be false, made with intent to deceive and which does deceive a mail carrier or other person who possesses or controls the mail;
(4) intentionally and without claim of right removes the contents of mail addressed to another;
(5) intentionally and without claim of right takes mail, or the contents of mail, that has been left for collection on or near a mail depository; or
(6) receives, possesses, transfers, buys, or conceals mail obtained by acts described in clauses (1) to (5), knowing or having reason to know the mail was obtained illegally.
A person convicted under subdivision 2 may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to a payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in section 627.01, an offense committed under subdivision 2 may be prosecuted in:
(1) the county where the offense occurred; or
(2) the county of residence or place of business of the direct victim or indirect victim.
Subdivision 1.Penalty.
Except as otherwise provided in section 609.526, any person who receives, possesses, transfers, buys or conceals any stolen property or property obtained by robbery, knowing or having reason to know the property was stolen or obtained by robbery, may be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of section 609.52, subdivision 3.
Subd. 4.Civil action; treble damages.
Any person who has been injured by a violation of subdivision 1 or section 609.526 may bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages sustained by the plaintiff or $1,500, whichever is greater, and the costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees.
Subd. 5.Value.
In this section, "value" has the meaning defined in section 609.52, subdivision 1, clause (3).
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.53; 1973 c 669 s 1; 1979 c 232 s 1,2; 1981 c 333 s 14-17; 1982 c 613 s 1-4; 1984 c 483 s 2; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1987 c 384 art 1 s 46,47; 1989 c 290 art 7 s 7,8
For the purpose of sections 609.531 to 609.5318, the following terms have the meanings given them.
(a) "Conveyance device" means a device used for transportation and includes, but is not limited to, a motor vehicle, trailer, snowmobile, airplane, and vessel and any equipment attached to it. The term "conveyance device" does not include property which is, in fact, itself stolen or taken in violation of the law.
(b) "Weapon used" means a dangerous weapon as defined under section 609.02, subdivision 6, that the actor used or had in possession in furtherance of a crime.
(c) "Property" means property as defined in section 609.52, subdivision 1, clause (1).
(d) "Contraband" means property which is illegal to possess under Minnesota law.
(e) "Appropriate agency" means the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, the Department of Commerce Fraud Bureau, the Minnesota Division of Driver and Vehicle Services, the Minnesota State Patrol, a county sheriff's department, the Three Rivers Park District park rangers, the Department of Natural Resources Division of Enforcement, the University of Minnesota Police Department, the Department of Corrections Fugitive Apprehension Unit, a city, metropolitan transit, or airport police department; or a multijurisdictional entity established under section 299A.642 or 299A.681.
(f) "Designated offense" includes:
(1) for weapons used: any violation of this chapter, chapter 152 or 624;
(2) for driver's license or identification card transactions: any violation of section 171.22; and
(3) for all other purposes: a felony violation of, or a felony-level attempt or conspiracy to violate, section 325E.17; 325E.18; 609.185; 609.19; 609.195; 609.2112; 609.2113; 609.2114; 609.221; 609.222; 609.223; 609.2231; 609.2335; 609.24; 609.245; 609.25; 609.255; 609.282; 609.283; 609.322; 609.342, subdivision 1, clauses (a) to (f); 609.343, subdivision 1, clauses (a) to (f); 609.344, subdivision 1, clauses (a) to (e), and (h) to (j); 609.345, subdivision 1, clauses (a) to (e), and (h) to (j); 609.352; 609.42; 609.425; 609.466; 609.485; 609.487; 609.52; 609.525; 609.527; 609.528; 609.53; 609.54; 609.551; 609.561; 609.562; 609.563; 609.582; 609.59; 609.595; 609.611; 609.631; 609.66, subdivision 1e; 609.671, subdivisions 3, 4, 5, 8, and 12; 609.687; 609.821; 609.825; 609.86; 609.88; 609.89; 609.893; 609.895; 617.246; 617.247; or a gross misdemeanor or felony violation of section 609.891 or 624.7181; or any violation of section 609.324; or a felony violation of, or a felony-level attempt or conspiracy to violate, Minnesota Statutes 2012, section 609.21.
(g) "Controlled substance" has the meaning given in section 152.01, subdivision 4.
(h) "Prosecuting authority" means the attorney who is responsible for prosecuting an offense that is the basis for a forfeiture under sections 609.531 to 609.5318.
Subd. 1a.Construction.
Sections 609.531 to 609.5318 must be liberally construed to carry out the following remedial purposes:
(1) to enforce the law;
(2) to deter crime;
(3) to reduce the economic incentive to engage in criminal enterprise;
(4) to increase the pecuniary loss resulting from the detection of criminal activity; and
(5) to forfeit property unlawfully used or acquired and divert the property to law enforcement purposes.
Subd. 4.Seizure.
(a) Property subject to forfeiture under sections 609.531 to 609.5318 may be seized by the appropriate agency upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction over the property. Property may be seized without process if:
(1) the seizure is incident to a lawful arrest or a lawful search;
(2) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this chapter; or
(3) the appropriate agency has probable cause to believe that the delay occasioned by the necessity to obtain process would result in the removal or destruction of the property and that:
(i) the property was used or is intended to be used in commission of a felony; or
(ii) the property is dangerous to health or safety.
If property is seized without process under item (i), the prosecuting authority must institute a forfeiture action under section 609.5313 as soon as is reasonably possible.
(b) When property is seized, the officer must provide a receipt to the person found in possession of the property; or in the absence of any person, the officer must leave a receipt in the place where the property was found, if reasonably possible.
Subd. 5.Right to possession vests immediately; custody of seized property.
All right, title, and interest in property subject to forfeiture under sections 609.531 to 609.5318 vests in the appropriate agency upon commission of the act or omission giving rise to the forfeiture. Any property seized under sections 609.531 to 609.5318 is not subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of the appropriate agency subject to the orders and decrees of the court having jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings. When property is so seized, the appropriate agency shall use reasonable diligence to secure the property and prevent waste and may do any of the following:
(1) place the property under seal;
(2) remove the property to a place designated by it; and
(3) in the case of controlled substances, require the state Board of Pharmacy to take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law.
Subd. 5a.Bond by owner for possession.
(a) If the owner of property that has been seized under sections 609.531 to 609.5318 seeks possession of the property before the forfeiture action is determined, the owner may give security or post bond payable to the appropriate agency in an amount equal to the retail value of the seized property. On posting the security or bond, the seized property must be returned to the owner and the forfeiture action shall proceed against the security as if it were the seized property. This subdivision does not apply to contraband property or property being held for investigatory purposes.
(b) If the owner of a motor vehicle that has been seized under this section seeks possession of the vehicle before the forfeiture action is determined, the owner may surrender the vehicle's certificate of title in exchange for the vehicle. The motor vehicle must be returned to the owner within 24 hours if the owner surrenders the motor vehicle's certificate of title to the appropriate agency, pending resolution of the forfeiture action. If the certificate is surrendered, the owner may not be ordered to post security or bond as a condition of release of the vehicle. When a certificate of title is surrendered under this provision, the agency shall notify the Department of Public Safety and any secured party noted on the certificate. The agency shall also notify the department and the secured party when it returns a surrendered title to the motor vehicle owner.
Subd. 6a.Forfeiture a civil procedure; conviction required.
(a) An action for forfeiture is a civil in rem action and is independent of any criminal prosecution, except as provided in this subdivision.
(b) An asset is subject to forfeiture by judicial determination under sections 609.5311 to 609.5318 only if:
(1) a person is convicted of the criminal offense related to the action for forfeiture; or
(2) a person is not charged with a criminal offense under chapter 152 related to the action for forfeiture based in whole or in part on the person's agreement to provide information regarding the criminal activity of another person.
For purposes of clause (1), an admission of guilt to an offense chargeable under chapter 152, a sentence under section 152.152, a stay of adjudication under section 152.18, or a referral to a diversion program for an offense chargeable under chapter 152 is considered a conviction.
(c) The appropriate agency handling the judicial forfeiture may introduce into evidence in the judicial forfeiture case in civil court the agreement in paragraph (b), clause (2).
(d) The appropriate agency handling the judicial forfeiture bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the property is an instrument or represents the proceeds of the underlying offense.
Subd. 7.Petition for remission or mitigation.
Prior to the entry of a court order disposing with the forfeiture action, any person who has an interest in forfeited property may file with the prosecuting authority a petition for remission or mitigation of the forfeiture. The prosecuting authority may remit or mitigate the forfeiture upon terms and conditions the prosecuting authority deems reasonable if the prosecuting authority finds that: (1) the forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without any intention on the part of the petitioner to violate the law; or (2) extenuating circumstances justify the remission or mitigation of the forfeiture.
Subd. 8.Forfeiture policies; statewide model policy required.
(a) By December 1, 2010, the Peace Officer Standards and Training Board, after consulting with the Minnesota County Attorneys Association, the Minnesota Sheriffs' Association, the Minnesota Chiefs of Police Association, and the Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association, shall develop a model policy that articulates best practices for forfeiture and is designed to encourage the uniform application of forfeiture laws statewide. At a minimum, the policy shall address the following:
(1) best practices in pursuing, seizing, and tracking forfeitures;
(2) type and frequency of training for law enforcement on forfeiture laws; and
(3) situations in which forfeitures should not be pursued.
(b) By December 1, 2010, the Minnesota County Attorneys Association, after consulting with the attorney general, the Peace Officer Standards and Training Board, the Minnesota Sheriffs' Association, the Minnesota Chiefs of Police Association, and the Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association, shall develop a model policy that articulates best practices for forfeiture and is designed to encourage the uniform application of forfeiture laws statewide. At a minimum, the policy shall address the following:
(1) statutory role of prosecuting authorities in forfeiture procedures;
(2) best practices for timely and fair resolution of forfeiture cases;
(3) type and frequency of training for prosecuting authorities on forfeiture laws; and
(c) By December 1, 2010, the Minnesota County Attorneys Association and the Peace Officer Standards and Training Board shall forward an electronic copy of its respective model policy to the chairs and ranking minority members of the senate and house of representatives committees having jurisdiction over criminal justice and civil law policy.
(d) By March 1, 2011, the chief law enforcement officer of every state and local law enforcement agency and every prosecution office in the state shall adopt and implement a written policy on forfeiture that is identical or substantially similar to the model policies developed under paragraphs (a) and (b). The written policy shall be made available to the public upon request.
1984 c 625 s 1; 1985 c 160 s 2; 1Sp1985 c 16 art 2 s 15; 1986 c 351 s 17; 1986 c 444; 1986 c 446 s 4; 1987 c 267 s 2; 1988 c 665 s 5-10; 1988 c 712 s 8; 1989 c 95 s 1; 1989 c 290 art 3 s 29; 1989 c 305 s 4; 1990 c 494 s 2; 1991 c 199 art 1 s 85; 1991 c 323 s 1; 1991 c 347 art 3 s 3; 1993 c 221 s 6; 1993 c 326 art 1 s 5; art 4 s 27,28; 1994 c 636 art 3 s 11; 1999 c 142 s 1; 1999 c 244 s 3; 2000 c 354 s 5; 2004 c 295 art 1 s 16; 2005 c 82 s 12; 2005 c 136 art 13 s 8; art 17 s 37; 2008 c 287 art 1 s 112; 2008 c 363 art 6 s 10; 2010 c 383 s 4; 2010 c 391 s 7-11; 2012 c 128 s 16,17,26; 2013 c 135 art 3 s 22; 2014 c 201 s 1; 2015 c 21 art 1 s 102; 2015 c 65 art 6 s 16
Subdivision 1.Controlled substances.
All controlled substances that were manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of chapter 152 are subject to forfeiture under this section, except as provided in subdivision 3 and section 609.5316.
Subd. 2.Associated property.
(a) All property, real and personal, that has been used, or is intended for use, or has in any way facilitated, in whole or in part, the manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, cultivating, exporting, transporting, or exchanging of contraband or a controlled substance that has not been lawfully manufactured, distributed, dispensed, and acquired is subject to forfeiture under this section, except as provided in subdivision 3.
(b) The Department of Corrections Fugitive Apprehension Unit shall not seize real property for the purposes of forfeiture under paragraph (a).
Subd. 3.Limitations on forfeiture of certain property associated with controlled substances.
(a) A conveyance device is subject to forfeiture under this section only if the retail value of the controlled substance is $75 or more and the conveyance device is associated with a felony-level controlled substance crime.
(b) Real property is subject to forfeiture under this section only if the retail value of the controlled substance or contraband is $2,000 or more.
(c) Property used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier is subject to forfeiture under this section only if the owner of the property is a consenting party to, or is privy to, the use or intended use of the property as described in subdivision 2.
(d) Property is subject to forfeiture under this section only if its owner was privy to the use or intended use described in subdivision 2, or the unlawful use or intended use of the property otherwise occurred with the owner's knowledge or consent.
(e) Forfeiture under this section of a conveyance device or real property encumbered by a bona fide security interest is subject to the interest of the secured party unless the secured party had knowledge of or consented to the act or omission upon which the forfeiture is based. A person claiming a security interest bears the burden of establishing that interest by clear and convincing evidence.
(f) Forfeiture under this section of real property is subject to the interests of a good faith purchaser for value unless the purchaser had knowledge of or consented to the act or omission upon which the forfeiture is based.
(g) Notwithstanding paragraphs (d), (e), and (f), property is not subject to forfeiture based solely on the owner's or secured party's knowledge of the unlawful use or intended use of the property if: (1) the owner or secured party took reasonable steps to terminate use of the property by the offender; or (2) the property is real property owned by the parent of the offender, unless the parent actively participated in, or knowingly acquiesced to, a violation of chapter 152, or the real property constitutes proceeds derived from or traceable to a use described in subdivision 2.
(h) The Department of Corrections Fugitive Apprehension Unit shall not seize a conveyance device or real property, for the purposes of forfeiture under paragraphs (a) to (g).
Subd. 4.Records; proceeds.
(a) All books, records, and research products and materials, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data that are used, or intended for use in the manner described in subdivision 2 are subject to forfeiture.
(b) All property, real and personal, that represents proceeds derived from or traceable to a use described in subdivision 2 is subject to forfeiture.
1988 c 665 s 11; 1989 c 290 art 3 s 30; 1989 c 305 s 5,6; 1992 c 533 s 2; 1993 c 6 s 5; 1993 c 326 art 1 s 6; 2005 c 136 art 13 s 9,10; 2010 c 391 s 12
NOTE: Subdivision 2 was found unconstitutional as applied to homestead property in Torgelson v. Real Property, 749 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 2008).
Subdivision 1.Property subject to forfeiture.
(a) All personal property is subject to forfeiture if it was used or intended for use to commit or facilitate the commission of a designated offense. All money and other property, real and personal, that represent proceeds of a designated offense, and all contraband property, are subject to forfeiture, except as provided in this section.
(b) All money used or intended to be used to facilitate the commission of a violation of section 609.322 or 609.324 or a violation of a local ordinance substantially similar to section 609.322 or 609.324 is subject to forfeiture.
(c) The Department of Corrections Fugitive Apprehension Unit shall not seize real property for the purposes of forfeiture under paragraph (a).
Subd. 1a.Computers and related property subject to forfeiture.
(a) As used in this subdivision, "property" has the meaning given in section 609.87, subdivision 6.
(b) When a computer or a component part of a computer is used or intended for use to commit or facilitate the commission of a designated offense, the computer and all software, data, and other property contained in the computer are subject to forfeiture unless prohibited by the Privacy Protection Act, United States Code, title 42, sections 2000aa to 2000aa-12, or other state or federal law.
(c) Regardless of whether a forfeiture action is initiated following the lawful seizure of a computer and related property, if the appropriate agency returns hardware, software, data, or other property to the owner, the agency may charge the owner for the cost of separating contraband from the computer or other property returned, including salary and contract costs. The agency may not charge these costs to an owner of a computer or related property who was not privy to the act or omission upon which the seizure was based, or who did not have knowledge of or consent to the act or omission, if the owner:
(1) requests from the agency copies of specified legitimate data files and provides sufficient storage media; or
(2) requests the return of a computer or other property less data storage devices on which contraband resides.
Subd. 2.Limitations on forfeiture of property associated with designated offenses.
(a) Property used by a person as a common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier is subject to forfeiture under this section only if the owner of the property is a consenting party to, or is privy to, the commission of a designated offense.
(b) Property is subject to forfeiture under this section only if the owner was privy to the act or omission upon which the forfeiture is based, or the act or omission occurred with the owner's knowledge or consent.
(c) Property encumbered by a bona fide security interest is subject to the interest of the secured party unless the party had knowledge of or consented to the act or omission upon which the forfeiture is based. A person claiming a security interest bears the burden of establishing that interest by clear and convincing evidence.
(d) Notwithstanding paragraphs (b) and (c), property is not subject to forfeiture based solely on the owner's or secured party's knowledge of the act or omission upon which the forfeiture is based if the owner or secured party took reasonable steps to terminate use of the property by the offender.
Subd. 3.Vehicle forfeiture for prostitution offenses.
(a) A motor vehicle is subject to forfeiture under this subdivision if it was used to commit or facilitate, or used during the commission of, a violation of section 609.324 or a violation of a local ordinance substantially similar to section 609.324. A motor vehicle is subject to forfeiture under this subdivision only if the offense is established by proof of a criminal conviction for the offense. Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, a forfeiture under this subdivision is governed by sections 609.531, 609.5312, and 609.5313.
(b) When a motor vehicle subject to forfeiture under this subdivision is seized in advance of a judicial forfeiture order, a hearing before a judge or referee must be held within 96 hours of the seizure. Notice of the hearing must be given to the registered owner within 48 hours of the seizure. The prosecuting authority shall certify to the court, at or in advance of the hearing, that it has filed or intends to file charges against the alleged violator for violating section 609.324 or a local ordinance substantially similar to section 609.324. After conducting the hearing, the court shall order that the motor vehicle be returned to the owner if:
(1) the prosecuting authority has failed to make the certification required by paragraph (b);
(2) the owner of the motor vehicle has demonstrated to the court's satisfaction that the owner has a defense to the forfeiture, including but not limited to the defenses contained in subdivision 2; or
(3) the court determines that seizure of the vehicle creates or would create an undue hardship for members of the owner's family.
(c) If the defendant is acquitted or prostitution charges against the defendant are dismissed, neither the owner nor the defendant is responsible for paying any costs associated with the seizure or storage of the vehicle.
(d) A vehicle leased or rented under section 168.27, subdivision 4, for a period of 180 days or less is not subject to forfeiture under this subdivision.
(e) For purposes of this subdivision, seizure occurs either:
(1) at the date at which personal service of process upon the registered owner is made; or
(2) at the date when the registered owner has been notified by certified mail at the address listed in the Minnesota Department of Public Safety computerized motor vehicle registration records.
(f) The Department of Corrections Fugitive Apprehension Unit shall not participate in paragraphs (a) to (e).
Subd. 4.Vehicle forfeiture for fleeing peace officer.
(a) A motor vehicle is subject to forfeiture under this subdivision if it was used to commit a violation of section 609.487 and endanger life or property. A motor vehicle is subject to forfeiture under this subdivision only if the offense is established by proof of a criminal conviction for the offense. Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, a forfeiture under this subdivision is governed by sections 609.531, 609.5312, 609.5313, and 609.5315, subdivision 6.
(b) When a motor vehicle subject to forfeiture under this subdivision is seized in advance of a judicial forfeiture order, a hearing before a judge or referee must be held within 96 hours of the seizure. Notice of the hearing must be given to the registered owner within 48 hours of the seizure. The prosecuting authority shall certify to the court, at or in advance of the hearing, that it has filed or intends to file charges against the alleged violator for violating section 609.487. After conducting the hearing, the court shall order that the motor vehicle be returned to the owner if:
(1) the prosecuting authority has failed to make the certification required by this paragraph;
(c) If the defendant is acquitted or the charges against the defendant are dismissed, neither the owner nor the defendant is responsible for paying any costs associated with the seizure or storage of the vehicle.
(e) A motor vehicle that is an off-road recreational vehicle as defined in section 169A.03, subdivision 16, or a motorboat as defined in section 169A.03, subdivision 13, is not subject to paragraph (b).
(f) For purposes of this subdivision, seizure occurs either:
(g) The Department of Corrections Fugitive Apprehension Unit shall not seize a motor vehicle for the purposes of forfeiture under paragraphs (a) to (f).
1988 c 665 s 12; 1993 c 326 art 1 s 7; art 4 s 29; 1994 c 465 art 1 s 59; 1995 c 244 s 21; 2000 c 466 s 5; 2000 c 478 art 2 s 7; 1Sp2003 c 2 art 4 s 25,26; 2005 c 136 art 13 s 11-13; art 17 s 38; 2012 c 128 s 26; 2013 c 80 s 1
(a) The forfeiture of property under sections 609.5311 and 609.5312 is governed by this section. A separate complaint must be filed against the property stating the act, omission, or occurrence giving rise to the forfeiture and the date and place of the act or occurrence. Within 60 days from when the seizure occurs, the prosecuting authority shall notify the owner or possessor of the property of the action, if known or readily ascertainable. The action must be captioned in the name of the prosecuting authority or the prosecuting authority's designee as plaintiff and the property as defendant. Upon motion by the prosecuting authority, a court may extend the time period for sending notice for a period not to exceed 90 days for good cause shown.
(b) If notice is not sent in accordance with paragraph (a), and no time extension is granted or the extension period has expired, the appropriate agency shall return the property to the person from whom the property was seized, if known. An agency's return of property due to lack of proper notice does not restrict the right of the agency to commence a forfeiture proceeding at a later time. The agency shall not be required to return contraband or other property that the person from whom the property was seized may not legally possess.
1988 c 665 s 13; 2010 c 391 s 13; 2012 c 128 s 26
Subdivision 1.Property subject to administrative forfeiture; presumption.
(a) The following are presumed to be subject to administrative forfeiture under this section:
(1) all money, precious metals, and precious stones found in proximity to:
(i) controlled substances;
(ii) forfeitable drug manufacturing or distributing equipment or devices; or
(iii) forfeitable records of manufacture or distribution of controlled substances;
(2) all conveyance devices containing controlled substances with a retail value of $100 or more if possession or sale of the controlled substance would be a felony under chapter 152; and
(3) all firearms, ammunition, and firearm accessories found:
(i) in a conveyance device used or intended for use to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony offense involving a controlled substance;
(ii) on or in proximity to a person from whom a felony amount of controlled substance is seized; or
(iii) on the premises where a controlled substance is seized and in proximity to the controlled substance, if possession or sale of the controlled substance would be a felony under chapter 152.
(b) The Department of Corrections Fugitive Apprehension Unit shall not seize items listed in paragraph (a), clauses (2) and (3), for the purposes of forfeiture.
(c) A claimant of the property bears the burden to rebut this presumption.
Subd. 2.Administrative forfeiture procedure.
(a) Forfeiture of property described in subdivision 1 that does not exceed $50,000 in value is governed by this subdivision. Within 60 days from when seizure occurs, all persons known to have an ownership, possessory, or security interest in seized property must be notified of the seizure and the intent to forfeit the property. In the case of a motor vehicle required to be registered under chapter 168, notice mailed by certified mail to the address shown in Department of Public Safety records is deemed sufficient notice to the registered owner. The notification to a person known to have a security interest in seized property required under this paragraph applies only to motor vehicles required to be registered under chapter 168 and only if the security interest is listed on the vehicle's title. Upon motion by the appropriate agency or the prosecuting authority, a court may extend the time period for sending notice for a period not to exceed 90 days for good cause shown.
(b) Notice may otherwise be given in the manner provided by law for service of a summons in a civil action. The notice must be in writing and contain:
(1) a description of the property seized;
(2) the date of seizure; and
(3) notice of the right to obtain judicial review of the forfeiture and of the procedure for obtaining that judicial review, printed in English. This requirement does not preclude the appropriate agency from printing the notice in other languages in addition to English.
Substantially the following language must appear conspicuously in the notice:
"WARNING: You will automatically lose the above-described property and the right to be heard in court if you do not file a lawsuit and serve the prosecuting authority within 60 days. You may file your lawsuit in conciliation court if the property is worth $15,000 or less; otherwise, you must file in district court. You may not have to pay a filing fee for your lawsuit if you are unable to afford the fee. You do not have to pay a conciliation court fee if your property is worth less than $500."
(c) If notice is not sent in accordance with paragraph (a), and no time extension is granted or the extension period has expired, the appropriate agency shall return the property to the person from whom the property was seized, if known. An agency's return of property due to lack of proper notice does not restrict the agency's authority to commence a forfeiture proceeding at a later time. The agency shall not be required to return contraband or other property that the person from whom the property was seized may not legally possess.
Subd. 3.Judicial determination.
(a) Within 60 days following service of a notice of seizure and forfeiture under this section, a claimant may file a demand for a judicial determination of the forfeiture. The demand must be in the form of a civil complaint and must be filed with the court administrator in the county in which the seizure occurred, together with proof of service of a copy of the complaint on the prosecuting authority for that county, and the standard filing fee for civil actions unless the petitioner has the right to sue in forma pauperis under section 563.01. The claimant may serve the complaint on the prosecuting authority by any means permitted by court rules. If the value of the seized property is $15,000 or less, the claimant may file an action in conciliation court for recovery of the seized property. If the value of the seized property is less than $500, the claimant does not have to pay the conciliation court filing fee. No responsive pleading is required of the prosecuting authority and no court fees may be charged for the prosecuting authority's appearance in the matter. The district court administrator shall schedule the hearing as soon as practicable after, and in any event no later than 90 days following, the conclusion of the criminal prosecution. The proceedings are governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure.
(b) The complaint must be captioned in the name of the claimant as plaintiff and the seized property as defendant, and must state with specificity the grounds on which the claimant alleges the property was improperly seized and the plaintiff's interest in the property seized. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, an action for the return of property seized under this section may not be maintained by or on behalf of any person who has been served with a notice of seizure and forfeiture unless the person has complied with this subdivision.
(c) If the claimant makes a timely demand for judicial determination under this subdivision, the appropriate agency must conduct the forfeiture under section 609.531, subdivision 6a. The limitations and defenses set forth in section 609.5311, subdivision 3, apply to the judicial determination.
(d) If a demand for judicial determination of an administrative forfeiture is filed under this subdivision and the court orders the return of the seized property, the court shall order that filing fees be reimbursed to the person who filed the demand. In addition, the court may order sanctions under section 549.211. If the court orders payment of these costs, they must be paid from forfeited money or proceeds from the sale of forfeited property from the appropriate law enforcement and prosecuting agencies in the same proportion as they would be distributed under section 609.5315, subdivision 5.
1988 c 665 s 14; 1989 c 290 art 3 s 31; 1991 c 323 s 2,3; 1993 c 326 art 1 s 8,9; 1997 c 213 art 2 s 5; 1999 c 225 s 3,4; 2005 c 136 art 13 s 14; 2010 c 391 s 14,15; 2011 c 76 art 1 s 67; 2012 c 128 s 18,19; 2014 c 201 s 2
Subdivision 1.Disposition.
(a) Subject to paragraph (b), if the court finds under section 609.5313, 609.5314, or 609.5318 that the property is subject to forfeiture, it shall order the appropriate agency to do one of the following:
(1) unless a different disposition is provided under clause (3) or (4), either destroy firearms, ammunition, and firearm accessories that the agency decides not to use for law enforcement purposes under clause (8), or sell them to federally licensed firearms dealers, as defined in section 624.7161, subdivision 1, and distribute the proceeds under subdivision 5 or 5b;
(2) sell property that is not required to be destroyed by law and is not harmful to the public and distribute the proceeds under subdivision 5 or 5b;
(3) sell antique firearms, as defined in section 624.712, subdivision 3, to the public and distribute the proceeds under subdivision 5 or 5b;
(4) destroy or use for law enforcement purposes semiautomatic military-style assault weapons, as defined in section 624.712, subdivision 7;
(5) take custody of the property and remove it for disposition in accordance with law;
(6) forward the property to the federal drug enforcement administration;
(7) disburse money as provided under subdivision 5, 5b, or 5c; or
(8) keep property other than money for official use by the agency and the prosecuting agency.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), the Hennepin or Ramsey County sheriff may not sell firearms, ammunition, or firearms accessories if the policy is disapproved by the applicable county board.
(c) If property is sold under paragraph (a), the appropriate agency shall not sell property to: (1) an officer or employee of the agency that seized the property or to a person related to the officer or employee by blood or marriage; or (2) the prosecuting authority or any individual working in the same office or a person related to the authority or individual by blood or marriage.
(d) Sales of forfeited property under this section must be conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.
Subd. 2.Disposition of administratively forfeited property.
If property is forfeited administratively under section 609.5314 or 609.5318 and no demand for judicial determination is made, the appropriate agency shall provide the prosecuting authority with a copy of the forfeiture or evidence receipt, the notice of seizure and intent to forfeit, a statement of probable cause for forfeiture of the property, and a description of the property and its estimated value. Upon review and certification by the prosecuting authority that (1) the appropriate agency provided a receipt in accordance with section 609.531, subdivision 4, or 626.16; (2) the appropriate agency served notice in accordance with section 609.5314, subdivision 2, or 609.5318, subdivision 2; and (3) probable cause for forfeiture exists based on the officer's statement, the appropriate agency may dispose of the property in any of the ways listed in subdivision 1.
Subd. 3.Use by law enforcement.
(a) Property kept under this section may be used only in the performance of official duties of the appropriate agency or prosecuting agency and may not be used for any other purpose. If an appropriate agency keeps a forfeited motor vehicle for official use, it shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the motor vehicle is available for use and adaptation by the agency's officers who participate in the drug abuse resistance education program.
(b) Proceeds from the sale of property kept under this subdivision must be disbursed as provided in subdivision 5.
Subd. 4.Distribution of proceeds of the offense.
Property that consists of proceeds derived from or traced to the commission of a designated offense or a violation of section 609.66, subdivision 1e, must be applied first to payment of seizure, storage, forfeiture, and sale expenses, and to satisfy valid liens against the property; and second, to any court-ordered restitution before being disbursed as provided under subdivision 5.
Subd. 5.Distribution of money.
The money or proceeds from the sale of forfeited property, after payment of seizure, storage, forfeiture, and sale expenses, and satisfaction of valid liens against the property, must be distributed as follows:
(1) 70 percent of the money or proceeds must be forwarded to the appropriate agency for deposit as a supplement to the agency's operating fund or similar fund for use in law enforcement;
(2) 20 percent of the money or proceeds must be forwarded to the prosecuting authority that handled the forfeiture for deposit as a supplement to its operating fund or similar fund for prosecutorial purposes; and
(3) the remaining ten percent of the money or proceeds must be forwarded within 60 days after resolution of the forfeiture to the state treasury and credited to the general fund. Any local police relief association organized under chapter 423 which received or was entitled to receive the proceeds of any sale made under this section before the effective date of Laws 1988, chapter 665, sections 1 to 17, shall continue to receive and retain the proceeds of these sales.
Subd. 5a.Disposition of certain forfeited proceeds; prostitution.
The proceeds from the sale of motor vehicles forfeited under section 609.5312, subdivision 3, after payment of seizure, storage, forfeiture, and sale expenses, and satisfaction of valid liens against the vehicle, shall be distributed as follows:
(1) 40 percent of the proceeds must be forwarded to the appropriate agency for deposit as a supplement to the agency's operating fund or similar fund for use in law enforcement;
(2) 20 percent of the proceeds must be forwarded to the prosecuting authority that handled the forfeiture for deposit as a supplement to its operating fund or similar fund for prosecutorial purposes; and
(3) the remaining 40 percent of the proceeds must be forwarded to the city treasury for distribution to neighborhood crime prevention programs.
Subd. 5b.Disposition of certain forfeited proceeds; trafficking of persons; report required.
(a) Except as provided in subdivision 5c, for forfeitures resulting from violations of section 609.282, 609.283, or 609.322, the money or proceeds from the sale of forfeited property, after payment of seizure, storage, forfeiture, and sale expenses, and satisfaction of valid liens against the property, must be distributed as follows:
(3) the remaining 40 percent of the proceeds must be forwarded to the commissioner of public safety and are appropriated to the commissioner for distribution to crime victims services organizations that provide services to victims of trafficking offenses.
(b) By February 15 of each year, the commissioner of public safety shall report to the chairs and ranking minority members of the senate and house of representatives committees or divisions having jurisdiction over criminal justice funding on the money collected under paragraph (a), clause (3). The report must indicate the following relating to the preceding calendar year:
(1) the amount of money appropriated to the commissioner;
(2) how the money was distributed by the commissioner; and
(3) what the organizations that received the money did with it.
Subd. 5c.Disposition of money; prostitution.
Money forfeited under section 609.5312, subdivision 1, paragraph (b), must be distributed as follows:
(1) 40 percent must be forwarded to the appropriate agency for deposit as a supplement to the agency's operating fund or similar fund for use in law enforcement;
(2) 20 percent must be forwarded to the prosecuting authority that handled the forfeiture for deposit as a supplement to its operating fund or similar fund for prosecutorial purposes; and
(3) the remaining 40 percent must be forwarded to the commissioner of public safety to be deposited in the safe harbor for youth account in the special revenue fund and is appropriated to the commissioner for distribution to crime victims services organizations that provide services to sexually exploited youth, as defined in section 260C.007, subdivision 31.
Subd. 6.Reporting requirement.
(a) For each forfeiture occurring in the state regardless of the authority for it, the appropriate agency and the prosecuting authority shall provide a written record of the forfeiture incident to the state auditor. The record shall include the amount forfeited, the statutory authority for the forfeiture, its date, a brief description of the circumstances involved, and whether the forfeiture was contested. For controlled substance and driving while impaired forfeitures, the record shall indicate whether the forfeiture was initiated as an administrative or a judicial forfeiture. The record shall also list the number of firearms forfeited and the make, model, and serial number of each firearm forfeited. The record shall indicate how the property was or is to be disposed of.
(b) An appropriate agency or the prosecuting authority shall report to the state auditor all instances in which property seized for forfeiture is returned to its owner either because forfeiture is not pursued or for any other reason.
(c) Reports shall be made on a monthly basis in a manner prescribed by the state auditor. The state auditor shall report annually to the legislature on the nature and extent of forfeitures.
(d) For forfeitures resulting from the activities of multijurisdictional law enforcement entities, the entity on its own behalf shall report the information required in this subdivision.
(e) The prosecuting authority is not required to report information required by this subdivision unless the prosecuting authority has been notified by the state auditor that the appropriate agency has not reported it.
The agency shall make best efforts for a period of 90 days after the seizure of an abandoned or stolen firearm to protect the firearm from harm and return it to the lawful owner.
1988 c 665 s 15; 1989 c 290 art 3 s 32; 1989 c 335 art 4 s 100; 1990 c 499 s 9; 1992 c 513 art 4 s 49; 1993 c 326 art 1 s 10-12; art 4 s 30; 1994 c 636 art 3 s 12-15; art 4 s 29; 1999 c 148 s 1,2; 2005 c 136 art 17 s 39,40; 2010 c 391 s 16-18; 2012 c 128 s 20-23,26; 2013 c 80 s 2-4
Subdivision 1.Contraband.
Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, if the property is contraband, the property must be summarily forfeited and either destroyed or used by the appropriate agency for law enforcement purposes. Upon summary forfeiture, weapons used must be destroyed by the appropriate agency unless the agency decides to use the weapons for law enforcement purposes or sell the weapons in a commercially reasonable manner to federally licensed firearms dealers, as defined in section 624.7161, subdivision 1. If a weapon is sold under this subdivision, the proceeds must be distributed under section 609.5315, subdivision 5 or 5b.
Subd. 2.Controlled substances.
(a) Controlled substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, sold, or offered for sale in violation of chapter 152, are contraband and must be seized and summarily forfeited. Controlled substances listed in Schedule I that are seized or come into the possession of peace officers, the owners of which are unknown, are contraband and must be summarily forfeited.
(b) Species of plants from which controlled substances in Schedules I and II may be derived that have been planted or cultivated in violation of chapter 152 or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or that are wild growths, may be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. The appropriate agency or its authorized agent may seize the plants if the person in occupancy or in control of land or premises where the plants are growing or being stored fails to produce an appropriate registration or proof that the person is the holder of appropriate registration.
Subd. 3.Weapons, telephone cloning paraphernalia, and bullet-resistant vests.
Weapons used are contraband and must be summarily forfeited to the appropriate agency upon conviction of the weapon's owner or possessor for a controlled substance crime; for any offense of this chapter or chapter 624, or for a violation of an order for protection under section 518B.01, subdivision 14. Bullet-resistant vests, as defined in section 609.486, worn or possessed during the commission or attempted commission of a crime are contraband and must be summarily forfeited to the appropriate agency upon conviction of the owner or possessor for a controlled substance crime or for any offense of this chapter. Telephone cloning paraphernalia used in a violation of section 609.894 are contraband and must be summarily forfeited to the appropriate agency upon a conviction.
1988 c 665 s 16; 1990 c 439 s 2; 1994 c 636 art 3 s 16,17; 1996 c 331 s 1; 1996 c 408 art 4 s 9; 2012 c 127 s 1; 2014 c 201 s 3
Subdivision 1.Rental property.
(a) When contraband or a controlled substance manufactured, distributed, or acquired in violation of chapter 152 is seized on residential rental property incident to a lawful search or arrest, the prosecuting authority shall give the notice required by this subdivision to (1) the landlord of the property or the fee owner identified in the records of the county assessor, and (2) the agent authorized by the owner to accept service pursuant to section 504B.181. The notice is not required during an ongoing investigation. The notice shall state what has been seized and specify the applicable duties and penalties under this subdivision. The notice shall state that the landlord who chooses to assign the right to bring an eviction action retains all rights and duties, including removal of a tenant's personal property following issuance of the writ of recovery and delivery of the writ to the sheriff for execution. The notice shall also state that the landlord may contact the prosecuting authority if threatened by the tenant. Notice shall be sent by certified letter, return receipt requested, within 30 days of the seizure. If receipt is not returned, notice shall be given in the manner provided by law for service of summons in a civil action.
(b) Within 15 days after notice of the first occurrence, the landlord shall bring, or assign to the prosecuting authority of the county in which the real property is located, the right to bring an eviction action against the tenant. The assignment must be in writing on a form prepared by the prosecuting authority. Should the landlord choose to assign the right to bring an eviction action, the assignment shall be limited to those rights and duties up to and including delivery of the writ of recovery to the sheriff for execution.
(c) Upon notice of a second occurrence on any residential rental property owned by the same landlord in the same county and involving the same tenant, and within one year after notice of the first occurrence, the property is subject to forfeiture under sections 609.531, 609.5311, 609.5313, and 609.5315, unless an eviction action has been commenced as provided in paragraph (b) or the right to bring an eviction action was assigned to the prosecuting authority as provided in paragraph (b). If the right has been assigned and not previously exercised, or if the prosecuting authority requests an assignment and the landlord makes an assignment, the prosecuting authority may bring an eviction action rather than an action for forfeiture.
(d) The Department of Corrections Fugitive Apprehension Unit shall not seize real property for the purposes of forfeiture as described in paragraphs (a) to (c).
Subd. 2.Additional remedies.
Nothing in subdivision 1 prevents the prosecuting authority from proceeding under section 609.5311 whenever that section applies.
It is a defense against a proceeding under subdivision 1, paragraph (b), that the tenant had no knowledge or reason to know of the presence of the contraband or controlled substance or could not prevent its being brought onto the property.
It is a defense against a proceeding under subdivision 1, paragraph (c), that the landlord made every reasonable attempt to evict a tenant or to assign the prosecuting authority the right to bring an eviction action against the tenant, or that the landlord did not receive notice of the seizure.
This section shall not apply if the retail value of the controlled substance is less than $100, but this section does not subject real property to forfeiture under section 609.5311 unless the retail value of the controlled substance is: (1) $1,000 or more; or (2) there have been two previous controlled substance seizures involving the same tenant.
1989 c 305 s 7; 1991 c 193 s 4; 1992 c 533 s 3; 1999 c 199 art 2 s 34; 2003 c 2 art 2 s 19,20; 2005 c 136 art 13 s 15; 2012 c 128 s 26; 2015 c 21 art 1 s 109
Subdivision 1.Motor vehicles subject to forfeiture.
(a) If the prosecuting authority establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a motor vehicle was used in a violation of section 609.66, subdivision 1e, the vehicle is subject to forfeiture under this section upon a conviction for the same offense.
(b) The Department of Corrections Fugitive Apprehension Unit shall not seize a motor vehicle for the purposes of forfeiture under paragraph (a).
(a) The registered owner of the vehicle must be notified of the seizure and intent to forfeit the vehicle within seven days after the seizure. Notice by certified mail to the address shown in Department of Public Safety records is deemed to be sufficient notice to the registered owner.
(b) The notice must be in writing and:
(1) contain a description of the property seized;
(2) contain the date of seizure; and
(3) be printed in English. This requirement does not preclude the appropriate agency from printing the notice in other languages in addition to English.
(c) Substantially, the following language must appear conspicuously in the notice:
Subd. 3.Hearing.
(a) Within 60 days following service of a notice of seizure and forfeiture, a claimant may demand a judicial determination of the forfeiture. If a related criminal proceeding is pending, the 60-day period begins to run at the conclusion of those proceedings.
(b) The demand must be in the form of a civil complaint as provided in section 609.5314, subdivision 3, except as otherwise provided in this section.
(c) If the claimant makes a timely demand for judicial determination under this subdivision, the appropriate agency must conduct the forfeiture under subdivision 4.
(a) If a judicial determination of the forfeiture is requested, a separate complaint must be filed against the vehicle, stating the specific act giving rise to the forfeiture and the date, time, and place of the act. The action must be captioned in the name of the prosecuting authority or the prosecuting authority's designee as plaintiff and the property as defendant.
(b) If a demand for judicial determination of an administrative forfeiture is filed and the court orders the return of the seized property, the court shall order that filing fees be reimbursed to the person who filed the demand. In addition, the court may order the payment of reasonable costs, expenses, attorney fees, and towing and storage fees. If the court orders payment of these costs, they must be paid from forfeited money or proceeds from the sale of forfeited property from the appropriate law enforcement and prosecuting agencies in the same proportion as they would be distributed under section 609.5315, subdivision 5.
(a) A vehicle used by a person as a common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier is subject to forfeiture under this section only if the owner is a consenting party to, or is privy to, the commission of the act giving rise to the forfeiture.
(b) A vehicle is subject to forfeiture under this section only if the registered owner was privy to the act upon which the forfeiture is based, the act occurred with the owner's knowledge or consent, or the act occurred due to the owner's gross negligence in allowing another to use the vehicle.
(c) A vehicle encumbered by a bona fide security interest is subject to the interest of the secured party unless the party had knowledge of or consented to the act upon which the forfeiture is based. A person claiming a security interest bears the burden of establishing that interest by clear and convincing evidence.
1993 c 326 art 1 s 13; 1993 c 366 s 9; 2005 c 136 art 13 s 16; 2012 c 128 s 24-26; 2014 c 201 s 4
Property that is subject to a bona fide security interest, based upon a loan or other financing arranged by a bank, credit union, or any other financial institution, is subject to the interest of the bank, credit union, or other financial institution in any forfeiture proceeding that is based upon a violation of any provision of this chapter or the commission of any other criminal act. The security interest must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
1996 c 408 art 11 s 7
Subdivision 1.Attachment.
Upon application by the prosecuting authority, a court may issue an attachment order directing a financial institution to freeze some or all of the funds or assets deposited with or held by the financial institution by or on behalf of an account holder charged with the commission of a felony.
Subd. 2.Application.
The application of the prosecuting authority required by this section must contain:
(1) a copy of a criminal complaint issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that alleges the commission of a felony by the account holder;
(2) a statement of the actual financial loss caused by the account holder in the commission of the alleged felony, if not already stated in the complaint; and
(3) identification of the account holder's name and financial institution account number.
Subd. 3.Issuance of court order.
If the court finds that (1) there is probable cause that the account holder was involved in the commission of a felony; (2) the accounts of the account holder are specifically identified; (3) there was a loss of $10,000 or more as a result of the commission of the alleged felony; and (4) it is necessary to freeze the account holder's funds or assets to ensure eventual restitution to victims of the alleged offense, the court may order the financial institution to freeze all or part of the account holder's deposited funds or assets so that the funds or assets may not be withdrawn or disposed of until further order of the court.
Subd. 4.Duty of financial institutions.
Upon receipt of the order authorized by this section, a financial institution must not permit any funds or assets that were frozen by the order to be withdrawn or disposed of until further order of the court.
Subd. 5.Release of funds.
(a) The account holder may, upon notice and motion, have a hearing to contest the freezing of funds or assets and to seek the release of all or part of them.
(b) The account holder is entitled to an order releasing the freeze by showing:
(1) that the account holder has posted a bond or other adequate surety, guaranteeing that, upon conviction, adequate funds or assets will be available to pay complete restitution to victims of the alleged offense;
(2) that there is no probable cause to believe that the account holder was involved in the alleged offense;
(3) that the amount of funds or assets frozen is more than is necessary to pay complete restitution to all victims of the alleged offense;
(4) that a joint account holder who is not involved in the alleged criminal activity has deposited all or part of the funds or assets; or
(5) that the funds or assets should be returned in the interests of justice.
(c) It is not grounds for the release of funds or assets that the particular accounts frozen do not contain funds or assets that were proceeds from or used in the commission of the alleged offense.
Subd. 6.Disposition of funds.
(a) If the account holder is convicted of a felony or a lesser offense, the funds or assets may be used to pay complete restitution to victims of the offense. The court may order the financial institution to remit all or part of the frozen funds or assets to the court.
(b) If the account holder is acquitted or the charges are dismissed, the court must issue an order releasing the freeze on the funds or assets.
Subd. 7.Time limit.
The freeze permitted by this section expires 24 months after the date of the court's initial attachment order unless the time limit is extended by the court in writing upon a showing of good cause by the prosecution.
Within ten days after a court issues an attachment order under this section, the prosecutor shall send a copy of the order to the account holder's last known address or to the account holder's attorney, if known.
For the purpose of this section, the following terms have the meanings given them.
(a) "Check" means a check, draft, order of withdrawal, or similar negotiable or nonnegotiable instrument.
(b) "Credit" means an arrangement or understanding with the drawee for the payment of a check.
Whoever issues a check which, at the time of issuance, the issuer intends shall not be paid, is guilty of issuing a dishonored check and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 2a. In addition, restitution may be ordered by the court.
Subd. 2a.Penalties.
(a) A person who is convicted of issuing a dishonored check under subdivision 2 may be sentenced as follows:
(1) to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both, if the value of the dishonored check, or checks aggregated under paragraph (b), is more than $500;
(2) to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both, if the value of the dishonored check, or checks aggregated under paragraph (b), is more than $250 but not more than $500; or
(3) to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or both, if the value of the dishonored check, or checks aggregated under paragraph (b), is not more than $250.
(b) In a prosecution under this subdivision, the value of dishonored checks issued by the defendant in violation of this subdivision within any six-month period may be aggregated and the defendant charged accordingly in applying this section. When two or more offenses are committed by the same person in two or more counties, the accused may be prosecuted in any county in which one of the dishonored checks was issued for all of the offenses aggregated under this paragraph.
Subd. 3.Proof of intent.
Any of the following is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that the person at the time the person issued the check intended it should not be paid:
(1) proof that, at the time of issuance, the issuer did not have an account with the drawee;
(2) proof that, at the time of issuance, the issuer did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee and that the issuer failed to pay the check within five business days after mailing of notice of nonpayment or dishonor as provided in this subdivision; or
(3) proof that, when presentment was made within a reasonable time, the issuer did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee and that the issuer failed to pay the check within five business days after mailing of notice of nonpayment or dishonor as provided in this subdivision.
Notice of nonpayment or dishonor that includes a citation to and a description of the penalties in this section shall be sent by the payee or holder of the check to the maker or drawer by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by regular mail, supported by an affidavit of service by mailing, to the address printed on the check. Refusal by the maker or drawer of the check to accept certified mail notice or failure to claim certified or regular mail notice is not a defense that notice was not received.
The notice may state that unless the check is paid in full within five business days after mailing of the notice of nonpayment or dishonor, the payee or holder of the check will or may refer the matter to proper authorities for prosecution under this section.
An affidavit of service by mailing shall be retained by the payee or holder of the check.
Subd. 4.Proof of lack of funds or credit.
If the check has been protested, the notice of protest is admissible as proof of presentation, nonpayment, and protest, and is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that there was a lack of funds or credit with the drawee.
This section does not apply to a postdated check or to a check given for a past consideration, except a payroll check or a check issued to a fund for employee benefits.
Subd. 6.Release of account information to law enforcement authorities.
A drawee shall release the information specified below to any state, county, or local law enforcement or prosecuting authority which certifies in writing that it is investigating or prosecuting a complaint against the drawer under this section or section 609.52, subdivision 2, clause (3), item (i), and that 15 days have elapsed since the mailing of the notice of dishonor required by subdivisions 3 and 8. This subdivision applies to the following information relating to the drawer's account:
(1) documents relating to the opening of the account by the drawer and to the closing of the account;
(2) notices regarding nonsufficient funds, overdrafts, and the dishonor of any check drawn on the account within a period of six months of the date of request;
(3) periodic statements mailed to the drawer by the drawee for the periods immediately prior to, during, and subsequent to the issuance of any check which is the subject of the investigation or prosecution; or
(4) the last known home and business addresses and telephone numbers of the drawer.
The drawee shall release all of the information described in clauses (1) to (4) that it possesses within ten days after receipt of a request conforming to all of the provisions of this subdivision. The drawee may not impose a fee for furnishing this information to law enforcement or prosecuting authorities.
A drawee is not liable in a criminal or civil proceeding for releasing information in accordance with this subdivision.
Subd. 7.Release of account information to payee or holder.
(a) A drawee shall release the information specified in paragraph (b), clauses (1) to (3) to the payee or holder of a check that has been dishonored who makes a written request for this information and states in writing that the check has been dishonored and that 30 days have elapsed since the mailing of the notice described in subdivision 8 and who accompanies this request with a copy of the dishonored check and a copy of the notice of dishonor.
The requesting payee or holder shall notify the drawee immediately to cancel this request if payment is made before the drawee has released this information.
(b) This subdivision applies to the following information relating to the drawer's account:
(1) whether at the time the check was issued or presented for payment the drawer had sufficient funds or credit with the drawee, and whether at that time the account was open, closed, or restricted for any reason and the date it was closed or restricted;
(2) the last known home address and telephone number of the drawer. The drawee may not release the address or telephone number of the place of employment of the drawer unless the drawer is a business entity or the place of employment is the home; and
(3) a statement as to whether the aggregated value of dishonored checks attributable to the drawer within six months before or after the date of the dishonored check exceeds $250; for purposes of this clause, a check is not dishonored if payment was not made pursuant to a stop payment order.
The drawee shall release all of the information described in clauses (1) to (3) that it possesses within ten days after receipt of a request conforming to all of the provisions of this subdivision. The drawee may require the person requesting the information to pay the reasonable costs, not to exceed 15 cents per page, of reproducing and mailing the requested information.
(c) A drawee is not liable in a criminal or civil proceeding for releasing information in accordance with this subdivision.
The provisions of subdivisions 6 and 7 are not applicable unless the notice to the maker or drawer required by subdivision 3 states that if the check is not paid in full within five business days after mailing of the notice, the drawee will be authorized to release information relating to the account to the payee or holder of the check and may also release this information to law enforcement or prosecuting authorities.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.535; 1967 c 466 s 1; 1971 c 23 s 56; 1974 c 106 s 1,2; 1981 c 202 s 1; 1981 c 247 s 1-3; 1983 c 225 s 10; 1984 c 436 s 34; 1985 c 140 s 3; 1986 c 444; 1988 c 527 s 2,3; 1991 c 256 s 11-13; 1992 c 569 s 26; 1999 c 218 s 3; 2004 c 228 art 1 s 72
Whoever does an act which constitutes embezzlement under the provisions of Minnesota Constitution, article XI, section 13 may be sentenced as follows:
(1) if the value of the funds so embezzled is $2,500, or less, to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both; or
(2) if such value is more than $2,500, to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.54; 1976 c 2 s 172; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11
Subdivision 1.Damage to library materials.
A person who intentionally, and without permission from library personnel damages any books, maps, pictures, manuscripts, films, or other property of any public library or library belonging to the state or to any political subdivision is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.
Subd. 2.Removal of library property.
A person who intentionally, and without permission from library personnel removes any books, maps, pictures, manuscripts, films, or other property of any public library or library belonging to the state or to any political subdivision is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Subd. 3.Detention of library materials.
A person who detains a book, periodical, pamphlet, film, or other property belonging to any public library, or to a library belonging to the state or any political subdivision, for more than 60 days after notice in writing to return it, given after the expiration of the library's stated loan period for the material, is guilty of a petty misdemeanor. The written notice shall be sent by mail to the last known address of the person detaining the material. The notice shall state the type of material borrowed, the title of the material, the author's name, the library from which the material was borrowed, and the date by which the material was to have been returned to the library. The notice shall include a statement indicating that if the material is not returned within 60 days after the written notice the borrower will be in violation of this section.
Subd. 4.Responsibility for prosecution for regional libraries.
For regional libraries the county attorney for the county in which the offense occurred shall prosecute violations of subdivisions 1 to 3.
Whoever obtains the services of another by the intentional unauthorized use of a credit card issued or purporting to be issued by an organization for use as identification in purchasing services is guilty of a misdemeanor.
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor who intentionally:
(1) rides in or on a motor vehicle knowing that the vehicle was taken and is being driven by another without the owner's permission; or
(2) tampers with or enters into or on a motor vehicle without the owner's permission.
Subdivision 1.Crime defined; stealing cattle; penalties.
Whoever intentionally and without claim of right shoots, kills, takes, uses, transfers, conceals or retains possession of live cattle, swine or sheep or the carcasses thereof belonging to another without the other's consent and with the intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof may be sentenced as follows:
(a) if the value of the animals which are shot, killed, taken, used, transferred, concealed, or retained exceeds $2,500, the defendant may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years, and may be fined up to $20,000;
(b) if the value of the animals which are shot, killed, taken, used, transferred, concealed, or retained exceeds $300 but is less than $2,500, the defendant may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years, and may be fined up to $10,000;
(c) if the value of the animals which are shot, killed, taken, used, transferred, concealed, or retained is $300 or less, the defendant may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $300 or both.
Subd. 2.Crime defined; selling stolen cattle.
Whoever knowingly buys, sells, transports, or otherwise handles cattle, swine, or sheep illegally acquired under subdivision 1 or knowingly aids or abets another in the violation of subdivision 1 shall be sentenced as in subdivision 1, clauses (a), (b), and (c).
In any prosecution under this section the value of the animals which are shot, killed, taken, used, transferred, concealed, or retained within any six-month period may be aggregated and the defendant charged accordingly in applying the provisions of this section.
Subd. 4.Amount of action.
Any person who has been injured by violation of this section may bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees.
1975 c 314 s 2; 1977 c 355 s 8; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444
A person who intentionally and without permission releases an animal lawfully confined for science, research, commerce, or education is guilty of a misdemeanor. A second or subsequent offense by the same person is a gross misdemeanor.
1989 c 55 s 2
For the purposes of sections 609.556 to 609.576 and 609.611, the terms defined in this section have the meanings given them.
Subd. 2.Property of another.
"Property of another" means a building or other property, whether real or personal, in which a person other than the accused has an interest which the accused has no authority to defeat or impair even though the accused may also have an interest in the building or property.
Subd. 3.Building.
"Building" in addition to its ordinary meaning includes any tent, watercraft, structure or vehicle that is customarily used for overnight lodging of a person or persons. If a building consists of two or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed a separate building.
1976 c 124 s 3; 1977 c 347 s 63
Subdivision 1.First degree; dwelling.
Whoever unlawfully by means of fire or explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any building that is used as a dwelling at the time the act is committed, whether the inhabitant is present therein at the time of the act or not, or any building appurtenant to or connected with a dwelling whether the property of the actor or of another, commits arson in the first degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.
Subd. 2.First degree; other buildings.
Whoever unlawfully by means of fire or explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any building not included in subdivision 1, whether the property of the actor or another commits arson in the first degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to a fine of not more than $35,000, or both if:
(a) another person who is not a participant in the crime is present in the building at the time and the defendant knows that; or
(b) the circumstances are such as to render the presence of such a person therein a reasonable possibility.
Subd. 3.First degree; flammable material.
(a) Whoever unlawfully by means of fire or explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any building not included in subdivision 1, whether the property of the actor or another, commits arson in the first degree if a flammable material is used to start or accelerate the fire. A person who violates this paragraph may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.
(b) As used in this subdivision:
(1) "combustible liquid" means a liquid having a flash point at or above 100 degrees Fahrenheit;
(2) "flammable gas" means any material which is a gas at 68 degrees Fahrenheit or less and 14.7 psi of pressure and which: (i) is ignitable when in a mixture of 13 percent or less by volume with air at atmospheric pressure; or (ii) has a flammable range with air at atmospheric pressure of at least 12 percent, regardless of the lower flammable limit;
(3) "flammable liquid" means any liquid having a flash point below 100 degrees Fahrenheit and having a vapor pressure not exceeding 40 pounds per square inch (absolute) at 100 degrees Fahrenheit, but does not include intoxicating liquor as defined in section 340A.101;
(4) "flammable material" means a flammable or combustible liquid, a flammable gas, or a flammable solid; and
(5) "flammable solid" means any of the following three types of materials:
(i) wetted explosives;
(ii) self-reactive materials that are liable to undergo heat-producing decomposition; or
(iii) readily combustible solids that may cause a fire through friction or that have a rapid burning rate as determined by specific flammability tests.
1976 c 124 s 4; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444; 1994 c 636 art 2 s 42; 1995 c 186 s 100; 1999 c 176 s 1
Whoever unlawfully by means of fire or explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any building not covered by section 609.561, no matter what its value, or any other real or personal property valued at more than $1,000, whether the property of the actor or another, may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.
1976 c 124 s 5; 1979 c 258 s 16; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1985 c 141 s 2; 1986 c 444; 1993 c 326 art 5 s 7
Whoever unlawfully by means of fire or explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any real or personal property may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of $10,000, or both, if:
(a) the property intended by the accused to be damaged or destroyed had a value of more than $300 but less than $1,000; or
(b) property of the value of $300 or more was unintentionally damaged or destroyed but such damage or destruction could reasonably have been foreseen; or
(c) the property specified in clauses (a) and (b) in the aggregate had a value of $300 or more.
1976 c 124 s 6; 1977 c 355 s 9; 1979 c 258 s 17; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1985 c 141 s 3; 1993 c 326 art 5 s 8
(b) "Multiple unit residential building" means a building containing two or more apartments.
