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Home News Money The U.S. women’s team won the World Cup, and they’re about to...
The U.S. women’s team won the World Cup, and they’re about to get paid — by sponsors, anyway
They won the World Cup on Sunday, and now it’s time for the U.S. women’s soccer team to score some serious endorsements.
Indeed, many players on the U.S. Women’s National Team have already been bridging the widely reported gender pay gap in soccer via sponsorship deals.
Take forward Alex Morgan, who went viral for her pantomime of sipping tea after scoring against England in the World Cup semifinal. She earns a $450,000 salary playing for the National Women’s Soccer League in Portland, but her endorsements from companies like Nike NKE, -0.50% , McDonald’s MCD, -0.03% , Coca-Cola COKE, -0.52% and Panasonic PCRFY, -1.34% 6752, -0.93% will bump her 2019 earnings to $1 million, Money.com projects.
And sports agents and marketing experts tell MarketWatch that now’s the time for these women to explore whatever endorsement deals, speaking engagements and social-media campaigns come their way. They need these deals to secure their financial futures while waging a pay-equity battle against the U.S. Soccer Federation, claiming that they earn just 38 cents on the dollar compared with the men’s team.
Related: The U.S. Women’s World Cup–winning soccer team will earn just 38 cents on the dollar compared to men
“These women are the best at their sport in the world, not once but twice with World Cup victories in 2015 and 2019,” said Andrew Lafiosca of Nielsen Sports Americas. “There is a commercial opportunity for each player now, whether it’s through camps and clinics, speaking appearances or endorsements, because their story is simply amazing and there are a lot of people that want to hear it.” (The U.S. team also won Women’s World Cup trophies in 1991 and 1999.)
Molly Fletcher, one of the first female sports agents, told MarketWatch that the U.S. players’ agents were probably already wheeling and dealing before the World Cup tournament even started.
“We live in a world of ‘What have you done for me lately?’ So you want to be ready the moment that that win happens,” said Fletcher, who has represented pro golfer Matt Kuchar, former major-league pitcher John Smoltz and Fox’s Erin Andrews. “A good agent would have been way out ahead of this with a branding plan anticipating this [victory], and how to leverage [new] endorsement deals and to capitalize on the ones you have now.”
Related: How the U.S. Women’s World Cup victory can help transform your child’s life
So what has becoming World Cup champs won them in terms of bonuses and marketability?
It’s difficult to determine just how much each player is taking home, since some payments are not disclosed, and different players get different salaries and bonuses from their various leagues and sponsors.
But each player is awarded about $250,000 in qualifying, roster and victory bonuses, the New York Times reported. On top of that, once Luna Bar learned that the Women’s World Cup roster bonus is $31,250 less than the men’s, the brand donated the difference to each USWNT player. And National Women’s Soccer League bonuses increased 5% this year to max out at $46,200. Money.com projected that the top players — household names like Morgan, Megan Rapinoe and Julie Ertz — could earn more $400,000 overall this year when combining salaries and bonuses, before factoring in endorsements.
As for those lucrative sponsorships, Stacy Jones, CEO of the marketing agency Hollywood Branded, told MarketWatch that social-media campaigns could earn star players anywhere from $25,000 to $250,000.
“Alex Morgan is a social-media queen; she has 8.1 million Instagram followers. She is truly a social-media influencer,” said Jones. “And I think where we’re going to see a lot of the money that these women make, and the ways that they can leverage their brands, is through their social accounts.”
Jones explained that her company works off a CPM, or cost per thousand, for Instagram FB, +1.76% campaigns. “Alex has 8.1 million followers, so she’s realistically looking at anywhere from $5 to $10 per CPM, so she would get paid possibly between $40,000 and $80,000 per social post on the low end, depending on what you asked her to do [whether that’s a single photo, a video or a series],” said Jones. “Let’s say we’re looking at Megan Rapinoe and her 1.4 million followers; she’s getting $7,500 to $15,000 for a social post. But because of their celebrity status, it may even be higher.”
Indeed, Morgan and Rapinoe have already promoted products on their Insta feeds. Morgan has hawked P&G’s PG, -1.00% Secret deodorant, FabFitFun subscription boxes and Molecule mattresses. Rapinoe recently announced a personal endorsement deal with Body Armor sports drinks, and also shared an ad for Hulu’s live sports service with the hashtag #TeamHuluSellouts.
And the star players stand to land more lucrative deals than many of defensive players and alternates who weren’t making headlines for sparring with President Trump as Rapinoe did, or scoring game-winning goals like Rose Lavelle’s rocket against the Netherlands that helped clinched the American win on Sunday in Lyon.
“If you’re not a household name, you’re going to be more vigilant in the team’s legal fight [for pay parity], you’re gonna be outspoken, or at least behind-the-scenes be assertive, with this equal pay within the U.S. Soccer Federation,” said Patrick Rishe, president of Sportsimpacts and director of the sports business program at Washington University in St. Louis. “That’s your best shot at really improving on your own personal circumstances.”
Or the lesser-known players can look for local marketing opportunities in their hometowns, or connect themselves with players like Rapinoe and Morgan in campaigns like the Hulu live sports video ad, or group trips like Wednesday’s victory parade in Manhattan.
Rose Lavelle celebrates with Alex Morgan, wearing No. 13, and Megan Rapinoe, No. 15, after scoring the second U.S. goal in Sunday’s final.
Players can also go the speaking- and appearance-fee route, which Jones says can bring in “tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars.” Indeed, the All American Speakers Bureau lists retired U.S. players Mia Hamm and Abby Wamback, who both won two Olympic gold medals and two World Cups in their careers, as commanding $50,000 to $100,000 for speaking engagements. The Washington Speakers Bureau features current player Kelley O’Hara at a rate of $25,000 to $40,000 — for now.
But there can also be a gender gap in the potential income from these deals, as well. “The size of one’s endorsement income is a function of one’s marketability and visibility,” explained Rishe. “While it is certainly possible that a very few select individual female soccer players could earn $5 [million] to $10 million in endorsement income (with Alex Morgan and Megan Rapinoe being near the top of that list right now), the reality is that [male international soccer stars] Cristiano Rinaldo ($44 million last year) and Lionel Messi ($35 million last year) have a much higher endorsement income ceiling, because there are many more consumer eyeballs on their sport than there is for the women’s game.”
The team celebrates the Sunday win.
That’s because, while the women’s final was watched by audiences on par with the men’s tournament, the men’s World Cup makes more money globally. The FIFA Women’s World Cup final was watched by 15.6 million people on Sunday, according to Nielsen data reported by the Los Angeles Times — which beats the 12.4 million who tuned in to watch the 2018 Men’s World Cup final between France and Croatia. And Goal.com estimates that 850 million viewers across all platforms watched the U.S. women’s win on Sunday, and the total audience could exceed 1 billion. But while the previous Women’s World Cup in Canada in 2015 made $73 million in revenue, Forbes reported, that’s a fraction of the $6 billion banked during the 2018 men’s World Cup in Russia.
Even compared with other women’s sports, however, the soccer team’s endorsement packages often lag behind. “Female tennis players at the very top over the last decade (including both Williams sisters and Maria Sharapova before her suspension a few years back) were commanding between $12 [million and] $25 million annually from endorsements,” said Rishe. “These are in part because individual-sport athletes (both men and women) tend to do better than most team-sports athletes in endorsements, in part because they are the team. Thus, when they compete, all the attention is on them.”
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SoCal Local Brings Home Bronze Medal from 2018 Gay Games Paris
Photos: Courtesy. Jo Popadynetz and Deborah Fields Perez on route to winning the Bronze.
A Santa Monican’s journey to medaling in dance at the 10th anniversary of the Gay Games.
By Brianna Kwasnik
Ten years ago, now Santa Monica resident, Jo Popadynetz was asked what her goal was when signing up for a local gym.
The person signing her up laughed when she told them she wanted to compete in the Gay Games. While it was a dream of hers, it was not yet set in motion.
This August, her and her dance partner, Deborah Fields Perez took home the bronze medal at the 10th annual Gay Games held in Paris, for the Women’s Senior Latin for the World Championship. The pair placed third out of 361 participants in the contest.
Jo with her bronze medal at Gay Games.
The Gay Games is held every four years and offers over 36 different sporting events. Participants can compete solo or as part of a team. This year brought out over 10,000 competitors from over 70 countries.
Popadynetz’ journey to dance began in 2016 when a friend told her of a gay social dance class being held by Liora Paniz. Here, she fell in love with dancing because she got to lead for the first time.
The instructors she’s had made her feel very welcome by honoring her wish to lead in dance. Some instructors have begun saying “leader and follower” rather than “man and woman” in terms of who leads the dance.
“It was like a whole world opened up,” she said. “Dancing makes the whole world disappear, you can’t think of anything else but the steps, your arms, your partner and the music.”
She soon found out that Paniz was giving private lessons and taking her students to a same-sex ballroom dance competition in the Latin category in Ohio.
“Jo was immediately ready to go after the first class she took,” Paniz said. “Her eyes became bigger and brighter as the class progressed.”
Immediately after her competition in Ohio, Popadynetz threw herself into training for the Gay Games.
Initially, Paniz was going to be her partner, however, due to prior obligations and preparing to start law school at USC, she was unable to dedicate the time needed to prepare to compete.
Two months into training, Jo tore two of her hamstrings and required a major surgery. She couldn’t dance for seven months.
She resumed her training in August 2017, one year prior to the start of the games, and was still without a partner. She began asking around the studio where she was taking classes, By Your Side Studio, in Culver City, and Deborah Fields Perez, who owns the studio was eager to step up to the task. Although she was taking classes with another instructor and the two hadn’t spoken prior, Fields Pere said she saw that Jo had natural talent and given her dedication, she knew she would put in the work and give it her all.
“I took on the challenge, because I could see in her eyes how much it meant to her,” Fields Perez said. “I couldn’t say no if I wanted to.”
Fields Perez immediately got to work choreographing five dances for the competition. The next challenge was for the pair to learn the moves and focus on how to properly execute the dances.
Jo said she danced as often as she could afford, given that dance classes were private lessons. She often practiced at home, working on memorizing the choreography.
Arriving in Paris for the first time was emotional for Popadynetz.
“To see all the same sex couples on the dance floor rehearsing together and the music playing in this space where it’s safe and celebrated, it was overwhelming emotionally,” Popadynetz said. “Never before have I felt that kind of welcome and community.”
Popadynetz said the experience overall hadn’t fully set in until her and Fields Perez returned to the states and she had a moment to process it all.
For now, she’s not sure exactly what the future holds, but she said “I know this: I’m not going to stop dancing. I’m just going to put one foot in front of the other right now.”
Santa Monica College
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The Albums That Shaped Me: FREEDOM AT POINT ZERO
December 29, 2014 rasiler
JEFFERSON STARSHIP: Freedom at Point Zero
Year it Came Into My Life: 1979
“Lightning Rose”
“Girl With the Hungry Eyes”
“Fading Lady Light”
“Freedom at Point Zero”
In my 10th grade year I met Janis. Janis was a year older than me in school and we hit it off. She was zany, irreverent, and funny as hell, and I still on an almost daily basis think of something that we did back then or jokes that we shared. She also introduced me to a lot of great music. This was the first. I don’t think she was a big fan of the band or anything, but she liked Grace Slick, and she loved “Jane”, the song that was on the radio at the time. Grace and Marty Balin had just left the band so neither was on this album.
The more I heard “Jane” on the radio the more I loved it. Our local album rock station gave “Rock Music” some play as well. I remembered being on vacation with my family over school Christmas break and hearing a live simulcast of a New Year’s Eve concert by the band. They played a nearly all the songs from this album but also a few classics. I recognized “Somebody to Love” and “White Rabbit”, and it was weird to hear them sung by Mickey Thomas, Starship‘s newest singer.
I bought the album very soon after this and learned all the songs. It’s an amazingly strong and cohesive album. All the songs, written by different members of the band, all hold together remarkably well and there’s not a weak one in the batch. The early favorites were “Lightning Rose”, “Just the Same” and the title track. It took me a little longer but I grew to love “Just the Same”, “Things to Come” and “Awakening”, and those are probably my favorites after all these years.
I was very intrigued by the band and wanted to explore more of the history. I found a 2-record Jefferson Airplane set called Flight Log, sort of a best-of, which gave me a good introduction. But a lot of it really didn’t grab me. I liked a few songs, but most of them I didn’t connect with. Some of that changed when, a year later, Grace rejoined the band. Originally she just did some guest vocals on the next album, Modern Times, but subsequently rejoined fully. I saw them on that tour, got to see Grace live for the first time, and heard some older songs that I’d never heard before, like “Fast Buck Freddie”.
I continued to love J Starship over the years, and slowly developed a strong appreciation for J Airplane as well. The influence that they had on me was to learn that music could be about more important things than partying, sex, romance, etc. Paul Kantner had a strong socio-political sensibility and his songs were about activism and criticism. They introduced me to all the other Woodstock-era bands, and pop music became a voice of change and revolution. It meant something. It was important.
Over the years, Jefferson Starship became more and more pop, and there was less room for Paul Kantner’s songs in their mix, and he left the band. But he took the “Jefferson” with him and wouldn’t allow the remaining band to use it. They carried on as Starship and had a string of major pop hits. Grace continued in the band for two albums until she too had had enough of it and left. She and Kantner reformed with the members of Jefferson Airplane and they released one pretty strong self-titled album.
To this day, I still consider this to be the best album recorded by the band, in any configuration and under any name (with the Airplane album Crown of Creation a very close second). Jefferson has had an enormous impact on me that I cherish to this day, and they introduced me to many other artists that I love as well.
albumsFreedom at Point ZeroJefferson Starship
4 thoughts on “The Albums That Shaped Me: FREEDOM AT POINT ZERO”
Thanks! Nice to be remembered well. I still love this album. Hope you are well. Love your blog and miss you.
rasiler says:
Well this is definitely a shock! I’ve no idea at all how you ever found my humble little blog (you must have used some “slick tactics” to find it!), but I’m so glad to hear from you. You definitely are remembered well, and if I were writing an entry about a Styx album, you’d be all over it. Thanks!
I still think about how many times I put you through watching the Star Trek movies on Sunday afternoons! What a good sport you are! Yes, I still laugh about “world wide History” and yelling across the band room at someone at full volume. These days, everyone thinks I am a quiet, retiring Pastor’s wife! I tell Michael all the time, “if they only knew . . .”
J Justus says:
Pretty sad week or two we have had here . . . Forgive me for forgetting, but did GS sing uncredited background vocals on this album? One of my favorites, too.
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Burley: Liverpool's stars step up in nervy win
MANCHESTER, England -- Marcus Rashford is making a case to be considered the best striker in the Premier League, according to Ole Gunnar Solskjaer.
The 21-year-old scored his seventh goal in his last 10 games as Manchester United beat Brighton 2-1 to maintain Solskjaer's perfect start as Old Trafford boss.
"You can argue for many strikers but I'm glad he's in my team," Solskjaer said. "Harry Kane is injured so maybe that gives him the best chance to be the best one at the moment.
"No one beats him on work-rate, no one beats him on attitude and he's very confident in front of goal at the moment, he finishes, tries to shoot, he doesn't think twice about it.
"I think he's playing the best football in his career."
Victory over Chris Hughton's side took Solskjaer's winning run to seven ahead of a trip to Arsenal in the FA Cup on Friday night.
Rashford's fine solo goal made it 2-0 after Paul Pogba had scored his 10th of the season from the penalty spot.
Pascal Gross pulled one back for Brighton in the second half to set up a nervy finish and Solskjaer admitted the final 20 minutes proved there is still room for improvement.
"We need to improve on quite a few things," Solskjaer said. "Defensively, we need to find our shape better, towards the end like today, we need to defend better with the ball, OK, we're under the cosh, winning 2-1, keep it away from them, let them run and try and get the ball.
"At times today we played some fantastic football and should have scored two or three in the beginning of the second-half."
United face Arsenal, Burnley, Leicester and Fulham before title-challengers Liverpool visit Old Trafford on Feb.24.
The nine straight victories under Jose Mourinho during the 2016-17 season is United's longest run since Sir Alex Ferguson retired in 2013 and Solskjaer has challenged his squad to pass it.
"The gaffer [Ferguson] used to challenge us at times with 'Why can't you win 10 games on the bounce?'" Solskjaer said.
"As long as you take one game at a time and prepare well we should go into any game as winnable one, we have had some tough years at the club. It's a challenge for us to get to where we as a club should be."
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West Bund Art & Design Returns for its Fifth Edition...
Participating this year are nearly 90 leading international galleries from 39 cities across Asia, Europe, and North America....
From Box Camera to Biennales: Six Decades of Hiroshi Sugimoto...
Born in 1948, Hiroshi Sugimoto recalls his first photographs as ones he took whilst trainspotting at the age of 9. Now 70, he is a multi-hyphenate visual artist, with his practice spanning photography, architecture, and performing arts....
An Interview with Victor Wang王宗孚, Curator of the Upcoming 'Insights' Exhibition at PHOTOFAIRS, Shanghai...
Victor Wang talks to The Artling about how his curatorial projects are all interrelated as they constantly bridge the gap between East to West, how it’s a major curatorial prerogative of his to destabilize singular art historical cannons, and what we’re to expect from his exhibition at PHOTOFAIRS Shanghai in September...
Reflections on Art Jakarta 2018...
This edition marked the ten year anniversary of the art fair, which has actively contributed to the exposure and promotion of Indonesian art dramatically since its inception....
Condo launches in Shanghai for the first time...
Condo, the new art fair that functions around an unconventional gallery-share model launched in Shanghai for the very first time this past weekend....
Highlights from The Inaugural JINGART Beijing 2018!...
This year marks the first edition of JINGART Beijing created by the team of Art021 Shanghai Contemporary Art Fair! Held in Beijing, the cultural and historical capital of China, the Expo focuses on modern and contemporary art and design from participating galleries worldwide....
Highlights from Art Central Hong Kong 2018...
Art Central 2018 returns to Hong Kong for the fourth edition, with a strong focus on the Asia-Pacific region. On the occasion, the Artling selects some must-see highlights from the fair!...
Highlights from Art Basel Hong Kong 2018...
The sixth edition of Art Basel Hong Kong has just begun! The Artling selects some of the highlights of this year's edition....
Making the Intangible Tangible: Exploring Jun Ong's Light Art...
Jun Ong is known for his immersive light art sculptures and installations. We speak to him to find out more about his latest commission for Art Central HK 2018 and his artistic process......
Ex-Art Basel Hong Kong Director Launches New International Art Fair in Taipei to Be Presented By UBS...
Magnus Renfrew, former director of Art Basel Hong Kong (previously known as Art HK before it was acquired by Art Basel), has announced the launch of his latest project, Taipei Dangdai (台北当代), a new international art fair that he has co-founded and will be directing....
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NVIDIA CEO: “Cryptocurrency Is Here to Stay”
jensenhuang
madmoney
jimcramer
john April 3, 2018, 1:57pm #1
nvidia.original.jpg990×550 96 KB
via Bitcoin Mag
Speaking with Mad Money host Jim Cramer, NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang recently claimed that “cryptocurrency is here to stay,” and he “doesn’t see the craze ending anytime soon.”
Though it first came to fruition in 2008, bitcoin gained a solid taste of mainstream popularity in 2017 when its price began rising faster than anyone had anticipated. The year started with a single bitcoin trading at nearly $1,000, though things ended on a higher note when the currency nearly grazed the $20,000 mark.
Since January 2018, bitcoin and other virtual currencies have experienced serious drops in their prices, but Huang is convinced that cryptocurrency remains as popular as ever.
“Cryptocurrency will be here,” he stated in the interview while discussing the future of finance. “The ability for the world to have a very low-friction, low-cost way of exchanging value is going to be here for a long time.”
NVIDIA is a technology company based in Santa Clara, California. Some of the enterprises’ staple products are its graphics processing units or GPUs. These small processors, Huang explains, were some of the main reasons the company first decided to get involved in cryptocurrency last year.
The GPUs have a powerful ability to mine virtual currencies, and blockchain technology requires computers that can be distributed “all over the world” while remaining immutable and safe. Thus, Huang felt his company’s products could be greatly beneficial to cryptocurrency miners:
“The reason why cryptocurrency became such a popular thing on top of our GPUs is our GPU system is the world’s largest installed base of distributed supercomputing. Our processor serves as the perfect processor to enable this supercomputing capability to be distributed, and that’s the reason why it’s used.”
Interestingly, Huang noted that while the chips were no doubt powerful and crucial to the mining industry, he and his fellow executives are “not ready to move” on this just yet. For the time being, NVIDIA is primarily involved in the gaming business, data centers and self-driving cars, and cryptocurrency and mining operations account for only small portions of the company’s profits.
In fact, NVIDIA currently has no alleged involvement in Bitcoin, per Huang’s comments at a recent GPU technology conference. He said its processors are predominantly used to mine ether, which accounted for roughly 6 percent of the company’s GPU sales in 2017.
“Ethereum ‘ether’ was designed as an algorithm to ensure no singular entity (or a few entities) has the power to control the ether,” he said. “It was designed so that the algorithm requires the type of computing capabilities — the type of processing capabilities — that are made possible by GPUs in a distributed system. The GPU is popular with Ethereum because the GPU is the single largest distributed supercomputer in the world. It is the only supercomputer that is literally in everyone’s hands, and no single entity can control the currency.”
He says that the influence of cryptocurrency isn’t likely to affect how they do business in the present, though he’s very confident this could change in the future:
“Gaming is a much bigger business; data center is a much bigger business; our professional graphics is a much bigger business, and, of course, in the future, everything that moves will be autonomous, and we’ll have autonomous capabilities, and that’s going to be a much bigger market, but cryptocurrency gave it that extra bit of juice that caused all of our GPUs to be in such great demand.”
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Home > Contributors >
Ali Nouri
Ali Nouri is president of the Federation of American Scientists. Previously he served as legislative director to US Senator Al Franken (D-MN) and adviser to US Senator Jim Webb (D-VA). He was also a biotechnology adviser to the office of the UN Secretary General; and a research associate at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School where he developed initiatives to cut off pathways through which biotechnology can be used to develop biological weapons. (@AliNouriPhD)
Articles by Ali Nouri
Synthetic biology: A call for a new culture of responsibility
By Ali Nouri, Shahram Seyedin-Noor | Opinion, Synthetic biology
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Ebook Poor Smart Rich: Moving from Poverty to Middle Class and Beyond
This product is available
Do you want to be poor all of your life?
If you feel like you’ve lost the economic race before you’ve even started it, John Segal has some good news for you. You can avoid poverty. You can succeed financially, professionally, personally, and spiritually.
Whether you’re just starting out or you’ve been struggling on your own for a few years, this author, teacher, and entrepreneur will lead you down the road from Poor to Smart to Rich!
"There’s a lot of fuzzy thinking today about the government’s role in wiping
out poverty. But I’m absolutely convinced that making wise choices on a
consistent basis gives you a better shot at winning than waiting on the state
to bail you out. And if you’re looking for some guidance on how to make
those life-changing decisions, this book is a great place to start."
—Dave Ramsey, Best-selling author and nationally syndicated radio show host
“Having spent a lifetime overcoming obstacles himself…few people are more qualified to convince youth that the path to opportunity still exists.”
—Don Eberly, former White House aide, author, and founder of the National Fatherhood Initiative
About Author John M. Segal: Overcoming early learning problems, John M. Segal graduated from Indiana University with a Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration and a Juris Doctorate in Law. He served on active duty in the United States Army. In addition to a professional career as owner of a leading international manufacturing and service business, Segal was a board member and chairman of the National Fatherhood Initiative (NFI) for 18 years. As a member of Young Presidents Organization, he developed and taught classes on how to write personal life goals. John currently teaches classes on law and business to joint graduate degree (Law-MBA) students at Indiana University. John and his wife Sara, live in Indiana, where they have been active in Young Life.
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Author: Robert Mullarkey
Computing graduate who works in an office. Still finds enough time to watch a lot of anime and play a lot of video games
Fruit of Grisaia, The - Eps.1-3
Stop me if you've heard this one before: An aloof male student transfers into a new school and suddenly catches the eye of every female cast member within five minutes of him stepping foot in the classroom. This same predicament befalls The Fruit of Grisaia's protagonist Yuji Kazami, simply due to the fact that he happens to be the only male student attending his school and that every female cast member happens to be the only other people within the school. What's meant to be billed as a “normal” school for “normal” students is suddenly thrown into question due to eccentricities and odd behaviours of the students, while protagonist Yuji trains himself in military fashion and brief snippets of his past seem to suggest working in shady areas as a hired mercenary. While some of the girls show odd behaviours, such as a girl trying to act Tsundere to the point of dyeing and styling her hair to better fit the character, a girl who is rather fond of breaking and entering and one who has a penchant for attacking people with a box cutter for no discernible reason. The anime makes a point of showing how odd and unique each of the characters are through their various interactions with Yuji.
This aspect not only makes up the show but is the only thing on display - so far, whatever plot The Fruit of Grisaia is meant to have is vaguely alluded to in favour of showcasing Yuji's round-robin interactions with each of the girls. Scenes jump back and forth between Yuji talking with each of the girls in a way that doesn't leave any character out but doesn't quite give any particular girl any extra attention or focus. From this it's hard to get too invested in particular character due to the way in which the anime handles their screen-time - just as one character is getting attention, the gears change and we see Yuji interacting with another in very haphazard transitions between scenes. Interspersed into the mix are a few comedic scenes which show several of the girls interacting with Yuji.
During these times the anime likes to play around with the art style, usually making character designs look simpler, brightening the screen and adding designs to the background. Most of the time it really stands out and clashes with the aesthetic the series has gone for but the juxtaposition somehow adds to the comedic value of these short scenes. Normally The Fruit of Grisaia has a clean yet sharp look to it, presented in a letterbox format, giving it an appearance more akin to a movie.
What remains to be seen from the series however is its actual plot. As stated previously, the series so far is mainly just a series of conversations with very little purpose other than establishing characters, providing some comedy and making sure each girl gets enough time on-screen so as to not offend already established fans familiar of the series through its visual novel roots. While the plot is unseen at the moment, there are a few scenes showing the briefest of glimpses into some of the character's back stories and hinting at a dark future plot. At this point, the main draw of the series seems to be its potential for some interesting plot development, as the characters alone are rather stereotypical and flit the line between being a cliché and parody. While there are characters who try to break the mold, not enough time and attention has been given yet for any of the characters in the show to be fully realised. In this regard each of the girls only have themselves and Yuji to play off, and the absence of any side characters and supporting cast gives the show a rather empty feeling to it. Characters are in rooms that are filled with between two to five people at any given time and the setting is an empty school that gives off a rather dull and lifeless motif.
The Fruit of Grisaia may not have the strongest starts and is a bit of a slow burner, but the character interactions and brief moments of comedy do enough to keep your attention while the plot waits to jump out from whatever corner it's hiding behind.
You can currently watch The Fruit of Grisaia in streaming form on Crunchyroll.
Japanese audio with English subtitles. Video is available in 360p, 480p, 720p and 1080p resolutions; HD formats and removal of advertisements available to paid subscribers.
A slow start saved from complete ruin by its character interactions and the promise of a deeper plot that's yet to unfold.
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Geomagic Adds Paul Rizzo to Board of Directors
Former IBM vice chairman brings strong mix of business and industry savvy to innovative 3D software company.
RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK, N.C., April 7, 1999 - Geomagic, Inc., the software company that introduces simplicity and automation to 3D model creation, today announced that Paul Rizzo, former IBM vice chairman has joined the company's Board of Directors. Mr. Rizzo's appointment comes as a result of funding by Franklin Street/ Fairview Capital. Mr. Rizzo is chairman of Franklin Street Partners and a general partner of Franklin Street/Fairview Capital.
"My contribution will be to guide the development of Geomagic's business strategies," said Paul Rizzo. "I am very pleased to take this position on their Board."
Paul Rizzo, who was one of the founding stockholders of Franklin Street Partners, recently retired from his position as vice chairman of the board of IBM Corporation. He currently serves on the boards of directors of several corporations, including Johnson & Johnson, Ryder Systems, and Cox Enterprises, Inc., which are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ-listed Pharmaceutical Product Development, Inc. and Kenan Transport Company. Mr. Rizzo is also former dean of the Kenan Flagler Business School at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He holds a BS from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
"I am honored to have Paul join our Board," said Ping Fu, co-founder, chairman, and chief technology officer of Geomagic. "He is very knowledgeable and brings a wealth of experience and connections to Geomagic."
About Geomagic
Geomagic (www.geomagic.com) is a global company dedicated to advancing and applying 3D technology for the benefit of humanity. Geomagic’s scanning and design software solutions are used to capture and model 3D content from physical objects, organically sculpt complex shapes, and prepare products for manufacturing. In addition, the company produces powerful 3D metrology and inspection software that verifies dimensional quality by comparing as-built products to master designs. Geomagic’s Sensable Phantom haptic devices simulate the sense of touch in a digital environment.
Geomagic’s software and hardware are utilized by world-class customers in a variety of industries, including aerospace, automotive, medical, consumer products, toys, collectibles, coindesign, jewelry, fine art, heritage restoration, research, education, mold making, entertainment, training and surgical simulation. In fact, some of the world’s leading companies and research organizationsuse Geomagic software, including Ford, BMW,Boeing, Harley Davidson, Timberland, Mattel/Fisher Price, Lego, Pratt & Whitney, NASA, Schneider Electronic, 3M, Danaher and Invisalign. Geomagic is based in Research Triangle Park, N.C., USA, with an office in Boston, subsidiaries in Europe and Asia, and channel partners worldwide.
Geomagic, Geomagic Studio, Geomagic Qualify, Geomagic Qualify Probe, Geomagic Spark, Wrap, Geomagic Wrap, Phantom, OpenHaptics, Omni, Freeform, Claytools, Sensable and Sensable Technologies, Inc. are trademarks or registered trademarks of Geomagic Inc. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners.
Rachael Taggart
Geomagic, Inc.
Contact Rachael
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Introducing... Girls Who Code UK!
Girls Who Code is an international non-profit organisation working to close the gender gap in technology by teaching girls computer science, bravery, and sisterhood. Our free programming is now available in the UK.
Women make up 50% of the UK workforce but less than 15% of STEM jobs
Computing is where the jobs are — and where they will be in the future — but women and girls are being left behind. While interest in computer science declines over time, the biggest drop-off happens during a girl’s teenage years. By university, women account for less than a third of STEM undergraduates in the UK.
Girls Who Code is changing that
Since launching in the United States in 2012, Girls Who Code has reached 185,000 girls through its programmes, and 100 million people through campaigns, advocacy work, and 13-book New York Times best-selling series.
Our Clubs lead the way
Girls Who Code Clubs are free programmes that get girls ages 11-18 excited about coding and computer science. Clubs can run before, during or after-school, on weekends or over the summer. In Clubs, girls engage in fun and simple online coding tutorials, build community through interactive activities, learn about inspiring role models in tech, and work together to design solutions to real-world problems facing their communities.
Start a free Club today
Schools, libraries, universities, faith-based organisations and other non-profits can apply now to start a free Girls Who Code Club in the UK. Clubs are led by volunteer Facilitators; many have NO technical experience.
Special thanks to our funding partners
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PCMag UK | Reviews | Consumer Electronics | Digital Cameras | Review
Sony Alpha 7 II
By Jim Fisher Dec 31, 2015
5-axis in-body stabilization system. 24-megapixel full-frame image sensor. Compact design. 5fps burst shooting. Clean, detailed high ISO images. Sharp, tilting rear LCD. Focus peaking and magnification. Sharp OLED EVF. Improved ergonomics. Dust and moisture-resistant design. Adds 3-axis stabilization to adapted lenses. High bitrate 1080p video.
Lacks PC sync socket. No built-in flash. External battery charger not included. Battery life is disappointing. Sensor design includes OLPF. Hyperactive eye sensor.
The mirrorless, full-frame Sony Alpha 7 II improves on its predecessor with in-body stabilization, faster autofocus, and a better ergonomic design, and earns Editors' Choice honors in the process.
The Alpha 7 II ($1,699.99, body only) is the latest camera in Sony's full-frame mirrorless series, and it's a marked improvement over its predecessor, the Alpha 7. It takes everything that we loved about the original A7 and improves upon it. The autofocus system is a bit snappier when tracking moving targets, the grip is more substantial for comfortable handheld shooting, and there's now an in-body stabilization system that steadies any lens that's attached to the camera, even ones that aren't native to the Sony system. That makes the Alpha 7 II our Editors' Choice in the full-frame mirrorless category.
Editors' Note: This review has been updated after testing the Alpha 7 II with updated firmware released in November 2015. The score has not changed.
SEE ALSO: How to Set Up an Amazon Echo
The Alpha 7 II is the fourth camera in the family—joining the 7S, Alpha 7R, and the 7, which is remaining in production at a lower price point. It's the first Alpha 7 family member to undergo a serious change in body design—a deeper handgrip and a refined control layout go a long way to make the camera more comfortable with which to shoot. But that does mean that if you opt to use a vertical shooting grip, you'll have to buy a new one; the grip for the A7 II is priced at $350, holds two batteries, and includes vertical shooting controls.
View All 29 Photos in Gallery
The camera measures in at 3.8 by 5 by 2.4 inches (HWD) and weighs 1.2 pounds without a lens. It's thicker than the initial trio of Alpha 7 cameras, and a little bit heavier (3.75 by 5 by 1.9 inches, 1 pound); the body itself is a bit deeper due to the stabilization system and the larger handgrip. The only non-Sony full-frame mirrorless cameras out there now are high-priced models from Leica, including the M (Typ 240) and SL. The Leica M is a bit smaller, but heavier, although it's a purely manual focus camera that uses a fixed optical viewfinder. Leica rangefinder lenses can be used on the A7 II via a mechanical adapter, benefitting from the in-body stabilization in the process. That broadens the appeal of the camera to those who value top-end optics, but don't want to spend a fortune on a camera body.
Aside from the lens release button, controls are absent from the front plate. The lens mount is stainless steel, just like the one on the Alpha 7S, so you can attach big, heavy lenses to the svelte body with some confidence. Sony doesn't stuff the top plate with controls either, there are none to the left of the EVF. A multi-interface hot shoe sits above the finder, and a diopter adjustment is included so you can fine-tune it to match your eyesight. To its right you'll find a standard mode dial, an EV compensation dial that can be set in third-stop increments from -3 to +3, and programmable C1 and C2 button. The power switch and shutter releases sit on an angle in front of those two buttons, atop the handgrip. The front control wheel is on the grip as well.
The Menu button sits at an angle on the rear plate, above the LCD and just to the left of the eyecup. To its right is C3, another customizable button that acts as a magnification control when reviewing images, and a rear control wheel. The bulk of the controls are flush on the back, to the right of the LCD. The topmost can switch between automatic or manual focusing, or lock the exposure—an integrated toggle switch adjusts its function. The Fn button brings up an on-screen menu of shooting settings, and there are the standard playback and delete buttons; delete doubles as the programmable C4 button when shooting.
A flat command dial with a center button rounds out the controls. By default, spinning it adjusts the ISO, but it also has directional presses that change the drive mode, engage the self-timer, set the amount of information displayed on the EVF or rear LCD, and offer direct access to the ISO menu. The function of the rear dial, as well as most of the other buttons on the camera, can be customized via the extensive menu system. The movie record button is located on the rear thumb grip, angled against right rear. It's recessed just enough that you're unlikely to activate it by accident, but it can be disabled when in still-capture modes if you're worried about accidentally starting a video.
The overlay menu launched via the Fn button is also customizable. It's got 12 banks, each of which can be programmed. In its default state it gives quick on-screen access to the drive mode, flash output settings, flash compensation, focus mode, focus area, exposure compensation setting, ISO, metering pattern, white balance, the dynamic range optimizer, picture output settings, and the shooting mode. Between programmable overlays and physical controls, the Alpha 7 II allows you to set almost all of its functions to suit your particular shooting style.
The 3-inch rear display is mounted on a hinge so you can frame shots from above or below. It's sharp at 1,228k dots, and plenty bright. It's as sharp as a 921k-dot display, but has an extra group of "white dots" that add luminosity. It's not a touch screen like the one on the Leica SL. The EVF is the same 2,759k-dot OLED that Sony uses in many other Alpha cameras. It's one of the best out there, with excellent sharpness and contrast. The camera automatically switches between the EVF and rear LCD via an eye sensor. The sensor is a bit hyperactive—its range is a bit excessive, so it's fairly easy to fool the camera into switching to the EVF when you're actually holding it at waist level with the screen titled up. Sony would be wise to add a feature that disables the EVF entirely when the screen isn't positioned flush against the rear, as you'll have to dive into the menu and disable the EVF entirely if you want to grab a shot with the camera tight against your body at waist level.
Wi-Fi and Image Stabilization
Wi-Fi is built in. The camera works with the Sony PlayMemories Mobile app to transfer images and video to iOS and Android devices. The app also supports remote control, but there are limited controls available out of the box. You'll want to download a free update from the PlayMemories Mobile app store, and you'll have to set up an account on a Web site in order to do so. Once updated, the remote control provides full manual control over shooting. You will have to set the mode via the camera itself, however.
Sony's PlayMemories app store offers a number of programs that can be downloaded to expand the functionality of the camera, and some of them are free. Freebies include Direct Upload, which allows you to post images and MP4 video directly to select social networks, and Sync to Smartphone, which makes sure that the images on your memory card are also on your phone. There are a number of paid apps, ranging in price from $4.99 to $9.99, and Sony has continued to expand the selection. My complaint with this approach is the same with the other Alpha cameras that I've reviewed—when you're spending this much money on a camera, the apps should be free, especially ones like Lens Compensation ($9.99), which corrects optical imperfections in the company's lens lineup.
In-body stabilization is one of the huge selling points of the Alpha 7 II, and it's the real deal. When you're using a native autofocus lens it stabilizes along 5 axes, compensating for pitch, yaw, x-axis and y-axis shift, and roll. To put that in perspective, most lenses with integrated stabilization can only compensate for pitch and yaw. Sony has several lenses in its E-mount line-up with integrated stabilization—they bear an OSS designation. When used in conjunction with the A7 II the in-lens and in-body systems work in concert to steady images.
If you're using a non-native lens, or even a native manual focus lens like the Zeiss Loxia 2/50, it's stabilized along three axes—yaw, pitch, and roll. There's a technical reason for that. In order to compensate along the x and y axes, the camera needs to know the distance to the subject, which requires electronic communication of the focal distance from the lens to the body. To compensate for the other three axes, the only data that needs to be transmitted is the focal length of the lens. Even if you're using a purely mechanical Leica lens it can be stabilized—you're able to manually enter the focal length via a menu. The only real downside to this is that the A7 II does not add that focal length to the recorded EXIF data, so if you like to track which lens a shot is captured with, you'll need to take notes.
But how well does the stabilization work? If you buy an A7 II and don't bother to update the firmware, you may find it a bit underwhelming; out of the box I was able to handhold a 135mm lens at about 1/60-second with acceptable results. But the firmware update really improves the in-body stabilization. Using an old manual focus Pentax 85mm lens this time, I was able to get tack sharp results at handheld speeds as low as 1/25-second, and reasonably sharp images at 1/15-second—and that's with stabilization along just three axes.
I also recorded some handheld video footage using the 85mm lens. With stabilization enabled the footage was stable, although sudden, jarring movements were still jarring. But watching it next to footage recorded under identical conditions with stabilization disabled shows why you'll want some sort of stabilization when shooting video. Nonstabilized footage was very jittery, even though I thought I was holding the camera fairly steady. The Alpha 7 II's in-body OIS won't replace a steadicam for serious video work, but it's a helpful addition for casual clips or cinema verité-style projects.
There was a big question mark about Sony's full-frame system when we reviewed the Alpha 7 and 7R in late 2013: lens selection. The system launched with just three available lenses, but the past two years have seen numerous releases from both Sony and Zeiss, to the point where it's safe to call the system mature.
But there are still a few gaps—f/2.8 zooms and extreme telephoto lenses are still missing. But the Alpha 7 II is a versatile camera that can mount lenses from other systems using adapters. And thanks to the latest firmware, autofocus SLR lenses from Canon, Nikon, and Sony can use the camera's on-sensor phase detection system for fast, accurate autofocus. This feature was first seen in the Alpha 7R II.
That's the idea, at least. I tested the camera along with an adapter for Canon EF lenses from Fotodiox and Sony's own LA-EA3 adapter for Alpha SLR lenses. Results in the field were hit and miss. When it worked, it worked quickly and very well, tracking moving subjects with ease and delivering accurate focus. But like the Alpha 7R II, the Alpha 7 II can have a tough time locking focus when using an adapted lens. If the focus wasn't set close to the subject to begin with, the lens could hunt back and forth for seconds without finding focus. I found that a quick twist of the manual focus ring helped considerably—if my subject was almost in focus the lens would be able to locate it, lock focus, and track it with ease.
This is a first-generation implementation, and I expect the technology to improve in future models. If you're buying an Alpha 7 II specifcially to use with third-party autofocus SLR lenses, you may find the experience to be disappointing, or at the very least inconsistent. You'll also find that the active phase detect focus area is rather small. It covers the center third of the frame, where the Alpha 7R II has phase detect points covering most of the image sensor.
Owners of Alpha SLR lenses have another option, the LA-EA4 adapter. It has its own phase detect sensor, and offered more consistent performance when I tested it with the original Alpha 7R.
Performance and Conclusions
The Alpha 7 II starts and shoots in 1.5 seconds, focuses quickly in bright light (0.05-second), and does the same in about 0.7-second in very dim light. It matches the original Alpha 7 in those figures. It also matches it in shot-to-shot time; when set to continuous drive mode with locked focus, it fires off photos at 5fps and it can 25 Raw+JPG, 27 Raw, or 65 JPG captures; the buffer requires 18.6 seconds, 15.2 seconds, or 22.6 seconds, respectively. The Alpha 7 was limited to 55 JPGs before slowing, so there's a slight improvement there.
Sony's claims that the focus system is improved by about 30 percent, and those improvements are in the realm of tracking accuracy and speed. The number of phase detect pixels and their placement hasn't changed, but the tracking method is now similar to what we see on the Alpha 6000. Small dots appear, corresponding to phase points, to detect moving objects. This allows the Alpha 7 II to fire off shots at 5fps while keeping your subject in focus. It worked as advertised in lab tests, although we didn't see as significant an improvement over the original Alpha 7 as Sony states. If you're really serious about shooting action, you'll still do better with a camera with a dedicated phase detect sensor that supports predictive tracking. The Sony Alpha 77 II is a strong entry in the APS-C field in that regard, and the Nikon D750 is one to consider when looking for a full-frame model.
Like the original Alpha 7, the Alpha 7 II incorporates an optical low-pass filter as part of its image sensor design. This limits critical sharpness, but also counteracts color moiré effects that can appear when capturing images with certain repeating patterns and video. If resolution and image detail are your main requirements, the Alpha 7R II, which omits the filter and uses a 42-megapixel full-frame sensor, is probably a better choice for you. There's still plenty of detail in the 24-megapixel output from the Alpha 7 II, but a camera that omits the OLPF captures images that are just a little crisper, a difference that's especially evident in prints.
See How We Test Digital Cameras
I used Imatest to check and see how well the A7 II handles shooting at high ISO sensitivities, often used in dim conditions. When capturing JPGs the A7 II keeps noise under 1.5 percent through its top ISO 25600 sensitivity, but a simple score on a test doesn't tell the whole story. I took a close look at images from our ISO test scene on a calibrated NEC MultiSync PA271W display to see how detail holds up at high sensitivities. There's definitely a drop-off in quality at ISO 25600, but image quality is stronger than other cameras we've seen when pushed that far. Some of the fine lines in our test scene have smudged together, and very fine detail has been washed away, but you can still get away with that setting if shooting for Web output. At ISO 12800 detail is stronger, but still compromised to a point. Things are better at ISO 6400, and at ISO 3200 images are crisp. Crops from each full-stop ISO are included in the review slideshow so you can judge for yourself.
The camera also captures images in Raw format, which is appealing to photographers who want to apply noise reduction via software tools like Lightroom, and who want to have the flexibility to adjust color balance and exposure after capture. You can choose to shoot in a compressed Raw format, which saves space on your memory card, or an uncompressed format for the highest quality image. The Alpha 7 II captures detailed Raw images with very little noise through ISO 1600. There's more noise at ISO 3200 and 6400, but detail is strong. Noise comes on strong at ISO 12800, but Raw output is crisper than the comparable JPG output. If you don't mind a very grainy image, ISO 25600 is a viable option when shooting Raw as well. I've also included crops from our ISO test sequence, converted from Raw using default settings in Lightroom 5.7.1, in the slideshow, so you can judge for yourself.
The A7 II supports video at 1080p24, 1080p30, or 1080p60 quality in a variety of recording formats. The highest quality is XAVC S, which requires you to use a Class 10 SDXC memory card in order to keep up with its 50Mbps bitrate. Video is crisp and full of detail, with quick autofocus. AVCHD is also available as a file format option, with bitrates up to 28Mbps, and MP4 is an option if you want to be able to copy low-bitrate footage directly to your smartphone over Wi-Fi. There's a standard mic input, as well as a headphone jack, so you can easily connect an external mic. The multi-interface hot shoe also supports Sony's XLR-K2M adapter ($599.99), which adds balanced XLR input and a shotgun mic, if you're serious about audio quality. Even when using the internal microphone you can view and adjust levels.
The video performance is strong, but it is limited to 1080p. More and more cameras are gaining the capability to record footage at 4K quality. Sony has one of those in its full-frame mirrorless lineup. The 12-megapixel Alpha 7S does require an external video recorder to capture 4K footage, but is quickly becoming a favorite among videographers who want to get the full-frame look from moving images.
In addition to headphone and microphone ports, the Alpha 7 II sports a micro HDMI video output and a micro USB port. Sony doesn't include a dedicated battery charger with the A7 II; instead you'll need to charge the battery in-camera via an included USB cable and AC adapter. If the battery life was better that wouldn't be a huge issue. CIPA rates the camera for 270 shots using the EVF or 350 with the rear LCD, but those figures don't take image review, Wi-Fi usage, or video recording into account. If you plan on shooting all day you'll want to pick up at least one additional battery ($49.99) and an external charger ($39.99) so you can charge one battery in-camera and the second in the charger simultaneously. The A7 II has a single memory card slot that supports SD, SDHC, SDXC, and Memory Stick Duo card formats. There's no built-in flash, and there's no PC sync socket to connect to studio strobes—but the hot shoe does support a PocketWizard transmitter, and there are numerous shoe adapters that add a sync socket. The camera can sync with a flash at speeds as short as 1/250-second.
There aren't a lot of full-frame mirrorless models on the market—and the affordable ones are all made by Sony. The Alpha 7 II represents a solid upgrade to the original Alpha 7, and despite not having a large number of peers, is worthy of an excellent rating. The in-body stabilization works well for stills and video alike, and the short distance between the lens mount and sensor allows you to use virtually any lens with the camera, as long as the proper adapter is available. The camera provides the depth of field control that full-frame photographers adore, and it focuses quickly and accurately in all types of situations. It's not perfect—the battery life is disappointing when compared with full-frame SLRs, and you'll need to buy an external charger if you want to shoot with the camera while charging an additional battery.
In terms of pure image and video quality, the Alpha 7 II isn't the best mirrorless camera that Sony makes. The 4K shooting, 42-megapixel Alpha 7R II wins out there, but it costs almost twice as much as the Alpha 7 II, making it more of a niche product. And Sony makes another specialized camera using this body design, the 12-megapixel Alpha 7S II, which offers the best 4K video of the bunch and is excellent when shooting at extreme ISO settings. But the Alpha 7 II's affordable price tag, excellent image quality, and full-frame image sensor make it our Editors' Choice. It's a versatile camera that will meet the needs of enthusiast photographers who want a full-frame body, as well as working pros who have embraced mirrorless systems.
Sony Alpha 7 ...
Firmware Update Adds Features to Sony Alpha 7 II
Jim Fisher Senior Analyst, Digital Cameras
Senior digital camera analyst for the PCMag consumer electronics reviews team, Jim Fisher is a graduate of the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, where he concentrated on documentary video production. Jim's interest in photography really took off when he borrowed his father's Hasselblad 500C and light meter in 2007.
He honed his writing skills at retailer B&H Photo, where he wrote thousands upon thousands of product descriptions, blog posts, and reviews. Since then he's shot with hundreds of camera models, ranging from pocket point-and-shoots to medium format digital cameras. And he's reviewed almost all of them. When he's not testing cameras and gear for PCMag, he's likely out and about shooting with ... See Full Bio
More From Jim Fisher
Hasselblad 907X Special Edition Camera Celebrates Moon Landing
Fujifilm Announces XF 16-80mm and GF 50mm Lenses
Sigma 70-200mm F2.8 DG OS HSM Sports
Nikon Z 7
The Right Camera for Every Vacation
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Special Event Monique Marvez
Select Show: Select Friday, Sep 20, 2019 8:00 PM Saturday, Sep 21, 2019 7:00 PM Saturday, Sep 21, 2019 9:00 PM Sunday, Sep 22, 2019 7:00 PM
Monique Marvez
Monique Marvez:
Monique and unique go hand-in-hand. This radio and television personality, writer and comedian is on a mission to make people laugh. Her comedy is the perfect balance of “aha!” and “ha-ha!”
Monique first exploded on the Miami comedy scene and soon starting touring the country and eventually the world. She has appeared on HBO, Comedy Central, ABC, Montel Williams, PBS and numerous other television shows. Monique was commissioned to develop a sitcom and write the pilot script about her rollercoaster love life by Dick Wolf Productions/ NBC Universal. She was nominated for an Alma Award for her Showtime Special “Latin Divas of Comedy” which has nearly a million hits on YouTube!
Barry Diller hand-picked her to be the face and late night host of his Miami television venture WAMI which resulted in two TV specials: “Monique Over Miami” and “Lady Zings the Blues.” Eva Longoria also chose her to be one of the original members of the on going comedy troupe “The Hot Tamales Live!” and she hosted segments of Dick Clark’s Rockin’ New Year’s Eve from South Beach. Marvez soon found her way into the world of morning radio in Indianapolis at WENS which lead to her winning the “Million Dollar Morning Show” contest conducted by San Diego’s JackFM. Monique stands alone as the only person in the country to host a Jack FM show.
Monique can currently be seen on “Snoop Dogg’s Bad Girls of Comedy” on Showtime, and she’s working on several original television projects and continuing to WOW audiences with her sharp stand-up comedy and amazing improv skills. She continues to headline at comedy clubs around the country and was selected as the spokesperson for Fox Sports for their VIP promotional tour. Her new book, “Not Skinny,
Not Blonde” will be released later this year.
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Techdirt on a roll
Matt Marshall February 13, 2006 8:24 AM
Most people don’t realize that the popular blog, Techdirt is also a company that is selling a pretty sophisticated information service to large companies. Mike Masnick and four other guys started the Belmont company in 2000, with no financing other than a few thousand dollars of Mike’s own money.
We caught up recently with Mike, who is the main writer over at the blog. Turns out, he’s now about to expand his service.
The site saw its traffic triple over past year, and our bloglines account shows it has more than 20,000 subscribers, more than any other blog we read regularly (BoingBoing, which is probably the biggest blog, has…
40,000).
So far, he’s been serving mostly Fortune 500 companies, combing through all kinds of publications and other news sources and selecting a recommended diet of reading for their employees. Typically, about 50 to 100 people use the service at each company customer, Mike tells us.
Next month, he’s moving his new product “Techdirt InfoAdvisor,” out of testing mode. It basically provides a tailor made information-news tracker to customers. He showed it to us; it’s a compelling combination of technology to track the most important news within a specific industry and Techdirt’s own personal editing services.
And on March 11, he’ll also be hosting a local tech conference, called “Techdirt Greenhouse,” a sort of idea workshop for start-ups that he wants to make more interactive than the usual conference. Each company will do a five-minute demo, and then attendees will break up into small groups to try to help answer a question or solve an issue the company is facing. He’ll be announcing it shortly…
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Collaboration helps communities plan for disaster, new research shows
LAWRENCE — When it comes to large-scale disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina or the Sept. 11 attacks, communities may be their own best allies for overcoming such crises, through their networks of contacts and connectedness, according to a new research article co-written by KU scholars, “Social Capital and Emergency Management Planning: A Test of Community Context Effects on Formal and Informal Collaboration.” The article appears in the latest edition of The American Review of Public Administration.
In the article, the researchers conclude that counties with higher rates of “bridging” social capital networks — non-government citizen groups that are highly interactive with other community groups — are better equipped for crisis management than counties whose community organizations are more isolated and less interactive with one another. In other words, good relationships between community groups lead to more collaboration on ideas and actions helpful in times of distress.
“With Hurricane Katrina, it wasn’t just first responders who stepped up — there was a larger community that came to the rescue, whether it was businesses like Home Depot or Walmart providing supplies or individuals who got in their cars and drove in to help,” said Bonnie Johnson, KU associate professor of urban planning and one of the researchers. “This gave us the idea to look at the characteristics of particular communities and see what difference they may make for emergency management versus simply looking at the skills of professional emergency managers or governmental resources.”
The research was conducted by Johnson, Holly Goerdel and John Pierce, both faculty members for KU’s School of Public Affairs and Administration, along with Washington State University faculty member Nicholas Lovrich Jr.
Previous research in public health, environmental management, public education and cybersecurity has shown comprehensive, collaborative planning is crucial to effectively respond to local government needs, emergency or not.
“We live in an era where we’re constantly asked to think about issues within the frame of ‘emergency situations,'” Goerdel said. “And when people are considering a situation where life is actually on the line, they want to reach out to others they trust.”
For this study, the researchers merged two data sets. The first, a 2006 survey representing 361 U.S. counties, asked emergency management professionals whether their counties had ever collaborated with a variety of federal, state and local agencies, as well as nonprofits, hospitals, schools and faith-based organizations.
Each county received a score for the number of partners with which it reported engaging with in one of four types of collaboration, from formal agreements to informal cooperation.
The second data set counted each county’s number of community organizations, from political and religious groups to sports clubs and labor organizations.
Merging the data sets revealed that the more “bridging” networks per capita, the more likely informal (not requiring official agreements) collaboration was to occur.
Data was taken from the National Association of Counties, the U.S. Census and other government documents. Researchers also took into account factors such as racial/ethnic makeup and affluence of each county.
“Bridging” social capital tends to be more useful in a crisis than “bonding” social capital, because it promotes many of the antecedents needed for collaboration, Pierce said.
“Bonding” social capital is created by more homogenous groups who may work toward common goals but don’t have much interaction outside their groups. Religious and church groups often fall into this category.
“Bridging means it occurs between groups. There’s interaction, sharing of information and a sense of trust between people,” Pierce said. “These groups, like political parties, for example, reach out to people outside their own group, and that ability in itself is a resource for accomplishing things.”
As a result, bridging social capital networks enhance emergency management’s potential to “plan creatively with multiple and non-formal strategies for the future presence of emergency circumstances and the threat of disaster,” the researchers concluded.
"Emergency management officials and other public officials might now look at their communities and take stock of social capital levels and strategize how to identify and employ bridging capital in order to improve prospects of being able to collaborate in times of crisis or when coming together as a community is required.”
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Asset Recycling in America
The Hon Joe Hockey
Australian Ambassador to the United States
Federal P3 Conference – Washington DC
Download PDF of speech
Australia and Americans like things that are big.
We have big countries and when it comes to infrastructure projects we have big ambitions.
In 1956, Eisenhower facilitated construction of the revolutionary and world renowned US Interstate Highway System. In 1949, Australia embarked on the largest engineering project in our history, the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectricity Scheme.
While these projects took place in decades past, they are remembered today, not only as great nation building exercises, but for their continued utility in the modern era.
However, in recent years Australia and the US have taken divergent approaches to infrastructure development even though we have the same federal structure, and states and territories own the infrastructure while the federal government is responsible for funding it. Australia has sought to leverage the capital of the private sector to develop this important public good and stimulate the economy. Our infrastructure is now experiencing an unprecedented boom, fuelled by common desire of governments and the private sector to get things built.
There is some irony that the very first private sector transport service in Australia was started by an American, Mr Freeman Cobb. The famous Cobb and Co used American stagecoaches to deliver exclusive transport services by stagecoach from Melbourne to the goldfields from 1853.
Pay as you go is a crucial part of the Australian infrastructure story. In fact, the famous Sydney Harbour Bridge could only be built as a toll road in 1932 and, like most of America’s toll roads, it was Government owned. That was until the seal was broken on P3s in 1992 when a consortium of an Australian engineering company and a Japanese construction company took over the Harbour Bridge Toll and at the same time build a new toll tunnel under the Harbour tunnel. Both tolls paid for the new, much needed Sydney Harbour crossing and the public only noticed the much needed new access.
Money and necessity forced the Government to work with the private sector. It worked. As DJ Gribben just remarked, “infrastructure is not screamingly urgent.”
It usually takes some form of economic crisis to get real economic reform as I saw during my time as Treasurer and as Chair of the G20. Extraordinarily the United States has fallen a long way behind the rest of the developed world on leasing, privatisation and P3s.
It’s not that you haven’t had crises or recessions. You seem to have those in cycles. It’s just that there is a lack of political will to engage with the private sector on infrastructure in the same way that many other countries have engaged.
From Korea to the United Kingdom and from Brazil to Germany, the need for big expensive infrastructure has led to the development of many new public/private partnerships.
In the 1990s, Australia privatised significant volumes of federal and state assets, including airports, electricity and gas facilities. The decade saw both Australia’s biggest bank, the Commonwealth Bank, and Australia’s national airline, Qantas, with a kangaroo on its tail, privatised by a centre-left government.
The policies were damned hard. I know because I was there.
In many cases, it was the choice between proactively seeking the best value for these assets and reinvesting the proceeds for the public good, or waiting their likely fire-sale in a bad debt environment.
The economic benefit was obvious. Many of your Congressmen and Senators that I have spoken with, and many of your Governors and Mayors that I have spoken with, can see the obvious need for more public/private partnerships but they can’t see a way through the politics.
Well, I can tell you, that the politics of these deals is no different in the United States to that of Korea, Brazil, Japan, the United Kingdom or any other country. The politics here are not unique.
In economic terms the United States will have to move far more urgently on public/private infrastructure partnerships than it may realize.
The American Society of Civil Engineers has estimated that an additional $4.5 trillion is needed over the next 7 years just to bring existing US infrastructure up to acceptable standards. That means your potential economic growth will fall if you do not spend $4.5 trillion just to maintain existing infrastructure.
To put that in perspective the US Administration has been promoting a potential $1 trillion on new infrastructure as a starting point. But if you don’t spend a new additional $4.5 trillion on fixing existing infrastructure, like water treatment plants, electricity supply, transport and roads, then the negative impact on the US economy will be enormous. If you don’t spend this $4.5 trillion, you will lose $3.9 trillion in GDP, 2.5 million American jobs will be lost and the modeling from the American Society of Civil Engineers says that there will be an average $3,400 reduction in disposable income per worker each year.
Even if the numbers are wobbly, can you risk anything like these numbers hitting your economy?
So where will this money come from?
US Government Debt
Well Governments haven’t got the money. And it’s going to get a lot harder here in the United States.
The Federal Government owns about 8 per cent of all US infrastructure but funds 14 per cent of it. The Federal Government’s ability to fund additional infrastructure is constrained by its own growing debt.
According to the IMF, over the next 5 years, the US is the only developed country which will see its debt to GDP ratio increase, with a forecast increase of nearly 9 per cent. Every other developed country in the world is trying to reduce its government debt during this period of economic growth. The US is the only country in the world to increase its debt.
As you are aware, state and local governments own the vast majority of US infrastructure assets – same as in Australia. But like the US Federal Government, the states’ ability to finance future infrastructure is constrained. While a number of states run a budget surplus - many do not. Five states ran a budget deficit of over 5 per cent in 2016.
Additionally, 43 states have some kind of restriction on the amount of debt they can issue.
In addition most US states have large underfunded pension liabilities that now total over $6 trillion.
Yet these same states and cities of America have trillions and trillions of dollars of underutilized and underperforming assets. Interestingly I have found that many states and cities don’t know all the assets they own let alone what they are worth, and how much they could be worth if they maximized their potential.
In addition there are many administrations that inadvertently run down valuable assets in transport, roads and even schools and hospitals because they can’t afford the maintenance programs.
But while government’s ability to finance and maintain infrastructure is highly constrained, the private sector as it so often does is stepping up to the plate.
The last three years have seen the private sector raise record levels of money for infrastructure investment. In the third quarter of this year alone, infrastructure funds raised almost $37 billion, with three quarters of that allocated to transactions in North America. However, utilizing these funds has been more of a challenge.
There are plenty of good news stories. For example the recent announcement of Carlyle’s $13 billion modernisation and expansion of Terminal 1 at JFK airport is a good story. But there is still too much money sitting idle.
There is some $173 billion of “dry powder” sitting in infrastructure funds, ready and waiting to be invested – an increase of 173 per cent since 2000.
Navigating regulations, local politics and competition with cheap public sector funding makes private investment in US infrastructure hard work. But it is not impossible.
Australia’s Asset Recycling Initiative
As the Treasurer of Australia in 2014, I sought to spur significant new infrastructure investment. We came to the view that we had to earn economic growth by improving productivity. Throwing money at the economy was not going to work. The easiest way to improve productivity was to build new improved infrastructure.
At the time, like every other Government, I didn’t have the money.
We had to be innovative and we used a number of tools.
I used our AAA credit rating to guarantee some private sector asset backed debt. We provided mezzanine finance for some projects and we provided some debt facilities for other projects.
For greenfields infrastructure we would provide seed funding as either a grant or a loan. We had to find some way to take political risk out of greenfields infrastructure. In my view, that was the biggest handbrake on infrastructure investment.
But the federal Government doesn’t really build infrastructure. It funds infrastructure.
It’s State and local governments that have much of the planning, environmental and regulatory controls although Washington still has its permitting process. They know what the local priorities are and they know how to handle the local politics.
If anything was going to be built I needed local administrations to have skin in each and every project.
But they didn’t have the money. They were asset rich and cash poor. The private sector is cash rich and asset poor.
This is why I launched the Asset Recycling Initiative.
The Asset Recycling Initiative provided Australian state and territory governments with a financial incentive to sell or lease government assets and redeploy the proceeds into new infrastructure. Effectively I gave them a bonus. I said I would give them a 15 per cent bonus to sell and invest in new infrastructure. Where did I get the money for this bonus? It came from the proceeds from selling the Federal Health Commission. State and territory governments had a pool of assets that did not pay tax. I needed them to be more efficient and to pay tax. If they paid tax, the assets would become taxpayers in perpetuity. The Federal Government in turn would get a return back in ten years, as I advised the Congressional Budget Office.
In order to create a sense of urgency, the Asset Recycling Initiative was open for a limited period of two years and operated on a first come, first serve basis. As it was time limited, the bonus was contingent upon the states and territories selling and building at the same time.
The Initiative was only available for agreed transactions with the Federal Government. Here is the political catch. I did not tell the states or territories what to sell or lease or what to build with the proceeds. They had to own the politics. If I told the states and territories what to sell or what to build then they wouldn’t have any buy in.
Overall, three of Australia’s eight states and territories participated in the scheme. Another state sought to participate but missed the two year deadline. Roughly $3 billion in incentive payments were paid to participating states and territories over the life of the scheme. This helped to unlock over $17 billion in new infrastructure development across Australia. And that was just the direct benefit.
There are now more cranes and tunnel boring machines in Sydney than in any other city in the world. And the ACT government is building a new light rail system for Canberra, paid for out of the proceeds from selling its lottery office and public housing. This was endorsement by a centre-left Government. And they are building what they wanted.
Australia is now spending more public money on new transportation infrastructure than any other major developed economy in the world. And the sale or lease of assets has spurned this growth. Government owned ports, electricity generators, transport and roads have been leased or sold. Even land titles offices, lotteries offices and dilapidated public housing have been sold or leased with governments redeploying the money into new infrastructure in partnership with the private sector.
And this has been embraced by all sides of politics. Last Saturday, the centre left government of Victoria, which boasts Australia’s largest city of Melbourne, was just reelected on the back of the biggest new infrastructure plan in Victoria’s history. Part of that is funded by recycling the proceeds of the lease of the Port of Melbourne into new infrastructure.
Australia is the world’s 13th largest economy with a population of just 25 million. It is the same size as the continental US. But we are investing more in transportation infrastructure than the likes of Germany, the UK, France or the United States.
Australia is spending more on infrastructure now than at any time in the past 30 years, since the Sydney Olympics. Last year alone, local, state and federal governments invested almost $100 billion in infrastructure development. Times have changed.
The number and value of Private-Public Partnerships has also broken records. In 2015, nine P3 transactions were completed in Australia – a record high - with a combined value of about $15 billion. In the state of NSW alone, there are currently over 36 active P3s. And of course, other states are engaging in this activity as well.
This new wave of infrastructure investment across Australia is one and a half times the size of the mining boom, which contributed to our 27 years of unbroken economic growth – a record among developed economies.
The benefits of infrastructure investment are obvious. Construction jobs now account for one in 10 jobs in the Australian economy – their largest ever share.
That’s not to say Australia’s infrastructure sector isn’t experiencing problems. But these aren’t the problems you typically hear about in the industry. The Chief Executive of our largest construction materials and building projects supplier lamented that he was “stretched” in meeting soaring demand for concrete and asphalt. From a business perspective, that isn’t a bad problem to have.
But bear in mind, the politics are never easy. Today critics are even complaining about too much construction work in our cities. A decade ago those same critics complained that there wasn’t enough infrastructure being built.
Progress in the United States
The US is making headway. I am more optimistic.
The Trump Administration’s “One Federal Decision” MOU is an example of a small but important step towards making US infrastructure investment opportunities easier to navigate. At a local level, the Australian Government has been proud to partner with the District of Columbia and the Bipartisan Policy Center on an “Asset Recycling Pilot” program. Launched last month, the Pilot links DC together with the Canberra in the Australian Capital Territory and Sydney in New South Wales – two Australian governments who are sharing their experience in asset recycling.
The DC Government is getting it right. The first thing every administration should do is have a public list of all its assets. Secondly it should have a real cost of maintenance associated with the list. Thirdly some assets that generate revenue should have an acceptable level of debt that provides some outside accountability for running the asset beyond the Government shareholder. And, finally, where appropriate the asset should have an independent board of management with an independent executive. All should have fiduciary obligations to act in the best interests of the business.
The District of Columbia to its credit is well on the way. It has the most comprehensive asset register in the US, down to the level of sidewalks and streetlights, along with a comprehensive asset maintenance program.
You live in the most innovative nation on earth. The United States is a pioneer in so many fields from Cobb and Co to the Hoover Dam you’ve always been able to do new and innovative projects. No country in the world does it bigger, and rarely, better than when the US puts its mind to it.
Australia’s experience is not unique, but when it comes to asset recycling we have taken the lead.
I want to emphasize that it is not a hard and fast formula. It is a concept that wins on the economics and the politics.
Variations on Asset Recycling that are good politics include giving workers some equity in the sale. Partnering with unions and pension funds in each state or city is also a good idea.
And every time an asset is leased or sold it becomes a new federal and state and city taxpayer – that is how it pays for itself.
There is however one big gap here in the US. There are very few obvious, respected and experienced sell side advisors to provide vendor advice to first time administration vendors. Much of the expertise is on the buy side for obvious reasons. But you need to work together to provide an entity that can provide trustworthy advice to administrations entering into these transactions for the first time. In Australia it took decades to develop this experience.
Asset Recycling will come to the United States in one form or another in the future. How it all works depends on all of you.
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Home Featured LDS First Presidency and apostles congratulate Trump on presidential victory
LDS First Presidency and apostles congratulate Trump on presidential victory
Rebecca LaneNov 09, 201600
The First Presidency of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints interact during the Women’s Session of the 186th Annual General Conference. From left to right, President Henry B. Eyring, President Thomas S. Monson and President Dieter F. Uchtdorf. (Photo courtesy LDS Church)
The First Presidency and Quorum of the Twelve Apostles of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints released a statement Wednesday morning congratulating U.S. President-elect Donald Trump.
“We invite Americans everywhere, whatever their political persuasion, to join us in praying for the president-elect, for his new administration and for elected leaders across the nation and the world,” the statement said. “Praying for those in public office is a long tradition among Latter-day Saints. The men and women who lead our nations and communities need our prayers as they govern in these difficult and turbulent times.”
“We invite Americans everywhere, whatever their political persuasion, to join us in praying for the president-elect, for his new administration and for elected leaders across the nation and the world.” —LDS First Presidency
With all but three states (New Hampshire, Arizona and Wisconsin) being called, Trump won the 2016 Presidential Election with 279 electoral votes over Democratic Presidential nominee Hillary Clinton’s 228 electoral votes, as of Wednesday morning at 11 a.m. MDT.
Besides congratulating Trump, the LDS leaders also thanked Clinton — as well as her supporters — for participating in the political process.
“We also commend Secretary Hillary Clinton and all those who engaged in the election process at a national or local level,” LDS leaders said in a statement. “Their participation in our democratic process, by its nature, demands much of those who offer themselves for public service. May our local and national leaders reflect the best in wisdom and judgment as they fulfill the great trust afforded to them by the American people.”
The LDS Church does not support a specific candidate, but it does encourage its members to participate in the political process by being informed and voting. On Oct. 5, the First Presidency of the LDS Church sent a letter to congregations to be read in the service, which said:
“Principles compatible with the gospel may be found in various political parties, and members should seek candidates who best embody those principles.”
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VSLive! Keynote: Abel Wang on Microsoft's DevOps Journey
By John K. Waters
The changes Microsoft had to make over the past few years to transform itself from a traditional, waterfall-oriented software provider into an agile, cloud-based organization -- from a company that shipped new versions of its products once every three years to one that delivers new features every three weeks, with multiple bug fixes and patches deployed daily -- were part of a "very painful journey," recalled Abel Wang, but one the company simply had to make.
"We had to adopt this DevOps mindset," Wang told attendees during his keynote presentation on day two of this year's Austin edition of the Visual Studio Live! conference, which runs through Friday. "It was 'adapt or die.' And nobody was interested in dying."
Wang is a senior cloud developer advocate at Microsoft specializing in DevOps and Azure. He's currently a member of a five-person team of DevOps practitioners with the unlikely name "The League of Extraordinary Cloud DevOps Advocates" (#LoECDA).
"Our sole charter is to help developers everywhere get into Azure using DevOps best practices."
Abel Wang, Senior Cloud Developer Advocate, Microsoft
"It's the most ridiculous name on the planet," Wang said. "It was a joke that stuck. But the team is amazing. Our sole charter is to help developers everywhere get into Azure using DevOps best practices. Notice I did not say 'using VSTS [Visual Studio Team Services] to get into Azure.' I want everyone to use VSTS, of course, but I really just want everyone to get into Azure."
Microsoft defines DevOps as "the union of people, process, and products to enable the continuous delivery of value to our end users," Wang explained.
"Notice I didn't say 'continuously delivery of code,'" he said, "because what does that give us? Piles and piles of code does us no good whatsoever. And notice that I didn't say 'continuous delivery of features,' because we could be delivering feature after feature, sprint after sprint, but if it's not what the users need or want, we're just wasting our time. We have to make sure that we are continually delivering value. That's what it's all about."
That and speed, apparently. Wang showed attendees a short film clip that compared the time it took a Formula One pit crew to service a race car at the 1950 Indianapolis 500 -- change the tires, gas up, and clean the windshield -- with a similar pit stop during a 2013 race in Melbourne, Australia. The 50s crew took 67 seconds; the modern crew about 5 seconds. (The sound didn't work, but the audience got the point.)
"Someone pointed out that, back in the day, they had to put gas in the car, and in the modern example, they didn't," Wang said. "How do you explain that in the DevOps world? I said, it works perfectly in the DevOps world, because putting fuel in the car was a giant bottle neck. Guess what they did? They shifted left. Technology advanced to the point where they could build engines that are not only much more powerful, but also require much less fuel…."
[Click on image for larger view.] Abel Wang Details Microsoft's DevOps Journey to the Visual Studio Live! Audience in Austin
"We have bottlenecks in the world of software, too," he added, "and one of the biggest is testing. Sure, we can build out these fancy CI/CD pipelines that deploy our code superfast into production. But how do we maintain quality, because we no longer have the luxury of spending weeks, if not months -- if not years -- doing end-to-end functional testing. So, we shifted left, where a lot of the responsibility for quality now with the developer. Instead of trying to tack on quality at the end, we build quality in from the start ... by shifting left, just like the race car."
Wang offered one Microsoft team's DevOps evolution as emblematic of the company's overall transformation.
"We had a boxed product call TFS [Team Foundation Server]," Wang explained, "and every three to four years we would come out with a new version, and we thought that was great. And back in 2005, it may have been good enough. But about seven years ago we started realizing that we were getting out-innovated by our competitors. They were moving at a much faster pace, and we quickly saw that, if we did not change the way we worked, we would become obsolete."
The application would have to be re-architected from a boxed product -- a CD that had to be installed on physical iron -- to an app that would run in the cloud, Wang said. But even more challenging, the group itself would have to be re-organized, and familiar roles would have to be redefined or eliminated.
The new team structure now recognizes only two roles: program manager and engineer. The program manager is roughly the equivalent of a product owner in the Scrum process. Everyone else is an engineer, with no distinctions between developers and testers. Also, restructured: the teams themselves, which had operated in segregated environments: UI developers worked on the UI layer, for example, while database people worked on the database layer. The restructured teams now own the entire feature set from beginning to end, including the UI layer, the data layer, and the database itself, as well as installation, deployment, and quality. Even the workspace was reconfigured: individual offices were replaced by team rooms, where everyone works together, including the program managers.
"Developers traditionally make incredibly bad testers," Wang pointed out. "And testers traditionally make very bad coders. So how did we do this? We trained our people and we required them to adapt...."
All these changes took a toll early in the process. The attrition rate hit around 20 percent, Wang said, but the remaining 80 percent adapted successfully to their new roles.
"It was incredibly painful," he said. "We suffered a lot of attrition from all sides -- management, developers, testers -- because the new way of looking at things and doing things was very different from the way we did things before. And we all know no one really likes change. But if there's one constant in our industry it's change."
Another element of Microsoft's new DevOps orientation is something called "aligned autonomy."
"Each team is autonomous in the sense that we get to decide what's in the backlog," Wang explained. "We get to decide what the priority is -- our program manager does. We decide which process we want to use, too, so we have some teams that are very strict Scrum users; other teams that are small-A agile; and other teams that use Kanban."
That's the "autonomous" part; the "alignment" part takes the form of practices required of every team, such as three-week sprints.
"When we first started, we all had this autonomy and we weren't quite aligned, and everyone started using their own JavaScript framework," Wang said. "So that had to change pretty quickly. And can you imagine what it would be like trying to deploy and coordinate with 50 teams having different sprint lengths? I can tell you, because we tried it. It was a disaster. With our three-week sprints, we are in lockstep."
In lockstep to a point; some overlap does occur, Wang said.
"VSTS services the entire globe, so deployments take a while," he said. "Because of that, we deploy through these different rings before it ends up all the way into production. It takes about a week, so we have an overlap between when we're deploying and when the next sprint starts."
To manage these overlaps, the group sets aside a couple of days for sprint planning, and then sends an e-mail to every member of every team explaining the plan for that sprint. At the end of the sprint, a second email that includes a video of what was accomplished goes out to the teams.
"It's not slick or produced," Wang said. "It's simple, just the raw video of what we're doing."
After every third sprint, all the related feature teams get together for what Wang calls a "scrum of scrums" to talk about what they did and what they're going to do. Every six months, the teams get together to check their progress against the long-term plan (18 months) and make sure they're on the right track. At that time, they re-evaluate and re-prioritize and make a new long-term plan.
"Each individual feature team is, of course, responsible for the work they need to do within a sprint," Wang said. "They are also responsible for the three-week plans. And by virtue of that, they kind of have to know and figure out what they're going to be doing every six months. Upper management, on the other hand, is looking at the big picture. They're looking at our 18 month scenarios. They're also looking at the six-month picture. But they're not looking into our plans or our backlog sprints. No micro-managing, which would cause developers to lose their minds."
These and other changes helped the VSTS group to shorten its product release cadence from once every three or four years to updates every three or four months, and eventually, every three weeks.
"Someone once asked me, Why three weeks?" Wang said. "Is that some magical number that Microsoft came up with? The answer is, no. We tried four weeks, and that was a really long time and didn't seem very agile to us. We tried one week, and that was a disaster. We tried two, and I think if we were a slightly smaller organization, it would have been perfect, but there's just too much overhead when you have 500 developers working together, trying to have this aligned autonomy. Three weeks just felt great."