(c) "Public building" means a building such as a hotel, hospital, motel, dormitory, sanitarium, nursing home, theater, stadium, gymnasium, amusement park building, school or other building used for educational purposes, museum, restaurant, bar, correctional institution, place of worship, or other building of public assembly.
Whoever intentionally by means of fire or explosives sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned any personal property in a multiple unit residential building or public building and arson in the first, second, or third degree was not committed is guilty of a gross misdemeanor and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
1998 c 367 art 2 s 19; 1999 c 176 s 2
Whoever intentionally by means of fire or explosives sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned any real or personal property of value is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
A student who uses an ignition device, including a butane or disposable lighter or matches, inside an educational building and under circumstances where there is an obvious risk of fire, and arson in the first, second, third, or fourth degree was not committed, is guilty of a petty misdemeanor. This section does not apply if the student uses the device in a manner authorized by the school.
For the purposes of this section, "student" has the meaning given in section 123B.41, subdivision 11.
A person does not violate section 609.561, 609.562, 609.563, or 609.5641 if the person sets a fire pursuant to a validly issued license or permit or with written permission from the fire department of the jurisdiction where the fire occurs.
Subdivision 1.Setting wildfires.
A person who intentionally sets a fire to burn out of control on land of another containing timber, underbrush, grass, or other vegetative combustible material is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 1a.
Subd. 1a.Penalty; felonies.
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d), a person who violates subdivision 1 may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
(b) A person who violates subdivision 1 where the fire threatens to damage or damages in excess of five buildings or dwellings, burns 500 acres or more, or damages crops in excess of $100,000, may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $15,000, or both.
(c) A person who violates subdivision 1 where the fire threatens to damage or damages in excess of 100 buildings or dwellings, burns 1,500 acres or more, or damages crops in excess of $250,000, may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $25,000, or both.
(d) A person who violates subdivision 1 where the fire causes another person to suffer demonstrable bodily harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of $15,000, or both.
(e) For purposes of this section, a building or dwelling is threatened when there is a probability of damage to the building or dwelling requiring evacuation for safety of life.
Subd. 2.Possession of flammables to set wildfires.
A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who possesses a flammable, explosive, or incendiary device, substance, or material with intent to use the device, substance, or material to violate subdivision 1.
Subd. 3. Restitution.
In addition to the sentence otherwise authorized, the court may order a person who is convicted of violating this section to pay fire suppression costs, damages to the owner of the damaged land, costs associated with injuries sustained by a member of a municipal or volunteer fire department in the performance of the member's duties, and any other restitution costs allowed under section 611A.04.
1990 c 478 s 2; 2013 c 139 s 1-3
Subdivision 1.Negligent fire resulting in injury or property damage.
Whoever is grossly negligent in causing a fire to burn or get out of control thereby causing damage or injury to another, and as a result of this:
(1) a human being is injured and great bodily harm incurred, is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both;
(2) a human being is injured and bodily harm incurred, is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both; or
(3) property of another is injured, thereby, is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced as follows:
(i) to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or both, if the value of the property damage is under $300;
(ii) to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both, if the value of the property damaged is at least $300 but is less than $2,500; or
(iii) to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both, if the value of the property damaged is $2,500 or more.
Subd. 2.Dangerous smoking.
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if the person smokes in the presence of explosives or inflammable materials. If a person violates this subdivision and knows that doing so creates a risk of death or bodily harm or serious property damage, the person is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
1976 c 124 s 7; 1977 c 355 s 10; 1981 c 107 s 1; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1985 c 141 s 5; 1989 c 5 s 8; 1989 c 290 art 6 s 20; 1993 c 326 art 5 s 9; 2001 c 155 s 1; 2003 c 82 s 1
For purpose of sections 609.582 and 609.583, the terms defined in this section have the meanings given them.
"Building" means a structure suitable for affording shelter for human beings including any appurtenant or connected structure.
Subd. 3.Dwelling.
"Dwelling" means a building used as a permanent or temporary residence.
Subd. 4.Enters a building without consent.
"Enters a building without consent" means:
(a) to enter a building without the consent of the person in lawful possession;
(b) to enter a building by using artifice, trick, or misrepresentation to obtain consent to enter from the person in lawful possession; or
(c) to remain within a building without the consent of the person in lawful possession.
Whoever enters a building while open to the general public does so with consent except when consent was expressly withdrawn before entry.
Subd. 5.Government building.
"Government building" means a building that is owned, leased, controlled, or operated by a governmental entity for a governmental purpose.
Subd. 6.Religious establishment.
"Religious establishment" means a building used for worship services by a religious organization and clearly identified as such by a posted sign or other means.
Subd. 7.School building.
"School building" means a public or private preschool, elementary school, middle school, secondary school, or postsecondary school building.
Subd. 8.Historic property.
"Historic property" means any property identified as a historic site or historic place by sections 138.661 to 138.664 and clearly identified as such by a posted sign or other means.
1983 c 321 s 1; 2007 c 54 art 2 s 11-14
Subdivision 1.Burglary in the first degree.
Whoever enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime, or enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in the building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits burglary in the first degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $35,000, or both, if:
(a) the building is a dwelling and another person, not an accomplice, is present in it when the burglar enters or at any time while the burglar is in the building;
(b) the burglar possesses, when entering or at any time while in the building, any of the following: a dangerous weapon, any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon, or an explosive; or
(c) the burglar assaults a person within the building or on the building's appurtenant property.
Subd. 1a.Mandatory minimum sentence for burglary of occupied dwelling.
A person convicted of committing burglary of an occupied dwelling, as defined in subdivision 1, clause (a), must be committed to the commissioner of corrections or county workhouse for not less than six months.
Subd. 2.Burglary in the second degree.
(a) Whoever enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime, or enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in the building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits burglary in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both, if:
(1) the building is a dwelling;
(2) the portion of the building entered contains a banking business or other business of receiving securities or other valuable papers for deposit or safekeeping and the entry is with force or threat of force;
(3) the portion of the building entered contains a pharmacy or other lawful business or practice in which controlled substances are routinely held or stored, and the entry is forcible; or
(4) when entering or while in the building, the burglar possesses a tool to gain access to money or property.
(b) Whoever enters a government building, religious establishment, historic property, or school building without consent and with intent to commit a crime under section 609.52 or 609.595, or enters a government building, religious establishment, historic property, or school building without consent and commits a crime under section 609.52 or 609.595 while in the building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits burglary in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.
Subd. 3.Burglary in the third degree.
Whoever enters a building without consent and with intent to steal or commit any felony or gross misdemeanor while in the building, or enters a building without consent and steals or commits a felony or gross misdemeanor while in the building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits burglary in the third degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Subd. 4.Burglary in the fourth degree.
Whoever enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a misdemeanor other than to steal, or enters a building without consent and commits a misdemeanor other than to steal while in the building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits burglary in the fourth degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
1983 c 321 s 2; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 6; 1986 c 470 s 19; 1988 c 712 s 9-12; 1993 c 326 art 13 s 33; 1995 c 244 s 22; 1998 c 367 art 2 s 21; 2007 c 54 art 2 s 15
Except as provided in section 609.582, subdivision 1a, in determining an appropriate disposition for a first offense of burglary of a dwelling, the court shall presume that a stay of execution with at least a 90-day period of incarceration as a condition of probation shall be imposed unless the defendant's criminal history score determined according to the Sentencing Guidelines indicates a presumptive executed sentence, in which case the presumptive executed sentence shall be imposed unless the court departs from the Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to section 244.10. A stay of imposition of sentence may be granted only if accompanied by a statement on the record of the reasons for it. The presumptive period of incarceration may be waived in whole or in part by the court if the defendant provides restitution or performs community work service.
1983 c 321 s 3; 1984 c 497 s 1; 1986 c 470 s 20; 1996 c 408 art 3 s 33
Notwithstanding section 609.04, a prosecution for or conviction of the crime of burglary is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed on entering or while in the building entered.
As used in this section, "code-grabbing device" means a device that can receive and record the coded signal sent by the transmitter of a security or other electronic system and can play back the signal to disarm or operate that system.
Whoever possesses a code-grabbing device with intent to use the device to commit an unlawful act may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
Whoever has in possession any device, explosive, or other instrumentality with intent to use or permit the use of the same to commit burglary or theft may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.59; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1986 c 444; 1988 c 712 s 13
As used in this section and section 609.592, "timber" means trees, whether standing or down, that will produce forest products of value including but not limited to logs, posts, poles, bolts, pulpwood, cordwood, lumber, and decorative material.
Whoever, without claim of right or consent of the owner, drives, places, or fastens in timber any device of iron, steel, ceramic, or other substance sufficiently hard to damage saws or wood processing or manufacturing equipment, with the intent to hinder the logging or the processing of timber, is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced as provided in subdivisions 3 and 4.
(1) if the violation caused great bodily harm, to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both;
(2) otherwise, to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
In addition to any sentence imposed under subdivision 3, the sentencing court may order a person convicted of violating this section, or of violating section 609.595 by damaging timber or commercial wood processing, manufacturing, or transportation equipment to pay restitution to the owner of the damaged property.
Whoever commits any of the following acts is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1) possesses a device of iron, steel, ceramic, or other substance sufficiently hard to damage saws, wood processing, manufacturing, or transportation equipment, with the intent to use the device to hinder the logging or the processing of timber; or
(2) possesses a chemical or biological substance, mechanical equipment, or tool with the intent to use it or permit its use to damage timber processing, manufacturing, or transportation equipment.
Whoever intentionally and without consent from one authorized to give consent causes any damage to or takes, removes, severs, or breaks:
(1) any line erected or maintained for the purpose of transmitting electricity for light, heat, or power, or any insulator or cross-arm, appurtenance or apparatus connected to the line, or any wire, cable, or current of the line; or any component used in the generation, transmission, or distribution of electricity, including equipment used for grounding, system protection, or personnel protection;
(2) any pipe or main or hazardous liquid pipeline erected, operated, or maintained for the purpose of transporting, conveying, or distributing gas or other hazardous liquids for light, heat, power, or any other purpose, or any part of the pipe, main, or pipeline, or any valve, meter, holder, compressor, machinery, appurtenance, equipment, or apparatus connected with any main or pipeline; or
(3) any machinery, equipment, or fixtures used in receiving, initiating, amplifying, processing, transmitting, retransmitting, recording, switching, or monitoring telecommunications services, such as computers, transformers, amplifiers, routers, repeaters, multiplexers, and other items performing comparable functions; and machinery, equipment, and fixtures used in the transportation of telecommunications services, radio transmitters and receivers, satellite equipment, microwave equipment, and other transporting media including wire, cable, fiber, poles, and conduit;
Whoever violates subdivision 1 is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
2007 c 54 art 2 s 16; 2016 c 152 s 1
(1) "critical public service facility" includes railroad yards and stations, bus stations, airports, and other mass transit facilities; oil refineries; storage areas or facilities for hazardous materials, hazardous substances, or hazardous wastes; and bridges;
(2) "pipeline" has the meaning given in section 609.6055, subdivision 1; and
(3) "utility" includes: (i) any organization defined as a utility in section 216C.06, subdivision 18; (ii) any telecommunications carrier or telephone company regulated under chapter 237; and (iii) any local utility or enterprise formed for the purpose of providing electrical or gas heating and power, telephone, water, sewage, wastewater, or other related utility service, which is owned, controlled, or regulated by a town, a statutory or home rule charter city, a county, a port development authority, the Metropolitan Council, a district heating authority, a regional commission or other regional government unit, or a combination of these governmental units.
Subd. 2.Prohibited conduct; penalty.
Whoever causes damage to the physical property of a critical public service facility, utility, or pipeline with the intent to significantly disrupt the operation of or the provision of services by the facility, utility, or pipeline and without the consent of one authorized to give consent, is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both.
Subd. 3.Detention authority; immunity.
An employee or other person designated by a critical public service facility, utility, or pipeline to ensure the provision of services by the critical public service facility or the safe operation of the equipment or facility of the utility or pipeline who has reasonable cause to believe that a person is violating this section may detain the person as provided in this subdivision. The person detained must be promptly informed of the purpose of the detention and may not be subjected to unnecessary or unreasonable force or interrogation. The employee or other designated person must notify a peace officer promptly of the detention and may only detain the person for a reasonable period of time. No employee or other designated person is criminally or civilly liable for any detention that the employee or person reasonably believed was authorized by and conducted in conformity with this subdivision.
Subdivision 1.Criminal damage to property in the first degree.
Whoever intentionally causes damage to physical property of another without the latter's consent may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both, if:
(1) the damage to the property caused a reasonably foreseeable risk of bodily harm; or
(2) the property damaged belongs to a common carrier and the damage impairs the service to the public rendered by the carrier; or
(3) the damage reduces the value of the property by more than $1,000 measured by the cost of repair and replacement; or
(4) the damage reduces the value of the property by more than $500 measured by the cost of repair and replacement and the defendant has been convicted within the preceding three years of an offense under this subdivision or subdivision 2.
In any prosecution under clause (3), the value of any property damaged by the defendant in violation of that clause within any six-month period may be aggregated and the defendant charged accordingly in applying the provisions of this section; provided that when two or more offenses are committed by the same person in two or more counties, the accused may be prosecuted in any county in which one of the offenses was committed for all of the offenses aggregated under this paragraph.
Subd. 1a.Criminal damage to property in the second degree.
(a) Whoever intentionally causes damage described in subdivision 2, paragraph (a), because of the property owner's or another's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability as defined in section 363A.03, age, or national origin is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year and a day or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
(b) In any prosecution under paragraph (a), the value of property damaged by the defendant in violation of that paragraph within any six-month period may be aggregated and the defendant charged accordingly in applying this section. When two or more offenses are committed by the same person in two or more counties, the accused may be prosecuted in any county in which one of the offenses was committed for all of the offenses aggregated under this paragraph.
Subd. 2.Criminal damage to property in the third degree.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision 1a, whoever intentionally causes damage to another person's physical property without the other person's consent may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both, if the damage reduces the value of the property by more than $500 but not more than $1,000 as measured by the cost of repair and replacement.
(b) Whoever intentionally causes damage to another person's physical property without the other person's consent because of the property owner's or another's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability as defined in section 363A.03, age, or national origin may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both, if the damage reduces the value of the property by not more than $500.
(c) In any prosecution under paragraph (a), the value of property damaged by the defendant in violation of that paragraph within any six-month period may be aggregated and the defendant charged accordingly in applying this section. When two or more offenses are committed by the same person in two or more counties, the accused may be prosecuted in any county in which one of the offenses was committed for all of the offenses aggregated under this paragraph.
Subd. 3.Criminal damage to property in the fourth degree.
Whoever intentionally causes damage described in subdivision 2 under any other circumstances is guilty of a misdemeanor.
1963 c 753 art 1 s 609.595; 1971 c 23 s 60; 1977 c 355 s 11; 1979 c 258 s 18; 1984 c 421 s 1; 1984 c 628 art 3 s 11; 1987 c 329 s 11; 1989 c 261 s 2-4; 2002 c 401 art 1 s 17; 2007 c 54 art 2 s 17,18
It is a felony for any person to intentionally and without justification cause the death of or great or substantial bodily harm to a police dog, a search and rescue dog, or an arson dog when the dog is involved in law enforcement, fire, or correctional investigation or apprehension, search and rescue duties, or the dog is in the custody of or under the control of a peace officer, a trained handler, or an employee of a correctional facility. A person convicted under this subdivision may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
It is a gross misdemeanor for any person to intentionally and without justification cause demonstrable bodily harm to a police dog, search and rescue dog, or an arson dog when the dog is involved in law enforcement, fire, or correctional investigation or apprehension, search and rescue duties, or the dog is in the custody of or under the control of a peace officer, a trained handler, or an employee of a correctional facility.
Subd. 2a.Misdemeanor.
It is a misdemeanor for any person to intentionally and without justification assault a police dog, search and rescue dog, or an arson dog when the dog is involved in law enforcement, fire, or correctional investigation or apprehension, search and rescue duties, or the dog is in the custody of or under the control of a peace officer, a trained handler, or an employee of a correctional facility.
Subd. 2b.Mandatory restitution.
The court shall order a person convicted of violating this section to pay restitution for the costs and expenses resulting from the crime. Costs and expenses include, but are not limited to, the purchase and training of a replacement dog and veterinary services for the injured dog. If the court finds that the convicted person is indigent, the court may reduce the amount of restitution to a reasonable level or order it paid in installments.
(1) "arson dog" means a dog that has been certified as an arson dog by a state fire or police agency or by an independent testing laboratory;
(2) "correctional facility" has the meaning given in section 241.021, subdivision 1, paragraph (f);
(3) "peace officer" has the meaning given in section 626.84, subdivision 1, paragraph (c); and
(4) "search and rescue dog" means a dog that is trained to locate lost or missing persons, victims of natural or other disasters, and human bodies.
1987 c 167 s 1; 1996 c 408 art 3 s 35; 1999 c 77 s 1; 2001 c 7 s 87; 2011 c 9 s 1
As used in this section, "police horse" means a horse that has been trained for crowd control and other law enforcement purposes and is used to assist peace officers or reserve officers in the performance of their official duties.
Whoever assaults or intentionally harms a police horse while the horse is being used or maintained for use by a law enforcement agency, or while under the control of a reserve officer who is operating at the direction of, under the control of, or on behalf of a peace officer or a law enforcement agency, is guilty of a crime and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 3.
(1) if a peace officer, a reserve officer, or any other person suffers great bodily harm or death as a result of the violation, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both;
(2) if the police horse suffers death or great bodily harm as a result of the violation, or if a peace officer or a reserve officer suffers demonstrable bodily harm as a result of the violation, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $4,000, or both;
(3) if the police horse suffers demonstrable bodily harm as a result of the violation, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year and one day or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both;
(4) if a peace officer or a reserve officer is involuntarily unseated from the police horse or any person, other than the peace officer or reserve officer, suffers demonstrable bodily harm as a result of the violation, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both;
(5) if a violation other than one described in clauses (1) to (4) occurs, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
1995 c 179 s 1; 2004 c 228 art 1 s 72; 2011 c 85 s 3
(a) A person who intentionally exposes a domestic animal to an animal disease contrary to reasonable veterinary practice, or intentionally puts a domestic animal at risk of quarantine or destruction by actions contrary to reasonable veterinary practice, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) do not apply to a person performing academic or industry research on domestic animals under protocols approved by an institutional animal care and use committee.
A person who violates subdivision 1 is liable in a civil action for damages in an amount three times the value of any domestic animal destroyed because it has the disease, has been exposed to the disease agent, or is at high risk of being exposed to the disease agent because of proximity to diseased animals.
For purposes of this section, "domestic animal" means:
(1) those species of animals that live under the husbandry of humans;
(2) livestock within the meaning of section 35.01, subdivision 3;
(3) a farm-raised deer, farm-raised game bird, or farm-raised fish; or
(4) an animal listed as a domestic animal by a rule adopted by the Department of Agriculture.
(a) The following terms have the meanings given them for purposes of this section.
(1) "Premises" means real property and any appurtenant building or structure.
(2) "Dwelling" means the building or part of a building used by an individual as a place of residence on either a full-time or a part-time basis. A dwelling may be part of a multidwelling or multipurpose building, or a manufactured home as defined in section 168.002, subdivision 16.
(3) "Construction site" means the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building or structure.
(4) "Owner or lawful possessor," as used in paragraph (b), clause (9), means the person on whose behalf a building or dwelling is being constructed, altered, painted, or repaired and the general contractor or subcontractor engaged in that work.
(5) "Posted," as used:
(i) in paragraph (b), clause (4), means the placement of a sign at least 8-1/2 inches by 11 inches in a conspicuous place on the exterior of the building, or in a conspicuous place within the property on which the building is located. The sign must carry a general notice warning against trespass;
(ii) in paragraph (b), clause (9), means the placement of a sign at least 8-1/2 inches by 11 inches in a conspicuous place on the exterior of the building that is under construction, alteration, or repair, or in a conspicuous place within the area being protected. If the area being protected is less than three acres, one additional sign must be conspicuously placed within that area. If the area being protected is three acres but less than ten acres, two additional signs must be conspicuously placed within that area. For each additional full ten acres of area being protected beyond the first ten acres of area, two additional signs must be conspicuously placed within the area being protected. The sign must carry a general notice warning against trespass; and
(iii) in paragraph (b), clause (10), means the placement of signs that:
(A) carry a general notice warning against trespass;
(B) display letters at least two inches high;
(C) state that Minnesota law prohibits trespassing on the property; and
(D) are posted in a conspicuous place and at intervals of 500 feet or less.
(6) "Business licensee," as used in paragraph (b), clause (9), includes a representative of a building trades labor or management organization.
(7) "Building" has the meaning given in section 609.581, subdivision 2.
(b) A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if the person intentionally:
(1) permits domestic animals or fowls under the actor's control to go on the land of another within a city;
(2) interferes unlawfully with a monument, sign, or pointer erected or marked to designate a point of a boundary, line or a political subdivision, or of a tract of land;
(3) trespasses on the premises of another and, without claim of right, refuses to depart from the premises on demand of the lawful possessor;
(4) occupies or enters the dwelling or locked or posted building of another, without claim
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Quick Fire At The Slaughterhouse: Interview With Bobby Nash
Posted on April 24, 2016 by richardgodwin
Bobby Nash is an award-winning author who writes a little bit of everything including novels, comic books, short prose, graphic novels, screenplays, media tie-ins. Between writing deadlines, Bobby is an occasional actor and extra in movies and television. The re-release of his first new novel has been published. Bobby met me at The Slaughterhouse where we talked about the publishing landscape today and genre fiction.
How do you see the publishing landscape today in its need for formula when there is so much more out there?
There are so many published genres, including mash-ups of genres readily available now from all corners of the world. If there’s a niche, then there is probably a book or book series out there to fill it. As great as it is that so many stories are available in paper, electronic, and audio, it also makes it harder for the readers to find exactly what they’re looking for in a sea of books. It is more imperative than ever, I think, for authors to know how to market their work lest they get lost on that sea of books. The change in how entertainment, not just books, but also movies, music, TV, news, etc. reaches the end user has changed and we, as the ones making that content, that entertainment, have to learn new ways to let readers know our work is out there and ready for them.
There was a time when a publisher could say, “westerns don’t sell” so that meant that if you were an author of westerns, your options were severely limited. That is not so much the case these days. Today, western authors can bypass those who say that those types of novels won’t sell and sell them directly to the audience that is looking for them. While that audience might be too small for a large publisher, it’s not too small for an independent author. It’s a brave new, sometimes scary, world.
Tell us about Evil Ways.
Evil Ways was actually my first published novel, released back in 2005. I was a published writer in comic books and newspaper/magazines, but Evil Ways was my big leap into novel-length prose. I love a good thriller so I decided to try my hand at one. The idea for Evil Ways started not as a novel, but as a movie. A filmmaker friend of mine wanted to move from filming shorts to a movie. I pitched an idea about someone stalking and killing a group of friends in town for a reunion and the authorities trying to catch him. My friend passed on the idea, but I tweaked it and added and deleted elements until it became Evil Ways.
Evil Ways follows FBI Agent Harold Palmer. After a close call on the job, he takes a much deserved break to reconnect with his younger brother, something that has been long overdue. Franklin Palmer is a newspaperman, who lives in a small North Georgia town called Sommersville where he bought the local newspaper and is trying to keep his head above water. The murder of a young woman is the big story when Harold comes to town and he, Franklin, and the local sheriff, Tom Myers, find themselves on the trail of a killer out for revenge on a group of locals who have returned home for their 10th high school reunion. What strange secret do they have that makes them the target of the killer stalking them?
To celebrate the 10th anniversary last year, a new cover was designed for the anniversary edition, which was released. A sequel, called Evil Intent, is scheduled to premiere later this year. Evil Intent will see Harold Palmer back in action with the FBI just a few short months after the end of Evil Ways.
Do you think too much crime fiction sanitises crime?
Possibly. I think we’ve all gotten used to reading (or watching in TV and movies) fights, gunshots, and things like that. As crime writers, we have to bring something new to the crimes so that the reader doesn’t feel that they’ve seen all this before. I don’t want to desensitize my audience from the brutality of crime, and I’ve killed a lot of characters in my books, but I also try not to sensationalize it either. Wherever I can, I like to leave some of the details of the brutality of the crimes in my novels to the reader’s imagination. I’ve found that makes it much more graphic than anything I could have written. I don’t want my readers, or myself, to start to think of certain crimes as “safe” or “boring”.
What else is on the cards for you this year?
2016 looks to be a busy one. In April, Moonstone Books is releasing the Sherlock Holmes/Domino Lady trade paperback collection that includes the 2 issues comic series by Nancy Holder and me. It also includes Nancy’s prose story from the Domino Lady “Sex As A Weapon” anthology where Holmes and Domino Lady and a new prose adventure featuring the duo by me. In May, also from Moonstone, is the first issue of the new Domino Lady: Threesome team-up comic book series. Domino Lady joins forces with 2 heroes in each issue to thwart the bad guys. Issues 1 and 2 are co-written by Nancy Holder and me. I take over as solo writer with issue #3. 2016 is the 10th anniversary of Lance Star: Sky Ranger and we’ll see 2 reprint collections and a new full-length novel written by me out this year. The Evil Intent novel, which we talked about earlier, will be out this year. The Ruby Files vol. 2 is a collection of pulpy p.i. stories coming soon. Strong Will is a graphic novel co-written and created by Michael Gordon and myself with art by Wendell Cavalcanti and Rob Jones that will be out later this year as well. There are several other things as well, but I don’t exact release dates yet. That’s just a few of the books coming out. I still have a lot of writing to finish up as well. The best place to keep up with all of my upcoming projects is at www.bobbynash.com.
Thank you Bobby for an informative interview.
Evil Ways can be had on Amazon US and UK
See all Bobby’s works on his website, on his Amazon author pages US and UK and Ben Books
Connect with Bobby on Facebook, Twitter @bobbynash, and Google+. See his website for more places.
← Quick Fire At The Slaughterhouse: Interview With Jane Haseldine
Quick Fire At The Slaughterhouse: Interview With Louise Phillips →
3 Responses to Quick Fire At The Slaughterhouse: Interview With Bobby Nash
Bobby Nash says:
Thanks again, Richard. Great chatting with you
Adam James says:
Very cool conncept. In fact this September I am returning to my home town in Michigan for a 56-year reunion with my old pals. Who knows what evil lurks in the hearts of men??? HAHAHAHA! That was an old radio schtick!
Cheers, y’all.😉
Jim in MT
Have a great reunion, Jim in MT. Just keep checking over your shoulder just in case. 🙂
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Anglican-Methodist Covenant
on Thursday, 30 October 2003 at 9.56 am by Peter Owen
categorised as News
The Anglican-Methodist Covenant in England will be signed at a national celebration on Saturday 1 November 2003 in the presence of Her Majesty the Queen. Earlier this year the Covenant was strongly endorsed by the Methodist Conference of Great Britain and the General Synod of the Church of England.
The event will begin at Methodist Central Hall, Westminster, at 11.00 am when the Archbishops of Canterbury and York and the President, Vice-President and Secretary of the Methodist Conference will sign the Covenant on behalf of their churches before an invited assembly. The ceremony will continue at Westminster Abbey with a short service of thanksgiving and dedication.
The order of service is not yet available online, but material from it, adapted for local use, is available here as a Word document and here as a pdf file.
Thirty years ago a unity scheme between the Church of England and the Methodist Church failed at the last stage. Formal conversations between the two churches began in 1999 and produced a Common Statement which proposed a Covenant between the two churches as the first stage on the road to unity.
Unfortunately the Common Statement is not available online. It contains much important information, particularly on those matters where there is general agreement between the two churches and those where there is not. It must however be said that there is often as much disagreement within each church as there is between the two.
The full text of the Covenant, and its accompanying Affirmations and Commitments, can be found here and here. The second of these links also lists all the resources that are available for purchase. One of these, a theological workbook, can be downloaded from here as a Word document.
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Lawmaker talks about sprinkler legislation a year after deadly blaze
State Rep. Kevin Wilson discusses legislation which mandated sprinkler systems in Missouri nursing homes.
More than 50 years ago, on a cold February night, a fire swept through a Missouri nursing home, killing 72 residents. In the wake of the deadly fire at Warrenton, Mo., in 1957, legislators vowed to pass laws requiring sprinkler systems in all nursing homes and other institutions.
But somehow, as other matters came before the Missouri Legislature, those promises got pushed back.
Fast forward more than 20 years to 1979, when a blaze at a residential care center killed 25 people in Farmington, Mo.
Yet it wasn’t until this year, after a blaze claimed the lives of 11 people in Anderson, that laws requiring sprinkler systems in all new nursing home construction and homes undergoing a major renovation, and retrofitted into nursing homes with 25 or more residents, passed the Missouri House and Senate. This was because of the efforts of an area lawmaker, Rep. Kevin Wilson of Neosho.
Hours after the Anderson blaze, Wilson vowed that fixing the problem would be his “No. 1 priority” in the next legislative session, which was then just over a month away.
“The whole thought process was we had this fire in 1957 which took the lives of 72 people in Warrenton, and people said ‘We have to do something about this,’ ” Wilson said in an interview last week. “Here we were, years later, with a fire that killed 11 people. I couldn’t let that pass without doing something to make these homes as safe as they could be. We just couldn’t allow more time to go by without fixing the problems.”
Wilson’s measure, signed into law last May by Gov. Matt Blunt, calls the addition of staff to assist the state fire marshal’s office in checking nursing homes to see if they meet compliance standards. These additions should be made by late 2008, Wilson said.
Other parts of the bill would mandate the addition of smoke detectors and heat rise indicators which indicate spikes in temperatures, and would be enacted by 2012, the same timeframe as set for sprinklers. Heat rise indicators may have given Anderson Guest House residents an earlier warning as to the fire.
While the cause of the Anderson Guest House fire may never be fully known, it is believed the fire started in the northwest corner of the building’s attic, where a technician had shorted out a heating and air system in order to repair it.
Bill Zieres, the state’s deputy fire marshal, told the Neosho Daily News last November the attic had about 6 inches of blown cellulose insulation. Investigators believe the fire smoldered for some time before breaking through the ceiling into the living areas.
The building that housed Anderson Guest House was built in 1982 and housed a grocery store for about a year. Afterward, the 150- by 55-foot building became a nursing home complex. In the mid-1990s, the Anderson Guest House was formed.
Wilson said loans for the entire cost of installing or retrofitting sprinkler systems were available from the state.
According to the bill, some facilities may not qualify for the loans. For instance, nursing homes which have a total reimbursement for those eligible for Medicaid of $52 or more a day may not qualify, but those which did qualify would have five years to pay back the loan. Nursing homes having a reimbursement rate of between $49 and $52 a day per resident would have eight years to pay off the loan, while those with reimbursement levels between $48 and $49 a day would have 10 years.
Facilities with reimbursement rates under $48 would not have payments or interest due until their rates exceeded $48. All facilities would have to have a complete fire alarm system tied into central dispatch, the fire department, or an alarm company, Wilson said. And according to the bill, manual pull stations would be located at each exit and attendant’s station. Wilson said three state agencies — the Department of Health and Human Services, the state fire marshal’s office and the Department of Mental Health — would be responsible for monitoring nursing homes to see if they are in compliance with the new law.
Additionally, these agencies will report to the state Legislature at the end of session next year.
Wilson’s measure sailed through the House by a 158-0 vote, and an amended version passed the Senate 32-1.
In a column dated June 4 for publication in Missouri newspapers, state Sen. Rob Mayer, R-Dexter, represents the 25th Senate district of Wayne, Ripley, Butler, New Madrid, Pemiscot and Dunklin counties, praised the measure.
“This new law won’t bring back the 11 people who died in the Anderson Guest House fire, but maybe it will prevent the next tragedy from happening,” he wrote. “It was the least we lawmakers could do to protect our citizens.”
Last Wednesday, Wilson said he could not have gotten the measure passed without the help of lawmakers such as Sen. Jack Goodman, R-Mount Vernon, House speaker Rod Jetton and Floor Leader Tom Dempsey.
“What it took is somebody pushing it and not taking no for an answer,” Wilson said. “A lot of people did that this year. A lot of people saw the priority of this and pushed this thing along. If we didn’t have the speaker and the majority Floor Leader in this, it wouldn’t have passed. The governor, obviously, was behind this 100 percent, as was the Senate Floor Leader, the Senate President, and Jack Goodman. These people thought it was a good idea, and supported it.”
Neosho Daily News
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What Have You Forgotten? Joby Williamson
11 June – 18 July 2010
Joby Williamson has been collecting discarded post-it notes on a daily basis for ten years. What began as a casual observation has evolved into a committed process of ‘i-spy’.
Scribbles, jottings, shopping lists, aides-mémoire, notes of endearment, phone numbers, announcements, ideas and doodles: these scraps of paper, seen en masse, form an anthology of personal and working lives, ranging from the prosaic to the profound.
We presented What Have You Forgotten? as an ongoing archaeological project. Like an insect collection, hundreds of post-it notes were suspended in time, as if Williamson had pressed the ‘pause’ button to provoke awareness of these small, tossed-away pieces of paper.
What Have You Forgotten? with text by Nicolas de Oliveira and Nicola Oxley, and Rosie Pedlow, accompanies the show.
About Joby Williamson
2nd PR
Joby Williamson
What Have You Forgotten?, 2010
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The Best Spas in New York for Weekend Getaways
Spas East Coast Spas
By Anitra Brown
lightphoto / Getty Images
Whether you're visiting New York City or live there and are looking for a weekend spa getaway, the surrounding New York state is home to a number of relaxing destinations.
New York spas and resorts provide a rich range of experiences that include everything from hiking, boating, and skiing at historic properties in remote locations to luxurious inns within just a few hours of the city.
If you're willing to go a few hours further, there are even more choices, including a French-style inn in the Finger Lakes and a casino spa with big marquee entertainers, and even if you don't want to travel, the luxury hotel spas of New York City are so numerous they deserve their own list.
Mohonk Mountain House (New Paltz)
The Spa at Mohonk Mountain House in New York
1000 Mountain Rest Rd, New Paltz, NY 12561-2825, USA
Mohonk Mountain House is a historical treasure that dates back to 1869 when a modest inn was built on the small mountaintop near Lake Mohonk in New Paltz, New York, which is less than two hours away from New York City.
Today the grand, sprawling 266-room Victorian hotel is still surrounded by thousands of acres of forest with 85 miles of hiking trails at its door. Rooms are small but 124 of them have wood-burning fireplaces. Also included in your room rate, you'll be treated to meals in a splendid dining room and exercises classes at the resort's gym.
While you're at the Mohonk House, enjoy tennis, golf, lake swimming, boating, ice skating, cross-country skiing, snowshoeing, and children's programs—depending on the season. Year-round, you can also enjoy the 30,000 square-foot Victorian style spa, which has 16 treatment rooms, a couples room with fireplace, and a co-ed solarium.
The Emerson Resort & Spa (Mt. Tremper)
Emerson Resort & Spa
5340 NY-28, Mt Tremper, NY 12457, USA
Set on the Esopus Creek in the northern Catskills of Mt. Tremper, New York, The Emerson is an elegant, family-friendly inn—you can even bring your dog.
The spa, redone in 2016, offers traditional massage therapies and facials along with a fitness studio. There's fine dining, excellent shopping, and the world's largest kaleidoscope also on-site, but don't expect traditional resort amenities like golf.
Buttermilk Falls Inn & Spa (Milton)
Buttermilk Inn
220 N Rd, Milton, NY 12547, USA
The Buttermilk Falls Inn & Spa is a charming bed and breakfast with a total of 19 rooms and guesthouses on 75 acres in prime orchard country in the Hudson Valley. Located near New Paltz on the western side of the Hudson River, it's just a few hours from New York City, which makes it a great getaway.
The on-site Henry's Restaurant features food from the inn's organic garden and beehives. The modern-looking spa is interesting, utilizing solar and geothermal energy to heat its sauna, steam room, and mineral pool.
The Copperhood Inn & Spa (Shandaken)
Courtesy of Copperhood Spa
7039 NY-28, Shandaken, NY 12480, USA
The Copperhood Inn & Spa is a small 15-room spa in the Catskills that has developed a following for its customized weight-loss, detox, juice-fast, and raw food programs, which range from three days to a month.
Not far from Emerson geographically, it's more modest in style—don't expect a luxurious atmosphere. However, it does have healthy food, yoga classes, hiking, and a modest but well-outfitted spa with six treatment rooms (including a wet room with Vichy shower, Scotch hose, and hydrotherapy tub). It also has a sauna, hot tub, steam room, 60-foot indoor pool, and full gym.
Continue to 5 of 11 below.
Gurney's Inn & Spa (Montauk)
Courtesy of Gurneys
290 Old Montauk Hwy, Montauk, NY 11954-5048, USA
With a fabulous beachfront location way out on Long Island, Gurney's is a Montauk institution. It's also the closest thing America has to a thalassotherapy spa.
Gurney's uses real seawater in a modern hydrotherapy tub (most spas just add powdered algae to tap water), and it has an indoor seawater pool with as little chlorine as possible. Gurney's can also help you design a customized thalassotherapy program to help with detoxification and weight loss.
Gurney's public space is 1950s-era and the spa is dated, but the setting is five-star and rooms have been nicely redone in contemporary beach style. They all face the ocean, with private decks for sunning yourself. It has 146 rooms, suites, and beachfront cottages.
Gideon Putnam Resort & Spa (Saratoga Springs)
Gideon Putnam
24 Gideon Putnam Rd, Saratoga Springs, NY 12866-6218, USA
One of the great 19th century resort towns because of its mineral waters, Saratoga Springs is still a vibrant historic city with great restaurants and shopping. Summer is peak season here because of thoroughbred racing and performances by the New York City Ballet and The Philadelphia Orchestra.
The Georgian Revival style Gideon Putnam Resort & Spa is in the Saratoga Spa State Park and has more than 20 suites and 120 guest rooms. It's right next to the Roosevelt Baths & Spa, a truly historic spa that offers heated mineral water bathing. The naturally effervescent water is mixed with tap water, but you can ask for one that is unmixed, and the massages are excellent.
Sagamore Resort & Spa (Bolton Landing)
110 Sagamore Rd, Bolton Landing, NY 12814, USA
This white clapboard classic dates to 1883, when an inn was first built on a private 70-acre island on Lake George, a historic vacation destination in the southern Adirondacks 60 miles north of Albany.
A seasonal, family-friendly resort with a championship golf course, The Sagamore has splendid views of the mountains and a modest spa and salon with a full range of treatments. Enjoy indoor and outdoor pools, a private beach, and jogger's trails as well nearby hiking, biking, white water rafting, and horseback riding. The historic hotel has 137 rooms and suites while the lodges have another 224 rooms.
While the Sagamore Resort and Spa is open year-round, it will only be open on the weekends from the end of October through the beginning of May. However, the Sagamore Resort will also be open for the full week of Thanksgiving in November, Christmas in December, and spring break in February.
Mirror Lake Inn Resort & Spa (Lake Placid)
Anitra Brown
77 Mirror Lake Dr, Lake Placid, NY 12946, USA
Set in the heart of the Adirondacks about 110 miles south of Montreal, the Mirror Lake Inn Resort & Spa is Lake Placid's finest hotel. The clubby 128-room white clapboard and green-shuttered resort has a private beachfront on its seven acres overlooking Mirror Lake on one side and mountain peaks on the other.
It's a year-round destination, with swimming, complimentary canoes and kayaks, hiking, and winter sports that include dogsled rides on the frozen lake. The plush spa is done up in marble and mahogany, with fireplace, whirlpools, and steam rooms.
Whiteface Lodge (Lake Placid)
Whiteface Lodge
7 Whiteface Inn Ln, Lake Placid, NY 12946, USA
Whiteface Lodge has a great camp feeling that has proven to be popular with weddings, groups, and families. The accommodations range from junior suites to one, two, and three-bedroom suites, all 94 of which are equipped with kitchens, dining room tables, washer-dryers, bathrooms with jet-tubs, and outdoor porches.
Additionally, a couple looking for a romantic getaway or group of spa-loving girls wanting to share a bonding experience can seek refuge in the 8,000 square-foot Adirondack-style spa on the lower floors of the resort. In summer, take a yoga class on the shores of Lake Placid or hike the many nearby trails. In winter, snowshoe or hit the slopes.
Mirbeau Inn & Spa (Skaneateles)
Mirbeau Inn
851 W Genesee Street Rd, Skaneateles, NY 13152, USA
Mirbeau Inn & Spa is a charming 34-room inn on the northern tip of Lake Skaneateles in New York's fabled Finger Lakes, which is about 20 miles west of Syracuse.
Designed to resemble Monet's garden, the inn has warm, yellow buildings and a pond with a green bridge at its center. Expect some berets and cafe music, but it's a lovely place from which to explore the historic town and nearby wineries.
Make day trips to Seneca Falls (home to feminism) or to the charming town of Aurora. Designed by Sylvia Sepielli, the spa is just gorgeous, with fireplaces in most of the 18 treatment rooms. It also has lots of exercise classes and a great steakhouse and wine list.
Skana, The Spa at Turning Stone Resort & Casino (Verona)
Skana Spa
5218 Patrick Rd, Verona, NY 13478, USA
The Oneida tribe owns this major casino resort on 1,200 acres in upstate New York's scenic Mohawk Valley, 35 miles east of Syracuse. Called the Leatherstocking region in James Fenimore Cooper's 1826 novel, "Last of the Mohicans," the surrounding area is rich in cultural history.
Skana, the spa, is named after the Oneida word for "peace." The resort has a full range of accommodations, ranging from an RV park (from mid-April to October) to luxury accommodations. Skana is located in the most upscale choice, the 95 room all-suite Lodge at Turning Stone Resort.
The 33,000 square-foot spa and salon is a tribute to Oneida architecture and has 12 treatment rooms. The more affordable Ahsi Day Spa is in the 19-floor Tower Building, along with The Fitness Club and casino.
The Best Spas in New York State
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Indulge in Montauk's Thalassotherapy Spa
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You Saw It in a Dream: Sagamore Resort on Lake George in the Adirondacks
New York Winter Resorts and Vacation Ideas
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A Day Away: Fab Family Vacations Within a 6 Hour Drive of Boston
Fab Family Vacations Within 6 Hours of NYC
The 9 Best Intercontinental Hotels of 2019
New York Resort Spas for Weekend Getaways
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Hitmen show no mercy on Ams in Game 1 | Tri-City Herald
Hitmen show no mercy on Ams in Game 1
By Annie Fowler, Herald staff writer
CALGARY, Alberta -- The Tri-City Americans were playing on the biggest stage of their careers Friday, and nothing went right from the drop of the puck.
Matt MacKenzie and Misha Fisenko scored two goals each and Martin Jones stopped all 26 Tri-City shots as the Calgary Hitmen trampled the Americans 7-0 in Game 1 of the Western Hockey League finals before a crowd of 10,980 at the Pengrowth Saddledome.
The series, which features the No. 1 seeds from the Western and Eastern conferences for the first time since 2002-03, continues tonight with Game 2 in Calgary.
Games 3 and 4 will be Tuesday and Wednesday at Toyota Center.
It's only the second time this season Tri-City trailed by six or more goals. The first was a 7-1 loss to Regina on Nov. 21 at Toyota Center.
"We got down 3-0 and we didn't answer the bell after that," said Tri-City captain Jarrett Toll. "Good thing is we get to play (today). We're not a team that's going to quit. We are not satisfied just making the finals."
Even with the lopsided score, Calgary coach Mike Williamson noted that there was room for improvement from his team.
"Fortunately in the first we were able to score on our chances," he said. "The second period I thought we were quite sloppy. The third, we buckled down and played a lot more sound. We know it will be tougher (today). We are happy to get this one."
Calgary, playing in the WHL finals for the second straight year, got a pair of first-period power-play goals from MacKenzie sandwiched by tallies from Cody Sylvester and Fisenko for a 4-0 lead.
Sylvester opened the scoring at 6:08 on a breakaway, sliding the puck under Drew Owsley's left pad.
MacKenzie scored his two just 49 seconds apart for a 3-0 Calgary lead. The first was a blast from the point, while the second came from a shot just inside the left faceoff circle.
Fisenko was able to get around Tri-City defenseman Brock Sutherland and sweep the puck around Owsley and in the net at 10:52. That was the end of Owsley's night -- he was replaced by Alex Pechurskiy, getting his first action since Game 3 of the first round against Chilliwack.
Calgary's Brandon Kozun, who leads the playoff scoring with eight goals and 20 assists, gave the Hitmen a 5-0 lead at 5:28 of the second period, going top shelf on Pechurskiy in the slot.
Fisenko scored his second of the night at 19:40 of the second, redirecting a shot by Del Cowan from the left point.
Ben Wilson finished the scoring at 15:12 of the third with his first goal of the playoffs.
"We know what we did wrong. We just have to correct those mistakes and battle harder (today)," said Ams defenseman Brett Plouffe.
Jones, who was named WHL goaltender of the year Wednesday, posted his second shutout of the playoffs.
"For the most part, we kept them to bad angles and I was able to see a lot of pucks," Jones said. "Not having turnovers at either blue line was big for us, because they're such a fast team."
The Americans outshot the Hitmen 26-23 on the night and were 0-for-5 on the power play.
"I thought our power play, which has been really good for us all year really struggled," Hiller said. "I thought Calgary put a lot of pressure on us. We need to be better on loose pucks, and we will be. We haven't lost two games in a row in the playoffs, and every time we've lost we've come back with an excellent effort."
It only takes one look to see how the Saddledome got its name. Its roof curves in the middle like the seat of a well-worn saddle.
Built in 1983, the Saddledome is home to the Calgary Flames, the Hitmen and the Roughnecks (National Lacrosse League), but it also is a prime venue for concerts, conferences and other sporting events. Depending on the event, the Saddledome can seat more than 19,000 people.
The attendance here for Game 1 of the WHL finals between the Americans and Hitmen was 10,980.
The Saddledome features a huge video board over center ice. There are big screens on all four sides and smaller screens on the upper half, not to mention the scoreboard. The video is clear and the color is sharp.
On the concourse, there is a vast array of places to eat, beer stations (a cold one will run you $7.50) everywhere you look and the rest rooms are plentiful. It's reminiscent of the concourse at Spokane Arena, but with more of everything.
Unlike Toyota Center, which has one price for every seat, the Saddledome has numerous levels and prices. For a Flames game, you will pay anywhere from $228 (plus tax) for club seating, to $33-37 for a seat in the third level.
For the Hitmen-Americans game, tickets ran from $23 to $43 (plus tax).
-- Fisenko and Pechurskiy are from the same hometown -- Magnitogorsk, Russia. ... Tonight's game will start at 7 p.m. PDT because the Roughnecks are playing the Edmonton Rush at noon in a lacrosse match.
Flu shots the Americans way at Kadlec
He was a Tri-City Americans star. He’s now taking his talents to the NHL
The National Hockey League’s Colorado Avalanche drafted Tri-City American player Sasha Matala in the 2019 draft. The Western Hockey League star was one of 28 WHL players selected in the 2019 NHL Entry Draft.
MORE TRI-CITY AMERICANS
The NHL is about to pick its next stars. These Tri-City Americans may be among them
Who’s that on the kiss cam? Toyota Center upgrades will make the picture much clearer
It didn’t go as hoped for the Tri-City Americans, but three stars were sent off in style
WHL commissioner likes what he sees in Toyota Center improvements
Americans’ win extends playoff series with Everett
Final high school basketball games set for Sunday in Yakima at SWX All-Star Classic
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David A. Rodriguez is incumbent at present as Executive Vice President and as Global Chief Human Resources Officer at Marriott International. He joined the company in 1998 in the position of senior vice president of staffing & development. He was appointed for Marriott Lodging as the executive vice president of human resources.
Dr. Rodriguez is a member of many associations such as Personnel Roundtable, Board of Directors for Human Resources Policy Association, the American Psychological Association, and Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology. He was inducted in the year 2014 as the National Academy of Human Resources Fellow. Prior to his current incumbency, he used to work at different positions related to human resources at Avon Products and Citicorp (now Citigroup).
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Westworld Season 3 Is Coming-And It's Totally Different From the First Two
Here's everything we know about the HBO show's upcoming run.
At the end of its second season, Westworld teased a new frontier: the world outside the park. Now that fans have gotten their first real glimpse of it, the anticipation for Westworld Season 3 is ramping up. From new cast members to the premiere date, here's what we know about the show's upcoming run.
THE FIRST TRAILER OFFERS A PEEK AT THE SERIES' EXPANDING WORLD.
The trailer is most notable for the fact that you don't realize it's a Westworld trailer until nearly the end. Few familiar faces and an entirely different landscape. We can see that the "real" world (i.e. the realm beyond the park) is a futuristic and sleek, full of flying machines, self-driving motorcycles, and robots (the obvious kind). But there's a distinct dystopic bent—technology hasn't made everything better. The trailer also introduces a new character, played by Aaron Paul (Breaking Bad). His voiceover offers insight into his psyche, while viewers watch him commit a crime or two—then, he finds an injured Dolores walking through the street. "You need help?" he asks, before the preview cuts to black.
PAUL ISN'T THE ONLY NEW CAST MEMBER.
Lena Waithe, known for appearing in Master of None and creating The Chi, has signed onto Westworld season three. Vincent Cassel (Black Swan) has also joined the show.
THE HUSBAND-AND-WIFE DUO BEHIND THE SHOW, JONATHAN NOLAN AND LISA JOY, ARE KEEPING PLOT DETAILS UNDER WRAPS.
But Joy did give a few thematic hints to the Guardian. "We saw some of the heroes stumble [in season two]," she said. "They made sacrifices that they may have found unconscionable before, but the exigencies of the circumstances changed what once was absolute morality into something more subjective. So I think we’ll continue to play with sympathies throughout."
THERE'S NO OFFICIAL PREMIERE DATE.
For now, HBO has only promised that Westworld's third season will bow sometime in 2020.
HBO Is Working on a Documentary on Natalie Wood, the Hollywood Actress Who Died After Drowning
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This New Cookbook Reveals the Baking Secrets of Wild Flour's Award Winning Pastry Chef
WATCH: A New Trailer Has Arrived for the Downton Abbey Movie
Even Classicists Hated the Game of Thrones Finale
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UEFA Champions League - Barcelona v PSV facts - News
Barcelona v PSV facts
So impressive at home in the UEFA Champions League, Barcelona welcome a PSV side who have never won in Spain.
Lionel Messi and Luis Suárez celebrate another Barcelona goal ©Getty Images
Barcelona will once again be banking on their imperious home form in the UEFA Champions League when they kick off Group B at home to PSV Eindhoven.
• The Catalan club won all five matches at the Camp Nou in the 2017/18 competition, and are unbeaten in five years at home in the UEFA Champions League. Furthermore, they kick off against a PSV side who have never won in Spain in 14 previous visits.
• Barcelona have won two of the teams' six fixtures, losing only one – both clubs have scored 12 goals.
• Most recently, the sides traded 2-2 draws in Eindhoven and Barcelona in the 1997/98 UEFA Champions League group stage.
• There were also plenty of goals in the teams' 1995/96 UEFA Cup quarter-final, Barcelona eventually going through 5-4 on aggregate (2-2 home, 3-2 away).
• PSV won the first tie between the sides, in the 1977/78 UEFA Cup semi-finals, 4-3 on aggregate. The Dutch club won the home first leg 3-0 – the teams' first meeting – and survived a 3-1 loss in Spain to progress; they went on to win the trophy.
Barcelona's five European Cup wins
• Spanish champions for the 25th time – and third in four years – in 2017/18, Barcelona have been European champions on five occasions, most recently in 2015.
• Barça have won their group in each of the past 11 seasons, and have reached at least the quarter-finals in all of those UEFA Champions League campaigns, both competition records. In 2017/18, they succumbed to a remarkable Roma fightback in the last eight, going out despite a 4-1 home first-leg victory after losing 3-0 in the Rome return.
• That defeat at Roma ended Barcelona's ten-match unbeaten run in the UEFA Champions League (W6 D4).
• Barcelona are unbeaten in 26 UEFA Champions League home matches, a run that started in September 2013 (W24 D2). They have won all their home group games in the last five editions.
• The Spanish side's last fixtures against Eredivisie opposition came in 2014/15, when they defeated Ajax twice in the group stage (3-1 home, 2-0 away).
• The Eindhoven club claimed their 24th Dutch league title in 2017/18 – the third time in four seasons they have lifted the Eredivisie crown.
• This is PSV's 16th season in the group stage – more than any other Dutch side. They qualified by beating Belarus champions BATE Borisov 6-2 on aggregate in the play-offs (3-2 away, 3-0 home).
• The first-leg win at BATE ended a ten-game run without a European away win for PSV (D4 L6).
• European Cup winners in 1988, PSV have reached the UEFA Champions League knockout stage only four times – most recently in 2015/16, when they got to the last 16.
• The Eindhoven club failed to win a game in their last group appearance, in 2016/17 (D2 L4) and have not won in their last eight UEFA Champions League fixtures, group stage to final (D4 L4).
• Their last away win in the UEFA Champions League proper was a 1-0 success at CSKA Moskva in November 2007. Their record since then is D3 L7.
• PSV's 2017/18 European campaign lasted only one tie – they lost 1-0 home and away to Croatian club Osijek in the UEFA Europa League third qualifying round.
• PSV's record in Spain is W0 D5 L9. Home and away, they are without a win since a 3-2 home defeat of Deportivo La Coruña in December 2003; their record since is D3 L5, most recently home (0-1) and away (2-0) defeats against Atlético Madrid in the 2016/17 UEFA Champions League group stage.
Highlights: PSV 3-0 BATE
Links and trivia
• PSV coach Mark van Bommel was a Barcelona player in 2005/06, winning the UEFA Champions League and the Spanish Liga title in his only season at the Camp Nou.
• Van Bommel was part of the Netherlands side beaten 1-0 by Spain, whose line-up included Gerard Piqué and Sergio Busquets, in the 2010 FIFA World Cup final.
• Have played in the Netherlands:
Luis Suárez (Groningen 2006/07, Ajax 2007–11)
Jasper Cillessen (NEC Nijmegen 2010–11, Ajax 2011–16)
Thomas Vermaelen (Ajax 2003–09, RKC Waalwijk 2004/05 loan)
• Has played in Spain:
Angelino (Mallorca 2017 loan)
• International team-mates:
Jasper Cillessen & Jeroen Zoet, Luuk de Jong (Netherlands)
• Summer transfers
In: Arthur (Grêmio), Clément Lenglet (Sevilla), Malcom (Bordeaux), Arturo Vidal (Bayern)
Out: Gerard Deulofeu (Watford), Andrés Iniesta (Vissel Kobe), Paulinho (Guangzhou Evergrande, loan), Douglas (Sivasspor, loan), Adriá Ortolá (Deportivo, loan), Lucas Digne (Everton), Aleix Vidal (Sevilla), Yerry Mina (Everton), André Gomes (Everton, loan), José Arnaiz (Leganés), Marlon (Sassuolo), Paco Alcácer (Dortmund, loan)
• Luís Suárez's next appearance in the UEFA Champions League will be his 50th.
• Barcelona came from behind to beat Sevilla 2-1 in the Spanish Super Cup on 12 August, Gerard Piqué and Ousmane Dembélé with the goals.
• Ernesto Valverde's side have won four out of four in this season's Liga, including an 8-2 defeat of promoted Huesca on 2 September. They were 2-1 winners at Real Sociedad on Saturday thanks to goals from Suárez and Dembélé.
• Dembélé has three goals already in the Liga this season, matching his total for the whole of last season.
• Lionel Messi has nine goals in his last eight Liga matches.
• Barça have won their last four home matches in all competitions, and are unbeaten in 30 matches at the Camp Nou (W27 D3), since a 3-1 defeat by Real Madrid in the Spanish Super Cup on 13 August 2017.
• Suárez scored twice as Uruguay beat Mexico 4-1 in a friendly win on 7 September while Philippe Coutinho found the net in Brazil's 5-0 defeat of El Salvador four days later.
• Samuel Umtiti made six appearances in France's FIFA World Cup victory in Russia this summer, scoring the only goal of the semi-final against Belgium; Dembélé featured in four matches.
In: Denzel Dumfries (Heerenveen), Nick Viergever (Ajax), Ryan Thomas (PEC Zwolle)*, Angeliño (Manchester City), Trent Sainsbury (Jiangsu Suning), Aziz Behich (Bursaspor), Érick Gutiérrez (CF Pachuca)
Out: Sam Lammers (Heerenveen, loan), Santiago Arias (Atlético), Joshua Brenet (Hoffenheim), Albert Gudmundsson (AZ Alkmaar)
*Not in UEFA Champions League squad
• On 4 August PSV lost on penalties to Feyenoord in the Johan Cruijff Schaal after a goalless 90 minutes at their own ground in Eindhoven.
• PSV have won all seven games in all competitions since then, including five in the Eredivisie. Saturday's 7-0 success at Den Haag followed the 6-1 defeat of Willem II on 1 September and gave them 27 goals across those seven matches.
• The 7-0 defeat of Den Haag was PSV's biggest win since 2 February 2013 – another success against Den Haag by the same scoreline.
• Steven Bergwijn has scored in PSV's last three matches, while Hirving Lozano and Gastón Pereiro both got two on Saturday and have four goals in five Eredivisie appearances this season.
• Lozano scored the only goal as Mexico beat then holders Germany in their opening game at the FIFA World Cup.
• Pereiro scored his first goal for Uruguay on his first start, a 4-1 friendly win against Mexico on 8 September; PSV team-mates Lozano and Érick Gutiérrez were in the Mexico team.
• Summer signing Ryan Thomas suffered a cruciate knee injury in late August, two weeks after signing from Zwolle; he has not been included in the UEFA Champions League squad.
© 1998-2019 UEFA. All rights reserved. Last updated: Sunday 16 September 2018
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Is Disney's "Robin Hood" a Libertarian Manifesto?
The ancient legend of Robin Hood has been endlessly adapted across all artistic media and its politics bent and readjusted just as endlessly. In 1973, the Disney studio reframed the legend and repopulated it with animal characters, their accents indicating class and character traits rather than nationality (almost all of the nobility have British accents, while the peasant characters tend to have American accents). Like many Disney films based on fairy tales and British and Chinese legends, including The Sword in the Stone, Cinderella, Sleeping Beauty, and, most interestingly, the Disney Renaissance films The Beauty and the Beast, The Little Mermaid, Aladdin, and Mulan, there is an unquestioning adherence to the ancient idea of a monarchy ordained by God. Since most of these films operate under a dualistic good v. evil morality, the "rightful" heir to the throne is invariably a good guy, while pretenders are bad guys. Robin Hood also bows to this view, which is, of course, deeply embedded in the mythology of Robin Hood, and necessary if he is to be framed as a hero.