"It's just something that worked for us," Wang added. "Everything I'm saying right now is what works for us, but that doesn't mean it'll work for everybody. Every team and every company is different."
The next Visual Studio Live! events are Visual Studio Live! Boston from June 10-14 and Visual Studio Live! Redmond at Microsoft Headquarters from August 13-17.
John has been covering the high-tech beat from Silicon Valley and the San Francisco Bay Area for nearly two decades. He serves as Editor-at-Large for Application Development Trends (www.ADTMag.com) and contributes regularly to Redmond Magazine, The Technology Horizons in Education Journal, and Campus Technology. He is the author of more than a dozen books, including The Everything Guide to Social Media; The Everything Computer Book; Blobitecture: Waveform Architecture and Digital Design; John Chambers and the Cisco Way; and Diablo: The Official Strategy Guide.
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Local nameМи-8
LocationAktobe, Kazakhstan
The Mil Mi-8 is a medium twin-turbine helicopter, originally designed by the Soviet Union, and now produced by Russia. In addition to its most common role as a transport helicopter, the Mi-8 is also used as an airborne command post, armed gunship, and reconnaissance platform. Along with the related, more powerful Mil Mi-17, the Mi-8 is among the world's most-produced helicopters, used by over 50 countries. As of 2015, it is the third most common operational military aircraft in the world.
Tags Aircraft
Download Download See more
Baltic Airlines Mil Mi-8 @ Vsevolod Aladyshkin
Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/en:Mil_Mi-8
Coordinates 50°17'2.524" N 57°8'54.428" E
Google Trips Alternative What to See in Asia What to See in Kazakhstan What to See in Aktobe What to See in Aqtöbe Province What to See in Aktobe Mikoyan MiG-29 Mil Mi-24 Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 Sukhoi Su-24 Antonov An-26 Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23 Yakovlev Yak-40 Mikoyan MiG-27 Sukhoi Su-17 Antonov An-12 Ilyushin Il-28 Sukhoi Su-25 Aero L-39 Albatros Aero L-39 Albatros Mil Mi-6 Aero L-29 Delfin Yakovlev Yak-50 Yakovlev Yak-18T A.N. Moldagulova V.I. Pacaev
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A Film’s Reprise for Earth Day
by Matthew Brodsky
Matthew Brodsky
Editor, Wharton Magazine
For Earth Day this year, Sundance Institute will be re-releasing the classic sustainability documentary, Ecological Design: Inventing the Future, which was conceived of and produced by Chris Zelov, WEV’83. The original film came out 18 years ago, when “sustainability” and “green building” were not part of the corporate or pop-culture lexicon.
Ecological Design is imbued with the influence of American designer, architect, inventor and futurist, Buckminster Fuller, who died in 1983. Fuller also served as a World Fellow in Residence at Penn until 1980.
In 1995, when the movie was shown at the Sundance Film Festival, it synthesized knowledge that had been around for years and cinematically rendered it to bring the public up to speed about the importance of Fuller’s oeuvre. The movie explores sustainable design, which dates back to the 1920s if not the ancient Greeks. Ecological Design was well-received, earning a nomination for the Grand Jury Prize. The film also won seven other awards and led to the companion book by Zelov, Design Outlaws.
What will be the reaction to the film in 2013?
“It will be giving somewhat of a history lesson so that people can know that sustainability did not just appear on the scene in 2000,” Zelov told Wharton Magazine.
“Sustainability is a buzzword,” he added. “Like any buzzword, there is a deep history and body of knowledge behind it.”
Besides Fuller’s residence at the University, Zelov is also quick to highlight other Penn and Wharton ties in the documentary. These include Ian L. McHarg, a former Penn professor of landscape architecture and regional planning; Thomas P. Hughes, Penn professor of history and sociology of science; Russell L. Ackoff, AR’41, GR’47, the former Anheuser-Busch Professor Emeritus of Management Science and pioneer of operations and systems research; and founders of Andropogon Associates, Carol Franklin, GLA’65, and Colin Franklin, GLA’67; and Pliny Fisk III, C’67, GFA’70, GLA’71.
A filmmaker and producer of five books, and many films, including the recently released City21: Multiple Perspectives on Urban Futures, Zelov can also be found on campus as a frequent attendee and presenter at events sponsored by the Wharton Initiative for Global Environmental Leadership (IGEL).
“I was happy to see that sustainability has become part of the corporate matrix,” he said. “The Wharton School is now taking a leadership role.”
Andropogon Associates, Buckminster Fuller, Chris Zelov, City21, Design Outlaws, Ecological Design, green building, Ian L. McHarg, IGEL, Initiative for Global Environmental Leadership, Matthew Brodsky, Pliny Fisk III, Russell L. Ackoff, Sundance Film Festival, Sundance Insititute, Sustainability, Thomas P. Hughes
Why I Dislike Earth Day Previous
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Leadership, Technology February 2, 2010 February 2, 2010
No curves to line up
Looks like there’s a leadership issue with President Obama’s change in direction for NASA. In short, let’s encourage private industry to build and launch the rockets. Interesting view of a president who acts as if government only has the capabilities for bold initiatives — like health care, job creation, and such.
The name of this writing is based on Neil Armstrong’s four curves as described in Rocket Men. In the initial posting I wrote:
A group of NASA employees went to Caltech, where the first moonwalker, Neil Armstrong, “got up at the blackboard and he drew four curves. They look kind of like mountain peaks.” The titles of the peaks were “Leadership,” “Threat,” “Good Economy”, and “World Peace.” As Griffin recalls, Armstrong said, “My theory is that when all of those curves are in conjunction, when they all line up together, you can do something like Apollo. Apollo, or something like it, will happen. And we happened to be ready for that when all those curves lined up” (p. 348).
Leadership or not, there’s a vacuum regarding human exploration. This curve is missing.
Threat. The country has many threats, real and perceived. The largest with respect to science and technology is China. The Chinese Long March booster is thought to be able to lift over 10,000 pounds into low earth orbit and around 5,000 pounds into stationary orbit so that a satellite revolves around the earth once a day. When placed at that position, the satellite says over one place on Earth. This is valuable for relaying communications and watching weather. The current booster is no threat.
In comparison, the Russian’s Energia booster can lift approximately 100 tons to low earth orbit, and approximately 20 tons to the higher orbit. The American Space Shuttle lifts about 25 tons to low earth orbit and around 5 tons to higher orbit. Clearly, the Russians are winning the booster chase, but the Chinese are working diligently on their program. Be mindful, but not surprised, of a Chinese surprise in space exploration. The president thinks that we don’t need a booster. Let’s stop the program and the progress.
Further, threats no longer appear to be international. Terrorism certainly is international, but nations threatening nations, like during the Cold War, is minimal. It’s impossible for a national leader to link a space race to terrorism. It’s not likely that a terrorist group will launch an ICBM at the United States. This threat is more local, by a few individuals turning small weapons against cities. No threat curve.
Good Economy? Not today. We are already spending an amount equal to the Apollo program in today’s dollars every 18 months in two desert wars. And the president wants to move toward private contractors. No economy curve.
World Peace. For the most part, yes, besides the regional conflicts and the real/perceived threat of terrorism. No curve here.
So, using Armstrong’s analysis, there are no curves to line up. No leadership, no threat, bad economy, and a world largely at peace. So it means no focused human exploration of the universe around us until the Chinese do something dramatic. Be watchful.
“Yes, but”
Richardson, Christensen and others continue to warn us of what's just across the horizon. If only we could or would do something about this. Rather all we hear is "Yes, but."
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Talks & Readings
Walter Annenberg Annual Lecture: Frank Stella
TUE, Dec 1, 2015
Floor One, Kenneth C. Griffin Hall
For the 2015 Walter Annenberg Lecture, artist Frank Stella, who is currently the subject of a career-spanning retrospective at the Whitney, will speak about his work and the history of American art in conversation with Adam D. Weinberg, the Museum’s Alice Pratt Brown Director. The conversation will take place in the Whitney Museum of American Art’s first-floor Kenneth C. Griffin Hall.
In honor of the late Walter H. Annenberg, philanthropist, patron of the arts, and former ambassador, the Whitney Museum of American Art established the Walter Annenberg Annual Lecture to advance this country’s understanding of its art and culture. Support for this lecture and for public programs at the Whitney Museum is provided, in part, by Jack and Susan Rudin in honor of Beth Rudin DeWoody, public funds from the New York City Department of Cultural Affairs in partnership with the City Council, the Barker Welfare Foundation, and by members of the Whitney's Education Committee.
Tickets are required ($15; $10 for members, seniors, and students). Please note: this event has reached ticketing capacity.
The Museum building is accessible and has elevator access to all floors. Service animals are welcome. Learn more about access services and amenities.
Frank Stella (b. 1936), Harran II, 1967. Polymer and fluorescent polymer paint on canvas. 120 × 240 in. (304.8 × 609.6 cm). Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York; gift, Mr. Irving Blum, 1982. © 2015 Frank Stella/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York
Frank Stella: A Retrospective
Oct 30, 2015–Feb 7, 2016
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Where the leaders in vision
keep an eye out for you
Learn more about your diagnosis
We’re just a blink of an eye away
Dr. Richard Spaide Receives
Multiple Recognitions and Awards
Our physicians serve as academic leaders in the field as the most published group in foremost peer-reviewed journals in the U.S.
Cutting-Edge Diagnostics
Our staff has the luxury of utilizing the most advanced equipment available, putting us at the forefront of ophthalmic imaging.
Our physicians have been instrumental in the development of worldwide standards for the diagnosis and treatment of retinal diseases.
With our conveniently located, state-of-the-art offices in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Westchester,
we serve as the largest retina practice in the New York Metropolitan area.
Isn’t it time you start seeing better?
Posterior Vitreous Detachment, Flashes and Floaters
VRMNY Is Moving!
moving, new location Announcements
We are excited to announce we are moving our NYC office!
As of June 3rd, 2019, Vitreous Retina Macula Consultants of New York Manhattan Office, currently located at 460 Park Avenue, will be relocating to 950 Third Avenue, 3rd Floor, New York, NY 10022. Our physicians, staff, main telephone, facsimile numbers and email remain unchanged.
Please contact our office directly for any questions or concerns: (212) 861-9797.
Dr. Richard Spaide Receives Multiple Recognitions and Awards
Macula Society, Maculart, New York Magazine, spaide, The Best Doctors in America Awards
Dr. Richard Spaide was recently picked as one of the best doctors in New York by New York Magazine, one of the best physicians in the United States by “The Best Doctors in America”, and he received the Gass Award, a prestigious international accolade at the Macula Society meeting in Singapore in June 2017. In July he won first prize in the Maculart meeting in Paris, which is a competition for medically themed artistic images and is awarded every two years. Dr. Spaide also won first prize in that competition in 2015. Dr. Spaide recently received a patent “Volume Analysis and Display of Information in Optical Coherence Tomography Angiography".
Richard Spaide, MD wins the prestigious Roger Johnson Award in Macular Degeneration Research
Roger Johnson Memorial Award, spaide Awards
In 2016 Dr. Spaide was awarded the Roger Johnson Memorial Award for Macular Degeneration Research from the University of Washington, which is given every two years to recognize outstanding contribution to the understanding of the pathogenesis and treatment of age-related macular degeneration by a clinician or basic science researcher working anywhere in the world. The Roger Johnson Award is one of the most prestigious awards in ophthalmology.
8 Jul , 2016
Dr. Richard Spaide lectured at the Yale Ophthalmology Spring Symposium/Alumni Day 2016. He spoke on Vascular Abnormalization with Periodic Antiangiogenic Therapy in Age-Related Macular Degeneration. Over the 45 year history of the Department of Ophthalmology and Visual Science at Yale, scientific discovery and treatment options for the range of ocular diseases have evolved into a massive body of knowledge. The faculty presenters at this symposium are contemporary experts in focused ophthalmic disciplines including cornea and external disease, glaucoma and retina, and will describe vision-saving medical and surgical therapies now considered the gold standard. This year's symposium explored updates in pediatric ophthalmology and adult retinal disorders, in addition to comprehensive offerings in glaucoma, cornea, and visual science. For more information about this symposium, click here.
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The Guy Who Demanded Obama’s College Transcripts Won’t Release His Tax Returns
Michael Vadon/Flickr
I know our memories are short. But this just happened four years ago.
That is Donald Trump demanding to see President Obama’s college applications, college transcripts and passport applications. He says he’ll give $5 million to charity if Obama releases them. Given what we know now about the Trump Foundation and the candidate’s charitable giving, that offer was probably never honest in the first place.
But it’s interesting that Trump calls Obama “the least transparent president in the history of this country.” I’m not sure what that makes Trump. All I do know is that four years later he is running for that office and has refused to release his tax returns or anything related to his corporate financials. That led the Washington Post to call Trump the “least transparent U.S. presidential candidate in modern history.”
What is even more interesting than the lack of transparency is the reason the Trump campaign is giving for their unwillingness to release these records. Here’s Donald Trump Jr. on that:
“He’s got a 12,000-page tax return that would create … financial auditors out of every person in the country asking questions that would detract from [his father’s] main message,” Trump Jr. said in a Wednesday interview with the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review.
Aside from the fact that it’s hard to imagine anyone having a 12,000-page tax return, Jr. is saying that it would raise too many questions. I thought immediately of what NTY Public Editor Liz Spayd said about the reporting on the Clinton Foundation.
In the case of the Clinton Foundation, The Times started with a legitimate issue: did the former secretary of state give improper access to foreign countries that donated tens of millions of dollars to her family foundation? That’s a question voters deserve to have answered.
One has to wonder if the same holds true for Donald Trump’s taxes. Are they a question that voters deserve to have answered? When it comes to the Clintons, those questions have been asked and (for the most part) answered. But on Trump’s personal and business finances, the questions remain. Kevin Drum does a fantastic job of summarizing what’s going on here.
It’s pretty obvious that these records would put Trump in a bad light, and the reason he doesn’t release them is that he figures the hit from being non-transparent is less than the hit he’d take from voters knowing the truth. He’s almost certainly right about that, but only because he’s not really taking much of a hit from being non-transparent. The only way to force candidates to be accountable is to hold their feet to the fire if they aren’t, and this just isn’t happening with Trump.
Where’s the fire on that one Ms. Spayd?
Nancy LeTourneau
Nancy LeTourneau is a contributing writer for the Washington Monthly. Follow her on Twitter @Smartypants60.
The White House/Flickr
One Man Didn't Break America and One Person Can't Fix It
To put our faith in democracy and self-government is to believe in the collective 'we.'
Kevin McCarthy Flickr
House GOP Strategy for 2020: Emulate Trump's Ruthless Attacks
They're going all-in with the taunts and name-calling.
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In Loving memory-Sensei Porter
Born in 1925, Philip S. Porter began his martial arts career at age 18 (in 1943), and has expertise in a variety of martial arts, but his emphasis since I first came to have known him, has been Judo and Jujitsu.
Sensei Porter has served as National Chairman of the AAU Judo Committee (1961-1964), Chairman of the U.S. Olympic Judo Committee (1964-1968), and Secretary General of the Pan American Judo Union (1964-1967), Technical Director of the Pan American Judo Union (1967-1969), President, U.S. Judo Association (1980-1995), Editor, “American Judo” (1960-1995), President and Head Coach, National Judo Institute and National Judo Team, (1984-1992).
In 1995, Sensei Porter founded the United States Marital Arts Association (USMA) and has remained president to this day.
One morning back in 1998 as Sensei was staying at my house for several days for a judo seminar, we were sitting at the dining room table and he said to my wife and I, as he said on many different occasions; “I have been blessed with the greatest teachers a man could ever have.” And he began to tell stories of his teachers. I love listening to his stories. On another occasion while I was having lunch with Sensei at a table in a restaurant in River Falls, Wisconsin, we were talking about his great teachers. The first teacher he talked about was, a teacher he had while he was in the Air Force. He was taught by the one and only Walter Todd. He talked very well of Walter and another of his Sensei's, the great Sumiyuki Kotani, who was a technical expert from Japan for the Air Force and Kotani promoted Porter to both Yondan and Rokudan. Both Todd and Kotani taught and coached at the Travis Air Force Base. He spoke so well of Kotani and would reminiscence about times he spent with him at the Kodokan. One night in our living room I spent time video taping him talking about these great moments. I will treasure them forever.
During a period of four years he studied with Trevor P. Leggett in England (1954-1958), were he earned his rank of Sandan. Trevor Leggett was also very influential in Sensei's life. However of all of these great teachers, when speaking with Sensei Porter, he will say, of all his teachers he refers to Sumiyuki as his most revered teacher.
Sensei’s Qualifications:
1951 Started competing in Judo
1957 US Air Force USAFE champion
1963 Placed in the US Senior Nationals
1975,1977,1980,1981: Won the US National Masters (over 30) Championships
1998 Two gold and a silver medal in the 1998 World Master Athlete Games in Ottawa, Canada
Shodan 1954
Nidan 1956
Promoted to Sandan by Leggett in 1959
Yondan 1963 Presented by Sumiyuki Kotani
Rokudan 973, After placing 3rd in the U.S. Judo Nationals. Presented to him by Sumiyuki Kotani
Shichidan 1981; President of USJA
Hachidan 1989; President of USJA
Kudan 1994; President of USJA
Judan 2005
The list is almost endless… congratulations to our Sensei, Philip S. Porter.
Sensei Phillip S. Porter 2007
Sensei Porter Interview in Winona 2007.
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U.S. proposes barring big tech companies from offering financial services, digital currencies
Ex-owner of Russia’s largest independent oil refinery arrested in Moscow
Saudi seniors reach Everest base camp
Sunday / July 14.
Saudi minister: Culture and technology build bridges between peoples
ST. PETERSBURG: Art and technology can build economic bridges between peoples and countries, Saudi Energy Minister Khalid Al-Falih said on Thursday as works by two Saudi artists went on show at Russia’s leading art museum.
“To create the opportunities to build economic bridges, you also need to build understanding and trust,” Al-Falih said at the opening of an art exhibition in St. Petersburg’s State Hermitage Museum celebrating the connection between technology and culture.
“This cultural dialogue is connected with how people think and how they feel, and with the emerging technologies of today, that creates this cultural understanding on which we can further build economic prosperity, for the people of Russia but importantly for people all over the world including the Middle East.”
The exhibition includes art by two Saudi women — Lulwah Al-Homoud and Daniah Al-Saleh — in a collection of 16 works by international artists on the theme “artificial intelligence and cultural dialogue.”
The launch of the show was one of the official opening ceremonies for the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, a three-day gathering of business leaders, policymakers and intellectuals sometimes known as the “Russian Davos.”
Al-Falih said: “Let’s look beyond the art itself and the creation of technology that we’ll be seeing, let’s get to appreciate the talent from different countries, let’s connect the dots between business, peoples all over the world, nations and between science and technology and innovation, and dream of a better tomorrow.”
He said the inclusion of the Saudi artists demonstrated the Kingdom’s social and cultural progress under the Vision 2030 strategy to transform the country. “It speaks to the cultural development as well as scientific development, as well as the capabilities of young people, especially women, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” he said.
Opposition Labour fight off Brexit Party to retain parliament seat
Mexico foreign minister says national guard to deploy to southern border
King Salman receives King of Malaysia
Magnitude 7.3 quake damages homes in eastern Indonesia
Nine killed as plane crashes during skydiving trip in Sweden
Erdogan says Trump can waive sanctions on Turkey
Pakistan to pay firm $6bn over mine closure
Dozens detained in Moscow as opposition demands to be included in vote
Exquisite Edinburgh: Scotland’s cultural heart
Size matters: Lebanese designer Dima Ayad’s push for inclusivity
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/ Home / Tags / information
Pages tagged with: information
BSc (Hons) Computer and Information Security
Cyber security is now widely recognised as an international priority, with hacking, malicious code, and data theft being just three of the many reasons why it is vital in the design, development and implementation of today’s IT systems.
BSc (Hons) Computing at the University of Plymouth. Would you be interested in becoming a computer specialist? In this flexible course, the first two years provide a solid background in many aspects of the subject of computing.
BSc (Hons) Computer Science
BSc (Hons) Computer Science. Do you want to know how computer systems really work? Our award-winning degree gives you the skills, insight and technical know-how to become a creative, versatile professional shaping the way people live and work tomorrow.
Information governance and GDPR
Information governance at University of Plymouth is the management of information through a co-ordinated approach of policies and procedures.
BSc (Hons) Computing & Games Development
BSc (Hons) Computing & Games Development, School of Computing and Mathematics at University of Plymouth. Our course is built on a core of computer science topics, supported by industry veterans and our own in-house Interactive Systems Studio.
BSc (Hons) Computer Science with Foundation Year
BSc (Hons) Computer Science with Foundation Year - Interested in the technical side of computing but don’t have the qualifications to apply for a degree? Then this new four-year degree route (incorporating a foundation) could be the pathway for you.
Information Specialists and Library Guides
University of Plymouth: Information Specialists support the development of information literacy for students at all levels.
Last updated: 5 February 2019
Information and resources to help combat security threats and keep the University's and your data safe.
Further education and skills partnerships information and resources
The University of Plymouth works with several partner colleges to deliver the Postgraduate Certificate in Education (for graduates) and the Certificate of Education (for non-graduates) teacher training awards in the further education and skills sector.
Faculty of Business Information Specialist and Library Guide
University of Plymouth: Information Specialists support the development of information literacy for students at all levels
Last updated: 3 August 2018
Christopher Brake: a career in cyber security
Christopher Brake, BSc (Hons) Computer and Information Security graduate, tells us about the impact his placement had on his career.
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Tag Archives: Inheritance of Hope
Honored for a Legacy of Hope
Posted by beavererinm in Hellcats, Outreach, Uncategorized
america, Army, band, Cancer, charity, Deric Milligan, Ellis Island Medal of Honor, Hellcats, hope, Inheritance of Hope, service, United States Military Academy, veterans, West Point, West Point Band
Each year the West Point Band is proud to provide musical support for the Ellis Island Medal of Honor ceremony. Sponsored by the National Ethnic Coalition Organization, these awards are presented annually to American citizens who have distinguished themselves within their own ethnic groups while exemplifying the values of the American way of life. Past Medalists include six U.S. Presidents; one foreign President; Nobel Prize winners and leaders of industry, education, the arts, sports and government; and everyday Americans who have made freedom, liberty, and compassion a part of their life’s work.
This year marks a special significance for the West Point Band, as we will honor one of our former members, Deric Milligan, who will receive the Ellis Island Medal of Honor at this year’s ceremony on May 9 at Ellis Island.
During his time in the band, Deric served as a Hellcat bugler, sounding Taps at hundreds of military funerals and performing in a multitude of concerts. In addition to his ceremonial duties, he led the Army football production staff. However, it is Deric’s dedication and talent in another area that earns him this distinguished award. This weekend he will be recognized as co-founder and Executive Director of Inheritance of Hope, a nonprofit charity dedicated to serve families with terminally ill parents.
Midway through Deric’s tenure with the band, his life took a turn when his wife Kristen was diagnosed with a rare terminal liver cancer in 2003. After several years of coping with the challenges of raising their three young children while battling a terminal illness, he and Kristen founded Inheritance of Hope together, with the mission to inspire hope in young families who are facing the loss of a parent. The charity achieves its mission by providing life-changing Legacy Retreats, Legacy Scholarships, outstanding resources, and individual and group ongoing support – spiritually, emotionally, and financially.
Kristen lost her courageous bout with cancer in 2012, but her legacy lives on through Inheritance of Hope. “Our goal is to provide families with an experience that they will remember forever,” said Deric. “Seeing the direct impact of Inheritance of Hope on me and my children in the wake of losing Kristen has been very affirming. I can clearly see the importance of the work we’re doing on a daily basis.”
Deric Milligan and his wife, Kristen, taken when he was in the Hellcats.
Former West Point Band trumpeter Eric Miller serves as Director of Marketing and Communications for Inheritance of Hope. A long-time family friend of Deric Milligan, Eric was invested early on in the organization, doing graphic design work and other marketing projects as needed. When Eric left the band in 2014, Deric made him a full-time job offer he couldn’t refuse, and Eric has enjoyed working for Inheritance of Hope ever since.
“It’s due to Deric’s leadership that Inheritance of Hope has become a thought leader in equipping families with the tools to thrive despite the grim circumstances surrounding terminal illness,” says Eric. “It’s been an absolute honor to not only work with Deric and the passionate team he has assembled; it’s also such a blessing to work for an organization that is truly making a difference in families across the country. The impact is profound – thanks to Deric and Kristen’s vision.”
For more information, go to www.inheritanceofhope.org and to watch the video, Kristen Milligan’s Legacy-Our Story in 4 Minutes, click here.
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Bennifer’s Back On (For Now)
Jennifer Garner has reportedly halted divorce proceedings and is giving it another try with Ben Affleck.
By Cheryl Ong
Updated 09 Mar 2017 20:32
Golden couple Ben Affleck and Jennifer Garner have found love in a hopeless place... we hope. The couple, both 44, had announced they were splitting back in June 2015 after ten years of marriage. But now, Jennifer has reportedly called off their divorce and the pair are said to be working towards mending their relationship.
The plot twist isn’t entirely unexpected. Although it’s been two years since the pair officially called it quits, they have continued living together with their three kids — Violet, eleven, Seraphina, 7, and Samuel, 5 — and even vacationed together. You know, just like any regular couple.
Well, here’s hoping that the pair eventually decides to call off their divorce... for good.
Everyone Is Talking About Jay Chou’s Super Cute Brother-In-Law
Marvel Comics Legend Stan Lee Dies At 95
No, The Stars Of Jalan Jalan Can't Name 5 Local Street Names Starting With Jalan
Trailer Watch: Marvel Studios' ‘Captain Marvel’
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Source: Fox, Bagley invited to join USA Select Team
Sacramento Kings stars Marvin Bagley lll and De'Aaron Fox has been invited to join the team USA select team.
Author: Sean Cunningham
SACRAMENTO, Calif. — The bright young future of the Sacramento Kings is getting a little brighter as two players are hoping to one day compete on the national stage.
Budding Sacramento stars De’Aaron Fox and Marvin Bagley III have each received invitations to participate USA Basketball’s Select Team, sources told ABC10 on Thursday.
Those sources spoke to ABC10 on the condition of anonymity because the Select Team had not been formally announced by USA Basketball.
The Select Team will train and compete at training camp in August, beginning in Las Vegas, with Team USA ahead of the 2019 FIBA World Cup in China. Many of Team USA’s roster is compiled of players who once competed on the Select Team.
Fox, the Kings’ 21-year-old point guard who was selected with the fifth pick out of Kentucky in the 2017 NBA Draft, averaged 17.3 points, 7.3 assists and 3.8 rebounds per game last season in Sacramento.
Bagley, 20, was drafted by the Kings out of Duke with the second overall selection in the 2018 NBA Draft. He appeared in 62 games and poster per-game averages of 14.9 points, 7.6 rebounds, one assist and one block in 25.3 minutes of action.
Fox and Bagley will compete with Kings teammate Harrison Barnes, who will return for a second stint with Team USA. Barnes is among the 20 finalists for the national team, which will be trimmed to
USA Basketball’s training camp in Las Vegas will take place Aug. 5-9 with a scrimmage taking place on the campus of UNLV on the final day. The roster will be trimmed to 12 for the World Cup, which begins on Aug. 31.
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ACYP News
Elevating the voice of children and young people in NSW: children want more say in the community
Posted by ACYP on Nov 27, 2016 10:00:00 AM
To celebrate Children’s Week, the Advocate for Children and Young People, Mr Andrew Johnson, will launch three new initiatives at Parliament House which elevate the voices of children and young people here in NSW.
Children and young people want to have their opinions heard, treated with respect and taken seriously. This was one of the main findings of state-wide consultations with more than four thousand children and young people, undertaken by the Office of the Advocate for Children and Young People.
As a result, voice is one of the six themes of Australia’s first three-year whole-of-government Strategic Plan for Children and Young People which was launched in July.
Today, the Advocate for Children and Young People Andrew Johnson will present:
Real NSW
The Advocate will announce the three winners of the Real NSW photo competition. The Advocate has spoken directly to thousands of children and young people across the state and they told him they often do not identify with the images used to portray them on websites, in the media and in general use.
This competition gave them an opportunity to show how they really want to be portrayed through highlighting what life is like for them, through their eyes and in their worlds.
Seen and Heard Video
The Advocate has developed a compilation of short videos that highlight when a child or young person’s voice was not heard at an important time in their life. They are based on stories told to him through the course of consultations.
“These short videos highlight how listening to children and young people can make a real difference in their lives.
“Our hope is these videos will assist people who work with children and young people every day and for all of those who interact with children, to gain a better understanding of the importance of listening to them,” Mr Johnson added.
The Advocate will launch an innovative new App that utilises augmented reality technology to bring the voices of children and young people into the room, no matter where you are.
“There are many different ways we can use technology to assist us in hearing and listening to the voices of children and young people, regardless of where they are and where you are,” Mr Johnson said.
Topics: Media Statement
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Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., EUL
The Air Force Civil Engineer Center issued a Request for Qualifications for an Enhanced Use Lease at Edwards AFB, Calif. The 133-acre parcel contains 407,000 tons of broken concrete slab material resulting from an Air Force runway replacement project. The Air Force proposes to lease the parcel, including the concrete slab material, to a private entity for the purpose of locating and operating a facility to process the material for resale and reuse.
The Highest Ranked Offeror selected would obtain any necessary financing, and design, construct, operate, maintain and manage the project for the term of the lease. The HRO would assume ownership of the processed concrete for resale and reuse off of Edwards AFB.
Industry Day Materials:
Invitation to Industry Day
Industry Day Agenda
The Air Force hosted an Industry Day to provide a tour of the site as well as to exchange information with private industry June 26, 2013.
View the final Request for Qualifications (solicitation #AFCEC-13-R-0012) at www.fbo.gov/index
Proposals were due by 5 p.m. CST on Sept. 12, 2013, and the Air Force is currently undergoing the source selection process.
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The Lab Rules Once Again – For Record 28th Straight Year!
By Ranny Green
Mar 20, 2019 | 3 Minutes
There just seems to be no stopping the Labrador Retriever!
For a record 28th year (2018), the versatile sporting breed reigns supreme on the American Kennel Club registry list, a run like no other breed has seen in the record books.
Changes in the Top Ten
Little changed in the Top Ten standings from 2017. Following the Lab are: 2, German Shepherd Dog; 3, Golden Retriever; 4, French Bulldog; 5, Bulldog; 6, Beagle; 7, Poodle; 8, Rottweiler; 9, German Shorthaired Pointer; 10, Yorkshire Terrier. All remained in their same spots from the previous year other than the last two, which swapped positions.
Breaking into the Top Ten ranks as a monumental move for the German Shorthaired Pointer, which has been quietly edging its way up the popularity list the past decade. The ninth-place position is its highest since becoming recognized in 1930. Conversely, the Yorkie dropped from No. 2 in 2008.
The ninth-place German Shorthaired Pointer ranks at its highest position since becoming recognized in 1930.
While Labs aren’t No. 1 in all major U.S. cities, here are a few where they hold the top spot: Austin, Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Fort Worth, Kansas City (Missouri), Jacksonville, Milwaukee, Nashville, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Portland (Oregon), Raleigh-Durham (North Carolina), San Antonio, St. Louis, Salt Lake City, and Seattle.
The 1970s marked the first appearance of the Labrador Retriever in the country’s Top Ten, and it has remained there since.
If you like statistical comparisons, here’s another good one: The No. 1 breed of the 1940s, the Cocker Spaniel, enjoyed a renaissance in ’80s, climbing back into the top spot from 1983-1990. That feat meant that it held the No. 1 position historically – 23 times – more than any other breed. Beginning in 1991, the Labrador Retriever began its uninterrupted reign atop the registry.
So What Makes the Labrador Retriever so Popular?
Three longtime breeders, Linda Maffett, of Bellingham, Washington; Judy Heim, of Turlock, California; and Erin Henlon-Hall, of Villa Ridge, Missouri, cite versatility, stable temperament, friendliness, trainability, and athleticism as just a few of its special qualities.
Maffett, a breeder since 1987, adds, “The qualities I focus on when placing my puppies in pet homes are the same as I am in looking for in a pup to keep for myself – temperament, temperament, temperament, and, of course, overall health and breed type.”
Heim, who started in Labradors 49 years ago, concurs, “We want a dog that is going into a home as a family dog. Hence the importance of temperament. Canines are social animals and will always live in a pack. If they are not living with a pack of dogs, their humans become their pack. It’s horrible for a dog to be put in the backyard to live its life in solitude. So we require that the dog be an indoor dog and part of the family. We put in our contract – and have the buyer initial the sentence that should he/she find the need to rehome the dog that it be returned to us.”
A Labs enthusiast since the ’70s, Henlon-Hall, adds, “This is a do-everything breed that needs to be with its humans. It personifies the definition of versatility – hunting, showing, family, dock diving, tracking, obedience. It’s as American as baseball, hot dogs, and apple pie.”
Ironically, while the American public has continued to show its love affair with the Labrador Retriever, the popular breed has never won a Best in Show in the Triple Crown of dog shows – Westminster, The National Dog Show, and the AKC National Championship.
Other Movers and Shakers
It’s no surprise that the Labrador Retriever, German Shepherd Dog, and Golden Retriever are America’s top three breeds for yet another year, positions they have held steady since the turn of the century. But the intriguing mover and shaker in the Top Ten in recent years is the French Bulldog, which has been ensconced in the No. 4 slot the past two years. It’s also the top dog in Honolulu, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York City, Oakland, Orlando, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Tampa, and West Palm Beach (Florida). The Frenchie entered the Top Ten in 2014 at No. 9 and has maintained a standing in that elite group since.
Five breeds that have made pronounced jumps in the past decade are the No. 13 Pembroke Welsh Corgi, from 24th; No. 14 Siberian Husky, from 23rd; and No. 15 Australian Shepherd, from 29th; No. 22 Bernese Mountain Dog, from 40th; No. 24 Havanese, from 36th.
The Miniature American Shepherd ranked one position higher than it did in 2017, at number 34.
The Miniature American Shepherd presents one of the most eye-popping stories of all. Introduced to the Herding Group in July 2015, it is already 34th in popularity, one step up from its 2017 ranking, a feat seldom matched by new breeds who tend to gradually ascend the popularity ladder.
And there was movement afoot by some of the rarer breeds, too, in 2018. Pumik jumped 11 spots (162 to 151), Ibizan Hounds rose 13 positions (165 to 152), and Finnish Lapphunds moved up 12 notches (173 to 161). Following years of decline, four terriers moved up: Rat Terriers (97 to 86), Border Terriers (92 to 88), Bedlington Terriers (151 to 141) and Dandie Dinmont Terriers (181 to 176).
For the full list, go here.
Where Should You Look for a Labrador Retriever Puppy?
They’re popular for a reason. Check out the AKC Marketplace for trusted, AKC-registered breeders.
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Imam Hasan al-'Askari (a) and the birth of his son, the 12th Imam (a)
halgar10-30-2001.mp3
Shi'a Islam: Class 15
MP3 Format;
- the increase in persecution of Shi'as during the period of the 9th, 10th and 11th Imams
- life history of the 11th Imam, and the importance of the institution of wikala (name representatives of the Imam) during his time
- written works of the Imam
- the death of the Imam, and the widespread confusion that resulted among the Shi'i community
- did the 11th Imam have a son? proof of the existence of the 12th Imam in ahadith of the Prophet and earlier Imams
- birth of the 12th Imam and the miracles associated with it
- the numerous groups that arose among the Shi'as at the death of the 11th Imam
Authors(s):
Dr. Hamid Algar
Place(s):
Univ. of California, Berkeley, USA
30th October, 2001
In the Playlist
Shi'a Islam [Dr. Hamid Algar] [Sep - Nov 2001] [Univ. of California, Berkeley, USA]
Specific Qur'anic Ayaat and Ahadith of the Prophet (s) relevant to Shi'ism
Theology (Kalam) & Mysticism (Irfan)
Theology (Kalam)
Principles of Law (Fiqh)
Scholarship and Hadith
12th Imam (a) (cont'd) & Shi'i Tafseer of Qur'an
12th Imam (a) (cont'd)
Al-Ghayba (Occultation)
Imam Muhammad al-Jawad al-Taqi (a) and Imam 'Ali al-Hadi (a)
Imam 'Ali Ar-Rida (a)
Imam Ja'far As-Sadiq (a) Part II
Imam Ja'far as-Sadiq (a)
Imam Musa al-Kadhim (a)
Midterm review and Imam Muhammad Baqir (a)
Long term effects of the events of Karbala, and Imam Zayn al-Abidin (a)
Legacy of Imam Ali (a) & Life of Imam Hasan (a)
Imam 'Ali b. Abi Talib (a), Part II
Imam 'Ali b. Abi Talib (a), Part I
Brief history of the Prophet (s) and his daughter Fatima (a), the confluence of two lights
Qur'an: The Foundational Document of Shi'i Islam
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Fergus Davidson Player Profile
Fergus Davidson
Full Name: Fergus McIntyre Davidson
Position: Centre Half
Signed: November 3rd, 1936
Career Totals: 19 appearances
Also Played For: Hibernian
1936-37 Division Two 19 0 - 0 0 31.6% 26.3% 42.1%
Totals: 19 (0) 0
Apr 16th, 1937 16/04/37 League Division Two vs. Stenhousemuir (A) 2 - 9
Apr 3rd, 1937 03/04/37 League Division Two vs. East Stirling (A) 1 - 2
Mar 27th, 1937 27/03/37 League Division Two vs. Edinburgh City (A) 3 - 2
Mar 20th, 1937 20/03/37 League Division Two vs. Leith Athletic (H) 4 - 2
Mar 6th, 1937 06/03/37 League Division Two vs. Montrose (A) 0 - 5
Feb 20th, 1937 20/02/37 League Division Two vs. Cowdenbeath (H) 1 - 1
Feb 6th, 1937 06/02/37 League Division Two vs. East Fife (A) 4 - 4
Jan 30th, 1937 30/01/37 Scottish Cup 1st Round vs. Airdrie (A) 1 - 3
Jan 23rd, 1937 23/01/37 League Division Two vs. Stenhousemuir (H) 3 - 2
Jan 2nd, 1937 02/01/37 League Division Two vs. Brechin City (A) 3 - 4
Jan 1st, 1937 01/01/37 League Division Two vs. Morton (H) 1 - 4
Dec 26th, 1936 26/12/36 League Division Two vs. Alloa Athletic (A) 0 - 2
Dec 19th, 1936 19/12/36 League Division Two vs. Ayr Utd (H) 1 - 2
Dec 12th, 1936 12/12/36 League Division Two vs. East Fife (H) 0 - 0
Dec 5th, 1936 05/12/36 League Division Two vs. Leith Athletic (A) 2 - 2
Nov 28th, 1936 28/11/36 League Division Two vs. Dumbarton (A) 5 - 4
Nov 21st, 1936 21/11/36 League Division Two vs. Edinburgh City (H) 2 - 2
Nov 14th, 1936 14/11/36 League Division Two vs. Forfar Athletic (H) 5 - 0
Nov 7th, 1936 07/11/36 League Division Two vs. Raith Rovers (A) 3 - 2
Fergus was an amateur signed from YMCA Anchorage. He retained his place in the side for much of the latter part of 1936-37. As an amateur he was automatically released at the end of the season and was not re-signed.
Raith Rovers 2 - 3 Dundee United
Tuesday, November 3rd, 1936
Debut - Raith Rovers 2 - 3 Dundee United
Saturday, November 7th, 1936
Last Appearance - Stenhousemuir 9 - 2 Dundee United
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Previous: Frederick Douglass
Samuel J. Miller
One of the most important figures in modern American photography, Harry Callahan was a humble and intuitive artist. He was largely self-taught, and as a teacher at Chicago’s Institute of Design (1946–61), he continued to learn by assigning photographic problems to students and then solving them himself. Influenced by both the classicism of Ansel Adams and the experimentalism of László Moholy-Nagy, Callahan fused formal precision and exploration with personal subjectivity. He photographed a wide range of subjects—female pedestrians lost in thought on Chicago’s streets; architectural facades; his wife, Eleanor; and weeds and grasses in snow. Chicago, one of his best-known pictures, shows trees covered in snow along Chicago’s Lake Shore Drive. Although Callahan captured all of the detail available in the bark and snow in his negative, he purposely printed this image in high contrast to emphasize the black-and-white forms of the trees against the stark backdrop. With a graphic sensibility typical of the Institute of Design, Callahan reminds the viewer that a photograph is first and foremost an arrangement of tones and shapes on a piece of paper.
Signed recto, on mount, lower right, below image, in graphite: "Harry Callahan"; inscribed verso, on mount, upper left, sideways, blue pencil: "Box 1#"; signed verso, center, in blue ink: "Harry Callahan"
19.2 × 24.2 cm (image/paper); 20.2 × 25.3 cm (mount)
The Mary and Leigh Block Endowment Fund
Greenough, Sarah, Joel Snyder, David Travis and Colin Westerbeck. 1989. “On the Art of Fixing a Shadow: One Hundred and Fifty Years of Photography.” Exh. cat. National Gallery of Art/Art Institute of Chicago. p. 387, cat. 306.
Wood, James N. 2000. “Treasures from The Art Institute of Chicago.” Hudson Hills Press, Inc. p. 291.
Travis, David and Elizabeth Siegel. 2002. “Taken by Design: Photographs from the Institute of Design, 1937–1971,” Exh. cat. Art Institute of Chicago/University of Chicago Press. p. 97, cat. 27, pl. 62.
Cuno, James and Eloise W. Martin. 2009. “Art Institute of Chicago: Pocketguide.” Art Institute of Chicago. p. 53.
Sharp, Robert V., Elizabeth Stepina and Susan E. Weidemeyer. 2009. “The Art Institute of Chicago: The Essential Guide.” Art Institute of Chicago. p. 281.
Druick, Douglas and Robert V. Sharp. 2013. “The Art Institute of Chicago: The Essential Guide.” Art Institute of Chicago. p. 295.
Washington D.C., National Gallery of Art, “On the Art of Fixing a Shadow: One Hundred and Fifty Years of Photography,” May 7–July 30, 1989; traveled to The Art Institute of Chicago, September 16–November 26, 1989; Los Angeles County Museum of Art, December 21, 1989–February 25, 1990.
Chicago, Art Institute of Chicago, “A Measure of Nature: Landscape Photographs from the Permanent Collection,” May 30–September 7, 1998. (Sylvia Wolf)
Chicago, Art Institute of Chicago, “Taken by Design: Photographs from The Institute of Design, 1937–1971,” March 2–May 12, 2002; traveled to San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, July 20–October 20, 2002; and Philadelphia Museum of Art, December 7, 2002–March 2, 2003. (David Travis and Elizabeth Siegel)
Tucson, Arizona, Center for Creative Photography, “Harry Callahan: The Photographer at Work,” January 27–May 7, 2006; traveled to the Art Institute of Chicago, June 24–September 24, 2006.
Gelatin silver (developing-out-paper) pr
Circus, Chicago, 1955
Eleanor and Barbara, 1953
Aix-en-Provence, France, 1958
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Three Studies of a Dancer in Fourth Position
Charcoal and pastel with stumping, and touches of brush and black wash, on grayish-tan laid paper with blue fibers, laid down on gray wove paper
Signed recto, lower left, in black pastel: "Degas"
Bequest of Adele R. Levy
Roger Marx, 1897, pp. 321 and 323 (ill.).
G. Bazin, L’Amour de l’Art (July 1931), p. 294 (ill.).
Georges Grappe, Degas (1936), p. 35 (ill.).
Camille Mauclair, Degas (Paris, 1937), p. 167, no. 150 (ill.).
Ernst Rouart, Le Point (February 1937), p. 17 (ill.).
John Rewald, Degas: Works in Sculpture, A Complete Catalogue (New York, 1944), pp. 21, and 62 (ill.).
Paul A. Lemoisne, Degas et son Oeuvre, 1 (Paris, 1946), pp. 330-331, no. 586 (ill.).
Lillian Browse, Degas Dancers (Boston, 1949), p. 368, no. 91 (ill.).
Harold Joachim and Sandra Haller Olsen, French Drawings and Sketchbooks of the Nineteenth Century 2 (Chicago, 1979), p. 40, no. 2F2.
George T. M. Shackelford, Degas, the dancers (Washington D. C., 1984), pp. 136, no. 20
Richard Brettell, French Impressionists (Chicago, 1987), pp. 52-53, and 117 (ill.).
Galeries Nationale du Grand Palais, Degas (Paris 1988), pp. 347-348, no. 224.
The Chicago Tribune (August 12, 1990), section 13, p. 15 (ill.).
Jean Sutherland Boggs, Degas (Chicago, 1996), pp. 45, 43 (ill. detail), 91 (ill.), and 109, pl. 20.
Writing and Grammar: Timeless Voices, Timeless Themes (2001).
Les Cahiers Ateliers-Degas (Fall 1996).
Maryann Cocca-Leffler, True Kelly, and Joan Holub, Edgar Degas: Paintings That Dance (New York, 2001).
American Federation of Art, Edgar Degas: The Painter of Dancers (2002).
New York, Museum of Modern Art, “The Mrs. Adele R. Levy Collection: A Memorial Exhibition,” June 9-July 16, 1961, p. 14 (ill.).
Edinburgh, National Gallery of Scotland, “Degas,” August 13-September 30, 1979, cat. 74 (ill.).
The Art Institute of Chicago, “Degas in The Art Institute of Chicago,” July 19-September 23, 1984, pp. 96-97, cat. 42 (ill.), by Richard Brettell and Suzanne Folds McCullagh.
Washington, D.C., National Gallery of Art, “Degas: The Dancers,” November 22, 1984-March 10, 1985, pp. 71 and 136, cat. 20 (ill.), cat. by Ted Shackelford.
Paris, Galeries Nationales du Grand Palais, “Degas,” February 9-May 16, 1988, cat. 224; also traveled to Ottawa, the National Gallery of Canada June 16-August 28, 1988; and New York, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, September 27, 1988-January 8, 1989.
The Art Institute of Chicago, September, 1996-January, 1997.
Omaha, Neb., Joslyn Art Museum, “Degas and the Little Dancer,” February 7-May 3, 1998, cat. 14, by Richard Kendall; also traveled to Williamstown, Mass., Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, May 30-September 8, 1998; and the Baltimore Museum of Art, October 4, 1998-January 3, 1999.
London, Royal Academy of Arts, “Degas and the Ballet, Picturing Movement”, September 17 - December 11, 2011, pp. 78-79,82-23, cat. 23, cat. by Richard Kendall and Jill Devonyar.
The Art Institute of Chicago, “Degas: At the Track, On the Stage”, July 1, 2015-February 26, 2016, no cat.
Roger Marx (died 1913), Paris [Paris 1988]; sold, Galerie Manzi-Joyant, Paris, May 11-12, 1914, Marx sale, lot 124, to Durand-Ruel, Paris, for 10,070 francs [Paris 1988]; sold to Trewes [Durand-Ruel archives]. Adele Rosenwald Levy (died 1960), New York; bequeathed to the Art Institute, 1962.
Dancer Stretching at the Bar, 1877/80
Horse Turned Three-Quarters, c. 1880
After the Bath (Woman Drying Her Feet), c. 1900
Two Dancers, c. 1893–98
Retiring, c. 1883
Ballet at the Paris Opéra, 1877
The Star, 1879/81
Harlequin, 1885
On the Stage, 1876–77
The Bathers, 1885/95
Landscape with Smokestacks, c. 1890
Breakfast after the Bath, 1895/98
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Equestrienne (At the Cirque Fernando)
Inscribed lower left: HT Lautrec
39 1/2 × 63 1/2 in. (100.3 × 161.3 cm)
Fénéon, La Vogue, September 1889 (Fénéon 1970, I, p. 168).
G. A[lbert] A[urier], “Choses d’art,” Mercure de France 2 (January, 1891), p. 62.
Gustave Geffroy, “Exposition Toulouse-Lautrec,” La Justice, February 15, 1893.
Gustave Coquiot, “Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec,” L’Art et les Artistes 19 (1914), p. 133 (ill.) as Le Cirque.
Gustave Coquiot, Lautrec, ou Quinze Ans de Moeurs Parisiennes, 1885-1900 (Paris, 1921), pp. 102, 137 as L’écuyère au Cirque Fernando.
“A Ticket for the Moulin Rouge,” International Studio 77, 34 (July 1923), p. 300 (ill.) as M. Loyal and the Cirque Fernando.
Gustave Coquiot, Toulouse-Lautrec (Berlin, 1923), trans. by Carl Einstein, pp. 57, 60 pl. 46 (ill.) as Kunstreiterin im Zirkus Fernando.
The Arts 7, 1 (January 1925), p. 37 (ill.) as La Piste.
F., “A Painting by Toulouse-Lautrec,” The Art Institute of Chicago Bulletin 19, 1 (January 1925), pp. 94-95 (ill.) as The Circus.
“Chicago Institute Buys a Striking Work by Toulouse-Lautrec,” The Art News 24, 8 (November 28, 1925), p. 4 (ill.) as The Circus.
Achille Astre, H. de Toulouse-Lautrec (Nilsson, 1925), p. 43.
Maurice Joyant, Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec, Peintre (Paris, 1926), vol. 1, pp. 128, 265, (ill. p. 162), vol. 2, p. 40 as Le Cirque.
Maurice Joyant, “Toulouse-Lautrec,” L’Art et les Artistes 14 (1927), p. 168 (ill.) as Le Cirque.
C.J. Bulliet, Apples & Madonnas: Emotional Expression in Modern Art (Chicago, 1927), n.p. (ill.) as The Circus.
Daniel Catton Rich, “Au Moulin Rouge,” Bulletin of the Art Institute of Chicago 23, 2 (February 1929), p. 14 as The Circus.
Zervos, Cahiers d’Art 2 (1931), p. 110.
Raymond Lécuyer, “La Rétrospective Toulouse-Lautrec,” L’Illustration No. 4.599 (1931), p. 492.
Léo Larguier, “Toulouse-Lautrec,” Vu (April 1931), p. 570 (ill.).
Valmy Baysse, Le Monde Illustré (April 25, 1931), p. 376 (ill.).
Art Institute, A Guide to the Paintings in the Permanent Collection (Chicago, 1932), pp. 74, 174 (ill.) as The Circus (M. Loyal: Cirque Fernando)/In the Circus Fernando: The Ring-Master.
James Johnson Sweeney, “La Peinture Française Moderne a l’Institut des Beaux-Arts de Chicago,” Cahiers d’Art 7 (1932), p. 334 (ill.) as Le Cirque Fernando.
Pierre Mac Orlan, Lautrec, pientre de la lumière froide (Paris, 1934), p. 132 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando—L’écuyère, 1888.
Emile Schaub Koch, Psychanalyse d’un peintre moderne (Litt. Intern, 1935), p. 183.
Théâtre Arts Monthly 21 (August 1937), pl. IX (ill.).
C. J. Bulliet, The Significant Moderns and Their Pictures (New York, 1936), n.p., pl. 116 (ill.) as At the Circus Fernando: The Ring Master, 1888.
Gerstle Mack, Toulouse-Lautrec (New York, 1938), pp. xiii, 215-216, 220 pl. 32 (ill.) as L’Écuyère, 1888.
J. S. Newberry, “The Age of Impressionism & Realism, Detroit’s Anniversary Exhibition,” Art News 38 (May 4, 1940), p. 15 (ill.).
(Article on Art), Life (1941), p. 213 (ill.).
G. R., “Le Cirque avec ses couleurs éclatantes retint longtemps Toulouse-Lautrec,” Radio 47 (1947), p. 22 (ill.).
Art Institute, The Winterbotham Collection (Chicago, 1947), pp. 44, 45 (ill.) as In the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster, 1888.
“Chicago’s Winterbotham Collection,” Art News 46, 7 (September, 1947), p. 34 (ill.) as The Circus Fernando, 1888.
Francis Jourdain, Lautrec (Marguerat, 1948), pl. 5 (ill.).
Walter Kern, Lautrec (A. Scherz, 1948), pl. 5 (ill.).
Carl O. Schniewind, The Art Institute Presents Toulouse-Lautrec (Chicago, 1949), pp. 3, 9 (ill.) as In the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster, 1888.
“Chicago Displays Lautrec Treasures,” The Art Digest 23, 18 (July 1, 1949), pp. 10, 30 as In the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster.
M. G. Dortu, Toulouse-Lautrec (Paris, 1952), n.p., pl. 11 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando, L’Écuyère, 1888.
Francis Jourdain and Jean Adhémar, T-Lautrec (Paris, 1952), pp. 30, 73, 81 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando, LÉcuyère, around 1888.
Edouard Julien, Towards an Understanding of Toulouse-Lautrec (Albi, 1953), p. 43 (ill.) as At Fernando’s Circus, 1888.
Jacques Lassaigne, Le gout de notre temps – Lautrec (1953), p. 42.
Sam Hunter, Toulouse-Lautrec (New York, 1953), pl. 12 (ill.).
Pierre du Colombier, Toulouse-Lautrec (1953), pl. 15 (ill.).
Douglas Cooper, Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec (New York, 1956), p. 32, 74-75 (ill.) as Cirque Fernando: The Equestrienne, 1888.
Dorothy Bridaham, Toulouse-Lautrec in the Art Institute of Chicago (Zurich, 1954), n.p. pl. IV (ill.) as In the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster, 1888.
Pierre Courthion, Le gôut de notre temps – Montmartre (Skira, 1957), p. 66.
Henri Perruchot, La Vie de Toulouse-Lautrec (Paris, 1958), pp. 145, 152, 157, 161 as l’Écuyère du Cirque Fernando.
Art Institute, Paintings in the Art Institute of Chicago: A Catalogue of the Picture Collection (Chicago, 1961), pp. 329, 453 (ill.) as In the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster, 1888.
Collection Génies et Réalités, Toulouse-Lautrec (Paris, 1962), p. 204, pl. 34 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando, around 1888.
Renato Barilli, Il Simbolismo nella Pittura Francese dell’Ottocento (Milan, 1967), pp. 22, 82, 99 pl. LVII as Circo Feranndo: la cavallerizza, 1888.
M. G. Dortu, Toulouse-Lautrec et son oeuvre (New York, 1971), vol. 2, p. 146 cat. P312 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando, l’Écuyère, 1888.
Richard Thompson, Toulouse-Lautrec (London, 1977), p. 48 cat. 20 (ill.) as At the Circus Fernando: the Equestrienne, 1888.
G. M. Sugana, L’opera completa di Toulouse-Lautrec (Milan, 1977), p. 101 cat. 224, pl. VII (ill.) as Al Circo ‘Fernando’: Cavallerizza, 1888.
Charles F. Stuckey, Toulouse-Lautrec: Paintings, exh. cat. (Chicago, 1979), pp. 124-126 cat. 32 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando, l’écuyere/At the Circus Fernando, the equestrienne, 1887.
Diane Kelder, The Great Book of French Impressionism (New York, 1980) pp. 290, 317-318 (ill.) as In the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster, 1888.
Daniel and Eugenia S. Robbins, Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec: A Selection of Works from The Art Institute of Chicago (Chicago, 1980), p. 9, pl. 8 (ill.) as At the Circus Fernando, 1887.
Gale B. Murray, “Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec: a checklist of revised dates, 1878-1891,” Gazette des Beaux Arts 95 (February 1980), p. 89 as Au Cirque Fernando: L’Ecuyère (Chicago), 1888-1889.
Bogomila Welsh-Ovcharov, Vincent van Gogh and the Birth of Cloisonism, exh. cat. (Toronto, 1981), pp. 40-41, 334-335 pl. 28 (ill.).
Charles F. Stuckey, Seurat: A Medaenas Monograph on the Arts (Mount Vernon, New York, 1984), p. 29 as At the Circus Fernando.
G. M. Sugana, Tout l’Oeuvre peint de Toulouse-Lautrec (Paris, 1986), p. 321.
Guy Cogeval, Les Années Post-Impressionnistes (Paris, 1986), p. 42 fig. 74 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando (l’Écuyère), 1888.
Götz Adriani, Toulouse Lautrec: Gemälde und Bildstudien, exh, cat. (Köln, 1986), pp. 86, 304, 305 (ill.) as Im Zirkus Fernando, 1888.
Richard R. Brettell, Post-Impressionists (New York, 1987), pp. 24-26 (ill.) as In the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster, 1887-88.
James N. Wood, Master Paintings in the Art Institute of Chicago (Chicago, 1988), p. 65 (ill.) as In the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster, 1888.
John Milner, The Studios of Paris: the Capital of Art in the Late Nineteenth Century (New Haven, 1988), pp. 146, 147, fig. 158 (ill.) as In the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster, 1888.
Sophie Monneret, Renoir (Paris, 1989) p. 82 fig. 3 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando: l’écuyère, 1888.
Claire and José Frèches, Toulouse-Lautrec: Les Lumières de la Nuit (Paris, 1991), pp. 42-43 (ill.) as Au cirque Fernando, l’écuyère.
Gale B. Murray, Toulouse-Lautrec: The Formative Years, 1878-1891 (Oxford, 1991), pp. xvii, 131, 146, 150, 161, 162, 171, 176, 190, 191, 193, 194, fig. and pl. 118 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando, l’écuyère.
Lesley Stevenson, H. de Toulouse-Lautrec (London, 1991), pp. 50-51, 63, 65, 69, 71, 73, 164 (ill.) as At the Cirque Fernando: The Equestrienne, 1888.
Jean Sagne, Toulouse-Lautrec au cirque (Paris, 1991), pp. 16, 19, 52, 53 (ill.) as Au cirque Fernando: l’écuyère, 1888.
Charles F. Stuckey, French Painting (New York, 1991), p. 166-167 (ill.) as In the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster, 1888.
Dominique Jarrassé, Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec-Monfa: Entre le Mythe et la Modernité (Paris, 1991), pp. 45, 52, 152-153, cat. 133 as Au Cirque Fernando: L’écuyère, 1888.
Richard Tilson, Seurat (London, 1991), pp. 28-29 (ill.) as At the Circus Fernando, 1887.
Patrick O’Connor, Nightlife of Paris: The Art of Toulouse-Lautrec (New York, 1991), pp. 56-57 (ill.) as In the Circus Fernando: the Ringmaster, 1888.
Toulouse-Lautrec, exh. cat. (Hayward Gallery, London, 1991-1992), pp. 234-237 (ill.).
Gérard Durozoi, Toulouse-Lautrec (London, 1992), pp. 70-71 (ill.) as At the Cirque Fernando: the Ringmaster, 1888.
Stephen F. Eisenman, Nineteenth Century Art: A Critical History (New York, 1994), pp. 334, 335 fig. 16.2 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando: Equestrienne, 1887-8.
Riva Castleman, Toulouse-Lautrec: posters and prints from the collection of Irene and Howard Stein, exh. cat. (Atlanta, 1998), p. 17 (ill.).
Margherita Andreotti, “The Joseph Winterbotham Collection at the Art Institute of Chicago,” Art Institute of Chicago Museum Studies 20, 2 (Chicago, 1994), pp. 124-125 (ill.) as Equestrienne (At the Circus Fernando), 1887-88.
Sophia Shaw Pettus, “Checklist of the Joseph Winterbotham Collection, 1921-1994,” Art Institute of Chicago Museum Studies 20, 2 (Chicago, 1994), p. 184 (ill.) as Equestrienne (At the Circus Fernando), 1887-88.
Julia Frey, Toulouse-Lautrec: A Life (London, 1994), pp. 215, 228, 238, 260, n.p. pl. 12 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando, l’écuyère (At the Cirque Fernando, the Bareback Rider), 1887.
Marcus Verhagen, “Whipstrokes,” Representations, no. 58 (Spring 1997), pp. 126-137, fig. 5 (ill.) as Equestrienne (At the Circus Fernando), 1887-1888.
Study of Toulouse-Lautrec’s images of the circus, especially drawings of clowns and female circus riders and the painting Equestrienne (At the Circus Fernando), 1887-1888 (Chicago, Art Institute).
David Sweetman, Explosive Acts: Toulouse-Lautrec, Oscar Wilde, Félix Fénéon and the Art & Anarchy of the Fin de Siècle (New York, 1999), pp. 176, 178,180-182 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando: Ecuyère/Ecuyère, the Bareback Rider.
Richard Thompson, “The Cultural Geography of the Petit Boulevard,” in Vincent Van Gogh and the Painters of the Petit Boulevard, exh. cat. (St. Louis Art Museum, 2001) pp. 100, 102 (ill.).
Daniel Wildenstein, Gauguin: Premier itinéraire d’un sauvage, Catalogue de l’oeuvre peint (1873-1888), vol. 2, p. 360 (ill.) as Le Cirque Fernando.
The Age of Impressionism at the Art Institute of Chicago (New Haven and London, 2008), cat. 60, pp. 128–29 (ill.).
Colin B. Bailey, “Acrobats at the Cirque Fernando (Francisca and Angelina Wartenberg),” Renoir, Impressionism, and Full-Length Painting. New Haven: Yale University Press and The Frick Collection, 2012. p. 130, fig. 8.
Possibly Brussels, Cinquieme Exposition des XX, 1888, cat. 11, as Ecquyère.
Paris, Moulin Rouge, Exposition Permanente, beginning in 1888.
Paris, Musée des Arts Decoratifs, Peintures et Lithographies originales de H. de Toulouse Lautrec 1864-1901, January 24-February 20, 1910, cat. 4.
Paris, Galeries Paul Rosenberg, Exposition d’Oeuvres de Toulouse-Lautrec, January 20-February 3, 1914, p. 8 cat. 20 as Monsieur Loyal, collection de M. Oller.
Paris, Galerie Manzi-Joyant, Exposition Rétrospective de L’Oeuvre de H. de Toulouse-Lautrec 1864-1901, June 15-July 11, 1914, p. 12 cat. 45 as Au Cirque. – M. Loyal, collection de M. le Baron Lafaurie.
Chicago, Art Institute, Arts Club, Catalogue of an Exhibition of Paintings by Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec, December 23, 1924-January 25, 1925, cat. 10 as Le Cirque (portrait de Monsieur Loyal).
Cambridge, Harvard University, Fogg Art Museum, Exhibition of French Painting of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, March 6-April 6, 1929, p. 20 cat. 87, pl. 45 as The Circus.
Chicago, Art Institute, Loan Exhibition of Paintings, Drawings, Prints and Posters by Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec 1930-1931, pp. 15, 57 cat. 7, (ill.) as At The Circus Fernando. The Ring-Master.
New York, Museum of Modern Art, Tenth Loan Exhibition: Lautrec, Redon, February 1–March 2, 1931, pp. 6, 14 cat. 7 (ill.) as At the Circus Fernando. The Ring Master, 1888.
Paris, Musée des Arts Décoratifs, Exposition H. de Toulouse-Lautrec au profit de la Société des Amis du Musée d’Albi, April 9–May 17, 1931, p. 14 cat. 52 pl. 2 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando: L’Écuyère, around 1887.
New York, Albright Art Gallery, 19th Century French Art in Retrospective, 1931, cat. 59.
Toronto, Art Gallery, Exhibition, December 1932-February 1933.
Chicago, Art Institute, Catalogue of A Century of Progress Exhibition of Paintings and Sculpture, Lent from American Collections, June 1-November 1, 1933, p. 53 cat. 373 as In the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster, 1888.
Chicago, Art Institute, Catalogue of A Century of Progress Exhibition of Paintings and Sculpture, June 1-November 1, 1934, p. 50 cat. 328 as In the Circus Fernando: The Ring-Master, 1888.
Buffalo, Albright Art Gallery, Exhibition of 19th Century French Art, 1934, cat. 59.
Boston, Museum of Fine Arts, Independent Painters of Nineteenth Century Paris, March 15-April 28, 1935, pp. 32, 75 cat. 49 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando, The Ringmaster, M. Loyal, 1888.
New York, Museum of Modern Art, Art in Our Time: An Exhibition to celebrate the Tenth Anniversary of the Museum of Modern Art and the opening of its New Building, May-September 1939, n.p. cat. 78 (ill.) as In the Fernando Circus: the Ring Master, 1888.
Detroit, Institute of Art, French Impressionism from Manet to Cézanne, May-June 1940.
Philadelphia, Museum of Art, Diamond Jubilee Exhibition: Masterpieces of Painting, November 4, 1950 – February 11, 1951, n.p. cat. 94 (ill.) as In the Circus Fernando. The Ringmaster, 1888.
Philadelphia, Museum of Art, Toulouse-Lautrec [exhibition organized in collaboration with the Albi Museum], October 29-December 11, 1955, p. 16 cat. 16 (ill.) as In the Circus Fernando: The Ring Master, 1888; traveled to Chicago, Art Institute, January 2-February 15, 1956.
New York, Museum of Modern Art, Toulouse-Lautrec: Paintings, Drawings, Posters and Lithographs, March 20-May 6, 1956, pp. 9, 45 cat. 8 (ill.) as At the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster, 1888.
Paris, Palais du Louvre, Toulouse-Lautrec Exhibition, September 1964-January 15, 1965.
Ottawa, National Gallery of Canada/Fine Arts Gallery of the Universal and International Exposition of 1967, Terres des Hommes/Man and His World, April 28-October 27, 1967, pp. 116, 117 cat. 56 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando: Le Maître du Cirque/In the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster, 1888.
Chicago, Art Institute, Toulouse Lautrec: Paintings, October 4-December 2, 1979, pp. 124-126, 143 cat. 32 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando, l’écuyere/At the Circus Fernando, the equestrienne, 1887.
Albi, Musée Toulouse-Lautrec, Trésors Impressionistes du Musée de Chicago, June 27-August 31, 1980, p. 20 cat. 38 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando, 1888.
Toronto, Art Gallery of Ontario, Van Gogh and the Birth of Cloisonism, January 24-March 22, 1981, pp. 40, 334 cat. 119, pl. 28 (ill.) as At the Circus Fernando: The Horsewoman, late 1887; traveled to Amsterdam, Rijksmuseum, April 9-June 14, 1981.
Leningrad, The State Hermitage Museum, Ot Delakrua do Matissa: Tbshedevry Frantsuzskoi zhivpici XIX-Nachala XX veka, iz ueieia Metropoliten v Niu-Iorke i Khudozhestvennogo Instituta v Chikago, March 15-May 10, 1988, cat. 38; traveled to Moscow, Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts, June 10-July 30, 1988.
London, Hayward Gallery, Toulouse-Lautrec, October 10, 1991-January 19, 1992, pp. 234-237 cat. 62 (ill.) as Au Cirque Fernando: Ecuyère; traveled to Paris, Galeries Nationales du Grand Palais, February 18-June 1, 1992.
St. Louis, Art Museum, Vincent van Gogh and the Painters of the Petit Boulevard, February 17-May 13, 2001, pp. 100, 102, 226 (ill.) as Equestrienne (At the Circus Fernando), 1887-1888; traveled to Frankfurt, Städelsches Kunstinstitut, June 8-September 2, 2001.
Atlanta, High Museum of Art, Toulouse-Lautrec: Posters and Prints from the Collection of Irene and Howard Stein, March 24-June 14, 1998, p. 17 (ill.) as Ecuyère (Au Cirque Fernando), 1887.
Washington, D.C., The National Gallery, Toulouse-Lautrec and Montmartre, March 20-June 12, 2005, pp. 236, 237, 239, 245, 258 fig. 266 (ill.) as Equestrienne (At the Circus Fernando), 1887-1888; traveled to Chicago, Art Chicago, July 16-October 10, 2005.
Joseph Oller, Paris, 1888 (bought for his café concert, Le Moulin Rouge) until 1914 [see Paris, Paul Rosenberg 1914]. Baron LaFaurie, Paris, by 1914 [see Paris, Manzi Joyant, 1914]. Paul Rosenberg & Co., Paris by 1924 [see Paris 1924]. Joseph Winterbotham, Chicago, by 1924; given to the Art Institute of Chicago, 1925.
Dortu P. 312
Audio stop 837.mp3
Artwork Resource Packet: Equestrienne (At the Cirque Fernando) by Henri Toulouse-Lautrec
At the Moulin Rouge, 1892/95
Portrait of the Artist’s Sister, 1891
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Woman in front of a Still Life by Cézanne
In this work, an unidentified woman sits in front of Paul Cézanne’s 1879–80 Still Life with Fruit Dish, now at the Museum of Modern Art, New York. The painting was part of Paul Gauguin’s own collection, and here he proprietarily signed his name over its white frame. Of the five or six Cézannes that he acquired while still a banker, this was the one he claimed he would never part with, “except in a case of direst necessity.” (He would eventually sell it to pay for medical treatment in Tahiti.) Although the version in this painting is nearly to scale with the original, it is more a translation than a copy, with rhythmical arabesques that are characteristic of Gauguin’s painting style rather than Cézanne’s.
Oil on linen canvas
Inscribed 6" above right corner: P. Go. / 90
65.3 × 54.9 cm (25 11/16 × 21 5/8 in.)
The Art Institute of Chicago, The Art Institute of Chicago Forty-Seventh Annual Report 1925 (Chicago: The Art Institute of Chicago, 1925), pp. 14, 39 (ill.).
“A Portrait of Gauguin,” The Bulletin of The Art Institute of Chicago 20, 1 (January 1926), p. 2 (ill.).
“Art Institute Buys a Gauguin Portrait,” The Art News 24, 18 (February 6, 1926), p. 4.
Arsène Alexandre, Paul Gauguin: Sa vie et le sens de son oeuvre (Paris, 1930), p. 29 (ill.).
The Art Institute of Chicago, A Guide to the Paintings in the Permanent Collection (Chicago, 1932), pp. 71 (ill.), 72, 154.
“The Rearrangement of the Painting Galleries,” The Bulletin of The Art Institute of Chicago 27, 7 (December 1933), p. 116.
Charles Kunstler, Gauguin, peintre maudit: anciens et modernes (Paris, 1934), p. 47 (ill.).
The Art Institute of Chicago, A Brief Illustrated Guide to the Collections (Chicago, 1935), p. 31.
Paul Gauguin, Paul Gauguin’s Intimate Journals (New York, 1936), p. 253 (ill.).
John Rewald, Gauguin (New York, 1938), p. 52 (ill.).
S. Rocheblave, La Peinture française au XIXe siècle (Paris, 1941), pl. 87.
The Art Institute of Chicago, An Illustrated Guide to the Collections of The Art Institute of Chicago (Chicago, 1945), p. 40.
The Art Institute of Chicago, The Winterbotham Collection (Chicago, 1947), pp. 21 (ill.), 22.
Maurice Malingue, Gauguin: Le Peintre et son oeuvre (Paris, 1948), ill. 153.
Herbert Lee van Dowski, Paul Gauguin oder die Flucht vor der Zivilisation (Bern, 1950), cat. 205.
Charles Estienne, Gauguin (Lausanne, 1953), p. 50 (ill.), 51.
Henri Dorra, “Gauguin and His Century,” Art Digest 28, 12 (March 15, 1954), p. 13 (ill.).
René Huyghe, Gauguin, 1954, pl. 13.
John Rewald, Post-Impressionism (New York, 1954), p. 309 (ill.).
Bernard Dorival and Agnès Humbert, Bonnard, Vuillard et les Nabis (1888-1903), exh. cat. (Paris, Musée National d’Art Moderne, 1955), under cat. 6.
John O’Connel Kerr, “Paul Gauguin: Creative Iconoclast,” The Studio 150, 753 (December 1955), pp. 172 (ill.).
John Rewald, Post-Impressionism: From Van Gogh to Gauguin (New York, 1956), pp. 308,309 (ill.).
Robert Goldwater, Paul Gauguin (New York, 1957), pp. 94, 95 (ill.).
Ernest W. Watson, “Borrowings of the Masters,” American Artists 24, 2 (February 1960), p. 39.
The Art Institute of Chicago, Paintings in The Art Institute of Chicago: A Catalogue of the Picture Collection (Chicago, 1961), pp. 170, 332 (ill.).
Georges Wildenstein, Gauguin (Paris, 1964), no. 387 (ill.).
Keith Roberts, “Current and Forthcoming Exhibitions,” Burlington Magazine 108, 755 (February 1966), pp. 105.
André Chastel, “Le Tableau dans le tableau,” Stil und Überlieferung in der Kunst des Abendlandes: Akten des 21. Internatioanlen Kongresses für Kunstgeschichte in Bonn 1964 (Berlin, 1967), pp. 26-27.
Richard W. Murphy and the Editors of Time-Life Books, The World of Cézanne 1839-1906 (New York, 1968), pp. 176, 177(ill.).
Mark Roskill, Van Gogh, Gauguin, and the Impressionist Circle (Greenwich, Conn., 1970), pp. 46-47, 54, pl. IV, ill. 29.
Mark Roskill, Van Gogh, Gauguin and French Painting of the 1880s: A Catalogue Raisonné of Key Works (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1970), pp. 196-197.
Wladyslawa Jaworska, Gauguin and the Pont-Aven School (London, 1972), p. 24 (ill.).
G. M. Sugana, L’opera completa di Gauguin (Milan, 1972), cat. 223 (ill.)
Herbert Lee van Dowski, Die Wahrheit über Gauguin: Mit vielen, zum Teil farbigen Abbildungen und einem “Katalog der Gemälde” (Darmstadt, 1973), p. 141 (ill.), cat. 205.
John Rewald, The History of Impressionism (New York, 1973), p. 561 (ill.).
René Huyghe, La Relève du Réel Impressionnisme Symbolisme (Paris, 1974), p. 345, ill. 299.
Daniel Wildenstein and Raymond Cogniat, Gauguin (Garden City, New York, 1974), pp. 48, 49 (ill.).
John Rewald, Post-Impressionism from Van Gogh to Gauguin (New York, 1978), pp. 270-271, 275, 286, 287 (ill.).
Patrice J. Marandel, The Art Institute of Chicago: Favorite Impressionist Paintings (New York, 1979), pp. 80, 81 (ill.).
Susan Wise, Paul Gauguin: His Life and His Paintings (Chicago, 1980), no. 10, ill.
Richard R. Brettell, Post-Impressionists (Chicago and New York, 1987), pp. 28 (ill.), 29-30, 31 (ill.).
Marina Aleksndrovna Bessonova, Gogen: Vzgliad iz Rossii: album-katalog (Moskwa, 1989), pp. 136 (ill. 19), 137.
Mary Louise Krumrine, Paul Cézanne: The Bathers, exh. cat. (Basel: Museum of Fine Arts, 1989), p. 285, 287 (ill.).
Michel Howard, Cezanne (London, 1990), p. 20 (ill.).
Richard Verdi, Cézanne (London, 1992), pp. 206, 208 (ill. 181).
The Art Institute of Chicago, The Joseph Winterbotham Collection at The Art Institute of Chicago, The Art Institute of Chicago Museum Studies 20, 2 (Chicago: The Art Institute of Chicago, 1994), pp. 128, 129 (ill.).
The Age of Impressionism at the Art Institute of Chicago (New Haven and London, 2008), cat. 65, p. 138 (ill.).
Joseph J. Rishel, “Arcadia 1900,” Gauguin, Cézanne, Matisse: Visions of Arcadia Exh. cat (Philadelphia Museum of Art, 2012), p. 6, p. 43, fig. 6.
Gloria Groom, ed. Gauguin: Artist as Alchemist, exh. cat. (Art Institute of Chicago/ Yale University Press, 2017). p. 22, 71n16, 85n14, 151, 154, 160,-161, 335, cat. 86.
Claire Bernardi and Ophélie Ferlier-Bouat, Guaguin: L’alchimiste, exh. cat. (Musée d’Osay/ Réunion des muséea nationaux-Grand Palais/ Graphicom, 2017), p.89, 308, cat. 96.
London, Stafford Gallery, Exhibition of Pictures by Paul Cezanne (1839-1906) and Paul Gauguin (1848-1903), November 23 and after, 1911, cat. 21, as Portrait of a Girl.
London, The Leicester Galleries, Exhibition of Works by Paul Gauguin (1848-1903), July-August, 1924, cat. 45, as L’Arlésienne.
The Art Institute of Chicago, Century of Progress: Exhibition of Paintings and Sculpture, June 1-November 1, 1933, cat. 358, as Mlle. Marie Henry.
The Art Institute of Chicago, Century of Progress: Exhibition of Paintings and Sculpture, June 1-November 1, 1934, cat. 303 (pl. XLIX), as Mlle. Marie Henry.
New York, Wildenstein & Co., Great Portraits from Impressionism to Modernism: A Loan Exhibition form the Benefit of the Public Education Association, March 1-March 29, 1938, cat. 17 (pl. IV), as Mlle. Marie Henry.
The Baltimore Museum of Art, Modern Paintings, Isms and How They Grew, January 12-February 11, 1940, no cat.