The fact that the government is a monarchy however is less important than how good and evil within governance is defined. King Richard's style of governance is largely unexamined, since he doesn't arrive until the final scene in the film. We're told that he pardons Robin Hood, imprisons Prince John and his cronies, sentencing them to hard labor (they're last seen in a shallow quarry pit), and presides over the wedding of Robin and Marian. His departure for the crusades is explained in this version as the result of hypnosis - Prince John's adviser Sir Hiss apparently convinced him to leave by hypnotizing him, therefore leaving the way open for John to seize the throne. His "crazy crusade" is thus rendered a mark of fallibility, a foolish undertaking, but not a blameworthy one. Richard is the "good" king primarily because he holds the right of inheritance, while Robin is a "good" man because he is a loyal partisan in favor of Richard.
Prince John's style of governance is characterized as evil, firstly because it is "unnatural." As long as Richard is alive, John can be no more than regent. The fact that he aspires to hold the throne himself delegitimizes his regency in the eyes of his subjects, though in actuality he has the full right to rule in Richard's absence. John's villainy is expressed by his paranoia, his ineptitude, his temper tantrums, and his mother fixation. At bottom, John is "the phony king of England" because he's childish. But his most salient policy, as well as the one his subjects object to most vociferously, and the one against which Robin works most tirelessly, is John's continually escalating taxation.
The sheriff of Nottingham is primarily, in his own words, "your friendly neighborhood tax collector," and he's portrayed stealing money from Robin disguised as a blind beggar and snatching it from a crippled blacksmith, the church poorbox, and a six-year-old bunny, who was given a farthing for his birthday. Those unable to pay their taxes are chained and imprisoned, with some offenders sentenced to hard labor. John, meanwhile, hoards the tax money, even sleeping with it. The role of government under Prince John is to acquire as much money possible and spend as little as possible. Taxation is thus, within the world of the film, a malevolent manifestation of greed and miserliness.
Other Robin Hood adaptations have approached the issue of John's fitness to rule differently. In the greatest Robin Hood film, The Adventures of Robin Hood (1938) starring Errol Flynn, Olivia de Havilland, and Basil Rathbone, Prince John does indeed squeeze the peasantry with ludicrous taxation, but his motive is not a simple matter of greed. There is a strong prejudicial element to John's policies in this version. The Saxons, of whom Robin is one, are oppressed by the heavy taxation, to the point of starvation, and they face brutal, often lethal, punishment for petty crimes, in contrast to the Normans, who enjoy greater freedoms and lower taxes. Marian, a Norman, is convinced to take Robin's side when she observes the misery of the Saxon peasants. Furthermore, John excuses the absurd tax rates with the claim that he needs it to ransom Richard, taken prisoner by an Austrian rival; naturally he has no intention of paying any such ransom. Thus, in this version, the taxation itself isn't the problem; ethnic oppression, in the service of ambition and deception, is the real root of John's evil.
These complications are not present in Disney's Robin Hood. All subjects to the English crown, barring those few like Sir Hiss who enjoy the dubious and changeable favor of Prince John, suffer under the taxation. The misery is universal. But, Prince John takes his paranoid need to destroy Robin to such great heights of evil that he proves himself a poor monarch. He plans to lure Robin into a trap by hanging Friar Tuck (in most versions, it is Robin, rescued by the Merrie Men, who risks the noose). This is, obviously, a nasty plan indeed, but Sir Hiss explicitly registers his shock that John could consider executing a man of the church. This attack on the clergy is framed as a moral wrong because of Friar Tuck's position as a spiritual leader - not because hanging itself is bad - and proves John's undoing.
Thus, the two main expressions of Prince John's badness and unfitness to hold the throne are his tax policies and his failure to hold the church sacred. These are deeply conservative sins, but while the first is certainly in tune with American libertarian politics, the second is absolutely not. The expressed politics of Disney's Robin Hood are not libertarian, but there is a strong libertarian shading that may prove rather disturbing to those who may not want their children to grow up believing that paying taxes is a form of evil social oppression. One also hopes that children watching the film come away simply convinced that death by hanging is an appalling thing, but the film in fact doesn't condemn capital punishment: it condemns capital punishment for "untouchable" authority figures. Overall, Robin Hood's moral simplicity lands it squarely in the conservative camp, both fiscally and socially.
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A colleague was about to travel to Zimbabwe for an American NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) to develop programs of child welfare. Why, he was asked, would he want to provide support to one of the world’s most corrupt and destructive dictators, Robert Mugabe? “For the sake of the children”, he responded.
When an NGO opened an office in Burma, an employee protested to the CEO, asking why he would want to provide support to one of the world’s most corrupt and destructive regimes? “For the sake of the children”, he responded.
In both cases the political and financial dimensions of the decision were staggering. Under the guise of good works, these companies were expanding their geographic range, tapping into the generosity of well-meaning but ill-informed donors, and positioning themselves with USAID as organizations at the vanguard of international development. They ignored the fact that these corrupt regimes would use the aid either to line their own pockets or to provide the social welfare programs they should be providing.
Workers at NGOs when disaster has hit someplace in the world are as excited as children at Christmas. The enthusiasm, the glee of being able to swing into action to provide help to the unfortunate was impressive. While there is no doubt that the tents, bottled water, food and medicines were necessary, there is also no doubt that the United States saw these disasters as a means of getting their foot in the door. The persistent and debilitating droughts of East Africa provided the United States an ideal opportunity of showing ‘the generosity of the American people’, introducing American food products, and winning the hearts and minds of citizens who had been numbed by years of dictatorship.
Of course none of this ever comes to pass. Ethiopia – a country which receives a disproportionate amount of USAID grants – is as mired in ethnic, regional, and political conflict as ever. Ethiopia not only receives periodic humanitarian assistance but is the recipient of standard US Government program grants.
No one in the ‘development’ business has ever doubted the political nature of foreign aid. It was designed for promote the United States, its principles, and its products; to position itself advantageously in the constantly-changing geo-political world, and to be at the head of the queue to buy the abundant natural resources available in many Third World countries. While the US has been more indirect in its support of dictatorships (as above, through USAID largesse) and no longer trains law enforcement (as it did in Brazil in the Sixties), nor provides military and security assistance (as it did in Chile to protect US mining interests), its political-economic interests are paramount.
The United States has a long history of providing police aid to Latin American countries. In the 1960s USAID’s Office of Public Safety (OPS) provided Latin American police forces with millions of dollars worth of weapons and trained thousands of Latin American police officers. In the late 1960s, such programs came under media and congressional scrutiny because the U.S.-provided equipment and personnel were linked to cases of torture, murder and "disappearances" in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.
In Washington, D.C., the Office of Public Safety had remained immune to public embarrassment as it went about two of its chief functions: allowing the CIA to plant men with the local police in sensitive places around the world; and after careful observation on their home territory, bringing to the United States prime candidates for enrollment as CIA employees. The OPS's director in Washington, Byron Engle, was close to the CIA. (Wikipedia)
If children are benefitted from an investment in corrupt oil-rich Angola, so much the better; but the purpose of the aid is to counter the growing influence of China and its access to Angolan oil. If Nigerian children are benefitted from US taxpayer dollars, this is a by-product of exerting regional influence in a large, unruly, populous, and resource-rich country.
William Easterly has written an article for the New York Review of Books entitled Foreign Aid for Scoundrels in which he criticizes the international foreign assistance establishment and that of the United States in particular, for continuing to support corrupt dictators and to ignore their abuses of human and civil rights. He refers to a seminal book by Dambisa Moyo:
Faced with this indifference to tyranny of even the most lethal kind, African intellectuals are increasingly beginning to protest. In her book Dead Aid, Dambisa Moyo struck a nerve because she protested so eloquently against the paternalism, presumption, and double standards of the donor countries’ aid agencies. In many cases, foreign aid, as a review of her book put it, “fostered dependency, encouraged corruption and ultimately perpetuated poor governance and poverty.”
Paul Collier, writing in The Independent focuses on Moyo’s observation that foreign aid disenfranchises the very citizens it is designed to help:
One of her (Moyo’s) central points is that aid can, in effect, disenfranchise Africans, since the population cannot “hold its government accountable. The first stage in her argument is that aid is easy money. If governments had to rely upon private financial markets they would become accountable to lenders, and if they had to rely upon taxation they would become accountable to voters. Aid is like oil, enabling powerful elites to embezzle public revenues.
Easterly has collected data on the amount and proportion of US foreign assistance to dictators:
The proportion of aid received by democracies has remained stuck at about one fifth (the rest are in a purgatory called “Partly Free” by Freedom House). As for US foreign aid, despite all the brave pronouncements such as the ones I’ve quoted, more than half the aid budget still went to dictators during the most recent five years for which figures are available (2004–2008).
Paul Biya, the dictator of Cameroon has been in power for 28 years and has been known for his brutal rule. Yet, he has received over $35 billion during his reign:
In February 2008, Biya’s security forces killed one hundred people during a demonstration against food price increases and also against a constitutional amendment that will extend his rule to 2018. Many of the victims were “apparently shot in the head at point-blank range.” The IMF justification for the newest loan in June 2009 noted laconically that these “social tensions” have not recurred and “the political situation is stable”. (Easterly)
Biya is not the only dictator to have so benefitted:
Helen Epstein recently described in these pages the support that aid donors give to Ethiopia’s tyrant Meles Zenawi, who has roughly matched Biya in aid receipts in a shorter period of time. Peter Gill in his excellent recent book Famine and Foreigners: Ethiopia Since Live Aid (2010) documents Meles’s misdeeds further, which rise to the level of war crimes in his counterinsurgency in Ethiopia’s Somali region (I reviewed the book for The Wall Street Journal on September 7, 2010).
Other long-serving aid-receiving dictators include Idriss Déby in Chad ($6 billion in aid between 1990 and the present), Lansana Conté in Guinea ($11 billion between 1984 and his death in 2008), Paul Kagame in Rwanda ($10 billion between 1994 and the present), and Yoweri Museveni in Uganda ($31 billion between 1986 and the present).
The issue is why such aid continues especially since the Cold War is well past. In addition to flying the flag, geopolitical positioning, and the spread of the US’s exceptional principles, the ‘war on terror’ has replaced Cold War ideology and investment. Countries that never should be receiving aid because of their corruption, inefficiency, and inability to use it properly are given millions to promote stability.
As US funds flowed into Mali because it was heralded as one of the gemstones of Africa’s new democracies, the simmering revolt of the Tuareg in the North boiled over into full-fledged war; and despite the health, welfare, and agricultural programs supported by USAID, the country began to fall apart. The recent coup in which the plotters used the turmoil in the North to their advantage has sealed the deal. Mali is no longer America’s sweetheart.
Easterly points to an even more important reason why aid money continues to flow:
Aid agencies exist to give aid, so they must keep the money flowing. The department of an aid agency assigned to help a country may not get a budget next year if its officials don’t disburse to the country’s ruler this year; so they hand out funds no matter how autocratic he is. (The autocratic recipients know this and know they can ignore any “raised concerns” about democracy, including human rights.) Only the most well-publicized and egregious violators of democratic principles—like Robert Mugabe—get cut off.
The project officers of the World Bank have always been judged on their ability to move money out the door; and have consistently rescheduled potentially delinquent loans to deadbeat countries. For those contractors who receive USAID money, funds not spent are funds lost. Countries of course know that donors want to give them money more than they want to receive it (in the case of Angola for example, the potential for skimming billions of oil revenues beggars any pittance of any US foreign assistance).
A colleague in the development business who worked for a non-profit company which received USAID financing said that it never mattered if his projects succeeded or not, for all he had to do was to tell his handlers that he would do better next time and he would get another grant. “I have evaluated the (failing) project”, he told them, “and we have identified all the obstacles to success. In the next phase of funding, we will remove them and be successful”. He always got the money.
Donor agencies will go out of their way to justify this continuing flow of money to recipients who will use it badly:
The concept of development helps rationalize the position of autocrats by postulating an unstoppable transition toward a bright future. This is why donors call all poor countries “developing.” Once the donors started paying lip service to democracy, they could label undemocratic aid recipients as “democratizing.” Let’s call this the Gerund Defense for supporting dictators. Thomas Carothers, an expert on the connections between aid and democracy, described the Gerund Defense in a classic article. He quoted a USAID description of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2001 as a country in “transition to a democratic, free market society.” (Such “democratizing” is still notably weak in 2010.)
Others have worked in ‘development’ for over 40 years and labored under a system which has not changed in all that time. Since foreign assistance has always been considered by corrupt governments as an entitlement, they had no interest in using the money wisely or well. If USAID-funding projects happened to work, it was because they were implemented well out of the orbit of government, benefited from far more money than any public agency could ever envisage, and were managed by a legion of expatriates. Although the implementing NGOs trumpeted their success, most critics realized that it was an illusory victory.
In conclusion, there are many reasons to end foreign assistance, and as Dambisa Moyo said above, so doing would force countries to borrow from the international capital markets. Governments would then have to choose carefully and select only those projects which would produce a return. No private bank would tolerate default. Adopting this non-intervention strategy would ultimately ‘help the children’ far more than any entitlement program to a corrupt regime would. It might take time, but countries would have to reform, be more responsible and accountable to their citizens.
Recognizing the double standards in aid, perhaps also speaking for the opposition leader who was a victim of “a new generation of democratic leaders,” Mo Ibrahim said:
All Africans have a right to live in freedom and prosperity and to select their leaders through fair and democratic elections, and the time has come when Africans are no longer willing to accept lower standards of governance than those in the rest of the world.
He knows that recognition of democratic values eventually leads to their realization; lack of recognition continues the subjugation of the poor.
Posted by Ron Parlato at 10:26 AM
Labels: Politics and Culture
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August 07, 2014 News + Opinion » Nova Scotia
Legalized loan sharking
Soon the province will review its rules around payday loans, and people who’ve become the lenders’ prey say things need to change to help the desperate catch a break
By Bruce Wark
Thomas Gaillard's troubles with payday loans began in 2008 when the financial meltdown on Wall Street sent Canada's economy into deep recession. As tire sales slumped, the Michelin plant in Waterville where Gaillard worked cut its production, and workers took turns staying home for a day each week. Weekend and holiday shifts were also cancelled. Gaillard says he earned $400 on each 12-hour shift and the production cuts sharply reduced his paycheque.
Gaillard, who is now 52, was supporting his wife and two children, a 14-year-old son and 10-year-old daughter. They lived in a three-bedroom duplex in Dartmouth and, on the days he was working, he commuted to the tire plant in Waterville.
"My wife and I just sort of tightened our belts," he says. "However, all it takes is a bit of an expense from an unknown source like a car repair or anything to do with the kids for school or things like that and the next thing you know, you're behind the eight-ball."
In Gaillard's case, it was an empty oil tank that sent him to Money Mart, one of Canada's biggest payday lenders. Someone he knew had mentioned that the company was offering interest-free, $200 loans for first-time borrowers. Gaillard showed a pay stub to prove he was working, handed over his banking information and walked out of the Dartmouth store with the $200 he needed to put oil in his tank.
It was fast and convenient, but there was a catch. When the loan came due in two weeks, he paid it off as required, but then had to borrow another $200 so he could cover his other bills. And that's when the interest kicked in. At the time, the Nova Scotia Utilities and Review Board allowed payday loan companies to charge up to $31 for every $100 they lent. That meant that when the next $200 loan came due on payday, borrowers like Gaillard, could be on the hook for $262.
"What kind of happens is you get caught in the cycle," Gaillard says. "And if another unexpected bill pops up out of nowhere, the next thing you know, you're in there and it's $300 you're looking for."
The payday trap
Gaillard's next "unexpected bill" came when the transmission went on his Dodge Caravan and he needed $3,000 to fix it. At the height of the recession, he says, the big banks had tightened their lending rules, especially for people like him with mounting expenses and falling incomes. "At that point," he says, "I had to get into some retirement savings plus use these payday loan people just to keep the vehicle on the road to get back and forth to work."
He ended up going to a second payday lender to help him pay off the first one and, as time went by, more and more of his paycheque was getting swallowed up.
"I felt like an animal in a trap," he says. "I can't imagine what income earners lower than myself have had to do. It must be terribly hard because it was hard for us."
Even though his wife went back to work as a hairdresser, the family continued to struggle and by 2012, owed $900 to payday lenders.
"One payday I looked at my wife," Gaillard says, "and I just said to her, 'I'm not paying them.' And she got upset and said, 'Well, we have to pay them.' And I said, 'You know what, I don't feel right about it. Look what I'm paying in interest alone. That's almost criminal.'"
So, Gaillard offered to pay his loans off gradually. At first everything seemed OK when he handed over a portion of the money he owed. But it wasn't.
"I think it was two hours later," he says. "I went to fill up my car to go for an overtime shift, they had cleaned out my account."
After his next payday, he got a call from his landlord telling him his rent cheque had bounced.
"Then I realized that they went into my account again," he says. "Instead of giving me maybe a month to clean it up with them, free and clear, they were taking it and then I had to sit back and think about my landlord, my power bill, my heating bill and all that sort of stuff."
Feeling desperate one morning after working an overnight shift at Michelin, Gaillard went to see the branch manager at the TD bank where he had his chequing account. The manager advised him to get help from Credit Counselling Services of Atlantic Canada, a non-profit agency that, for a small fee, helps clients get control of their debts. His credit counsellor advised Gaillard to close his bank account and open another so the payday lenders couldn't clean it out. That's when he started getting threatening phone calls demanding money.
When he answered those calls, Gaillard says he tried to reason with the payday lenders. "Basically, all I was telling them was, 'Look, your system doesn't work. People get trapped in your system. This is the only way I could figure of getting out.'"
Even though he promised to repay the loans, the phone calls continued. Gordon Arsenault, his credit counsellor, told him to ignore them. Arsenault arranged a consolidated loan from the TD Bank that let Gaillard repay his loans with no more interest accumulating.
Although two years later the Gaillards now have their finances under control, they're still struggling. He's been off work since last August, receiving Workers' Compensation after rupturing a tendon in his foot. But, no matter how tight money gets, Gaillard vows there's no way he would ever borrow again from payday lenders.
"I'd go homeless before I ever went back to them," he says. "To tell you the truth, the government has allowed legalized loan sharking."
Payday loan sharks
As a matter of fact, payday lending is a form of legalized loan sharking. In 2007, the federal government amended the criminal code to allow payday lenders to set their rates higher than 60 percent per year. That 60 percent maximum had been intended to stop loan sharks from preying on people in desperate financial straits by lending them money at excessively high rates.
The change in the criminal code gave payday lenders just what they wanted. Now, they could legally charge more than 60 percent on an annual basis without having to worry about class-action lawsuits on behalf of customers angry about criminal rates of interest. A series of such lawsuits had cost the companies millions in legal fees and settlements.
However, there was one tiny catch. Payday lending would be exempt from loan sharking rules only in provinces that adopted regulations governing the industry. Nova Scotia obligingly cleared the way. In 2009, it became the first province to regulate the industry. Eventually every western province from Ontario to BC followed suit, creating a variety of rules and interest rates. Only in Quebec and the rest of eastern Canada—except Nova Scotia—are the payday lenders potentially vulnerable to class-action lawsuits for charging more than federal law's 60 percent interest rate.
Nova Scotia's regulations included a cap on the interest payday lenders could charge for loans under $1,500 for terms up to 62 days. The regulations also required payday lenders to post the cost of their loans on an annual basis so that customers could compare their rates with other sources of credit. And such comparisons can be eye-opening.
First and worst
Federal laws against loan sharking set the maximum interest rate on loans at 60% per year. The feds offered to waive the laws for payday lenders in any province that created its own regulations, and in 2009 Nova Scotia became first to adopt the requisite rules. Here are the rates in the provinces that have followed our lead.
In 2011, Nova Scotia reduced the maximum payday lenders could charge from $31 to $25 per $100, still the highest rate in any province that has passed regulations. As a result, a $300 payday loan for 14 days could cost up to $75 and carry an annual percentage rate (APR) of 651.8 percent. The same loan on a line of credit would cost about $5.81 with an APR of seven percent; bank account overdraft protection would cost $7.19 with an APR of 19 percent and a cash advance on a credit card would typically cost $7.42 with an APR of 21 percent.
Mark Furey, the provincial cabinet minister in charge of payday loan policies, agrees such loans are expensive, but says payday lenders provide a service for people who can't borrow from banks or credit unions. "We recognize that the clientele are those that are most vulnerable and that's not lost on us," he adds. "That's one of the reasons that there are regulations, very stringent regulations, that oversee this consumer service."
The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board is planning to look at those regulations again this year, but Furey has asked it to hold off until a federal-provincial committee completes its review of payday lending practices. In Ontario, for example, one payday lender, The Cash Store, has been offering lines of credit that exceed the interest cap on payday loans. The company filed for bankruptcy protection from its creditors in May and put itself up for sale after the Ontario government barred it from making new loans in that province.
Furey says the federal-provincial committee will also be looking at other lending practices such as loans for which clients put up their cars as collateral and high-cost rent-to-own leases for appliances and furniture. The minister says he's looking forward to the committee's report followed by a review, probably this fall, by the NSUARB.
When asked why the new Liberal government is following its NDP predecessor and leaving the rules for payday lending up to an unelected regulatory body, Furey replies that governments are criticized if they seem to go too far in regulating business, but on the other hand, can also be criticized for not doing enough to protect consumers. "I think it's really a matter of finding a balance," he says.
The payday loan cycle
Oddly enough, when he was federal minister of finance, the late Jim Flaherty seemed to suggest that the balance between the payday industry and its customers was out of whack and Ottawa needed to work with the provinces to strengthen regulations. In his last budget statement in February, Flaherty said: "Payday lending and other high-cost loans are an extremely expensive way for consumers to access short-term lending. Payday lenders typically target vulnerable populations, including low-income workers and families, persons with disabilities and the elderly."
Gordon Arsenault, the credit counsellor who helped rescue Thomas Gaillard from the payday lenders, wonders about Flaherty's words pointing out that "the federal government is the one that basically washed their hands of the payday loan industry."
Arsenault adds that payday loans are a "vicious cycle" for people who need small loans. "The thing with a payday loan," he explains, "is that it's not giving a person any additional money. It's just moving it ahead a couple of weeks, so that if they need $300 or $400 for a particular reason and they get a payday loan, they're not going to have that additional $300 or $400 when they get paid."
That means, he says, payday borrowers must keep taking out more loans just to stay afloat, often borrowing from one lender to pay off another. Arsenault says about 70 percent of Credit Counselling's clients have payday loans.
"It's very, very seldom that you'll see a client with one payday loan. They usually have anywhere between three and five and sometimes even more," he says.
Melanie Delorey knows all about juggling payday loans. Delorey, 28, now works full time as a nurse's aide at the IWK children's hospital. She started going to payday lenders about four years ago when she held an $11-an-hour job at the Tim Hortons inside the IWK. She says there were payroll problems because her manager would repeatedly submit fewer hours than she had worked and the mistakes couldn't be corrected until her next pay. Sometimes she'd get only half the money she was owed, other times only a third. "I was renting," she says, "and I had phone, internet and cable plus I had power to pay for and then transportation to work."
So to top up her paycheque, Delorey started taking out payday loans. "It's actually quite convenient," she says. "You go there with your pay stub, your banking information and you get money right away."
Delorey ended up going from one payday lender to another.
"I would borrow from one to pay another one," she says. "I tried to keep with the one I had initially, but it just got to the point where I got farther and farther behind so I went to a second one and after that I went to a third."
Delorey admits that aside from the $700 she ended up owing payday lenders her "bad spending habits" wracked up total debts of about $6,000. A friend mentioned Credit Counselling Services and with their help, she has consolidated her debt and is sticking to a repayment scheme that is within her budget. She says she will never borrow from payday lenders again.
"I dislike them," she adds, "it's just not a good system for people if they need money. It's just a way to get further into debt."
Payday defender
Stan Keyes, president of the Canadian Payday Loan Association which represents some—but not all—payday lenders, complains there are many inaccuracies reported about his industry. Keyes, a former Minister of National Revenue, has represented the CPLA since 2006.
When asked about the payday debt trap with customers struggling to repay several loans, Keyes insists that careful payday lenders wouldn't hand money over to such customers because it's too risky. He acknowledges, however, that a payday loan clerk may not know if a customer is juggling several loans, but adds a careful look at a client's banking records could reveal it.
"You're always going to find someone who is prepared to take more risk in lending someone money," he says. "But the more responsible lenders who are members of the Canadian Payday Loan Association...are far more careful." (Note: Both Thomas Gaillard and Melanie Delorey took out their first loans with Money Mart, which is a member of the CPLA.)
Keyes argues that, in some cases, payday loans are just what a cash-strapped customer needs. "Put yourself in the borrower's shoes for just a minute," he says. "These loans are expensive, but less expensive than a series of bank overdrafts, or defaulting on an auto loan or defaulting on your mortgage, and they're a better deal than having the electricity, or your heat or the telephone turned off only later to pay for having them turned on again. So, in many instances, the payday loan is the smarter choice."
Banks should step up
Jerry Buckland doesn't agree that payday lending is a good system for people who need small loans. Buckland is a professor at Menno Simons College in Winnipeg and the author of the book Hard Choices: Financial Exclusion, Fringe Banks, and Poverty in Urban Canada.
Buckland argues that Canada's chartered banks should be doing more to provide basic banking services including lower-cost, small loans. He points out that the big Canadian banks are highly profitable. In fact, last year the five biggest ones made record profits earning $29.2 billion, up from $27.8 billion in 2012.
"Someone has described the Canadian banking system as a protected oligopoly meaning that there's a small number of very large banks," Buckland says, "and the government essentially has regulations that protect them from foreign competition."
He also points out that Canadian banks have been closing branches that serve lower-income people in inner cities. So, he says, in return for protection from foreign competition, the federal government should require the banks to provide better service including the kind of small loans that payday lenders now provide.
It seems unlikely, however, that a government led by Stephen Harper and his ultra-conservative colleagues will compel the big chartered banks to provide small loans at reasonable rates. The provinces, which regulate credit unions, could require them to offer small, low-interest loans and indeed, Nova Scotia's minister, Mark Furey says it's something he's prepared to look at.
"My mind's not closed, I don't wear blinkers," he says. "It's certainly an option and an opportunity we could explore as government."
In the meantime, the forthcoming regulatory review is being left firmly in the hands of the business-friendly Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board.
Thomas Gaillard—still bitter about his experiences with payday lenders—has some advice for the board.
"Shut them down, outlaw them," he says. "Shut them down."
Tags: Nova Scotia, longreads, Payday loans, banking
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Heartbroken Never Trumpers Mourn for the Party of Lincoln
It was supposed to be a final farewell to Donald Trump, but Republican anti-Trump campaigners left their D.C. party in despair.
Tim Mak
Anadolu Agency/Getty
WASHINGTON — It was a calamity. Never Trumpers gathered at an Abraham Lincoln-themed restaurant in Washington, D.C. for what they hoped would be the final nail in Donald Trump’s coffin.
But what was dead, they came to find, was the Republican Party they had known and supported their entire lives.
By 10:30 p.m. it was clear that something had gone seriously wrong with the polls, which before Election Night had indicated a clear Hillary Clinton win. The crowd had been thick with excitement and energy. At midnight, the crowd thinned to almost nothing—no one wanted to be part of the election disaster party.
Politicos opposed to Trump were on the verge of tears. Couples held each other close. The less fortunate were left staring blankly at their glowing smartphones in shock.
Trump’s candidacy created a fissure in the Republican Party that won’t soon be healed—in the men’s bathrooms, Never Trumpers had put Trump buttons in the urinals so that anyone relieving themselves would have to piss on Trump’s face. It was a vulgar statement that reflected deep disdain for the man—one that won’t simply disappear overnight.
The event featured a hodge-podge of anti-Trump voters all all stripes: supporters of independent conservative Evan McMullin, Libertarian Gary Johnson, and Clinton. But they were largely Republicans who felt they could no longer recognize their own Republican Party.
Never Trumpers left the event wondering if they’d ever have a political home again.
“First I won’t consider myself part of the Republican Party anymore,” said Jennifer Lim, the founder of Republican Women for Hillary. She had worked for moderate Republicans in the Northeast, such as Sens. Olympia Snowe and Scott Brown, and had found Trump’s treatment of women abhorrent.
“Republicans like Trump and Republicans like us are not going to be able to be in the same party, because we’ll clearly have very different values and very different ideas for what’s best for the country,” she said.
The location the Never Trumpers had decided to gather at in the capital was no coincidence. For much of the last year, moderate Republicans have been lamenting how a bloviating businessman had become the nominee of the “Party of Lincoln.”
So Never Trumpers decided to hold their Election Night party at Lincoln, a trendy restaurant near downtown Washington’s K Street, to honor “our party’s founding president and the party’s once and future values,” organizers said.
There was no mistaking the message: The bar and restaurant is festooned with portraits of the 16th president of the United States, as well as an homage to the giant chair Lincoln sits in at the D.C. monument that bears his name. And outside, a giant Lincoln mascot—featured frequently at Washington Nationals baseball games—waited to take selfies with eventgoers.
“For Republicans that consider themselves to be part of the party of Lincoln, they are currently homeless,” said John Stubbs, the co-founder of Republicans for Clinton group called R4C16. “The party of Lincoln is now the party of Trump because he has brought in a bunch of people who are not aligned with any of the foundational principles [of the GOP] which include equality for all people, respect for the individual and global engagement.”
The Never Trump movement has been a movement of cascading and frustrating failures—but a principled effort to continue to resist their party’s nominee, despite the odds. It began to emerge in earnest when Rubio dropped out of the Republican primaries in mid-March, following a humiliating loss in his home state of Florida. Supporters of #NeverTrump doubled down months later, when Sen. Ted Cruz conceded that he would not win the nomination, all but guaranteeing Trump the nomination.
Despite overwhelming challenges, Republicans opposed to Trump tried to stop him at the Republican National Convention in Cleveland, with a small but substantial number of delegates attempting to fight the businessman’s nomination on the convention floor. This too failed.
For Republicans opposed to Trump, their support of Clinton was bittersweet. Many had spent years opposed to her politics, but the odious nature of Trump’s candidacy was a bridge too far. Never Trumpers cite things like his proposal to ban Muslims, his comments about immigrants, and his willingness to work with Russia as among the reasons they would not vote for the Republican nominee.
“Donald Trump is the least qualified, most dangerous candidate to run for president of the United States,” said Andrew Weinstein, a former spokesperson for Newt Gingrich when he was speaker of the House and an organizer of the Election Night Never Trump event.
The struggle between Trumpism and Never Trumpers does not end on Election Night. In fact, it is only gearing up. While Trump controls the Republican Party, many conservatives will continue to oppose his vision for America—or even create a third party in the process.
“Most of the Never Trump supporters I know are not willing to be a part of a party that is the party of Donald Trump,” Weinstein said. “If they continue to stay on the Trump path that they’re on, Never Trumpers will leave. The party needs to ask itself if it wants to move toward the fringe or toward the mainstream.”
“Donald Trump has taken over my party, and I’m not OK with it,” added Veronica Brown, a lifelong Republican who was attending the event and is opposed to Trump. “I’d like to remain a Republican. But if Trump is the future of the Republican Party I’m not sure I can be affiliated with it.”
The event’s organizers put up a cardboard cutout of Donald Trump wearing a Never Trump sweatshirt, in front of a wall with an inscription of the Emancipation Proclamation. Red, white, and blue balloons bounced alongside it.
But as the crowd began to leave, and the bar closed, and waiters began to break the tables down for the night, someone silently turned the cardboard cutout of Trump against the wall.
Perhaps it hurt too much to look at.
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Trump must answer for the deaths of thousands in Puerto Rico
Richard Wolffe
Hurricane Maria killed more Americans than the 9/11 terrorist attacks but Trump claims that the Federal Emergency Management Agenecy did ‘a fantastic job’
@richardwolffedc
Fri 8 Jun 2018 06.00 EDT Last modified on Mon 10 Sep 2018 20.26 EDT
Donald Trump was in self-congratulatory mood during his visit to the Federal Emergency Management Agency with Vice-President Mike Pence. Photograph: Jim Watson/AFP/Getty Images
They say the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results. At the start of this year’s hurricane season, it’s already clear that the Trump administration has gone mad.
This is a collective sickness that extends far beyond the very stable genius at the top of the executive branch. And it matters far more than whether Trump himself cares about the lives of American citizens, or can be bothered to tweet about them.
For this is a group of so-called leaders who ran the most powerful government in the world while at least 1,400 – and more likely as many as 5,000 – of their own citizens died on their watch.
You wouldn’t know it by listening to them talk at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (Fema) headquarters this week. Donald Trump told Brock Long, Fema’s administrator, that he had done an awesome job presiding over a post-hurricane recovery that was so incompetent that several thousand Americans died from a lack of medicine, food, water and power.
“We really appreciate the job you’ve done,” Trump said in front of the TV cameras. “It’s been amazing, and you really have kept quite busy, I would say, unfortunately. We had no choice. We were hit hard. But you’ve done a fantastic job.”
Puerto Rico: thousands more died from hurricane than official toll, study finds
A fantastic job of watching thousands of Americans die. Not in the high winds and floods, but in the disastrous aftermath, when Fema and the federal government were the most powerful people in Puerto Rico. A heckuva job, as George W Bush would say.
This isn’t just Trump ignoring reality. It’s his whole administration, refusing to look at their catastrophic failures and refusing to learn from them.
“We are marshaling every available resource to ensure maximum preparation for rapid response. That’s what we had last year,” Trump claimed.
Seriously? There’s nobody in the disaster response business, and nobody in Puerto Rico, who thinks there was maximum preparation for, or rapid response after, Hurricane Maria.
“Disaster response and recovery is best achieved when it’s federally supported, state-managed and locally executed,” Trump said, reading someone else’s words. “You agree with that, I think, Brock, right? This is really the great model that we’ve built, and there’s no better model anywhere in the world.”
Trump and his Fema leadership are deluding themselves if they really believe a great model is one that leaves thousands of Americans dead.
They are also engaged in an epic case of passing the buck by claiming that it’s really up to the state and local leaders to get stuff done when an economy is wiped out by a Category Four hurricane that destroys the entire power grid and communications network.
This is Fema’s official position about Puerto Rico: they are just playing a supporting role. But what if there’s nobody effective to support, which was also true in New Orleans? What if Americans are dying and the only people who can step in are the feds?
If only water bottles were really a joke in Puerto Rico, where Americans were drinking rainwater after the hurricane.
Don’t expect any insight from Mike Pence, who was himself a governor until 18 months ago. The vice-president is now a mini-me who bizarrely thinks he needs to copy the weird tics of his boss, like abruptly making a water bottle disappear from view in the Fema meeting. For this alone he has become the butt of a nation’s jokes, including on the normally respectful sets of local TV news in the heartland.
“Karen and I saw firsthand the extraordinary, at times sacrificial, efforts made by public servants here at Fema and all of the broad range of agencies that addressed those 4.7 million Americans that ended up requesting assistance,” Pence said.
You know what’s really sacrificial? The suffering of the Americans in Puerto Rico.
Of course, even all this empty talk of sacrifice was abruptly set aside when the cameras left the room. According to a leaked audio recording, Trump couldn’t keep his attention on hurricane season, preferring to brag about his own negotiating skills and the election results in California.
Heckuva job, Trumpie.
At least 1,400 people – and probably as many as 5,000 – died in Puerto Rico in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria. Photograph: Gerald Herbert/AP
None of this federal insanity absolves the island’s government, or its mayors, from their responsibility for the preventable deaths after Maria. There’s been no accounting for what happened inside the island’s government. Instead, until last week, the administration of Governor Ricky Rosselló clung on to the ludicrous notion that the death toll was just 64.
Presumably anything higher would have prompted some awkward questions, like: how the hell did that happen and what did you do to save lives?
The death toll in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria is now at least as great as Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, according to the island’s health department. But researchers from Harvard estimate the number is more than three times that disaster, making it a greater loss of life than the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
After both events, the total amount of investigation, oversight, academic study, journalistic output and political debate was overwhelming. The 2001 terrorist attacks changed our worldview forever and transformed George W Bush’s reputation. Of course, that reputation changed once again after Katrina, when his presidency was all but finished: if he couldn’t save an American city after a hurricane, how could he hope to deal with the rest of the world?
Trump came to Puerto Rico like an emperor: with pomp and little sympathy | Susanne Ramirez de Arellano
But after Hurricane Maria, there’s been nothing remotely comparable. The news media abandoned the island after a few days, when the Las Vegas massacre took place, and barely returned. Even though the real disaster in Puerto Rico took place over the many weeks that followed the hurricane.
When the Harvard study emerged last week, it was quickly buried under the mountain of coverage about Roseanne’s tweets. Because what could be more important than a prime-time sitcom?
This distraction lets those responsible off the hook. Without media scrutiny, there is nobody to ask the questions that remain unanswered: why did so many people die unnecessarily in Puerto Rico, and what has changed to prevent more deaths next time?
Congress certainly isn’t asking those questions. Republicans on the House oversight committee refuse to subpoena Fema to understand how so many huge contracts failed. Long has only testified once before Congress about the response to Maria. It’s hard to fathom how Republicans who were so fascinated by Benghazi can barely muster any interest about Puerto Rico.
Of all the scandals that threaten the future of the Trump administration, if not the freedom of some of its officials, there is none greater than the loss of thousands of American lives in Puerto Rico. Not Russia, and not corruption.
Even more important than the election of 2016 is the government of 2017. It’s time we reclaimed our sanity. It’s time we focused on saving American lives, and honoring those who died so needlessly just six months ago.
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Women accuse Morgan Freeman of harassment, inappropriate behavior
Posted: 11:17 AM, May 24, 2018
Christopher Polk
<p>Honoree Morgan Freeman accepts the Life Achievement Award onstage during the 24th Annual Screen Actors Guild Awards at The Shrine Auditorium on January 21, 2018 in Los Angeles, California. </p>
A young production assistant thought she had landed the job of her dreams when, in the summer of 2015, she started work on "Going In Style," a bank heist comedy starring Morgan Freeman, Michael Caine and Alan Arkin.
But the job quickly devolved into several months of harassment, she told CNN. She alleges that Freeman subjected her to unwanted touching and comments about her figure and clothing on a near-daily basis. Freeman would rest his hand on her lower back or rub her lower back, she said.
In one incident, she said, Freeman "kept trying to lift up my skirt and asking if I was wearing underwear." He never successfully lifted her skirt, she said -- he would touch it and try to lift it, she would move away, and then he'd try again. Eventually, she said, "Alan [Arkin] made a comment telling him to stop. Morgan got freaked out and didn't know what to say."
Freeman's alleged inappropriate behavior was not limited to that one movie set, according to other sources who spoke to CNN. A woman who was a senior member of the production staff of the movie "Now You See Me" in 2012 told CNN that Freeman sexually harassed her and her female assistant on numerous occasions by making comments about their bodies.
"He did comment on our bodies... We knew that if he was coming by ... not to wear any top that would show our breasts, not to wear anything that would show our bottoms, meaning not wearing clothes that [were] fitted," she said.
At 80 years old, Freeman is one of Hollywood's biggest stars, with a movie career that spans nearly five decades. His starring roles in movies like "Driving Miss Daisy" and "Shawshank Redemption" in the late 1980s and early 1990s made him a household name. He won an Oscar for Best Supporting Actor for 2004's "Million Dollar Baby," and has earned four other Oscar nominations. His voiceover work has also become iconic, including his narration for the Academy Award-winning documentaries "The Long Way Home" and "March of the Penguins."
In all, 16 people spoke to CNN about Freeman as part of this investigation, eight of whom said they were victims of what some called harassment and others called inappropriate behavior by Freeman. Eight said they witnessed Freeman's alleged conduct. These 16 people together described a pattern of inappropriate behavior by Freeman on set, while promoting his movies and at his production company Revelations Entertainment.
Of those 16, seven people described an environment at Revelations Entertainment that included allegations of harassment or inappropriate behavior by Freeman there, with one incident allegedly witnessed by Lori McCreary, Freeman's co-founder in the enterprise, and another in which she was the target of demeaning comments by Freeman in a public setting. One of those seven people alleged that McCreary made a discriminatory remark regarding a female candidate for a job at the Producers Guild of America, where McCreary is co-president.
Four people who worked in production capacities on movie sets with Freeman over the last ten years described him as repeatedly behaving in ways that made women feel uncomfortable at work. Two, including the production assistant on "Going in Style" whose skirt he allegedly attempted to lift, said Freeman subjected them to unwanted touching. Three said he made public comments about women's clothing or bodies. But each of them said they didn't report Freeman's behavior, with most saying it was because they feared for their jobs. Instead, some of the women -- both on movie sets and at Revelations -- said, they came up with ways to combat the alleged harassment on their own, such as by changing the way they dressed when they knew he would be around.
CNN reached out to dozens more people who worked for or with Freeman. Some praised Freeman, saying they never witnessed any questionable behavior or that he was a consummate professional on set and in the office.
Several other times during this investigation, when a CNN reporter contacted a person who had worked with Freeman to try to ask them if they had seen or been subjected to inappropriate behavior by an actor they had worked with -- not initially even naming the actor they were asking about -- the person would immediately tell them they knew exactly who the reporter had in mind: Morgan Freeman. Some of those people were sources for this investigation while others declined to comment further or did not want what they said used in this story.
The pattern of behavior described by those who spoke with CNN shows another example of the systematic problems that exist in the entertainment industry. The allegations against Freeman are not about things that happened in private; they are about things that allegedly happened in public, in front of witnesses -- even in front of cameras. Before #MeToo, many men in the industry could behave without fear of consequences, because many times when a powerful man did so, it was the victim who suffered repercussions.
CNN reached out to Freeman's spokesperson for comment and then, at his request, emailed him a detailed list of the accusations against Freeman. The spokesperson did not respond to multiple follow-ups by email seeking comment on the accusations.
CNN also reached out to a spokesperson for McCreary, and then provided her with a detailed list of accusations regarding Freeman's alleged behavior at Revelations and details of the accusation against her as well as a number of questions for her regarding Freeman's alleged behavior at Revelations and the environment there. The spokesperson did not respond to multiple follow-ups by email seeking comment.
The allegations of inappropriate behavior by Freeman are not limited to the confines of his company or to movie sets. Three entertainment reporters who spoke to CNN said Freeman made inappropriate remarks to them during press junkets, which are publicity events for journalists who cover new films, typically attended by the movie's biggest stars.
One of the three, CNN entertainment reporter Chloe Melas, the co-author of this article, says she was subjected to inappropriate behavior by Freeman more than a year ago, when she interviewed him at a press junket for "Going in Style." According to Melas, who was six months pregnant at the time, Freeman, in a room full of people, including his co-stars Arkin and Caine, shook Melas' hand, not letting go while repeatedly looking her up and down and saying more than once a variation of, "I wish I was there." She says he also said to her, "You are ripe." Cameras were on and recording during one of Freeman's remarks to Melas -- "Boy, do I wish I was there" -- but not for the rest. As is common practice with such junkets, Melas was the only CNN employee there at the time.
Afterward, Melas reported what had happened to her supervisor, who instructed her to inform CNN human resources. According to Melas, she was told that CNN HR contacted their counterparts at human resources for Warner Bros., which produced and distributed the movie, and which like CNN is owned by Time Warner. Melas said she was also told that Warner Bros. HR could not corroborate the account because only one of Freeman's remarks was on video and the Warner Bros. employees present did not notice anything. Melas and her supervisor agreed that she would not cover the movie.
Asked for comment, a spokesperson for Warner Bros. confirmed that what Melas was told was accurate, but declined to comment further. A representative for Caine declined to comment. A representative for Arkin said he was not available for comment.
After the encounter with Freeman, Melas started making calls to see if other women had experienced anything similar, or whether this was an isolated incident. She soon learned that other women had similar stories -- and so she, and later her co-author, began this months-long reporting process.
Inside Revelations Entertainment
Freeman and Lori McCreary founded Revelations Entertainment in 1996. Variety reported last year that Freeman started the company with McCreary because he was frustrated by the lack of choice roles for black actors and because he wanted to reveal the truth about serious issues -- a mission that inspired the name "Revelations."
The company's credits include a list of ambitious films about religion, apartheid, astronomy and stem cell research. Revelations also produced the film "Along Came a Spider" and the hit CBS show "Madam Secretary," both of which feature strong female leads.
But former staffers who spoke with CNN say that behind the façade of a progressive and artistic agenda the company's two founders created what one called a "toxic" work environment. Six former staffers said they witnessed Freeman's questionable behavior around women, which they said included sexual comments and one said included an incident of unsolicited touching. One female former staffer said she was the target of sexual comments by Freeman.
The female former employee at Revelations told CNN that Freeman was flanked by a group of men on the set of "Through the Wormhole" when she met the actor for the first time. He "looked me up and down," she said, and then asked her, "How do you feel about sexual harassment?"
"I was stunned," she told CNN. "This is the person that I worked for, this is his company, I didn't expect it at all ... I said timidly, 'I love it' in a sarcastic way hoping to make light of the situation because I was so confused and then he turned to the guys on the crew ... and said, 'See guys, this is how you do it.'"
One woman who was a manager at Revelations told CNN that sometimes Freeman would "come over to my desk to say hi and he'd just stand there and stare at me. He would stare at my breasts."
"If I ever passed him he would stare at me in an awkward way, would look me up and down sometimes stopping and just staring," she said. "One time he stopped, looked me up and down as I walked into a room of people, and everyone burst out laughing. And I literally froze feeling very uncomfortable and one of the people in the office said, 'Don't worry, that's just Morgan.'"
"That sort of interaction was when I stopped wearing a skirt around the office when he was there," said the former manager. "I can't say it was an accident that I'd be wearing a potato sack and a ponytail on certain days when he was there and do my best to avoid him when he was in the office."
Freeman was not in the office on a daily basis, the former employees said. But when he did show up, he behaved like a "creepy uncle," in the words of a male former employee. "One time I witnessed Morgan walk up to an intern and start massaging her" shoulder, he said. "The intern got visibly red and wiggled out of his grasp, it was awkward." The incident stood out to him because Freeman was using only one hand to touch the intern, as his other was injured in a 2008 car accident that was widely covered by the press. Another former employee told CNN she was present when the male former employee told several people about this incident shortly after it occurred.
CNN spoke to two male witnesses who each saw a separate occasion in which Freeman asked women to twirl. One instance occurred at the office, while another happened at an off-site company event.
Another incident stood out to people who spoke with CNN who witnessed it. Two former staffers who were there, and a writer for the show "Madam Secretary" who also attended, each described the scene to CNN.
For his 79th birthday, Revelations threw Freeman a party in the office. According to the sources, roughly 30 people attended the party, some of whom were new to the company and had never met the actor. McCreary was among those in attendance, the sources said.
People at the party had to stand in a circle, a former executive at the company who attended the party told CNN, and tell Freeman who they were and what they did. Then, the former executive said, Freeman went up to women in the circle and would "stand maybe within an inch of their face and just look them up and down and not say anything, and then would move on to the next woman and he'd stand like within an inch of their face and look them up and down and not say anything, and it was really, really strange." The former executive added, "It was really weird and he did it to every woman but of course he didn't do it to any of the men. He didn't speak to any of the men."
The writer for "Madam Secretary" who was at the party said, "We saw Morgan go around to the girls in the circle and get really close to their faces, he didn't do it to the men. I don't know what he said but we all thought it was strange and couldn't wait to get the hell out of there. Absolutely there were sexual undertones to it." After the #MeToo movement began, the same writer said, writers on the show joked -- with that incident in mind -- "that Morgan would be the next person to be called out."
McCreary herself has also been the subject of demeaning comments by Freeman. In front of what was reportedly an audience of 400 people at 2016's Produced By conference, Freeman described what she was wearing during their first meeting, saying, "She had on a dress cut to here."
"She wants to be thought of as serious," said Freeman of McCreary, who was on the same panel. "But you can't get away from the short dresses."
Freeman stood by his comments when he appeared a few days later on the "Today" show and host Savannah Guthrie said some people were "surprised" by the remarks he made on the panel.
"It was just something I said in jest about when I first met her, it was more than 20 years ago," he said to Guthrie. "How is that news?"
The Hollywood Reporter reported at the time that McCreary "did not visibly react to the comment." One of the former Revelations executives told CNN that McCreary was visibly upset when she returned to the office.
"I tried to console her and she was clearly upset and I think she was surprised and found it hurtful and embarrassing," said the former executive. "She was devastated."
Five sources told CNN that there was no formal human resources department at Revelations at the time. There was a rotation of executives who served as the point of contact for HR issues, but former staffers said they did not feel comfortable talking to senior personnel about their workplace grievances. This prompted some staffers to form a "survivors club" where they gathered to vent about their experiences at Revelations, according to five sources who have been to the gatherings, which take place outside of the office.
Publicly, McCreary champions the #MeToo and Time's Up movements. Two days before January's Screen Actors Guild awards, at which Freeman accepted a Lifetime Achievement Award, McCreary released a statement on behalf of the Producers Guild of America (PGA), to say that its board ratified new anti-sexual harassment guidelines for its members. "The PGA is indebted to Time's Up as a resource in creating our protocols," she said in a press release issued with her co-president Gary Lucchesi, referring to the initiative aimed at fighting harassment and discrimination against women.
Yet the former Revelations employee who said Freeman asked her how she felt about sexual harassment also alleged that on a phone call with a member of PGA, McCreary said of a candidate vying for a position at PGA East, "she'll never be able to do a good job, she has a family."
Two former senior level Revelations employees said McCreary would openly mock women who had to leave work early for family commitments and school functions. McCreary also allegedly said that some employees couldn't handle big workloads because they had to "run home" to their families and therefore couldn't stay late at work, according to one of the sources. She openly advocated for work-life balance, that source said, but she would make "snide" remarks to those who left work early.
A spokesperson for the PGA said in a statement, "The Producers Guild of America is an Equal Opportunity Employer that does not question or consider marital or parental status in its hiring practices. As soon as CNN notified us about the allegation, we investigated the matter and have found that it has no merit. Lori McCreary is an outstanding PGA President. In all of her work with the Guild, she has been a consistent, vocal, and proactive advocate for women and all who are underrepresented in our community."
A spokesperson for McCreary did not respond to repeated follow-up requests for comment regarding the allegations against McCreary.
On set
One of the former male Revelations employees recounted to CNN what he called the "shocking" remarks that Freeman made while he was on set for a number of Freeman's movies. What he says he witnessed follows the pattern described by the women who said they were harassed by Freeman.
"[He'd say] things like 'I'd like to have an hour with her' or make vulgar and sexual comments about women," the former employee said. "He would be verbally inappropriate and it was just shocking. You're more shocked than anything because it's hard to have the wherewithal to say to him 'That's inappropriate.' You're just like 'whoa.' It's hard because on any set he is the most powerful person on it. It's weird because you just don't expect it from Morgan Freeman, someone who you respect."
The female production assistant (PA) mentioned at the beginning of this story who worked on "Going In Style" said she was in her early 20s when Freeman, then 78 years old, harassed her. She said the experience led to her decision to leave the movie industry.
"It was constant comments about the way I looked," she said, adding that Freeman often made the comments within earshot of others on the production staff. She said she frequently came home from work in tears.
The woman recalled a time when she went to the set wearing a dress with a t-shirt over it to cover her exposed back, but "Morgan said to me that I shouldn't be wearing the shirt over my dress."
Another female production assistant who witnessed this particular alleged incident told CNN that Freeman's behavior towards the younger female production staff was an unchecked and persistent issue during filming. Both women said the t-shirt incident took place in front of a group of people and that they heard at least one other woman publicly chastise Freeman for that particular comment. The behavior was discussed among the women he targeted, the female production assistant said.
A third woman who worked on a recent movie of Freeman's recalled an incident at the film's wrap party. "He was looking at my breasts, and I told him, 'My eyes are up here.' Then we went to take a group photo and he pressed himself up against me. It was inappropriate."
CNN spoke to one of the woman's colleagues on the film, who said that as soon as the photo was taken, the woman walked over and told a group of people what Freeman had done to her.
Another production assistant, who worked with Freeman on "The Dark Knight," told CNN that although she was never personally targeted by Freeman, she witnessed some inappropriate comments Freeman made to female members of the crew. She also said that female members of the crew would at times discuss how Freeman had made them feel uncomfortable.
"Morgan did things in a way that an older more established person can get away with because they have that power," she told CNN. "They can't be replaced, but you can be replaced very easily, that's just kind of the dynamic on set. PA's can be replaced, grips can be replaced, electricians can be replaced, but the actors -- once they're in, they're in. Had it been somebody else on the crew... I would feel comfortable reporting them because I wouldn't feel like my job would be in danger by reporting them, but if you report somebody like Morgan Freeman that the movie would lose a lot of money by replacing them or getting them in trouble, then you're the trouble maker and you'll get fired because you're just a PA."
With reporters
Freeman's alleged fixation on how women dressed was apparent when he hit the road to promote his films, as was his alleged pattern of looking women up and down while making sexually suggestive comments to them.
As the entertainment producer at Chicago's WGN-TV, Tyra Martin spent hours interviewing Freeman at various press junkets. Over the course of a decade, she said, she sat down with him at least nine times and grew accustomed to his comments about her appearance. But Martin made it clear in an interview with CNN that she was always "in on the joke." WGN produced videos featuring some of Freeman's remarks to Martin, describing it as him flirting with her. But Martin felt that one incident crossed a line.
"When I stood up, I pulled my skirt part of my dress down and he did say, 'Oh, don't pull it down now.'" Martin said. "That gave me pause but I never felt uncomfortable."
It is unclear whether video of that incident exists.
An entertainment reporter who is a member of the Hollywood Foreign Press Association said Freeman made comments about her skirt and her legs during two different junkets. Much like many of the women in this report and those who declined to go on the record, the reporter said Freeman's fame and power kept her from speaking out.
"I was just trying to do my job and I brushed it off," said the reporter, who did not want to be identified for this story because she's fearful of losing out on interviews with other celebrities.
"You don't want to put him on the spot because one, he's famous and two, it's on camera and three, you just want to do your job."
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HWD Weekly
Oscars: It’s All Over but the Votin’
Rebecca Keegan
It’s Friday, voting on the Oscar nominations ends at five P.M. Pacific, and at 5:01 I’m pouring a bourbon and changing into sweats.
Hello from Los Angeles, where we’re celebrating the good judgment of the Directors Guild, biting our nails about James Franco, and making one last Hail Mary pass for Hostiles.
CRINGING OUR WAY THROUGH THE SEASON
The week that began with Natalie Portman pointedly introducing the “all-male” directing nominees at the Golden Globes wound down with a more inclusive batch of nominations from the Directors Guild of America on Thursday. Vanity Fair’s inaugural awards-issue cover subjects, Greta Gerwig (Lady Bird) and Jordan Peele (Get Out), made the list, along with Chris Nolan (Dunkirk), Guillermo del Toro (The Shape of Water), and Martin McDonagh (Three Billboards Outside Ebbing, Missouri). Peele even doubled up, collecting a nod in the best-first-time-director category, suggesting his peers in the guild are bullish on his prospects, and all those hours spent making Key & Peele episodes before tackling his first feature paid off. As V.F.’s Yohana Desta writes, this guild is a terrifically reliable predictor of Oscar nominations. There still are a few omissions that could squeak in with the Academy’s directors branch, however, and knock one of these five out of the running, perhaps Steven Spielberg (The Post), Dee Rees (Mudbound), or Sean Baker (The Florida Project).
A far less predictive but infinitely weirder awards-season contest unfolded at the Barker Hangar in Santa Monica Thursday night, as the Critics’ Choice Awards were handed out. The Shape of Water took the top prize, but at this show, it’s not so much about who wins, but about who attends and earns some points in the marathon charm offensive of the Oscar race. In this most unusual #MeToo awards season, it was also about who did not attend. James Franco won best actor in a comedy for his performance in The Disaster Artist, just hours after the Los Angeles Times launched a story in which five women accused Franco of inappropriate behavior (Franco’s attorney has disputed the women’s allegations). The actor, who had planned to attend the show, was absent from the ceremony, leaving clearly uncomfortable presenter Walton Goggins to accept the award on his behalf as the room tepidly applauded. Desta has a write-up here.
Jordan Peele and Greta Gerwig, photographed in Los Angeles.
Photograph by Art Streiber.
When I saw Scott Cooper’s Hostiles in Telluride this year, the elegantly crafted Western stopped me like a bullet, and I expected to see it well represented in the Oscar race, particularly for Christian Bale’s subtle lead performance. But though the film has some passionate supporters in the Academy, including Jerry Bruckheimer, who hosted a screening at his home Thursday night, many Academy members I’ve talked to haven’t seen it. That might be because the movie is brutal in its early minutes—to the point that it could cause some to pop out their screener. What’s more, the film got picked up by distribution newcomer Byron Allen, who is still learning the witchcraft of awards season. Maybe the issue is that Bale hasn’t done much press for the film, busy as he is on another project (the previous Oscar winner just wrapped playing Dick Cheney for his Big Short director, Adam McKay). I interviewed Cooper this week, and he had another theory: one day on the set of his 2013 thriller, Out of the Furnace, Cooper had asked Sam Shepard about his relationship to the Academy. Shepard, who had won a Pulitzer, 10 Obies, and a PEN Award, never won an Oscar. “Sam said, ‘You know, I just don’t think they dig my shit,’” Cooper said. “And I get what he means. I kind of feel the same way.” I don’t know about that. The reality is, the movie got a late start in the awards space. As Cooper told me, “It’s a little bit like the Los Angeles Rams, where we’re down 26-13 on a slippery field in the fourth quarter, but we’re trying to mount a comeback.” Regular folks still have plenty of time to see Hostiles, which opens in wide release on January 19, and you can read my full interview with Cooper here.
BEST-DRESSED
In Paul Thomas Anderson’s Phantom Thread, clothes are a source of high drama. So it only makes sense that Focus Features and Vanity Fair held a fashion show at the Chateau Marmont Wednesday featuring some of costume designer Mark Bridges’s couture creations for the film. Lily James, the Haim sisters, John C. Reilly, Rodarte’s Kate and Laura Mulleavy, Last Jedi director Rian Johnson, Call Me by Your Name director Luca Guadagnino, Darkest Hour director Joe Wright, and Baby Driver director Edgar Wright showed up to celebrate the looks. V.F.’s Julie Miller delivers this dispatch and photo gallery from the party.
EARBUDS TIME
As Oscar season phase one winds down, V.F.’s Katey Rich and Richard Lawson make sense of Sunday’s drama-filled Golden Globes show, and of the British Academy of Film and Television Arts awards nominations in our podcast Little Gold Men.
That’s the news for this week on the Hollywood and awards beat. Tell me what you’re seeing out there. Send tips, comments, valet-line gossip, big deals you overheard at the Polo Lounge, bad vibes you picked up on at Craft, and your completed Oscar nominations ballot to Rebecca_Keegan@condenast.com. Follow me on Twitter @thatrebecca.
Emmy Noms: HBO Resumes Its Place on the TV Throne
Just How Much Will Beyoncé Dominate This Awards Season?