Museum of Fine Arts of Houston, Paul Gauguin: His Place in the Meeting of East and West, March 27-April 25, 1954, cat. 18 (ill.), as Portrait of a Woman, Marie Henry.
Edinburgh, The Royal Scotish Academy, An Exhibition of Paintings, Engravings and Sculpture: Gauguin, 1955, cat. 35 (pl. XII), as Portrait of Marie Henry.
The Art Institute of Chicago and New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gauguin,: Paintings, Drawings, Prints, Sculpture, February 12-March 29, 1959 and April 21-May 31, 1959, cat. 24 (ill.), as Marie Derrien.
San Francisco, California Palace of Legion of Honor, M. H. de Young Memorial Museum, and The San Francisco Museum of Art, Man, Glory, Jest, and Riddle: A Survey of the Human Form through the Ages, November 10, 1964-January 3, 1965, cat. 182, as Portrait of Marie Derrien.
London, Tate Gallery, Gauguin and the Pont Aven Group, January 7-February 13, 1966, cat. 33 (pl. 23b), as Portrait of Marie Derrien, traveled to Zürich, Kunsthaus, Pont Aven: Gauguin und sein Kreis, March 5-April 11, 1966, cat. 30 (ill.).
New York, Wildenstein and Co., Faces from the World of Impressionism and Post-Impressionism: A Loan Exhibition for the benefit of The New York Chapter of The Arthritis Foundation, November 2-December 9, 1972, cat. 30 (ill.), as Marie Derrien.
The Art Institute of Chicago, European Portraits 1600 – 1900 in The Art Institute of Chicago, July 8-September 11, 1978, cat. 21 (ill.).
The Art Institute of Chicago, The Art of the Edge: European Frames 1300-1900, October 17-December 14, 1986, not included in cat.
Washington, National Gallery of Art, The Art Institute of Chicago and Paris, Galeries nationales du Grand Palais, The Art of Gauguin, May 1-July 31, 1988, September 17-December 11, 1988, and January 10-April 24, 1989, cat. 111 (ill.).
The Art Institute of Chicago, Van Gogh and Gauguin: The Studio of the South, The Art Institute of Chicago, September 22, 2001-January 13, 2002, traveled to The Van Gogh Museum, Amsterdam, February 9-June 6, 2002, cat. 129 (ill.).
Essen, Museum Folkwang, Cézanne and the Dawn of Modern Art, September 18, 2004-January 16, 2005, no cat. no., ill. p. 24.
Chicago, The Art Institute of Chicago, Gauguin: Artist as Alchemist, June 25-Sept. 10. 2017; Paris, Musée d’Orsay, Oct. 9, 2017-Jan. 1, 2018.
Bernheim-Jeune Galerie, Paris [according to Wildenstein 1964]. Ernest Brown and Phillips, Leicester Galleries, London by 1924 [see London 1924 and Wildenstein 1964]. Chester H. Johnson Gallery, Chicago, by 1925; sold to the Art Institute, 1925.
Cat. 23 Woman in front of a Still Life by Cézanne, 1890
Arlésiennes (Mistral), 1888
No te aha oe riri (Why Are You Angry?), 1896
Polynesian Woman with Children, 1901
Portrait of Jeanne Wenz, 1886
Oil Sketch for “La Grande Jatte”, 1884
The Home of the Heron, 1893
Madame Vallotton and her Niece, Germaine Aghion, 1899
Félix Edouard Vallotton
Young Peasant Having Her Coffee, 1881
Woman and Child at the Well, 1882
Landscape: Window Overlooking the Woods, 1899
Édouard Jean Vuillard
Andromeda, 1904/10
Child Playing: Annette Roussel in Front of a Wooden Chair, c. 1900
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Posts Tagged ‘Bank of America’
Fannie Mae Asks Uncle Sam For More Money
Wednesday, March 21st, 2012
In an attempt to dig itself out of a deepening hole, Fannie Mae has requested $4.6 billion in additional federal aid. “We think that we have reserved for and recognized substantially all of the credit losses associated with the legacy book,” Chief Financial Officer Susan McFarland said. “We’re very focused on returning to profitability so we don’t have to draw (from Treasury) to cover operating losses.”
Although the nation’s banks seem to be recovering nicely, the same cannot be said for mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Writing in Forbes, Steve Schaefer notes that “The mortgage finance giants have taken on a greater share of supporting the U.S. housing market as private players pared back their exposure in recent years, and the result has been billions of losses on the taxpayer dime. Fannie Mae reported booking a $16.9 billion 2011 loss capped off by the loss of $2.4 billion in the 4th quarter. Fannie Mae’s losses are still coming largely from its legacy book of business (from before 2009), which led to $5.5 billion in credit-related expenses tied to declining home prices.
“The black holes of Fannie and Freddie – Fannie’s Q4 report shows it has requested to draw $116.2 billion since being placed under conservatorship Sept. 6, 2008 while paying back $19.9 billion in preferred stock dividends – are the biggest black eyes of the 2008 bailouts. Plenty of critics of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) have made their voices heard over the years, but at least most of the banks that received TARP injections – the biggest of which went to Bank of America and Citigroup – have paid back the government’s loans and are back to making profits, if modest ones. Even American Intl Group and the automakers that received bailouts – General Motors and Chrysler – have moved beyond needing additional government dollars. Fannie and Freddie, on the other hand, show few signs of becoming anything resembling productive companies until the housing market turns around or the pre-2009 assets are completely wiped off the books or new policies are necessary to encourage new refinancing beyond those currently in place that have had limited impact.”
“While economic factors such as falling home prices and high unemployment produced strong headwinds for our business again in 2011, we continued to grow a very strong new book of business as we have since 2009, “said CEO Michael Williams, who handed in his resignation in January but is still on board while the government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) looks for his replacement.
Bank of America last week announced that it had stopped selling some mortgages to Fannie Mae because of a dispute over requests from the government-run company to buy back defective loans. “If Fannie Mae collects less than the amount it expects from Bank of America, Fannie Mae may be required to seek additional funds from Treasury,” the company said.
Fannie Mae blamed its loss primarily on pre-2009 loans and falling home prices, which pushed up the company’s credit-related expenses. In the 4th quarter of 2010, Fannie Mae posted a slight profit to end a streak of 13 consecutive quarterly losses, though the company was back in the red in the following quarter and each since. The net cost to taxpayers for bailing out Fannie and Freddie stands at more than $152 billion.
During the 4th quarter, Fannie Mae acquired 47,256 single family homes through foreclosure compared with 45,194 in the 3rd quarter. The company disposed of 51,344 REO properties in the quarter, down from 58,297 in the 3rd quarter. As of the end of 2011, Fannie Mae was holding 118,528 REO properties, a reduction from the 122,616 at the end of September and 162,489 on December 31, 2010. The value of the single-family REO was $9.7 billion compared with $11.0 billion at the end of the 3rd quarter and $15.0 billion at the end of 2010. The single family foreclosure rate in the 3rd quarter was 1.13 percent annualized compared with 1.15 for the first three quarters of the year and 1.46 percent for 2010.
Meanwhile, the federal government wants to sell approximately 2,500 distressed properties in eight locations to investors who buy them in bulk and rent them out for a predetermined period. The properties, located in Atlanta, Phoenix, Las Vegas, Los Angeles/Riverside, and three Florida regions, include single-family homes and co-op apartment buildings. “This is another important milestone in our initiative designed to reduce taxpayer losses, stabilize neighborhoods and home values, shift to more private management of properties, and reduce the supply of REO properties in the marketplace,” said Edward J. DeMarco, the acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which oversees Fannie Mae.
Tags: Bank of America, Chrysler, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, Federal Housing Finance Agency, foreclosure, Freddie Mac, General Motors, Government-sponsored enterprise, REO properties, Troubled Asset Relief Program, U.S. Treasury Department
Posted in Economics, Financing, General | No Comments »
A New Chapter for Iconic Empire State Building
The landmark 102-story Empire State Building in midtown Manhattan could raise as much as $1 billion in a share sale and become a real estate investment trust (REIT), if the company that controls that iconic structure if its plans pan out. According to a Securities and Exchange Commission filing, Empire State Realty Trust, Inc., intends to list the shares on the New York Stock Exchange. The firm, Malkin Holdings, LLC, will consolidate a group of closely held companies to form the REIT as part of the IPO, according to a separate filing.
Malkin, supervisor of the company the holds the title to the tower, said that it had “embarked on a course of action” that could result in the Empire State Building becoming part of a new REIT. Malkin Holdings supervises property-owning partnerships led by Peter and Anthony Malkin, and owns the 2.9 million-square-foot Empire State Building in conjunction with the estate of Leona Helmsley. Bank of America, Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. will advise on the IPO. The price and number of shares were not disclosed in the filing.
The proposed IPO would give investors a rare opportunity to own a piece of one of the world’s most famous buildings as New York’s real estate values rebound after the recession. Midtown Manhattan office property prices have recovered 87 percent of their value since bottoming out in mid-2009, according to Green Street Advisors Inc., a REIT research firm.
The REIT would consolidate Manhattan and New York area properties owned by companies including Empire State Building Associates LLC, 60 East 42nd St. Associates LLC and 250 West 57th St. Associates LLC. Participants can opt to receive cash instead of shares for as much as 15 percent of the value.
Since gaining control of the building 10 years ago, Malkin has invested tens of millions of dollars to improve the office spaces and cut the cost of heating and maintaining the 81-year-old structure. That helped attract tenants such as social networking site LinkedIn. According to the SEC filing, Malkin said that upgrading the building still requires additional investment of between $55 million and $65 million over the next four years.
As with many recent tech and internet IPOs, the company plans to have two classes of stock — class A shares that are sold to the public and worth one vote, as well as class B shares with 50 votes each. The structure leaves the Malkin family with significant control. The proceeds will pay existing stakeholders in the buildings who chose to take cash in exchange for their interests, and to repay debt. The REIT will list itself on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol “ESB.”
The Malkins realize that leasing in New York is “highly competitive,” and faces new rivals in the skyline, primarily the One World Trade Center, which will have a broadcast antenna and observation deck that could attract tenants away from the Empire State Building.
At 1,250 feet and 102 floors, the art deco-style building is one of New York City’s most recognizable tourist destinations, enjoying its second stint as the city’s tallest building. It was the world’s tallest building from its 1931 opening until 1974, when the 442-meter Sears Tower (now Willis Tower) was completed in Chicago.
The building played a starring role in several movies, most notably “King Kong,” “An Affair to Remember” and “Sleepless in Seattle.”
Tags: "An Affair to Remember", "King Kong", "Sleepless in Seattle", “ESB”, 60 East 42nd Street, and 250 West 57th Street Associates LLC, Associates LLC, Bank of America, Empire State Building, Empire State Realty Trust, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Green Street Advisors, Inc., IPO, Leona Helmsley, LinkedIn, LLC, Malkin Holdings, Manhattan, Merrill Lynch, New York Stock Exchange, One World Trade Center, Real estate investment trust, Sears Tower, Securities and Exchange Commission, World Trade Center
Posted in Economics, Financing, General, Office | No Comments »
A Lifeline for Underwater Homeowners?
Federal officials and some of the nation’s largest banks are collaborating on a plan that would make refinancing available to some borrowers whose houses are worth less than their loans, with the caveat that they must be up-to-date on mortgage payments. Typically, these borrowers can’t refinance because they don’t have enough equity in their homes. The plan would apply only to bank-owned mortgages.
Federal officials have been trying to negotiate a deal with the five largest mortgage servicers – Ally Financial, Inc, Bank of America, Citigroup Inc, J.P. Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo & Co. Officials favor a plan that would break a legal impasse with big banks over alleged foreclosure abuses such as robo signing and ease problems in the housing market. Discussions are still underway and the final outcome is not yet known.
Pressure is building in Washington, D.C., to help underwater homeowners with a generous refinance plan. President Barack Obama told Congress that he wants to help “responsible homeowners” refinance, saying it would “give a lift to an economy still burdened by the drop in housing prices.” A bipartisan coalition of 16 senators wrote to the administration urging swift action on a refinance plan.
“A huge floodgate would open up” if underwater refinancing were broadly available, said Fif Ghobadian, a broker at Guarantee Mortgage in San Francisco. “It would provide the help that lowering interest rates cannot do alone. Someone who’s been making payments at 7.5 percent religiously but cannot qualify to refi – boy, would that four percent make a huge difference in their life.”
A program has existed for some time that provides guidelines to lenders for refinancing some Fannie Mae- and Freddie Mac-backed underwater mortgages. The program is called HARP (Home Affordable Refinance Program), it’s two years old and has resulted in approximately 800,000 refinances, far short of the five million originally envisioned. Only a fraction of those homeowners were deeply underwater. HARP’s main impediment has been the lenders themselves. Concerns about issues such as being forced to take responsibility for refinances that default (known in the industry as “buybacks”) has made lenders reluctant to issue HARP mortgages. The proposed new plan would likely expand HARP to make it more acceptable to lenders and more usable by a broader swath of homeowners. “Changes (being contemplated) would address several HARP obstacles,” said Erin Lantz, director of the mortgage marketplace for Zillow. “The industry now makes it hard for people to qualify. The process would be more streamlined.”
According to a recent Harvard study, approximately 11 million homeowners with mortgages are underwater. This accounts for roughly one-fourth of all homes with mortgages in the nation. An additional five percent have near-negative equity (<five percent home equity).
Writing for Reuters, Felix Salmon doesn’t think much of the potential mortgage plan. “It’s pretty weak tea: under the terms of the deal, if (a) you’re underwater on your mortgage, and (b) you’re current on your mortgage payments, and (c) your mortgage is owned by the bank outright, rather than having been securitized, then you would be given the opportunity to refinance your mortgage at prevailing market rates. It’s worth remembering, at this point, that mortgages are by their nature pre-payable. When you write a fixed-rate mortgage, you make a general assumption that if mortgage rates fall substantially, the borrower is going to pay you off and refinance. The underwater questions we’re talking about here were written during the housing boom, when banks simply assumed that house prices always went up; those banks cared massively about prepayment risk at the time, and spent huge amounts of money and effort trying to hedge it. As it happened, mortgage rates did fall substantially — with the result that the banks’ hedges paid off. But then the banks realized that they could make money on both legs of the deal — that they could collect on their mortgage-rate hedges, without having to worry about prepayment. Because now the borrowers are underwater, they’re not allowed to refinance. So the banks continue to cash above-market mortgage payments every month — something they never expected that they would be able to do.
“It’s not inconceivable at all. In fact, wholesale mortgage refinance for underwater borrowers is a major part of Barack Obama’s jobs bill, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has been costing it in various ways. At heart, it’s a way of rectifying a market failure, and thus makes perfect sense. But that’s precisely why I don’t think that this plan deserves a place in the mortgage-settlement talks. For one thing, it’s downright unfair and invidious to allow 20 percent of underwater homeowners to refinance while ignoring the other 80 percent. More to the point, giving homeowners the ability to refinance their mortgages is what you do, if you’re a bank. It’s not some kind of gruesome punishment.”
Tags: Ally Financial, Bank of America, Citigroup Inc, congress, Congressional Budget Office, Fannie Mae, Fixed-rate mortgage, Freddie Mac, Harvard, Home Affordable Refinance Program, Inc., J P Morgan Chase, Mortgage refinancing plan, President Barack Obama, refinancing, underwater mortgages, Wells Fargo & Co., Zillow
Posted in Economics, Financing, General, Residential | No Comments »
August Foreclosures Rise 33 Percent Over July
Default notices sent to delinquent U.S. homeowners soared 33 percent in August when compared with July, evidence that lenders are accelerating the foreclosure process after almost one year of delays, according to RealtyTrac, Inc. First-time default notices were filed on 78,880 homes, the highest number in nine months. Total foreclosure filings, which also include auction and home-seizure notices, rose seven percent from a four-year low in July to 228,098. One in 570 homes received a notice during August. “The industry appears to be hitting the reset button and the logjam may finally be breaking up,” Rick Sharga, RealtyTrac senior vice president, said. Foreclosure filings in 2011 have been “artificially low.”
“This is really the first time we’ve seen a significant increase in the number of new foreclosure actions,” Sharga said. “It’s still possible this is a blip, but I think it’s much more likely we’re seeing the beginning of a trend here.” Foreclosure activity started declining last year after problems surfaced with the way many lenders were handling foreclosure paperwork, such as shoddy mortgage paperwork comprising several shortcuts known as robo-signing.
Additional factors have also stalled the pace of new foreclosures. In some cases, the process has been held delayed by courts in states where judges are involved in the foreclosure process, a possible settlement of government investigations into mortgage-lending practices, and lenders’ reluctance to take back properties because of slowing home sales. A rise in foreclosures also means a potentially faster turnaround for the U.S. housing market. Experts say that revival won’t occur as long as the glut of potential foreclosures remains on the market.
Foreclosures depress home values and create uncertainty among potential homebuyers who worry that prices may further decline as more foreclosures hit the market. There are approximately 3.7 million more homes in some phase of foreclosure at present than there would be in a normal housing market, according to Citi analyst Josh Levin. “This bloated foreclosure pipeline now presents the greatest obstacle to a housing market recovery,” he said.
Although negotiations between some banks and state attorneys general regarding foreclosure practices are still unresolved, several restarted foreclosure actions after an April settlement with federal regulators. JPMorgan Chase & Co., as of the end of June, had resumed foreclosure actions in nearly all of the 43 states where it had suspended its efforts. So-called “shadow inventory,” or the looming foreclosures that are still expected to hit the market, is a major threat for a housing sector that already has a glut of unsold homes. In spite of everything, default notices had fallen 18 percent when compared with August of 2010 and down 44 percent from the peak reached in April 2009 during the tail end of the recession.
Writing for The Consumerist website, Chris Morran says that “Last year, several of the country’s largest mortgage servicers — Bank of America, GMAC/Ally, JPMorgan Chase, among others — were forced to hit the pause button on foreclosure procedures after it was revealed that many foreclosure documents were being rubber stamped by untrained, ill-informed ‘robo-signers.’ This delay caused a bottleneck of foreclosure-worthy properties waiting to be reviewed. But now it looks like those homes are starting to trickle out into what could be a flood in early 2012. According to Bank of America, “We are on an ongoing path to return foreclosures to normal levels. Strong gains like that from July to August demonstrate our progress – primarily in judicial states — clearing more volume to advance to foreclosure once we pass the numerous quality controls we have in place and exhaust all options with homeowners. Our progress each month builds upon foreclosure levels lower than the market realities would dictate.”
A more optimistic view of the dismal report was offered by Gregory Tsujimoto, who performs market research for John Burns Real Estate Consulting in Irvine, CA, and views the data as reflecting more of a stall in an improving market than a new downtrend. Despite the sharp increase in monthly figures, Tsujimoto attaches more weight to an 18 percent decline in default notices on a yearly basis. Tsujimoto believes that the uptick in default notices is “a leading indicator for future foreclosures, which is not coming at a great time when measures of consumer confidence have declined.” But, he says that we must address the backlog of distressed inventory and “vacant homes in the marketplace before we get true improvement.” The other key, he says, is “creating jobs to spur demand.”
Among the states with the highest foreclosure rates, California led in new foreclosures with an increase of 55 percent over July, according to RealtyTrac. Cities in inland California posted big jumps, with Riverside and San Bernardino counties soaring 68 percent, Bakersfield 44 percent and Modesto 57 percent. “Scratch beneath the surface and there’s not a lot to cheer about this month. Home sales were up from a year earlier but remained far below average,” DataQuick President John Walsh said. “Many would-be buyers can’t find financing, and others who want to make a move now are stuck because they owe more than their homes are worth.”
The decision to move ahead is an important one since RealtyTrac has long maintained that property values won’t rise until a large number of distressed properties are purchased. “We don’t know yet if this is a beginning of a trend, but there is a good chance we might see a return to more realistic foreclosure numbers,” Sharga concluded.
Tags: Bank of America, California, DataQuick, Distressed properties, Foreclosure auctions, foreclosures, GMC/Ally, housing market, Inc., Inside Mortgage Finance Publications, John Burns Real Estate Consulting, JPMorgan Chase & Co., mortgage defaults, property values, RealtyTrac, recession, robo-signing, Shadow inventory
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One Solution to Rundown Foreclosed Houses? Bulldoze Them
Several banks have found a new solution to the glut of foreclosed houses – many of them in poor condition. It’s the bulldozer. Bank of America (BoA) owns a glut of abandoned houses that no one wants to purchase. As a result, the nation’s largest mortgage servicer is bulldozing some of its most uninhabitable inventory. Additionally, Wells Fargo, CitiCorp, JP Morgan Chase and Fannie Mae have been demolishing a few of their repossessed houses. BoA is donating 100 foreclosed houses in the Cleveland area and in some cases will contribute to the cost of their demolition in partnership with a local agency that manages blighted property. The bank has similar plans impacting houses in Detroit and Chicago, and more cities tare expected to be added.
“There is way too much supply,” said Gus Frangos, president of the Cleveland-based Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corporation, which works with lenders, government officials and homeowners to salvage abandoned homes. “The best thing we can do to stabilize the market is to get the garbage off.” Detroit mayor Dave Bing is in the process of ” right-sizing” the motor city by razing entire neighborhoods.
BoA plans to donate and bulldoze 100 houses in Cleveland, 100 in Detroit, and 150 in Chicago. The lender will pay up to $7,500 for demolition or $3,500 in areas eligible to receive funds through the federal Neighborhood Stabilization Program. Uses for the land include development, open space and urban farming. “No one needs these homes, no one is going to buy them,” said Christopher Thornberg, founding partner at the Los Angeles office of Beacon Economics LLC. “Bank of America is not going to be able to cover its losses, so it might as well give them away and get a little write-off and some nice public relations.”
Some foreclosed properties are so uninhabitable that the bank is willing pay to have them destroyed. A bank spokesman said some in this category are worth less than $10,000.
Writing in The Atlantic, Daniel Indiviglio says that “The motivation here is pretty straightforward. They get out of ongoing maintenance costs and taxes that they would have to pay as long as the property remains on the market. But the even better news is that the banks can often write-off these properties as a result. In some cases, banks can deduct as much as the homes’ fair market value from their income taxes. From the real estate market’s standpoint this strategy is also positive. With less supply, prices will stabilize more quickly. Disposing of these foreclosures will make the market clear sooner. And yet, the idea of bulldozing homes does seem rather unsavory, does it not? Perhaps some of these homes are condemned and/or beyond repair. In those cases, it might turn out to be more expensive to try to get them back up to code than it would be to knock them down and start over. But does this really describe all of the cases? This is reportedly happening to thousands of homes across the U.S. My concern is that banks are using this as an easy out to minimize their loss with little concern about what’s best for the U.S. economy. If some of these homes could be converted to perfectly adequate rental properties at minimal additional cost at some point in the future, for example, then this would make a lot more sense than knocking them down and building new homes from scratch.”
According to a Time magazine article, “After multi-billion dollar legislative efforts in the form of the Stimulus, Dodd-Frank and stand-alone legislation, President Obama declared failure earlier this month and said he’s going back to the drawing board on a housing fix. Negotiations between the 50 state attorneys general and the big mortgage lenders, rather than clearing the air for banks and borrowers, has become an enormous wet blanket as negotiations drag out and banks refuse to make any move without knowing how much of the reported $20 billion settlement will fall on them. Economists argue that the failure to clear the housing market is a primary cause of the stunted recovery: continued household debt weighs on consumer spending, home ownership and excessive debt puts a drag on labor mobility, and banks fear the consequences of increased lending.”
Tags: Bank of America, Beacon Economics LLC, Chicago, CitiCorp, Cleveland, Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corporation, Dave Bing, Detroit, Dodd-Frank Act, Fannie Mae, Foreclosed houses, home ownership, JP Morgan Chase, Mortgage servicer, Neighborhood Stabilization Program, President Barack Obama, Right-sizing, stimulus bill, Wells Fargo
Regulators Cracking Down on Banks Over Foreclosures
Federal regulators at the Departments of Justice, Treasury and Housing, as well as the Federal Trade Commission, have ordered the nation’s largest banks to revamp their foreclosure procedures and compensate borrowers who were financially hurt by “pervasive” bad behavior or carelessness. According to the bank regulators, failure to comply with the rules will result in fines and a broad investigation conducted by state attorneys general and other federal agencies. The regulators acted after being criticized for not putting a halt to risky lending practices during the housing boom.
Describing the lending practices as “a pattern of misconduct and negligence,” the Federal Reserve said that “These deficiencies represent significant and pervasive compliance failures and unsafe and unsound practices at these institutions.” Borrowers in trouble have complained that applying for a modification using the Obama administration’s program has been too complicated and characterized by multiple games of telephone tag. Enforcement requires servicers to set up compliance programs and hire an independent firm to review residential-foreclosures. The banks will be required to make sure that communications are more “effective” between borrowers and banks when it comes to foreclosure and mortgage-modification proceedings.
Citibank, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo, the nation’s four leading banks, top the list of financial firms cited by the Federal Reserve, Office of Thrift Supervision and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Citigroup said that it had “self-identified” desired changes in 2009 and that it has helped more than 1.1 million homeowners avoid foreclosure. “We are committed to working with our regulators to further strengthen our programs in these areas and meeting these new requirements,” the company said.
As stern as the recent move seems to be, there are still critics. “These consent orders are worse than doing nothing,” said Alys Cohen, staff attorney for the National Consumer Law Center. “They set the bar so low on some things and they give the banks carte blanche on others. And they give the appearance of doing something while giving banks control of the process.” Additionally, consumer advocates and members of Congress said the new rules are too little, too late.
Congressional critics maintain that the order is too moderate. House Democrats introduced legislation that would require lenders to perform specific actions, including an appeals process, before starting foreclosures. “I want to know what abuses (the government agencies) identified, which banks committed them and how their proposed consent agreement is going to fix these problems,” said Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-MD) the ranking member of the House Government and Oversight Committee. “Based on what I have read…I am not encouraged at all.”
More than 50 consumer groups don’t like the settlement, and claim that the expected settlements do little more than require mortgage servicers to obey existing laws and that they lack penalties. “They’re left to police their new improvements,” said Katherine Porter, a University of Iowa law professor who is an expert on mortgage services. Another concern is that the settlements may weaken the ability of 50 state attorneys general to force concessions from mortgage servicers. The attorneys general have been investigating mortgage servicers since last fall, and in March sent the companies a list of terms, which go further than those pursued by bank regulators. Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller, who’s leading the joint effort, says any settlements with banking regulators will not “pre-empt” the states’ efforts.
Tags: Bank of America, bank regulators, Citibank, congress, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Justice, Federal Reserve, Federal Trade Commission, foreclosure, House Government and Oversight Committee, house of representatives, J P Morgan Chase, National Consumer Law Center, Obama administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Predatory lending, Regulations, Representative Elijah Cummings, Treasury Department, Wells Fargo
Posted in Economics, Financing, General, Residential | 1 Comment »
The Fed Sends 19 Biggest Banks Back to the Treadmill
The Federal Reserve‘s second round of stress tests requires the 19 largest U.S. banks to examine their capital levels against a worst-possible-case scenario of another recession with the unemployment rate hovering above 8.9 percent. The banks were instructed to test how their loans, securities, earnings, and capital performed when compared with at least three possible economic outcomes as part of a broad capital-planning exercise. The banks, including some seeking to increase dividends cut during the financial crisis, submitted their plans in January. The Fed will complete its review in March.
“They’re essentially saying, ‘Before you start returning capital to shareholders, let’s make sure banks’ capital bases are strong enough to withstand a double-dip scenario,'” said Jonathan Hatcher, a credit strategist at New York-based Jefferies Group Inc. Regulators don’t want to see banks “come crawling back for help later,” he said.
The review “allows our supervisors to compare the progress made by each firm in developing a rigorous internal analysis of its capital needs, with its own idiosyncratic characteristics and risks, as well as to see how the firms would fare under a standardized adverse scenario developed by our economists,” Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo said. Although Fed policymakers aren’t predicting another slump any time soon, they want banks to be prepared for one. In January, the Federal Open Market Committee forecast a growth rate of 3.4 percent or more annually over the next three years, with the jobless rate falling to between 6.8 percent and 7.2 percent by the 4th quarter of 2013. Unemployment averaged 9.6 percent in the 4th quarter of 2010.
The new round of stress tests are being overseen by a financial-risk unit known as the Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee (LISCC). The unit relies on the Fed’s economists, quantitative researchers, regulatory experts and forecasters and examines risks across the financial system. Last year, the LISCC helped Ben Bernanke respond to an emerging liquidity crisis faced by European banks. “The current review of firms’ capital plans is another step forward in our approach to supervision of the largest banking organizations,” Tarullo said. “It has also served as an occasion for discussion in the LISCC of the overall state of the industry and key issues faced by banking organizations.”
At the same time, Bernanke expressed his support for the Dodd-Frank Act, which will add new layers of regulation to the financial services industry, as well as the Consumer Protection Act. “Dodd-Frank is a major step forward for financial regulation in the United States,” Bernanke said, noting that the Fed is moving swiftly to implement its provisions. Additionally, the Fed wants banks to think about how the Dodd-Frank Act might affect earnings, and how they will meet stricter international capital guidelines. Banks will have to determine how many faulty mortgages investors may ask them to take back into their portfolios. Standard & Poor’s estimates that mortgage buybacks could carry a $60 billion bill to be paid by the banking industry.
In the meantime, the big banks are feeling adequately cash rich to pay dividends to their stockholders. Bank of America’s CEO Brian T. Moynihan said that he expects to “modestly increase” dividends in the 2nd half of 2011. “We’d love to raise the dividend,” James Rohr, CEO of PNC, said. “We’re hopeful of hearing back in March from the regulators.” JPMorgan CFO Douglas Braunstein told investors that the bank asked regulators for permission to increase the dividend to 30 percent of normalized earnings over time. Braunstein said that JPMorgan’s own stress scenario was more severe than the Fed’s, and assumed that the GDP fell more than four percent through the 3rd quarter of this year with unemployment peaking at 11.7 percent.
Clive Crook, a senior editor of The Atlantic, a columnist for National Journal, and a commentator for the Financial Times, believes that United States fiscal policy itself merits examination. Writing in The Atlantic, Crook says that “Fiscal policy needs a hypothetical stress test, just like bank capital. Let’s be optimistic and suppose that the deficit projections do hold, and that a debt ratio of 80 percent can be comfortably supported at full employment. What happens when we enter the next recession with debt at that level? Assume another really serious downturn, and another 30-odd percentage points of debt. Worried yet? That’s why the problem won’t wait another ten years, and why sort-of-stabilizing at 80 percent won’t do.”
Tags: Bank of America, Bank stress tests, Ben Bernanke, capital, Capital levels, Consumer Protection Act, Daniel Tarullo, Dividends, Dodd-Frank Act, Earnings, Federal Open Market Committee, Federal Reserve, financial crisis, financial reform, financial services, GDP, Inc., industry, Jeffries Group, JPMorgan Chase PNC Financial Services Group, Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee, loans, Mortgage buybacks, recession, Regulators, securities, Standard & Poor’s, Stockholders, unemployment, Wall Street reform
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Federal Reserve Comes Clean on Who Received Bailout Money
At the instruction of Congress, the Federal Reserve has released the names of the approximately 21,000 recipients of $3.3 trillion in aid provided during the financial meltdown –without doubt the nation’s worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. Not surprisingly, two of the top beneficiaries were Bank of America and Wells Fargo, who received approximately $45 billion each from the Term Auction Facility. American units of the Swiss bank UBS, the French bank Societe Generale and German bank Dresdner Bank AG also received financial assistance. The Fed posted the information on its website in compliance with a provision of the Dodd-Frank bill that imposed strict new financial regulations on Wall Street.
One of the biggest surprises on the list is the fact that General Electric accessed a Fed program no fewer than 12 times for a total of $16 billion. Although the Fed originally objected, Congress demanded accountability because there was evidence that the central bank had gone beyond their usual role of supporting banks. In addition, the Fed purchased short-term IOUs from corporations, risky assets from Bear Stearns and more than $1 trillion in housing debt.
Reactions to the revelations are both positive and negative. On the positive side, Richmond Fed President Jeffrey Lacker said “We owe an accounting to the American people of who we have lent money to. It is a good step toward broader transparency.” Sarah Binder, a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution, disagrees, noting that “These disclosures come at a politically opportune time for the Fed. Just when Chairman Bernanke is trying to defend the Fed from Republican critics of its asset purchases, the Fed’s wounds from the financial crisis are reopened.”
Senator Bernard Sanders (I-VT) said “We see this (list) not as the end of a process but really a significant step forward in opening the veil of secrecy that exists in one of the most powerful agencies in government. Given the size of these commitments, it is incomprehensible that the American people have not received specific details about them.”
Tags: AIG, Bank of America, Bear Stearns, Ben Bernanke, Bloomberg News, Brookings Institution, congress, Dodd-Frank bill, Dresdner Bank AG, Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, financial crisis, General Electric, Goldman Sachs, Great Depression, Lehman Brothers, Senator Bernard Sanders, Societe Generale, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, Term Auction Facility, UBS, Wall Street, Wells Fargo
Half of Companies Plan to Hire New Employees in 2011
Approximately half – 47 percent – of American companies whose sales range from $25 million to $2 billion say they will hire more employees in 2011, according to a Bank of America survey of chief financial officers (CFOs). The new number represents a significant uptick over the 28 percent who planned to hire new employees one year ago. The news is not all good – 61 percent of companies who do not plan to hire said there is still reduced demand for their products or services. The survey of 800 firms covered a broad range of industries throughout the United States.
The CFOs are unsure that the economic recovery will last, as well as being concerned about the impact of the healthcare reform law that Congress passed in March of 2010. Their caution is evident in the fact that – on a scale of one to 100 – the CFOs gave the economy a rank of 47. This represents a slight increase over the 44 level recorded last year. An addition 64 percent expect their companies’ revenue will grow in 2011; 55 percent anticipate margin growth.
“Despite the challenging economic climate, many CFOs have growing confidence that their companies have weathered the worst of the storm and are poised for expansion,” Laura Whitley, Bank of America’s global commercial products executive, said. “Although concerns about the economy remain, the increase in CFOs who expect to hire employees could be crucial to improving the nation’s unemployment rate. It’s exciting to see a more positive mood.” Yet, she noted, the recovery has been slower than expected. “When talking with businesses we hear it all the time.”
Tags: Bank of America, CFOs, congress, economy, Healthcare costs, Healthcare reform law, hiring, jobs, manufacturing, Margin growth, Revenues, Services
Posted in Development, General, Office | No Comments »
Congressional Oversight Panel Takes on the Foreclosure Mess
Wednesday, December 8th, 2010
Sloppy foreclosure paperwork could upset the nation’s housing market and destabilize the economy in general, according to a report released by the Congressional Oversight Panel. This group oversees the government bailout and its statement marks the first time a federal watchdog has issued an opinion on the foreclosure issue. Consumer advocates and financial analysts had previously raised the issue, noting that although the consequences of the foreclosure mess are unclear. The situation has the potential to impact mortgages that are not in trouble but were securitized and sold to investors.
“Everyone’s very nervous about what’s going to happen,” said an anonymous industry source. “We have all hands on deck.” Some lawmakers want to revisit legislation that would allow bankruptcy judges to order lenders to reduce the principal the homeowner owes. Others favor allowing big banks to spin off their mortgage-servicing operations to avoid conflicts of interest. “The risk is small that a bill gets through, but we are taking it very seriously,” said another unidentified financial lobbyist. The dilemma became apparent in recent months as Ally Financial, Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase halted foreclosures as it became clear that many were based on flawed documentation.
The oversight panel also voiced concerns that investors who bought the securitized mortgages could file lawsuits that ultimately might cost banks billions of dollars. At the same time, the panel said the Treasury Department’s claims that the mortgage situation poses slight systemic risk to the financial system are premature. “Clear and uncontested property rights are the foundation of the housing market. If those rights fall into question, that foundation could collapse,” according to the report, which also recommended that the Treasury and Federal Reserve conduct new stress tests on Wall Street banks to gauge their ability to cope with any new upheavals.
Tags: Ally Financial, Bank of America, Congressional Oversight Panel, Consumer advocates, Federal Reserve, Financial analysts, Financial Fraud Task Force, foreclosures, Fraudulent foreclosure paperwork, JPMorgan Chase, lobbyists, Senate Banking Committee, stress tests, Treasury Department, Wall Street banks
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Politics & SocietyOf Many Things
Matt Malone, S.J. November 16, 2017
The danger in losing our shared sense of history
French soldiers in their trench somewhere on the Western Front. (Library of Congress/Wikipedia Commons)
“In Flanders the British have captured 800 yards of German trenches south of Ypres, only to lose them subsequently,” America reported in the issue of March 11, 1916. “In Asia Minor, the Russians are making progress…. The only other theater where there has been fighting of an important character is Verdun.”
That last sentence contains the first reference in our archives to one of the longest, deadliest battles in human history. It began the previous month, when the German Fifth Army attacked the troops of the French Second Army in the hills north of Verdun-sur-Meuse, in northeastern France. When America went to press with that first report, nearly 70,000 men had already fallen. Nearly one million more men from both sides would be killed or wounded before it was over, a number greater than the population of present-day San Francisco.
What we see and how we see it largely depends on where we are standing.
On a bright, windswept day last October, I climbed the stairs of the 151-foot tower that marks the highest point of the battlefield. From the observation deck at the top, I had a panoramic view of the battlefield, where row upon row of alabaster headstones stand mute on a vast countryside still pockmarked by the artillery fire. The tower itself caps an enormous ossuary containing the remains of more than 100,000 unknown soldiers. Through the small windows in the tower’s base, you can see countless piles of human bones, some 12 or 15 feet high. “The windows,” I thought. “The people who designed this place wanted us to see this in all its grotesque magnitude. They wanted us to recoil at the sight of it. They wanted us to remember.”
As my stomach churned and my eyes swelled with tears, I reached for the handkerchief in my pocket. There I also found my iPhone, vibrating with the latest news. I looked down and reviewed the last couple of dozen posts in my Twitter feed: some war talk in Washington, serious charges of sexual harassment, political maneuverings hither and yon. Interesting stuff, some of it serious. But none of it seemed important, at least not in relation to where I was standing.
And that’s the point. What we see and how we see it largely depends on where we are standing. A shared sense of history, of what was, or might’ve been, or could be again, is the indispensable touchstone of our collective judgment, for memory is the soul of conscience. “History, despite its wrenching pain,” Maya Angelou once wrote, “cannot be unlived, but if faced with courage, need not be lived again.”
A shared sense of history is the indispensable touchstone of our collective judgment, for memory is the soul of conscience.
Remembering the past also relativizes the present, reminds us of what is ultimately important and enduring. The church, for example, is one of only two institutions, along with the synagogue, that survived the fall of the Roman Empire. It is probably not going to be brought down by our contemporary ecclesiastical politicking. We’re just not that powerful. And the church will likely survive the United States. Long after the United States has joined Rome and Austria-Hungary and Britain on the ash heap of imperial history, the people of God will still gather to participate in the one true history of humanity, to worship the true Creator and Redeemer of us all. I find hope in that, at least as much as I find despair in the ossuary in Verdun.
5 years in, what I've learned as the editor of America
Matt Malone, S.J.
A Broken World: Benedict XV’s efforts for peace during the First World War
Dennis A. Castillo
The thing about history, though, is that one must know it for it to be instructive. For the first time in human existence, the sum of human knowledge is literally in the palms of our hands. Yet we are painfully ignorant of our own history, like trees without deep roots, easily tumbled by the slightest gale. We often say when talking about dementia that one of the greatest tragedies that can befall an individual is to lose his or her memory. But it’s just as tragic when a people loses its collective memory. It is also far more dangerous. “The beginning of the end of war,” Herman Wouk once wrote, “lies in remembrance.” Without a sense of history, we risk becoming the myopic, jingoistic mob that the poet-soldier Siegfried Sassoon spoke of in his poem, “A Suicide in the Trenches”:
You smug-faced crowds with kindling eye
Who cheer when soldier lads march by,
Sneak home and pray you'll never know
The hell where youth and laughter go.
Ten months after its first report, America was still covering the cataclysm at Verdun: “Additional battles have been reported from the Verdun district at Mort Homme Hill and Hill 304,” one dispatch read. “But no decisive results were obtained.”
For their sake, as well as ours and that of future generations, that last part especially is worth remembering.
Robert Killoren
Nice job, Matt. Seems America (the country not the magazine) is itself stuck in the trenches of our own political Verdun. The national conversations are always the same no matter the subject matter of the day. We’re bogged down, standing in our own trench, be it “left”or “right,” and lobbing grenades over no man’s land at the others’ trench. It is a pointless war. We just haven’t realized that yet.
Thanks for writing this Matt. We took our sons to Verdun in 1994, the youngest was 11 at that time. Indelible 23 years later.
Barry Fitzpatrick
What a timely piece! Thank you. A priest friend once wrote, "forgiveness is letting go of the hope that the past will be better or different." This does not mean forgetting the past, however, especially as it can be instructive to our present. I am moved, as Fr Malone was at Verdun, every time I visit the Vietnam Memorial in Washington. 50,000 names etched on a wall, all gone for a cause we still cannot explain. Their lives and the lives of those buried at Verdun will not have been in vain if we learn the lessons therein. War is not now, not ever, the answer. Peace comes at great cost, but the resulting good far outweighs the cost. We must end "the hell where youth and laughter go" forever so that generations can grow to learn to live together in a world of conflicting interests, loyalties, and messages. The beginning of the end of this insanity certainly lies in remembrance, but as one author said "vision without execution is hallucination." This isn't a movie, it's life. Remember, yes. And then change! Thanks, Fr. Malone.
ROBERT RYALS
Thank you for this article about The Great War (hypothetically, the "war to end all wars"). From my perspective it was a reminder of the similarities between learning in our global society and learning by an individual. The article also served as a reminder about the fundamental differences between those who adopt a "short term" memory approach in lieu of "long term" memory approach as it pertains to social and political strategy in our global society.
On an individual level, the human mind requires both short-term and long-term memory to function and to accomplish tasks in the present. However, the short-term memory needs the depth of understanding that long-term memory provides in the human experience. Thus, the experiences learned from short-term memory and then transferred and stored in long-term memory becomes the voice for rational decision-making in the present and future. For example, an adult person who has lived the experience in youth of what happens when his/her hand is placed on a hot stove only to get burned will not make the same mistake twice. Sadly, this application of the "lesson learned" gets missed in our global society when watershed opportunities for change are ignored, forgotten, or completely re-written from a perspective which is self-serving and full of hidden agendas.
Our larger global society possesses both short-term and long-term memory. Social advancement and creating watershed moments creating opportunities for change occur based on learned experiences. The global society, like an individual, processes learned experiences first through short-term memory which are then transferred to long-term memory for storage and future access.
Some in our global society, namely, dyed in the wool Trump-worshippers, chose to ignore, discard, or re-write the learned experience of history. That group tends to mislabel themselves as being progressive-minded and future-thinking people who lack a depth of understanding about the consequences of actions taken in the past that led to disastrous outcomes. This "short-term" memory demographic relies strictly on the present circumstances and the here and now.
Others in our global society - historians and scholars - represent a long-term" memory demographic and emphasize the need to preserve the context and understanding of significant events in our global society's past. This group appreciates how these watershed moments in history possess the ability to bring about incremental social change. It matters not whether one believes that history repeats itself, or, believes that history doesn't repeat itself but it often rhymes. Facing the consequences of history, learning from it, and deploying ideas for effective policy change based on the cautions of learned experiences from the past serves as a "less reckless" approach for the present and future.
This article also appeared in print, under the headline "Past, Present, Future," in the November 27, 2017 issue.
More: War & Peace / History
@americaeditor
See all work by Matt Malone, S.J.
More by Matt Malone, S.J.
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The Answers, er, Questions to ‘America Jeopardy’ 2019
It’s time for America Jeopardy! 2019! How well will you fare?
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Health care isn’t about statistics or abstractions. It’s about people.
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Designing Higher Education Risk-Sharing Proposals
Evaluating Choices and Tradeoffs
By Ben Miller and Beth Akers Posted on May 22, 2017, 5:00 am
AP/Steve Helber
Students walk to class at the University of Richmond in Richmond, Virginia, September 13, 2016.
Risk sharing ensures that institutions—not just students and taxpayers—share the burden when students default on loans.
Risk sharing improves our current all-or-nothing accountability system by creating more tailored penalties for bad outcomes.
This report reviews eight different proposals for how institutions could better share the risk of federal investments in higher education.
Kyle Epstein
gro.ssergorpnacirema@nietspek
Introduction and summary
Attending college in the United States, more than in any other nation, is a high-risk, high-reward proposition. To a growing extent, students are taking on debt and betting their financial futures on the hope that their gamble on college will pay off in the future.
U.S. taxpayers are making the same gamble—funding grants and loans to put college within reach of more Americans—based on the belief that college is good for both individual students and society.
Unfortunately, this is a gamble that does not always pay off. Students do not always see lucrative returns on their investment in higher education programs. Some students fall victim to institutions that collect tuition dollars but offer little in return, while others face adversity as a result of their own decision-making. Regardless of who is at fault, students and taxpayers are the ones who pay the price. Students cannot get back the time or money they spent pursuing higher education, and taxpayers are on the hook financially when borrowers do not repay their debts. Institutions, however, are largely insulated from paying a price when their students do not succeed.
This imbalance of responsibility has prompted many to argue for a new approach to dividing the costs when federal investments in students do not produce successes. Researchers, advocates, and political leaders from across the ideological spectrum have embraced a concept called risk sharing that would create a new regime in which colleges would share in some portion of the costs generated when federal investments in higher education do not work out.
The concept of risk sharing is simple: put institutions on the hook to cover some of the costs generated when student investments in higher education do not pay off. The theory is that a risk-sharing regime would cause institutions to have more skin in the game, increasing incentives to ensure that students are set up to succeed, at least financially.
Despite its popularity as a concept, there is little consensus about the best way to construct a risk-sharing regime. For example, there are currently three bills in Congress that propose to create some sort of risk-sharing system, all of which take slightly different approaches.1
Recognizing this deficiency—and also Congressional interest in risk sharing—the Center for American Progress coordinated the publication of a body of research on the subject.2 The goal was to develop a set of concrete and detailed risk-sharing proposals that could be used to inform policymaking. The proposals—eight in all— were authored by individuals and organizations from a variety of positions within the higher education policy community, including academic researchers, think tank scholars, and analysts from advocacy and trade organizations. Not only do the proposals’ authors come from different constituencies, they also represent a range of positions on the ideological spectrum. Contributors to the research series were encouraged to carefully examine the implications of their proposals, including the unintended consequences.
The proposals produced are outlined in the following papers:
“A New Approach to College Accountability: Balancing Sanctions and Rewards to Improve Student Outcomes” by Lindsay Ahlman, Debbie Cochrane, and Jessica Thompson, The Institute for College Access and Success, or TICAS
“Risk-sharing: An Efficient Mechanism for Funding Student Loan Safety Nets” by Beth Akers, Manhattan Institute and formerly of the Brookings Institution
“Getting Risk-Sharing Right: Creating Better Incentives for Colleges and Universities” by Kristin Blagg and Matthew Chingos, Urban Institute
“Designing and Assessing Risk-Sharing Models for Federal Student Aid” by Nicholas W. Hillman, University of Wisconsin-Madison
“A Risk-Sharing Model to Align Incentives and Improve Student Performance” by Jorge Klor de Alva and Mark Schneider, Nexus Research and Policy Center
“Sharing the Risk: A Plan for Colleges to Participate in the Costs of Student Loan Failure” by Ben Miller and CJ Libassi, Center for American Progress
“A Flexible Risk Retention Model for Federal Student Loans” by Barmak Nassirian and Thomas L. Harnisch, American Association of State Colleges and Universities
“Risk-Sharing and Student Loan Policy: Consequences for Students and Institutions” by Douglas A. Webber, Temple University
The aim of this report is to synthesize the above set of proposals. Rather than summarizing each proposal, this report outlines the concepts that emerged consistently across the various proposals and highlights the more nuanced differences between the recommendations. Table 1 also provides a simple summary matrix of the policy recommendations from each proposal, although it is recommended that interested readers examine the original proposals for more detail and specifics.
Generally, we found that the proposals were shaped by the answers to three key questions:
Which metrics should be used to measure institutional performance?
How should the financial sanctions on institutions be calculated?
Should institutions with vulnerable populations receive differential treatment?
This report intentionally refrains from recommending a particular risk-sharing setup. By laying out clear design questions and possible ways to address them, this report provides a guide for policymakers interested in the subject. The hope is that this detailed discussion of benefits and trade-offs will aid in the creation of risk-sharing policies that are fair, efficient, and effective.
Background: Risk in higher education
The theory underpinning the concept of risk sharing is that bringing institutions’ incentives more in line with the interests of students and taxpayers will result in institutions working harder to generate student success. Improved student outcomes will then in turn lessen the students’ reliance on publicly funded safety nets. The product of this sort of arrangement is that institutions directly bear some of the cost generated when students do not succeed—expenses that are currently borne by students and taxpayers.
Currently, students shoulder the risk in obvious ways. They invest time that cannot be recouped and some combination of their own money and creditworthiness on the assumption that future employment opportunities will make the investment worthwhile.
As for taxpayers, substantial state and federal intervention in the higher education market also puts them on the hook for some of the risk of investments when higher education does not pay off. This risk assumption happens through two primary channels: front-end subsidies and a back-end safety net. Front-end subsidies, such as grants to students and funds given directly to institutions, mean that taxpayers have made an investment with the expectation that there will be a return in terms of positive student outcomes. If an educational experience fails to yield the anticipated returns, then the resources expended will have been spent in vain. On the back end, the relationship with risk is more explicit: Federal student loan programs provide borrowers with a range of benefits that allows them to pause payments or have loan balances forgiven when they face consistently low earnings relative to their debt.3 But these programs are not free; when a student has to stop making loan payments or receives loan forgiveness, the taxpayers—again—are on the hook. And of course, borrowers who fall into extreme financial hardship due to their college expenses may make use of other social safety nets, including housing, health care, and other necessities—costs borne by taxpayers.
As already noted, the current system imposes little cost on institutions when the services they provide do not generate the expected return. As detailed in the next section, there is just one situation in which all institutions risk the loss of access to federal financial aid as a result of poor student outcomes: having too many borrowers default on their federal loans. Certain types of career programs can also land in hot water if they fail to maintain a ratio of debt payments relative to earnings for their graduates. Some states, meanwhile, hold their institutions accountable through what is known as outcomes-based funding systems, in which future funding appropriations are partially tied to results achieved. This, however, only affects public institutions, and the amount of funds at risk varies substantially by state.4
Outside of these oversight systems, there is one mechanism through which institutions can pay a price for producing bad student outcomes: reputation. It is often difficult for potential students to assess the value of different programs of study. As a result, students may make decisions about where to enroll based on the reputations of the institutions they are considering attending. It is certainly possible that a history of bad outcomes could tarnish the reputation of an institution, thereby reducing enrollment and its corresponding revenue. However, this effect is mitigated by the fact that enrollment decisions are made with incomplete information. Students often may not know the experiences and concerns of their predecessors. Moreover, the amount of institutional skin in the game is further lessened by the fact that students themselves are protected to a degree from negative outcomes by loan-repayment safety nets. This means that students are less likely to be disgruntled by the failure of their institution to meet their expectations.
This obvious imbalance in who shoulders the downside risk of federal investment in colleges likely explains the popularity of proposals calling for institutional risk sharing. Proposals in this space seek to fill in the missing leg of the stool of shared higher education responsibility composed of students, government, and institutions.
The current system of federal accountability
Under the current system of federal oversight, institutions face no regulatory penalties for poor outcomes unless their performance is so concerning that they fail to meet basic eligibility criteria, in which case they are expelled from the federal aid program.
The primary performance metric used in this system is the cohort default rate, which tracks the percentage of students who attend a given school and default on their loans within three years of entering repayment.5 Institutions whose default rate exceeds 30 percent for three consecutive years risk losing access to all forms of federal financial aid. Those with a default rate of more than 40 percent in one year risk losing access to federal loans.6
Unfortunately, this system leaves much to be desired when it comes to aligning the incentives of institutions with the incentives of students and taxpayers. First, this system has very little bite. That is to say, very few schools end up facing sanctions due to high student loan default rates. Of the 593,000 students who entered repayment on a federal loan in 2013 and defaulted within three years, just 619 students attended a college at risk of losing access to financial aid due to high default rates.7 And even the small number of schools that are facing loss of federal aid eligibility may avoid accountability thanks to a host of appeal options to avoid consequences. Second, the three-year cohort default rate is not an ideal indicator of institutional quality, even if concerns are limited to financial outcomes alone. For example, it fails to capture a range of negative loan outcomes, such as borrowers remaining current on their debt but having the balance increase over time. It also says nothing about whether the benefits of a program of study justify the price a student paid. And lastly, this system only creates an effective improvement incentive for institutions with cohort default rates that are close to the eligibility threshold, since institutions whose default rates are high but not near the eligibility cutoff have no pressing reason to get better.
Proponents of risk sharing tend to believe that this system of accountability offers insufficient protections for both students and taxpayer dollars and that, instead, the introduction of a risk-sharing regime would offer an improvement over the status quo.
Designing a system of risk sharing
The following sections are intended to help guide policymakers through the different decision points in the creation of a risk-sharing system. To that end, there are three design questions that need to be addressed:
The first two questions define the process for determining the financial obligation to be paid by the institutions. The third deals with how to address the unintended consequences of risk sharing—namely, the potential adverse impact of risk sharing on access for disadvantaged student populations.
This report refers to several measures of institutional performance, often in rather specific detail. To guide readers, the commonly used definitions for these measures are provided below. Please note that many proposals suggest using modified definitions for these measures.
Default rate: This is the percentage of student loan borrowers who have defaulted on their federal student loans within three years of entering repayment. This measure tracks all individuals who entered repayment in the same federal fiscal year.
Repayment rate: This is the percentage of student loan borrowers who, after three years of repayment, have made sufficient payments to reduce the balance they owed upon entering repayment by at least $1 and not defaulted.
Completion rate: This is typically the percentage of full-time students who have never enrolled in another institution—that is to say, did not transfer into the institution—who complete their programs within 150 percent of the expected time to completion. In a bachelor’s degree program, for example, this means the percentage of students who graduate within six years.
Institutional performance metrics included
The first step in setting up a risk-sharing regime is to determine the outcomes on which institutional performance will be judged. This is an important step because the metrics used in determining institutional payments also serve as performance targets for schools. If the system creates strong enough incentives, then institutions will modify their practices to improve outcomes on these dimensions. Judging institutions on a metric that reflects student and taxpayer values will lead to an alignment of incentives, and as a result, institutions will work to achieve the outcomes that students and taxpayers desire. Using a metric that does not reflect those values will lead to unintended consequences, examined in a later section.
There was a striking level of agreement between the proposals on how best to manage the measurement of performance. Almost all of the proposals use student financial outcomes as the primary indicators of institutional performance. They differ, however, in how to quantify that performance and exactly how to define specific measures. Most of the proposals recommend that performance should be measured using some combination of three student outcomes: student loan default rates, student loan repayment rates, and completion, which includes graduation rates. See the text box above for the definitions of these measures, but note that proposals differed on whether they suggested following the traditional definition or not.
Some policy analysts prefer the repayment rate over the default rate because it captures borrowers who are not making progress in paying down their debt but have not been delinquent enough to default. Borrowers who seek a forbearance from the federal government, under which they are not required to make any payments for at least several years, will not be counted in the default rate but will be counted against the repayment rate.
A completion rate measures a different type of outcome—the share of students entering a program who ultimately finish. Unlike repayment or default rates, it need not track only the results for individuals who have federal student loans. The role of dropouts in a completion rate is different as well. Both default and repayment rates typically judge the outcomes of graduates and dropouts together. Because these measures are only concerned with what happens to loan balances, they allow a dropout to still be counted as a success as long as they do not default or fail to repay. By contrast, completion rates treat a noncompleter as a negative outcome.
The most commonly used completion rate in postsecondary education looks at the percentage of students who attended full time, never enrolled at another institution, and completed their programs within 150 percent of the typical expected time to finish—for example, six years for a four-year program. Despite its popularity, this formula is often criticized by many stakeholders because it fails to capture results for part-time students or deal with the issue of transfer students.8
While no two proposals produce identical policy designs, certain themes emerge around the types of measures recommended for use. In particular, six of the eight proposals suggest using some form of a repayment rate, either as the sole measure or in conjunction with other measures. In their description of the rationale for this choice, the authors tend to suggest using repayment rates for one or two main reasons: the limitation of cohort default rates as an effective accountability mechanism and the need for accountability at institutions where large numbers of borrowers may end up having too much debt relative to their income, potentially resulting in student loan forgiveness.
While tracking negative outcomes beyond default is a substantial benefit of repayment rates, other authors raise concerns about whether this measure may be influenced by behavioral choices that are not under an institution’s control. For example, the proposal offered by Blagg and Chingos, “Getting Risk Sharing Right: Creating Better Incentives for Colleges and Universities,” notes that borrowers choosing to prioritize paying other debts over student loans could affect repayment rates. Similarly, borrowers could choose to make the lower payments allowed under income-driven repayment even if they could afford to contribute greater amounts.
Even for those authors recommending the use of student loan-repayment rates, key issues remain. One question is of particular concern: whether the current formula commonly used by the U.S. Department of Education for student loan repayment makes sense. Under that measure, a student is deemed to be successfully repaying as long as they have paid $1 of their principal and not defaulted. The Institute for College Access and Success, in “A New Approach to College Accountability: Balancing Sanctions and Rewards to Improve Student Outcomes,” suggests revisiting the construction of repayment rates and recommends as one of those changes adjusting the repayment rate by the percentage of students who borrow. Hillman, in “Designing and Assessing Risk-Sharing Models for Federal Student Aid,” suggests that the Department of Education disaggregate both its repayment and default figures by repayment plan and status of the borrower, as well as by loan volume and servicer.
Three other proposals suggest judging repayment success based upon a tougher bar: whether students are on track to repay their loans on time. “A Flexible Risk Retention Model for Federal Student Loans” by Barmak Nassirian and Thomas Harnisch from the American Association of State Colleges and Universities and CAP’s paper “Sharing the Risk” both suggest that institutions should be responsible for some share of the difference between what students should have repaid in order to retire their debt on time and what they have actually paid. In “Risk-Sharing: An Efficient Mechanism for Funding Student Loan Safety Nets,” Akers follows a similar approach, albeit with different framing. She suggests that risk-sharing payments should reflect the cost imposed on taxpayers by borrowers’ utilization of loan-repayment safety nets. Although not presented directly as a repayment rate, the concept is similar: Students who do not repay in a timely manner would generate a risk-sharing payment for a school.
Default rates
The proposals that chose to use default rates in their risk-sharing calculation noted that these rates are a valuable accountability metric because the consequences associated with this outcome are so severe for borrowers. However, they also noted that the default rate may not capture all worrisome outcomes due to the use of income-driven repayment, deferments, and forbearances, which allow borrowers to avoid default without necessarily making progress in paying down their loans.
Of the four proposals that recommend using a default rate, only the one published by Nexus Research and Policy Center, “A Risk-Sharing Model to Align Incentives and Improve Student Performance,” included it as the sole measure of student loan performance. By contrast, CAP and Hillman recommend using a combination of default and repayment rates, with the latter proposal also calling for adjusting rates by the percentage of students who borrow. TICAS, meanwhile explores using either default or repayment rates, in both cases adjusting for a school’s borrowing rate without making a choice between the two.
Other measures
Completion of some form is the only type of measure that also showed up in more than one proposal, albeit in very different forms. The Blagg and Chingos proposal rejects typical risk-sharing structures that establish payments based on student outcomes several years after leaving an institution. Instead, it suggests that institutions should make a risk-sharing payment when a student drops out in the middle of a term. By contrast, the Nexus Research and Policy Center proposal suggests partially tying risk-sharing payments to the graduation rate for Pell Grant recipients. Although CAP does not have a direct measure for completion, it does suggest calculating risk-sharing payments separately based on results for graduates and for students who did not complete.
Calculating institutional payments
Selecting performance measures is only the beginning of a risk-sharing system. The next step requires translating an institution’s results into a calculated payment. This rests on two key questions: Should all institutions make payments or only those that fall short of a performance benchmark? And what is a reasonable payment size for an institution to make?
The majority of proposals agree that institutions should not be asked to repay any portion of loans in good standing. This means that risk-sharing payments would be calculated as a percentage of loans in default, nonrepayment, or both, depending on the proposal. For example, TICAS and Nexus Research and Policy Center suggest that risk-sharing payments be based on a share of the balance of an institution’s loans in default.9 Alternatively, Webber, in his paper “Risk-Sharing and Student Loan Policy: Consequences for Students and Institutions,” and Nassirian and Harnisch suggest that institutions should be on the hook for a share of the loans not being repaid on time. CAP, meanwhile, employs a hybrid approach that calculates payments based on loans in both categories.
There was less agreement among the proposals about exactly how to determine the proper payment levels, although three broad approaches emerged: create a preset payment schedule based on performance; require institutions to pay a share of each loan with a negative outcome; or require institutions to pay a portion of projected taxpayer losses from nonrepayment. Each is explained in greater detail below.
Preset payment schedule based on performance
This approach adopts the idea that institutions should make risk-sharing payments only if they fail to meet a predetermined performance standard. For example, Hillman recommends that only institutions whose default or nonrepayment rate is more than one standard deviation worse than the typical result for two-year or four-year schools should make a risk-sharing payment. Similarly, Nexus Research and Policy Center and TICAS both recommend risk-sharing payments for schools that fall within certain ranges of performance on measures such as default. Nexus Research and Policy Center also suggests a payment schedule based on Pell Grant graduation rates.
The proposals tied to performance targets often also vary by how much a school would pay based upon where the institution falls within that range of performance. An example from Nexus Research and Policy Center’s proposal shows how this idea works. Nexus Research and Policy Center recommends that colleges face a risk-sharing payment of up to 20 percent of defaulted loan balances based upon the institution’s cohort default rate. The percentage a school would pay depends on where it falls within a set schedule of payments. For example, schools with a cohort default rate between 15 percent and 17 percent would pay only 2 percent of defaulted loan balances, while those with a cohort default rate between 17 percent and 19 percent would pay 3 percent, and so on.
This type of set schedule approach has several noteworthy features. First, it sends a strong signal that risk sharing should only be focused on institutions that have particularly poor results. Second, it provides institutions with an easy-to-follow schedule that may help them predict payment amounts. That said, it does have the potential drawback of creating cliff effects, where institutions that fall barely on one side or the other of a threshold pay disparate amounts. For example, in the Nexus Research and Policy Center proposal, an institution with a default rate of 18.9 percent pays a rate that is 40 percent less than the amount a school with a default rate of 19.1 percent pays.
Institutions pay a share of each loan with a negative outcome
Instead of a set schedule, several proposals suggest having institutions repay a portion of affected loan balances each time a negative event occurs. This type of approach takes several forms. One is to require institutions to repay a set percentage of a loan balance each time. Webber, for example, suggests that institutions should repay 5 percent of each loan that is not making progress toward repayment after two years. Meanwhile, Blagg and Chingos suggest that institutions return 50 percent of all aid used for tuition and fees if a student drops out before the midpoint of a semester and 25 percent if they leave before the end of a semester.
Setting a fixed share of each loan or aid amount that a school returns has several noteworthy features. First, it creates a clear calculation formula that institutions can easily understand. Second, it extends the question of risk sharing to a broader set of institutions, since it means that schools would end up making payments even if their overall performance was not among the worst. This approach also avoids any issue related to cliff effects, since the total amount paid simply increases each time something bad occurs. At the same time, approaches such as the ones suggested by Webber and Blagg and Chingos do not increase the share of each loan that must be repaid as performance worsens. For example, an institution with very high dropout or nonrepayment rates is still on the hook for the same payment per bad outcome as a school with very good results.
Institutions pay a share of projected taxpayer losses from nonrepayment
Three proposals took an approach to determining payments that is driven entirely by institutional results and does not rely on a predetermined standard of performance. As a consequence, these systems include neither a set bar for performance targets nor a uniform percentage of loan balances to be repaid.
For example, the CAP proposal suggests that institutions should repay a share of their defaulted and nonrepaid loans based upon the rate at which those problems manifest. Under this approach, if a school has a default rate of 10 percent, it would repay 10 percent of defaulted loan amounts. The result is that the actual share of balances repaid by a school go up or down as its performance worsens or improves.
Similarly, the Nassirian and Harnisch proposal suggests that institutions be on the hook for some share of the loan balances that are not being repaid in a timely manner. There is not, however, a set assessment rate. Rather, the Department of Education would calculate for each borrower how much should have been paid down if the loan was going to be retired on a reasonable schedule versus how much was actually paid down. Institutions would be responsible for the sum of this difference across all borrowers but only after making adjustments for several factors, including the makeup of the student body and spending on instruction.
The Akers proposal, meanwhile, suggests that a school’s assessment rate reflect the extent to which its former borrowers need to make use of income-driven repayment and student-loan forgiveness benefits. While this is not as clear cut as charging institutions a set share of balances, it does allow for substantial variation in the amount repaid based upon a school’s past results.
Like the other approaches, a performance-based assessment regime corrects for some problems while introducing others. On one hand, it avoids the problems that the first two solutions present: cliff effects and not increasing payments as performance worsens. It also presents a more individualized payment rate for each school. On the other hand, these systems are less predictable for institutions than other approaches. It would be harder for schools to project what they are likely to repay, which could create some uncertainty in adjusting to the new risk-sharing system.
Payment calibration
Regardless of how a risk-sharing payment is calculated, it is important that the payment amount be properly calibrated. If the liability is too small, it will have no effect on institutional behavior. If it is too big, it could cause good institutions to stop serving risky students or even shutter their doors.
Most of the proposals suggest some sort of payment calibration on a sliding scale, such that the lowest-performing institutions pay a liability equal to a larger fraction of their defaulted loan balances than high-performing institutions. For example, Nexus Research and Policy Center suggests that institutions should make payments of up to 30 percent of defaulted loan balances. TICAS, meanwhile, provides a hypothetical payment system of up to 14 percent of defaulted loan balances. Webber’s structure ensures that schools would pay 5 percent of the balances of loans not being paid down.
While data limitations make it difficult to definitively know how large the payments based on defaulted loan balances may end up being in terms of the total loan dollars received by a school, several papers estimated answers to this question. For example, the CAP proposal provides some estimates of its predicted payments based on default and nonrepayment rates, and suggests that institutions would end up being responsible for somewhere on the order of 1 percent to 5 percent of all loan volume received in a year. By contrast, Hillman estimates payments would range from 5 percent to 15 percent of all loan balances.
There is some precedent for risk sharing in federal loans in roughly the range of 5 percent of balances or lower. For example, the now defunct bank-based loan system required lenders to absorb 3 percent of a loan’s balance as a loss when it defaulted—although the exact amount lost would be less when taking into account the provision of additional loan subsidies.10
Considerations for vulnerable populations
Most of the proposals discussed in this report recognize that a risk-sharing system carries the potential of dissuading institutions from enrolling greater numbers of students who are likely to struggle with debt. Relatedly, several proposals also acknowledge that institutional performance on default and repayment would be at least partly affected by the demographics of each institution’s student body.
Six of the proposals provide recommendations for dealing with the issue of an institution’s demographic makeup in one of two main ways: create upfront adjustments of performance metrics or offer bonuses to reward schools that do well. These two choices were not mutually exclusive, and some of the proposals suggest doing both. It should be noted that the proposals by Blagg and Chingos and by Akers did not recommend either of these approaches. In the former case, this is because their proposal suggests that institutions immediately return aid to the Department of Education when a student drops out so that there is no risk of unexpected future costs that could create incentives for enrollment changes. As for Akers, she recommends that the savings generated by her proposal be used to fund grant aid aimed at reducing the access gap for disadvantaged students.
Upfront adjustments of performance metrics
One approach to dealing with the potential effects of student body demographics on institutional results is to adjust the measures up front. Known more commonly as input adjustment, this requires an analysis that determines the extent to which observed student outcomes can be fairly attributed to an institution’s contribution rather than explained by its students’ intrinsic likelihood of success. A given school’s performance level can then be adjusted to reflect only the portion of its results that can be explained by the quality of the service it provides. For example, input adjustment would modify a school’s graduation rate to account for the demographic makeup of its students as a way of recognizing that enrolling a large portion of low-income students will likely lower the graduation rate. We refer to this up-front adjustment to highlight that it differs from the current system in which institutions can only lobby the Department of Education for special consideration after the agency publishes final performance metrics.
Some proposals argue that adjusting an institution’s results up front to account for its demographics can provide several benefits. First, it eliminates the reputational risk that comes with having unadjusted low results made public. It also eliminates the need for a backend appeals process where schools try to show that their raw results are better than they appear.
Input adjustment, however, is not easy to get right. It requires making difficult choices about what variables should be controlled for and how. Input adjustment also carries the risk that comparing institutions to their peers sets the bar too low. For example, if every school within a given type of colleges has poor results, then an adjustment process that only compares these schools to each other may excuse results that overall are not good enough.
Two proposals ultimately recommend some form of adjustment based on institutional characteristics. Nexus Research and Policy Center recommends adjusting the Pell Grant graduation rates based upon student risk factors identified by the Department of Education such as delaying enrollment, attending part time, or working while enrolled.11 It also recommends reducing a school’s risk-sharing payment if more than half of its students received need-based federal financial aid; the school spent a high percentage of its expenditures on education, career services, and retention; and the school was carrying out a debt management plan.
The Nassirian and Harnisch proposal also calls for several types of up-front adjustment, with the overall goal of determining what portion of the lending can be attributed to the institution instead of student characteristics or broader economic conditions. First, Nassirian and Harnisch recommend adjusting results based on the percentage of low-income students. Second, they suggest a safe harbor provision in which institutions with higher percentages of their expenditures going to instructional purposes would face lower risk-sharing payments.
Institutional bonuses were also a common approach to account for a school’s student body composition, with half of the proposals recommending such a solution. Under a bonus system, institutions could have their financial liabilities associated with risk sharing reduced if they undertook reforms to benefit students. Just as with up-front adjustment of accountability metrics, two different types of bonus systems emerged: rewards for good performance and opportunities for institutions to reduce their risk-sharing payments.
Regardless of the approach chosen, three themes emerged among all bonus proposals. First, all of the proposals recommending a bonus system included success with vulnerable populations as part of the bonus determination. The goal of these provisions was to mitigate the negative impact of the risk-sharing regime on the enrollment of disadvantaged students and to encourage increased access for low-income students where possible. Second, all the bonus systems tie rewards to an institution’s performance enrolling Pell Grant recipients, the outcomes of Pell Grant students, or both. Third, all the bonus systems take scale into account when rewarding institutions. This is most direct in the proposals from TICAS, Webber, and CAP, all of which recommend making payments on a per-student basis.
It should be noted that four proposals did not recommend any bonus system, although most did suggest some use for the money received by the Department of Education from a risk-sharing system. For instance, Nexus Research and Policy Center recommends that the federal government put any funds paid in a risk-sharing system into a competitive grant program open to institutions where at least half the students receive need-based assistance from the Department of Education. Hillman, meanwhile, suggests that funds go into a pool used for default prevention. Akers suggests that any savings from risk sharing that are not tied to covering the costs of student loan forgiveness be returned to students in the form grant aid designed to reduce enrollment gaps. Because the Blagg and Chingos proposal has institutions return funds as soon as a student drops out, there is no risk-sharing payment made, and thus no need to plan for additional spending.
Among the papers recommending a bonus system, the structure depended in great measure on whether the rest of the risk-sharing system used input adjustment. The more risk-sharing payments are based on results that are not adjusted up-front for institutional performance, the more important it is that the potential to earn bonuses be available to all schools. By contrast, a system with substantial up-front adjustments could adopt a simpler bonus system based on the fact that it has already taken external factors into account.
Bonuses for good performance
Two proposals—TICAS and Nassirian and Harnisch—present bonuses as a way to reward institutions that demonstrate better-than-expected performance. In the former case, these bonuses would go to institutions with repayment or default rates that, when combined with borrowing rates, met certain target thresholds. For Nassirian and Harnisch, bonuses would go to institutions where students repaid more than expected after adjusting for student body composition.
In both these proposals, bonuses act as a carrot that makes the risk-sharing system more palatable for institutions by rewarding the schools that do well. This process also means there is no overlap between schools that make a risk-sharing payment and those that receive a bonus.
Opportunities for risk-sharing payment reduction
The bonus systems in CAP’s and Webber’s proposals suggest a different approach that does not restrict these rewards only to institutions with good results. This is partly because neither of these proposals suggest doing any up-front adjustments for demographics at an institution. Instead, they rely on the bonus system to help offset potential payments for schools.
Webber’s bonus proposal is the more straightforward of the two. He suggests that institutions should receive a bonus for each at-risk student, such as a Pell Grant recipient, who graduates from a school and repays their loans. The goal is to only direct rewards for success with at-risk students, which in turn creates a strong financial incentive for institutions to enroll these individuals and do well by them.
The CAP bonus proposal takes a more complex approach. It determines bonus eligibility by generating individual repayment rate targets for each institution. These figures are based on an expected repayment rate, which is calculated by adjusting for an institution’s demographics, state and local unemployment rates, and whether it is a minority-serving institution, among other factors. Institutions that exceed the expected rate by a reasonable amount receive a bonus for each student who performs better than anticipated. The CAP proposal also runs a second calculation just for Pell Grant recipients who borrow. It suggests that bonuses for successful Pell Grant repayment should be double the size of bonuses provided for overall success.
Because of the substantial federal investment in higher education—more than $120 billion each year—it is imperative that there is an effective system of oversight in place that aligns the incentives of institutions with those of students and taxpayers.12 Establishing a system in which institutions share in a greater portion of the risk when federal loans go wrong is a promising way to accomplish this goal.
Admittedly, risk sharing is not a simple concept. Different design choices will yield quite different systems and results. And the potential for unintended consequences—particularly around the admission of low-income or vulnerable students—is high. However, by laying out the key questions that must be answered along the way, as well as options for addressing them, this report hopefully provides a path for policymakers to chart a course through complex choices. The end goal is a risk-sharing system that is fair, thoughtful, and brings needed reform to the oversight of institutions of higher education.
Appendix: Descriptions of proposals in the risk-sharing series
The Center for American Progress commissioned seven proposals for a federal student loan risk-sharing system. CAP also produced its own proposal on the topic. The external authors were afforded complete editorial independence, and their ideas and suggestions do not necessarily reflect the opinions or views of CAP. Below is a short summary of each of the proposals. A link to each, where greater detail can be found, is provided in the endnotes.