2019 Emmy Nominations: The Year’s Biggest Snubs and Surprises
After Keanu, Which Beloved Actor Is Due for a Renaissance Next?
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Infamous Femmes Fatales Throughout History
It's day 2 of Femme Fatale Week on Va-Voom Vintage and today we're talking about real life deadly dames.
These are my top 5 favorite historical Femmes Fatales...
Queen of Egypt who married her brother and then seduced Julius Caesar to give her aid in leading a revolt against her brother. She gave birth to his son just 10 months after they first met (what a vixen!). After the death of Caesar, She took Marc Antony as her lover and persuaded him to execute her sister (who took sanctuary at a Roman temple)so that she would not lose her power over the Egyptian throne. Antony broke Roman law and executed the teenage Arsinoe on the steps of the temple. Modern science has concluded that Cleopatra was not a beauty but she had plenty of charm, intelligence, power and appeal to win over two of history's most powerful men.
Eleanor of Aquitaine
One of the most powerful women of the Middle Ages, Duchess of Aquitaine (at age 15), Queen of France, Queen of England and mother of Richard the Lionheart. In her younger years, Eleanor has the best of everything. She was skilled in several languages, literature, music and evening hunting. After the death of her parents, she was married and became Queen of France. It is said that even as a young woman (and a Queen) she dressed and spoke as she pleased. Gervase of Canterbury described her much later as "an exceedingly shrewd and clever woman, born of noble stock, but unstable and flighty." When she was in her early 50's, Eleanor and her 3 sons revolted against the King. She disguised herself as a man and tried to escape to France but she was captured and imprisoned for 16 years. Throughout her life, Eleanor went on crusades, built her empire and even founded the "Court of Love" where ladies with love problems could come to her and she would determine the best course of action for them.
The beautiful Italian Renaissance femme fatale. The illegitimate daughter of Roderigo Borgia who later became Pope Alexander VI. "She is described as having heavy blonde hair which fell past her knees, a beautiful complexion, hazel eyes which constantly changed colour, a full, high bosom, and a natural grace which made her appear to "walk on air". Lucrezia's life was full of scandal and sex. She was married 3 times to very powerful men: Giovanni Sforza ,Alfonso of Aragon and Alfonso d'Este. She had many affairs with various men, including her bi-sexual brother in law and it is rumored that her first child was fathered by her own brother! Her second husband was murdered by her brother because he was jealous that his sister paid so much attention to her husband and not to him. It is also rumored that Lucrezia wore a hollowed out ring which she used to poison her enemies.
Queen Anne Boleyn
Anne Boleyn was the daughter of Thomas Boleyn and Elizabeth Boleyn, Earl and Countess of Wiltshire. She was educated in the Netherlands and France and became a lady in waiting to Queen Catherine of Aragon. Anne's sister Mary became the mistress to the King and apparently gave birth to two of his children. King Henry soon became madly in love with Anne and tried to make her his mistress as well. Anne refused to be a lowly mistress and pressured the King to divorce his wife and marry her. When the Pope refused to annul Henry's marriage to Queen Catherine, Anne Boleyn and her family conspired to make Anne Queen of England. When the Boleyn family chaplain became Archbishop of Canterbury, he annulled the King's marriage to Catherine and married Henry and Anne. The Pope excommunicated everyone involved and the Church of England broke from the Pope's religious reign in Rome, starting a political and religious upheaval (all because Anne wanted to be Queen and Henry wanted to get her in bed!) The people of England hated Queen Anne and called her a witch and a whore. After she couldn't bear a male heir to the throne, fickle Henry became sick of her and had her arrested, charged for incest, adultery and treason. He claimed that she used spells to capture his affections. She was executed by beheading on May 19th 1536.
Exotic dancer, executed for espionage in 1917. Mata Hari is a very mysterious character in history. No one really knows if she was indeed a spy or if she was a scapegoat. At any rate, rumors suggest that she blew a kiss to the firing squad before they executed her (or that her lawyer and former lover was present and the kiss was intended for him). Another rumor suggests that she flung open her coat to reveal her naked body and proclaimed "Harlot, yes, but traitor, never!" and that her last words were "Merci monsieur.". During her lifetime, Mata Hari had many lovers and even became the mistress of a French millionaire. She was scandalous, seductive and dangerous!
garofit September 12, 2010 at 10:43 AM
lovely article, but seems to me it's pretty dangerous to be a femme fatale, it's fatal to oneself in the end :)
Tart Deco™ September 12, 2010 at 12:21 PM
Since you are in the Renaissance period, don't forget Mary Queen of Scots. She was a total vixen. Married to the Dauphin of France at 16, widowed at 18, she remarried her first cousin Lord Darnley a few years later who mysteriously died (supposedly at the hands of her next husband). Her son with Darnley later became King of England after Queen Elizabeth I died, even though Mary was executed for treaty against QEI for reportedly trying to get Liz overthrown and get herself appointed Queen of England. Even more scandalous was that she wore a red chemise to the beheading- ooh snap!
Crafty Baker September 12, 2010 at 2:23 PM
I also like Ann Boleyn. Her childhood home isn't that far from where I live, I must get around to visiting! x
Brittany_Va-Voom Vintage September 12, 2010 at 2:54 PM
So true! Mary Queen of Scots was a total femme fatale, shacking up with all of those guys, betraying her cousin, etc.
I read that Anne Boleyn also wore red on the day of her execution. Baaad girls!! :)
BaronessVonVintage September 12, 2010 at 3:16 PM
Oh, definitely Salome, too!
b. September 12, 2010 at 8:32 PM
Hmm, I agree with garofit ~ to be a femme fatale seems to be pretty darn fatal!! Still these women's stories are interesting.
xox,
bonita of Depict This!
Posted about ~ Nail Art, Plum Blossoms & bonita answers
Great list! I'm glad you added Eleanor of Aquitaine to it : ).
fullyfashioned September 13, 2010 at 2:36 AM
Awesome post, as a bonafide history geek this made me smile.
Wallis Simpson is another one- although not necessarily "fatale" she completely changed the British line of succession in 1936, plus she's from one of our favourite eras too!
FF xo
fully-fashioned.blogspot.com
Anastasia September 13, 2010 at 4:30 AM
What a great history lesson. Love it.
LandGirl1980 September 13, 2010 at 7:46 AM
The men around her , more than Anne herself were the conspiritors. Especially her Uncle - the Duke of Norfolk - who pulled the stings and cut them accordingly. In fact - the Duke of Norfolk had one of the casting votes when it came to her trial in 1536. She and Henry were in love for 8 years before the Pope became involved and wanted nothing more than to be married. Henry had grown tired of Catherine of Aragon, who he had been forced to marry when his brother Arthur died leaving behind a 14 year old widow that they could not send back to Spain. Catherine had also failed to produce a living heir – so things were not stacked in her favour. With the help of Thomas Cromwell (a huge plotter who always seemed to be pleasing the people who could please him and who later displeased the King and paid from the neck up - oops) and a certain passage in the Bible - plus excommunication from Rome and the development of the Church of England - they were married. But those that rise high - often fall fast - and inside of 3 years - Anne (minus the often misquoted red dress - she wore a fur coat to the scaffold - but wore a simple gown underneath) was beheaded by French swordsman who made her look the other way as he swung the sword. It is true that she was disliked in England – mainly due to the fact that in their eyes she had usurped a Queen (as in a proper Royal Princess ) and had gained a divorce. I think it made women panic that if the King could cast one wife aside for another - then so could his subjects. And as they could not focus their anger on the King - she was the next best thing. I think that due to this she has gone down the ages either loved or loathed. Me? I fall on the “hero worship” side (*wink*)
Wow! That was a ramble! Sorry!! :o)
Brittany_Va-Voom Vintage September 13, 2010 at 9:43 AM
No, I like the historical ramblings! She is such an interesting character. I often wonder if she played a bigger part in that drama than most people think or if she was a simple pawn to the men in her family that wanted power. We'll never know for sure but I'm like you, I LOVE her!
Jennifer Hawkins Hock October 18, 2010 at 12:44 PM
What an intriguing post - got to get back to it in free time, since I love history and I love learning about gutsy women and scandals of the past. Don't have any interest for smutty stuff of the present, but it's great to find out that humans have always been human and that we're not really getting any worse! My favorite thing is that beautifully-tinted photo of Mata Hari, with her adornments and drapery. Excellent.
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Experts: Haiti Reconstruction Faces Huge Challenges
By Robert Raffaele
Representatives of major donor countries will gather in Montreal on January 25 to discuss reconstruction efforts in Haiti, following the massive earthquake that struck the Caribbean nation January 12.
Many Haitians have been given a new lease on life, thanks to rescue workers from around the world.
In the months ahead, Haiti's future will depend to a large degree on the efforts of multinational agencies and reconstruction teams.
Roberto Vellutini is a vice president at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in Washington. It has provided aid to Haiti over the past 50 years. He says reconstruction efforts face serious challenges, but foremost is the cost.
"It's huge. Someone estimated that reconstruction would need anywhere between five to $10 billion, for I don't know, the next five years or something. So, someone needs to come up with this money," he said.
The IDB will allocate more than $200 million toward Haiti's reconstruction in the immediate future, but donor nations must deal with a bigger question.
"Do you want to rebuild Port-au-Prince exactly the way it was in the same place, in the same location? Shall we move the capital? Is it a vulnerable place? Will it be better off in the north? We don't know," Vellutini added.
Robert Maguire teaches international affairs at Trinity Washington University. He says Haiti's capital, when rebuilt, should be scaled back to prevent the overcrowding that existed before the earthquake and adds that Haiti needs to decentralize.
"Decentralize the functions of government, decentralize investment, the assembly plants that may come later to offer jobs," he said. "Decentralize the social services, so people don't feel they have to come into Port-au-Prince to put their kids in a decent school or find decent health care."
The United Nations special envoy to Haiti, former US President Bill Clinton, is a key asset, Maguire says.
Clinton gained valuable experience in a similar role following the 2004 Asian tsunami.
"[Bill Clinton] has a great wealth of experience in this, and his objective there, as it will be in Haiti, is to help to coordinate among donors, to make sure that not everybody is doing the same thing in the same place, that the vast array of needs are being treated," Maguire noted.
Experts agree that reconstruction in Haiti will take many years. The United Nations has appealed for more than $550 million for emergency relief over the next six months.
Haitians Flee Capital in Search of Aid, Shelter
Haiti's government and aid groups are struggling to respond to the housing needs of tens of thousands of people affected by last week's earthquake. Some people are trying to leave the damaged city behind. Buses stream out of the Haitian capital, packed with people in search of a safe and stable place to live, as aftershocks continue to rattle the city's residents. Some are heading back to their family homes in smaller towns on the coast or in rural parts of the…
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By Vidushi Sinha
Celebrities Appeal for Haiti Relief in Televised Fundraising Concert
Celebrities lent their star power to help the people of Haiti in a telethon Friday that originated in Los Angeles, New York, London and Haiti. The concert was broadcast in the United States and Canada, and seen by hundreds of millions of international viewers on cable and satellite channels, and the Internet. Alicia Keys set the tone for the Hope for Haiti Now telethon. Against a backdrop of grim images of the January 12th earthquake, she made a musical…
(REMOVE-REPLACED)US Official Tells VOA Haiti Supply Chain is in Full Gear
Head of the Department of Health and Human Services tells VOA that adequate medical supplies are in the pipeline
By Melinda Smith
Robert Raffaele
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Welcome to the Vietnam Veterans for Factual History website. Our mission is to provide facts from professional historians, eyewitnesses, and participants in the Vietnam War to correct the historical record of the War wherever that correction is warranted.
Vietnam Vets Group Demands PBS Documentary Correct 'Inaccuracies'
Vietnam Veterans Set the Record Straight After PBS TV Series Whitewashes Communism
Vietnam veterans challenge Ken Burns on the accuracy of his epic documentary
PBS Responds - See their letter
As veterans, many of whom served in the conflict and have remained very conscious of its history, we have become concerned that the 1978 prediction of Guenter Lewy has proven to be all too accurate. 35 years ago he wrote "Mythology, half-truth and falsehood concerning events in Vietnam abound and, unless corrected, will enter the textbooks for the mis-education of our children."
His prediction has proven to be all too accurate, and far too much of the literature about the war has been filled with exaggerations, inaccuracies, opinions presented as facts, and sometimes simple falsehoods. In recent years, historians, many of them being veterans of the Vietnam war, have written more accurately about the war's events. The newer work is often done with information gathered from the records of the communist protagonists, and these contributors are referred to as "revisionists". This is in contrast to the early and still prevalent writings in academia, originally by professors who had been part of the antiwar movement and now by a newer generation trained by those predecessors.
We started out as a group of veterans, historians, and other interested parties who came together recently in reaction to conferences dominated by those with clear antiwar biases. We have committed ourselves to set the record straight, with very factual approaches to those historical events. However this project is more than open to anyone for whom publishing the true history of the war in SE Asia is important. First among them would be the surviving Vietnamese who fought and suffered for their country - then those Americans who served outside of South Viet Nam's borders, or who were involved as diplomats, reporters, civil servants, or in any other capacity during that time, or those younger people who find this history of great interest; all are eagerly welcomed to this alliance. All are encouraged to bring their knowledge and experience of the history to light, as well as whatever questions they have or suggestions to help in fulfilling our mission. United we are bound to achieve more in serving this good cause.
We are the Vietnam Veterans for Factual History, a program being conducted under the auspices of RADIX Foundation. [501c(3)]
This Group, formerly known as Vietnam Veterans to Correct the Myths, has previously published The Boston Manifesto (2004) and Our Pre-sponse (2013) and has supported the publication of Whitewash/Blackwash (3rd Edition 2006).
Vietnam Veterans for Factual History, 3307 Raleigh Row, Missouri City, TX 77459-6768
© 2019 Vietnam Veterans for Factual History
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Series: Oct. 1: Lessons and Reflections
From Tragedy, Recovery and Resilience
After the Oct. 1 shooting, UNLV researcher Stephen Benning found increases in stress and gratitude. Here, he shares perspective on his findings.
Students at a campus vigil the day after the Oct. 1, 2017, mass shooting in Las Vegas. (Josh Hawkins / UNLV Creative Services)
By UNLV News Center
On Oct. 1, 2017, the lives of more than 22,000 people and their extended families changed irrevocably, and the Las Vegas community stood shocked and horrified in the wake of the largest mass shooting in modern American history.
Like others on campus, my team wanted to help make sense of what felt senseless. We quickly devised a study on the psychological experiences of those who attended the 2017 Route 91 Harvest Festival and those in our larger Las Vegas community to gain a deeper understanding of how this tragedy changed us.
Within two weeks after the incident, we launched an online survey, collecting stories about the event and tracking a variety of psychological symptoms. Nearly 170 people — roughly 50 who’d attended the festival and 120 from the Vegas community—participated in this initial data collection.
We asked people to complete our first wave of data collection within a month of the incident. We checked in with them 45 days, three months, and six months after the incident to collect follow-up data and see how their experiences may have changed over time.
As could be expected with such a life-threatening experience, those who were at the festival had substantially higher levels of post-traumatic stress (PTS) symptoms than people in the broader community. But we also found that both groups had higher levels of PTS symptoms and higher depression scores than people outside the Las Vegas area. The incident did indeed affect our entire community.
However, the events of Oct. 1 did not seem to impact our participants’ levels of well-being on the whole. In fact, participants’ levels of gratitude were highest immediately after the tragedy, indicating a surge of thankfulness in the community as well as in survivors of the festival.
Furthermore, throughout the course of the study, people who were at the festival had higher levels of gratitude than people in the community. This surprising result indicates that people may grow psychologically even after experiencing the most grievous trauma.
Within three months, participants’ negative psychological symptoms were generally reduced, though there was still substantial variability in people’s symptoms. Overall, PTS and depression levels in the broader Las Vegas community returned to normal ranges. However, people who’d attended the festival continued to exhibit elevated symptoms of PTS and depression.
Many wonder what can help people recover in these types of situations. We found that the positive effects of support from our participants’ social circles took roughly six months to build up enough to buffer against experiencing PTS and depression. Conversely, criticism from participants’ social circles was associated with higher levels of PTS and depression, and the negative impacts of criticism began registering psychologically within 45 days after the event.
Oct. 1 changed our lives and our city, but we can still provide each other with the social support that helps all of us cope with any tragedy. I hope our team’s work will encourage everyone to do just that.
UNLV News Center
Originally Posted In
UNLV Innovation
research, Innovation 2018
Administrative Units:
Division of Research and Economic Development
The Lessons of Tragedy, Waking Up to Our Community Changed
Related Experts:
Stephen D. Benning
An Eastsider's Perspective
Research | July 17, 2019
Latinx oral history project gives grad student a way to up-end the misperceptions of the Las Vegas community he grew up in.
Myth-Busting UNLV Study Reveals that Gamblers Can’t Detect Slot Machine Payout Percentages
As casino operators optimize the house advantage, a new UNLV study contradicts long-held beliefs about a player’s ability to detect differences in how much – and how often – a slot machine pays.
Alumni Event Reveals Ancient Maya Secrets (and Rebel Pride)
UNLV archaeologists Arlen and Diane Chase spoke with Salt Lake City alums as the Alumni Association launches its new Rebels Forever membership structure.
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S’pore 3rd most corrupt-free country in the world, 1st in Asia
By Flora Isabelle LimJanuary 30, 2019Current
TL;DR – We were previously 6th.
Singapore was ranked the third most corrupt-free country in the world, based on the Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 by international non-governmental organisation, Transparency International.
In the previous 2017 ranking, we were ranked sixth.
The index, which ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption according to experts and businesspeople, uses a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean. Singapore scored 85 points out of 100. In 2017, the score was 84.
In Asia, Singapore is deemed the most corrupt-free country. The organisation also mentioned that there is little to no progress on anti-corruption in this region.
Here’s the full listing if you are interested:
READ MORE: Four key things Chan Chun Sing said in his final May Day media briefing
Previous PostPlanning a proposal? Why not do it at the Marina Bay Carnival?
Next PostSingPost investigating case of mail supposedly discarded by postman in Ang Mo Kio
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"No Control, she doesn't want to move. She says it's a human rights issue." Developing the Right to Freedom of Movement within a spatial context
Thomas Coggin
"The standoff continued for what seemed like hours. In truth, it was only a few minutes. By now, there were radioed messages. The men in the house must have been calling for backup. The Security man replied, “It’s a woman. Bravo. She is not doing nothing. Sitting in the car. No, control, she doesn’t want to move. She says it’s a human right issue. I don’t know control. No, control. Properly dressed. No, control. Doesn’t look like that. Sober. I think she was phoning, control. English control. Only English. No, not only English, Zulu also. Me, I speak only English to her….”
What began as my mild refusal to be bullied congealed into something more ominous and ugly. A slow, cold anger rose within myself. I knew I had crossed a threshold.
The radioed exchange stopped. The Security man asked me to please move. He was only doing his job. Now, they were telling him to remove me by force. I replied “We have a problem. I am not going to be told by you or anybody to move. Please, understand this. I have nothing against you or the owner of that house. I am simply parked in the street. I do not owe you an explanation. Now, I may I ask that you leave me alone.”
This is part of an extract from a Facebook post by Nomboniso Gasa, a researcher and analyst in South Africa who works on issues of law, gender, politics, and cultural issues. On that night in September 2016, she experienced what perhaps many others experience in accessing and engaging with public space in South Africa’s cities, and is a lucid portrayal of the prevalence of spatial apartheid which continues to characterize the South African urban environment.
Her experience is emblematic of the extent to which movement is controlled in South African cities. This emerges both from a history of legislated control of movement, as well as a contemporary context of high crime rates and under-resourced policing. This has led to gating practices (in which a street or suburb is cordoned off, and access is policed privately), private policing practices (in which, for example, private police vehicles patrol typically wealthy suburban streets), and community policing through online social media forums (in which, for example, a member of a community alerts other via social media or a group instant messaging platform of a suspicious vehicle in the neighborhood).
How does the law respond to this new form of spatial apartheid? Does it outlaw private security altogether, relying rather on the mechanisms of the South African Police Service in pandering to our senses of insecurity? Does it completely forbid the gating of streets, or does it go even further by mandating that townhouse or gated communities remain open to passing pedestrian traffic? And how does it stop us policing each other based on preconceived notions of what or who constitutes a danger – the 'bravo' male, or the 'bravo' female who speaks English and isiZulu, and who refuses to move because, she says, “it’s a human rights issue.”
This is the first post in a series which tries to provide some answers to these questions. The series will be structured as follows: First, it will develop the right to freedom of movement from one which is understood primarily as facilitating intra-state movement, to one which informs law and policy aimed at enabling movement within the spaces that make up the city. The second part of the series will look at arguments in favor of lawfully limiting the right to freedom of movement, principally through the prism of the right to freedom of security of the person. The third part of the series will look at a constitutional framework in which these two conflicting rights may be balanced. The fourth, and final part of the series will look at what this may mean for policy and law going forward.
But first: How can we begin to develop the Right to Freedom of Movement, as contained in Section 21 (1) of the South African Constitution, within a spatially-oriented context?
Section 21 (1) of the Constitution, which provides simply that everyone has the right to freedom of movement, must be understood with due regard to South Africa’s history of restrictions on movement. Section 10 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act[1] provided that no African could remain for more than 72 hours in a particular area unless he/she was born or resided in the area, worked continuously for one employer for more than 10 years, or was the wife, unmarried daughter or underage son of the African person. Section 29 of the Act allowed for an authority to banish any African deemed undesirable, or whose presence is apparently detrimental to the maintenance of peace and order.
Section 2 (1) of the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-Ordination of Documents) Act[2] required Africans to carry ‘passbooks’. These had to be carried at all times, and in terms of section 10(2) could be demanded by a police officer at any time (failing which resulted in imprisonment). Section 8 (1) of the Act had the effect of ensuring that the only occasion an African could enter into a ‘white’ area was if he/she was employed there.
The Group Areas Act was a series of three acts designed to designate certain areas along racial lines.[3] Thus, formerly diverse areas such as Sophiatown in Johannesburg were in 1955 destroyed by the state and rebuilt as purely a white suburb. Its residents were moved to the southwestern urban fringe of the city – those classified as black were moved to Meadowlands, those classified as Indian to Lenasia, and those classified as coloured to Eldorado Park. The impact of this legislation was to create a spatial imaginary in the South African city located across lines of race; you simply did not live in heterogeneous communities because the law channeled you into a very particular space.
Section 21 (1), however, must also be interpreted within the contemporary spatial context of South African cities. In this regard, Clarno and Murray conducted empirical research looking at the practices of private policing in Johannesburg. They note how managers and employees of ‘several security companies’[4] openly admitted that ‘the definition of “suspicious” is racialised. Whenever they come across “two black males,” security officers are instructed to conduct an investigation.’[5] They note further from their research how private security officers exercise a discretion in determining whether a person has legitimate business in the area; if not, they are escorted out of the neighborhood.[6] If a person refuses to leave, a variety of intimidation tactics is used, including following their movements, alerting the police, or taking their photograph.[7] Even more alarmingly, the focus group conducted by Clarno and Murray noted how when physical violence is necessary, it is used – both in terms of extracting information from those caught allegedly in the act of committing a crime, and those whose return is not welcome in the neighborhood.[8]
This entrance to a boomed-off street in Johannesburg requires a visitor to sign in with a security company. It is assumed that the role of the surveillance cameras is to record who is entering the street, and the vehicle registration of the car. A panic button points to the sense of insecurity residents and visitors alike seem to feel when engaging with the street.
In addition to this more active form of private policing, there is a more passive mode that exists within digital spaces created by residents in a particular area. Anecdotal observations of these digital spaces reflect how this mode of private policing exists primarily through quite strange semantics and involves alerting others to suspicions about various people using the neighborhood in some form or another. This occurs through the use of a reductive and almost militaristic terminology – a ‘bravo’ male to describe a black male, for example. This not only suggests an inherent preoccupation with wanting to categorize those who access and use the area along the lines of race but also suggests a poorly-disguised desire to exclude the other from the invisible scale at which residents feel comfortable.
It is this captivation with defining scale in terms of race which Dirsuweit and Wafer suggest was the genesis of road closures in Johannesburg. They posit that the immediate post-apartheid deconstruction of the city meant that white residents sought to reimagine the scale in which they identified with the city. This occurred in a manner that reiterated the narratives of ‘community self-determination,’[9] viewing road closures ‘as an attempt to “scale-down” local politics in an attempt to maintain control of spaces of privilege.’[10]
The result is an ingrained desire to control the movement of the other. This has significant implications for the right to freedom of movement in that the right itself is an antithesis to control, and particularly within the contemporary and historical spatial context of the South African city, its limitation should be viewed with circumspection.
A typically suburban scene in newly-developed areas of Johannesburg, where public space functions merely as a road arterial connecting enclosed townhouse/condominium developments.
Freedom of movement allows for an equality of access to the various opportunities that the city is able to offer. It broadens the city-scale in that the city’s islands of privilege and poverty are submerged. It allows for encounters with others, facilitating a city of difference rather than one that is heterogeneous in its interactions.
There is also a certain infringement of the right to dignity in being able to control who can access a public space. In grappling with dignity, Haysom identifies three distinct concerns which emerge as key elements of the right to dignity: firstly, that dignity implies a level of autonomy for the individual; secondly, that dignity rejects conduct which treats a person as non-human, less than human, or as an object; and thirdly, that dignity sees everyone as having equal worth and value.[11]
In light of the above, we can see a certain objectification of the body in the controlling of a person’s movement through a public space. The ‘bravo male’ is pre-eminently someone whose movements are not to be trusted; he is an object that moves around white spaces, devoid of feelings and experiences that make him human. He has limited autonomy in deciding where he moves, which is decided for him depending on the legitimacy accorded to him by those that control these spaces. In this way, the control of movement strips people of their dignity, and an argument may be made that any perceived need for personal security (as opposed to actual need) outweighs the desire for a society based on equality, freedom and dignity.
An 'Inyala' police van belonging to the South African Police Services. This kind of van was/is used as a riot vehicle, and is symbolic of the repressive violence that characterized apartheid South Africa during the 1980s. In this photo (taken in 2012), the van (which, at the time, sat empty) appeared to be used as a crime-deterrent in an upscale suburban shopping mall in Johannesburg's eastern suburbs.
It also strips people of their right to the city. The control of movement is, I would suggest, one of the key determinants that bring the right to the city into play in the first place. The control of movement reinforces the repressiveness of dominant strategies and ideologies[12] inherited from a legislated system of spatial apartheid. It stifles the enjoyment of a right to urban life,[13] in which places of encounter and the exchange value of property remain paramount.[14] In this way, it detracts from the city as oeuvre because the production of space is constructed through a consumerist prism of control, rather than the relationships between people.
The next post considers the extent to which the right to freedom of movement can legitimately be limited. Do you think the right should be limited within a contemporary South African spatial context? What considerations should be taken into account when considering this limitation? What is the role of the law in balancing conflicting considerations in this regard?
[1] 25 of 1945.
[3] Clarno & Murray ‘Policing in Johannesburg after apartheid’ (2013) 39 Social Dynamics: A journal of African studies 210, 219.
[4] Group Areas Act 41 of 1950; Group Areas Act 77 of 1957; and Group Areas Act 36 of 1966.
[5] Clarno & Murray (note 219.
[6] Ibid 220.
[9] Dirsuweit & Wafer ‘Scale, governance and the maintenance of privileged control: the case of road closures in Johannesburg’s northern suburbs’ (2006) 17 Urban Forum 327, 330
[11] Ibid 5-6.
[12] See Lefebvre Le Droit a la Ville (1968), translated and reprinted as part of Lebfebvre (Kofman & Lebas – trans) Writings on Cities (1996) 154.
[13] Ibid 158.
Thomas Coggin March 5, 2017 Freedom of Movement, Public Space, Right to the City, Gating, Private PolicingComment
Magic Mike and the Illusion of Fair Rules in Public Urban Space
Thomas Coggin October 26, 2017
“She doesn’t know what the City’s budget is; she is just a kitchen assistant.” An introductory post to the Urban Law Lab.
Urban Law Lab March 5, 2017 Public Transport, Evictions, Housing
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Risk outweighs reward in deploying airstrike spotters, officials say
WASHINGTON – Deploying specialized troops to call in airstrikes on Islamic State targets with greater precision would require sending dozens to hundreds more personnel to Iraq and the likelihood that some
Risk outweighs reward in deploying airstrike spotters, officials say WASHINGTON – Deploying specialized troops to call in airstrikes on Islamic State targets with greater precision would require sending dozens to hundreds more personnel to Iraq and the likelihood that some Check out this story on USATODAY.com: http://usat.ly/1Id17oi
Tom Vanden Brook, USA TODAY Published 1:58 p.m. ET June 2, 2015
A Navy aircraft returns after a bombing raid against Islamic State targets.(Photo: John Philip Wagner Jr., AP)
WASHINGTON — Deploying specialized troops to call in airstrikes on Islamic State targets with greater precision would require sending dozens to hundreds more personnel to Iraq and the likelihood that some would be wounded or killed, two senior military officials say.
Moreover, they would not provide a clear-cut advantage in collecting intelligence on targets over drones, say the two officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to describe the thinking of top commanders.
The teams, known as Tactical Air Control Parties, call in airstrikes and strafing runs. They require vehicles, communication equipment and support personnel to accompany them. The additional personnel would likely include medical-evacuation crews and a quick-reaction force to rescue spotters pinned down by the enemy.
Casualties would be guaranteed if these forces deployed, said one of the two officials. The new troops would have to move on the battlefield and expose themselves to IEDs (improvised explosive devices). "It's back to the future in Iraq."
However, a greater U.S. presence, including air controllers, is essential to beating ISIL, said Michael O'Hanlon, a military analyst at the Brookings Institution. American advisers closer to the front lines and special operations forces to conduct raids against ISIL fighters should also be considered. He urged a commitment similar to that in Afghanistan, where there are about 10,000 U.S. troops.
The rewards outweigh the risks, he said.
"It's worth it if we want to win," O'Hanlon said. "We should also send in forward-deployed advisers and, if you ask me, special forces too, to help in raids. I think an Iraq presence not unlike our current Afghanistan one is the best option."
Calls have been increased for a more robust military response from the Pentagon as the strategy to defeat militants from the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, has faltered. Late last month, the Iraqi provincial capital of Ramadi fell to ISIL, and the militants also captured the historic city of Palmyra in Syria. There are about 3,000 U.S. troops in the region now, including teams to train, advise and assist Iraqi troops.
Palmyra may be off limits to U.S. airstrikes
Among the voices calling for on-the-ground spotters for more lethal airstrikes: Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., who also chairs the Armed Services Committee, and Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, another member of the committee who announced his bid for the Republican presidential nomination on Monday. Former Florida governor Jeb Bush, a likely candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, backs their use, too. An editorial in The Washington Post also supports their deployment.
The bomb spotters, known as Joint Terminal Air Controllers, are airmen or Marines, generally seasoned sergeants, lieutenants or captains, according to Pentagon briefing documents. They operate in units ranging in size from companies, about 200 troops, to divisions of as many as 18,000 strong. The teams "own the bomb" aboard aircraft and can drop to protect troops on the ground or destroy enemy targets.
Their effectiveness has been great in Afghanistan and Iraq when troops fight in close combat and precisely dropped bombs or strafing runs can destroy the enemy.
Defense Secretary: Iraqi forces showed no will to fight in Ramadi
The controllers often require three to four vehicles and multiple troops, the second senior official said. In turn, those personnel would require "considerable force protection measures," especially in Iraq to mitigate their risk.
They would also require logistical support, the first official said. They would require fuel for their vehicles, likely thirsty Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) trucks to protect them from IEDs. Mechanics would be needed to maintain the vehicles because, the official said, "It's Iraq, and things break all the time." If the teams stay for weeks or months, they'll need quarters to sleep in, somewhere to eat and administrative staff.
At the low end, the first official said, sending in a few teams would require hundreds of additional troops. There appears to be "little appetite" at the Pentagon for doing so now, the second official said.
In any event, the lack of spotters on the ground has not severely limited airstrikes, said a third senior officer, familiar with intelligence matters in Iraq and Syria but not authorized to speak about them.
U.S. says Iraqi military regrouping to retake Ramadi
All of the obvious targets have been hit in Syria and Iraq, the officer said, and much of the intelligence about them has been developed by spying on them with drones. Spotters on the ground could expedite developing targets but wouldn't change it greatly.
A key issue in the air war, which began in Iraq last August, is the directive not to avoid civilian casualties, the officer said. Targets have a "non-combatant value" of zero; in other words, ISIL fighters can't be struck if the blast can be expected to kill innocent civilians.
Pentagon planners know, for instance, key ISIL headquarters buildings in the Syrian city of Raqqa, the officer said. But for now they are off limits because hitting them would kill civilians.
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LEED v4, the Newest Version of LEED Green Building Program Launches at USGBC’s Annual Greenbuild Conference
Marisa Long Nov 20, 2013
122 projects across the globe projects already using new LEED system
Philadelphia, Pa. — (Nov. 20, 2013) — The U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) announces that LEED v4, the newest version of the LEED green building program, launched today at the annual Greenbuild International Conference and Expo in Philadelphia. LEED has revolutionized the marketplace since 1998 as the world’s premier benchmark for the design, construction and operation of high-performance green buildings. LEED v4 builds on the fundamentals of previous versions while offering a new system that prepares all LEED projects in a portfolio to perform at a higher level.
“LEED v4 is a quantum leap for LEED,” said Rick Fedrizzi, president, CEO and founding chair, USGBC. “Over the past 15 years, LEED has fundamentally revolutionized how we design, construct, operate and maintain our buildings and communities. LEED has created a completely new industry of business enterprise committed to energy savings and efficiency. LEED v4 is as much a testament to the achievements of LEED project teams around the world as it is to the green building community’s ambition to create significant global and local change through resource-efficient, cost-effective green buildings.”
LEED v4 encourages and accelerates global adoption of sustainable green building and development practices through the creation and implementation of universally understood and accepted tools and performance criteria. Already, 122 beta projects from around the world are using LEED v4.
Highlights of LEED v4 include:
New market sectors: New market sector adaptations for LEED include data centers, warehouses and distribution centers, hospitality, existing schools, existing retail and mid-rise residential projects.
Time saving support tools and resources: Simplified LEED credit submittal requirements, descriptive step-by-step reference guide materials with videos and tutorials, and a more intuitive technology platform.
Building performance management: LEED v4 is focused on outcomes so that building owners have a better understanding of how to manage their buildings to meet full performance potential.
New impact categories: Climate change, human health, water resources, biodiversity, green economy, community and natural resources.
“LEED v4, at its core, provides insight into the synergies within the building system, providing solutions for optimizing performance, and ultimately achieving better environmental, economic and social outcomes in our buildings,” said Scot Horst, senior vice president of LEED, USGBC. “LEED v4 is the LEED of the future, where we challenge the marketplace to go further, to make the next great leap toward better, cleaner, healthier buildings where people live and work.”
The first LEED v4 project certifications were recognized at Greenbuild this week: the Haworth Beijing Organic Showroom achieved LEED v4 Gold. Located in Beijing, China, this project certified its commercial interior space. The project is owned by Haworth, and the LEED process was administered by Bisagni Environmental Enterprise (BEE) Inc.
1800 K St. in Washington, D.C., was awarded LEED v4 Silver. This project was certified as an existing building and is owned by Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management and administered by Transwestern. Additionally, three core and shell projects earned LEED precertification: University Place in Philadelphia, 10 Emery St. in Bethlehem, Pa., and Capitol Tower Complex in Houston.
About LEED The U.S. Green Building Council's LEED green building certification system is the foremost program for the design, construction, maintenance and operations of green buildings. Every day, more than 1.5 million square feet of space is certified using LEED. More than 56,000 commercial and institutional projects are currently participating in LEED, comprising 10.4 billion square feet of construction space in 147 countries and territories. In addition, more than 47,000 residential units have been certified under the LEED for Homes rating system. Learn more at usgbc.org/LEED.
About the U.S. Green Building Council The U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) is committed to a prosperous and sustainable future through cost-efficient and energy-saving green buildings. USGBC works toward its mission of market transformation through its LEED green building program, robust educational offerings, a nationwide network of chapters and affiliates, the annual Greenbuild International Conference & Expo, the Center for Green Schools and advocacy in support of public policy that encourages and enables green buildings and communities. For more information, visit usgbc.org, explore the Green Building Information Gateway (GBIG) and connect on Twitter and Facebook. Learn more at usgbc.org.
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Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation
Statement of Jon W. Dudas, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate
Chairman Leahy, Ranking Member Specter, and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the United States Patent and Trademark Office's (USPTO) thoughts and recommendations on patent reform issues and in particular the provisions of S. 1145, the "Patent Reform Act of 2007."
This new patent bill is a revised version of legislation considered in the last Congress to improve patent quality, reduce patent litigation costs and to further international harmonization of patent laws. We support these goals and commend you Mr. Chairman and your colleagues in the Senate and on the House side for introducing this bicameral and bipartisan legislation.
Before I address the provisions in the bill, I want to take this opportunity to thank you Mr. Chairman and the committee for your help in ensuring that our current fee schedule remains in effect for FY 2007. We look forward to working with you to make that fee schedule permanent.
We are also pleased that the FY 2008 budget request gives the USPTO full access to the $1.9 billion in fees we expect to collect. This is the fourth consecutive year that the president's budget recommends full access to collected fees, and we appreciate the continued Congressional support for that funding level.
Full access to user fees allows the USPTO to continue our successful model of disciplined focus on real measures that enhance quality and increase production, increase hiring and training, promote electronic filing and processing, provide telework opportunities for our employees and improve intellectual property protection and enforcement domestically and abroad.
Patent Reform Proposals
The bill includes reform proposals that would directly impact the USPTO. These include provisions on first-inventor-to-file, third-party submissions of prior art and post-grant review of patents. There are also litigation-management provisions relating to assessment of damages, willfulness determinations and venue considerations that do not directly impact USPTO operations, but rather patent policy in general
There are also certain provisions that, while not currently in the bill as introduced, could usefully modernize the U.S. patent system. In the interests of providing as complete a picture as possible, we are including suggestions that are consistent with the goal of modernization.
In analyzing the provisions of S. 1145, and in suggesting additional items, we consider what will benefit U.S. inventors and the American public. It is from this perspective "benefit to Americans" that we approach our review and make recommendations.
Quality Is a Shared Responsibility
The U.S. patent system is predicated on disclosure. It cannot be emphasized enough that the grant of a patent right presumes an exchange of complete openness by the inventor for various rights of exclusivity. Thus, U.S. patent law requires inventors to disclose the "best mode" for reproducing their invention, and to explain their proposal in a manner clear to one skilled in a particular art. We believe that emphasis on full disclosure-as is required for fair exchanges in all fields of enterprise-will ensure a vibrant, modern patent system.
A corollary of full disclosure must be intolerance for willful suppression or hiding of information. While, of course, fraud cannot be accepted, we also need a system that permits good-faith efforts to provide high quality and complete applications. The challenge for policymaking is to ensure modernization that both eliminates incentives for fraud and promotes full and complete applications.
Applicant Quality Submissions (AQS)
Perhaps the most important factor in ensuring high-quality, expeditious examination and processing of patent applications is the application as submitted by the inventor. Patent applicants have the most knowledge, the most opportunity, and the most to gain by providing the USPTO with the best possible information about their inventions.
In the USPTO's new Accelerated Examination Program- where the first patent was issued in less than six months from the date it was filed-applicants participate in an interview and provide the USPTO with a search and a support document. While the AQS program has only been in place since August 2006, our experience with this initiative has already demonstrated that both applicants and examiners realize that better written and oral information from applicants improves patent application quality and processing timeliness.
The USPTO looks forward to taking the success of this model-captioned "applicant quality submissions"-to lower pendency, raise productivity and increase quality, and apply it to all patent examinations. To that end, the USPTO believes that applicants should be given every opportunity and the responsibility to provide more and better information to examiners about their inventions. For such a program to be successful, the USPTO will ensure that requirements for more and better information do not become overly burdensome in general and in particular to independent inventors and small entities.
We recognize that, in many cases, applicants have expressed strong concerns about providing the USPTO with complete information about their applications. In some cases, applicants simply do not want to provide important information for fear that it will limit the scope of the patent they may receive (though such a limitation would be proper under the facts and the law). Unfortunately, an additional percentage of applicants do not make the effort to fully define their inventions because there is currently no procedural or other deterrent to submitting an ill-defined application.
In some other cases, applicants or their attorneys fear that the legal doctrines of inequitable conduct and unenforceability may unfairly punish them with Draconian penalties for innocently omitting information. The theory is that, if one does provide information, it must be perfect. Otherwise, the consequence may be loss of the patent and/or disciplinary action (for the applicant's attorney). By way of contrast, failure to share or disclose information has absolutely no adverse legal consequence.
Under existing case law, courts must hold all of a patent's claims invalid if they find inequitable conduct in any aspect of prosecuting a patent application-even if the claims are completely valid and/or the inequitable conduct was irrelevant to prosecution of the claims. Thus, the only remedy available is complete loss of the patent. Inequitable conduct can be found if the applicant deliberately withholds or inaccurately represents information material to patent prosecution. Anything the court deems that a reasonable examiner would find important can be material and the evidence necessary to show intent varies according to the nature of the omission. Accordingly, the inequitable conduct standard is uncertain and the potential penalties severe. For example, any misstatement in an affidavit, or even a failure to disclose a possible source of bias, has been held to be capable of rendering all claims of the patent unenforceable.
While the risk of an inequitable conduct finding is low, it is frequently alleged. When alleged, inequitable conduct assertions add substantially to litigation costs and malpractice claims. The "all or nothing" result of an inequitable conduct finding understandably has a perverse effect on the actions of applicants and their attorneys with respect to "risking" a proper search in the first place. As a result, the doctrine results in counterproductive behavior before the USPTO. It discourages many applicants from conducting a search and leads others to be indiscriminate in the information they submit. In a review two years ago, we found that over 50 percent of submitted applications contained either no information disclosure statement or that such submissions included more than 20 references.
As we review and evaluate the elements of a successful and efficient AQS program, we believe there are two related issues that would require legislative action, namely inequitable conduct and the ability of micro-entities to meet new information requirements.
(a) Inequitable Conduct
Consistent with the discussion above, the USPTO recommends that the bill be amended to address the doctrine of inequitable conduct and unenforceability to ensure that patent applicants are not discouraged from fully and fairly sharing relevant information with the USPTO.
Current uncertainties associated with the doctrine would be significantly reduced by clarifying the appropriate standards. First, the standard for finding intent could be explicitly separated from the materiality of the withholding, requiring proof that the misrepresentation was knowing, with intent to deceive. Second, the doctrine could be changed to a standard requiring a finding that the information would have been relevant to a reasonable examiner. The "relevance" standard could usefully be framed in terms of whether a reasonable examiner would have allowed the patent, without more, but for the misrepresentation or omission.
With respect to materiality, Congress may wish to consider requiring the USPTO to define the term (as it does now) and limit the courts to finding inequitable conduct only in circumstances in which information that the USPTO has defined as material is misrepresented or withheld.
The USPTO looks forward to working with the committee and stakeholders to develop provisions that would be more effective than the current doctrine in facilitating the targeting of fraud that actually affects the examination process and in improving the quality of applicant submissions.
(b) Micro-Entity Status
We recognize that any AQS program-with requirements for more and better information-must not be overly burdensome in general, and must be sensitive to the particular situation of independent inventors and small entities.
Accordingly, the USPTO recommends that the bill be amended to define a "micro-entity" status that would ensure fair access to the patent system for entry-level type inventors. The definition of "micro-entity" could be based on a number of factors including: income level; number of patent applications filed; lack of representation by a registered practitioner; and lack of assignment activity. The status would exempt an applicant from some or all of the requirements of an AQS program.
That status also could be used to identify inventors eligible for reduced fees and other treatment and assistance designed to ensure fair access to the patent system.
Prior Art Submissions
Section 9(b) of the bill expands the ability of third parties to submit information they believe is pertinent to a pending application. Specifically, the proposal would permit the submission of patents, published applications or other printed publications before the earlier of: (1) the mailing date of a notice of allowance, or (2) either six months after pre-grant publication, or the date of the first rejection of any claim by the examiner, whichever occurs later.
This proposal is consistent with the discussion above regarding AQS and overall efforts to encourage a highly participatory examination process with more engagement by applicants as well as by other interested parties with information relevant to that examination.
Current USPTO rules permit submission of patents or printed publications within two months of publication or before the mailing of a notice of allowance, whichever occurs first.
In contrast to current USPTO rules, the bill would require that the submission include a "concise description of the asserted relevance of each submitted document." Current USPTO rules do not permit inclusion of comments or explanations concerning the submitted patents or printed publications.
The USPTO supports enactment of this section, with minor revisions, and anticipates that the provisions will serve to provide our examiners with information they may not otherwise obtain and should result in a more efficient examination process and a higher quality, more reliable patent. We have identified a few technical revisions that should be made prior to enactment and recommend that the provision be accompanied by regulatory authority for the Director of the USPTO to implement procedural requirements to make the submission process as efficient as possible.
Consistent with the provisions and rationale of this section, the USPTO is cooperating in a pilot program involving peer review of patent applications. Up to 250 applications, assigned to Technology Center 2100 (which examines computer-related technologies), will voluntarily be placed, by the applicants, on a non-USPTO website for an expanded and public review by a peer group of patent users, attorneys and academics.The pilot group of applications will include applications filed by small-entity filers. The public group will determine and submit to the USPTO what they consider the best available and relevant prior art. The pilot program will test whether this peer review can effectively identify prior art that might not otherwise be found by our examiners during the typical examination process. We will also make an evaluation as to whether this process results in measurable examination timesavings and quality improvements.
Litigation Management Items
The disclosure philosophy has even more relevance to litigation than to examination, as it exposes the economic repercussions of a failure to fully disclose. One of the purposes of the patent system authorized by the Constitution of the United States is to promote the dissemination of knowledge to the public through disclosure of inventions. Requirements for more and better information to support a patentability determination are comparable to current requirements in virtually every judicial and administrative proceeding for parties to bring the most relevant, reliable and complete information before the decision-making body.
We fully appreciate that not all industries are similarly situated, that market conditions change over time, and that practical matters-such as channels of trade-may be legitimate factors for consideration in a patent-infringement case. Therefore, we believe it is critical that litigation-management modernization efforts preserve discretion for courts that enables them to account for differences across industries, markets, and time.
Apportionment of Damages
Section 5(a) of the bill, in part, directs the court to ensure that a reasonable royalty is applied only to the economic value attributed to the patented invention as distinguished from the economic value attributable to other features added by the infringer. More specifically, the bill also provides that in order for the entire market rule to apply, the patentee must establish that the patent's specific improvement is the predominant basis for market demand.
Current patent law provides that a patentee is entitled to damages adequate to compensate for infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty. The question of what is the value of a relatively small piece of patented technology when it is integrated as a component of a larger article has attracted substantial attention by the high-tech industry.
Under the entire market rule, the value of the entire apparatus, which includes both patented and other inventions not covered by the patent at issue, is used as the royalty base for computing reasonable royalty.
Concerns have been expressed that patent awards based on the entire market value are overly generous. Legislative proposals have attempted to solve this problem by directing courts to consider the contribution of other elements of the entire product added by the infringer. This is one of several factors, commonly referred to as the Georgia-Pacific factors, typically considered by courts in determining royalty rates.
While the appropriateness of damages awards in a number of patent cases may be subject to debate, the USPTO does not believe that a sufficient case has been made for a legislative provision to codify or emphasize any one or more factors that a court must apply when determining reasonable royalty rates. Further evaluation or research is necessary to determine whether a statutory "entire market rule" may not be readily or appropriately applicable to technology that involves something other than a physical component of a product.
It appears that the courts have adequate guidance through Georgia-Pacific and, as a general matter, do in fact consider numerous factors in determining royalty rates, including: rates paid by other licensees; nature and scope of the license; profitability of the product; commercial relationship between the licensee and licensor; as well as the portion of the realized profit attributable to the invention. The amount of a reasonable royalty should turn on the facts of each particular case, as best as those facts can be determined.
Willful Infringement
Section 5(a) of the bill, in part, limits a court's ability to award enhanced damages in the following ways: (1) codifies that increased damages are limited to instances of willful infringement; (2) requires a showing that the infringer intentionally copied the patented invention; (3) requires notice of infringement to be sufficiently specific so as to reduce the use of form letters; (4) establishes a good faith belief defense; (5) requires that determinations of willfulness can only be made after a finding of infringement; and (6) requires that determinations of willfulness be made by the judge, not the jury.
Willful patent infringement can certainly have significant consequences. The court may treble the damages and award attorney fees. With escalating patent litigation costs, the threat of treble damages can be quite substantial. Some have expressed concerns that willfulness is frequently alleged as a matter of course and alleged infringers have to bear the expense of defending such actions.
While there is some evidence to support the claim that willfulness is frequently alleged, the evidence also suggests that willfulness is currently difficult to establish. The additional requirements, limitations, and conditions set forth in the bill may significantly reduce the ability of a patentee to obtain treble damages.
Modernization efforts should avoid perverse incentives that might make infringement simply "a cost of doing business." While not the only deterrent to patent infringement, the possibility of treble damages provides an important and substantial obstacle - more than might be seriously considered in a practical business calculus.
For lack of a clear and substantiated case for major statutory reform in this area, the USPTO is unable to support all the provisions of section 5(a) of the bill as currently drafted. However, we can support a number of the narrowly drawn provisions of the section that we believe are appropriate, reasonable and fair to most interested parties.
Accordingly, the USPTO supports enactment of the amendments contained in section 5(a) that statutorily limit enhanced damages to determinations of willful infringement; require sufficiently specific notices of infringement; and provide that an inference of willfulness can not be drawn from the decision of an infringer not to present evidence of advice of counsel.
Prior User Defense
Section 5(b) of the bill expands the prior use defense, created by t he American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, by eliminating the limitation that the subject claim be directed to a "method of doing or conducting business." It also enhances the safe harbor for non-patentees in that they would only have to show commercial use, or substantial preparations for commercial use, at any point before the effective filing date of the patent application (rather than that date plus one year).
The benefit of a prior use defense is clearly directed toward the non-patentee. Proponents argue that this is reasonable in a competitive economy and strikes a balance between trade secret and patent protection.
Critics argue that prior user rights undermine the purpose of a patent system by creating a strong incentive to protect innovations as trade secrets. Under a prior use defense regime, if inventors are able to protect their innovations as trade secrets, they are able to use them indefinitely, even if someone else obtains a patent on the invention.
Absent a change to a first-to-file system, the USPTO does not support the bill's expansion of the prior user defense at this time. The existing defense has rarely been invoked and there is insufficient information to gauge the potential impact of substantially expanding it.
Section 10(a) of the bill limits the places where corporations may be sued by amending 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) to provide that a corporation "resides" only where it has its principal place of business or in the State in which the corporation is incorporated.
This provision is clearly more restrictive than the current "personal jurisdiction" standard that requires "minimum contacts" for venue purposes and represents a substantial departure from established practice. While this proposal addresses forum shopping concerns expressed by many patent owners, it may not result in the most appropriate and convenient venue for litigation.
Also, the proposal expands the types of actions subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) which currently is limited to patent infringement actions. The proposal would cover any civil action arising under any federal law relating to patents, other than declaratory judgment and Patent Board decisions.
The USPTO has not taken a position on the provisions of this section. We will review and evaluate the proposal, along with possible alternatives, in consultation with the Department of Justice.
Interlocutory Appeals
Section 10(b) of the bill provides that parties in a patent infringement suit are permitted to have an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit after a Markman hearing on claim construction, rather than waiting for a final judgment to be rendered by a district court.
While proponents of this provision maintain that these appeals would reduce the length and cost of litigation, others believe that the appeals may have the opposite effect and would in fact offer "another bite at the apple" because the reversal rate for claim construction is fairly high.
The USPTO is unable to support this provision at this time. We will consider the merits in consultation with the Department of Justice.
Proposals Directly Affecting the USPTO
Section 6 of the bill establishes post-grant review procedures under which any person may request the USPTO to cancel as unpatentable any claim of a patent: within 12 months after issue or reissue; when the petitioner establishes a substantial reason to believe that the continued existence of the challenged claim causes or is likely to cause the petitioner significant economic harm; or when the petitioner has received notice from the patent holder alleging infringement by the petitioner.
Post-grant review procedures would be more expansive than existing reexamination procedures and would include consideration of evidence gleaned through depositions and interrogatories as well as patents and other documents. A newly designated Patent Trial and Appeal Board would be responsible for conducting the post-grant reviews.
The USPTO director would prescribe regulations establishing and governing the proceedings including standards for showings of "substantial reason to believe" and "significant economic harm" and procedures for the submission of supplemental information and discovery of relevant evidence. The director would also establish by regulation reasonable fees to be paid by the person requesting the proceeding.
Final determinations would be issued within one-year with a six-month extension available for good cause shown. Regulations would address sanctions for abuses of the proceedings.
Many aspects of the post-grant review section are similar to those contained in the draft bill prepared by the USPTO in 2005. A primary difference is the scope of the "second window." While the USPTO's proposal would also provide for a one-year first window, it would limit the second window to a six-month period after receipt of a notice from the patent holder alleging infringement. Additionally, the USPTO proposal would authorize the director to promulgate regulations that would also require a petitioner to show substantial economic harm. That authority would enable the USPTO to control or limit an influx of potential cases.
A second significant difference is that the bill's applicability reaches back to patents issued before the effective date of the legislation. The USPTO's procedures would be available only on a prospective basis.
The broad scope of the bill's second window coupled with the substantial number of patents subject to the proposed review procedures create very legitimate concerns about the USPTO's ability to effectively handle the potential workload. Accordingly, while we support the establishment of post-grant review procedures, we suggest revision of the bill's provisions to more closely align with those in the USPTO's draft bill. We would be pleased to work with the Committee in that regard.
USPTO Regulatory Authority
Section 11 of the bill would specifically authorize the USPTO to promulgate such rules, regulations and orders that the director determines appropriate to carry out the provisions of Title 35 or any other applicable law or that the Director determines necessary to govern the operation and organization of the USPTO.
We thank Congress for suggesting appropriate authority for the USPTO. The USPTO has long believed that rulemaking authority is beneficial to the patent system, and welcomes authority that is necessary to promulgate regulations to ensure an efficient and quality-based patent examination process. We have concerns about unbounded discretion, and therefore want to be certain that any grant is not overbroad.
First Inventor to File
Section 3 of the bill converts the U.S. patent system from a first-to-invent to a first-inventor-to-file system and makes various conforming amendments. A grace period is provided to promote an inventor's disclosure of the subject matter of the claimed invention without loss of priority. Interference proceedings are replaced with a derivation proceeding to determine whether the applicant with an earlier-filed application is the proper applicant for the claimed invention.
While the rest of the world uses a first-to-file system, the United States continues to award a patent to the first to conceive an invention, provided that all patentability criteria are satisfied. Proponents of first-to-file maintain that it would simplify the patent process, reduce legal costs, improve fairness and enhance the opportunity to make progress toward a more harmonized international patent system.
Opponents of first-to-file are concerned that adoption of first-to-file could promote a rush to the USPTO with hastily prepared disclosure information resulting in a decline in quality. Also, because many independent inventors and small entities lack sufficient resources and expertise, they feel that they would be unlikely to prevail in a "race to the patent office" against large, well-endowed entities.
Conversion to a first-to-file system has been advocated by various interest groups in the United States for decades. It is still the subject of continuing controversy. While the USPTO recognizes the potential benefits of a first-to-file system, we do not support immediate conversion to first-to-file via this legislation.
It should be noted that U.S. conversion to first-to-file is an overriding consideration in ongoing substantive patent law harmonization discussions with foreign patent offices. We hope those discussions will lead to significant benefits for patent applicants and promote work sharing among worldwide patent offices. In this regard, we believe that any U.S. commitment to convert to first-to-file should be contingent on significant progress and international agreement in those harmonization discussions. In particular, the United States seeks a standardized one-year international grace period to protect American inventors who might disclose their invention prior to filing for a patent.
Additionally, with respect to the specific text of section 3 of the bill, we have identified a number of concerns regarding the scope and application of provisions relating to prior art and grace period that may require revision and clarification.
Assignee Filing
Section 4 of the bill proposes several changes to current practice regarding who must or may file an oath or declaration in a patent application and the application itself. A person to whom an inventor has assigned or is under an obligation to assign the invention would be able to make an application for a patent. Current practice requires that, as a general matter, applications must be filed by the inventor(s).
The USPTO and most members of the patent community generally favor simplifying and streamlining patent application procedures and reducing any unnecessary formalities. The proposal is an appropriate step in that direction. While we support adoption of these provisions, we have identified a number of technical issues in the text of section 4 that should be addressed and clarified as the legislative process continues. Those issues relate to specific entitlement to the grace period and national security and transparency considerations.
18-Month Publication
Section 9(a) of the bill eliminates the current opt-out provision for publication of patent applications. Current law permits an applicant to request upon filing that his or her application not be published at 18-months if a certification is made that the invention disclosed in the application has not and will not be the subject of an application filed in another country that requires such publication.
The USPTO is hesitant to support this provision at this time considering that the current opt-out provision is a result of the careful balancing and sensitive negotiations that took place during the legislative process that led to the enactment of the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999. It addresses the serious concerns expressed then and now by independent inventors and small entities that large entities and foreign interests may misappropriate their inventions upon disclosure and prior to issuance of a patent.
Thank you for this opportunity to share our views on this important piece of legislation. We look forward to working with the committee to develop legislation that improves our patent system, while maintaining the balance among the interests of patent applicants, relevant third parties, the general public, and the information needs of the USPTO to serve all three.
This page is owned by Office of the Chief Communications Officer. Published on: Jun 6, 2007 06:00 PM EDT Last Modified: Oct 25, 2016 05:16 PM EDT
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Statement of Intent re: Patent Law Harmonization - 08FEB2005
1. The Participants of the Exploratory Meeting of Interested Parties Concerning the Future of Substantive Patent Law Harmonization ("Participants"), held February 3-4, 2005, in Alexandria, Virginia, wishing to promote and facilitate progress on certain key issues under consideration in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), agree to convene future meetings to consider:
(i) substantive patent law harmonization issues, notably the Trilateral "first package," as developed by the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the European Patent Office and the Japan Patent Office and set forth in WIPO Document WO/GA/31/10; and
(ii) issues with regard to intellectual property and development, including proposals for a WIPO Development Agenda and proposals relating to genetic resources,
with a view to seeking a common basis for further discussions in WIPO.
2. The Participants agree that the following parties will be invited to participate in the future meetings: all Members of WIPO Group B, member States of the European Union, the European Commission, Member States of the European Patent Organization, and the European Patent Office.
3. The Participants further agree to have regular, intersessional meetings of subgroups to address the issues referenced in Paragraph 1.
(Posted 08FEB2005)
This page is owned by Office of Patent Legal Administration. Published on: Apr 4, 2007 01:01 PM EDT Last Modified: Dec 5, 2014 11:33 AM EST
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Wednesday, July 17, 2019 | Vol 52 Issue 28
New Growth Family Centre heads into new decade of community service
Mike RobinsonApril 26, 2019 @ 9:44 amCommunity, News
Place for youth - Aletha McArthur opened Althea’s Place in Mount Forest’s New Growth Family Centre in January. The facility provides overnight respite accommodation for young people. Photo by Mike Robinson
MOUNT FOREST – Walking through the doors of the New Growth Family Centre is a first step to a better world for young people.
In today’s world it takes an involved community to raise a healthy, successful child – and Aletha McArthur intends to do her part.
In 1999, McArthur, a behaviour and special education specialist, conceived the idea of New Growth Family Centre Inc. It became a registered charity in 2004.
Then, roughly a decade ago, McArthur opened the doors to New Growth Family Centre, located on the site of a former church, which now offers a place local youth can access the skills and tools needed to make their place in the community.
McArthur has since built credibility and rapport with children, youth and their families as well as with foster care agencies, schools, medical practitioners and mental health professionals in southern Ontario.
McArthur delivers her own unique balance of firm yet caring educational strategies in a therapeutic learning environment that is safe, structured and supportive.
She believes that early intervention is the key to school success and she is dedicated to ensuring that all children, including those who have experienced early trauma, grow up to reach their potential and become responsible and productive adults who succeed in life.
Now, Aletha’s Place within the centre is set to provide overnight respite accommodation for youth.
“We are dedicated to the betterment of children, youth and families.”
McArthur pointed out, “We’ve been in this building for 10 years now.”
She explained, “Over the past while, there has been a real focus on homelessness among youth … and then what to do about it.”
Aletha’s Place provides a supervised “home away from home” within the community of Wellington North during a time of confusion and family conflict.
Short stays offer a place for a youth to stabilize and think through the situation before making reactive decisions that may affect their lives forever.
It also allows parents to breathe and think clearly in the midst of the stress and know that their youth is safe.
Aletha’s Place has added three bedrooms, a full bathroom and a meeting room where parents and youth can meet together to solve problems with support in order to repair and maintain their relationship.
The facility can accommodate up to four overnight or weekend respites. Clients will have access to all the resources of the New Growth Family Centre.
Here, clients can engage in gym sports, music jams, arts and crafts, Wii games and more. In the auditorium they can enjoy a movie on the giant screen.
Outdoor activities include hiking, camping and a paint ball area located at the facility’s pond just seven kilometres away.
The renovations were made possible by generous donations from the 2016 International Plowing Match Committee in Minto, the Mount Forest Kindred Credit Union, the Kindred Charitable Fund and the Wellington North Youth Action Council.
Clients can immediately plug into New Growth Family Centre’s conflict resolution and coaching programs for continued support or they can be referred to additional community support services.
She stressed “this is not a drop in or a shelter – but it is a short-term respite accommodation.”
“It is a space for someone who has nowhere else to go.”
McArthur said young people have a lot of influences coming at them regarding how to behave.
“For some, they are getting into situations which are dangerous and very destructive.
“Because I work with children and youth, I am seeing this happening.
“This is a place to settle somewhere safe and warm, and there are people there to offer some guidance.
“Homelessness is now much more obvious and people are asking what can we do about it? We have done something.”
Since the idea started a year ago there were substantial donations from within the community that allowed the centre to move forward and undertake renovations. McArthur stressed without those donations the work would not have been possible.
“Right now, we are in the process of getting the word out,” about the facility, McArthur said.
An open house was held earlier this year for members of the community to learn more about what the centre offers, and plans for the future.
“We had people attending who were interested in what was happening and those who were surprised that homelessness is a problem among youth.
“The parents with kids 15 to 18 … they get it.”
McArthur said there are a lot of enticing influences young people are exposed to that are unrealistic.
“Celebrities are doing things, living a lifestyle – and the kids get the idea it is normal.”
McArthur said the goal is to provide a safe space for up to 48 hours.
“A lot of thinking and a lot of change can happen in those 48 hours,” she said.
“If the youth chooses to continue on the path they are on, they are going to do it anyway.”
McArthur noted the program is all volunteer driven.
“The goal is to hear the underlying problem, then bring the families together to help repair and maintain these relationships right here in the community.”
She said “if the kids leave the community and are in a shelter in Guelph, it starts a whole other path.
“This provides a safe space within the community.”
Keeping the service local allows the family to connect with other local medical or social services as needed.
She added if the youth is still in school and moved to Guelph, the local connection is lost.
McArthur is pleased with the centre’s progress over the past decade.
“It’s a prevention program.”
When kids are reacting with behaviour, McArthur seeks to find the underlying cause.
“If identified early, we can make a difference.”
McArthur said kids who’d been heading on the path to foster care, were reunited with their families following work with the child and the parents.
She stressed neither she nor her husband are paid for their work at the centre and any revenue generated “goes directly to support New Growth Family Centre.”
Government agencies such as Family and Children Services and CMHA contract New Growth Family Centre “for specific programs for youth and their families.”
Since its inception, McArthur states the centre “has taken the steps to make a positive difference in the lives of children, youth and families.
“Many of our families do not have sufficient financial resources to pay for private programs to help their child. Insurance plans cover mental health conditions in adults but not for prevention and treatment plans for children and youth.
“Together we can do it right here in Wellington North.”
McArthur said donations are needed to continue the work. “People think charities get money from somewhere … but where does it come from?”
In addition, McArthur pointed out that paid overnight staff are required to supervise.
“These are people who have to understand the heart of the story as to why these kids are here.”
She added “all the staff have full-time jobs of their own, but are willing to come in to assist me – because I cannot be here 24/7.”
McArthur compared it to a situation where parents may need a break and send the kids to their grandparents for the weekend.
Then McArthur can look at the root of the situation and work on steps to bring the young people and their families back together with a mutual plan to move forward.
“It is not just sending the person off on their way the next day. It is about providing some guidance while the young person is in a safe place.
“It really is a home away from home.”
To learn more about New Growth Family Centre Inc. or to support its work, visit www.newgrowthfamilycentre.com or call 519-509-6432.
Mike Robinson
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You are at:Home»Insights»The Global Wellness Industry Hits $3.72 Trillion
Image Credit: Aral Tasher
The Global Wellness Industry Hits $3.72 Trillion
By Laura Hill on October 26, 2016 Insights, Popular
KITZBüHEL, Austria — The global wellness industry is now worth $3.72 trillion, according to new research released by the Global Wellness Institute.
Rising by 10.6% over the last two years, the latest figures provide fresh evidence that wellness is one of the world’s largest, fastest growing, and most resilient markets.
“Recent years have been marked by global economic contraction and disruptive geopolitical events, but a ‘wellness economy’ just keeps rising, with an upward trajectory that seems unstoppable,” commented Ophelia Yeung, Senior Research Fellow at the Global Wellness Institute.
Among the ten wellness markets analysed in the study, the fastest growing categories from 2013-2015 include preventive/personalised medicine and public health, fitness and mind-body, wellness lifestyle real-estate, wellness tourism, and healthy eating, nutrition and weight loss.
Yeung predicts that consumers, governments and employers will continue to spend big on these sectors due to a number of driving factors including the emergence of a global middle class, the rapidly increasing aging population, and a growing subset of consumers seeking experiences rooted in meaning, purpose, authenticity and nature.
“A profound shift in the way people consume wellness is underway,” added Katherine Johnston, Senior Research Fellow, GWI.
“And the spend on proactive healthy choices – on wellness – will continue to comprise a greater percentage of massive multi-trillion industries, whether real-estate, food and beverage, or travel.”
Image: GWI
Highlighting some of the most prominent categories covered in the study, below, we’ve rounded up the facts and figures that demonstrate why the wellness industry now represents 5.1% of all global economic output.
Wellness Tourism
From 2013-2015, wellness tourism revenues grew by 14%, which is more than twice as fast as overall tourism expenditures (6.9%) for the same period.
World travelers made 691 million wellness trips in 2015, 104.4 million more than in 2013.
Wellness tourism now accounts for 15.6% of total tourism revenues – nearing 1 in 6 of total “tourist dollars” spent. That’s, in part, because wellness travelers spend much more per trip: international wellness tourists spend 61% more ($1,613/trip) than the average international tourist, and the premium for domestic wellness travelers is even higher: $654 per trip, 164% higher than the typical domestic tourist.
Wellness tourism is responsible for 17.9 million jobs worldwide.
Spa Industry
The spa economy, including spa facility revenues ($77.6 billion), and also education, consulting, associations, media, and event sectors that enable spa businesses ($21 billion), grew to a $98.6 billion market in 2015.
Spa locations jumped from 105,591 in 2013 to 121,595 in 2015.
Since 2013, the industry has added 16,000 spas, more than 230,000 workers (to reach 2.1 million), and $3.5 billion in revenue.
The modest 2.3% annual revenue growth rate (2013-2015) is largely due to the U.S. dollar currency conversion from large spa markets across Europe and Asia. If global spa facility revenues are converted to the Euro, the market actually grew a robust 25%: from €56 billion to €70.1 billion.
As the cost of unwell workers skyrockets (reaching 10-15% of global economic output), employers are spending more on employee wellness each year.
The global industry grew 6.4% from 2013-2015, to $43.3 billion. But two-thirds of that spend is concentrated in North America ($16.2 billion) and Europe ($16.1 billion).
The Global Wellness Institute estimates that with only 9.5% of today’s workforce covered by a workplace wellness program, this remains a wellness market with some of the largest growth opportunity.
Wellness Lifestyle Real Estate
The market for residential, hospitality, and mixed-used real estate that incorporates wellness elements (i.e., human, social and environmental health) into its design, construction, amenities and services, was one of the fastest-growing wellness sectors from 2013-2015: growing 19% to $118.6 billion.
Boots Opens Wellness Flagship In London To Inform Future Retail Strategies
Co-Living In London Gets A Makeover As Investment In Wellness Real Estate Surges
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Your Besotted Brain: A Neuroscience Love Song
Adam Cole, Ryan Kellman
Love is complicated, scientifically speaking. There's no single, specific "love chemical" that surges through our bodies when we see our beloved, and we can't point to a specific corner of the brain where love resides.
Still, scientists have measured real changes in our bodies when we fall in love: an ebb and flow of signaling molecules. In that early lustful phase, sex hormones like testosterone fuel the libido (in both men and women). The dopamine highs of new attraction have been compared by some scientists to the effects of cocaine use.
The anxiety associated with new romance has been linked to low levels of serotonin in the brain. And some researchers say they see similarities in the way serotonin is regulated in the early phases of love and the way it is modulated in obsessive compulsive disorder.
Meanwhile, our brains start producing more oxytocin, a chemical that is crucial to, among other things, the bonding of mothers and infants.
Comparisons to drug use and compulsion aren't perfect (obviously there's a lot more fancy chemistry going on in our brains) but they do seem to speak to our experience. Love can feel addictive and all-consuming.
In Skunk Bear's new video, we explore the symptoms of love and their neurological causes. Why does your heart race when you see your crush? What gives you that feeling of butterflies? And why does love make us act so dumb? This love ballad is our Valentine's gift to you.
Follow Skunk Bear, NPR's science show, on Youtube and Facebook.
Copyright 2018 NPR. To see more, visit NPR.
NPR News // Tue, 13/02/2018 - 5:00am
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Yale University Launches Web Application Highlighting Careers and Achievement of Women in STEM
Yale University has recently launched Science Stories, a linked-data, image-based web application highlighting the careers and achievements of women in STEM fields. The application was conceived by Katherine Thornton, a Council on Library and Information Resources postdoctoral fellow with joint appointments in the department of computer science and the Yale Library’s digital preservation department. The new initiative honors the 50th anniversary of co-education at Yale, which will be celebrated this year.
“It struck me that one way to celebrate the milestone is to look back at the women who performed scientific research on campus prior to 1969, as their work and achievements helped paved the way for co-education,” said Dr. Thornton.
Currently, Science Stories has archived nearly 600 profiles of women scientists. Each story has several common elements including a timeline of significant events in the subject’s career, a map marking places of importance to their lives, pages identifying where they were educated and their mentors of collaborators, a library of their published research, published articles about them, and complementing videos offering more information about various digital images. The information in Science Stories was acquired from digitized materials housed at Yale, and at libraries and museums all over the world.
Science Stories is part of an international movement to make digital images of collection material from museums, libraries, and other repositories accessible to scholars and the public. The images presented in the application are dynamic, making it easy for viewers to interact with them through zooming in or out, rotating, or changing the contrast and brightness. Additionally, viewers can access any given image’s metadata for additional information including a pathway back to the repository where the original material is housed.
“What we’re doing is taking metadata from different collections, and making it interoperable by transforming it into linked open data,” Dr. Thornton said. “We’re using that metadata to support the images related to these women or their publications, or in the case of certain scientists, like Katharine Jeannette Bush, the biological specimens that they collected and used in their research.”
Dr. Thornton holds a Ph.D. in information science from the University of Washington.
Science Stories may be accessed here.
Filed Under: Milestones • STEM Fields
Tags: University of Washington • Yale University
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Doctor Who: Amy's on-screen partner tight-lipped on pregnancy
ARTHUR Darvill is about to make a lot of men very unhappy.
Because the man who plays new Doctor Who sidekick Amy Pond’s hapless partner Rory – a position envied by men and teenage boys across the nation – says it’s not all it’s cracked up to be.
Although Pond, as played by red-headed beauty Karen Gillan, tops the charts of science-fiction hotties and has caused a scandal after some viewers complained her short skirts and sassy attitude are too much for a family show, Darvill says her real life persona is far from a smouldering sex kitten.
“No, not at all,” he laughs.
“It’s so funny to read about all of this ‘sexing-up of Doctor Who’ scandal when really she couldn’t be less like that if she tried.
“Obviously she’s completely lovely but she’s off in her own world half the time really. She’s no femme fatale, that’s for sure!”
Refusing to be drawn on any plot points, including the recent pictures of a pregnant Pond, Darvill – who can be seen for the first time in next Saturday’s episode The Vampires of Venice – described his audition for the role as “secretive”.
“The scripts I read bore very little relation to the ones that were finally produced, they changed all the significant details so I couldn’t spill the beans if I didn’t get it,” he said.
Eagle-eyed viewers might recognise Darvill from the 2009 BBC version of Little Dorrit.
“Yes, I was doing all this period drama stuff last time I was on TV. I suppose you can’t get much further away from that than Doctor Who,” he said.
While this might be 28-year-old Darvill’s first close encounter with sci-fi, it isn’t the first time that he and the new Doctor, Matt Smith, have worked together.
“Matt and I were in a play called Swimming With Sharks with Helen Baxendale and we really enjoyed working together and said that we should definitely do it again if we ever got the chance,” he said.
“Little did we know that it was going to be on this!”
Despite Doctor Who being one of the BBC’s flagship productions and the biggest TV success of the last few years, Darvill, who is originally from Birmingham, says he didn’t feel any extra pressure being on set.
“It’s very purposeful, obviously, but working with Matt and Karen, it’s basically like working with your best mates anyway,” he said.
“It’s quite relaxing in a weird way at times while also being massively busy.”
Some of the tranquility on set is down to filming taking place in Wales.
“I loved filming and working in Wales,” he said. “There are so many amazing locations, it’s great when you pick up the filming schedule and go ‘Oh, another lovely castle, then a beautiful beach’. There are worse ways to spend a day that’s for sure.
“And whereas when I’m in London people are always on at me to meet them here and race all over town, it’s nice to be able to answer the phone and say ‘Actually I can’t do that, I’m in Wales. Sorry’.”
CardiffThe couple who made the most famous sandwich in Cardiff have diedArthur and Vi Petty's bacon doorstops were the main ingredient to every rugby international for nearly 30 years
Homes for saleYou could now own this popular guest house on the Pembrokeshire seafrontLive and work on the beautiful beach at Broad Haven
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You are here: Home » News » General Store Special Permit Granted
General Store Special Permit Granted
There are few buildings in the waterfront village neighborhood of Mattapoisett more iconic to the town’s past than the General Store situated at 10 Water Street. Although it cannot boast to be the oldest, the image of the structure has appeared in photographs from several centuries. But everything must change, even old buildings. Thus, as the needs of the current owners, Chris Demakis and Vince Cragin, have changed, they proposed changes to make the building better for modern living and commerce.
Seeking a Special Permit during the January 18 meeting of the Mattapoisett Zoning Board of Appeals, Demakis described their plans.
Stairs leading from the first floor to the second floor residential space are very steep, nearly ladder-like, Demakis said. He said their dog and visitors of all ages are finding the 11-inch spacing between the risers hard to scale. With this in mind, and a growing need for a bit more floor space in the first floor retail area, they requested a Special Permit. The permit would allow for a two-story addition measuring 10.6 feet by 16 feet on the eastside of the current structure.
“We’ll use the additional floor space in the store for coolers,” Demakis said, adding that those would be used for beer and wine products.
Demakis said that if the permit were approved, construction would take place during March at which time the store would be closed for the renovations.
Noting the fine job the partners have done on the building during their years of ownership, the ZBA members unanimously granted the request.
Also seeking a Special Permit for the construction of a new home located at 16 Cove Street was Donna McCaffery, represented by engineer Rich Charon.
Charon gave the ZBA members a history lesson on the vacant lot, explaining its complicated past from being part of a singular large parcel in the 1800s to becoming an unbuildable lot prior to public sewer extension into the beach community, and then to a buildable lot if older set-backs (those prior to 1973) were recognized by the ZBA now.
Charon said that through his research he was unable to find any time when the lot had been joined to another one situated across Cove Street, although the two lots had shared a common lot line.
Charon explained that in the 1920s a public right of way that still exists today was established; thus, the two lots – the leading characters in the deed story – could not be joined to make one larger lot.
McCaffery’s aunt had given her the lot in question and the other lot went to McCaffery’s cousin. Now with the availability of sewer, McCaffery sought to have the pre-1973 setbacks approved and build a new single family.
Charon said that the Conservation Commission had issued an Order of Conditions and that the Board of Health would allow the sewer tie-in upon approval of the Special Permit.
The ZBA members saw no problem with the project as presented, granting McCaffery a Special Permit.
The next meeting of the Mattapoisett Zoning Board of Appeals will be scheduled for February 15 at 6:00 pm in the town hall conference room if there are cases to be heard.
Mattapoisett Zoning Board of Appeals
By Marilou Newell
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Surf Guru Gerry Lopez On the Medicinal Powers of Movement
Gerry Lopez knows the waves—and has found himself over and over again when in the flow. Learn from Gerry at Wanderlust O’ahu! Tickets on-sale now.
By Jillian Billard
Photo by Kylie Fly
Learn from legend Gerry Lopez in person at Wanderlust O’ahu this winter! For tickets and more information, click here.
When I connect with Gerry Lopez, he’s traveling in San Jose del Cabo with his family. “I’m going through this phase in my life where I’m learning to become a surfer again,” Gerry jokes. “It’s not easy, man is it rewarding.”
Despite what his humble words might suggest, Lopez is no novice when it comes to catching waves. The Hawaii-born surfer found what would become a lifelong passion in 1958, when his schoolteacher mother brought a 10-year old Gerry and his brother down to the beach at Waikiki, where some of her students ran a board rental stand. “In Hawaii in the 1950s, all life revolved around The Beach.” Lopez tells me. “People would refer to Waikiki simply as that, The Beach, as though there were no other.”
Since catching that first wave, he was hooked. “That first time you surf—it’s the most extraordinary sensation,” says Lopez. “There’s this feeling of gliding—you feel as free as a bird. Most surfers spend their entire lives trying to re-discover that initial sensation.”
When Gerry and his brother were teenagers, they would frequently go down to the beach on weekdays to surf. “I started to notice that it was only us kids and old guys” he recalls. “I actually asked one of the older guys where all of the 20 and 30 year olds were and he said ‘well, they’re working.’ I thought about that a lot.” He explains that he knew then and there that he never wanted that kind of lifestyle that would keep him from the waves—and he never did.
Led by his fervent desire to have the freedom to surf, Gerry was able to carve a life for himself that didn’t revolve around the typical 9–5 desk job, but rather operated on nature’s time. Surfing, perhaps more than any other practice, is intrinsically reliant on weather patterns.
“Now they have all of these apps that tell you how the surf is going to be, but back then, you never knew until you actually went down to the shore and looked,” says Gerry. In order to be around when the waves were good, he began a small business repairing and making boards—a craft he learned by doing.
“Today surfing has become such a major industry,” says Gerry, “but back then, it was so simple.” He laughs, noting that “since all of my clients were surfers, it was just understood that if the surf was good on a certain day, it might take longer to get their board, because of course we were all out there on the waves.”
In 1968, Gerry began practicing yoga, as he considered that it would enhance his surfing. However, over time the practice became equally as important to his daily life. When he and his wife moved to Oregon in the ‘90s, he had more time to devote to the practice. “They are truly parallel paths,” he says. “They each require a certain meditative state or flow state, where you are completely focused and wayward thoughts don’t inhibit you. When you’re not in that flow state, you will not be in harmony with the wave, or with yourself.”
Gerry’s easy-going temperament and humble wisdom is staggering as he describes traveling around the world looking for surf, and living his life in accordance with nature. A sentiment that he continually repeats is this mantra that “movement is medicine.” He speaks with this sense of trust in the natural flow of things as he describes this state of harmony in which effort becomes bliss. “We just have to keep paddling,” says Gerry, “on the waves and also in life.”
Jillian Billard is a poet, yoga teacher, cellist and avid wanderer. A native New Yorker, she is often caught daydreaming of sprawling green fields and mountains. She trained and received her ashtanga yoga teacher’s certification in Goa, India and works at Laughing Lotus Yoga Center in Brooklyn. You can often find her with her head buried in a book, doused in lavender. Follow her on her (very newly developed) Instagram page for class schedules and updates at @jillboyoga
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WorldViews Analysis
Few countries are meeting the Paris climate goals. Here are the ones that are.
Dead trees stand in a recently deforested section of the Amazon rainforest in Brazil. (Mario Tama/Getty Images)
By Amanda Erickson
Amanda Erickson
Email Bio
This week, a top scientific body studying climate change released a terrifying report. The world has just a decade to take “unprecedented” action to cut carbon emissions and hold global warming to a moderate — but still dangerous and disruptive — level. That would require a “rapid and far-reaching” transformation of the world’s economy, one of such scale and magnitude that it has no historical equivalent.
The U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warned that nearly every country will need to significantly scale up the commitments made under the 2015 Paris climate accord if humans hope to avoid disaster. Under that agreement, 195 countries pledged to cut their greenhouse-gas emissions to try to keep global warming under two degrees Celsius.
But it’s hard to imagine that will happen, as almost no country is doing a good job meeting the relatively modest goals in place. (The United States was a signatory of the 2015 Paris agreement, but last year President Trump announced that Washington was pulling out of the pact.)
The Climate Action Tracker, a project run by a group of three climate-research organizations, has been monitoring the progress of 32 countries in meeting the Paris accord goals. Taken together, those 32 countries account for 80 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions.
The tracker’s goal is to provide an “up-to-date assessment of countries' individual reduction targets and with an overview of their combined effects.” It looks at how much greenhouse gas each country emits right now; what it has committed to change on paper; and how well it’s following through on those promises.
As the graphic below shows, the group found that most major polluters are making few, if any, efforts to meet their goals. By Climate Action’s calculations, “critically insufficient countries” failed to even commit to cutting emissions significantly on paper. Only seven countries have made commitments or efforts that would achieve the goal of the Paris accord.
A graphic from the Climate Action Tracker shows the efforts of the world's larger greenhouse gas producers to reduce those emissions in accord with the Paris climate agreement. (Climate Action Tracker/Climate Action Tracker)
But there are bright spots:
The North African nation is one of only two countries with a plan to reduce its greenhouse-gas emissions far enough to keep warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius, an important threshold for staving off some of the worst effects of climate change. Morocco has promised to halt its growth of greenhouse gas emissions by commissioning large-scale renewable energy projects. The country has commissioned the largest concentrated solar power plant in the world, scaled up its natural-gas imports and cut back fossil-fuel subsidies. Morocco is on track to get 42 percent of its energy needs from renewable sources by 2020.
The West African nation is the only other country on track to cut its carbon output in line with a 1.5 degree Celsius rise. According to Climate Action Tracker, it’s one of the only developing countries in the world to lay out a plan that would “bend its emissions in a downward trajectory.” A major part of that plan is a massive reforestation project it’s running to stop environmental erosion and degradation by planting trees.
One of the world’s biggest economies, with one of the fastest-growing renewable energy programs, India could meet its goal of generating 40 percent of its energy from non-fossil-fuel sources as early as the end of this year. It has done that by declining to open new coal-fired plants and promoting electric vehicles.
Like most industrialized nations, the United Kingdom is struggling to cut its emissions. But the nation deserves special mention as the only developed economy in the world to create a body to track how well the country is meeting its Paris agreement commitments and how the country could do better. Britain is also working toward an ambitious plan to reduce its emissions to “net zero” by 2050.
The world has just over a decade to get climate change under control, U.N. scientists say
Climate scientists are struggling to find the right words for very bad news
Who drew it? Trump asks of dire climate report, appearing to mistrust 91 scientific experts
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Chance the Rapper joins board of Chicago history museum
By - Associated Press - Friday, January 6, 2017
CHICAGO (AP) - Chance the Rapper is joining the board of a prominent African American history museum in Chicago.
The DuSable Museum of African American History on Friday announced several new board of trustee members, including the Chicago artist named Chancelor Bennett.
Museum CEO Perri Irmer tells The Chicago Tribune that the rapper’s leadership on the board will help attract young people.
The museum also cited the 23-year-old’s work promoting racial justice and his anti-violence efforts.
The rapper has been critical of Chicago leaders’ response to violence in the city. In November, Bennett hosted a concert in a Chicago park and led a march to the polls to encourage people to vote.
The museum on Chicago’s South Side was founded in 1961.
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Exclusive: Obamacare's Mystery Woman Says She Fell Victim to Cyberbullies
ABBY D. PHILLIP
Good Morning America November 13, 2013
The smiling woman who was once the face of the Affordable Care Act's website has come out of the shadows to stand up to the "cyberbullying" she says she suffered after the law's flawed kickoff.
Speaking exclusively to ABC News, Adriana, who asked that only her first name be used, said she was speaking out now to defend herself after weeks of enduring online lampooning.
"They have nothing else to do but hide behind the computer. They're cyberbullying," Adriana told ABC News' Amy Robach.
President Bill Clinton Weighs in on Obamacare
"I'm here to stand up for myself and defend myself and let people know the truth," she said.
On Oct. 1, 2013, when the ACA's website launched to enroll Americans in health insurance through federally run exchanges, it was Adriana's face that greeted them.
Dubbed the "enigmatic Mona Lisa of health care," her face was soon mocked, Photoshoped, altered. She became the subject of late-night jokes, partisan hatred and intense speculation.
The saga of the photo started innocuously enough. Adriana responded to an email from someone at the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the agency responsible for the Affordable Care Act's rollout, about having photos of her and her family taken for free in exchange for allowing the photos to be used to market the new health care law. She was never paid.
She learned over the summer that her photo would be on healthcare.gov's main page, but she didn't realize it would become so closely associated with the problems of the glitchy website.
"I mean, I don't know why people should hate me because it's just a photo. I didn't design the website. I didn't make it fail, so I don't think they should have any reasons to hate me," Adriana told ABC News.
Speculation swirled that Adriana might not be a legal resident of the United States, and therefore not even eligible for the health care exchanges. Adriana said she is a wife and mother who lives in Maryland with her 21-month-old son and husband of six and a half years. Her husband is a U.S. citizen, as is his her son. Adriana, who is Colombian, said she has lived legally in the U.S. for more than six years, is currently a permanent resident and is applying for citizenship.
Though she is eligible for healthcare through the ACA, Adriana says she hasn't signed up for it, and is neither in favor nor against it.
Obamacare Enrollee Numbers to Fall Far Short
She said that while she knew her photo would be used on the healthcare.gov website, she was stunned at the negative reception.
"Like I said it was shocking. It was upsetting. It was sad. We were having a hard day when we read all this," she said. "And in a way, I'm glad that my son is not old enough to understand, because you know whatever happens to you, it hurts them too."
About two weeks ago, her photo was removed from the site and replaced by several icons. "That was a relief," she said.
"They took the picture down. I wanted the picture down, and they wanted the picture down. I don't think anybody wanted to focus on the picture."
McConnell Uses Obamacare as Rx for Election Campaign
A spokesperson for the Department of Health and Human Services said that Adriana's photo was removed because "Healthcare.gov is a dynamic website," not because she requested it.
"The individuals in the images that we used for the launch of the website redesign in June and through the beginning of open enrollment signed standard releases and understood how their images would be used," said the HHS spokesperson. "We transitioned to new graphics because we believe they provide a better way to visually reinforce key information to users about options for applying at this point in time."
Now that it's over, Adriana said she could find a bit of humor in the jokes, even in political satirist and TV host Stephen Colbert calling her that "vaguely ethnic smiling woman."
"I'm pure Colombian," she said, laughing.
"They didn't ruin my life. I still have a job, I'm still married," Adriana said. "That didn't really crush me to the ground. I'm fine. Now I laugh about it."
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Signs defaming Maj. Gen. Sharon Afek, Chief Military Advocate General of the IDF
Right-wing activists defame Military Advocate General
Following IDF decision to halt demolition of house belonging to Abd al-Rahman Bani Fadel who stabbed to death Adiel Kolman, posters attacking Maj. Gen. Sharon Afek are put up in a terrorist's hometown of Aqraba in West Bank; 'Thank you, Major General,' posters read cynically.
Published: 09.08.18 , 21:08
Several right-wing activists put up signs defaming the Military Advocate General, Maj. Gen. Sharon Afek, in a Palestinian village of Aqraba in the West Bank on Thursday, following a recent IDF decision not to demolish a home of the terrorist who killed Adiel Kolman, 32-years-old father of four, in a stabbing attack in Jerusalem six month ago.
Aqraba was the terrorist's hometown, Abd al-Rahman Bani Fadel, who had stabbed Kolman when he was making his way home from his workplace in Jerusalem. Activists put up posters in the village saying, “Thank you, Major General”, cynically criticising the decision not to demolish the perpetrator’s home.
Signs defaming Maj. Gen. Sharon Afek
In June, the IDF said that it would not demolish the home of Abd al-Rahman Bani Fadel, who was shot and killed on the scene by a police officer, due to his "mental state."
The IDF Spokesperson's Unit issued a statement saying, "It has been decided not to demolish the house of Abd al-Rahman Bani Fadel following a thorough examination of the claims made by the terrorist's family regarding his mental state and after reviewing the relevant documents presented."
Adiel Kolman (Photo: Courtesy of the family)
Fadel, a father of two, had a temporary permit for a week that allowed him to enter Israel to search for employment. He had already received such permits in the past, as there was no indication of his hostile intentions.
Yael Kolman, Adiel's mother, expressed her anger over the decision.
"We don't accept this decision. If he (Abd al-Rahman Bani Fadel) was competent to work, his house can be demolished. This should be thoroughly reexamined again," bemoaned the mother.
"I seek for deterrence, not for vengeance. My son wasn't murdered by a mentally ill person, his family supports Hamas and has been supported by them ever since he was killed," she stated.
Kolman's family at his funeral (Photo: Amit Shabi)
Zvi Sukkot, Yitzhar settlement resident, reiterated these sentiments.
“There are assemblies in the village in the terrorist’s honor, and dozens of signs honoring the Shahid and his actions. This leaves no doubt regarding his intentions, and the importance of actions that enforce deterrence," Sukkot stressed.
“In the words of the High Court of Justice—'deterrence policy has shown results, even if not many’ and these results are just what we need in this situation," he concluded.
See all talkbacks "Right-wing activists defame Military Advocate General"
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Insulin pumps are worn by diabetics to monitor blood glucose levels and replace manual injections. (Wikimedia Commons)
Americans head to Canada to buy cheap insulin; some worry about supply here
Four states including Florida have passed legislation allowing for wholesale or individual imports of medications
The soaring cost of insulin in the United States prompted a group of American diabetics to head to Canada on Friday to buy the non-prescription drug at a fraction of the price.
The group of about 25 left Minneapolis, Minn., for London, Ont., where they also plan to hold a press conference to draw attention to the affordability plight.
One of the organizers, Quinn Nystrom, who is making her second such expedition, said insulin prices south of the border have skyrocketed in two decades.
“One in four Americans are rationing their insulin because they cannot afford it, so people are dying,” Nystrom, 33, said in an interview as she prepared to leave. “It’s a tragedy.”
When she was diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes 20 years ago, Nystrom said, the price of insulin was around US$16 for a vial. Now it costs US$340 — roughly 10 times the price in Canada.
READ MORE: Insulin pumps to be covered for adult diabetics in B.C.
Nystrom, with the group Minnesota #insulin4all, said Americans can take home a maximum three-month personal supply, but some can only afford a vial or two. One vial of insulin, which helps regulate blood-sugar levels, generally lasts from a few days to a couple of weeks, depending on the patient.
While insulin tourism to Canada is still relatively small scale, it is sparking some concern.
“Any time you have a large population such as the U.S … coming to Canada to access medications that are earmarked for the Canadian market, there’s potential for disruption of some sort,” said Barry Power, a senior director with the Canadian Pharmacists Association. ”We see it as a risk that we want to bring to the attention of the federal government.”
Four states including Florida have passed legislation allowing for wholesale or individual imports of medications.
“That’s worrying to us, because if people see it as sanctioned by the U.S. government, then there could be a lot of pressure on Canadian pharmacists and the supply chain,” said Power, a pharmacist in Ottawa.
Health Canada and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration need to put their heads together to start addressing the situation, Power said. Ideally, Health Minister Ginette Petitpas Taylor would talk to her American counterpart to ensure the drug supply in Canada is safeguarded, and manufacturers could do more to limit exports, he said.
Petitpas Taylor’s spokeswoman Thierry Belair said on Friday the government was monitoring the situation.
Because insulin is non-prescription in Canada, there is no tracking mechanism of how much might be heading south.
“I do not want to be a bad neighbour,” Nystrom said. “I would never come to Canada if there was a drug shortage (and) I do not think going to Canada is a long-term solution. It’s like putting a Band-Aid on a gunshot wound.”
The Minnesota group is planning to visit Banting House in London, where Sir Frederick Banting came up with his idea that led to the discovery of insulin 99 years ago. They plan a news conference on Saturday to raise awareness.
Ironically, Nystrom said, Banting sold his patent for $1 because he believed his discovery belonged to the world and should not be for profit.
“That’s crucial for us to show all Americans: Look at what it’s become in the U.S. It become greed and corruption,” Nystrom said. “It’s gotten out of control with the price, and they increase it every year and we’re held hostage.”
Canada, in line with other industrialized countries, regulates drug prices through the quasi-judicial patented medicine prices review board whose mandate is to prevent gouging. Market forces — essentially whatever people will pay — operate in the U.S.
Colin Perkel, The Canadian Press
Fawn reunited with doe after man carries it through B.C. liquor store
B.C. to argue for injunction on Alberta’s turn-off-the-taps law in Calgary court
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Talking in a foreign language makes our decision more about utility, less about emotion
Last updated on August 18th, 2017 at 4:15 pm by Alexandru Micu
The language you use when making a decision makes a huge difference in the outcome. Psychologists from the University of Chicago (UOC) report that people communicating in a foreign language base their decision more on maximizing utility than on emotion or social expectations.
Image credits Alpha / Flickr.
Would you push a bystander in front of a train knowing he would die if it would save five others? Would you do it if you pondered the issue in say, German or French? Research shows that in the latter case, you probably would. UOC psychologists have previously found that people communicating in a foreign language when wrestling with such an issue are far more likely to sacrifice the bystander than those who use their native tongue. A new paper published by the same university builds on those findings to explain why language meddles with out decision-making process.
Speaking is believing
“Until now, we and others have described how using a foreign language affects the way that we think,” said Boaz Keysar, a UOC psychology professor and paper co-author.
“We always had explanations, but they were not tested directly. This is really the first paper that explains why, with evidence.”
Keysar and his team used the train dilemma to see if bilinguals speaking in a foreign tongue are nudged towards different decisions by a reduction in emotional response, an increase in their desire for maximizing ‘good’ in a utilitarian sense, or a combination of the two.
Their results suggested that people using a foreign language “were not any more concerned with maximizing the greater good” than their native-speaking fellows. But they did show less aversion to violating social taboos which “can interfere with making utility-maximizing choices,” the team details. Their theory is that when speaking in a foreign language people can put some emotional distance between them and the question — allowing them to take a more utilitarian approach to the issue.
“I thought it was very surprising,” Keysar said. “My prediction was that we’d find that the difference is in how much they care about the common good. But it’s not that at all.”
The findings align well with previous research from the team, which shows people speaking in foreign language tend to be more logical and utility focused. It makes you slow down and concentrate on what you’re hearing and saying, all of which puts you in a more deliberative state of mind. As a side-effect, this makes saving five people seem much more important (in an utilitarian sense) than saving a single person.
Where does emotion fit in?
Keysar, however, had a hunch that emotion also plays a part in this equation. His native language is Hebrew, and for him, English simply doesn’t deliver the same deep-seated emotional resonance as Hebrew. His second language was thought in a classroom, not at home with family while growing up, so it didn’t have the same emotional connections built-in. Keysar’s theory was that this emotional coldness of non-native languages can then seep into our decision-making process.
“Your native language is acquired from your family, from your friends, from television,” said lead author Sayuri Hayakawa, a UOC doctoral student in psichology. “It becomes infused with all these emotions.”
But “less emotional” and “more utilitarian” are two states of mind that would produce the same observable behavior. To help comb the two apart, the team worked with University of Chicago Booth School of Business postdoctoral research fellow David Tannenbaum, an expert in process dissociation. Together, they performed six studies with six different groups, including native speakers of English, German, and Spanish. Each participant spoke at least one of the other two languages so that all combinations were equally represented. Participants were randomly tasked to use either their native language or second language throughout the experiment.
For the trial, each participant was asked to read paired scenarios that had key “systematic” differences. For example, instead of being asked whether they’d sacrifice a man to save five people from death, the team might ask if they’d kill him to protect five people from light injury. In other words, the taboo part (killing somebody) was still there, but the consequences varied. Pool enough of these scenarios together, and you start getting a picture of what people look to when making a choice.
“We found that people using a foreign language were not paying any more attention to the lives saved, but definitely were less averse to breaking these kinds of rules,” Hayakawa adds.
“So if you ask the classic question, ‘Is it the head or the heart?’ It seems that the foreign language gets to the heart.”
The next steps are to find out why this happens. It could be the case that speaking and thinking in a foreign language tones down how people imagine the consequences of their choice, making the sacrifice feel less dramatic than they would otherwise think. Or it could be that a different language affects which memories get recalled during the decision-making process, skewing people’s choices.
Another important next step is to see if these lab results translate to real-world situations in which the stakes are high and people are under a lot of pressure. For example, Keysar’s team will be looking at how parties in peace negotiations in Israel assess the same proposal differently based on which language it’s written in.
The full paper “Thinking More or Feeling Less? Explaining the Foreign-Language Effect on Moral Judgment” has been published in the journal Psychological Science.
Tags: emotionForeignlanguageNativeTabooUtility
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Shifting the economic system onto a sustainable path
By Graeme Maxton
[Editor’s note: Graeme Maxton and Jorgen Randers are the authors of Reinventing Prosperity: Managing Economic Growth to Reduce Unemployment, Inequality and Climate Change, (Greystone, 2016). The German Edition is Ein Prozent ist genug (One percent is enough)( oekoem Verlag, 2016 ). Graeme Maxton is the currently Secretary General of the Club of Rome. Jorgen Randers is one of the original authors of The Limits to Growth (1972) and Professor emeritus at the BI Norwegian Business School]
For most of the last 30 years there has been strong economic growth in the rich world and yet unemployment has remained stubbornly high while the gap between rich and poor has widened. According to traditional economic thinking this should not have happened. High rates of growth should have created lots of new jobs, for a largely stable population, and spread wealth around more evenly, especially as it was supplemented by more open trade and less market regulation, two other economic foundations praised by traditional economists for their beneficial impacts. Instead, average standards of living have stagnated or declined in much of the OECD and only the rich have become richer.
Because the problems of unemployment and inequality have affected such a comparatively large percentage of the population, and absorbed so much political effort, they have made it much harder for humanity to address its big environmental challenges, such as climate change. This is partly because many politicians and business people think that any substantive response to the ecological problems will make the economic situation worse. That is, they think that the steps needed to reduce energy-related emissions and slow the pace of climate change will bring slower economic growth, further job losses and even wider inequality, at least for a while. As a result, economic policies remain predominately focused on the promotion of further GDP growth and greater market liberalization.
Yet continuing on the current path makes no sense, because the ever-widening gap between rich and poor that it causes will eventually undermine social stability. The existing path will also ruin the planet for future generations. If emissions continue to rise as they are currently doing, the level of CO2 in the atmosphere will reach 450ppm by around 2035 which will make a 2°C increase in average global temperatures compared to pre-industrial times a certainty by 2050. Among many other consequences, this will spark runaway climate change, which the vast majority of scientists say would be impossible to stop and which would eventually have catastrophic consequences for the majority of living things.
So there is a need for alternative economic thinking, and a change to the current ideology.
In the past, attempts to encourage a transition to a more sustainable economic system have failed largely because they have appealed to people’s good consciences, to their desire to ensure a better life for their grandchildren. They have involved asking people to make a short term sacrifice – to reduce consumption and emissions, in effect – for a long term and largely unquantified benefit, most of which will accrue to others, that is, the next generation and nature. This has not been an appealing message for the majority, whose interests are greatly focused on their immediate problems, including unemployment and inequality, and so it has failed.
For any sustainable policy to be acceptable then, it needs to provide a benefit to the democratic majority in the short term, because that is what motivates most people.
A new approach should also avoid making the current problems worse in the interim, to overcome the other major stumbling block.
In a new book, Reinventing Prosperity, written by Jorgen Randers and me, we provide 13 politically feasible proposals to achieve this transition in the rich world. (We think that the approach needs to be different in the poor world, as the challenges there are different.)
In formulating these proposals, our goal has been a future where average living standards are higher than today and the pace of climate change is greatly slowed. We believe that by combining our ideas—by grafting them onto the current economic system—it is possible to steer the world toward a better future. Almost all of our proposals will need to be implemented gradually, over many years, to give the economic system, businesses and society time to adjust.
13 proposals to shift the economic system onto a sustainable path in the rich world
Shorten the length of the work year
Every year a certain amount of work is done in an economy. Typically, only part of the workforce is fully employed in doing this work, while many others are employed part-time when they would like to work more. There is also a large number of people who are unemployed. This problem exists not because the economies of the rich world need to grow more, but because work, incomes and wealth are so unevenly shared. If the GDP of the OECD is divided by the population, as a simple proxy for average income and economic value per head, there is already more than enough output for everyone. Logically then, if the work can be shared more evenly, those employed full-time could work less, giving others the chance to work more. With a little jiggling, everyone can have enough work, and sufficient income to live comfortably, without there being any economic growth at all. The way to achieve this is to increase the amount of paid vacation time each year, by around two days a year, over 20 years.
For this idea to work best, vacation time needs to be compulsory and self-employment discouraged.
Norway, Germany and other European countries have already applied this policy systematically since 1960. The citizens of these countries have a work year (1,600 hours a year) which is much shorter than that of US workers (2,000 hours). Incomes in these countries remain high, vacations are longer, productivity is good – and well-being has risen.
Raise the retirement age
To raise the compulsory retirement age and boost the size of the workforce at a time when there are already too few jobs in the rich world, and when robotisation threatens to increase the number of unemployed even further, might seem counterintuitive. Yet, combined with our other proposals to shorten the work year (proposal 1) and provide a basic income for those who need it (proposal 13), raising the retirement age makes sense. If the elderly want to work and look after themselves, and not become a drain on the welfare system or their families, this should be encouraged. It means others can work less, because they will not have dependents to care for, and governments can spend less than they otherwise might on healthcare and welfare.
Re-define paid work to include home-carers.
Some essential work done in the economy currently goes unpaid while some of exactly the same work is paid. This is an anomaly that society can easily correct and simultaneously boost the size of the workforce, increase GDP and redistribute income. In this case, we are talking about the home-care sector, where millions of (mostly) women spend their days looking after children and the elderly. They mirror what happens in the rest of the economy, in schools, kindergartens, hospitals and care-homes, only the work they do at home is unpaid while those employed elsewhere are paid. So our third proposal is for the state to pay all those who provide care at home, to recognize the valuable work they do and bring millions of people into the economy.
This proposal would also help soften the impact of aging populations in many rich world countries. Today, many families find themselves stuck in a situation where they have to care—without pay—for their ailing parents. If this work was properly remunerated it would reduce the pressure on the public health system, not only by requiring fewer places in nursing homes, but also because it is often cheaper and better to care for the elderly in their homes.
Increase welfare payments.
Our next proposal is for governments to increase welfare payments. This would quickly reduce inequality and social tension, and with it the growth of political extremism. This is essential for another reason though, because many millions of people will need a proper safety net if there is to be a transition to a healthier and less polluting economic system. Positioned correctly, companies should welcome the idea of higher welfare payments too, because it will boost consumption in the short term, and make it easier for them to boost efficiency through mechanization by reducing backlash from those being made redundant. Businesses would need to pay higher taxes on their earnings to cover the cost of this, of course, and also to share the rewards of greater robotisation more evenly. This proposal would also result in a long term decline in total consumption (and so the human ecological footprint) as incomes were spread more evenly.
Tax corporations more
Increasing corporation taxes is not just about raising funds for the state to redistribute. It gradually changes the structure of the economy. It increases demand for public services (those things that governments buy with their increased tax revenue) and a lowers demand for investment goods (those things that rich individuals and corporations buy with their excess liquidity). This leads to higher consumption growth in the short term, but lower consumption growth in the long term—because of the lower rate of addition of new productive capacity. During the transition there may be a temporary increase in unemployment and smaller business profits, but not in the long run: higher taxes simply change the balance of the economy.
If governments are wise enough to use part of the increased tax income to pay for the production of collective goods, such as improved energy efficiency, reduced emissions of greenhouse gases, and a cleaner environment, the tax increase could not only maintain GDP and jobs, but also lead to a reduction in the production and consumption of physical goods that increase the human ecological footprint. Increasing business taxes provides the opportunity to gradually increase the time-horizon of the banking and finance sector too, reducing the substantial risk it currently presents to economic stability by accentuating and amplifying short-term fluctuations.
Expand the use of green stimulus packages
Non-profitable collective activities, such as increasing the capacity to generate renewable energy or reduce inequality through higher welfare payments, can be paid for through higher taxes or they can be financed by printing money. Cranking up the printing presses has the advantage of spreading the cost across society in the form of slightly higher inflation. The idea should also find political support, because it would create a number of interesting new jobs.
The “green stimulus packages” adopted by some rich nations after the 2008 financial crisis can serve as a model. At the time, these failed to have the reflationary impact that was expected because the money was not given to those who needed it – the poor and unemployed – but to the rich. The rich proved unable to find enough investment opportunities because there was so little unsatisfied demand, and so they used the money instead to drive up the cost of other assets (real estate, shares, etc.). Unemployment remained high and GDP growth anemic.
We propose that QE continues, in other words, but that the money is invested in an energy transition and in actively reducing the gap between rich and poor.
Tax fossil fuels and return the proceeds in equal amounts to all citizens
Our next proposal is to adopt, in a slightly different format, James Hansen’s idea of taxing fossil fuels and distributing the income equally among adult citizens. This benefits the majority, the poor and those with lower energy consumption, while encouraging a shift to clean energy.
The tax would be levied at the coal face, oil well, or gas pipeline entry point (or at the port of import) and returned to the people equally in monthly pay cheques. This would make coal, oil and gas more expensive, and accelerate the transition to renewable and energy efficient activity. The dividend cheque received by the majority of people would also be larger than the extra cost of energy, since most people use less than the average. So the policy will benefit most people and also be re-distributive. The majority would have an immediate short term cash advantage and everyone would have an incentive to use less dirty energy. As fossil energy use declined, the tax could be increased to maintain the flow of revenue or applied to other undesirable activities.
Iran has used this method to reduce its subsidies on fossil fuels. To gain popular support for the measure the government started by sending cheques to all households one month before they cut the subsidy.
Shift taxes from employment to emissions and resource use
If we are to stop climate change and still have expanding economies, growth needs to become “green”, in the strictest sense, meaning it should decrease the ecological footprint.
One way to achieve this transition is for externalities to be charged back to businesses using Pigovian taxes. Companies then pay the full costs for what they produce, as classical economics says they should, and governments have a source of revenue to assist in dealing with the negative effects of pollution. Of course almost everything that is consumed would then cost more, and so the policy will need to be implemented gradually. Demand for many items would also gradually decline, though GDP need not as it is a measure of value not volume. Companies would then find it more profitable for goods to be repairable and recyclable, and to last longer, reducing the human ecological footprint. The sales revenue and profitability of companies need not necessarily decline either, if prices increase to reflect added costs.
Contrary to popular belief, switching to a green economy could also create millions of jobs, many of which would be more satisfying jobs than those that exist today, with more people employed to repair, redesign and recondition products, rather than working on the drudgery of a production line.
Increase death taxes
The next proposal is that the unfair transfer of wealth to those lucky enough to be born to rich parents should gradually be phased out. The state can then devote the proceeds according to agreed social priorities rather than leaving the choices to wealthy individuals.
Encourage unionization to boost incomes and reduce exploitation
For many people, this proposal will seem heretical because there is today a widespread belief that the greatest human achievements of the last 100 or so years are the result of innovations by a relatively small number of enterprising individuals. When it comes to democracy, freedom, improved human rights and higher average standards of living, health and education, however, most of the important gains have been the result of large and organized groups of people demanding change – first in the work place, to make it safer and to reduce exploitation, and then in wider society, to demand a greater say in the political process, equal rights for women and less discrimination generally. Much of this was achieved with the explicit and essential support of trade unions. More of that sort of thinking will make the transition to a sustainable economic system easier.
Restrict trade where necessary
Trade policies should in future be designed for the benefit of the majority. Today, free trade and open markets have become accepted as essential pillars of a healthy economic system, even though the policy is mostly to the benefit of big companies. It allows them to shift manufacturing overseas and then re-import whatever is produced, tariff free. So the next proposal is for governments and society to think a little harder about trade, and to act on the basis of wider social interests, jobs and well-being. By imposing tariffs on products that damage the environment, a progressive country can also encourage others to do the same.
Encourage smaller families
While the world has improved its energy and resource efficiency dramatically in the last 30 years, these gains have been more than offset by the near-doubling in the number of people, with the result that the total human ecological footprint has continued to rise. Humanity lives today as there were 1.6 planet Earths, something which is only sustainable for a short time.
Fixing this problem is hard and without some sort of famine, war or pestilence on a near-global scale, the number of people in the world will continue to grow for many decades, and with it the pace of ecological damage. It often appears as if the only steps that can be taken to reduce the rate of population growth are to improve levels of education, especially of women, encourage wealth distribution from the rich world to the poor world, increase urbanization and provide easily available contraception. This is certainly what we advocate in the poor world.
A new proposal for the rich world is to reward families that have one child only, or none. We propose a financial bonus of $80,000 to be paid to every woman in the rich world with fewer than two children on her fiftieth birthday. This will help strengthen the status of women and further increase their influence over the crucial decision of family size.
We do not pretend that such an idea will be easy to implement, or indeed easy to accept. We accept, too, that there are all sorts of practical problems, such as how societies should reward singles, same-sex couples, the infertile, those who adopt children, and couples who have twins, triplets, or more when they planned for just one child.What we are trying to encourage is a change in mind-set—and for the rich world to lead by example, because a child born in the US or Europe creates as much as 30x more ecological havoc than one born in the poor world.
Introduce a guaranteed livable income for those who need it
Many of the previous proposals move the rich world closer to having a universal basic income. However, providing a basic income for everyone today is likely to be politically divisive, especially in those countries most wedded to the current economic model. So our last proposal is only to provide a basic income, at about one third of the national average, to the sick, the elderly and the unemployed. We also know this is possible without a revolt from the rich because something like it already exists.
A rich nation generates economic value per person of around $40,000 a year (in 2005 USD terms) and so it is theoretically possible to pay each citizen a decent income. Unfortunately, such a dramatic redistribution is not feasible. It would require imposing high taxes on those earning more than $40,000 a year and negative taxes on those earning less, as well as direct payments to those without an income.
Unfortunately, the current income distribution in the rich world, while skewed, is not skewed enough to achieve this. The Palma Ratio (the share of income received by the richest 10% divided by the share of income received by the poorest 40%) ranges from 2.5 in poor countries to 1 in the OECD. This means that even reducing the income of the top 10% by a quarter would only increase the income of the poorest 40% by 25%. So, redistribution can only be used to increase the incomes of a minority, and not for all.
Back-of-the-envelope calculations show what is possible.
In Nordic countries, around 27% of the population (POP) are dependent (pensioners 15%, disabled 6%, sick 3%, unemployed 3%), and all receive around $15,000 a year. So the total transfer is 27% x POP x $15,000 out of the total national income of 100% x POP x $40,000. In other words, around 10% of the total is taken from those who work and given to those who, for some reason or other, do not.
So it appears to be financially and practically possible (at least in homogeneous societies) to pay a guaranteed income equal to 40% of the GDP per person to 30% of the population. If $15,000 a year can be regarded as “livable” in societies where the average GDP is $40,000 a year, then it is possible to pay a livable minimum income to a third of the population—without going broke, inciting the rich to move abroad, or sparking a tax revolt. But that is probably the limit of what can be achieved.
We have provided much more extensive analysis on each proposal in our book as well as a range of additional reading.
To many people, these proposals will seem an idealized list that has absolutely no chance of being accepted by those in power—by which we mean financiers, the rich, and big corporations, not elected politicians. Many will also be resisted by those who fear losing their jobs or paying more tax. But we have deliberately offered proposals that we believe have a chance of being politically accepted. This is because each of our proposals, with a couple of exceptions, provides an immediate benefit to most people. They should appeal to the democratic majority, which in much of the world still carries enough weight to push through change—although we acknowledge that this is likely to take time and be difficult in a number of countries.
From: pp.2-5 of WEA Commentaries 7(1), February 2017
Download WEA commentaries Volume 7, Issue No. 1, February 2017 ›
David Harold Chester says:
Item 8 is good but far from sufficient. A tax regime which places the burden on those who unjustly take from society would be a lot better. Such a system was proposed 138 years ago as described below. It has strong ethical appeal..
A wise and sensible government would recognize that this problem of poverty derives from lack of opportunity to work and earn. It can be solved by the use of a tax system which encourages the proper use of land and which stops penalizing everything and everybody else. Such a tax system was proposed 138 years ago by Henry George, a (North) American economist, but somehow most macro-economists seem never to have heard of him, in common with a whole lot of other experts. (I would guess that they don’t want to know, which is worse!)
In “Progress and Poverty” 1879, Henry George proposed a single tax on land values without other kinds of tax on produce, services, capital gains etc. This regime of land value tax (LVT) has 17 features which benefit almost everyone in the economy, except for landlords and banks, who/which do nothing productive and find that land dominance has its own reward.
17 Aspects of LVT Affecting Government, Land Owners, Communities and Ethics
Four Aspects for Government:
1. LVT, adds to the national income as do other taxation systems, but it replaces them.
2. The cost of collecting the LVT is less than for all of the production-related taxes–tax avoidance becomes impossible because the sites are visible to all.
3. Consumers pay less for their purchases due to lower production costs (see below). This creates greater satisfaction with the management of national affairs.
4. The national economy stabilizes—it no longer experiences the 18 year business boom/bust cycle, due to periodic speculation in land values (see below).
Six Aspects Affecting Land Owners:
5. LVT is progressive–owners of the most potentially productive sites pay the most tax.
6. The land owner pays his LVT regardless of how his site is used. A large proportion of the ground-rent from tenants becomes the LVT, with the result that land has less sales-value but a significant “rental”-value (even when it is not used).
7. LVT stops speculation in land prices and the withholding of land from proper use is not worthwhile.
8. The introduction of LVT initially reduces the sales price of sites, even though their rental value can still grow over a longer term. As more sites become available, the competition for them is less fierce.
9. With LVT, land owners are unable to pass the tax on to their tenants as rent hikes, due to the reduced competition for access to the additional sites that come into use.
10. With LVT, land prices will initially drop. Speculators in land values will want to foreclose on their mortgages and withdraw their money for reinvestment. Therefore LVT should be introduced gradually, to allow these speculators sufficient time to transfer their money to company-shares etc., and simultaneously to meet the increased demand for produce (see below).
Three Aspects Regarding Communities:
11. With LVT, there is an incentive to use land for production or residence, rather than it being unused.
12. With LVT, greater working opportunities exist due to cheaper land and a greater number of available sites. Consumer goods become cheaper too, because entrepreneurs have less difficulty in starting-up their businesses and because they pay less ground-rent–demand grows, unemployment decreases.
13. Investment money is withdrawn from land and placed in durable capital goods. This means more advances in technology and cheaper goods too.
Four Aspects About Ethics:
14. The collection of taxes from productive effort and commerce is socially unjust. LVT replaces this extortion by gathering the surplus rental income, which comes without any exertion from the land owner or by the banks– LVT is a natural system of national income-gathering.
15. Bribery and corruption on information about land cease. Before, this was due to the leaking of news of municipal plans for housing and industrial development, causing shock-waves in local land prices (and municipal workers’ and lawyers’ bank balances).
16. The improved use of the more central land reduces the environmental damage due to a) unused sites being dumping-grounds, and b) the smaller amount of fossil-fuel use, when traveling between home and workplace.
17. Because the LVT eliminates the advantage that landlords currently hold over our society, LVT provides a greater equality of opportunity to earn a living. Entrepreneurs can operate in a natural way– to provide more jobs. Then earnings will correspond to the value that the labor puts into the product or service. Consequently, after LVT has been properly introduced it will eliminate poverty and improve business ethics.
TAX LAND NOT PEOPLE; TAX TAKINGS NOT MAKINGS!
Troy Massey says:
Education around the history, means, and current development of sociopolitical wherewithal and will to organize viable responses to such problems will be the number one priority after working to meet basic needs by implementing ecologically sustainable methods.
Better measurement of productivity in effect or result through usage of material is necessary to create healthier systems of accountability which will lead to evidenced trust relations through better tracking technologies.
In addition to such pursuits, a greater understanding of societal progress throughout hi.story is needed to be developed among the general population by embedding True critical analysis and synthesis embedded in a popular culture to raise intelligence.