Title: “A New Approach to College Accountability: Balancing Sanctions and Rewards to Improve Student Outcomes”
Authors: Lindsay Ahlman, Debbie Cochrane, and Jessica Thompson, The Institute for College Access and Success
Proposal: TICAS proposes an accountability system, including risk sharing and rewards, that phases in over time based on a borrower-weighted debt outcome measure. Colleges that perform well would receive financial rewards based on their low-income student enrollment and/or nonfinancial rewards. Colleges that struggle would make progressively higher risk-sharing payments—5 percent to 14 percent of the volume of defaulted loans—depending on performance. Colleges with unacceptably poor outcomes would lose access to federal financial aid. Performance thresholds would be fixed, not relative, meaning that all schools would be held to the same standards. College outcomes could be measured using one of two options: either the Student Default Risk Indicator, which is a school’s cohort default rate multiplied by its borrowing rate, or the Student Nonrepayment Risk Indicator, or SNRI, which is a school’s nonrepayment rate multiplied by its borrowing rate.13
Title: “Risk-sharing: An efficient mechanism for funding student loan safety nets”
Author: Beth Akers, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and former fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on Children and Families
Proposal: Akers proposes a system of risk sharing in which institutions pay a premium to the Department of Education to cover the cost of providing loan-repayment safety nets to their former students. Akers argues that risk sharing should be used to correct the perversion of incentives created by repayment safety nets in the federal lending program and that risk sharing as a punitive mechanism would be ineffective.14
Title: “Getting Risk Sharing Right: Creating Better Incentives for Colleges and Universities”
Authors: Kristin Blagg and Matthew Chingos, Urban Institute
Proposal: Risk-sharing proposals traditionally focus on long-term repayment metrics, but Blagg and Chingos expand the concept to include short-term metrics focused on completion. Specifically, they propose a risk-sharing system that modifies current rules around returning aid when students drop out in the middle of a term. Under their proposal, institutions would return to the Department of Education 50 percent of federal student aid used to pay for tuition and fees for students who dropped out before the middle of a term and 25 percent for those who dropped out before the end of the term. In addition, institutions would lose access to federal aid programs if a large share of their students receiving these funds ended up earning poverty wages after leaving the institution. They also propose changes to the disbursement of financial aid for living expenses so that students who drop out do not end up with as much debt.15
Title: “A Flexible Risk Retention Model for Federal Student Loans”
Authors: Thomas L. Harnisch and Barmak Nassirian, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities
Proposal: The authors propose a new federal student loan risk-retention model. They caution that a punitive risk-retention framework only works as a fail-safe mechanism against extreme institutional subpar performance, and argue for pairing any risk-retention policy with a positive incentive for enhancing quality, such as an institutional bonus system for better-than-expected outcomes. Their model distributes progressively larger financial liabilities to institutions that produce increasingly poorer borrower repayment patterns. The authors call for identifying and separating the social-policy costs of student lending—such as promoting access and opportunity—from costs that are reasonably attributable to program quality. Harnisch and Nassirian advocate for allocating policy costs to the federal government, while assigning a portion of quality costs—as measured by repayment patterns—to the institutions themselves. Their proposal would provide an allowance for institutions that enroll large proportions of low-income students. They suggest that institutions only face risk related to spending for noninstructional purposes, helping institutions that devote larger portions of their budgets on instruction.16
Title: “Designing and Assessing Risk-Sharing Models for Federal Student Aid”
Author: Nicholas Hillman, associate professor in educational leadership and policy analysis at the University of Wisconsin–Madison
Proposal: Hillman proposes a system that uses measures of student loan default and nonrepayment, each adjusted by the percentage of students at a school who borrow. Institutions would be asked to repay between 5 percent and 15 percent of the balance of loans received if they had results far outside the norm of similar schools. His paper also provides a detailed look at the characteristics of the institutions that would make risk-sharing payments under his system versus other models suggested by members of Congress.17
Title: “A Risk-Sharing Model to Align Incentives and Improve Student Performance”
Authors: Jorge Klor de Alva and Mark Schneider, Nexus Research and Policy Center
Proposal: Klor de Alva and Schneider propose a system that would be applicable to any institution where more than 25 percent of students borrow. Institutions would make a risk-sharing payment of up to 30 percent of the value of loans in default based on a combination of their three-year cohort default rate, up to 20 percent, and the graduation rate of students receiving Pell Grants, up to 10 percent. Institutions where at least half of students receive need-based federal assistance; spend a lot on education, retention, and career services; and make progress on a student loan management plan would be able to reduce their payment as much as 50 percent.18
Title: “Risk-sharing and student loan policy: Consequences for students and institutions”
Author: Doug Webber, assistant professor in the economic department at Temple University and a research fellow at the Institute of Labor Economics
Proposal: Webber proposes a risk-sharing system where institutions would be responsible for 5 percent of the balances for borrowers who are not making progress repaying their loans within two years of entering repayment. He also proposes a bonus payment for each student who successfully graduates and repays their loans. His proposal also models the interaction between risk-sharing payments and tuition levels.19
Title: “Sharing the Risk: A Plan for Colleges to Participate in the Costs of Student Loan Failure”
Author: Ben Miller, senior director for postsecondary education at the Center for American Progress, and CJ Libassi, policy analyst at CAP
Proposal: CAP proposes a system of risk-sharing payments and bonuses. The payments would be based upon an institution’s default and repayment rates. Institutions would repay an amount of affected loan dollars equal to the rate at which an unwanted outcome occurred. In other words, a school with a 10 percent default rate would repay 10 percent of defaulted loan dollars. Institutions would receive bonus payments for every student who repayed beyond an expected level.20
Beth Akers is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. Before joining the Manhattan Institute, she was a fellow in the Brookings Institution’s Center on Children and Families. Akers previously held the position of staff economist with the president’s Council of Economic Advisers, where she worked on federal student lending policy, as well as other education and labor issues. She is an expert on the economics of education, with a focus on higher education policy. She is the co-author of Game of Loans: The Rhetoric and Reality of Student Debt. Akers received a Bachelor of Science in mathematics and economics from the University of Albany-SUNY and a Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University.
Ben Miller is the Senior Director for Postsecondary Education at the Center for American Progress. He was previously the research director for higher education at New America, as well as a senior policy adviser in the Office of Planning, Evaluation and Policy Development at the U.S. Department of Education. Miller’s work focuses on higher-education accountability, affordability, and financial aid, as well as for-profit colleges and other issues. Miller’s work has appeared in The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, The Chronicle of Higher Education, and Inside Higher Ed, among other outlets. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history and economics from Brown University.
The National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators, “Institutional Risk Sharing” (2016), available at https://www.nasfaa.org/uploads/documents/Risk_Sharing_Brief.pdf. ↩
Ben Miller and CJ Libassi, “Sharing the Risk: A Plan for Colleges to Participate in the Costs of Student Loan Failure” (Center for American Progress, 2016), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/reports/2016/12/19/295187/sharing-the-risk/. ↩
Office of Federal Student Aid, “Federal Versus Private Loans,” available at https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/federal-vs-private (last accessed May 2017). ↩
National Conference of State Legislatures, “Performance-Based Funding for Higher Education,” July 31, 2015, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/performance-funding.aspx. ↩
Author’s analysis of data from the Office of Federal Student Aid, “Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools,” available at https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr.html (last accessed May 2017). ↩
Miller and Libassi, “Sharing the Risk.” ↩
Bryan Cook and Terry W. Hartle, “Why Graduation Rates Matter—and Why They Don’t” (Washington: American Council on Education, 2011), available at http://www.acenet.edu/the-presidency/columns-and-features/Pages/Why-Graduation-Rates-Matter%E2%80%94and-Why-They-Don%E2%80%99t.aspx. ↩
Note: TICAS specifically uses the defaulted loan balance from the school’s cohort default rate. This version of the defaulted loans is a more limited measure of default than using all defaulted loans. ↩
Congressional Budget Office, “Costs and Policy Options for Federal Student Loan Programs” (2010), available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/reports/03-25-studentloans.pdf. ↩
Author’s analysis of data from the National Center for Education Statistics, Profile of Undergraduates in U.S. Postsecondary Education Institutions: 1992-93 (U.S. Department of Education, October 1995), available at https://nces.ed.gov/pubs/web/96237.asp. ↩
Office of Federal Student Aid, 2016 Annual Report (U.S. Department of Education, 2016), available at https://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/2016report/fsa-report.pdf. ↩
Lindsay Ahlman, Debbie Cochrane, and Jessica Thompson, “A New Approach to College Accountability: Balancing Sanctions and Rewards to Improve Student Outcomes” (The Institute for College Access and Success, 2017), available at http://ticas.org/sites/default/files/pub_files/ticas_risk_sharing_working_paper.pdf. ↩
Beth Akers, “Risk-sharing: An efficient mechanism for funding student loan safety nets” (Brookings Institution, 2016), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/risk-sharing-an-efficient-mechanism-for-funding-student-loan-safety-nets. ↩
Kristin Blagg and Matthew Chingos, ”Getting Risk Sharing Right: Creating Better Incentives for Colleges and Universities” (Urban Institute, 2016), available at http://www.urban.org/research/publication/getting-risk-sharing-right. ↩
Barmak Nassirian and Thomas L. Harnisch, “A Flexible Risk Retention Model for Federal Student Loans” (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2016), available at http://www.aascu.org/policy/publications/aascu-special-reports/riskretention.pdf. ↩
Nicholas W. Hillman, “Designing and Assessing Risk-Sharing Models for Federal Student Aid” (Center for the Advancement of Postsecondary Education, 2016), available at http://wiscape.wisc.edu/wiscape/publications/working-papers/wp018. ↩
Jorge Klor de Alva, “A Risk-Sharing Model to Align Incentives and Improve Student Performance” (Nexus Research and Policy Center, 2016), available at http://nexusresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Risk-Sharing-Model.pdf. ↩
Douglas A. Webber, “Risk-sharing and student loan policy: Consequences for students and institutions” Economics of Education Review (57) (2017): 1–9, available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775716302643. ↩
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How does one determine the molecular formula from the empirical formula?
By first determining the approximate molecular mass of the compound in question, usually by measurements of osmotic pressure, freezing point depression, or some other colligative property that depends on the number of molecules present. The approximate molecular mass of the substance in question is then calculated from the colligative property measurements, and this value is then divided by gram molecular mass corresponding to the empirical formula. The nearest integer to the resulting quotient is then applied as a factor by which to multiply each subscript of the empirical formula to yield the molecular formula.
How do you calculate Molecular formula from empirical formulaWhat could you do with that information to determine that the empirical and molecular formulas are related to one another by a factor of 6?
In order to find molecular formula from empirical formula, one needs to know the molar mass of the molecular formula. Then you simply divide the molar mass of the molecular formula by the molar mass of the empirical formula to find out how many empirical formulae are in the molecular formula. Then you multiply the subscripts in the empirical formula by that number.
How does one determine a molecule formula from the empirical formula?
The density or some other information must be given that allow you to find the molar mass. Calculate the empirical formula mass. Divide molar mass by empirical formula mass. This answer is multiplied by all subscripts of the empirical formula to get the molecular formula.
What is the difference between a molecular formula and an empirical formula?
An empirical formula is one that shows the lowest whole number ratio of the elements present. The molecular formula shows the composition of the molecules. An example is phosphorus pentoxide, P2O5 empirical formula, P4O10 molecular formula.
What do empirical formulas determine?
Empirical formulas determine the ratio of atoms of different elements within a chemical compound and can be derived by dividing the number of each element's atoms by their greatest common factor. They do not necessarily describe the full chemical makeup of a molecule. For example, benzene has the formula C6H6 but its empirical formula is simply CH because there is one hydrogen atom for every carbon atom. Glucose has the molecular formula of C6H12O6; its… Read More
What other information is required to know whether a formula is both empirical and molecular?
Find the mass of the substance and divide it by the mass of the substance defined by the empirical formula. If you get 1, then the empirical formula is also the molecular one.
What molecular formulas are also an empirical formula?
Any molecular formula where the subscripts do not have a common factor that can divide them all. For example: CH4 (methane) is a molecular formula that is also an empirical formula because there is no number (other then one) that can divide both the 4 and the 1. Take ethane as another example. It hasn't the empirical formula which is similar to the molecular formula.
What is the empirical formula for potassium nitrate?
The empirical formula for potassium nitrate is the same as the molecular formula, KNO3, because the molecular formula shows only one atom each of potassium and nitrogen.
Is the number of atoms in a molecular formula always greater than a empirical?
No. A molecular formula can be the same as the empirical formula, such as CH4 (methane), because the two component atoms exist in a ratio that cannot be mathematically further broken down - one carbon to four hydrogens. In this case the molecular formula (the actual number of atoms per molecule), and the empirical formula (the simplest ratio of those numbers) is identical. On the other hand, ethane, C2H6 - two carbons to 6 hydrogens… Read More
Can one substance have same empirical and molecular formula?
Yes it can be
How does one determine a molecular formula from the empirical formula?
molar mass over grams of element The above answer is somewhat correct. In order to find the molecular formula when given the empirical formula, you must first find the molar mass of the empirical formula. MOLAR MASS # atoms element A x atomic mass element A (periodic table) = mass A # atoms element B x atomic mass element B (periodic table) = mass B ... etc. Add up all of the mass values found… Read More
Contrast molecular formula and empirical formula?
A molecular formula specifies the exact number of atoms of each element in one molecule of a compound, but an empirical formula shows only enough of the atoms of the element with the smallest number of atoms in the compound to specify the proportions between or among each kind of atom in the compound. The subscript numbers after each atomic symbol in a molecular formula will therefore be an integral multiple of the subscript numbers… Read More
Can 2 compounds have same empirical formula?
Yes. One of the simples examples is the pair butane and 2-methylpropane, which have not only the same empirical but the same molecular formula, C4H10.
What is the molecular formula of a compound whose empirical formula is CH3?
The most common one would be C2H6, but there might be others.
Contrast molecular formulas and empirical formulas?
Molecular formula tells you how the actual number of atoms of each element are in one molecule of a compound. The empirical formula shows this same information as a reduced ratio. For example: H2O2 is the molecular formula of hydrogen peroxide. In one molecule of hydrogen peroxide there are two atoms of hydrogen and two atoms of oxygen. This can be thought of as a 2:2 ratio of H:O. Reduced this ratio yields 1:1, and… Read More
What is the empirical formula for the compound C2H6O2?
CH3O: When a molecular formula has a set of subscripts that can all be integrally divided by any integer other than one, division of the subscripts by the highest such integer will yield the empirical formula.
How does one determine an empirical formula from a percent composiition?
Based on % composition, one can determine the moles of each element in, say, 100 grams of compound. Then, one can see the mole ratio of all the elements in the compound, and adjust them so as to obtain whole numbers in the lowest possible ratio. This is then the empirical formula.
What is the molecular formula of a compound with a empirical formula of NO2?
Assuming you came upon the empirical formula by chemical analysis, the molecular formula would be a multiple of (NO2)n. The vale for n (1, 2, 3 etc) would need to be established by investigation. In this case the molecular formula is N2O4. This molecule is in equilbrium with the monomer NO2. N2O4 is the more common species at low temperatures and is the form found in the solid. NO2 is paramagnetic as it has one… Read More
What is the empirical formula of dioxin?
The "dioxin" that most people mean when they just say "dioxin" is 2,2',3,3'-tetrachlorodiphenyldioxin, which has a molecular formula of C12H4O2Cl4. It's the one that's most toxic.
How does one determine a percent composition from an empirical formula?
divide the total mass of the element by the mass of the compound and multiply by 100%
What is the difference between the empirical and chemical formulas?
In an empirical formula, at least one of the element symbols must have a subscript (possibly including the implicit subscript "1" that is presumed when there is no explicit subscript) that is a prime number. The subscripts in a chemical formula must correspond to the actual number of atoms of each element present in a molecule or formula unit of the compound and therefore may be any integral multiple of the subscripts in the empirical… Read More
When are the empirical and molecular formulas the same?
If one of the atoms is already at its smallest amount. i.e. CH4 would be the same for both, while C2H8 would also have an empirical formula of CH4 though. H2O --> H2O etc.
How can empirical formula be same as molecular formula?
If one of the atoms is already at its smallest amount. i.e. CH4 would be the same for both, C2H8 would also have an emperical formula of CH4 though. H2O --> H2O etc.
What is the empirical formula of the compound C5h15O10?
The requirements for an empirical formula are that it give the correct ratios between all pairs of atoms in the actual molecule and have subscripts (including the value 1 implied by lack of an explicit subscript) with the lowest possible values to achieve all the correct ratios. To meet the latter condition, either one subscript must be one or the two smallest subscripts must be distinct prime number. The formula of the compound given has… Read More
Can a compounds molecular formula be 2.5 times greater than the empirical formula?
No. It must be a whole number. Since the empirical formula of a compound shows the proportions of the elements in the simplest whole number ratio there is going to be at least one odd number in the formula. Multiplying by 2.5 would then result in you having half an atom somewhere in the molecule, which you can't really have.
Explain what you can tell about a compound with the formula C6 H12 O6?
From the formula C6H12O6, it is possible to tell that the compound Has six carbon atoms, 12 hydrogen atoms, and 6 oxygen atoms in every one of its molecules Has a molar mass of 6(12.00g) + 12(1.01g) + 6 (16.00g) = 180.12 grams per mol. Has an empirical formula of CH2O (which is not to be confused with the molecular formula, for CH2O is the molecular as well as the empirical formula of formaldehyde, but… Read More
Why is the chemical formula of maltose not a multiple of its empirical formula?
Because you've gotten at least one of them wrong. The chemical formula of maltose is a multiple of its empirical formula, because that's kind of a requirement in the definition of "empirical formula."
What is the difference between a formula unit and a molecular formula?
Molecular formulas refer to covalently bonded substances (molecules). The molecular formula shows the exact number of atoms of each element present in the smallest unit of the substance. For example, benzene is a molecule composed of six carbon and six hydrogen atoms and has a formula C6H6. A formula unit refers to ionic compounds and network solids (both are crystals). Because in ionic crystals each ion is electrostatically bonded to every oppositely charged nearest neighbor… Read More
What is the empirical formula for the compound WO2?
WO2: If any element symbol in a formula has no subscript, implying a subscript of one, the formula is already empirical.
How do you get the chemical formula of a compound if the given is the percentage of the elements?
First lets assume you mean percent by mass which are the usual numbers given. The determination of chemical formula from percentage by weight is achieved through the use of the concepts of molecular mass, empirical formula, and molar mass. The molecular mass of a compound can be found by taking its constitute atoms and adding their relative atomic mass (a number given in atomic mass units (u), where a carbon 12 isotope is defined as… Read More
How many times larger is the number of hydrogen atoms then oxygen atoms in all carbohydrates?
C6H12O6 is a carbohydrate. If the molecular formula is simplified to an empirical formula it would be CH2O. So, for every one oxygen atom, there are two hydrogen atoms.
Why is the empirical formula not double that of the monosaccharides?
According to biologists, the reason an empirical formula is not double that of the monosaccharide is because it loses one water molecule.
Is C8H20 an empirical formula?
Yes, it LOOKS like an empirical formula BUT it is NOT a correct one: Either C9H20 or C8H18 are correct (both are saturated alkanes) but not C8H20
What two compounds have the same empirical formula?
For example, all linear alkenes with one double bond and no other functional groups have the same empirical formula.
What is the isomer for c3h8o3?
There will be several chemical compounds with that empirical formula. Each compound will have one or more isomers. Without knowledge of the particular molecular formula you are asking about, the question is unanswerable except at great length. The obvious (?) compound would be propan-1,2,3-triol - that has a single isomer.
Why is the formula for an ionic compound the empirical formula?
The ionic compounds do not exist as free unit but due to non directional nature of ionic bond any one ion is surrounded by 4,6 or 8 oppositely charged ions and pattern repeats itself in all dimensions forming a crystal so the formula can not represent the actual no of combining ions and we simply represent the ratio of ions as empirical formula, the covalent compound may exist as free units (molecules) so we represent… Read More
What is relationship between empirical formula and formula unit?
A formula unit includes the correct number of each kind of atoms present in a molecule of a covalently bonded compound, but an empirical formula does not necessarily do so. An empirical formula is reliable with respect to the ratios between each kind of atom, but the molecule may contain any positive integral number of empirical formulas, including one.
How can you determine a chemical formula is ionic?
I'm Dutch, and we commonly use the word Salt for ionic solutions. That means: One metal, or NH4+, and one molecular material. For example: potassiumchloride K+ + Cl- --> KCl Potassium is a metal and chloride a molecular material.
What are some empirical formulas of citric acid?
CH3COOH is citric acid's formula. Empirical formula is the simplest whole number ratio of atoms in a substance. THIS MEANS THERE CAN ONLY BE ONE EMPIRICAL FORMULA FOR A GIVEN SUBSTANCE. that's wrong...its C6H8O7... C2O2H4 DOESN'T MAKE SENSE.
How is the molecular formula NO different from the molecular formula N2O?
The molecule of NO has only one nitrogen and one oxygen while N2O has two nitrogen and one oxygen.
Molecular formula of Helium?
There isn't one. there is a common formula: He
What is the molecular formula for vineger?
Vinegar is a mixture and does not have a molecular formula as such. The "active" ingredient in vinegar is acetic acid, which has the formula CH3COOH, in one common method of writing it.
How does one determine a percent composition from a empirical formula?
- Calculate from the empirical formula the molar mass - Write the atomic weight of the chemical elements contained - From these data calculate the percent composition Example: water, H2O Hydrogen atomic weight: 1; H2 is 2 Oxygen atomic weight: 16 Molar mass is 18 Percentage of oxygen in water is: (16 x 1000/18 = 88,88 %
What is the difference between a structural and molecular formula?
A molecular formula indicates the numbers and kinds of atoms in one molecule of a substance. The structural formula shows how the atoms fit together in the molecule. For example, water has the molecular formula of H2O and the structural formula of H-O-H.
Is H2 is a molecular or a chemical formula?
H2 is the molecular formula for hydrogen gas; H is the chemical formula for one atom of hydrogen, whether it be gas, liquid, or solid.
What is the molecular formula of alkene?
The molecular formula of a non-cyclic alkene with only one double bond and n carbon atoms is CnH2n.
What is molecular formula?
The molecular formula of a compound is the number of atoms of each element in one molecule. So in water (H2O), one molecule of water has 2 Hydrogen atoms and one oxygen.
How do you calculate an empirical formula?
the empirical formula is the simplest whole number ratio of the elements present in one molecule or formula unit of a compounds we calculate the empirical formula using the following steps: 1. note the mass of each element correctly 2. divide the atomic masses by the masses deduced in step 1 3. divide the step 2 calculation by the lowest figure
What is the molecular formula for butanal?
One common way of writing this formula is C3H7CHO.
What is the empirical formula of copper sulfide?
as copper is a transition metal its charge can vary however say its charge is 2+ as most transition metals in general are. write a balanced equation: Cu+S-----> CuS an empirical formula is one that contains the simplest whole number ratio of elements, CuS cant get any simpler so it is the empirical formula.
What is the emprical formula for the compound C2N2?
CN. An empirical formula should not have any common integral factor other than one among the subscripts in the formula.
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Job Training and Career Qualifications Salary and Pay Rates Jobs for Teens All Topics
Jobs | Salary and Pay Rates | Psychology | Psychological Disciplines
What jobs can you get with a masters in psychology?
What Jobs are available with a masters in clinical psychology?
The bulk of jobs available to those with a masters in clical psychology is counseling. However, jobs in academics, teaching, and research are also within reach.
What jobs can you get with a masters in health psychology?
Most obvious is a clinical psychologist.
How easy it to find a job with a masters in psychology?
Hard. Jobs are rare and far between.
What colleges offer a master's degree in Psychology?
There are many colleges that offer a Masters Degree in Psychology. One of the colleges that offers a Masters Degree in Psychology is the University of Phoenix.
What is the correct abbreviation of masters in psychology?
Master of Psychology (MPsy)
What to do with a master's in psychology?
Careers in psychology are interesting, challenging and absorbing. They are not always easy to master but they are absolutely rewarding. The field of psychology offers variety of career opportunities as it's in a great demand. Especially diverse career choices are available for graduates with Masters in psychology or PhD. The science of psychology is sweeping. It embraces many different fields, so that each person is able to fit in. So can you with your Masters… Read More
How many credit hours for a masters degree in psychology?
The amount of credits required to complete a Masters Degree in psychology is strictly dependent on the college or university and the type of Masters in Psychology one is pursuing. There are a number of graduate programs in psychology to include Counseling Psychology, Educational Psychology, School Psychologist , Clinical Psychology, Behavioral Sciences etc. That being said, there are Master degrees in psychology that could run anywhere from 33 to 72 credit hours depending. Viper1
What is academic suffix for a masters in psychology?
Depends on what your masters is: Master of arts (MA) or masters of science (MSc)
How many credits are needed for a masters in psychology?
It depends on the type of masters degree (specialty), and the curriculum design particular to the institution offering the degree. In other words, a masters in general psychology, or behavioral science may run between 33 and 40 credits, a masters in school psychology may run 70 credits plus.
How much psychologists get paid with a bachelor's degree in psychology?
A bachelors degree in psychology does not make you a psychologist. What you will be is an individual who has a degree in psychology. A psychologist has the minimum of a masters, with most professionals at the doctorate level particular to a specific discipline. A bachelors degree in psychology does not make you a psychologist. What you will be is an individual who has a degree in psychology. A psychologist has the minimum of a… Read More
Where are summer jobs for psychology major in WA state?
There are several summer jobs for psychology major in WA state. Some jobs are restaurant jobs, grocery store jobs, or bank jobs.
What is the length of time it takes to complete a Masters of Psychology?
It depends on the specific program of study. In other words, a masters in school psychology would take longer than a masters in behavioral psychology. In addition, the length of time will depend on the course load carried per semester. However, the approximate length of time is three years.
What college courses are needed to get a master's in psychologist?
It really depends on what masters program in psychology you are enrolled in. At the masters level you get to specialize in a particular area of psychology and the course curriculum varies between graduate programs. In general, expect to spend at least 2 years on coursework and writing a thesis or completing an internship to receive a masters in psychology.
Do you have to have a masters degree before you get a Ph.D in psychology?
Typically yes. There are some schools that do have a combined masters/PhD.
What non teaching jobs can you get with a masters degree in physical education?
There are a number of non-teaching jobs that you can get with a masters degree in physical education. Some jobs include fitness training jobs, athletic administration jobs and exercise physiology jobs.
What is the difference between an Master of Science and a Master of Philosophy?
About $50 K per year. A Masters of Science is a specific type of Masters degree. For instance, I hold a masters degree in psychology (and a Ph.D.). I could elect to receive either a Masters of Arts or Masters of Science in Psychology. Some programs you don't have a choice between the two, but there is no "real" difference.
Where can you find a list of psychology jobs available in New York?
You can find psychology jobs available in New York through Monster and CareerBuilder. You can also visit the American Psychological Association's website for more information about psychology jobs.
What jobs can you get with a masters degree in computer science?
alot of jobs
Can you get a Masters in Psychology if your bachelor's is not in psychology?
Yes. A Masters program will have required undergraduate courses, and you must have taken the courses to be accepted. However, you may be able to gain acceptance without having a complete degree in psychology, as long as you have a BA or BS, and you have completed the required courses.
What jobs can you get with bachelors in psychology?
Psychology doctor Psychology teacher ----------------------------------- Professional Fax Solution Joyfax Server
What does a masters in psychology signature look like?
The abbreviation for a master's in psychology is MPsy. John Doe, MPsy would be read as, "John Doe, Master of Psychology"
Is it possible to do a masters in child psychology with a bachelor of arts in psych?
If a college or university offers a masters in child psychology, it would appear to me that you have the appropriate background and prerequisites to pursue that degree, provided you meet the entrance requirements.
What jobs can one get with a Bachelors in psychology?
Having a bachelors in psychology is an impressive feat. Jobs that require that kind of knowledge would include jobs similar to Case Management or Psychiatric Therapy.
Do you need a linencse in counseling psychology?
Yes, you will absolutely need a license to practice counseling psychology. This is after you earn your masters or PhD.
How long does it take to get a master's in phsycology?
There are a number of specialties within psychology on the masters level. How long it would take to complete the masters would depend on that specialty. For example, some specialties would include: * General Psychology * Clinical Psychology * School Psychology * Behavioral Psychology * Industrial Psychology There are more, but the point is the length of time to complete the degree depends on the specialty, and the particular school's curriculum layout. Typically, the masters… Read More
Are there any psychology jobs helping children with learning disabilities?
Psychology jobs with children that have a learning disability can be a very challenging but rewarding career. A lot of elementary schools or even middle schools will have psychology jobs so that every student has a fair way to learn.
Does your bachelor's degree have to relate to your masters?
No it does not. My bachelors is in psychology, but my masters is in organizational management. The only thing is, if the masters requires any prerequisites, you may have to complete them at the undergraduate level first. Still, this is not for all masters.
Do i qualify for masters in industrial psychology with a bsc honours in psychology?
Since the MA would be in one area of psychology and your degree is in another most likely you will have to enroll in the graduate program for industrial psychology. Call your university graduate studies office. I know here in the US it wouldn't automatically give you a Masters degree with only undergraduate work completed.
I am getting a degree in Fine Arts can i master in psychology?
Any given university will have specific prerequisites for its masters degree program in psychology, in terms of courses that need to be taken at the undergraduate level. You will have to talk about this with the university which you would like to attend. But in theory yes, you can have a fine arts degree and still get a masters in psychology.
How long does psychology take to finish?
It depends on which level of education you are referring to. Bachelors, masters, or doctorate. A bachelors is typically a four year degree, a masters approximately two to three years beyond the bachelors, and doctorate approximately four years beyond a bachelors. There is a two year associates degree, but an associates in psychology does not offer much in terms of careers within psychology. It depends on which level of education you are referring to. Bachelors… Read More
What is the difference between Masters in counseling and masters in counseling psychology?
There many types of counseling.And there are also variation among them.Masters in counseling deals with all types of counseling on the other hand psychology counseling deals with only psychological matters.
How do you get a masters in phychology?
You have to apply to graduate school to get a masters in psychology. The application typically requires submission on transcripts, personal statements, and GRE scores.
What degrees are needed to complete a master degree in psychology?
A bachelors of arts or science is oftentimes required for a graduate degree in psychology including a masters.
Do you have to have a BS in psychology to get a Masters in psychology?
If BS means bachelors, yes. But if BS means Bachelors of science, no, you can have a bachelors of arts (BA) as well.
How many years of school for an educational psychologist?
BA in psychology: 3 to 4 years. Masters in educational psychology: 2 to 3 years.
What jobs can you get with a Masters in Music?
gutar teacher
What kind of jobs can I get if I double major in Psychology and Biology I would have a BA in Psychology and a BSc in Biology. I was just wondering what jobs I could get with only the 4 years.?
I think the most you can get is be a lecturer in a university or if you get an MA in psychology you can be a professor.
What does ma llp cps degree stand for?
masters with limited licensed psychology
What education is needed for child psychology?
If I'm not wrong, you will have to take a course in Psychology first, and after your BSc you will have to do a masters in an area related to child psychology. But check out some universities just to give you an idea.
How many years of school are required for a Psychology major?
A major in psychology is offered at every level of education to include: * Associates * Bachelors * Masters * Doctorate
Are my associate and bachelor's degrees in psychology needed to obtain a masters and doctorate in psychology?
Yes, you need at least a bachelor's degree to get a masters or PhD, Though many times you can come from a different major. It is still preferable to have at least a minor in psychology however, but at most universities that is pretty easy to obtain. Other majors that psychology grad schools like are math degrees and the social sciences like sociology.
Where can one find jobs for psychology majors?
Psychology major jobs can be found by completing internships during the semester or term. Then this leads to the company perhaps extending a contract at the completion of your degree.
What kind of schooling is required to be a Psychotherapy?
You will need a masters or PHD in psychology to practice psychotherapy.
Which international universities offer Masters Degrees in Humanistic Psychology?
How many college credits are needed for a masters degree in psychology?
This depends on your geographical location.
What jobs can you get with a masters in french?
a french teacher at schools
I have a bachelors degree in computer science. can i directly do my masters in psychology?
Usually you have to have done a PSYCHOLOGY degree first. Check with your university for whichever country you live in.
What masters programs outside of psychology are available with a Bachelor's degree in psychology?
Medical school, P.A School (Physician's assistant programs), and Neuroscience, Business/Advertising.
If you have a bachelors degree in science can you get a masters in nutrition?
Once you have a bachelor degree, you can get a masters degree in whatever you wish. The masters degree will help you get better paying jobs.
How long does it take to earn a Psychology Masters online?
It usually takes about two to four years to earn a Psychology Masters degree online. This data comes from California Southern University but there are other online courses that might take less time or more time.
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Chemistry Physics Biology Genetics Math and Arithmetic Earth Sciences All Topics
Science | Biology | Genetics | Acids and Bases
Where does pyruvic acid come from?
Pyruvic acid comes from the glycolysis of glucose.
What happens to pyruvic acid if no oxygen?
pyruvic acid is then converted to lactic acid
Preparation of pyruvic acid from tartaric acid?
on heating the tartaric acid, the tartaric acid forms a keto acid which is known as pyruvic acid C4H6O6 ------KHSO4/heating------> C3H4O3 (tartaric acid) (Pyruvic acid)
Does pyruvic acid store energy?
No pyruvic acid releases energy.
Is pyruvate and pyruvic acid the same thing?
Pyruvate is actually a salt, ester or anion of pyruvic acid, but the name pyruvate is often used for pyruvic acid.
What is the function of pyruvic acid?
Pyruvic acid supplies energy to living sells.
Can Pyruvic acid be further reduced without the presence of oxygen?
Pyruvic acid can be further reduced without the presence of oxygen using anaerobic respiration. Pyruvic acid is reduced to lactic acid in this process.
What is the formula for pyruvic acid?
Pyruvic acid is an organic acid which has a carboxylic acid and a ketone functional group. Its chemical formula is C3H4O3.
What is the end product of the breakdown of pyruvic acid occur?
The end product of the breakdown of pyruvic acid occur in acetyl-CoA. The breakdown of pyruvic acid related tot he citric acid cycle is the first thing added to citric acid cycle.
How is glycolosis different from the breakdown of pyruvic acid?
Glycolysis is the breakdown of glucose to give pyruvic acid and energy. Pyruvic acid is then used for different reactions, the most important one being Kreb's cycle.
Which acid is in garlic?
Can pyruvic acid use in the Krebs cycle?
Pyruvic acid is the end product of glycolysis that enters the mitochondria for the Kreb's cycle. Pyruvic acid however does not enter the mitochondria in the acid form; instead it enters in the form of salts and as the anionic pyruvate.
What is more reduced lactic or pyruvic acid?
Pyruvic acid is more reduced than lactic acid. This is because yruvic acid contains carboxylic acid and a ketone to oxaloacetate.
How many carbon atoms are in one pyruvic acid molecule?
Pyruvic acid is C3H4O3 and has 3 carbon atoms.
What does glycolysis from pyruvic acid produce?
Nothing, pyruvic acid is the primary substrate used in gluconeogenesis or reverse glycolysis.
Show how alanine could be deaminated to give the end-products indicated alanine pyruvic acid of what value is deamination to a microbe?
Alanine is deaminated to give pyruvic acid (C3H4O3 ) and Ammonia (NH3) Pyruvic Acid.
What is the conversion of pyruvic acid to carbon dioxide and ethanol called?
What is the process in which glucose is broken down to pyruvic acid?
The process by which glucose is broken down into pyruvic acid is called glycolysis.
Does pyruvic acid enters the krebs cycle?
Pyruvic acid cycle does enter the Krebs cycle and is turned into acetyl coenzyme A.
What is lactic acid fermentaion?
glucose firstly converts into pyruvic acid. Pyruvic acid or pyruvate is further reduced to lactic acid. Here no evolution of CO2 takes place
How is pyruvic acid used in the Kreb's cycle?
How is pyruvic acid used in the Kreb's cycle? the krebs cycle uses the two molecules of pyruvic acid formed in glycolysis and yields high energy molecules of NDA & FADH & ATP
What compound is made during anaerobic fermentation in muscle cells?
Lactic acid (also called lactate). The product of glycolysis in the cytoplasm is pyruvic acid (= pyruvate). If there is not enough oxygen for the mitochondria to oxidize the pyruvic acid, the enzyme lactic acid (or lactate) dehydrogenase, which is in the cytoplasm, reduces the pyruvic acid to lactic acid.
Is this true or false The pyruvic acid produced in electrolysis enters the chloroplasts if the oxygen is present in a cell?
It is false that if oxygen is present in a cell, pyruvic acid in glycolysis enters the chloroplasts. The pyruvic acid enters the mitochondria if oxygen is present in a cell.
What is the name of the process in which pyruvic acid is converted to lactic acid?
When pyruvic acid is converted into lactic acid, the process is called anaerobic synthesis. This process occurs during strenuous exercise.
How is the breakdown of pyruvic acid related to the citric acid cycle-?
The breakdown of pyruvic acid is usually accomplished by a series of reactions. Citric acid is usually the 1st compounds formed by these reactions.
What happens to pyruvic acid without oxygen and what is the process called?
Pyruvic Acid w/o Oxygen converts into Lactic Acid, the Process is known as Anaerobic Glycolysis
What types of acid is created in glycolysis?
Pyruvic acid.
How many CO2 does each pyruvic acid produce?
A molecule of pyruvic acid (C3H4O3) contains 3 carbon atoms, so one molecule of pyruvic acid will form 3 molecules of carbon dioxide when it is completely oxidized to CO2 and water.
What is the difference between pyruvic acid butyric acid and acetic acid?
One way that pyruvic acid, butyric acid, and acetic acid are different is that their molecular masses are all different. They all also have different molecular formulas.
Which one is formed during the Krebs cycle FADH2 or pyruvic acid?
FADH2 since pyruvic acid is needed to START the Krebs cycle
How many molecules of pyruvic acid are derived from glucose?
Two molecules of pyruvic acid are derived from each glucose that goes through glycolysis.
What is the name of the molecule that reacts with pyruvic acid?
Any base would react with pyruvic acid. I think you need to be considerably more specific.
What happens to pyruvic acid without oxygen?
Without oxygen present cells must convert pyruvic acid to lactic acid. This regenerates the NADH required to continue glycolysis.
What is the role of pyruvic acid in aerobic cellular respiration?
Pyruvic acid enters the mitochondrion and is oxidized into a compound called acetyl coA, which then enters the citric acid cycle (krebs).
What elements does pyruvic acid contain?
Pyruvic Acid is an organic acid, a ketone, as well as the simplest of the alpha-keto acids. The elements that form peruvic acid are Carbon, Hydrogen and Oxygen, the formula of peruvic acid is CH3COCOOH.
What does glycolysis produce?
Glycolysis (glycos, sugar + lysis, splitting) A glucose molecule is broken down into two molecules of pyruvic acid. The pyruvic acid molecules are then absorbed by the mitochondria. In the mitochondrial matrix, a CO2 molecule is removed from each of the acid molecules. What is left of the pyruvic acid then enters the Krebs cycle.
What is pyruvic acid converted to when there is a inadequate oxygen?
Lactic Acid.
Which acid form glycolysis?
Pyruvic acid is formed in glycolysis.
What is the by-product of lactic acid fermentation?
pyruvic acid and lactic acid.
Write equation to show how lactic acid fermentation compares with alcoholic fermentation?
alcoholic fermentation:- pyruvic acid + NADH ------> alcohol + CO2 + NAD+ lactic acid fermentation:- pyruvic acid + NADH ------> lactic acid + NAD+
Where do the reactants for the Krebs cycle come from?
They are the end products of glycolysis. ** ^wrong, in between glycolysis and the kreb's cycle is pyruvic acid oxidation
What happens to pyruvic acid produced during glycolysis when oxygen is available?
Pyruvic Dehydrogenase is formed
How is pyruvic acid used in the Krebs cycle?
Durning the Krebs cycle, pyruvic acid is broken down into carbon dioxide in a series of energy-extracting reactions.
Why do we test for the presence of indole rather than pyruvic acid as the indicator of tryptophanase activity?
Because the insole test is simpler and quicker than the pyruvic acid
What is the equation for lactic acid fermentation?
pyruvic acid + NADH = lactic acid + NAD+
Lactic acid is produced as a result of the chemical reduction of?
What is the role of NADH in fermentation?
citric acid cycle - pyruvic acid
What is the final electron acceptor in lactic acid fermentation?
What is the byproduct of anaerobic metabolism?
The answer is pyruvic acid which is then converted into lactic acid
Forms when pyruvic acid reacts with the enzyme CoA?