Take up the dialogue with me to determine How :)
Troy Massey
EcoEconomist11@Gmail.com
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Appeals court gives Trump a win in sanctuary city case
The 2-1 opinion overturned a nationwide injunction issued by a federal judge in Los Angeles.
By GENE JOHNSON Associated Press
SEATTLE (AP) — A federal appeals court gave President Donald Trump a rare legal win in his efforts to crack down on "sanctuary cities" Friday, upholding the Justice Department's decision to give preferential treatment in awarding community policing grants to cities that cooperate with immigration authorities.
The 2-1 opinion overturned a nationwide injunction issued by a federal judge in Los Angeles. The court said awarding extra points in the application process to cities that cooperate was consistent with the goals of the grant program created by Congress.
"The Department is pleased that the Court recognized the lawful authority of the Administration to provide favorable treatment when awarding discretionary law-enforcement grants to jurisdictions that assist in enforcing federal immigration laws," the Justice Department said in an emailed statement.
"This ruling reverses a lawless decision that enabled Sanctuary City policies, putting the safety and security of all Americans in harm's way," the White House said later Friday in an emailed statement. "We urge citizens across America to demand that Democrat leaders cease their support for Sanctuary policies that deprive Americans of life, limb, and liberty."
Federal courts have blocked some efforts by the administration to withhold money from sanctuary cities, including an executive order issued by the president in 2017 that would have barred them from receiving federal grants "except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes." Courts also barred the Justice Department from imposing new immigration enforcement-related conditions on Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants, the biggest source of federal funding to state and local jurisdictions.
The 9th Circuit's ruling Friday concerned a different program, Community Oriented Policing Services, or COPS, grants, which are used to hire more police officers. Previously, the Justice Department has given extra points to cities that agree to hire veterans, or that operate early intervention systems to identify officers with personal issues, or that have suffered school shootings.
In 2017, under then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, the Justice Department for the first time decided extra points would go to cities that listed immigration enforcement as a priority or that certified they would cooperate with federal immigration authorities by allowing them access to detainees in city jails and giving 48 hours' notice before an undocumented immigrant was released from custody.
Los Angeles applied for a grant that year, but declined to list immigration enforcement as a priority — it listed building community trust instead — or to make the certification. It failed to win, and it sued.
The Justice Department had introduced conditions that impermissibly coerced the grant applicants to enforce federal immigration law, the city said. It also said the immigration-related conditions were contrary to the goals for which Congress had approved the grant money: to get more police on the beat, developing trust with the public.
The judges in the majority, Sandra Ikuta and Jay Bybee, both appointed by Republican President George W. Bush, rejected that.
"Cooperation relating to enforcement of federal immigration law is in pursuit of the general welfare, and meets the low bar of being germane to the federal interest in providing the funding to 'address crime and disorder problems, and otherwise ... enhance public safety,'" Ikuta wrote.
Several other jurisdictions did win funding without agreeing to the DOJ's immigration enforcement preferences, she noted.
Judge Kim Wardlaw, appointed by Democratic President Bill Clinton, dissented, calling the majority's opinion "Orwellian" in the way it tried to equate federal immigration enforcement with enhanced community policing.
"Nothing in the congressional record nor the Act itself remotely mentions immigration or immigration enforcement as a goal," she wrote. "In the quarter-century of the Act's existence, Congress has not once denoted civil immigration enforcement as a proper purpose for COPS grants."
The Los Angeles city attorney's office did not immediately respond to an email seeking comment.
Supporters of sanctuary cities say that encouraging local police to participate in federal immigration enforcement is counterproductive: People will be less likely to report crimes if they believe they'll be deported for doing so. But the 9th Circuit's opinion found that to be a question of policy, not law, said David Levine, a professor at University of California Hastings College of the Law.
“What the Justice Department was doing before, they were trying to force sanctuary cities to do things, and yank money from them retroactively if they didn’t,” Levine said. “They’ve gotten a little more sophisticated now. They’re saying, ‘You don’t have to take this money, but if you want it, it comes with strings attached.’ That’s a well understood way the federal government gets states to do things. You don’t use a stick, you use a carrot.”
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filed: September 7, 2011 • Michigan
Bay City DEQ wind turbine might have a gear box failure
Credit: By Andrew Dodson | Booth Mid-Michigan, www.mlive.com 7 September 2011 ~~
BAY CITY – Why isn’t that wind turbine at the state Department of Environmental Quality office in Bay City spinning?
It’s been months since the turbine has generated any electricity, and officials are unsure when it could start up again.
According to Kevin King, chief of field operations and facilities section for all DEQ offices across the state, the turbine may have a gear box failure. The DEQ hired the turbine’s original manufacturer to climb the tower and take a peek to see what was wrong, but that proved to be unsuccessful.
“When you’re 120 feet up in the air and only have 6-inches of workspace, you can’t quite tell everything that’s going on,” said King.
The blades were then secured with rope so they wouldn’t spin and potentially contribute to more damage, said King.
Now the DEQ is working to bring down the turbine and have it re-commissioned.
The gearbox is one of the more important components in a wind turbine, according to a report from Wind Mission. It’s placed between the main shaft and the generator, and is tasked to increase the slow rotational speed of the rotor blades to the genreator rotation speed of 1000 or 1500 revolutions per minute.
In February 2010, some DEQ employees were annoyed by the flicker effect from the turbine. Frosted skylights on top of the building give off great natural light, but when the sun shines just right, shadows were created from the turbine blades, creating a strobe-like effect inside.
New blinds to cover the skylights during the flicker were supposed to be installed in the summer of 2010, but have yet to appear.
“The blinds are still on order,” said King.
Software, however, has been acquired by the DEQ that allows employees in the building to shut down the turbine at the touch of a button.
This past week, Jack Anderson, of Bay City, wrote a letter to the editor wondering why the turbine wasn’t working. Calls were put into the DEQ last week to help supplement an article on a proposed wind farm in Bay, Saginaw and Tuscola counties.
Source: By Andrew Dodson | Booth Mid-Michigan, www.mlive.com 7 September 2011
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We at Women’s Aid Federation Northern Ireland wish to express our deepest sympathies and condolences to the family of Concepta Leonard, and we wish her son Conor a full and speedy recovery.
Concepta’s death highlights the nature of domestic violence. For hundreds and thousands of women in Northern Ireland and across the UK, home can be a dangerous place; the perpetrator knows you, and he knows where you live. He also knows how to hurt you. This case is tragic and horrific, it will shock and scare people.
It may also confuse people, provoking questions about why he did it.
The most appropriate response is one that preserves Concepta’s privacy and her dignity, that protects her son and her family, and that recognises that we must not ignore domestic violence or allow it to fall off our political, policy and funding agenda.
Concepta Leonard’s life matters – she was a smart, funny, caring woman, and she was murdered by the man she had once loved. The enormity of this, the dreadful reality of domestic violence is still not talked about enough.
Furthermore, in the cold austerity environment where government is cutting services and rural areas are being hit hard, her death must provoke questions about what we as a society regard as important.
The awful reality of this murder is that Concepta’s name is now on a list of women in the UK and Ireland who have been killed by their partner or ex-partner – and though we will react with shock in the days to come, we must endeavour to protect the women in our community who are suffering on a daily basis.
2 women are killed by a partner or ex-partner every week in the UK. Like Concepta, these women had families, lives and dreams. Like Concepta, they are not just statistics, but women in our communities – mothers, daughters, friends.
Like Concepta, they are victims of domestic violence.
As a society, we must ask what more can we do – all of us – to help our family, friends and neighbours to stay safe. We must take action to stop more women being added to the list.
We urge women in our community to seek support by contacting the 24 Hour Domestic and Sexual Violence Helpline on 0808 802 1414 , your local Women’s Aid group or the PSNI on 999. If you’re worried about a friend or family member, you can also call the 24 Hour Domestic & Sexual Violence Helpline. Our staff are on hand to talk over your concerns.
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home > conditions > general women's health > women's unique health needs
Women’s unique health needs
By Liz Lipski, PhD, CCN
Historically women’s maladies were often discounted as hysteria, depression, and psychosomatic. Even today women’s complaints aren’t always taken as seriously as men’s. A recent study from the Netherlands reported that women with rheumatoid arthritis (RA) were more likely than men to have a delay in referrals to specialists, even though disease activity was similar in both sexes. An Austrian study stated that women take longer to access coronary angiography than men despite free access to services. And in 1984 the National Institutes on Aging published a study using data derived only from men and called it “Normal Human Aging.”
Prior to 1990 women were rarely subjects for research, although results were widely extrapolated for women’s treatment. Women were largely excluded from studies to prevent possible birth defects and “not to confound results with the normal cyclic variations in many functions that occur over the estrus cycle.” The impact of this is that the impact of cyclic changes on diagnosis and treatment of women has been largely ignored.
In 1990 the NIH issued guidelines requiring the inclusion of women and minorities in all NIH funded clinical research to address the issue of gender/minority inequities in medical research and funding. A recent study that surveyed research articles in major medical journals in the years 1993, 1994, 1997, and 1998 found that over this five–year period, only 80% of NIH non-sex-specific studies included women. Only one-fourth to one-third of the studies analyzed data or results by sex of the subjects. These numbers did not improve significantly over time.
Women are different!
80% of the population with osteoporosis are women.
75% of people with lupus are women.
Twice as many women as men have arthritis.
Hypothyroidism is ten times more prevalent in women than in men.
Fibromyalgia (FM) is nine times more prevalent in women than in men.
Chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) is three times more common in women than in men.
Migraine headaches affect women three times more than men.
Women experience more severe and more pain overall than men.
Interstitial cystitis is almost exclusively found in women.
Multiple sclerosis occurs more in women than in men.
Endocrine imbalance affects women more than men.
Women with auto-immune conditions often have food and/or environmental sensitivities, heavy metal toxicity, dysbiosis and/or leaky gut syndrome. Depending on the genetics, lifestyle, and environmental affects, each person’s unique biochemistry will determine which tests are of highest priority.
For example, osteoporosis is of major concern for aging women. Bone mineral density testing is necessary to determine bone health. Solomon and colleagues reported that bone mineral density testing (BMD) is under-utilized by a majority of health care professionals. BMD is an important test for assessment of bone density. Urinary bone resorption assessment is a useful test to monitor whether treatment is preventing further bone loss.
Thyroid dysfunction was reported to be three times as high in women with rheumatoid arthritis (RA) than in women with non-inflammatory rheumatic diseases such as osteoarthritis and fibromyalgia. Some RA patients have food and environmental sensitivities, and others have dysbiosis. RA has especially been linked with a genetic predisposition and Proteus bacteria as a trigger for the illness.
Bairey–Merz reports that about 50% of women but 17% of men who have diagnostic cardiac catheterization have normal coronary arteries. So, 50% of the time chest pain in women is due to some other cause(s). Assessment of mineral status, and of other cardio risk factors such as homocysteine, fibrinogen, and C–reactive protein can be used to detect other contributors to chest pain. These tests and others are included in a comprehensive cardiovascular assessment. Magnesium deficiency often mimics angina and arrhythmia. Serum minerals testing would be of benefit.
Higher levels of estradiol also are associated with increased risk of chest pain, so a hormone panel would be indicated as well.
Although CFS and FM are distinct, they have many common characteristics in symptoms, diagnosis, and treatment. Several studies have reported a high incidence of food sensitivities, leaky gut syndrome, and thyroid autoimmunity in fibromyalgia and CFS.
So, it’s important for healthcare practitioners to really listen to women’s concerns. They are not plagued with psychosomatic illness, but rather clues to their distress lie in functional analysis and an integrative medicine approach to their healing.
Elizabeth Lipski, PhD, CCN is a clinical nutritionist in practice in the mountains of North Carolina. She is the author of Digestive Wellness and Leaky Gut Syndrome. Visit her website at www.InnovativeHealing.com.
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Armenian Communities, Armenian Diaspora, Armenian Genocide, Armenian Survival, Armenian Survivors, Bourj Hammoud, Delacampagne, photographs, photography
The Armenians of Bourj Hammoud: A Book Presentation
NOTE: THIS LECTURE HAS BEEN RESCHEDULED TO TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 2015 at 7PM.
On the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, the Zohrab Information Center and the Department of Armenian Studies of the Diocese of the Armenian Church (Eastern), in collaboration with the A.G.B.U. Ararat Magazine, will present a new photographic exposé of a vibrant Armenian community that rose from the ashes of that calamity. #bourjhammoud
Ariane Ateshian Delacampagne will present her new book, Portraits of Survival: The Armenians of Bourj Hammoud. The author-photographer will speak about her work and exhibit many of her vivid photographs, as she tells poignant stories of survival and success.
The event will take place on Thursday, March 5 at 7PM in the Guild Hall of the Armenian Diocese, 630 2nd Avenue, New York.
Bourj Hammoud in northeast Beirut, Lebanon, is home to a close-knit, vibrant Armenian community of shopkeepers, craftspeople and artists, young and old, a thriving combination of modern commerce and traditional trades. In less than a century the area has transformed itself from a tent city of refugees — the Armenians who fled Turkey in 1915 and began flocking here in the 1920s — to a bustling urban economic center.
It is here that Delacampagne, a photographer of Armenian descent, chose to focus her lens. She spent years among the remarkable people working and living here: the tailors and cobblers, embroiderers and clockmakers, jewelers and gem cutters, and the families. The result is an unforgettable portrait of the spirit and courage, the enterprise and heritage, which forms the soul of Bourj Hammoud.
Ariane Ateshian Delacampagne is a noted photographer born in Beirut, Lebanon. Her latest work is a photographic exposé of the vibrant Armenian community of Bourj Hammoud, born from the ashes of the Genocide 100 years ago.
Ariane Ateshian Delacampagne was born in Beirut, Lebanon. She has a master’s in political science from the American University of Beirut and studied photography at the International Center of Photography in New York. She currently lives and works in New York.
The evening is free and open to the public. A reception will follow. For further information contact the Zohrab Center at zohrabcenter@armeniandiocese.org or (212) 686-0710.
CLICK HERE to download a color flyer. #bourjhammoud
Portraits d’une survie: les Arméniens de Bourj Hammoud / Portraits of Survival: the Armenians of Bourj Hammoud (Somogy éditions d’art, 2014) represents Delacampagne’s most intensive project to date. This work has been the focus of solo exhibitions including: Survivants d’un génocide, les Arméniens de Bourj Hammoud (2007) at the French Institute, Barcelona; Armenians of Bourj Hammoud Today (2010) at the Centre Culturel Français, Beirut; and Les Arméniens de Beyrouth (2011) at Dupif Photo, Paris. Her photographs of the Armenian Sanjak Camp in Beirut were published in Nouvelles d’Arménie Magazine (no. 131, June 2007).
Other exhibitions, publications and awards include: Duende: Visages et Voix du Flamenco (Archange Minotaure, 2007) with a text by Christian Delacampagne, with whom she also published Here Be Dragons: A Fantastic Bestiary (Princeton University Press, 2003), co-published in French as Animaux étranges et fabuleux, un bestiaire fantastique dans l’art (Citadelles-Mazenod, 2003). It was awarded the Cercle Montherlant-Académie des Beaux-Arts prize in 2003 and the Syndicat National des Antiquaires prize in 2004.
Her earlier series on flamenco was the subject of three solo exhibitions: Duende (2008) at the Maison Française at New York University and Flamencos at Fort de Bellegarde (2007) in Le Perthus and at the École Supérieure des Beaux-Arts (2005) in Nîmes, France. The work was included in several group exhibitions at the Aperture Gallery, New York (2009); the Centro Andaluz de Arte Contemporaneo, Sevilla (2010); and Audi Villa, Beirut (2010).
« BOURJ HAMMOUD BOOK PRESENTATION POSTPONED
New Book on 19th Century Armenian Composer Kristapor Kara-Murza »
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Entries in Weatlh (1)
Egypt's Mubarak Likely to Retain Vast Wealth
Photo Courtesy - Official White House Photo by Pete Souza(CAIRO) -- President Hosni Mubarak's power may have visibly crumbled before the world on Jan. 25 when protesters took to the streets of Cairo, but his personal wealth will likely be intact when he leaves office as pledged at the end of the year, or sooner if the crowds have their way.
Experts say the wealth of the Mubarak family was built largely from military contracts during his days as an air force officer. He eventually diversified his investments through his family when he became president in 1981. The family's net worth ranges from $40 billion to $70 billion, by some estimates.
Amaney Jamal, a political science professor at Princeton, said those estimates are comparable with the vast wealth of leaders in other Gulf countries.
"The business ventures from his military and government service accumulated to his personal wealth," said Jamal. "There was a lot of corruption in this regime and stifling of public resources for personal gain."
Gross national income is $2,070 per family in Egypt, according to the World Bank. About 20 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, according to a 2010 report by the CIA.
Robert Springborg, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and a Middle East scholar, said while the family is very wealthy, they have not been extremely overt with their wealth.
"One of the sons has a nice apartment in Cairo but nothing hugely lavish. There are many other people in Egypt who live a more lavish lifestyle than them."
Whatever Mubarak's wealth is, Jamal said it is certain that whenever the president actually leaves office, there will be an investigation into his assets.
"There's not much of a cover-up," she said. "The people have already outed him as a corrupt leader."
Wednesday, February 2, 2011 at 3:36PM by Matt Siegelheim Permalink
tagged Assets, Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, Weatlh in World News General
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Ask the US Embassy
Clearing Customs
Netball World Cup: Sunshine Girls take 32-21 half-time lead vs Scotland 11:30 am
Jamaica supports int'l maritime gender equality campaign
KINGSTON, Jamaica — Jamaica has lent its support to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 2019 campaign: 'I Am On Board with Gender Equality'.
Director General of the Maritime Authority of Jamaica, Rear Admiral Peter Brady, made the commitment in his message marking International Day of the Seafarer, which is observed on June 25 each year.
According to Admiral Brady, Jamaica is committed to empowering women in the Maritime community through the endorsement of the various initiatives of the IMO that pertain to the upliftment of women in the industry.
“We actively support the Women in Maritime Association Caribbean (WiMAC) – the regional chapter of the IMO's women's movement – whose mandate is to increase the participation and contribution of women to the maritime industry and provide mentorship and other support to female seafarers,” he said.
“Our maritime industry boasts females in all spheres of maritime professions who have made sterling contributions to the development of our industry and continue to drive its success through their commitment, leadership and innovation,” the director general added.
He pointed out that the maritime community includes not just a significant number of female seafarers, but also female cadets who are seafarers in training.
“We are very involved in helping to train the next generation of female seafarers at international standards through the Caribbean Maritime University (CMU), where women are provided with the opportunity to be equipped to pursue seafaring careers,” Brady said.
Throughout 2019, there will be a strong emphasis within the maritime world on the importance and value of women within the professional ranks. This is largely being driven by the theme for World Maritime Day 2019 – 'Empowering Women in the Maritime Community'.
Admiral Brady also lauded the overall efforts of seafarers.
“Today, on the International Day of the Seafarer, we pay tribute to the many men and women who man the global shipping fleet, transporting goods around the world to facilitate trade; fishing the seas to feed global populations; in our navies, protecting our populations, lands and seas; in the tourism sector, helping people to experience and enjoy our oceans first-hand; and in transport, ferrying passengers between our islands,” he said.
The director general thanked them for choosing to become seafarers and often spending many days or weeks away from family and friends and braving all types of weather while at sea.
On the Day of the Seafarer, officials from the Maritime Authority of Jamaica visit the island's ports to speak with seafarers, listen to concerns and offer support.
Gov't approves additional funds to truck water
Clear top tier emerges in crowded Dems field
This Day in History— July 17
Man given lengthy jail term for killing Jamaican
Supt Wayne Cameron heads Police Officers' Association
Jamaica's location a double-edged sword, says Chang
Drop-in centre haven from the streets
Union welcomes plans to address issues affecting guards
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Tara Russell
Tara Russell (°1994, London, United Kingdom) is an artist who works in a variety of media. By manipulating the viewer to create confusion, Russell tries to develop forms that do not follow logical criteria, but are based only on subjective associations and formal parallels, which incite the viewer to make new personal associations.
Her artworks are often classified as part of the new romantic movement because of the desire for the local in the unfolding globalized world. However, this reference is not intentional, as this kind of art is part of the collective memory. By putting the viewer on the wrong track, she tries to create works in which the actual event still has to take place or just has ended: moments evocative of atmosphere and suspense that are not part of a narrative thread. The drama unfolds elsewhere while the build-up of tension is frozen to become the memory of an event that will never take place.
Her works sometimes radiate a cold and latent violence. At times, disconcerting beauty emerges. The inherent visual seductiveness, along with the conciseness of the exhibitions, further complicates the reception of their manifold layers of meaning. By using popular themes such as sexuality, family structure and violence, she tries to increase the dynamic between audience and author by objectifying emotions and investigating the duality that develops through different interpretations.
Her works never shows the complete structure. This results in the fact that the artist can easily imagine an own interpretation without being hindered by the historical reality. By choosing mainly formal solutions, she creates work through labour-intensive processes which can be seen explicitly as a personal exorcism ritual. They are inspired by a nineteenth-century tradition of works, in which an ideal of ‘Fulfilled Absence’ was seen as the pinnacle.
Her works often refers to pop and mass culture. Using written and drawn symbols, a world where light-heartedness rules and where rules are undermined is created. By taking daily life as subject matter while commenting on the everyday aesthetic of middle class values, her works references post-colonial theory as well as the avant-garde or the post-modern and the left-wing democratic movement as a form of resistance against the logic of the capitalist market system.
Her works are given improper functions: significations are inversed and form and content merge. Shapes are dissociated from their original meaning, by which the system in which they normally function is exposed. Initially unambiguous meanings are shattered and disseminate endlessly. By demonstrating the omnipresent lingering of a ‘corporate world’, she seduces the viewer into a world of ongoing equilibrium and the interval that articulates the stream of daily events. Moments are depicted that only exist to punctuate the human drama in order to clarify our existence and to find poetic meaning in everyday life.
Her works are characterised by the use of everyday objects in an atmosphere of middleclass mentality in which recognition plays an important role. By referencing romanticism, grand-guignolesque black humour and symbolism, she wants the viewer to become part of the art as a kind of added component. Art is entertainment: to be able to touch the work, as well as to interact with the work is important.
Her works demonstrate how life extends beyond its own subjective limits and often tells a story about the effects of global cultural interaction over the latter half of the twentieth century. It challenges the binaries we continually reconstruct between Self and Other, between our own ‘cannibal’ and ‘civilized’ selves. By examining the ambiguity and origination via retakes and variations, she often creates several practically identical works, upon which thoughts that have apparently just been developed are manifested: notes are made and then crossed out again, ‘mistakes’ are repeated.
Her works are based on formal associations which open a unique poetic vein. Multilayered images arise in which the fragility and instability of our seemingly certain reality is questioned. By emphasising aesthetics, she touches various overlapping themes and strategies. Several reoccurring subject matter can be recognised, such as the relation with popular culture and media, working with repetition, provocation and the investigation of the process of expectations.
Her works are based on inspiring situations: visions that reflect a sensation of indisputability and serene contemplation, combined with subtle details of odd or eccentric, humoristic elements. By creating situations and breaking the passivity of the spectator, she often creates work using creative game tactics, but these are never permissive. Play is a serious matter: during the game, different rules apply than in everyday life and even everyday objects undergo transubstantiation.
Her works are on the one hand touchingly beautiful, on the other hand painfully attractive. Again and again, the artist leaves us orphaned with a mix of conflicting feelings and thoughts. Tara Russell currently lives and works in My Vagina .
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Home » News & events » PS Seminar: Why bilins are essential for oxygenic phototrophs
PS Seminar: Why bilins are essential for oxygenic phototrophs
3.30–4.30pm 12 July 2019
Slatyer Seminar Room, Level 2, RN Robertson Building (46)
Professor Clark Lagarias, Department of Molecular and Cellular Biology, University of California
Bilins are linear tetrapyrroles used as chromophores of phycobiliproteins and phytochromes for their light-harvesting and light-sensing properties, respectively. Enzymes for their biosynthesis first evolved in cyanobacteria and were subsequently transferred to photosynthetic eukaryotes during endosymbiosis. Although many present day eukaryotic algae lack both phycobiliproteins and phytochromes, as do some cyanobacteria, e.g. prochlorophytes, all oxygenic phototrophs retain a bilin biosynthetic pathway which consists of plastid-localized heme oxygenase (HO/HMOX1) and ferredoxin-dependent biliverdin reductase (FDBR) enzymes. We previously showed that bilins are retrograde signals released from plastids which mitigate oxidative stress during diurnal dark-to-light transitions, and are also required for maintenance of a functional photosynthetic apparatus in diurnal light-dark cycles in the green alga Chlamydomonas reinhardtii. We hypothesize that bilins are needed to sustain sufficient chlorophyll synthesis in light for repair of daily damage to the photosynthetic apparatus. The loss-of-function mutant of CrHMOX1, the enzyme responsible for the formation of biliverdin IXa (BV) from heme in C. reinhardtii, is phenotypically similar to non-lethal mutants in the chlorophyll biosynthesis pathway - all of which bleach under high light. One such mutant affects CrGUN4, which encodes a known positive regulator of Mg-chelatase activity. Our studies show that CrGUN4 can tightly binds bilins, and it can also interact with CrPCYA1 in a bilin-dependent manner. Localized to both thylakoid and stroma, CrPYCA and CrGUN4 are thus well positioned to function as bilin-dependent regulators of chlorophyll synthesis in the presence of both light and oxygen. Since C. reinhardtii lacks phytochromes, ongoing research seeks to identify cytosolic bilin binding proteins that might function as bilin (and/or light) sensors to regulate the diurnal oxidative stress pathway uncovered by our studies.
J. Clark Lagarias is a Distinguished Professor of Biochemistry at the University of California-Davis with degrees in Chemistry and Botany from the University of California-Berkeley. The recipient of the Paul K. and Ruth R. Stumpf Professorship in Plant Biochemistry in 1999, Dr. Lagarias was elected to the National Academy of Academy of Sciences in 2001, one of the highest honors accorded to a scientist or engineer in the United States. Internationally known for his work to understand the molecular basis of plant and cyanobacterial light perception, Lagarias' research interests hold significant potential for improving crop yield and for development of bilin-based fluorescent and optogenetic probes for live cell applications.
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How to Choose a Chinese Name
Patrick Kim | October 19, 2016 | | 9 Comments
In the West, we don’t think a lot about the origins or meaning of our names. By contrast, Chinese names have immediately recognizable meaning, and are thought to strongly influence a person's destiny. A good Chinese name is chosen for its sound, the visual appeal of its characters, various literal and metaphorical meanings, and sometimes even an astrological interpretation of its character components. The different approach to choosing names in China helps explain why Chinese people sometimes end up with English names like Apple, Cherry, Rain, or Mars (yes, these are real examples), or why it is common to be asked in China what your name means when most English names don’t have any worldly meaning. Choosing a Chinese name is an opportunity to reinvent yourself, but names should be chosen carefully, as they are an important part of making a good first impression.
Don’t Transliterate Your Name
The most common mistake most people make in choosing a Chinese name is to pick a direct transliteration of their name. While this works for celebrities, for instance with Kobe (科比 Kēbǐ), or Hilary Clinton (希拉里 克林顿, Xīlā lǐ Kèlíndùn), it doesn’t work for everyone. Part of the reason it doesn’t work for most people is that unlike Kobe or Clinton, most people aren’t famous, and the transliterated names of normal people can easily be mistaken for the name of a place or object. Since there are only about 400 syllables in the Chinese language, transliterated names don’t usually bear too much resemblance to the original name. Take for instance the transliterated version of the popular TV show Sherlock Holmes (link) – 夏特罗克 福尔摩斯 (Xiàtèluòkè Fú'ěrmósī). If I hear this or saw it in writing, I would have a hard time guessing what the heck it was. Chinese names are made up of only two or three syllables, making it especially difficult to fit an approximation of the sound of your original name into a typical Chinese name format.
Choosing a Surname First
Last names are the most important part of a Chinese name, but choosing one is easy since there are only about 100 common Chinese last names. Choosing a common Chinese last name will ensure your Chinese name is readily identifiable as a personal name, as Chinese names are structured with the last name first. For example, if your last name is Johnson, the very common surname 张 (Zhāng) might suit you. Similarly, 孙 (Sūn) could also reflect the “son” in Johnson. Family names are very important in Chinese culture, owing to the long history of filial piety and association by kinship in China, and you can reflect some appreciation for this cultural aspect of Chinese names by choosing a last name that sounds similar your original last name. It is best to choose a common one so that your name is easy to digest for native speakers, so if you would like to get creative with your Chinese name, leave it for the given name.
Finding the Right Balance for Your Given Name
Giving yourself a new name is an exciting opportunity for some self-invention, but choosing the right name means paying attention to the many cultural nuances that play into how a name is perceived. For non-native speakers, selecting the right characters out of thousands is bewildering, especially as each character can have multiple meanings. It is always a possibility to take someone else's given name and add it to a surname you have chosen, but this would be to sacrifice the opportunity to add some personal touch to your name.
Instead, you might start by looking at the differences between characters used in male and female names. Next, download a dictionary app to search for characters that reflect your personality traits. For example, if you are a determined or hardworking person, 志 (zhì), meaning aspiration or willpower, is a solid choice for a given name. Also look into characters that reflect your cultural heritage. If you are of Swedish (瑞典 Ruìdiǎn) or Swiss (瑞士 Ruìshì) descent, for example, you might use the character 瑞 in your name, as it not only reflects where you are from, but it is also a common character for given names as it means lucky or propitious.
Finally, choose characters that coalesce well with the surname you’ve settled on. My last name Kim can be directly translated as 金 (Jīn) in Chinese, which I paired with 泽辉 (Zéhuī) for my given name. Together these characters mean “glorious shining gold.” While my name’s meaning might seem a little ostentatious, Chinese names operate by different standards, so don’t be afraid to try out names that would sound ridiculous in English. I have been told that my name is appealing not only for its sound, but also because it has a cohesive and positive meaning, and also speaks to my Korean side. Since Chinese names are complicated and evaluated on many different levels, it is a good idea to come up with several different options for names that appeal to you so that you have a better chance of choosing one that has the most appeal within the context of Chinese culture.
Consult a Chinese Person Before Settling on A Name
Chinese parents and grandparents spend a lot of time deliberating during the name choosing process, as names are thought to strongly influence a child’s future. Some parents even go to a fortuneteller to make sure the earth, wood, fire, and water elements embedded in the characters of a name auspiciously combine by balancing each other out. While it is unlikely that your Chinese name will go under enough scrutiny to necessitate a fortuneteller, you should, however, consult at least two native Chinese speakers with several options of names to make sure they are not unlucky or unsavory in any way to your average Chinese audience.
When Mark Rowswell, a native Canadian fluent in Chinese, debuted on the CCTV New Years Gala in 1988, he rapidly climbed to fame as the most famous foreign celebrity on Chinese TV by the name of the character he played, 大山 (Dàshān). Rowswell’s very Chinese name carried well because he was the first foreigner to gain celebrity status on Chinese TV, a feat accomplished only by his mastery of crosstalk, a traditional performing art requiring Chinese language skills beyond those of your typical native speaker. Many foreigners, especially Canadians, opt for a name along the same lines as Rowswell's like 泰山, 高山, and so on. However, since Rowswell’s time, many foreigners have become fluent in Chinese and make appearances on Chinese TV. In my opinion, foreigners choosing overtly Chinese names like大山 has lost some of its appeal since the time when foreigners learning Chinese was a novelty (keep in mind also that Rowswell is more than just fluent in Chinese), and keeping some aspect of your original name or identity may play better to cultural nuances. In any case, a Chinese person will be able to tell you whether your name will help you make a good first impression or not.
Related: Choosing A Brand Name in Chinese
Learn How to Introduce Your Name
Chinese people (not just foreigners who are having trouble mastering the tones) often have to explain which characters are in their name, just like how in the West we spell out our names when registering for something or consulting a customer service representative about an account. There are two ways of going about this: explaining the smaller character components, or describing the characters by association. The first way is usually more difficult for Chinese learners because it requires knowledge of characters components in addition to the characters themselves, such as identifying the 氵 radical in 洋 as “三点水.” The second method only requires you to know a compound character vocabulary word that includes the character you are trying to describe. The way I normally “spell out” my Chinese name is “金色的金，毛泽东的泽，光辉的辉,” which lets people know that the characters I use to write my name are also found in “gold,” Mao Zedong’s given name, and “glorious.” Being able to explain your name in Chinese is great for conversation, as the many layers of meaning in Chinese names leads to interesting discussions about how you got your name and what it means for you.
Want To Learn Chinese? Join TutorMing to learn more!
Patrick Kim
Patrick Kim is an editor at TutorMing. He has a B.A. in East Asian Studies from UCSB, and has worked in China for 3 years. His hobbies are soccer, being outdoors, and studying Chinese.
Mandarin learning tips (4)
learning Chinese (1)
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Dispelling DREAM Act Myths
Washington D.C. - The DREAM Act - a popular proposal to provide legal status to undocumented youth who entered the U.S. as children, graduated from U.S. high schools, and attend college or enter the military - is the target of a smear campaign from anti-immigration hardliners. This tired effort to pit immigrants and native-born, whether they are workers or students, against one another is not only destructive, but has no basis in fact. Moreover, it ignores the economic benefits that come from legalizing a group of talented, hard-working individuals who want nothing more than to contribute to America and repay the country for the opportunities they've been given.
Research has shown that providing a legal status for young people who have a proven record of success in the United States would be a boon to the economy and the U.S. workforce. The U.S. military also needs the DREAM Act. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy, Bill Carr, stated that the law would be "good for readiness" and would help to recruit "cream of the crop" students. The DREAM Act is part of the Department of Defense's 2010-2012 Strategic Plan to assist the military in its recruiting efforts.
Yet, despite the popular support and extensive data that should make passage of the DREAM Act a no-brainer, there are those who continue to spread half-truths. The Immigration Policy Center has compiled a fact check that breaks down typical myths about the DREAM Act.
To view the fact check, in its entirety see:
Dispelling DREAM Act Myths (IPC Fact Check, November 23, 2010)
Labels: Global Visions, Immigration Translations
World Language Communications provides Chinese int...
For Immediate Release Dispelling DREAM Act Myths ...
TRANSCRIBERS NEEDED FOR ENGLISH ONLY AUDIO Proje...
ESSAKANE DOCUMENTARY features The Most Remote M...
World Language Communications featured in Savvy Cl...
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Lessons from the sea for a landlocked city
December 2, 2010 Mysore Venkatrao Prabhakar
Bangalore being a land locked city, many are not aware as to what the Indian Navy is all about. In fact the role and responsibility of the navy is not very clear to the majority of the nation. I still remember an incident, which happened way back in the early seventies when I was coming by train on annual leave to Bangalore. A fellow passenger asked me where I was working, I told him "I work in the Indian Navy". He gave my answer a very serious thought and after much reflection he said, "You people must be getting fish cheap?" – that sums up the understanding of the general public. With this backdrop, I have attempted to explain in elementary terms the meaning of the Indian Navy to the citizens of Bangalore.
Missile boat launching Surface to Surface Missile somewhere in the Indian Ocean. Pic Courtesy: Author
On December 3rd 1971 in a radio broadcast shortly before midnight, the then Prime Minister, Smt Indira Gandhi, addressed the nation. She said "I have no doubt that by the united will of the people, the wanton and unprovoked aggression of Pakistan should be decisively and finally repelled…..aggression must be met and the people of India will meet it with fortitude , determination, discipline and utmost unity….." In response to the call of the nation, the Indian Navy had planned a most audacious and daring attack in the history of naval warfare ‘Operation Trident’.
I wish to pay homage to a college mate – B G Vasuki- a young Sub Lieutenant and a smart and efficient naval officer. He was the second in command of a Patrol Vessel, INS Ajit. The ship sailed from Port Blair in April 1971 on an operational mission prior to the war. During the passage, the ship encountered a very severe storm and extremely rough seas. Being a small vessel the crew found it exceedingly difficult to counter the ravaging storm. In the ensuing battle against nature, the ship was mercilessly tossed and thrown about in the open sea, which resulted in flooding. The crew battled bravely to keep the ship afloat. In spite of all efforts the ship sank in the Bay of Bengal taking away our very own ‘Dear Vasuki ‘. Some of the survivors later on told me that BG being a good swimmer had given his own life jacket to a sailor. The courage required to make such a magnanimous gesture, especially when facing certain death is an act of supreme sacrifice and highest bravery. BG was and an Officer and a Gentleman’ in the truest sense.
The plan required ingenuity, perfect timing and absolute emphasis on surprise. On the night of 4th December 1971 a Task Group consisting of three missile boats escorted by Frigates, stealthily approached the Makaran coast. At about 22.15 hours, the three missile boats carried out a very successful attack on Pakistani naval ships and Karachi harbour. In all, three enemy ships sank that night. Many more were to follow as the war progressed. Each year on the 4th of December, the Indian Navy celebrates ‘Navy Day" to commemorate our courageous attack on the Pakistani ships and harbour.
Even though we grew up far away from the ocean and salt spray, more than a dozen of us from National College Basavanagudi – Bangalore, joined the Indian Navy in the late sixties.
For more information on Navy Day, please read Capt. Prabhakar’s account here.
The Indian Navy has a small presence in Bangalore. The city plays host to more than 200 retired naval officers. All of us meet once a quarter under the aegis of the ‘Navy Foundation Bangalore Chapter" to discuss topics of maritime interest, rub shoulders with each other and go down memory lane.
An honest man cannot function in a corrupt party: Babu Mathew
April 11, 2014 Pushpa Achanta
What does AAP candidate for Bangalore North, Babu Mathew promise to his voters? Read on!
Week’s news in brief: Oct 03-09
October 9, 2008 News Desk
This week’s scan of Bangalore’s Kannada dailies includes a number of reports from borewell water contamination to terror training in the city.
Mario Miranda’s characters are unforgettable
October 20, 2009 Deepa Vaishnavi V M
Visit the exhibition on Mario Miranda’s work, let his countless characters jostle for space in your memories!
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Boston Celtics rookies already winning fans over
July 10, 2019 BostonRumors
The Celtics are off to a hot start in the Summer League, going 3-0 against the 76ers, Cavaliers, and most recently the Nuggets.
It’s no secret that 7-foot-6 center Tacko Fall has already emerged as a fan favorite. But, it looks like the Celtics’ draft picks are becoming favorites too.
On Tuesday, Barstool’s Dan Greenberg tweeted “The Celtics rookies have won my heart” with a video of Tremont Waters, Grant Williams, Carsen Edwards, and Romeo Langford sharing what it means to be a part of the Boston organization.
And the genuineness of their responses will likely win over the hearts of more than just Greenberg.
“Well personally, just coming from Indiana, they kind of have the same background just with the winning mentality, with chasing the sixth banner in Indiana, and Boston trying to get another banner coming up soon. It’s really just the same for me, honestly, just the tradition and the winnningness,” Langford said, despite being unable to participate in Summer League due to his thumb injury.
“Yeah for me, I’m actually from Connecticut, so I’m just right down the road from Boston, and just to be able to go from LSU to obviously to the Boston Celtics feels really good. And the fan base is crazy. Obviously playing with these guys is definitely a learning experience, but it’s been fun,” Waters, who recently agreed to a two-way contract, added.
“For myself, it’s really been amazing just because being surrounded by tremendous people, whether it’s my teammates or Danny Ainge and historic guys you looked up to. My grandfather loved the Celtics and he’s a guy who was probably the happiest that I went there, so I’m really thankful to be a part of the organization, but I’m thankful that Tennessee gave me an opportunity, gave me a place to do it,” Williams said, who was drafted at No. 22 overall.
In addition to feeling thankful to be Celtics, the players were then asked to giving a scouting report on two of the players who are shorter for their respective positions: Edwards and Williams.
“Well Carsen, I’d just say his ability to make tough shots and even though he’s small for his position, it’s just that dog mentality to be able to guard people who are bigger than him. He takes on that challenge to guard guys bigger, or the guy that’s scoring all the points,” said Langford of his fellow point guard. Langford is listed at 6-foot-6, while Edwards is listed at just 6-foot.
Williams is in a similar situation to Edwards merely from a size standpoint. But, according to Waters, the 6-foot-7 power forward doesn’t let that hold him back.
“He’s undersized for the position, but he’s a tough person, like forget basketball, he’s a tough person and he’s willing to take on any challenge,” Water said. “And overall, he’s just willing to use his body to root guys out and get rebounds and he’s just a tough player overall.”
Despite being undersized, Edwards and Williams have put up an impressive performance so far this summer. Edwards has led the team in points, averaging 19 per game, in addition to 2.7 rebounds, while shooting 54 percent. Meanwhile, Williams has averaged 11 points and 6.7 rebounds per game, while shooting 46 percent.
Next, the Celtics will take on the Grizzlies Thursday at 10:30 p.m.
Full article @ Boston Celtics rookies already winning fans over
Former Celtics forward Al Horford thanks Boston in social media post
Boston Celtics rookie Romeo Langford on Summer League: 'It's kind of boring for me'
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How Celtics have fared with mid-first-round picks in recent years
The Boston Celtics head into Thursday’s NBA Draft with three first-round picks. They have selections at Nos. 14, 20, and 22 with hopes of adding depth to their roster, adding assets to package into a future trade, or creating trade leverage for a draft-night move. Whichever they choose to do, Boston definitely has experience drafting around the middle of the first round. Let’s take a look at their recent history in the 14-22(ish) range:
In the 2010 NBA Draft, the Celtics selected Avery Bradley with the 19th overall pick. Bradley was Marcus Smart before Marcus Smart. He was a nightmare on defense, fought for every loose ball, and could shoot the three well enough that defenses couldn’t forget about him. He was recognized twice on the NBA All-Defensive team during his time with the Celtics and helped keep the team afloat during the rebuilding period. The summer of 2017 marked the end of Bradley’s tenure in Boston after he was traded along with a 2019 second-round pick to Detroit for Marcus Morris.
The 2012 NBA Draft brought Jared Sullinger (No. 21) and Fab Melo (No. 22) to Boston. Sullinger was a starter for four seasons but was heavily criticized for being out of shape and not being able to get up and down the floor. He was an example of a guy that played a big role during a few weird rebuilding years. Melo, on the other hand, had problems with academic ineligibility at Syracuse then spent most of his career in the developmental league before he passed away in February 2017.
The Celtics had the 16th overall pick in 2013 and used it to select Lucas Nogueira before immediately trading him to the Dallas Mavericks in exchange for Kelly Olynyk, who had been taken with the 13th pick. Olynyk served four seasons for the Celtics, averaging 9.5 points per game and 4.7 rebounds. He was a solid role player with a rebuilding team before becoming a starter for a 7-seed playoff team. Two of his most memorable moments were inadvertently dislocating Kevin Love’s shoulder in the 2015 playoffs, and dropping 26 points in a Game 7 win in the second round of the 2017 playoffs. Olynyk went on to take his talents to South Beach and has spent the last two seasons getting quality minutes for the Miami Heat.
In 2014, the same draft that landed Marcus Smart sixth overall, the Celtics chose James Young out of Kentucky with the 17th pick. Smart has proven to be a gritty defender and crucial member of the Celtics embodying everything it means to be from Boston. Young, however, was forced to miss the summer league, most of training camp, and the early part of his rookie season in 2014. He spent some time in the developmental league with the Maine Red Claws and got a handful of opportunities to dress with the pros through 2016 before becoming a free agent and signing with the New Orleans Pelicans in the summer of 2017. Young was never able to make the jump to a full-time roster spot and needless to say, didn’t make much of an impact with the Celtics. His career high 13 points came in a loss to the Charlotte Hornets in 2015.
The Celtics’ 2018 playoff run partly has the 2015 NBA Draft to thank. Boston stole Terry Rozier at the 16th pick and found their overqualified backup point guard. Rozier spent a fair amount of his rookie season with the Red Claws before earning a roster spot in 2016 and he hasn’t looked back. With Isaiah Thomas stealing the hearts of Celtics faithful, Rozier spent some time in his shadow. When Kyrie Irving came to Boston it was more of the same for Rozier. Kyrie was forced to miss the latter portion of the regular season and couldn’t come back for the playoffs, which gave Rozier an opportunity to showcase his talent. There were rumors of his increased trade stock leading to a potential move that would make him a starter elsewhere and bring in a new piece, but he was happy (at the time) to stay in Boston and contend for a title. A sub-par year the following season led to an ESPN tour where he laid out all of his frustrations. His future with the team is still up in the air.
The ping pong balls in the 2016 draft lottery landed the Celtics the third (via Brooklyn), 16th (via Dallas), and 23rd overall picks. The Celtics turned the Nets pick into Jaylen Brown, who has turned into a reliable part of the Celtics’ rotation, with still more room to grow. At 16, they took Guerschon Yabusele, who played professionally in France and Shanghai before being drafted in 2016. Yabusele signed with the Red Claws in March 2017 before officially signing with the Celtics four months later. He hasn’t been in the league for long, but he wants to be with the Celtics and if he shows improvement he may turn into a serious role player moving forward. With the 23rd pick, the Celtics selected Ante Žižić, who was traded one year later in the package that brought Kyrie Irving to Boston. Žižić averaged 18 minutes through 59 games in the 2019 season for the Cleveland Cavaliers as a role player for the 14-seed in the east.
Selections with pick Nos. 25-30
Once you get to the late first round, the Celtics haven’t had an abundant amount of success finding contributors. The Celtics selected MarShon Brooks 25th overall in 2011 and he was immediately traded to the Brooklyn Nets for the 27th overall pick that gave them JaJuan Johnson. Brooks made his way back to Boston for a year in 2013 and spent a couple years as a role player before making his way overseas. Selected 28th overall in the 2015 draft, R.J. Hunter spent a year with the Celtics, appeared in three games with the Bulls, and has since been in the developmental league. The Celtics picked Robert Williams 27th overall in the 2018 draft and he doesn’t have a huge sample size to measure his success with the team, but he swatted two Anthony Davis shots in the same game and appears to have some upside.
From drafting the last decade in their post-2008 championship era, working through some rebuilding years, getting back to being a major contender in the East, and now possibly looking at another at least partial rebuild, it’s clear the Celtics have not let any top picks go to waste. Picks between 12-24 have serious potential to bring in strong role players or the occasional starter. That’s the range Boston is working with in the 2019 draft so it’s not crazy to say the Celtics could call the name of player we’ll hear about for years to come.
Full article @ How Celtics have fared with mid-first-round picks in recent years
Nets may not be sold on Kyrie Irving as team’s lone star
Celtics rumors: Chemistry issues may have started with 'force feeding' Gordon Hayward
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How to Live - A Life of Montaigne
How to Live - A Life of Montaigne In One Question and Twenty Attempts at an Answer-by Sarah Bakewell
“WINNER OF THE 2010 NATIONAL BOOK CRITICS CIRCLE AWARD FOR BIOGRAPHY”
In this new book, Sarah Bakewell takes the already-readable Montaigne and makes him that much easier to read. The main themes of his writing are distilled and presented within the historical and biographical context that makes it all come alive.
How to get along with people, how to deal with violence, how to adjust to losing someone you…Read
Even Nameless Horrors must be Named
To what extent can an aestheticisation of mass murder be seen as acceptable or valid? Is it question of content or purpose, or rather about who is doing the actual writing? And if one kind of aestheticisation is legitimate, on what basis should another be disallowed?
This is a complex question. Those seeking to answer it can easily find themselves drowning in noncommittal goodwill statements of the “this must be shown” variety, without touching on the complications involved in all literature based on things that really happened. Just as there is no such thing as…Read
Fragmented Memories
“If I can remember, I can talk.” Perjovschi (2006)
Order and disorder are well known concepts in various fields, such as mathematics, physics, biology, but also literature, linguistic, and social sciences. For instance, the transition theories—starting with Rustow (1970) up to the most recent work of Carothers (2002) and O’Donnell (2002)—address, in some way, the uncontrollable, chaotic, and hybrid characteristic of a society in transition to democracy. As such, while analyzing the collapse of the organizational system of the Zunis, in Southwest US, Stone calls the anthropologists to have a look at the…Read
During the Christmas holidays I read a book by José Saramago called Blindness which details what happens when nearly everyone in a city goes blind and everything starts going horribly out of control. This is a frightening story but at the same time it portrays a group of people that even in such catastrophic circumstances exhibit courage and reason as a means to re-creating a safer environment. However, there are examples of people’s selfishness, opportunism, and indifference.
Towards the end of the story the question is raised, “why did we become blind,…Read
Why Sartre Matters
The 21st June 2005 was an auspicious date – the summer solstice, the tipping point of Gemini into Cancer, and the centenary of the birth of Jean-Paul Sartre. And on 15th April 1980 – just 32 years ago – Sartre died. These two dates are worthy of note because, in the intervening 75 years, Sartre created a legacy that is not only memorable but is also, and more importantly, an appeal to an unconventional worldview and, by implication, to action.
Sartre’s attainments as writer and intellectual suffice in themselves to ensure his eminence in the canon of French literature.…Read
The Second Sex
This article first appeared in the Guardian Newspaper.
'It changed my life!'
Everyone should read Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, argues Toril Moi
An accomplished novelist, Simone de Beauvoir won the Prix Goncourt for The Mandarins in 1954. She is also one of the most important French memoirists of the 20th century. Yet it is to The Second Sex, her epochal essay from 1949 on the oppression of women, that we should return.
Ever since it was published, The Second Sex has provoked intense responses. In 1949, it unleashed a sexual…Read
The Limits of authenticity
Ben G. Yacobi asks if it possible to live authentically
We are told: “To thine own self be true!”
But what do we mean if we say that somebody is an authentic person, or a very genuine person? Personal authenticity is often defined as being true and honest with oneself and others, having a credibility in one’s words and behaviour, and an absence of pretence. Its meaning is then often clarified by contrasting it to inauthenticity, like comparing light to darkness. But in the absence of any…Read
Sam Spade Existential, Hero?
Perhaps the most popular existential work of the 20th century was written by a man who has not usually been identified as a philosopher, but whose work clearly embodies existential themes. Dashiell Hammett, creator of the hard-boiled detective novel, applied an existential viewpoint to his writing. His novel The Maltese Falcon is an excellent example of literature in which existential themes run through the story.
The Maltese Falcon begins when a young and very attractive woman, Brigid O’Shaughnessy, approaches private detective Sam Spade and his partner, Miles Archer. She wishes to hire them to rescue…Read
Existence unplugged
There’s something about the word ‘existentialism’ that conjures up the image of serious-looking Frenchmen in a dimly lit cafe, discussing the absurdity of life and the inevitability of death in between slow inhalations of tobacco. They carry coffee-stained notepads from which they earnestly recite poetry on the human condition, and (for the more serious listener) their philosophical musings.
Freedom is the cause celebre of the modern age. For existentialists, though, the full acceptance of human freedom seems to place an almost terrifying weight upon our shoulders. We are, as Sartre puts it, condemned…Read
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Caledonia Pride is the first professional women's basketball team in Scotland. This franchised has been created to act as a performance pathway to help
Scotland qualify for the 2018 Commonwealth Games in Australia.
basketballscotland are in partnership with the University of Edinburgh to ensure the athletes are provided with the best possible performance environment and The National Performance Centre 'Oriam' is the official home court of the team, providing a fantastic venue with a capacity for over 350 fans.
The Scottish side are currently competing in the Women's British Basketball League, playing against the best talent up and down the country. The league provides fierce and experienced competition, readying the players for the Commonwealth quest.
The aim is to not only qualify for the Commonwealth Games but to sustain the programme to allow home grown talent to progress and develop their basketball career without looking overseas. This will help to change the culture of basketball in Scotland and produce more and more national talent.
George’s defensive impact propels U.S. into semifinals
Team USA stuffs Argentina, advances to semifinals
Offseason Player Movement: Southeast Division
2016 Scotland Basketball. All rights reserved. Website by SportLomo.
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Colin Cameron
AZ State Parks repairs historic San Rafael home
October 26, 2012 by Arizona Heritage Alliance
[Source: JB Miller, The Weekly Bulletin] – After years of neglect due to funding cuts, as well as a wildfire that nearly razed one of the state’s most important territorial style homes, Arizona State Parks is now rushing to save the historic headquarters of the San Rafael Ranch. As part of this effort, over a dozen AZ State Parks personnel recently spent two days (Oct 9-10) cleaning house, making repairs, and getting the grounds into shape.
In addition, a new caretaker has been hired to keep an eye on the ranch house and adjoining property located along the U.S.-Mexico border just east of Lochiel. “All hands are on deck,” said Lee Eseman, acting chief of operations, who was busy working on one of the columns along the weathered and termite eaten porch that wraps around the 9,000 square foot house. “Hopefully it is in time.”
In 2008, the state parks system experienced a heavy layoff, leaving the San Rafael State Natural Area devoid of staff. “We had this place pretty much vacant when the recession hit and they started cutting back on our funding. When they did away with the Heritage Fund they did away with all the operational funding for this,” said Assistant State Parks Director Jay Ream. “We’ve had about $2 million over the last few years taken from our operating fund to help out with the state budget. We just couldn’t put people here and keep other parks open too. The problem was if you don’t keep a park open you begin to spiral down.”
In addition to damage to the main house, it was discovered that the adobe walls to the barn were crumbling away. “It’s been deteriorating quickly,” said Eseman, who added that there are also two out buildings “cowboy houses” that need to be maintained. Other challenges include keeping the solar and water systems going. Near one of the bunkhouses, a windmill broke and water had to be trucked in. The vegetation that surrounded the structures had also gotten out of hand, which fueled a wildfire that broke out following what was suspected a lightning strike this past summer.
“The fire in June was a wake-up call,” said Ream about the wildfire that destroyed a nearby pump house before burning all the way up to the historic headquarters. Luckily firefighters from the Patagonia Volunteer Fire and Rescue Department and the Coronado National Forest Service were able to respond quickly enough to douse the flames.
“We dodged a bullet and swore that when we got to the new fiscal year, we were determined to get somebody in here and have a clean-up day,” Ream said. In addition to mowing around the house in order to make it more “fire wise,” the work crew also removed an alarming amount of dead grass that had blown against the buildings. “A clean-up day does two things – one it gets a lot of big projects done in a hurry, but it’s also a nice team-building thing,” Ream said. He said parks personnel also wanted to knock out as much as they could so it wouldn’t seem so daunting to the new caretaker, Jon Erickson, who he described as a “good all-around hand.”
For now the San Rafael House will remain closed to the public. “It’s not structurally sound nor does it have the facilities for the general public (restrooms etc),” said Eseman, adding that safety along the border has also been a concern for AZ State Parks.
Originally a Mexican Land Grant, San Rafael de la Zanja was purchased by Colin Cameron and partners in the late 1800s. Built in 1900, the “Cameron House” was sold along with the ranch three years later to William C. Greene, better known as Colonel Greene the “Copper Skyrocket.” After the death of William Greene’s daughter Florence Greene Sharp, the ranch was sold to The Nature Conservancy in 1998 and eventually Arizona State Parks purchased 3,557 acres of the property in 1999 as a natural area.
According to the San Rafael State Park website, the purchase was made with Heritage Funds, which are used to preserve open areas. In 2008 the ranch headquarters was designated as a National Historic District. “It’s an investment in Arizona’s future,” Ream said while looking out of one of the windows at the surrounding San Rafael Valley. “Fifty years from now people will be seeing this as one of the greatest places in the world. I’ve seen maps of what Arizona is supposed to look like in 2050 and vast places like this will be the places people will want to visit.”
Categories Arizona State Budget, Budget, Heritage Fund, Historic Preservation, State ParksTags Colin Cameron, Coronado National Forest, Florence Greene Sharp, Jay Ream, JB Miller, Jon Erickson, Lee Eseman, Lochiel, Patagonia, San Rafael, San Rafael de la Zanja, The Nature Conservancy, William C. GreeneLeave a comment
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« Does Arne Duncan's NCLB Waiver Decision Open the Door for Illinois? | Main | How Did SIG Schools Do on Graduation, Attendance, and Other Factors? »
Arne Duncan Mounts Strongest Defense Yet of Common Core Standards
By Michele McNeil on June 25, 2013 3:00 PM
In a speech today to the American Society of News Editors in Washington, U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan mounted his strongest defense yet of the common-standards movement and sought to beat back claims that the federal government has gone too far to encourage the standards' adoption.
In his remarks, he tried to draw bright lines in the controversy: That the federal government encouraged the standards' adoption, but didn't mandate them and that the standards are just that—standards—and not a set of lesson plans or curricula, which the federal government is barred under law from getting involved in.
Duncan told the audience, "The federal government didn't write them, didn't approve them, and doesn't mandate them, and we never will. Anyone who says otherwise is either misinformed or willfully misleading."
He called some of the claims opponents are making—that the standards and tests will lead to mind control, robots, and biometric brain mapping—just "wacky." (My colleague over at State EdWatch has more about Duncan's speech from the state perspective.)
Duncan called on his audience of journalists to use their jobs, their power, and their reach to investigate claims rather than just report the back-and-forth.
"As you know, good journalism is more than just claim and counterclaim. It's investigating what's true and false, what's a responsible statement, and what's not," he said. My colleague Catherine Gewertz details more of Duncan's challenge to his audience of journalists over at Curriculum Matters.
Then, Duncan sought to lay out exactly what the federal government's role has been. (And that role isn't so cut and dry.)
In his speech, Duncan says that when Obama took office in 2009, the standards were already in development. But that's iffy. In April 2009, chiefs and governors met in Chicago to take the first concrete step towards launching the common standards drive. At this point, the groups were still seeking commitments from states, not developing the standards. By June 2009, 46 states had signed on to the idea of common standards.
Then Race to the Top came along, with the rules first announced in late 2009.
On a grading scale of 500 points, Duncan said adopting common standards and assessments was worth relatively little. "Did the points, and the dollars, matter to the states? Absolutely. But it's not the only reason or even the most important reason why states adopted the Common Core," he said.
In fact, adopting and implementing common standards and assessments was worth 50 points, or 10 percent. That's the same amount of points allotted to a state's plan for turning around low-performing schools. In a contest in which only a few points separated winners from losers, those points mattered—a lot. And it likely spurred states to actually adopt the standards; the first state adopted them in February 2010.
(Let's not forget about the role of Congress in Race to the Top, which established the four "assurances" that would govern the 2009 stimulus money that funded the $4 billion state contest. Standards and assessments was one of those assurances states had to commit to improve. Of course, the stimulus law said nothing about a "common" set of standards, but the law was crafted against the backdrop of the state-led common-standards effort. Duncan then took the broad language of that law and really ran with it.)
Back to Duncan's speech, there were some things he left out.
He didn't mention Race to the Top Round 3, the bridesmaid round as we call it, when common standards adoption and implementation mattered even more. Implementing common standards and participating in a testing consortia were required in order for any of the nine finalist states to get their consolation prize. (UPDATE: I should point out that the department did this to make sure states didn't backtrack from the promises they made in the original rounds of competition.)
Also going unmentioned was the $360 million in Race to the Top funds Duncan used to help states develop common tests linked to the common standards. His speech was almost entirely focused on the standards themselves.
Duncan used the speech to take on his critics, basically accusing them of taking the easy way out as they sought to derail other education-improvement efforts.
"Some of the hostility to Common Core also comes from critics who conflate standards with curriculum, assessments and accountability. They oppose mandated testing and they oppose using student achievement growth and gain as one of multiple measures to evaluate principals and teachers. They also oppose intervention in chronically low-performing schools. Some seem to feel that poverty is destiny," he said.
"It's convenient for opponents to simply write it all off as federal overreach—but these are separate and distinct issues--and they should be publicly debated openly and honestly with a common understanding about the facts."
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Education Week's blogs > Education and the Media See more News Coverage
Mark Walsh
Mark Walsh is a contributing writer to Education Week and author of The School Law Blog. He has covered education issues for more than two decades and now looks at how schools are covered in the general news media and in the popular culture.
« HBO's John Oliver Takes on Standardized Testing | Main | 'Kelly and Michael,' 'Rachael Ray' Shows Recognize and Reward Teachers »
Alexander Russo Launches New Blog on Education Journalism
By Mark Walsh on May 6, 2015 2:36 PM | No comments
The peripatetic and highly opinionated education blogger Alexander Russo has a new outlet beginning today: a blog called The Grade at the site of Washington Monthly magazine.
"Think of it as NPR's 'On The Media' for education news, or as a public editor or ombudsman for national K-12 news coverage," Russo says in a welcome note to readers. "There's a ton of education news being pumped out every day, but what's particularly good (or bad) about the coverage that's being provided—and what if anything can be done to make it even better?"
Russo, based in Brooklyn, N.Y., tells me via email that This Week in Education, his wide-ranging education blog hosted by Scholastic, will continue "full speed ahead." But media-related items, which have been a staple there, will now likely be found at the Grade.
(In his initial welcome message posted Wednesday morning, the blog was called "Grade Point," and Russo said there that he didn't care that The Washington Post had a higher education blog with the same title. On Wednesday afternoon, though, the initial message disappeared for a while and then reappeared under the name "The Grade." Russo says in a revised welcome messag that the change was made "so as to not confuse anyone" with the Post's blog.)
"What qualifies me for this work?," continues Russo, a former U.S. Senate aide on education issues, in his welcome message. "I've been writing about education for a long time, in print and online. Along the way, I've praised and damned pretty much everyone out there (including both reform advocates and their critics). And, since I'm going to continue this blog and my other freelance efforts, I'm not financially beholden to anyone."
Still, besides accepting support from Washington Monthly, Russo says there are two other "starting funders": the American Federation of Teachers, the nation's second-largest teachers' union, and Education Post, a Chicago-based organization run by former Arne Duncan spokesman Peter Cunningham. (Education Post itself is supported by the Los Angeles-based Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation, the New York City-based Bloomberg Philanthropies, the Bentonville, Ark.-based Walton Family Foundation, and an anonymous donor.)
"Most days it might not seem like these two organizations [AFT and Education Post] would agree on much, but their leaders have stepped up to support this effort out of a desire for smart education coverage (and agreed to give me room to write whatever seems most important on any given day)," Russo writes.
He added in his email to me that "the AFT and Education Post won't necessarily like what I write about every day of the week, but they'll benefit from there being a place where media quality is being discussed."
Asked by me about the support for the venture, AFT President Randi Weingarten said via email, "There are fewer and fewer reporters covering the education beat, and we need to do what we can to help those who are interested in balanced reporting find that balance. That's why we supported Alexander's venture at this reputable publication."
Michael Vaughn, the communications director for Education Post, said via email: "We respect Alexander's voice and think that education journalism and commentary deserve thoughtful scrutiny. At the end of the day, we can't have a better conversation if we can't agree on certain basic truths. People say a lot of unsupported things, and it can get very confusing for readers. Our hope is that it makes all of us more careful, and we fully expect to be challenged by him sometimes."
Russo says he will call on a group of advisers that includes Richard Lee Colvin, a former education reporter for the Los Angeles Times and former head of the Hechinger Institute on Education and the Media at Teachers College, Columbia University; Jay Mathews, an education columnist of The Washington Post; Linda Perlstein, a veteran education writer and editor; Liz Spayd, the editor and publisher of the Columbia Journalism Review; and Peg Tyre, an education journalist and author.
Russo called on readers to forward examples of good and bad education journalism.
"Together, we'll keep an eye on the folks who are keeping an eye on the schools, making sure they're neither too credulous nor too critical, and help ensure that what people understand about education is a little bit better than it might otherwise have been."
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Teacher Blogs > Road Trips in Education See our Opinion
David B. Cohen is a veteran high school English teacher from Palo Alto, Calif., and former associate director of Accomplished California Teachers. He is currently on sabbatical and using the time to travel to schools throughout California and write a book about his experiences. Follow him on Twitter @CohenD.
« Learning That Lasts | Main | Why Employers Care What Workers Want »
Are School Choice and Equity Incompatible?
By David B. Cohen on February 5, 2015 1:23 AM
Last week was National School Choice Week, an annual nationwide publicity effort sponsored by a coalition of organizations, mostly charter school and education reform groups. The choices they're celebrating include not only charters, but also magnet schools, independent schools, and home schooling. While their website doesn't, at a glance, reveal any particular stance on vouchers, their coalition partners include supporters of vouchers and tax credits. Those approaches to school choice are even more problematic, but for now, I'll focus on charter schools.
It's hard to argue against the idea of choice. Everyone wants choices, and as school choice advocates point out, the current situation is that people with greater wealth and moblility have choices that others do not. In my childhood, I benefitted from attending a magnet school and a private school. (I also attended two Department of Defense schools and one traditional public elementary school). Like my parents did with my schooling, my wife and I exercised some choice in my children's education: we entered our older son in a lottery to enter a bilingual immersion program in our district (he didn't get a spot), and we now have both sons enrolled in a choice program within our neighborhood public middle school.
So I understand the desire for choices, and I am not constructing an argument against the concept. In practice, however, I can't get behind the charter school movement as a whole, primarily because so much of it depends on competition for inadequate resources. There's a resentment I've heard in multiple settings as I've traveled to schools around California this year. Dedicated and talented educators doing their best in challenging circumstances often feel charter schools are opportunistically undercutting the established schools and districts. I don't mean to impugn the motives of charter school teachers who work in those schools, but on balance, I worry that the competitive nature of charter school politics is more harmful than helpful.
Public education is an institution that demands equity rather than the creation of winners and losers, but the charter movement pits schools against each other. The net effect of charters on student learning nationwide is ambiguous at best, but the increase in segregation is relatively clear.
I am not out to condemn charter schools en masse; there are so many types and models that generalizations are unwise. Many of them are wonderful places for students and teachers. Some are barely different than they were before charter conversions that were carried out for fiscal or procedural benefits. Others have been founded by teachers, sponsored directly by districts, or designed as educational laboratories through university-district partnerships. These are small-scale efforts that keep resources and funding in local control. There's no issue of profits driving decisions, no marketing and development departments to employ, no means to help real estate portfolios. These are not the types of charter outfits that end up being investigated by the FBI. It's not that traditional public schools and districts are immune to such problems, but rather that the public (through regulations and elections) retains more ability scrutinize and regulate public schools compared to charter management organizations (CMOs).
Some readers may be saying, "But charter schools are public schools!" According to the National Labor Relations Board, ruling in a case from Chicago, charter school operators should be treated in labor relations as "private entities acting as contractors for the government." Charter schools use public money to serve some of the public, but their governance and operations are sufficiently independent from government that they should be considered "private entities."
They certainly act like private entities. They focus on what's good for their own organization and their students - as would seem appropriate - but then, the possibility of diminished resources for other schools in a district becomes worse than an afterthought; it becomes a competitive advantage. A struggling public education system is fertile ground for charter school growth.
Our public education system has a mandate to provide a quality education to every child. In a modern comprehensive system, that means students of diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds, at all skill levels, with all kinds of interests. It means students coping with special educational needs of varied origins and durations. It means rural and urban communities. It includes all of the challenges that follow from poverty, housing instability, or homelessness. Students in foster care. In the judicial system or correctional facilities.
There's transportation costs to get students to and from school. There's equipment for science labs, computer labs. Athletic programs (including equipment, uniforms, and coaches), orchestras and instruments, field trips... I could go on quite a while listing all the items a comprehensive school or district might reasonably be expected to try to pay for. Hard decisions must be made, and some areas will inevitably be stronger than others.
The overall mandate doesn't change even as the budget fluctuates, and legislators keep shifting the policy landscape, often adding unfunded requirements that demand resources and steal focus. Given the growing poverty in the country, public school systems face continually increasing struggles, and the people in government who should be held accountable for failing to support schools are instead paving the way for competition that may weaken them further.
CMOs - some of them aiming to turn a profit - know that there are unhappy students and parents in the system, and look for opportunities to expand. Even if charters have less money overall (which may or may not be the case), charters can capitalize on their newness and flexibility; they can create a niche, select a focus, and then compete for students (or parents) to whom their model appeals. The comprehensive public school or district is not equipped to respond, nor is there a societal consensus that would allow them to veer from their responsibility to serve all students if necessary to compete with charters.
Freedom from serving all students is a competitive edge for charters, for example, helping some charter high schools produce impressive matriculation and college attendance statistics. Additionally, the explicit expectation or (illegal) requirement of parental involvement in the school may help ensure a certain type of student and family form a higher percentage of the student body. A certain linguistic or cultural focus may further boost interest in a charter, and choice in locations may also be advantageous. A higher expulsion rate can provide an advantage in school climate. If students leave charter schools mid-year, the funding stays with the charters while the student with a disrupted educational experience returns to the traditional schools. Charters can choose to leave "open seats" rather than enroll new students as openings are created in later grades, shielding charters that engage in this practice from challenges their traditional counterparts are obligated to take on.
In our society, competition is widely accepted, a cultural norm. Competition is supposed to bring out best efforts and assure that only the meritorious prosper. In practice, the competition between public schools and private entities with different mandates and different resources is not serving us well. We need to view education as an essential public institution too important to allow the collateral damage in schools that "lose" the competition.
And yet, recognizing the value of options and choice, and in order to spur innovation, I would like to see more flexibility and creativity in schools overall. Can we have both equity and choice? I think the best path forward is to adapt the public school system to offer more choices under a unified system that ensures equity, with the added goal of reserving public resources to serve the public good. We should promote the expansion of various secondary education pathways and specialties, academies, or schools-within-schools. Allow more intra- and inter-district flexibility for students and staff, using technology and blended learning if that helps. Consider other innovative models that expand options and promote change, without segregating or excluding students, and without draining resources from the overall system. One school I visited this year, New Technology High School in Napa, CA, seen above, is a choice school created by a district and open to all students. (The New Tech Network supports districts or schools, both traditional and charter). It might also be worth considering breaking up large or dysfunctional districts that have been less responsive to community concerns and less effective at meeting the needs of students and schools. That idea has circulated in Los Angeles Unified for decades.
Charter schools might remain a small part of the system as well, but with tighter oversight, non-exclusionary policies, and some means of favoring non-profit operators with local ties or community partners.
Ideally, a robust public education system should be a cornerstone of a democratic and equitable society. Having a quasi-private system siphoning off public resources, playing by different rules with less oversight, does not advance that ideal.
Photo by David B. Cohen
National School Choice Week
Unpacking After 'Road Trips'
The Limitations of Imitation
The Future of EdCamp
Is Teacher Learning a 'Mirage'?
Rolling in the Deep of Cultural Assumptions
--- Select a Category --- Education Policy (15) School visits (12) Teacher leadership (4) Teaching and Learning (16)
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Two Decades of OSHA Recognition
April 2019—Twenty years almost to the day that OSHA and NCCCO signed their historic agreement officially recognizing CCO certification as an objective assessment of the knowledge and skills of crane operators, representatives from the two agencies sat down again in the very same room at the Department of Labor in Washington, DC, that the Agreement had been signed in. They reflected on that historic moment and reviewed the events that led up to the publication last November of a final rule that, once and for all, specified the requirements by which crane operators must be qualified.
Pictured in February 2019 receiving a Recognition Award from NCCCO President Kerry Hulse, is Acting Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, Loren Sweatt, together with (to her immediate right) Director of Construction Standards and Guidance, Garvin Branch; regulatory analyst, Vernon Preston (behind); and Bryant Seymour, Occupational Safety and Health Specialist. To the right of Hulse are NCCCO CEO Graham Brent and NCCCO Immediate Past President, Thom Sicklesteel.
“It is not overstating the impact of that formal recognition by OSHA to say that the signing of the Agreement between the two organizations in 1999 marked the beginning of a turning point for NCCCO certification and the industry as a whole,” said NCCCO President Kerry Hulse. “While NCCCO was borne directly out of the industry it was designed to serve, the additional credibility that this recognition conferred, together with the third-party accreditation NCCCO had been awarded a year earlier, served as the encouragement needed for many employers to step out from the sidelines and become fully fledged participants in what was, at the time, an innovative and ground-breaking safety initiative,” he said.
Then and Now. The signing ceremony in February 1999 was attended by more than 50 senior representatives of the construction industry including over a dozen of the nation’s preeminent construction organizations and institutions who gathered to witness what the then Director of the Directorate of Construction, Russell Bruce Swanson (second from left), called “an historic moment that many thought would never come.”
Of course, much has been achieved in the two decades since, and the beneficiary, as study after study has shown over the last two decades, has been the construction industry itself and those who work in it, as evidenced by reduced accidents and incidents, fewer injuries and saved lives.
It’s a sentiment echoed by the current Acting Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, Loren Sweatt, who paid tribute at the meeting to her team at the Directorate of Construction. “Since the revision in the early 2000s of OSHA’s crane standard by C-DAC (the Cranes and Derricks Advisory Committee) that emerged as a Final Rule in 2010, this team has stayed the course on operator certification as it made its way through various twists and turns until this past November when we finally saw a federal requirement published for crane operators to be certified as part of a comprehensive qualification process,” she said.
“We wanted to make sure we got it 100 percent right,” Sweatt added. “It required a full-court press to get that done and I am very proud of their accomplishment.”
It was worth the wait, according to NCCCO Immediate Past President Thom Sicklesteel. “As a third-generation crane owner, I really have to commend OSHA for developing what at the end of the day is a highly workable and what I believe will be proven to be an extremely effective qualification process,” he said. “In particular, the evaluation component of the final rule is now clearly defined and eminently practical.”
Now that the rule was published and in effect, the emphasis was on assisting employers with compliance with the new provisions, said Director of Construction Standards and Guidance, Garvin Branch. “As we develop FAQs to respond to questions from the industry, we’ll also be revising the Compliance Guide used by all compliance officers in the field,” he noted.
Reducing Accidents
The signing ceremony for the joint OSHA/ NCCCO Agreement that was held at the Department of Labor’s headquarters offices in Washington, DC in February 1999 was hosted by then Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, Charles Jeffress, who had personal experience of the need for crane operator certification and who declared his appreciation at the ceremony for all that NCCCO had done. “This certification will help us reduce the number of accidents that occur with cranes,” he stated, a prediction which, of course, has proved accurate.
The ceremony was attended by more than 50 senior representatives of the construction industry including over a dozen of the nation’s preeminent construction organizations and institutions who gathered to witness what the then Director of the Directorate of Construction, Russell Bruce Swanson, called “an historic moment that many thought would never come.”
“It was an extraordinary display of support from the industry for an initiative that was barely three years old and had yet to make a significant impact on crane safety,” said NCCCO CEO Graham Brent. “In many ways, the Agreement was remarkably prescient in its estimation of the effect it would have on the industry, not least in the way it anticipated that certification would become part of the natural progression in crane operators’ careers.”
In light of the significance of the role that OSHA had played in improving the safety record of the construction industry through this action, the NCCCO Board of Directors had wanted to demonstrate its gratitude for the foresight and initiative displayed by OSHA more than two decades ago, said NCCCO CEO Brent. “Too often it seems, regulatory agencies are vilified rather than respected, their successes overwhelmed by negative commentary,” he said. “The anniversary of an event that has made such a contribution to turning the tide on how crane operators in the construction industry are qualified, we feel should not pass without credit being given where it is due.”
Find numerous related resources and extensive historical information in NCCCO’s OSHA Crane Rule Resource Center.
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Important Intramolecular HOMO/LUMO Mixing
(Preview of "Conjugation" and "Resonance" Stabilization)
We know that mixing an unusually high HOMO with an unusually low LUMO can lead to bond formation between two molecules. A similar kind of interaction can make certain molecules more stable than a naive person might think they should be. This is the so-called "resonance" stabilization.
Remember our earlier discussion of the special stability of amides, a stability that we associated with our ability to draw these two more-or-less reasonable bonding pictures for this functional group. The picture on the left with complete octets and no separation of charge is expected to be a more important "resonance structure" than the one on the right, which also has complete octets but suffers from charge separation.
[Here we have included two curved arrows for bookkeeping purposes to show the source of the + charge on N, the C=N double bond, and the negative charge on oxygen in the minor resonance structure.]
Why should our inability to draw a good single "Kekulé" picture of this molecule have anything to do with its stability?
Here again is a case of "Compared to what?"
When we say that an amide is "resonance stabilized," we mean that it is more stable than we would have expected if we thought its properties would be properly predicted on the basis of the first structure alone, so that the electronic energy would be the sum of the energies expected for an unshared electron pair orbital on N, a σ and a π bonding orbital between C and O, 2 σ N-H bonding orbitals, etc.
"Resonance energy" is rather like "correlation energy." Both are fancy names for errors we made when we chose too simple a model for reality. Both are cases where, by doing what comes naturally, electrons outsmart us and find a lower-energy home than we had built for them. [One might imagine an analogy to a public redevelopment authority that constructs a utopian housing development for individuals who turn out to be able to do a better job devising their own homes.]
When we draw the structure on the left and naively suppose that it is an adequate structure, we suppose that the energy of the molecule includes the energy of an unshared pair of electrons on N. Notice however that the C atom adjacent to this N is part of an unusually low LUMO, the π* orbital of the C=O double bond. The p orbital of the C atom is a larger contributor to the antibonding π* orbital than the p orbital of the O atom (which was mostly used up in the bonding π orbital), so there is good overlap between the π*C=O orbital and the N lone pair.
In this simple picture there is an unusually low "LUMO" in position to overlap effectively with the high "HOMO" of the N atom. In truth the electron pair should not be unshared, as suggested by the single picture. It should be shared with the adjacent C=O group and be stabilized in the process. This is why the true molecule is more stable than we would have guessed on the basis of a single simple structural diagram.
Notice that this does not involve any crazy bouncing back and forth between two different positions for the electrons. It is just that the true molecular orbitals involve a more extensive sharing and stabilization than the simple picture envisions. It is crucial that there be effective overlap between the AOs of the carbon and nitrogen atoms to allow this special stabilization.
The magnitude of the resonance stabilization in the amide group is about 16 kcal/mole. This is about 1/4 as large as the energy of the C-N σ bond itself, so it is quite important. This phenomenon is particularly significant in proteins where every amino acid unit is linked to the next by an amide group.
Think of some of the other implications of this phenomenon for the properties of proteins.
GEOMETRY : Whereas most molecules have easy rotation about single bonds, rotation about the C-N bond in amides is difficult, "because" there is a partial double bond, as shown in the ionic resonance structure. The barrier to this rotation is ~16 kcal/mole (determined by nmr spectroscopy, as we'll discuss later).
Of course the real problem is that twisting about the C-N bond destroys the overlap between the unshared pair of the N and the π* vacant orbital on C, as shown in the diagram on the right. This turns off the resonance stabilization and allows us to equate the barrier to rotation with the magnitude of resonance stabilization.
A second geometric implication has to do with the bonds to N. We know that the N in NH3 is pyramidal, so that the N can use some of its s-orbital character to accommodate the unshared pair. In the amide group, this pair of N electrons spends some of its time on C=O, so there is no longer as much reason for the N to use its s-character to stabilize this pair. A planar arrangement around N allows the s character to be taken from the pair and used to form stronger σ bonds to carbon and the two hydrogens. Furthermore, the N unshared pair overlaps better with C=O when it is in a p orbital than when it is in an sp~3 hybrid.
Because there is no "twist" about the central C-N bond, and the N is sp2 hybridized, all of the six atoms in the core of the amide group (N-C=O and the three other atoms attached to C and N) lie in a common plane. This imposed rigidity has profound implications for the shape of proteins.
There are also implications for bond lengths. To the extent that nN (nitrogen's lone pair) mixes with π*C=O, the C=O bond should be weakened and lengthened, while the C-N bond should be strengthened and shortened. These changes are suggested by the ionic resonance structure for the amide. The average C=O bond length in 481 aldehydes and ketones is 1.20Å, while that in 410 amides is 1.23Å, 0.03Å longer.
The average C-N bond length in 115 amides is 1.33Å, much shorter than that the 1.47Å average of 1200 amines, but here there is a "compared to what" problem, because there is another source of shortening and strengthening for the amide - the carbon and the nitrogen atoms both use sp2 rather than sp3 hybrids in making the C-N σ bond.
Good Overlap - - - - - - - - -> Poor Overlap
REACTIVITY : The unshared pair on N, which would have been an unusually high HOMO in a normal amine, is lowered in energy, and made less reactive, by mixing with the π* LUMO of the C=O group.
At the same time the unusually low π* LUMO of the C=O group, which made it acidic, is raised in energy by mixing with the occupied p orbital of N. Thus both the basic amine group and the acidic carbonyl group are made less reactive by interacting within the amide group.
This is why it is much better to regard the amide group as a distinct functional group, than as an amine and a carbonyl group.
The reduction of reactivity makes proteins resistant to reaction. So when you take a shower, or get a little sodium hydroxide solution on your hands, you don't have to worry about your skin dissolving.
CHARGE DISTRIBUTION : Shift of the electron pair from N to C=O gives the amide group a polar character. This polarity is indicated by the gold arrow in the figure to the left (calculated by MacSpartan Plus). The + end of the arrow shows the positive end of the electrical dipole near N and the point shows the negative end near O.
[The dipole moment measured experimentally by Kurland and Wilson in 1957 is 3.71 D and is oriented at 39.6° from the C-N axis, in good agreement with the calculation. This strength of dipole moment would result from shifting 1/3 of an electron's charge from nitrogen to oxygen.]
Positive-negative attraction between the charges generated by this electron shift strengthens "hydrogen bonds" which hold the N-H portion of one amide group to the O atom of another, as shown on the far right. This kind of association is crucial to the formation of α-helices, β-sheets, and other "secondary" structures of proteins.
Usually we think about HOMO/LUMO mixing being intermolecular, and leading to reaction between two different molecules. Here we think of intramolecular "HOMO/LUMO" mixing as a correction to an oversimplified view of the energy, structure, reactivity, and electron distribution of a single molecule. Fortunately we can ignore intramolecular mixing for normal bonds and antibonds because overlap is small and energy-match is poor.
Return to HOMO/LUMO Mixing Return to Quantum Mechanics Return to Chem 125 Home Page
copyright 2001-2003 J. M. McBride
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Consultant hired to help Heinz supply chain companies
The Windsor-Essex Economic Development Corporation is hiring a consultant, to help with the impending closure of the Heinz plant.
Brian Payne is working on the supply chain companies that keep the plant operating.
Payne says "The people who supply packaging, supply bottles and cans, they're the tradesmen, the sheet metal workers the engineers, customs brokers, trucking companies, warehousing companies."
So far, Payne has identified 68 companies that are going to need some help transitioning away from Heinz as a client.
"A lot of these had 75 to 80 per cent of their business with Heinz," says Payne.
For 31 companies, which Payne will not identify, 18 have a full scale assessment of their business, including looking at their financial documents, re-designing business plans and Payne is even helping with new sales calls.
Payne has worked in this industry for 20 years and he says what is surprising about this work is the level of commitment to Leamington and Windsor-Essex displayed by the companies he's talking to.
"Are there going to be casualties? Yes, but the majority are going to make the transition. That’s what we're doing here."
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Hattiesburg American
The Clarion-Ledger
1 (currecnt)
The Clarion-Ledger | Summons
BEFORE THE MISSISSIPPI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2019-UA-107 TIPPAH EPA EA003003600 IN RE: PETITION OF TIPPAH ELECTRIC POWER ASSOCIATION FOR CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY AUTHORI...
BEFORE THE MISSISSIPPI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2019-UA-107 TIPPAH EPA EA003003600 IN RE: PETITION OF TIPPAH ELECTRIC POWER ASSOCIATION FOR CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY AUTHORIZING IT TO CONSTRUCT AN ELECTRIC SUBSTATION AT 15650 HWY 15 RIPLEY, MS 38663, IN TIPPAH COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI NOTICE Notice is hereby given that on the 1st day of July, 2019, Tippah EPA filed with the Mississippi Public Service Commission the above referenced matter. Any person desiring to participate in or receive further notice of these proceedings is required under RP 6.121 of the Commission's Public Utility Rules of Practice and Procedure to file a written petition to intervene on or before twenty (20) days from publication of this notice. This cause is returnable to the regular meeting of the Commission to be held at 10:00 A.M., Thursday, August 8, 2019, at the Mississippi Public Service Commission Hearing Room, 1st Floor, Woolfolk State Office Building, Jackson, Mississippi. If a hearing is required, the Commission, by subsequent order, will set a time and place for said hearing. This cause is subject to being set for disposition on a hearing date not less than twenty (20) days from the date of publication of this Notice. If protest, answer or other appropriate pleading is on file in response to this matter, the Commission will consider same on said hearing date. WITNESS MY HAND AND THE OFFICIAL SEAL of the Mississippi Public Service Commission, on this the 11th, day of July, 2019. Katherine Collier Executive Secretary (SEAL) 07/17/19
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Hattiesburg American | Summons
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI JUDY W. ROYALS PLAINTIFF v. CAUSE NO. 19-CV-00399-SM MYRON H. SITTON AND CLYDE ASHER, AS TRUSTEES FOR THE MARSHALL P. WALKER TRUST, THE GARTH G...
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI JUDY W. ROYALS PLAINTIFF v. CAUSE NO. 19-CV-00399-SM MYRON H. SITTON AND CLYDE ASHER, AS TRUSTEES FOR THE MARSHALL P. WALKER TRUST, THE GARTH GILCHRIST WALKER TRUST, AND THE PIERRE G. WALKER TRUST; ROBERT A. GILCHRIST AND GEORGE W. HEALY, III, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE WILLIAM G. GILCHRIST, JR. TRUST, DATED NOVEMBER 19, 1965; SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, SR., AND AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, SR., TRUST, BEARING NO. 14772; SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN LUCILE M. RUSSELL AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE EDWARD P. RUSSELL CHILDREN'S TRUST, BEARING NO. 14775; EDWARD P. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN LUCILE M. RUSSELL AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, JR., CHILDREN'S TRUST, BEARING NO. 14774; DONOVAN O. MCCOMB, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC, AS TRUSTEE UNDER A CERTAIN DEED OF TRUST FOR THE BENEFIT OF FIRST SOUTHERN BANK; FIRST SOUTHERN BANK, AS BENEFICIARY OF A CERTAIN DEED OF TRUST; AND ALL OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES HAVING OR CLAIMING ANY LEGAL OR EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THIS COMPLAINT DEFENDANTS SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI TO: Samuel I. Russell, Successor Trustee under Trust Agreement between Samuel I. Russell, Sr., and American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Samuel I. Russell, Sr., Trust, bearing No. 14772, last known address is 312 Rosery, Bellair Florida 33756 You have been made a Defendant in the suit filed in this Court by Judy W. Royals, seeking to confirm and quiet title to certain real property located in Forrest County, Mississippi, that was conveyed to her by way of a special warranty deed. The subject property described in the Complaint is as follows: That part of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25, Township 5 North, Range 14 West, Forrest County, Mississippi, being more particularly described as commencing at the Southwest corner of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 25 and run thence North and along the West line of the said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 for a distance of 30 feet to the North line of a public road to and for the Point of Beginning; from said point of beginning run thence North and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 for a distance of 605 feet; run thence North 53 degrees 50 minutes East for a distance of 158.5 feet to the Southwest right-of-way line of U.S. Highway No. 49; run thence South 36 degrees 10 minutes East and along said right-of-way for a distance of 735 feet; run thence South 53 degrees 50 minutes West along the right-of-way of said highway for a distance of 25 feet; run thence South 36 degrees 10 minutes East along the right-of-way of said highway for a distance of 111.7 feet to the North line of the aforesaid public road; and run thence Westerly and along the North line of said public road for a distance of 615.1 feet to the Point of Beginning; LESS AND EXCEPT the following: A part of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25, T5N, R14W, City of Hattiesburg, County of Forrest, State of Mississippi, and being more particularly described as commencing at the Southwest corner of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 25, thence run N 00°41'23" E and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25 for 287.5 feet to the Point of Beginning, thence continue N00°41'23" E and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25 for 349.50 feet, thence run N53°51'13" E for 158.49 feet to the West Right-of-Way line of U.S. Highway 49, thence run S 36°10'00" E and along the West Right-of-Way line of U.S. Highway 49 for 372.00 feet, thence run S 67°55'29" W for 379.55 feet to the Point of Beginning, containing 2.08 acres, more or less. Defendants other than you in this action are Myron H. Sitton and Clyde Asher, Trustees for the Marshall P. Walker Trust, the Garth Gilchrist Walker Trust, and the Pierre G. Walker Trust; Robert A. Gilchrist and George W. Healy, III, Deceased, Successor Trustees of the William G. Gilchrist, Jr. Trust, dated November 19, 1965; Samuel I. Russell, Successor Trustee under a Trust Agreement between Lucile M. Russell and The American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Edward P. Russell Children's Trust, bearing No. 14775; Edward P. Russell, Successor Trustee under a Trust Agreement between Lucile M. Russell and the American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Samuel I. Russell, Jr., Children's Trust, bearing No. 14774; Donovan O. McComb, Attorney at Law, PLLC; First Southern Bank; and other Unknown Defendants. You are required to mail or hand-deliver a copy of a written response to the Verified Complaint to Confirm and Quiet Title to Frederick N. Salvo, III, the attorney for the Plaintiff, who's address is One Eastover Center, 100 Vision Drive, Suite 400, Jackson, MS 39211. YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE MAILED OR DELIVERED NOT LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER JULY 10, 2019, WHICH IS THE DATE OF THE FIRST PUBLICATION OF THIS SUMMONS. IF YOUR RESPONSE IS NOT SO MAILED OR DELIVERED, A JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU FOR THE MONEY OR OTHER RELIEF DEMANDED IN THE COMPLAINT. You must also file the original of your response with the Clerk of this court within a reasonable time afterward. Issued under my hand and seal of said Court, this the 8th day of July, 2019. CHANCERY CLERK FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI 07/10, 07/17, 07/24/19
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI JUDY W. ROYALS PLAINTIFF v. CAUSE NO. 19-CV-00399-SM MYRON H. SITTON AND CLYDE ASHER, AS TRUSTEES FOR THE MARSHALL P. WALKER TRUST, THE GARTH GILCHRIST WALKER TRUST, AND THE PIERRE G. WALKER TRUST; ROBERT A. GILCHRIST AND GEORGE W. HEALY, III, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE WILLIAM G. GILCHRIST, JR. TRUST, DATED NOVEMBER 19, 1965; SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, SR., AND AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, SR., TRUST, BEARING NO. 14772; SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN LUCILE M. RUSSELL AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE EDWARD P. RUSSELL CHILDREN'S TRUST, BEARING NO. 14775; EDWARD P. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN LUCILE M. RUSSELL AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, JR., CHILDREN'S TRUST, BEARING NO. 14774; DONOVAN O. MCCOMB, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC, AS TRUSTEE UNDER A CERTAIN DEED OF TRUST FOR THE BENEFIT OF FIRST SOUTHERN BANK; FIRST SOUTHERN BANK, AS BENEFICIARY OF A CERTAIN DEED OF TRUST; AND ALL OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES HAVING OR CLAIMING ANY LEGAL OR EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THIS COMPLAINT DEFENDANTS SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI TO: Edward P. Russell, Successor Trustee under a Trust Agreement between Lucile M. Russell and the American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Samuel I. Russell, Jr., Children's Trust, bearing No. 14774, last known address is Thunderbird Country Club, Box Y, Rancho Mirage, California 92270 You have been made a Defendant in the suit filed in this Court by Judy W. Royals, seeking to confirm and quiet title to certain real property located in Forrest County, Mississippi, that was conveyed to her by way of a special warranty deed. The subject property described in the Complaint is as follows: That part of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25, Township 5 North, Range 14 West, Forrest County, Mississippi, being more particularly described as commencing at the Southwest corner of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 25 and run thence North and along the West line of the said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 for a distance of 30 feet to the North line of a public road to and for the Point of Beginning; from said point of beginning run thence North and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 for a distance of 605 feet; run thence North 53 degrees 50 minutes East for a distance of 158.5 feet to the Southwest right-of-way line of U.S. Highway No. 49; run thence South 36 degrees 10 minutes East and along said right-of-way for a distance of 735 feet; run thence South 53 degrees 50 minutes West along the right-of-way of said highway for a distance of 25 feet; run thence South 36 degrees 10 minutes East along the right-of-way of said highway for a distance of 111.7 feet to the North line of the aforesaid public road; and run thence Westerly and along the North line of said public road for a distance of 615.1 feet to the Point of Beginning; LESS AND EXCEPT the following: A part of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25, T5N, R14W, City of Hattiesburg, County of Forrest, State of Mississippi, and being more particularly described as commencing at the Southwest corner of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 25, thence run N 00°41'23" E and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25 for 287.5 feet to the Point of Beginning, thence continue N00°41'23" E and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25 for 349.50 feet, thence run N53°51'13" E for 158.49 feet to the West Right-of-Way line of U.S. Highway 49, thence run S 36°10'00" E and along the West Right-of-Way line of U.S. Highway 49 for 372.00 feet, thence run S 67°55'29" W for 379.55 feet to the Point of Beginning, containing 2.08 acres, more or less. Defendants other than you in this action are Myron H. Sitton and Clyde Asher, Trustees for the Marshall P. Walker Trust, the Garth Gilchrist Walker Trust, and the Pierre G. Walker Trust; Robert A. Gilchrist and George W. Healy, III, Deceased, Successor Trustees of the William G. Gilchrist, Jr. Trust, dated November 19, 1965; Samuel I. Russell, Successor Trustee under Trust Agreement between Samuel I. Russell, Sr., and American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Samuel I. Russell, Sr., Trust, bearing No. 14772; Samuel I. Russell, Successor Trustee under a Trust Agreement between Lucile M. Russell and The American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Edward P. Russell Children's Trust, bearing No. 14775; Donovan O. McComb, Attorney at Law, PLLC; First Southern Bank; and other Unknown Defendants. You are required to mail or hand-deliver a copy of a written response to the Verified Complaint to Confirm and Quiet Title to Frederick N. Salvo, III, the attorney for the Plaintiff, who's address is One Eastover Center, 100 Vision Drive, Suite 400, Jackson, MS 39211. YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE MAILED OR DELIVERED NOT LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER JULY 10, 2019, WHICH IS THE DATE OF THE FIRST PUBLICATION OF THIS SUMMONS. IF YOUR RESPONSE IS NOT SO MAILED OR DELIVERED, A JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU FOR THE MONEY OR OTHER RELIEF DEMANDED IN THE COMPLAINT. You must also file the original of your response with the Clerk of this court within a reasonable time afterward. Issued under my hand and seal of said Court, this the 8TH day of July, 2019. CHANCERY CLERK FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI 07/10, 07/17, 07/24/19
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI JUDY W. ROYALS PLAINTIFF v. CAUSE NO. 19-CV-00399-SM MYRON H. SITTON AND CLYDE ASHER, AS TRUSTEES FOR THE MARSHALL P. WALKER TRUST, THE GARTH GILCHRIST WALKER TRUST, AND THE PIERRE G. WALKER TRUST; ROBERT A. GILCHRIST AND GEORGE W. HEALY, III, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE WILLIAM G. GILCHRIST, JR. TRUST, DATED NOVEMBER 19, 1965; SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, SR., AND AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, SR., TRUST, BEARING NO. 14772; SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN LUCILE M. RUSSELL AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE EDWARD P. RUSSELL CHILDREN'S TRUST, BEARING NO. 14775; EDWARD P. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN LUCILE M. RUSSELL AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, JR., CHILDREN'S TRUST, BEARING NO. 14774; DONOVAN O. MCCOMB, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC, AS TRUSTEE UNDER A CERTAIN DEED OF TRUST FOR THE BENEFIT OF FIRST SOUTHERN BANK; FIRST SOUTHERN BANK, AS BENEFICIARY OF A CERTAIN DEED OF TRUST; AND ALL OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES HAVING OR CLAIMING ANY LEGAL OR EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THIS COMPLAINT DEFENDANTS SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI TO: All other persons or entities having or claiming any legal or equitable interest in the following described land, viz: That part of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25, Township 5 North, Range 14 West, Forrest County, Mississippi, being more particularly described as commencing at the Southwest corner of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 25 and run thence North and along the West line of the said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 for a distance of 30 feet to the North line of a public road to and for the Point of Beginning; from said point of beginning run thence North and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 for a distance of 605 feet; run thence North 53 degrees 50 minutes East for a distance of 158.5 feet to the Southwest right-of-way line of U.S. Highway No. 49; run thence South 36 degrees 10 minutes East and along said right-of-way for a distance of 735 feet; run thence South 53 degrees 50 minutes West along the right-of-way of said highway for a distance of 25 feet; run thence South 36 degrees 10 minutes East along the right-of-way of said highway for a distance of 111.7 feet to the North line of the aforesaid public road; and run thence Westerly and along the North line of said public road for a distance of 615.1 feet to the Point of Beginning; LESS AND EXCEPT the following: A part of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25, T5N, R14W, City of Hattiesburg, County of Forrest, State of Mississippi, and being more particularly described as commencing at the Southwest corner of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 25, thence run N 00°41'23" E and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25 for 287.5 feet to the Point of Beginning, thence continue N00°41'23" E and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25 for 349.50 feet, thence run N53°51'13" E for 158.49 feet to the West Right-of-Way line of U.S. Highway 49, thence run S 36°10'00" E and along the West Right-of-Way line of U.S. Highway 49 for 372.00 feet, thence run S 67°55'29" W for 379.55 feet to the Point of Beginning, containing 2.08 acres, more or less. You have been made a Defendant in the suit filed in this Court by Judy W. Royals, seeking to confirm and quiet title to certain real property located in Forrest County, Mississippi, that was conveyed to her by way of a special warranty deed. Defendants other than you in this action are Myron H. Sitton and Clyde Asher, Trustees for the Marshall P. Walker Trust, the Garth Gilchrist Walker Trust, and the Pierre G. Walker Trust; Robert A. Gilchrist and George W. Healy, III, Deceased, Successor Trustees of the William G. Gilchrist, Jr. Trust, dated November 19, 1965; Samuel I. Russell, Successor Trustee under a Trust Agreement between Samuel I. Russell, Sr., and American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Samuel I. Russell, Sr., Trust, bearing No. 14772; Samuel I. Russell, Successor Trustee under aTrust Agreement between Lucile M. Russell and The American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Edward P. Russell Children's Trust, bearing No. 14775; Edward P. Russell, Successor Trustee under a Trust Agreement between Lucile M. Russell and the American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Samuel I. Russell, Jr., Children's Trust, bearing No. 14774; Donovan O. McComb, Attorney at Law, PLLC; First Southern Bank; and other Unknown Defendants. You are required to mail or hand-deliver a copy of a written response to the Verified Complaint to Confirm and Quiet Title to Frederick N. Salvo, III, the attorney for the Plaintiff, who's address is One Eastover Center, 100 Vision Drive, Suite 400, Jackson, MS 39211. YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE MAILED OR DELIVERED NOT LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER JULY 10, 2019, WHICH IS THE DATE OF THE FIRST PUBLICATION OF THIS SUMMONS. IF YOUR RESPONSE IS NOT SO MAILED OR DELIVERED, A JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU FOR THE MONEY OR OTHER RELIEF DEMANDED IN THE COMPLAINT. You must also file the original of your response with the Clerk of this court within a reasonable time afterward. Issued under my hand and seal of said Court, this the 8th day of July, 2019. CHANCERY CLERK FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI 07/10, 07/17, 07/24/19
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI JUDY W. ROYALS PLAINTIFF v. CAUSE NO. 19-CV-00399-SM MYRON H. SITTON AND CLYDE ASHER, AS TRUSTEES FOR THE MARSHALL P. WALKER TRUST, THE GARTH GILCHRIST WALKER TRUST, AND THE PIERRE G. WALKER TRUST; ROBERT A. GILCHRIST AND GEORGE W. HEALY, III, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE WILLIAM G. GILCHRIST, JR. TRUST, DATED NOVEMBER 19, 1965; SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, SR., AND AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, SR., TRUST, BEARING NO. 14772; SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN LUCILE M. RUSSELL AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE EDWARD P. RUSSELL CHILDREN'S TRUST, BEARING NO. 14775; EDWARD P. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN LUCILE M. RUSSELL AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, JR., CHILDREN'S TRUST, BEARING NO. 14774; DONOVAN O. MCCOMB, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC, AS TRUSTEE UNDER A CERTAIN DEED OF TRUST FOR THE BENEFIT OF FIRST SOUTHERN BANK; FIRST SOUTHERN BANK, AS BENEFICIARY OF A CERTAIN DEED OF TRUST; AND ALL OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES HAVING OR CLAIMING ANY LEGAL OR EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THIS COMPLAINT DEFENDANTS SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI TO: Samuel I. Russell, Successor Trustee under a Trust Agreement between Lucile M. Russell and The American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Edward P. Russell Children's Trust, bearing No. 14775, last known address is 312 Rosery, Bellair Florida 33756 You have been made a Defendant in the suit filed in this Court by Judy W. Royals, seeking to confirm and quiet title to certain real property located in Forrest County, Mississippi, that was conveyed to her by way of a special warranty deed. The subject property described in the Complaint is as follows: That part of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25, Township 5 North, Range 14 West, Forrest County, Mississippi, being more particularly described as commencing at the Southwest corner of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 25 and run thence North and along the West line of the said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 for a distance of 30 feet to the North line of a public road to and for the Point of Beginning; from said point of beginning run thence North and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 for a distance of 605 feet; run thence North 53 degrees 50 minutes East for a distance of 158.5 feet to the Southwest right-of-way line of U.S. Highway No. 49; run thence South 36 degrees 10 minutes East and along said right-of-way for a distance of 735 feet; run thence South 53 degrees 50 minutes West along the right-of-way of said highway for a distance of 25 feet; run thence South 36 degrees 10 minutes East along the right-of-way of said highway for a distance of 111.7 feet to the North line of the aforesaid public road; and run thence Westerly and along the North line of said public road for a distance of 615.1 feet to the Point of Beginning; LESS AND EXCEPT the following: A part of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25, T5N, R14W, City of Hattiesburg, County of Forrest, State of Mississippi, and being more particularly described as commencing at the Southwest corner of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 25, thence run N 00°41'23" E and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25 for 287.5 feet to the Point of Beginning, thence continue N00°41'23" E and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25 for 349.50 feet, thence run N53°51'13" E for 158.49 feet to the West Right-of-Way line of U.S. Highway 49, thence run S 36°10'00" E and along the West Right-of-Way line of U.S. Highway 49 for 372.00 feet, thence run S 67°55'29" W for 379.55 feet to the Point of Beginning, containing 2.08 acres, more or less. Defendants other than you in this action are Myron H. Sitton and Clyde Asher, Trustees for the Marshall P. Walker Trust, the Garth Gilchrist Walker Trust, and the Pierre G. Walker Trust; Robert A. Gilchrist and George W. Healy, III, Deceased, Successor Trustees of the William G. Gilchrist, Jr. Trust, dated November 19, 1965; Samuel I. Russell, Successor Trustee under Trust Agreement between Samuel I. Russell, Sr., and American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Samuel I. Russell, Sr., Trust, bearing No. 14772; Edward P. Russell, Successor Trustee under a Trust Agreement between Lucile M. Russell and the American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Samuel I. Russell, Jr., Children's Trust, bearing No. 14774; Donovan O. McComb, Attorney at Law, PLLC; First Southern Bank; and other Unknown Defendants. You are required to mail or hand-deliver a copy of a written response to the Verified Complaint to Confirm and Quiet Title to Frederick N. Salvo, III, the attorney for the Plaintiff, who's address is One Eastover Center, 100 Vision Drive, Suite 400, Jackson, MS 39211. YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE MAILED OR DELIVERED NOT LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER JULY 10, 2019, WHICH IS THE DATE OF THE FIRST PUBLICATION OF THIS SUMMONS. IF YOUR RESPONSE IS NOT SO MAILED OR DELIVERED, A JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU FOR THE MONEY OR OTHER RELIEF DEMANDED IN THE COMPLAINT. You must also file the original of your response with the Clerk of this court within a reasonable time afterward. Issued under my hand and seal of said Court, this the 8th day of July, 2019. CHANCERY CLERK FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI 07/10, 07/17, 07/24/19
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI JUDY W. ROYALS PLAINTIFF v. CAUSE NO. 19-CV-00399-SM MYRON H. SITTON AND CLYDE ASHER, AS TRUSTEES FOR THE MARSHALL P. WALKER TRUST, THE GARTH GILCHRIST WALKER TRUST, AND THE PIERRE G. WALKER TRUST; ROBERT A. GILCHRIST AND GEORGE W. HEALY, III, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE WILLIAM G. GILCHRIST, JR. TRUST, DATED NOVEMBER 19, 1965; SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, SR., AND AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, SR., TRUST, BEARING NO. 14772; SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN LUCILE M. RUSSELL AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE EDWARD P. RUSSELL CHILDREN'S TRUST, BEARING NO. 14775; EDWARD P. RUSSELL, AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER A TRUST AGREEMENT BETWEEN LUCILE M. RUSSELL AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, DATED AUGUST 3, 1959, AND KNOWN AS THE SAMUEL I. RUSSELL, JR., CHILDREN'S TRUST, BEARING NO. 14774; DONOVAN O. MCCOMB, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC, AS TRUSTEE UNDER A CERTAIN DEED OF TRUST FOR THE BENEFIT OF FIRST SOUTHERN BANK; FIRST SOUTHERN BANK, AS BENEFICIARY OF A CERTAIN DEED OF TRUST; AND ALL OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES HAVING OR CLAIMING ANY LEGAL OR EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THIS COMPLAINT DEFENDANTS SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI TO: Clyde Asher, Trustee for the Marshall P. Walker Trust, the Garth Gilchrist Walker Trust, and the Pierre G. Walker Trust, last known address unknown You have been made a Defendant in the suit filed in this Court by Judy W. Royals, seeking to confirm and quiet title to certain real property located in Forrest County, Mississippi, that was conveyed to her by way of a special warranty deed. The subject property described in the Complaint is as follows: That part of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25, Township 5 North, Range 14 West, Forrest County, Mississippi, being more particularly described as commencing at the Southwest corner of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 25 and run thence North and along the West line of the said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 for a distance of 30 feet to the North line of a public road to and for the Point of Beginning; from said point of beginning run thence North and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 for a distance of 605 feet; run thence North 53 degrees 50 minutes East for a distance of 158.5 feet to the Southwest right-of-way line of U.S. Highway No. 49; run thence South 36 degrees 10 minutes East and along said right-of-way for a distance of 735 feet; run thence South 53 degrees 50 minutes West along the right-of-way of said highway for a distance of 25 feet; run thence South 36 degrees 10 minutes East along the right-of-way of said highway for a distance of 111.7 feet to the North line of the aforesaid public road; and run thence Westerly and along the North line of said public road for a distance of 615.1 feet to the Point of Beginning; LESS AND EXCEPT the following: A part of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25, T5N, R14W, City of Hattiesburg, County of Forrest, State of Mississippi, and being more particularly described as commencing at the Southwest corner of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 25, thence run N 00°41'23" E and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25 for 287.5 feet to the Point of Beginning, thence continue N00°41'23" E and along the West line of said NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 25 for 349.50 feet, thence run N53°51'13" E for 158.49 feet to the West Right-of-Way line of U.S. Highway 49, thence run S 36°10'00" E and along the West Right-of-Way line of U.S. Highway 49 for 372.00 feet, thence run S 67°55'29" W for 379.55 feet to the Point of Beginning, containing 2.08 acres, more or less. Defendants other than you in this action are Myron H. Sitton, Trustee for the Marshall P. Walker Trust, the Garth Gilchrist Walker Trust, and the Pierre G. Walker Trust; Robert A. Gilchrist and George W. Healy, III, Deceased, Successor Trustees of the William G. Gilchrist, Jr. Trust, dated November 19, 1965; Samuel I. Russell, Successor Trustee under a Trust Agreement between Samuel I. Russell, Sr., and American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Samuel I. Russell, Sr., Trust, bearing No. 14772; Samuel I. Russell, Successor Trustee under aTrust Agreement between Lucile M. Russell and The American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Edward P. Russell Children's Trust, bearing No. 14775; Edward P. Russell, Successor Trustee under a Trust Agreement between Lucile M. Russell and the American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, dated August 3, 1959, and known as the Samuel I. Russell, Jr., Children's Trust, bearing No. 14774; Donovan O. McComb, Attorney at Law, PLLC; First Southern Bank; and other Unknown Defendants. You are required to mail or hand-deliver a copy of a written response to the Verified Complaint to Confirm and Quiet Title to Frederick N. Salvo, III, the attorney for the Plaintiff, who's address is One Eastover Center, 100 Vision Drive, Suite 400, Jackson, MS 39211. YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE MAILED OR DELIVERED NOT LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER JULY 10, 2019, WHICH IS THE DATE OF THE FIRST PUBLICATION OF THIS SUMMONS. IF YOUR RESPONSE IS NOT SO MAILED OR DELIVERED, A JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU FOR THE MONEY OR OTHER RELIEF DEMANDED IN THE COMPLAINT. You must also file the original of your response with the Clerk of this court within a reasonable time afterward. Issued under my hand and seal of said Court, this the 8th day of July, 2019. CHANCERY CLERK FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI 07/10, 07/17, 07/24/19
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MAE ETHEL TAYLOR, DECEASED CAUSE NO: 2019-164 SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION STATE OF MISSISSI...
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MAE ETHEL TAYLOR, DECEASED CAUSE NO: 2019-164 SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION STATE OF MISSISSIPPI COUNTY OF HINDS TO: TO ANY AND ALL KNOWN OR UNKNOWN HEIRS AT LAW OF MAE ETHEL TAYLOR, DECEASED, WHOSE NAMES, POST OFFICE AND STREET ADDRESSES ARE UNKNOWN AFTER DILIGENT SEARCH AND INQUIRY: You have been made a Respondent in the Chancery Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, by Ezra Taylor, Petitioner, Administrator of the Estate of Mae Ethel Taylor, Deceased, seeking a determination of the heirs-at-law of Mae Ethel Taylor, Deceased. You are summoned to appear and defend against the Petition to Determine Heirs filed against you in this action at 9:00 o'clock A.M. on August 5, 2019, in the courtroom of the Honorable Tiffany Grove, Chancellor in the Chancery Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, located Jackson, Mississippi, to show cause, if any, why the relief sought in said Petition should not be granted by the Court. Failure to appear at the time and place mentioned herein may result in a judgment against you for the relief demanded in said Petition. You are not required to file an answer or other pleading, but you may do so if you wish. ISSUED UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF SAID COURT, this, the 8th day of July, 2019. DEREK L. HALL, PC EDDIE JEAN CARR, CLERK 1911 Dunbarton Drive HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Jackson, Mississippi 39216 Phone: (601) 202-2222 Fax: (601) 981-4717 Attorney for Petitioner By:__________________________________ D.C. 07/10, 07/17, 07/24/19
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF MADISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION BY ANTHONY AND CASSUNDRA JOHNSON OF THE MINOR CHILD, NAMED IN THE PETITION CAUSE NO. 2019-446B RULE 81 SUMMO...
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF MADISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION BY ANTHONY AND CASSUNDRA JOHNSON OF THE MINOR CHILD, NAMED IN THE PETITION CAUSE NO. 2019-446B RULE 81 SUMMONS THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI TO: ANY UNKNOWN PUTATIVE FATHER You have been made a Defendant in the suit filed in this Court by Anthony and Cassundra Johnson on the Amended Petition for Adoption of the minor child of Sabrina Harris. You are summoned to appear and defend against the Petition filed against you in this action at 8:30 a.m. on the 29th of July, 2019 in the Chancery Courtroom of the Madison County Courthouse in Canton, Mississippi, and in case of your failure to appear and defend a judgment will be entered against you for the money or other things demanded in the Petition. You are not required to file an answer or other pleading but you may do so if you so desire. Issued under my hand and seal of said Court, this 26 day of June, 2019. /s/ RONNY LOTT, CHANCERY CLERK OF MADISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI /s/ By: Kim Siebers, D.C, 07/12, 07/19, 07/26/2019
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: KEITH A. BROWN, SR., DECEASED MARION D. BROWN, PETITIONER CIVIL ACTION NO. P-2019- ...
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: KEITH A. BROWN, SR., DECEASED MARION D. BROWN, PETITIONER CIVIL ACTION NO. P-2019- 123 T/1 SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI TO: Marion D. Brown, Keith A. Brown, Jr., Lamario Youngblood, and the Unknown Heirs at Law of Keith A. Brown, Sr., deceased, whose name, residence, whereabouts, post office addresses, and street addresses are unknown to the Petitioner after diligent search and inquiry to ascertain same. You have been made a Respondent in the suit filed in this Court by MARION D. BROWN, petitioner, seeking a determination of heirs-at-law of KEITH A. BROWN, SR., deceased. You are summoned to appear and defend against the petition filed against you in this action at 9:00 o'clock a.m. on Monday, August 12, 2019, in the Chancery Court Chambers of the Hinds County Courthouse in Jackson, Mississippi, Honorable Dewayne Thomas presiding, and in case of your failure to appear and defend a judgment will be entered against you for the things demanded in the petition. You are not required to file an answer or other. Pleading, but you may do so if you desire. Issued under my hand and the seal of said Court, this the day of July, 2019. EDDIE JEAN CARR CLERK OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI 7/12, 7/19, 7/26/2019
IN THE COUNTY COURT OF HINDS COUNTY STATE OF MISSISSIPPI U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY AS TRUSTEE FOR THE RMAC TRUST, SERIES 2016-CTT PLAINTIFF VS. NO...
IN THE COUNTY COURT OF HINDS COUNTY STATE OF MISSISSIPPI U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY AS TRUSTEE FOR THE RMAC TRUST, SERIES 2016-CTT PLAINTIFF VS. NO. 19-2054 FITZGERALD STEELE; AND THE UNKNOWN OCCUPANTS OF 126 Marshall Drive, Jackson, MS 39212 DEFENDANTS SUMMONS THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI TO: Fitzgerald Steele and The Unknown Occupants of 126 Marshall Drive, Jackson, MS 39212 You have been made a Defendant in the suit filed in this Court by U.S. Bank National Association, not in its Individual capacity but solely as Trustee for the RMAC Trust, Series 2016-CTT, Plaintiff, seeking possession of property at 126 Marshall Drive, Jackson, MS 39212. Defendants other than you in this action are none. You are summoned to appear and defend against the Complaint or Petition filed against you in this action at 9:30 o'clock A.M. on the 5th day of September, 2019, before Judge Cooper Stokes, in the courtroom of the Hinds County Courthouse in Jackson, Mississippi, and in case of your failure to appear and defend a judgment will be entered against you for the money or other things demanded in the Complaint or Petition. You are not required to file an answer or other pleading but you may do so if you desire. At the hearing, a judge will determine if the landlord is granted exclusive possession of the premises. If the Judge grants possession of the premises to the landlord and you do not remove your personal property, including any manufactured home, from the premises before the date and time ordered by the Judge, then the landlord may dispose of your personal property without any further legal action. Hinds County Court Clerk 407 East Pascagoula Street Jackson, MS 39205 07/13, 07/20, 07/27/2019
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A glimpse at EU member states’ guidelines for the Brexit negotiations
Published on Open Europe's blog
Dutch daily De Volkskrant has more on the long-awaited 'guidelines' that will determine the position of the 27 remaining EU member states in the upcoming Brexit negotiations. Open Europe's Pieter Cleppe provides a summary of the revelations.
The document only contains ten pages and would only have been seen by six people, including European Council President Donald Tusk and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. De Volkskrant is reporting about its content on the basis of information provided by “some who were involved” in its preparation.
The guidelines have been drafted during the last nine months by the head of the Council’s Brexit task force, Belgian diplomat Didier Seeuws. He used to be both the chef de cabinet of Herman Van Rompuy (when he was European Council president) and the spokesman of the European Parliament’s Brexit ‘point man’ Guy Verhofstadt (when he was Belgian Prime Minister).
Chapter 1 – “Access to the internal market requires the acceptation of the EU’s four freedoms”
The first chapter of the guidelines is reportedly quite general, and insists that the EU-27 are united and that access to the internal market requires acceptance of the ‘four freedoms’, including freedom of movement of workers.
Chapter 2 – Principles regarding the exit
The second chapter deals with the principles preferred by the EU-27 for the “exit” negotiations. First of all, the EU-27 reportedly want the 3 million EU citizens who are currently in the UK to be able to stay, keep their jobs and right to health care. In return, they would be prepared to guarantee the same for the approximately one million Britons who reside in the EU.
Secondly, the chapter deals with the UK’s “liabilities” or “exit bill”. According to De Volkskrant, the guidelines won’t mention the €60 billion figure which the EU Commission has floated. The idea would be to negotiate a calculation method. The newspaper mentions that this part is a technical and legal minefield, given the challenge of how to calculate future pension liabilities of EU officials as well as the value of the EU’s assets, to which the UK has contributed.
One particular challenge results from former Prime Minister David Cameron’s efforts to cut the EU’s 2014-2020 budget. This resulted in a compromise by which EU “payments” are being cut for the first few years, while – in return – higher “commitments” were agreed for the future. As a result of this, the situation will arise that the EU Commission will be promising money during the time that the UK is still a member which member states would only need to effectively pay for after Brexit.
Furthermore, as the UK would no longer recognise the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as the arbiter to sort disputes related to the exit negotiations, the International Court of Justice in The Hague may fulfill this role – or at least some are suggesting that it should.
Chapter 3 – Principles regarding Britain’s trade status after its exit
The third chapter deals with the UK’s status after Brexit. Here, the proposed EU-27 guidelines would insist that EU membership should be rewarding, meaning that the UK should lose some of its trade “benefits”.
This of course assumes that a benefit for the UK isn’t a benefit for the EU-27, indicating that the EU – or at least those who drafted the guidelines – consider trade really to be a zero-sum game. Little consideration is made for EU-27 consumers facing higher hurdles when trying to tap into capital from the City of London or UK consumers facing more expensive German cars or less choice in European wine.
Chapter 4 – “Loyal cooperation” as the guiding principle of the negotiations
The fourth and final chapter discusses the principles of the negotiations itself, with “loyal cooperation” being pushed forward as the key principle.
More about the negotiations
The article reveals that EU leaders will need to decide if they’ll start with the talks about the separation act and trade relation simultaneously or whether they’ll prioritise the former, suggesting that there may be some sympathy for the UK government’s stance that things should be discussed in parallel. Let’s hope that this line will indeed prevail. Not only is trade access to the UK also very important for a number of EU member states so it’s better not to lose time, the EU may well manage to convince the UK to pay a bit more if this is linked to trade access. Interestingly, the newspaper mentions that a third option is being considered, which is to start negotiating on everything with the caveat that there can’t be a deal on any issue related to trade before there is a deal on the exit-aspect of that issue.
When the 27 EU leaders approve the mandate at 29 April, it’s reportedly expected they’ll have some discussions on the calculation method for the exit bill and on whether negotiations on exit and on whether Britain’s trade status after the exit should be conducted in parallel. After that, the EU Commission’s Brexit team, led by former French EU Commissioner Michel Barnier, will further develop their “directives” to negotiate in detail and then receive approval for that as well. That apparently shouldn’t take a lot of time, as the guidelines would have been prepared in close coordination with Juncker and Barnier in the first place.
Barnier and his deputy, German EU Commission official Sabine Weyand, have now visited all 27 member states and would be ready with the registration of all sensitivities and possible division points among the 27. Barnier himself is keen to start the negotiations already in May, aiming to conclude them in autumn 2018, so member states and the European Parliament can approve the separation act before the European Parliament elections of May 2019.
Another recent blog comment on Brexit can be found here.
The EU could learn from Dutch PM Mark Rutte on how to stop the populist tide
Published on CNN, Czech newssite eurozpravy.cz and Open Europe's blog
Just because Geert Wilders’ Party of Freedom failed to win as many votes as predicted in the Dutch elections, it doesn’t mean wider discontent in both the Netherlands and across Europe has disappeared.
We shouldn’t forget that during his campaign, Wilders didn’t even try to moderate himself – unlike Marine Le Pen, leader of the French National Front, for example. In February, Wilders called Moroccan immigrants “scum,” despite only two months earlier having been convicted of inciting discrimination against the very same group. His style may have lost him the votes of people who thought he was too extreme. But it is possible that this was part of a deliberate strategy by Wilders to influence the policy discourse of the opposition. To a certain extent, he’s been successful at that.
Not only was there Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s firm stance on immigration during the campaign – in January he wrote an open letter to immigrants, saying those who did not “behave normally should go away” – but also Rutte’s confrontation with NATO ally Turkey in the days before the vote. The Turkish Foreign Minister was banned from entering the country and Turkey’s family affairs minister deported, according to Turkish media, after being told she was not welcome to give a talk at the Turkish Consulate-General in Rotterdam. His use of the term “normal” is questionable from a civil liberties perspective, but Rutte’s Turkey-stance was broadly supported across the political spectrum. International law also allows host nations to declare a particular member of the diplomatic staff to be persona non grata at any time, without providing a reason. However, without Wilders, the Dutch government may not have gone so far.
The other two traditional mainstream parties in the Netherlands – the Christian Democrats and Labour – have also adopted a more critical stance towards the EU. As a result of this, it will be hard to get the Dutch government to agree to shift more powers to the European Union. This could create fresh tensions, as the new coalition is unlikely to become more Eurosceptic: The centrist D66 and maybe even the Green Left, who’re both in favor of more transfers of powers to the EU, stand a good chance of entering government together with the Christian Democrats and Rutte’s more Eurosceptic, center-right VVD.
The popularity of the anti-establishment forces in the Netherlands can be explained by more than just excessive intervention in domestic affairs by the European Union and the opposition to political globalization – which should be firmly distinguished from economic globalization. Also crucial were uncontrolled mass immigration, lack of integration of existing minorities and Islamist terrorism, while the Dutch welfare state is struggling to cope with an aging population. Technological disruption has also gotten people used to the idea of the status quo being upset in many ways, so even in a country with pretty decent economic performance – achieved after the implementation of austerity measures – many are keen to challenge the system.
The European Union could take a lesson from Rutte about how to stop the populist tide and take the concerns of the disgruntled more seriously. It could become more modest and focus on what it’s good at: scrapping trade barriers. As long as it thinks it will win the hearts and minds of people by concentrating ever more power and money at the central level or micromanaging national and local issues, it’s bound to fuel the anti-establishment brigade.
What a Wilders victory would mean for the European Union
Published on IB Times
It’s widely expected that Dutch right-wing populist Geert Wilders is unlikely to enter government in the Netherlands, when it elects a new Lower House on Wednesday. Mainstream political parties are simply planning to form a government with as many parties as needed just to keep him out. However, what would happen if he would somehow manage to rise to power after all?
Then, the first concern wouldn’t be Dutch membership of the European Union. It would be Dutch membership of the Eurozone. Wilders has said that "If I become prime minister, there will be a referendum in the Netherlands on leaving the European Union”, specifying that “We want be in charge of our own country, our own money, our own borders, and our own immigration policy."
As destabilizing a Dutch EU exit may be, the likely thing is that markets would focus on a possible Dutch exit from the monetary part of the EU club.
It has emerged that in early 2012, at the height of the euro crisis, both the Dutch and German governments had emergency plans for a return to their national currencies. The details have never been disclosed, but it’s obvious that a bank holiday and capital controls would be implemented during the transition stage, which may take a few years. Who would keep their savings in Dutch banks in the run up to the referendum? A bank run would be a real risk, which on its turn would also make it less likely that people would vote to get rid of the euro. It may actually be a good idea for the Netherlands to exit the euro, given how taxpayers, importers, consumers and savers would gain much more than the advantage an undervalued currency represents for exporters, but due to the unstable transition stage, even a country where deposits may go up in value if it were to exit the euro may decide not to do so.
Would a Dutch euro-exit lead to other countries leaving? Possibly. Finland would be a candidate, pursing “Fixit”, but also Germany, the eurozone’s paymaster, may do so. Countries who would see their new currency depreciate against the euro are less likely to exit as a lot of their debt would then still need to be settled in euros, making a default more likely. Still, the precedent would make markets more convinced that an exit of a weak Eurozone member state could be a serious option, so a Dutch euro exit would accelerate the end of the euro.
What about Dutch EU-membership? On the one hand, there is a much stronger consensus that the EU is a good thing for the Netherlands than there is about the euro. On the other, it’s probably much easier for the Netherlands to leave the EU, as costly as it may be, than to leave the euro. A “Nexit” is currently not enjoying support in opinion polls, but the difference between “remainers” and “leavers” is only a few percentage points in some polls. Also, well-known pollster Maurice de Hond has pointedout that EU opponents could win a referendum if the turnout among Nexit supporters would be higher than expected.
Even if the Netherlands would somehow remain a member of the Eurozone while leaving the EU, this would be a massive blow to the EU project. Not only was the Netherlands one of the six founding members of the project in 1960, it’s also a member of the EU’s predecessor, the Benelux Customs Union, which was agreed in 1944.
In all likelihood, a Dutch exit from the EU would cause a fundamental rethink of European cooperation. If a new alternative arrangement would be created, it would have the following two features.
First of all, it wouldn’t be as intrusive as the EU has been at times, with its overregulation, fiscal transfers, national budget supervision and measures imposing mandatory quotas to accept asylum seekers.
Secondly, it wouldn’t have as many member states, as especially Bulgarian and Romanian EU-accession are seen as a mistake by many Dutch. This is also why the Dutch government is blocking accession to the passport-free Schengenzone for them.
According to a Pew poll, a majority in EU member states wants to return powers from the EU back to national capitals. In the public discourse, the European Union rarely gets criticized for making it easier to buy or sell products or services across borders. Typically, when it is under fire, it’s because some are annoyed about freedom of movement of people. It’s hard to imagine that if the EU were to be refounded in some modified form, monopolies for airlines would be restored. Imagine the public outcry. On the contrary, the “new EU” may not include a number of Balkan countries, something that may make them more unstable, while also freedom of movement may face more restrictions. In any case, especially in the age of e-commerce, if the EU wants to become more popular again, it should focus on its core task where it still enjoys trust: removing national barriers to trade.
Four things you need to know about the Dutch elections
Comment published on Open Europe's blog and The Daily Telegraph
1. Right-wing populist Geert Wilders is very unlikely to enter government
Despite leading opinion polls for more than a year now, right-wing populist firebrand Geert Wilders isn’t likely to enter government or even prop up a minority government, as he did between 2010 and 2012.
Unlike France’s Marine Le Pen, Wilders hasn’t been attempting to moderate himself. Le Pen is no longer a proponent of just giving up the euro like that, but wants to organize a referendum on the issue, as part of an overall vote on EU membership and after negotiations with other European countries.
Wilders on the contrary is clear: he wants to take his country out of the EU and out of the Eurozone. His full programme for government is written on exactly one single page. Only his Party for Freedom refused to allow the Dutch Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis to calculate the economic effects of their proposals. Wilders also didn’t want to take part in a number of TV panel debates, in a further sign of unwillingness to engage with opponents.
In 2012, Wilders torpedoed the then minority government, because of his opposition to spending cuts. Since then he’s become more radical than ever, leading his supporters into chants demanding “fewer Moroccans” in 2014, while recently calling “a large part” of Dutch Moroccans “criminals”. Last December, he was convicted without facing punishment for those comments, something that seems to have boosted his popularity for a while. Recent opinion polls, however, indicate that he’s losing support and Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s centre-right VVD party may now even overtake his party and become the biggest again.
Wilders has stated that he would never form a government with the VVD as long as Rutte is its leader. Rutte has responded that there is “zero chance” that his party would manage to close a coalition deal with Wilders, given their policy differences. Rutte has, however, stopped short of excluding Wilder’s party on principle, while VVD faction leader Halbe Zijlstra denied that his faction would agree a deal with Wilders even without Rutte. Zijlstra stated that Wilders “is now economically to the left of the Socialist Party and wants to end certain liberties for certain groups”.
In any case, Rutte’s top priority is to make sure his party is bigger than Wilders’ Party for Freedom. The biggest party is traditionally given a prominent role in coalition talks, so coming first would avoid even having to go through a round of talks with Wilders. Yet there is a precedent for excluding the biggest party from government – in 1977 the social democrats then the biggest party were excluded from government. According to an opinion poll in November by prominent pollster Maurice de Hond, 60% of Dutch thinks Wilders’ party needs to be welcomed in government if it becomes the biggest party, indicating that keeping Wilders out may not be popular.
So far, only one party which is likely to get a decent number of seats in the polls, the “50PLUS” party, a pensioners’ interests party, has not ruled out governing with Wilders, but it’s unlikely the two parties would together obtain a majority.
2. In all likelihood, we’ll see a government composed of at least four parties
The Netherlands has a strongly proportional system of voter representation, which results in political fragmentation. In order to obtain 76 out of 150 seats, opinion polls suggest that at least four parties will be needed: Rutte’s ruling centre-right VVD, the centrist Christian democratic CDA and EU-federalist D66, which have been rumoured to be keen to form a government, narrowly scrape together only about 60 seats. To add the “GreenLeft” party and/or the “Protestant” parties Christian Union and SGP, could just result in a shaky coalition. The ruling Labour party (PvdA), currently in coalition, could then lick its wounds in the opposition, likely to lose between two thirds and 75% of its seats since the 2012 election, if polls are correct.
3. The influence of the Dutch Senate and the referendum on the EU-Ukraine Treaty
Another reason why at least four parties will be needed for a government coalition is that currently, and until 2019, it takes at least four parties to obtain a majority in the Dutch Senate. There, VVD, CDA and D66 together with GreenLeft have a very narrow majority of 39 seats.
The Dutch Senate doesn’t have a lot of powers so it wasn’t a major issue for the current VVD-PvdA coalition to have to close deals with opposition parties there. Yet after the elections the Dutch Senate will need to decide whether to ratify the EU-Ukraine Treaty, which a majority rejected in a referendum last Spring. Following an EU declaration on the issue obtained by Rutte, D66 and GreenLeft are happy to approve ratification anyway. There are also strong indications that CDA Senators would be willing to lend support. This would take away a major headache for Rutte if indeed he would become PM again. Whether ignoring a referendum isn’t going to boost Euroscepticism on the long term is of course a whole different matter. A number of small parties, including right-wing liberal VNL and the Forum for Democracy have been receiving a lot of media attention railing against those ignoring the referendum result.
4. Euroscepticism is becoming mainstream but the EU is only part of the debate
The current two governing parties, the centre-right VVD and the centre-left PvdA, have both adopted strong elements of Euroscepticism. The VVD always tended towards this, defending free market reform of the EU, but recently PM Rutte has adopted some of the harsher language of Wilders on immigration, for example warning immigrants to “be normal or be gone”.
The Labour party has also abandoned its unconditional support for the EU. Its new leader, Lodewijk Asscher, has complained that “wage-lowering labour migration in Europe nowadays leads to unequal competition between workers”, stopping short of calling for restrictions on free movement of labor, but arguing for the need to “tackle the negative side-effects” of the EU’s free movement of workers.
Still, a Dutch exit from the EU or Nexit is only supported by a minority. In the run-up to the election, banks as Rabobank or ABN have come out with warnings of the economic consequences of this. Given how integrated the Dutch economy is with the other economies of mainland Europe, it’s clear that the EU’s downsides need to be a lot bigger for the Netherlands than they are for the UK to make it beneficial to leave.
Meanwhile, the eurocrisis refuses to go away, most recently with Greece yet again debating with other Eurozone countries whether it has fulfilled the conditions to receive bail out cash so it can pay back its debt. Greece only needs to pay back lenders in July, so in all likelihood this isn’t going to influence the Dutch elections much but it hardly reflects well on Rutte and his government.
One reason for the success of Geert Wilders are the loose monetary policies of the ECB, which have triggered parliamentary debates in a country with more than 1700 billion euro in pension savings. Pension investors already had to cut payouts and may well do so again as a result of the fact that low interest rates make it harder for them to comply with their promises. One Christian democratic MP, Pieter Omtzigt, has claimed the ECB damage to Dutch pensions amounts to 100 billion euro. Amid complaints from trade unions and the success of “50PLUS”, Geert Wilders has suggested that each pensioner should be given €300 from the €900 million he claims the Dutch government has saved in terms of interest payments.
Still, this time around it’s not just about the economy, which has been recovering quite well after a series of savings packages had been implemented, following the financial crisis and the painful bursting of a real estate bubble. As Dutch commentator Derk Jan Eppink describes it: “culture wars have reached the Netherlands”, referring to opinion polls suggesting there’s a lot of sympathy in Europe for Donald Trump’s travel ban for people from a number of Muslim countries, adding: “do EU leaders even know their own population?” Still it would be a mistake to see Wilders’ success merely as a sign of the ‘original’ population of the Netherlands rebelling against a multicultural society, given that his party would be the second most popular among Dutch originating from Suriname.
The popularity of anti-system forces in the Netherlands and beyond can probably be explained through a multitude of factors: uncontrolled mass immigration, problematic integration of existing minorities and Islamic terrorism, a welfare state struggling to cope with an ageing population, supranational overreach and, last but not least, technological disruption challenging the status quo in many ways. In terms of the EU debate, a more modest EU, focused on scrapping trade barriers without organizing mass financial transfers and micromanaging national or local issues, could fit very well in today’s mood. It seems like many in the Dutch political class have understood this, unlike EU Commission chief Jean-Claude Juncker, who thinks we need more Summits and grand projects to concentrate power and money- this time only for “core Europe”. Core Europe may be about to send him a message.
A glimpse at EU member states’ guidelines for the ...
The EU could learn from Dutch PM Mark Rutte on how...
What a Wilders victory would mean for the European...
Four things you need to know about the Dutch elect...
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COROSSOL STRUCTURE
Type: Central peak
Location: N 50°03′ W 66°23′ – underwater in the Gulf of St. Lawrence
Diameter: 4.0 Km;
Age: >12,900 yearsa – PLEISTOCENE
Possible central peak crater
a Calibrated 14C ages of shells in the sediments can be extrapolated to give an estimate of the age of the base of the sedimentary sequence of ~12,900 cal BP
The Corossol Crater is a complex crater ~4 km in diameter with a central uplift, a prominent moat, and multiple, low-relief ridges. Quebec, Canada.
The Corossol crater (50°3’N, 66°23’W) was first discovered by the Canadian Hydrographic Service about 10 years ago while mapping the entrance to the Sept Iles harbour, Gulf of St Lawrence, Canada. It is a complex circular structure about 4 km in diameter with a central uplift that rises to about -70 m and an annular valley ~160 m deep. There are no other circular structures nearby.” (Higgins et al, 2011).
The Corossol Crater’s Origins Are Slowly Revealed
In 2001, a hydrographic survey conducted by the Canadian Hydrographic Service in Mont-Joli, on behalf of the National Defence, revealed the existence of a strange underwater crater. Found near Sept-Îles at a depth of 40 metres, this circular structure generated considerable interest among researchers, geologists and geomorphologists, who saw it as an “enigmatic form” of “great interest.”
Since then, scientific teams have sampled sediments and taken other measurements to determine the nature and age of the crater. The structure has a raised central core and concentric rings whose morphology and geometry resemble those of craters created by complex impacts. An article recently published in the international journal Meteoritics and Planetary Scienceestablishes that the age limits of this formation fall between 470 million years (Ordovician) and 12 600 years BP (Before Present). According to study results, the most realistic hypothesis suggests a violent impact, probably from a meteorite. The study indicates that other radiometric measurements are required to confirm these conclusions.
Scientists named the Corossol Crater after a ship from King Louis XIV’s fleet that ran aground near Sept-Îles in 1693. This discovery demonstrates how much remains to be done to truly broaden our knowledge on the country’s as yet unexplored seabeds.
The authors of the article The Corossol structure: a possible impact crater on the seafloor of the northwestern Gulf of St. Lawrence, Eastern Canada are researchers from the Université Laval (Patrick Lajeunesse and Jacques Locat), the Université du Québec à Rimouski (Guillaume Saint-Onge), the Geological Survey of Canada (Mathieu J. Duchesne), the Université du Québec à Chicoutimi (Michael Higgins), Kent State University (Joseph Ortiz), and Fisheries and Oceans Canada’s Canadian Hydrographic Service (Richard Sanfaçon). (InfoOcean Quebec Bulletin December 2013 – January 2014/Volume 16/Number 6)
Age of impact
At present it is only possible to give age limits. The maximum age is very difficult to establish. Clearly, it is younger than Ordovician, but it is not clear if it is younger or older than the cuestas. The paucity of sediments in the crater might be taken to indicate that it is young. The minimum age was established using data from a ~7 metre core taken in the central trough, which almost reached the basement, as defined by seismic data. Calibrated 14C ages of shells in the sediments can be extrapolated to give an estimate of the age of the base of the sedimentary sequence of ~12,900 cal BP, if no hiatus or older sediments were preserved between the base of the core and the bedrock. This is taken to be the youngest possible age of the impact.” (Higgins et al, 2011).
Suevite breccia clast dredged from the central uplift and the innermost annular rim. A) Scanned image of a thin section in non-polarised light. Limestone clasts are medium-grey. B) Planar deformation features in a crystal of quartz. Cross-polarised light. C) Broken fragment of a glassy droplet. Darker areas have a composition close to apatite, pale areas are pyritic. In the matrix calcite is pale and dolomite is darker. Back-scattered electron image. D) Carbonatitic material infilling between limestone fragments. Euhedral crystals are Dolomite. Plane-polarised light.
Possible link to the Younger Dryas Extinction
M. D. Higgins, P. Lajeunesse, G. St-Onge, J. Locat, M. Duchesne, J. Ortiz, R. Sanfaçon, BATHYMETRIC AND PETROLOGICAL EVIDENCE FOR A YOUNG (PLEISTOCENE?) 4-KM DIAMETER IMPACT CRATER IN THE GULF OF SAINT LAWRENCE, CANADA. 42nd Lunar and Planetary Science Conference (2011)
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Vol. 4, Issue 3-1, Jun.
Volume 6, Issue 6, December 2017, Page: 58-64
Determinants of Tax Revenue in Ethiopia
Neway Gobachew, Department of Accounting and Finance, Jimma University, Jimma, Ethiopia
Kenenisa Lemie Debela, Department of Accounting and Finance, Jimma University, Jimma, Ethiopia
Woldemicael Shibiru, Department of Accounting and Finance, Jimma University, Jimma, Ethiopia
Received: Nov. 15, 2017; Accepted: Nov. 25, 2017; Published: Feb. 12, 2018
DOI: 10.11648/j.eco.20170606.11 View 1608 Downloads 167
Fiscal deficit is the core issue of most of the developing countries over the past several decades. The reason behind the large increase in fiscal imbalance is the rapid expansion in expenditure and low revenue collection. Hence, efficient tax system is crucial for these countries. Since Ethiopian is one among developing countries, pattern of tax revenues and economic growth across country has become a significant concern. Due to aforementioned deficiencies, Ethiopia struggles with budget deficits for a long time. The focus of this paper is to identify determinants of tax revenue in Ethiopia by using a secondary data and multiple variables regression model using OLS method. Quantitative research method was employed on time series data set for the years 1999/00 to 2015/16. Both descriptive statistics and econometric tools were employed to analyze and present the data collected from concerned bodies. The finding reveals that, industry sector share to GDP, per capita income and trade openness as measured by share of export and import to GDP have significant positive effect on tax revenue whereas; agriculture sector share to GDP and annual rate of inflation have significant and negative effect on tax revenue as measured by share of tax revenue to GDP.
Determinants, Ethiopia, Tax Revenue
Neway Gobachew, Kenenisa Lemie Debela, Woldemicael Shibiru, Determinants of Tax Revenue in Ethiopia, Economics. Vol. 6, No. 6, 2017, pp. 58-64. doi: 10.11648/j.eco.20170606.11
Agbeyegbe, T., J. G. Stotesky and A. Woldemariam, 2004. Trade liberalization, exchange rate changes, and tax revenue in Sub Saharan Africa. IMF Working Paper 04/178: 1-32.
Ahmed, M., & Mohammed, S. (2010). Determinant of Tax Buoyancy: Empirical Evidence from Developing Countries. European Journal of Social Sciences – Volume 13, Number 3 (2010) 408.
Alemayehu, G., & Abebe, S. (2005). Taxes and tax reform in Ethiopia, 1990-2003. United Nations University World institution of development research paper No.2005/65.
Anware, N. (2014). Determinants of tax revenue performances in Ethiopia:mini research paper.
Belay, Z. (2015). Determinants of tax revenue performance in Ethiopia federal government.
Bhushan, A., & Sami. (2012). Aid and taxation: Is Sub-Saharan Africa different? North South Institute Research Report.
Basirat, M., F. Aboodi and A. Ahangari, 2014. Analyzing the effect of economic variables on total tax revenues in Iran. Asian Economic and Financial Review, 4(6): 755-767.
Brooks C. (2008). Introductory econometrics for finance, 2nd edn. New York: Cambridge university press.
Chaudhry, I., & Munir, F. (2010). Determinants of low tax revenue in pakistan. journal of social science, 30(2) 439-452.
Eltony, N. (2002). Evaluation of tax revenue in Arab countries. Kuwait: API publication.
Gupta. (2007). Determinants of tax revenue effort in developing countries. Washington: IMFworking paper 70/184.
International Monetary Fund (2016). IMF Executive Board Concludes 2016 Article IV Consultation with the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Press Release No. 16/443. Washington, D. C. 20431 USA.
Karagöz, K. (2013). Determinants of tax revenue: Does sectorial composition matter? Journal of finance accounting and management, 4(2),50-63.
Levin, J. (2008). Determinants of tax revenue in sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Business and economics, 1-21.
Mahdavi, S. (2008). The level and composition of tax revenue in developing countries. International review of economic and finance.
Misrak T. (2008). Ethiopian tax accounting. Finfine: Aster Nega publishing PLC.
Muibi, O., & Sinbo, O. (2013). Macroeconomic Determinants of Tax Revenue in Nigeria (1970-2011). World Applied Sciences Journal 28 (1): 27-35, 2013 ISSN 1818-4952. IDOSI Publications, 2013 DOI: 10.5829/idosi.wasj.2013.28.01.1189.
NEPAD - OECD (2009) African Investment Initiative. Taxation for Investment and Development: An overview of policy challenges in Africa.
OECD (2006), Tax Policy Reforms in Turkey, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration (CTPA), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD, Online database.
Pius, K., & Raymond, E. (2014). Factors affecting tax revenue in pakistan. International Journal of Advanced Research, volume2, issue 2,449-458.
Tadele B. (2015). Analysis of Tax Buoyancy and Its Determinants in Ethiopia (Cointegration Approach) Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development Vol.6, No.3, ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) www.iiste.org.
Tanzi, V. (1991). The impact of macroeconomic policies on the level of taxation (and on the fiscal balance) in developing countries. in Eglar public finance in developing countries(116-132). Edward: Eglar publishing Ltd.
Teera, J. (2002). Tax performance: A comparative study. Department of Economics, University of Bath Working paper.
Tesfaye A. (2015). Determinants of Tax Revenue in Ethiopia. A Master’s Thesis at Addis Ababa University Department of Accounting and Finance.
Velaj, E. & Prendi, L. (2014). Tax Revenue - The Determinant Factors- the Case of Albania. European Scientific Journal September 2014 /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.1 ISSN: 1857–7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431.
Workneh, A. (2016). Determinants of tax revenue in Ethiopia (Johansen co-integration approach). Journal of Business, Economics and Management, 3(6):69-84.
World Bank. (2013). “Global Monitoring Report 2013, Policies and Actions for achieving the MDGs and related outcomes. Washington DC: World Bank.
world Bank. (2015). World Development Indicators. Washington D.C. World bank.
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Home Georgia State University Signal Page 1
Georgia State College Signal, 1968-10-10
Title Georgia State College Signal, 1968-10-10
Identifier GSUS1968-10-10
Creator Georgia State University
Description The Georgia State College Signal, volume 27, number 6 (October 10, 1968). The Signal was formed in 1943 by the merger of two student newspapers, The Evening Signal (1933-1943), and The Junior Collegiate (1935-1943). Since 1943, GSU has been the Atlanta Division of the University of Georgia (1947-1955), then an independent unit known as the Georgia State College of Business Administration (1955-1961), Georgia State College (1961-1969) and finally Georgia State University (from 1969). The Signal has been published continuously since 1943, but reflecting the evolution of GSU, its masthead has also had the titles The University Signal, The Georgia State Signal, The Georgia State College Signal, and the Georgia State University Signal. The University Archives has a good run of copies of The Signal, but is missing issues from various years.
Subject College student newspapers and periodicals
Subject (names) Georgia State College (Atlanta, Ga.)
Note Students at Georgia State University and its predecessors have been producing a newspaper since the 1920s. Like the university, the student newspaper existed in several forms over the years. When the institution was the Evening School of Commerce of the Georgia School of Technology, the first student newspaper, The Technite, was published (1926-1932). Later, the school was the University Extension Center in Atlanta, with two separate divisions, Georgia Evening College (Night) and Atlanta Junior College (Day Division). The night students published a newspaper, The Evening Signal (1933-1943), while their counterparts in the Day Division produced The Junior Collegiate (1935-1943). In 1943, the two newspapers merged to form The Signal. Since then, the institution has been the Atlanta Division of the University of Georgia (1947-1955), then an independent unit known as the Georgia State College of Business Administration (1955-1961), Georgia State College (1961-1969) and finally Georgia State University (from 1969). The Signal has been published continuously since 1943, but reflecting the evolution of GSU, its masthead has also had the titles The University Signal, The Georgia State Signal, The Georgia State College Signal, and the Georgia State University Signal.
Curatorial area University Archives
Source format newspapers
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From Our House to Bauhaus: Crafting the Creative Curriculum
Tom Wolfe, in his book From Bauhaus to Our House, had it backwards: The Bauhaus, rather than being alien to the United States as Wolfe suggests, was originally home grown. The Bauhaus, established by architect Walter Gropius to promote a powerful fusion of art, technology, and craft, has renewed relevance now, when people are looking at ways in which education can stimulate creativity and innovation through learning that is more “hands on.” The Bauhaus (German for “build house”) was a “makerspace” par excellence. Far more often, architects shape the spaces in which learning occurs rather than the learning curriculum itself. Yet architects, since they straddle the fields of art and technology, have unique insight into the kinds of creative curricula now sought for STEM, and even more especially STEAM education. An overview of the Bauhaus highlights this.
Wolfe traced the origins of the Bauhaus to Europe following World War I. He saw the Bauhaus and its principles as alien, even hostile, to the United States. Yet had he traced it back a little further, he would have found its truer origins in Chicago, where at Hull House in 1901 Frank Lloyd Wright gave his lecture, “The Art and Craft of the Machine.” In it, Wright suggested creating a machine-oriented crafts society, like a Guild, that collaborates with manufacturers. It would take excursions to factories to learn industrial processes firsthand, with an eye towards improving the work produced by applying improved design. Wright proposed that rather than fleeing from machine technology towards an antiquarian Arts and Crafts approach, architects should instead embrace and exploit new technologies, and reconcile their aesthetic with them. He outlined a sort of trade school in which industry and institution unite in a new synthesis of machine aesthetic, technology, crafts, and architecture: the “art and craft of the machine.”
Wright suggested that simplicity of expression in harmony with machine technology arises naturally when that technology is properly understood: “Now let us learn from the Machine. It teaches us that the beauty of wood lies first in its qualities as wood; no treatment that did not bring out these qualities all the time could be plastic, and therefore not appropriate-so not beautiful, the machine teaches us, if we have left it to the machine that certain simple forms and handling are suitable to bring out the beauty of wood and certain forms are not; that all woodcarving is apt to be a forcing of the material, an insult to its finer possibilities as a material having in itself intrinsically artistic properties, of which its beautiful markings is one, its texture another, its color a third.” This new Guild, Wright envisioned, would learn how to handle wood, steel, iron, cement, and other materials by learning from machine technology, and through this their designs will be purified. “(T)he Machine is a marvelous simplifier; the emancipator of the creative mind, and in time the regenerator of the creative conscience.”
Wright summarized his vision by saying that “not one educational institution in America has as yet attempted to forge the connecting link between Science and Art by training the artist to his actual tools, or, by a process of nature-study that develops in him the power of independent thought, fitting him to use them properly.”
Yet it remained for Gropius to implement this vision, two decades later in Germany. Gropius’s architecture had been influenced by Wright’s architecture, which he saw in the Wasmuth portfolio, published in Germany in 1910. His Bauhaus curriculum echoed Wright’s vision as well. Gropius summarized the situation facing postwar Germany in terms that echo Wright’s own view of nineteenth century Chicago in his Hull House lecture: “When, in the last century, the machine-made products seemed to sweep the world, leaving the craftsmen and artists in a bad plight, a natural reaction gradually set in against the abandonment of form and the submersion of quality. Ruskin and Morris were the first to set their faces against the tide, but their opposition against the machine could not stem the waters. It was only much later that the perplexed mind of those interested in the development of form realized that art and production can be reunited only by accepting the machine and subjugating it to the mind. ‘The Arts and Crafts’ schools for ‘applied art’ arose mainly in Germany, but most of them met the demand only halfway, as their training was too superficial and technically amateurish to bring about a real advance. The manufactories still continued to turn out masses of ill-shaped goods while the artists struggled in vain to supply platonic designs. The trouble was that neither of them succeeded in penetrating far enough into the realm of the other to accomplish an effective fusion of both their endeavors.” (Walter Gropius, The Scope of Total Architecture, P 9)
Wright, though he envisioned it, did not have the focus on education to put it into practice. Gropius, a more committed educator, instead advanced the curriculum that trained generations of artists, designers, and architects. Gropius founded the Bauhaus in Weimar in 1919 as a school that would bring together fine arts and traditional crafts. In its early years, its teaching emphasized expressionism and individual craftsmanship, somewhat along the lines of a traditional Guild.
Holland, which had sat out WWI, arrived at an advanced modern aesthetic ahead of Germany. The Dutch painter and architect Theo Van Doesburg’s De Stijl aesthetic was inspired in part from the linear pattern of Wright’s Willits House and the influence of the Wasmuth portfolio. His De Stijl aesthetic has more the clarity we associate today with the Bauhaus than did the early expressionist projects being produced there. In it, the linear and planar clarity of separate parts is combined with shifting spatial relationships that result in a machined freedom.
Van Doesburg came to Weimar in 1921 hoping to secure a teaching post at the Bauhaus and spread his ideas of De Stijl. But Gropius found him overbearing and refused him a position. So instead he set up across the street from the Bauhaus, where he held soirées that were attended by Bauhaus teachers including Lyonel Feininger, Paul Klee, and Wassily Kandinsky, as well as his own private De Stijl courses that were attended by a number of Bauhaus students. In these, he criticized the Bauhaus curriculum and argued for greater objectivity, impersonality, machine production, and technology. This spurred Gropius to change his Bauhaus pedagogy, and helped Gropius resolve his own desire for spatial movement and a closed, hard, machined aesthetic, such as he had pursued in his own architecture.
By 1922, two decades after Wright’s lecture, Gropius changed the focus of the Bauhaus from more expressionistic craft to the rigorous understanding of industrial methods of production under a “design master.” Its faculty mastered the intellectual as well as technical knowledge needed to produce artistically designed, economical goods. The Bauhaus workshops, which included metal, weaving, pottery, furniture, typology, wall painting, and (after 1927) architecture, included manual as well as formal training, and were the birthplaces of a new approach to industrial design. When the Bauhaus moved to Dessau, it also gave birth to the highly influential Bauhaus buildings themselves. “The Bauhaus,” Gropius wrote, “aimed at the training of people possessing artistic talents as designers in industry and handicrafts, as sculptors, painters and architects.” He felt that artistic ability was natural and common, but that “innate artistic ability can only be intensified by influencing the whole being, by the example of the design master and his work.”
New to the Bauhaus was its effort to unite art and industry, to integrate artist and craftsman. The unity of arts had also been central to the late 19th-century Arts and Crafts movement, and the ideals of William Morris influenced Gropius's curriculum for the school. Yet at the Bauhaus, the focus on craft continually gave way to the focus on deriving form from production methods, material constraints, and programmatic necessities. It steadily abandoned the Arts and Crafts romance of individualized craftsmanship to embrace 20th-century machine culture. Its aesthetic, in harmony with machine technology and mass production, demanded design clarity and reduction to essentials. Breuer’s tubular steel chairs exemplify this approach to creative design solutions aligned with production technology. “To an ever greater degree,” as Walter Benjamin wrote, “the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility.”
When the German Bauhaus closed in 1933, many of its design masters moved to the United States.
Josef and Anni Albers emigrated to America in 1933, where they taught at Black Mountain College in North Carolina and developed a foundation course based on the original ideas of the Bauhaus. Josef later taught at Yale. Moholy-Nagy went to Chicago, where in 1937 he founded his own art institution, the "New Bauhaus", which like its successor, the Chicago Institute of Design, adopted and expanded Gropius's original curriculum. It too aimed at the education of the widely oriented universal designer. Mies van der Rohe also moved to Chicago where he designed the campus and taught at the Illinois Institute of Technology. Marcel Breuer and Walter Gropius taught at Harvard. And the methods of the German Bauhaus were also adopted in modified form by other American schools by professors with no original connection to the Bauhaus. The Bauhaus became responsible for the gradual reduction of the previously unchallenged predominance of the Beaux-Arts tradition in the United States. More than an institution, the Bauhaus was an idea, and this is what gave it tremendous power.
Architects most often are responsible for shaping the spaces where learning happens, rather than in shaping the learning curriculum itself. Yet since their work forces them to straddle the fields of science, technology, engineering, art, and math, they have insight into the training these fields require. So when, as here, architects do get involved in shaping curricula, it can have great effect. The Bauhaus was a brilliant response to the need for a new type of design education in the 20th century. Since it was more an idea than just an institution, it had outsize influence. It raises the question of what is the appropriate type of design education in the 21st century, what form might it take, and what role might architects have in it?
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Cosan reports slight increase in ethanol production in Q3 results
By Erin Voegele | November 12, 2014
Brazil-based Cosan has released financial results for the third quarter, reporting a slight increase in the volume of ethanol produced despite reduced sugarcane crush volumes.
Cosan’s Raízen Energia business unit crushed 24.47 million tons of sugarcane during the quarter, down 9 percent from the 26.82 million tons crushed during the same period of 2013. The reduction is attributed to dry weather that damaged the sugarcane planting and reduced the resulting crush level.
While sugar production dropped 12 percent when compared to the third quarter of 2013, ethanol production was up 2 percent. Raízen Energia produced 903,000 cubic meters of ethanol during the quarter, up from 884,000 cubic meters during the same period of the previous year. The 903,000 cubic meters included 496,000 cubic meters of hydrous ethanol and 407,000 cubic meters of anhydrous ethanol.
The company’s Raízen Combustíveis business unit sold 590 million liters (155.86 million gallons) of ethanol during the quarter, up from 577 million liters during the third quarter of the prior year. Net revenue for ethanol increased from R$756 million ($295.03 million) during the third quarter of 2013 to R$832 million during the third quarter of 2014.
The Raízen Energia business unit reported ethanol net revenue of R$952 for the third quarter, down from R$1.52 billion during the same period of the previous year.
Overall, Cosan reported net revenue of R$10.28 billion for the quarter, up 8 percent from R$9.55 billion reported for the same period of last year. EBITDA was down 12 percent, reaching R$1.06 billion with the EBITDA margin at 10.3 percent. The company reported net income of R$15 million, down significantly from R$206 million during the same quarter of last year.
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ETSU Physicians offers integrative medical services Featured
Written by April Richardson
Dr. Anton Borja shows how acupuncture is used to treat pain. April Richardson
When most people think of visiting the doctor they usually think of visiting a medical doctor, somebody who examines symptoms and prescribes medicine or surgery to help the patient overcome maladies. But other forms of treatment have been widely used around the world.
Neil Anton Borja is a family physician and doctor of osteopathic medicine at East Tennessee State University. He also has a master's of acupuncture and traditional Chinese medicine and practices integrative medicine.
After completing studies in China, California and New York, he now serves as the director of the integrative medicine clinic at ETSU, and as assistant professor in the Department of Family Medicine at the Quillen College of Medicine.
Borja’s areas of expertise reflect his heritage. He affectionately refers to his parents as "Hisp-Asian" because his mother is Filipino and Cuban, while his father is Chinese and Spanish.
"[Spanish] was my first language, but like many raised in the U.S., I lost the skill simply because I did not want to use it as a child,” Borja said. “But I have been working hard ever since to get it back."
Borja said integrative medicine combines aspects of allopathic medicine, osteopathic medicine and traditional Chinese medicine. He says it is a growing field.
“Many patients seek a holistic, patient-centered type of treatment,” said Borja. “Integrative medicine uses modern conventional medicine and other evidence-based, non-conventional treatments. It is patient-centered and looks at the whole person.”
About 80 percent of hospitals in the U.S. offer integrative medical treatments, according to Ruthann Russo, assistant professor at City University of New York and author of Putting the HIM in IM.
If a person seeks treatment for a bacterial infection, it is not uncommon for a medical doctor to prescribe antibiotics. This is allopathic medicine, the methods of prescribing medications, surgeries or procedures to treat the symptoms of the patient and work toward a cure.
A patient visiting an integrative medical clinic for neck pain may be treated with osteopathic manipulation instead of painkillers or invasive surgery. A doctor of osteopathic medicine treats patients by massaging muscles, manipulating movement or stretching ligaments. The idea behind osteopathic medicine is that if bones, muscles and ligaments are functioning properly, the patient will feel better.
“Osteopathic manipulation is a manual type of medicine. It’s hands-on care,” said Borja. “It’s an extra tool you can help your patients with.”
At an integrative medicine clinic, traditional Chinese medicine treatments may be used for the patient with neck pain. One of these treatments might be acupuncture, where the doctor inserts needles the width of human hair into points on the body to relieve pain. This type of medicine views health as a state of balance, so that if a person’s body is out of balance, the patient feels unwell. According to Borja, traditional Chinese medicine seeks to restore balance.
“A doctor of osteopathic medicine has to take the same college classes and tests to get into medical school; they study the same material, they go through the same residency training and are licensed to practice in all specialties of medicine.”
– Neil Anton Borja
“Chinese medicine looks at the body as a microcosm of the whole world and universe. It seeks to help a person maintain that balance,” said Borja.
Some medical offices use osteopathic medicine to complement allopathic medicine. A patient with neck pain might be given allopathic medication in addition to osteopathic manipulation or acupuncture in the regions responsible for the discomfort.
Someone unfamiliar with integrative medicine may be concerned about the legitimacy of the field, and may assume a doctor of osteopathic medicine is not qualified to administer allopathic treatments. Borja says this is not the case.
“A doctor of osteopathic medicine [D.O.] has to take the same college classes and tests [as M.D.s] to get into medical school; they study the same material, they go through the same residency training and are licensed to practice in all specialties of medicine,” he said. "What is different for a doctor of osteopathic medicine is they also train in osteopathic manipulation, which is an extra tool that can be used in treating patients."
Osteopathic medicine and integrative medicine are rapidly growing fields, with many facilities offering these treatments opening daily. Between 2010 and 2013 the number of osteopathic physicians in the U.S. grew from 70,480 to 82,146, and 5,154 osteopathic physicians-in-training were expected to graduate within the year, according to the American Osteopathic Association. Tennessee had 813 licensed osteopathic doctors in 2013, a number expected to grow by the end of 2014.
According to a 2012 study, patients treated with osteopathy have seen results. In a study conducted in the UK, 160 osteopathic hospital patients returned a survey about their experiences. The patients were questioned about their osteopathic treatment 24 hours after it was administered; 74 percent reported less pain, 90 percent had a reduction in anxiety and 98 percent would recommend the treatment to other hospitalized patients.
A benefit of osteopathic medicine is the hands-on treatment and interaction between patient and doctor. Osteoopathic manipulative treatment can be used on patients of all age groups, allowing more interaction between doctors and patients at all life stages.
“One of the things I love about this job is that I see a varied group of patients,” Borja said. “We see everybody from the cradle to the grave—everyone from newborns to our very oldest patients.”
Borja enjoys the variety of patients he sees at ETSU Family Physicians, and said patients are excited to have more options for medical treatment.
Harriet Masters, director of the ETSU Women’s Resource Center, invited Borja to speak at a women’s health lecture in October.
“When I saw that we [at ETSU] hired you, I thought, ‘Well, I guess we’re finally breaking out of the box,’” Masters told Borja.
Some patients who do not receive integrative treatment have expressed interest in making the switch to ease their muscle and bone pain.
“I would consider this type of treatment for my fibro,” said Brooke Edward, a patient with fibromyalgia. “I like the idea of controlling my pain at the source instead of taking medications alone.”
Testimonials for osteopathy can be found from patients receiving numerous forms of treatment. From gastric bypass for weight loss to fibromyalgia, a disorder that causes unexplained muscle fatigue and pain, doctors of osteopathy have treated thousands of patients.
One fibromyalgia patient in Texas saw improvements in her condition after two treatments. Her doctor administered osteopathic manipulation treatments on the muscles where the pain was centered. Following those initial treatments, the patient, whose name was given as Elida, now visits her D.O. weekly and said her pain has subsided. In her testimonial on the osteopathic.org website, she stated she was eventually able to stop taking pain medications altogether.
Patients want results when they seek medical treatment. The growth of the integrative medical field is evidence of its results.
“If an integrative medicine treatment has evidence that it benefits patients, they should be able to get it,” said Dr. Borja. “If it works, by all means use it.”
Photos: April Richardson
En español: Los médicos de ETSU ofrecen servicios médicos integrativos
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Randall Shrock '68
Collegiate Profile
The Earlham College Strategic Plan
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Campus & History
Randall Shrock '68 majored in History. As a student he participated in the Germany/Austria Program. Randall completed his Ph.D. in History from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1980. Randall's greatest Earlham involvement has been his 40 years of teaching as a professor of history in a shared appointment with Alice Almond Shrock ’68, also professor of history, in one of the first and longest continuous faculty appointments in the U.S. He was active in the Humanities Program and a co-leader of 14 off-campus study programs, including three alumni trips. He was also a professor of history and education (1994-2005) and the founding director (2001-05) of Earlham's Master of Arts in Teaching (M.A.T.) program. Randall resides in Richmond, Indiana. He began his term on the Alumni Council in Fall 2013. Looking back at his time at Earlham, his favorite memories include falling in love with Alice at Welliver's Hagerstown Smorgasboard; presenting daughter Rachel with her Earlham diploma as she crossed Chase Stage in 2005; and having daughter Amy join the Earlham faculty (2009-13).
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E C O
At ECO (Earthcare Outreach Trust), we join children and adults in exploring limits of their creativity and imagination to create empowered communication around their lives by using visual media. Our special focus is in working with children in the area of environment communication. ECO is a non-profit trust based in Delhi.
Memories of Adharshila
Reaching Adharshila, a small school located in the remote village of Sakad in Madhya Pradesh, after travelling for almost four hours in the scorching heat, should have robbed me of all my enthusiasm for the grueling three weeks that was to come. Instead, I found an oasis amidst the barren and desolate landscape. And the sheer energy, love and kindness shared by the kids rinsed out the tiredness and drove me to work harder and push the boundaries.
On being offered the project, as is common to our generation, one of the first things I did was “google” Adharshila. I was the only one among the crewmembers who had no idea about the space and I was anxious to change that status. What I found on the net was not exactly very illuminating; neither did it promise a great scope for enjoyment. It was just a school for adivasis (indigenous people) employing alternate methods of learning. My initial reaction was one of cynicism. Oh! Another one of those vocational training schools that dot the countryside.
At that stage, what was most interesting was, that we were going to hold workshops on filmmaking, teaching the young kids the craft and technology that it has become today, at the end of which they would make a complete film. Our task was to capture this whole process along with the day-to-day running of the school, its activities, mode of working and other aspects of the life of these kids.
We were met at Indore station by Anil and Sarang, two of the kids who would be participating in the workshop. Things started going berserk the moment they were given a handy cam. A camera in the hands of even adults turn them into children and these guys were, well, just kids! But through that process, somehow I managed to become their friend.
That first night, we slept under the stars out in the open. It was quite an exhilarating experience though lugging all that equipment and travelling for almost a day in that heat had completely worn us out and we were asleep in no time.
The morning brought fresh challenges, as there was no running water in the bathrooms. In fact, for all purposes, there were no bathrooms. One had to fill up buckets and find a secluded corner and do whatever we needed to do. Anyway, we had scheduled our first meeting with the kids post-breakfast and I got ready for the day.
Before the meeting Kavita, formally introduced us with Amit bhai and Jayashree didi, the people who had left a much more comfortable life in the cities to go into this tribal heartland to open a school for the adivasi children of that area. They came across as honest, hardworking who really cared about their surroundings and the people they were working with. Afterwards we had our first meeting with Revali, Pushpen, Prakash, Lelsingh, Anju, Quram, Sanjay and Vinesh who along with Anil and Sarang made up the group who would be attending the workshop and in the process make a film of their choice.
The first session was spent getting to know each other, discussing the format of the workshop and Kavita, the trainer and our director, laying out the ground rules in no uncertain terms. The only spoilsport was the intense heat, which started taking its toll even on our equipment.
The unique thing about the workshop was the participatory element. Right from the very beginning, there was no attempt to impose pre-conceived notions or ideas. The inputs given by Kavita were purely on technical aspects of film making such as different kind of shots, method of editing and storytelling and of course once in a while streamlining their chain of thoughts, if it was travelling in a haphazard direction. Primarily, the film was taking shape through a process of discussion and brainstorming between the kids. It was fascinating to watch them think of an idea, then discuss ways of visually and aurally achieving it.
As the workshop progressed and the participants started opening up and getting more involved what surprised me was the kind of creativity with which they started ideating and building up the film. The process of the training pushed them into terrains they hadn’t explored earlier and that set their imagination free.
In the course of my stay I came to know Adharshila intimately. The first realization of course was that this is not just another vocational training institute. What Amit Bhai and Jaya didi were doing was teaching maths, physics, chemistry, english, history and other things in a practical way, easy to understand and would remain with them for the rest of their lives. It was more about learning by doing. So one group of kids would spend the whole day intimately creating the battle between the tribal leader Khajya Naik and the British forces. This not only helped them learn history and their own culture but also forced them to think innovatively. Thus colourful bottle caps would replace helmets of the British soldiers while painstakingly collected twigs of various shapes would become the arms of the brave tribal warriors. Whoever said that necessity is the mother of invention was bang on.
Children here not only have fun but also learn things that no text book can teach them. They would know as much about quadratic equations as they would about drip farming. And amazingly, they were doing it against all odds. There was always a conflict with power and acute water shortages. The famous Indian ‘jugaad’ was at its zenith there.
Despite power shortages and having to work at night because of the heat, and after endless fights, discussions, arguments and the much-needed forceful motivation from Kavita, the film was finally made. The children and all of us in the crew were so excited. This whole process was a revelation of sorts as each one revealed their strengths and weaknesses. By then I had become Shankho ‘Bhaiyya’. The long hours spent waiting for electricity would transform into spontaneous jam sessions between Sarang on the tabla and me on the guitar or an intense discussion on Hindi films prompted by Anil who happens to be a huge Mithun fan. What it actually did was build a connection that would remain etched in my heart forever.
As I look back, in spite of the hardships we had to go through, the heat, the unavailability of certain comforts, I fondly remember the nights we spent sleeping on an open terrace under a clear sky with the kids talking about constellations, bollywood and music. We fondly referred to it as our ‘million star hotel’ and that is what it is going to remain for me. Forever.
Shankhayan Chowdhury
Shankhayan recorded the sound and coordinated production besides being the children's friend on this production.
'Trikon khirkeewala school' is a work in progress and should be up in a few days from now…
This film as well as training children in Participatory Video was supported by Community, the Youth Collective, New Delhi.
Posted by E C O at 09:47 No comments:
ECO pics
Krishnendu Bose, the Managing Trustee of ECO, is a documentary filmmaker making films on environment conservation and people's rights, for the last 25 years, under the banner of Earthcare Films. Kavita Das Gupta, Trustee & Director, is a Community Media Practitioner specialising in Participatory Video. She has been in the community media sector for the last 6 years. Earlier she was making films with Earthcare. Ravi Agarwal, Trustee, is an environmentalist and an installation artist. Ravi is the founder Director of Toxics Link, a Delhi based NGO working on advocacy against Toxics. Seema Bhatt, Trustee, is an Independent Consultant on Climate Change and Biodiversity issues. Madhurima Sen Bose, Trustee, is the Director of Earthcare Productions and a Line Producer for International Documentaries and Reality shows.
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Bravely Default is more Final Fantasy than Final Fantasy
by J. J. Ulm
Handheld gaming consoles have been a comfortable home for the Japanese Role-Playing Game genre since the green-screened Game Boy days. With a focus heavily on storytelling and menu-heavy turn-based combat, JRPGs don't suffer much from the relatively limited graphics and controls on a handheld system. So while the Final Fantasy series, one of the cornerstones of the genre, has always been released primarily on home gaming consoles, a new game from the same publisher â Square Enix â is bringing an experience even closer to the original Final Fantasy games to Nintendo's handheld 3DS. Bravely Default, released here in the United States on February 7, may not carry the Final Fantasy name, but it carries the spirit even better than the more Action RPG-style Final Fantasy XIII or the MMORPG Final Fantasy XIV. The game focuses on four characters, Tiz, Agnès, Edea and Ringabel, as they go on an adventure to save their world's elemental crystals from a mysterious darkness. This echoes the original Final Fantasy, released all the way back in the 1980s for the Nintendo Entertainment System, which was also about four heroes saving the world's darkening elemental crystals. Itâs a story element that shows up occasionally in more recent games, but is more often discarded. True to JRPG traditions, the story here is a definite focus. The characters are strong and memorable, and there are mysteries scattered about that keep you playing not just to achieve in-game goals but to uncover more about them. Read the amnesiac Ringabel's cryptic, seemingly time-displaced journal all the way through â then fight the urge to look up spoilers to find out what it all means. Another link to the earlier FF games is the robust Job system. You get to choose which characters are warriors, which are mages, and which are bunny-eared Performers. Similar to the classic Tactical RPG Final Fantasy Tactics, each character can retain the skills from one previous job, allowing for a decent amount of customization. They can also retain selected passive abilities from previous classes, so a Warrior who was once a Thief can still keep a speed boost. Something new but not obtrusively so is the Brave and Default system, which takes the old Defend command and makes it useful. You can use Brave to take several turns in advance or Default to save a turn for later in exchange for a defense boost. The game forces you to make good use of it, too, as some bosses will KO your entire party if you don't Default at the right time. It adds a new element to combat without fundamentally changing it. The game does suffer a little from uncomfortable amounts of fanservice and squicky Japanese pervert humor. Some of Agnès's and Edea's Job-specific outfits had to be tweaked a little for the Western release, and their ages were bumped from 15 to a more appropriate 18-plus. Some scenes with a perverted old hermit-slash-dressmaker went on far too long. It would have been nice not to sit through 10 straight minutes of him and Ringabel trying to coax Agnès into a miniscule bikini. Sadly, that sort of thing is still the price of entry into the video game world, and that's a problem too big to pin on a single game. There have been re-releases of some older Final Fantasy games for the Nintendo Game Boy Advance, the DS, and even iOS and Android, but often this just makes these games show their age. The much-adored Final Fantasy VI got an iOS/Android release recently and was panned for looking like someone took a smoothing tool to the pixels. Bravely Default offers that classic FF game play without looking like a mediocre port. The 3D looks good without being obtrusive and the character and environment art is just plain beautiful. The 3DS took its sweet time accruing enough great games to be worth buying, but Bravely Default deserves a place alongside Pokemon X/Y and Fire Emblem: Awakening as a must-have game for the current handheld generation.
Appears in Issue:
Columbus Free Press Feb 20 2014
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The ethics of Palestinian resistance
With Jimmy Carter's book a best seller and the Iraq War a top political concern, many Americans may have an interest right now in thinking about Israel and Palestine. I'd like to recommend to anyone with that interest picking up a copy of a short and brilliant book by the British philosopher Ted Honderich called "Right and Wrong and Palestine, 9-11, Iraq, 7-7."
"7-7," for Americans who haven't memorized that number, is the date of the terrorist attack in London's subway. Honderich addresses ethical questions raised by the four topics in his title, but does so after laying out a general understanding of the philosophy of ethics. In fact, it is on page 114 of a 247-page book that he finally gets around to a preliminary discussion of the definition of terrorism and on page 131 that he first touches on the four topics named. The preceding pages may, however, be the most valuable portion of his book.
Honderich provides a compelling overview of the place of philosophy in ethical inquiry, of the standards of human rights, just war theory, conservatism and liberalism, and democracy. He gives a powerful defense of consequentialist and non-utilitarian ethics (and explains what that means). And he sets out in the place of utilitarianism or any other past system of ethics something he calls "The Principle of Humanity." Humans, Honderich writes, desire a decent length of life, the means to support a quality of life, freedom and power, relationships with others, respect and self-respect, and the goods of culture. A bad life is one deprived of some or all of these things. The principle of humanity is that the right thing to do is aimed at getting and keeping people out of bad lives.
I've grossly oversimplified and recommend reading Honderich's position in the original. I think it outdoes the ethical positions of the vast majority of philosophy professors. I also think the rest of the book demonstrates the limited usefulness of having done so. That is to say, my reaction to Honderich's book is one that he has pre-interpreted in his conclusion as based on fear and inconsistency: I accept his ethical premises and then reject one of his conclusions. Of course I do so under the belief that I am not lacking courage, and rather that Honderich is lacking sufficient imagination.
I recently published an article praising members of the U.S. military who publicly refuse to serve in Iraq or simply go AWOL from an illegal and immoral war. To ask every member of the military to take that step is to ask them to be heroes, to set aside their particular concerns of family and friendship about which I know nothing, to encourage the taking of risks that I have never taken, and to do so from a position that I have been privileged to avoid. I cannot ask for such heroism or criticize those who lack it. But I can praise it where it exists and encourage it. In fact I am happy to both endorse and incite it (see below).
I find myself in a similar position toward Palestinians. If you follow Honderich's careful reasoning you end up facing one of two options: either accept his conclusion that Palestinian terrorism against Israel is ethically right and good, or defend a proposal that Honderich fails to even imagine, namely that there are other possible ways by which Palestinians might attempt to secure their freedom and end their oppression. To make such a defense is to ask people being terrorized by Israel not to engage in terrorism in return. It is to ask Palestinians, in the particular sense of loving one's enemies, to be Christians, to be Gandhi, to be Martin Luther King Jr. That's a lot to ask of anyone. In fact, tellingly, it is more than Honderich is willing to ask of himself.
After endorsing Palestinian violence, Honderich draws a ludicrous distinction between "endorsing" and "inciting", and explicitly admits that he is doing so in order to avoid the possibility of going to jail for inciting violence. He then lists other things that British and other Western readers of his book can do to oppose Israel's attempts to seize more Palestinian land: demand withdrawal to the territory of Israel in 1948 (territory Honderich argues Israel was right to seize and is right to keep), urge divestment from the company that makes the caterpillar bulldozers used to destroy Palestinians' homes, boycott retail stores and other businesses dealing with Israel, and use civil disobedience and symbolic public acts.
I'm less concerned that Honderich eschews such civil disobedience himself in drawing his absurd distinction between "endorsing" and "inciting" actions he deems right, than I am that he denies the possibility of such civil disobedience to the Palestinians themselves, reserving it only for well-fed Brits. Here's the lead sentence from an article in November 2006 in the Christian Science Monitor:
"In perhaps the most effective act of nonviolent protest in the six-year Palestinian uprising, hundreds of Gazans forced Israel over the weekend to call off airstrikes on the residence of a militant leader by swarming the house as human shields." [ http://www.afterdowningstreet.org/node/15764 ]
Here is civil disobedience by Palestinians in defense of Palestine, and it's effective. That's something suicide bombing appears doomed to fail at: being effective.
So, why do I recommend Honderich's book so strongly if I disagree with his conclusion? Well, I disagree with one of his four sets of conclusions. I think he gets 9-11, 7-7, and Iraq exactly right. I think he draws the connections between his four topics in exactly the right way. And I think he provides one of the most compelling possible rigorous arguments against a vast array of positions on Palestine that are even more wrong than his own. Until you understand the Palestinians as engaged in self-defense, and understand that as a position that is not anti-Semitic, you cannot even get to the debate over whether the tools employed should be violent ones. Honderich is an author who can guide you to this understanding, and to an understanding of ethics that may be useful in other areas as well.
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