Carbon dioxide is formed when pyruvic acid reacts with coenzyme A. These processes occur during the Calvin Cycle in organisms.
If oxygen is not present where in the cell does the pyruvic acid remain?
If oxygen is not present, the pyruvic acid molecules will begin to undergo fermentation. They remain in the cell during aerobic respiration.
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the SAGE Handbook of Social Psychology Concise Student Edition Sage Social Psychology Program
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A Century of Social Psychology: Individuals, Ideas, and Investigations : The SAGE Handbook of Social Psychology
The SAGE Handbook of Social Psychology
Preface and Introduction Michael A. Hogg and Joel Cooper -
PART ONE HISTORY AND NATURE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
A Century of Social Psychology: Individuals, Ideas, and Investigations George R. Goethals Questions and Comparisons: Methods of Research in Social Psychology Phoebe C. Ellsworth and Richard Gonzalez
PART TWO INDIVIDUAL PROCESSES
Social Inference and Social Memory: The Interplay Between Systems Steven J. Sherman, Matthew T. Crawford, David L. Hamilton, and Leonel Garcia-Marques Stereotyping and Impression Formation: How Categorical Thinking Shapes Person Perception Kimberly A. Quinn, C. Neil Macrae, and Galen V. Bodenhausen Portraits of the Self Constantine Sedikides and Aiden P. Gregg Attitudes: Foundations, Functions, and Consequences Russell H. Fazio and Michael A. Olson Affect and Emotion Joseph P. Forgas and Craig A. Smith Attribution and Person Perception Yaacov Trope and Ruth Gaunt
PART THREE INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES
Attitude Change Penny S. Visser and Joel Cooper Interpersonal Attraction and Intimate Relationships Julie Fitness, Garth Fletcher, and Nickola Overall Altruism and Helping Behavior C. Daniel Batson, Paul A.M. van Lange, Nadia Ahmad, and David A. Lishner Human Aggression: A Social-Cognitive View Craig A. Anderson and L. Rowell Huesmann
PART FOUR PROCESSES WITHIN GROUPS
Social Performance Kipling D. Williams, Stephen G Harkins, and Steve J. Karau Social-Influence Processes of Control and Change: Conformity, Obedience to Authority, and Innovation Robin Martin and Miles Hewstone
PART FIVE INTERGROUP PROCESSES AND SOCIETY
Intergroup Behavior and Social Identity Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams The Social Psychology of Cultural Diversity: Social Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination Stephen C. Wright and Donald M. Taylor
Preface and Introduction
MICHAEL A. HOGG AND JOEL COOPER
The Sage Handbook of Social Psychology was published in 2003. With twenty- three chapters it was primarily a resource for academic researchers and graduate student research. We decided to prepare this Concise Student Edition to cater more for upper division and graduate student courses focusing in on a subset of six- teen of the original chapters that are most closely aligned to relevant upper division and graduate classes. To prepare this edition, and to make the text more accessible, we had our authors thoroughly update their references and prepare a short introduction and summary for their chapters.
Editing a handbook of social psychology is not for the fainthearted. This is something we have learned. It is an awesome enterprise, not only because it is such a big task but also because handbooks occupy such an influential role in the discipline. Handbooks describe the state of the art they survey what we know about social psychology, and in so doing identify gaps in our knowledge, current foci of research activity, and future research directions. There have been many handbooks of social psychology. The first, edited by Murchison, was published in 1935 it was a weighty tome that signaled that social psychology was a discipline to be taken seriously. Seventy years on, two of the most recent handbooks are the twovolume Handbook of Social Psychology , which is now in its fourth edition (Gilbert et al., 1998), and the Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology , which comes as four separately edited volumes (Tesser and Schwartz, Fletcher and Clark, Hogg and Tindale, and Brown and Gaertner, respectively), pub- lished in 2001 under Hewstone and Brewers overarching editorship. The reason we originally set out to edit our own handbook is that the field of social psychology moves very quickly. We wanted to produce an accessible survey of the state of the discipline at the dawn of the new millennium what do we know about human social behavior and what are the current and future hot topics for research? Such a survey must be authoritative, and so we invited leading scholars from around the world to write about their fields. We felt that such a survey should not only cover the field in a scholarly manner but also be accessible to graduate students, senior undergraduates, and, to some extent, people in relevant neighboring disciplines, and so we configured the chapters to fit into a single volume.
A Century of Social Psychology: Individuals, Ideas, and Investigations
George R. Goethals
In 1954, in his classic chapter on the historical background of modern social psychology, Gordon Allport nominated Auguste Comte as the founder of social psychology as a science. He noted that Comte, the French philosopher and founder of positivism, had previously, in 1839, identified sociology as a separate discipline. In fact, sociology did not really exist, but Comte saw it coming. Allport notes that one might say that Comte christened sociology many years before it was born (Allport, 1968: 6). In the 1850s, during the last years of his life, Comte argued that beyond sociology a true final science would emerge. Comte called this science la morale positive, but it was clearly psychology. In fact, combined with sociology it would become social psychology. Social psychology has a history before and after Comte. But it is interesting to know that when it was first conceptualized as a discipline it was seen as being the ultimate one. If not with Comte, where does social psychology begin? Clearly, ancient philosophers pondered the inherent nature of humankind, the way people interact and influence each other, and the way they govern themselves. In The Republic, Plato argued that men organize themselves and form governments because they cannot achieve all their goals as individuals. They are interdependent. Some kind of social organization is required. Various forms emerge, depending on the situation, including aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. Plato clearly favored aristocracy, where the wise and just govern, and allow individuals to develop their full potential. Whatever the form, social organization and government develop to serve the interests of people in achieving various goals. As on many other issues, Plato's younger colleague Aristotle had a different view. He held that people came together and organized groups from instinctual tendencies toward sociability, rather than utilitarian needs for a social contract. He was also more positively disposed toward democracy than Plato. Plato reasoned from his concept of the ideal state that a ruling elite, governed by dispassionate reason and intellect, would be the best form of government. Aristotle had more faith that the combined talents of different individuals, combined with their inherent propensities for positive affiliations, would produce the better state. Aristotle based his judgments on data, as he understood them. His idea that people naturally came together and that they could be trusted to use their varying talents to create the good society was based on a more generous view of human nature than Plato's. Thus, the differing perspectives of these Greek philosophers defined enduring arguments that have since guided inquiry in social psychology and many other intellectual disciplines. How much of human behavior, particularly social behavior, can be understood as deriving from external constraints and contingencies vs. internal drives and dispositions? How capable are people of using their intellectual capacities wisely and effectively? Are the basic instincts of human beings good or evil? How much of human behavior can we understand and predict from deductive theoretical reasoning, and how much more can we learn from careful observation and induction? Nearly 2,000 years later, these issues became matters of sharp debate during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. According to Allport (1954), one of the most enduring issues was whether human behavior was governed rationally or irrationally. And if irrationality was dominant, what were the qualities of the irrational forces which guided human behavior? Among the philosophers who struggled with these questions were Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (17121782). The earlier thinkers, Machiavelli and Hobbes, were much more pessimistic about the quality of human nature and argued that some kind of social order needed to be imposed simply to constrain human selfishness and aggressiveness. Locke and Rousseau were more optimistic. Locke was particularly influential, with a balanced view of human qualities, and a faith that people could be reasonable, moderate, and cooperative (Allport, 1968: 19). The debate between the optimists and pessimists informed debates between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton at the founding of the American republic in the 1780s, and still persists in the present day.
The emergence of psychology
Plato's and Aristotle's fundamental arguments about the nature of human beings, especially as they related to ideas about the best forms of social organization and government, continued for centuries. Alongside these debates were other philosophical inquiries, also tracing back to the ancients, particularly Socrates and Aristotle, about many other aspects of the human condition. Are people capable of free will, or is behavior determined? What is the nature of human thought and consciousness? Do individuals perceive reality accurately? At the same time, as Comte pointed out, the sciences were also developing. People studied medicine, astronomy, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and physiology, again, with roots dating back to the Greeks and beyond. The scientific method emphasized evaluating philosophical and theoretical propositions against data data that could be collected by a variety of methods. When philosophers and scientists both began to tackle the same questions in the late nineteenth century, the true final science of psychology emerged. A pivotal figure in this development was the German neural scientist Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894). He conducted important early research on the nervous system and various aspects of vision, hearing, and perception. The application of longstanding scientific methods to age-old philosophical questions about human behavior and mental processes gave birth to psychology. The year 1875 saw one marker of its emergence, when Wilhelm Wundt established a laboratory in Leipzig, Germany. In the same year, William James, like Wundt, a physician, physiologist, and philosopher, established an informal laboratory in his basement in Cambridge, Massachusetts in the USA, and gave the first psychology course at Harvard University. James is said to have commented that the first lectures on psychology he heard, he gave himself.
Psychology blossomed under the leadership of Wundt, James, and then G. Stanley Hall, who founded the first formal American psychological laboratory at Johns Hopkins University in 1883. In 1890, James published his classic two-volume Principles of Psychology, followed in 1892 by a briefer course version of the same work. He wrote on such topics as sensation, vision, hearing, habit, the brain and neural activity, the self, and the will. While much of the earliest psychology dealt with questions outside the domains of social psychology, it was not long before the scientific method was applied to social questions. For example, Hall (1891) made extensive use of questionnaires in his studies of children's social interaction. In fact, the emergence of modern social psychology is marked by the application of the scientific methods that defined psychology as a whole to questions about social influence and social interaction. Two milestones in the emergence took place before the century ended.
1895: the birth of social psychology
In 1895, Norman Triplett at Indiana University in the USA began his studies of how social forces affect bicycle racing. In the same year, in Paris, Gustave Le Bon published his analysis of group behavior in Psychologie des foules, translated in 1896 as The Crowd. Both of these highly influential works considered the impact of other people on the individual. Norman Triplett was a cycling enthusiast who pored over statistics from the Racing Board of the League of American Wheelmen. He noticed that riders' times were faster when they were racing against other riders than when they were simply racing against the clock. From these observations he developed a theory of dynamogenesis that held that the presence of competing others released energy in individuals that they could not release on their own. Triplett then proceeded to test his theory with a series of experiments in which participants wound fishing reels alone and in direct competition with others. Triplett (1897) found that participants wound reels faster when competing than when alone and concluded that his theory was supported. Triplett's work raised more questions than it answered. Was it the mere presence of others that produced enhanced performance? Or was it competition, or perhaps being observed by others (Wheeler, 1970)? These questions were studied vigorously in the twentieth century, beginning with Floyd Allport during World War I (Allport, 1924). Allport coined the term social facilitation to refer to the observation that the presence of others, for some reason, produced enhanced performance in individuals. Thus, Triplett not only conducted what are regarded as the first experiments in social psychology, but also initiated a rich and enduring line of theoretical and empirical exploration. Interestingly, as with many other social phenomena, social facilitation findings became increasingly complex. Sometimes the presence of others led to poorer performance. The extremely varied empirical landscape in this domain provided a basis for decades of theory and research (Geen and Bushman, 1987; Zajonc, 1965). Gustave Le Bon also dealt with the impact of the presence of others. His contribution was more sweeping theoretically, but tied to a different kind of data. Rather than conduct experimental laboratory research with quantitative measures, Le Bon simply observed groups of many kinds, particularly those that gather in crowds. He was stunned by the transformation that comes over individuals in a group situation. He held that in crowds people are more emotional, less rational, more prone to extreme behaviors, and easily stimulated by leaders from one kind of extreme feeling to another in short periods of time. Le Bon described a person in a crowd as someone who has lost his or her individuality, whose conscious personality is somehow stripped away, revealing an ugly, aggressive unconscious personality that is widely shared by other group members. As Le Bon tried to explain the transformation of people in crowds, especially the lowering of intellectual functioning and the willingness to follow others with great emotional intensity, he relied heavily on notions of contagion and suggestion. In crowds, he argued, people are highly suggestible and can be led easily by emotional appeals of leaders. Mark Antony's stunning manipulation of the crowd in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar provides a powerful literary example of a leader's manipulating the extreme emotions of a crowd, and dramatically redirecting them from sympathy with the assassin Brutus to outrage (The noble Brutus hath told you Caesar was ambitious. If it were so, it was a grievous fault, and grievously hath Caesar answered it.). Le Bon's explanation of suggestion was less compelling than his description of wild mob behavior, but his observations and ideas had a lasting impact. They figured prominently in Freud's volume (1921) on group behavior and have influenced subsequent work on groupthink, deindividuation, and leadership.
Stirrings: the early twentieth century
The general development of psychology, fostered in great part by G. Stanley Hall, brought social psychology along with it, but the field of sociology also contributed to the emergence of social psychology, just as Comte had foreseen. Le Bon's work was perhaps more influential among sociologists and informed important turn-of-the-century work by Charles Horton Cooley, whose book Human Nature and the Social Order (1902) developed the idea of imitation, a concept closely related to Le Bon's concept of suggestion. Imitation is more concerned with behavior, suggestion with thought and cognition. A few years later, in 1908, sociologically and psychologically oriented treatments of social psychology were represented in two textbooks that contained the phrase social psychology in their titles. E.A. Ross's Social Psychology, like Cooley's book, emphasized the ideas of suggestion or imitation. Social interaction could be largely understood in terms of the basic phenomenon of people influencing the thoughts and actions of others. Ross's ideas were applied especially to issues such as crowds, social movements, social class, marriage, and religion (Pepitone, 1999). William McDougall's Introduction to Social Psychology held that there were many different explanations of social behavior, but that many of them could be subsumed under the general concept of instincts. Among others, McDougall (1908) considered the reproductive and the parental instinct, the instinct of pugnacity, the gregarious instinct, and instincts through which religious conceptions affect social life. Clearly, scholars had developed a fertile field of study and many ways of trying to understand its varied phenomena. Although social psychology gained momentun from Ross and McDougall, neither their specific concerns with particular societal phenomena nor their concern with instincts remained central in the work of later social psychologists. The field as we recognize it in the twenty-first century can be seen taking shape in Floyd Allport's influential textbook, Social Psychology (1924). Allport was heavily influenced by
behavioristic methods and ideas, and he firmly grounded social psychology in scientific methods. Allport was particularly influenced by J.B. Watson and his provocative Psychological Review paper (1913), Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It. Watson challenged Wilhelm Wundt's (1894) introspectionist approach to psychology, an approach which emphasized individual reports of consciousness and mental processes. Watson argued that the study of consciousness should be banished and that psychologists would make progress only by focusing on observable stimuli and responses. The behavioral perspective became highly influential within psychology for over fifty years and was clearly congenial to Floyd Allport. Among the problems that Allport took on were those explored by Triplett and Le Bon in 1895. Nearly thirty years after the publication of their work, Allport found these topics worthy of study. In fact, as noted above, Allport had been conducting research on social facilitation since World War I and explained enhanced performance in the presence of others in behavioristic, stimulus-response terms. The sight and sounds of others were a stimulus to more intense responses. He used similar concepts in explaining extreme behavior in crowd situations. Dramatic action by one or more people in a crowd was a stimulus to similar behavior in others, which in turn stimulated or restimulated the original actors, or led to yet others being drawn in. The status of social psychology as a scientific discipline was firmly established by the early 1930s. In 1931, Gardner Murphy and Lois Murphy of Columbia University published Experimental Social Psychology, a volume which reviewed over 800 studies of social processes. In 1937, the Murphys and Theodore Newcomb, a Columbia PhD, brought out the encyclopedic revised edition, which reviewed several hundred more studies. The influence of Gardner Murphy is often overlooked in the history of social psychology. Theodore Newcomb was a student of Murphy, as were Solomon Asch and Muzafer Sherif, whose important work will be considered below.
Explorations in social influence: the 1920s and 1930s
It is obviously a matter of interest and taste to identify which of the hundreds of studies reviewed by Murphy et al. (1937) are of lasting importance in understanding the evolution of social psychology. But, surely, the study of social influence was a key line of work in the preWorld War II decades. One early study by H.T. Moore (1921) demonstrated the influence of a reported majority of peers and of experts on participants' preferences between two musical, ethical, and linguistic options. Moore found that their judgments were very frequently reversed in response to either kind of influence, particularly majority influence. To Moore, these findings made sense. In the tradition of Floyd Allport, he argued that the opinions of others serve as stimuli that elicit a conforming response. This interpretation resonated with Ross's earlier emphasis on suggestion and imitation and the views of philosophers who had been pointing for many years to human irrationality. A similar study by Lorge was published in 1936, and again highlighted the impact of prestige and suggestion. He asked students their reactions to the statement that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms are in the physical. The statement was attributed to either Thomas Jefferson, who actually made it, or Vladimir Lenin. Lorge found that participants were much more likely to agree with the statement when it was attributed to Jefferson. The explanation was Jefferson's greater prestige, among Americans, than Lenin's. Later, as we shall see, Solomon Asch (1948) took issue with the Moore/Lorge interpretation. He argued that people have a completely different interpretation of what a little rebellion means when mentioned by Lenin as opposed to Jefferson. What changes is the object of judgment, not the judgment of the object (Wheeler, 1970). This debate once again goes back to basic questions perhaps unresolvable of human motivation and rationality. Another important series of studies of interpersonal influence studies that have become classics in the field was conducted in the 1930s by Muzafer Sherif to address in part questions debated by McDougall and Floyd Allport in earlier decades. In 1920, McDougall published his book The Group Mind. In it, he argued that certain ideas and feelings in groups have an existence independent of the individuals in the group. In the Watsonian tradition, Allport argued that the term group mind should be banished forever. For him, the unit of analysis should be the individual. There was no sense in positing an unobservable, unverifiable, mystical, and confusing group mind. McDougall came to regret using the term, but the debate about the nature of groups, and what, if anything, exists in groups apart from individuals became contentious. Sherif quite deliberately stepped onto this battlefield. In Sherif's classic experiments, groups of participants were seated in a totally dark room with a single point-source of light in front of them. Because there is no frame of reference for judging the location of the light, it appears to move. How much it appears to move varies considerably with individual judges. Sherif established that groups devise norms that govern the judgments of individuals in the group, that new entrants into the group adopt those norms, and that people take established norms into new groups. Thus, Sherif found that a set of norms that is characteristic of the group exists quite apart from any particular individual. The implications of this research for the group mind controversy aside, Sherif showed how hard people in ambiguous situations work to reduce confusion and define a frame of reference for making judgments. They look to other people for information about reality and, through a process of mutual influence, develop norms and frames of reference. Importantly, Sherif showed that thoughtful, careful laboratory experimentation with relatively small numbers of people could explore basic aspects of group functioning that characterize groups ranging in size from a few individuals to whole cultures. Two other important studies of interpersonal influence were conducted in the 1930s, before the USA entered World War II. They both show continuing concern with the impact of the group on individuals. The first was conducted by Kurt Lewin and his colleagues, and was inspired by Lewin's experience as a refugee from Nazi Germany (Lewin et al., 1939). Kurt Lewin is a giant in the history of social psychology, even though he was not a social psychologist at the beginning of his career. Lewin started publishing his work in Germany in 1917 and made major contributions to understanding personality, child development, learning, memory, and perception. His work on conflict was particularly influential. Lewin developed what he called field theory. In some ways, it was more a language than a set of theoretical propositions. Strongly influenced by physics and topology, Lewin used concepts such as the life space, vectors, region, force field, energy, need, tension system, and valence. Field theory emphasized the way internal and environmental forces combined to influence behavior as people negotiated their way through their perceived world, or life space. Lewin was renowned for this linking of theory and data. Deeply concerned with world problems, Lewin wanted to do research that had an impact on important real-world problems. He and his students called their work action research. But Lewin wanted to base applications on
theory and data. He is often quoted as saying, there's nothing so practical as a good theory, and the definitive biography of Lewin, written by his close friend and collaborator Alfred Marrow, is called The Practical Theorist. When Lewin came to the USA in 1933, in the first year of Hitler's Reich in Germany, he left the prestigious Psychological Institute in Berlin for the Department of Home Economics at Cornell. Shortly thereafter, he took an appointment at the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station. It was there that Lewin and his colleagues conducted an important study on social climate and behavior in groups. Clubs composed of groups of eleven-year-old boys were supervised by adults who adopted one of three leadership styles: democratic, autocratic, or laissezfaire. The democratic style produced constructive and independent group norms, marked by focused and energetic work whether the leader was present or absent. Boys in the groups with laissez-faire leadership were generally passive, while groups with autocratic leaders were either aggressive or apathetic. Here was research with a social message. When large and dangerous countries led by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes were threatening world peace and democratic institutions, Lewin's action research spoke to the quality of life in differing social systems. Research on group norms by Theodore Newcomb (1943) at Bennington College in the late 1930s had less social relevance but dealt with perennial questions of the nature of social norms and social influence. In the 1930s, the newly founded Bennington College, an undergraduate school for women, was an interesting mix of mostly liberal faculty members and mostly conservative students at least when the young women first enrolled. Newcomb showed that students became considerably more liberal over time, and that the more they were accepted and integrated into the college community, the more liberal they tended to be. Local norms exerted a strong influence on those who became engaged in the community. In a follow-up study nearly thirty years later, Newcomb (1963) showed that the Bennington women remained liberal, particularly when they married husbands who supported their new attitudes. The work of Sherif and Newcomb clearly demonstrated the power of social norms. It did not answer age-old questions about the role of rational as opposed to irrational processes in producing such dramatic conformity to social norms. These enduring questions would await further research, after World War II.
World War II and studies of group dynamics, attitudes, and person perception
The research by Sherif on group norms and Lewin and his colleagues on leadership showed that social psychology was alive to important social issues. Once the USA was drawn into World War II, social psychologists became engaged in questions prompted by the need to mobilize the nation for a long conflict. Kurt Lewin again was at the forefront. He was asked by the National Research Council to study ways of persuading women homemakers to serve animal viscera heart, sweetbreads, and kidneys to their families. Lewin continued to be interested in group forces and reasoned that influence through group norms would be more influential and more lasting than influence produced by a persuasive message presented in a lecture. Lewin (1943) and later researchers (Bennett, 1955; Radke and Klisurich, 1947) found that changes in attitude and behavioral commitmentproduced by perceptions of group norms were, in fact, the most dramatic. At the same time, other psychologists, led by Carl Hovland of Yale University, began exploring attitudes more broadly, with special emphasis on US army propaganda, especially with regard to issues affecting troop morale. In the 1920s, attitude had been thought to be the central concept in the field of social psychology (McGuire, 1968; Thomas and Zaniecki, 1918-20; Watson, 1925). The bulk of Murphy and Murphy's (1931) Experimental Social Psychology concerned attitudes. But attitude research had crested and faded during much of the 1930s, as more work was done on group dynamics and interpersonal influence. Issues of troop morale during the war brought renewed urgency to understanding attitudes. Much of the work that Hovland and his colleagues conducted during the war was summarized in the book Experiments on Mass Communication (Hovland et al., 1949). Their work was focused on such questions as how long the war against Japan in the Pacific would last after the defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe. It explored a wide variety of independent variables, including whether to present information by lectures or films, and whether two-sided or one-sided messages produced more, and more lasting, persuasion. After the war, Hovland and his colleagues at Yale continued to do groundbreaking research on attitudes. This work culminated in the classic volume, Communication and Persuasion (1953) by Hovland et al. This research studied in detail the paradigm, Who said what to whom? How are different audiences affected by different messages from different communicators? Specific questions concerned the credibility of communicators, the organization and structure of messages, whether fear-arousing communications enhanced persuasion, and what audience personality variables affected the success of persuasive messages. The work of the Yale school was guided in part by a model of persuasion based on the theoretical work of the behaviorist Clark Hull, long a member of the Yale faculty, and a mentor of Carl Hovland. Hull had developed the formulation that behavior is a function of drive and habit, or that performance is a function of learning and motivation. Therefore, the key to producing attitude change was to teach an audience a new point of view (learning) and the motivation to accept it. Persuasion could also be seen as following the three steps of paying attention to the message, understanding it, and, finally, accepting or yielding to it. A great deal of creative research was done by focusing on the elements in this formula. Interestingly, this work was not divorced from the work on group dynamics and group norms that had been so influential prior to World War II. One of the chapters in Communication and Persuasion was Group Membership and Resistance to Influence. It reported a number of important studies by Harold Kelley on conformity to group norms, and summarized Kelley's seminal theoretical paper on the normative and comparison functions of reference groups. After the war, at the same time that Hovland and his colleagues developed their highly creative work on communication and persuasion, Kurt Lewin and his successors continued their vigorous exploration of group dynamics. Lewin attracted a group of original and highly productive young scholars to the group dynamics enterprise. One of the most brilliant, Leon Festinger, completed his PhD under Lewin at the University of Iowa before the war. Festinger sought Lewin out for graduate work not because of an interest in social psychology, but because of the power of Lewinian ideas such as force fields, memory, and tension systems, and because of the excitement of tying theory closely to data. Festinger joined Lewin and Dorwin Cartwright in establishing the Research Center for Group Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) near the end of the war. Among the distinguished social psychologists working at the Center were Kurt Back, Morton Deutsch, Murray Horwitz, Harold Kelley, Albert Pepitone, Stanley Schachter, and John Thibaut (Jones, 1985). In the very early years, there was significant interchange between the MIT Center for Group Dynamics and the newly formed Department of
Social Relations at nearby Harvard University (Festinger, 1980). Thus, Gordon Allport and Jerome Bruner were involved in the dynamic intellectual ferment of the immediate postwar period. In just a few years, due to MIT's waning interest in supporting an endeavor somewhat peripheral to its main concerns, the Center began a move to the University of Michigan. In the midst of this transition, Kurt Lewin suddenly died, and his successors took the leadership role. Major works from the MIT years included Festinger et al.'s (1950) work on affiliation in housing complexes in postwar Cambridge, Massachusetts. Once again, the influence of Lewin in doing practical research was evident. A housing shortage needed attention. In addition to the research centers at Yale and Michigan, exploring attitudes and group dynamics, respectively, another significant postwar development was taking place in response to the creative work of Fritz Heider. Heider came to the USA from Hamburg, Germany, in 1930, teaching for a time at Smith College and then moving to the University of Kansas in 1947. Heider was a major figure in the tradition of Gestalt psychology, a perspective that emphasized cognitive and perceptual organization. The term Gestalt comes from the German and means shape or form. Gestalt psychologists, such as Koffka, Kohler, and Wertheimer, emphasized the very active way people process information and organize perceptual elements into coherent wholes, particularly wholes that have good fit and are pleasing (Koffka, 1935). One of its key principles is that the whole is different from the sum of its parts. The parts are integrated into a meaningful and satisfying form. For example, the individual notes in a musical chord combine to make an integrated sound that has its own integrity (Wheeler, 1970). In the 1940s, Heider wrote two extremely influential papers that extended Gestalt principles into the realms of person perception, attitude organization, and interpersonal relations. In 1944, Heider published the paper social Perception and Phenomenal Causality, the first systematic treatment of attribution processes. Heider argued that perceivers link people's actions to underlying motives or dispositions because there is a good Gestalt or perceptual fit between the way people behave and the nature of their personal qualities. This basic insight into the ways people make causal attributions for personal behavior was more fully developed later in Heider's classic book The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations ( 1958). Heider's other paper from the 1940s had even more immediate impact (Jones, 1985). In Attitudes and Cognitive Organization, Heider developed balance theory. Again the emphasis, with some mathematical adornment, was on principles of good perceptual fit. People had both attitudes toward (sentiment relations) and connections to (unit relations) other people, objects, ideas, or events. The organization of these units could be in balance or out of balance. Balance prevails, for example, when person P is linked to an action and likes another person, O, who approves of that action. Imbalance exists when two people like each other but are linked in opposite ways to objects, actions, or ideas, or dislike each other but are similarly linked. Balance theory gave rise somewhat later to a strong focus on cognitive consistency. Another enduring line of research in social psychology also developed in the immediate postwar years. Solomon Asch conducted several extremely important studies of person perception within the Gestalt tradition. Asch, like Heider, had been born in Europe, but moved to New York City when he was thirteen. Like Muzafer Sherif and Theodore Newcomb, he studied at Columbia with Gardner Murphy. Asch's paper Forming Impressions of Personality (1946) highlighted two findings. The first was that perceivers given information about another individual's personal qualities organized that information into a coherent whole such that one critical piece of information could color the entire impression. People told to form an impression of a person who was intelligent, skillful, industrious, warm, determined, practical, and cautious perceived that individual very differently from one described as intelligent, skillful, industrious, cold, determined, practical, and cautious. The only difference, of course, is the substitution of the word cold for the word warm. But these two traits serve to organize the overall impression such that terms like determined and industrious have a somewhat different meaning. Again, the whole perception is important, and the whole is different from the sum of the parts. Second, the impressions people form are strongly affected by the order in which they receive different pieces of information. People learning that a person is intelligent, industrious, impulsive, critical, stubborn, and envious form a more positive impression than those who learn about someone who is envious, stubborn, critical, impulsive, industrious, and intelligent. The initial traits form the basis for an initial impression, and later information is made to fit that first impression. Early research on impression formation and person perception explored questions such as the personal qualities of accurate judges of personality, but Asch's work and that of others (cf. Bruner and Tagiuri, 1954) stimulated a more general consideration of the processes underlying the perception of people.
The 1950s: the era of Leon Festinger
There are a number of giants in the history of social psychology: Floyd Allport, Solomon Asch, Fritz Heider, Muzafer Sherif, and, perhaps most of all, Kurt Lewin. But, arguably, the work of Leon Festinger has stimulated more theory, research, and controversy than that of anyone else. Festinger graduated from the College of the City of New York at a young age and found Kurt Lewin in Iowa. His talent and his seniority among the many students of Lewin made him, along with Dorwin Cartwright, the leader of the Center for Group Dynamics after Lewin's death. Festinger was enormously energetic and original, and he produced highly creative and influential theory and research in a number of areas. While it is possible to follow the transitions from one domain of research to another, the sheer range and variety of Festinger's work is extremely impressive. Festinger's (1950) book on housing and affiliation, with Schachter and Back, was fundamentally a study of Social pressures in informal groups. Not surprisingly, in the same year, Festinger (1950) published an important theoretical paper, Informal Social Communication. Festinger argued that the need to define social reality or to achieve group locomotion (a classic Lewinian term meaning getting something accomplished) created pressures toward uniformity of opinion within groups. These pressures would be observed in informal social communication, or talk, among group members, and would tend to produce uniformity through opinion change or the rejection of people with deviant opinions from the group. Festinger's theory produced a great deal of research that he conducted with colleagues such as Gerard, Hymovitch, Kelley, Raven, and Schachter. Perhaps the most important study in this tradition was Schachter's (1951) experiment on deviation and rejection, showing that people expressing a deviant opinion in groups were subject to an enormous amount of socialinfluence pressure, seen in increased communication, until they are rejected by the group if they refuse to conform. Rejection is seen in cessation of communication treating the deviant as a nonperson and the assignment of unpleasant tasks to the deviant. Four years later, Festinger published his highly original and highly influential paper A Theory of Social Comparison Processes. In the
Lewinian tradition, Festinger and his colleagues also published a number of empirical papers supporting the new theory, effectively commandeering an issue of Human Relations. Social-comparison theory can be viewed as an extension of the theory of informal social communication. It argues that people evaluate their abilities as well as their opinions through reference to a social reality. A key difference is that the new theory focused on the individual's need to evaluate opinions and abilities by comparison with similar others rather than the group's need to establish opinion uniformity. This change in focus is reminiscent of issues pertaining to the group mind and the existence of group phenomena independent of the individuals in the group. The shift located Festinger's concerns directly in the mind of the individual person, thereby sidestepping the old questions of the independent nature of groups. It is of interest that in considering ability as well as opinion evaluation, Festinger returned to the topic of his first publication, in 1940, on level of aspiration. While the consideration of abilities, and the emphasis on individuals, are striking differences, the similarities between the theory of informal social communication and the theory of social-comparison processes are even more impressive. Both theories highlight the importance of similarities among groups of individuals, and the tendency to reject, or cease comparing with, others who cannot be made similar. Social-comparison theory essentially got lost for some time after its appearance, though it re-emerged sporadically during the 1960s and 1970s (Latane, 1966; Suls and Miller, 1977). Now that it is firmly re-established, there is today a varied and vigorous tradition of social comparison research, a tradition linking social-comparison processes to issues of self and social identity (Suls and Wheeler, 2000). Despite the enduring importance of social comparison theory, and the vitality of research on comparison processes today, Festinger is best known for another contribution. Moving quickly and creatively after the publication of social comparison research, Festinger began studying rumor transmission. This seemed like a natural extension of his interest in communication. In studying rumors about natural disasters, such as earthquakes and floods, Festinger was struck by studies showing that people in areas outside sites of immediate destruction spread rumors about even worse calamities about to come (Festinger, 1975). Why would people be creating and spreading fear-arousing rumors? Why would they make themselves scared? Festinger had a transforming insight. The people were not making themselves scared. They were already scared, but had no clear justification for their anxious feelings. They had to make up a cognition that fit and justified their emotion. The thought that they were scared did not fit the thought that there was nothing to fear. When cognitions do not fit, there is pressure, Festinger reasoned, to make them fit. Thus was born the idea of cognitive dissonance. Early research by Brehm (1956) on decision making, research by Festinger et al. (1956) on proselytizing after failed prophecies, and Festinger's (1957) book A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance began an extremely vigorous research tradition which is still active today. As for Festinger himself, after responding to a number of criticisms of dissonance theory, he once again moved on, physically and intellectually and, in 1964, began studying color vision at the New School for Social Research. The most enduring line of research coming out of dissonance has examined the consequences of behaving inconsistently with attitudes. The classic experiment by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) showed that when participants lied by telling a confederate that an extremely boring task was actually a lot of fun, they subsequently came to believe that the task really was fun to a greater degree if they were paid a smaller ($1) rather than larger ($20) amount of money for saying so. A small incentive provides insufficient justification for the counterattitudinal behavior. Attitude change is necessary to justify the behavior and reduce dissonance. This and other research provided strong evidence for dissonance theory, even though critics dubbed the original experiment the 20 dollar misunderstanding. One reason that this line of research was important and controversial was that it cut against the behaviorist tradition which suggested that people should believe what they say the more they are paid (reinforced) for saying it. Those in the behaviorist tradition (Rosenberg, 1965) attacked the empirical base of the dissonance claims, but eventually most social psychologists came to accept the basic finding: there is an inverse relationship between reward for counter attitudinal behavior and subsequent self-justificatory attitude change. Later critics accepted the data but offered challenging alternative explanations. A self-perception account (Bem, 1972) held that no dissonance motivation was needed to account for the findings people were merely inferring their attitude after considering their behavior and the situation in which they performed it. A self-presentation account (Tedeschi et al., 1971) argued that people need only to appear consistent, not feel consistent. And a more recent self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) holds that people simply need to affirm that they are good rather than feel consistent. In contrast to these challenges, a provocative paper by Cooper and Fazio (1984) has strengthened the basic arguments of dissonance theory, pointing to the role of physiological arousal stemming from aversive consequences. A great deal of research on when and why self-justificatory attitude change takes place has kept the cognitive dissonance tradition alive and well.
The 1960s: the return of social influence
Thanks in part to the impact of Leon Festinger's own changes in direction, social-influence and group-dynamics research receded in prominence immediately after World War II. One extremely important exception was the work of Solomon Asch on prestige influence and conformity. As noted above, Asch was influenced by Gestalt principles and, in 1948, he took on the studies by Moore and Lorge from the 1920s and 1930s, arguing that people were not thoughtlessly influenced by majority or expert opinion. In the late 1940s Asch also began his extremely important and influential studies of conformity. Asch (1951) asked naive research participants to make judgments about the length of lines when a unanimous majority of their peers made obviously erroneous judgments about the lines in a face-to-face situation. The question was whether people would simply conform to others' judgments when it was entirely clear that their judgments were wrong. Asch was surprised by the extent to which people did indeed conform. They were much more influenced by majority opinion, even when it was obviously in error, than he thought they would be. Asch distinguished three processes that might have produced the conformity he observed. First, there might simply be distortion of action. People knew that the majority was wrong but simply went along with it anyway. Second, there might be distortion of judgment whereby people knew that they did not see the lines as the majority did, but figured that the majority must be correct. Finally, in a few cases, there was distortion of perception whereby participants craned their necks and squinted until they actually saw the wrong line as the right one. Huge quantities of research have been done to explore the details of Asch-like conformity. One of the most important distinctions in this literature is the one between compliance and internalization, that is, simply going along with social pressure without believing what one is saying as opposed to actually coming to believe that others are correct. Herbert Kelman (1961) importantly added to the conceptual
overview by suggesting that identification should be set alongside compliance and internalization as a process of opinion change. Sometimes people come to believe something because they identify with an attractive source. They do not fully internalize the opinion into their belief and value system but hold it so long as they are trying to be like the attractive communicator. Reintroducing identification brings back one of the original explanations in Le Bon's (1895) and Freud's (1921) account of leadership and group behavior. Issues of conformity and blind social influence were put into sharp relief in the early 1960s by Stanley Milgram's (1963, 1965) well-known studies of obedience to authority. Adult, rather than student, research participants were drawn from the New Haven, Connecticut, area. Through strikingly clever experimental theatrics, including highly convincing experimenters and confederates, participants were urged by an experimenter to give what they believed were extremely painful and dangerous electric shocks to a learner in the context of a study on punishment. Would subjects obey the experimenter ordering these shocks, or refuse to continue? Like Asch, Milgram found much more social influence than he, or almost anyone else, thought possible. Exactly why so many people were fully obedient to the experimenter, even though they believed that they might be very seriously harming another person, is still not entirely clear. Probably critical was the experiment's insisting that he was responsible for the outcome of the experiment. Milgram proposed an essentially Lewinian explanation. A series of studies suggested that subjects were caught in a conflicting force field, and that they responded to whichever source the experimenter or the learner was closer. The closer the learner was to the participant, the more the participant could see or hear him, the less they obeyed directives to shock him. Moreover, when the experimenter was more distant, sometimes even phoning in his directives, obedience dropped. The face-to-face (some might say in your face) nature of the situation seems extremely important, although it is not really clear what elements of the situation create such power. It may be that the participant's inability to articulate reasons for disobeying are an important element in producing obedience. The Milgram research had a profound impact on social psychology for reasons quite beyond its empirical or theoretical implications. Observers of, as well as some participants in, the social psychological scene were disquieted by the wide use of deception in many of the experiments. But Milgram's research set off a firestorm (Baumrind, 1964). Was it ethical to deceive research participants? Was it moral to put them in situations that they had not consented to be in, and to stress, coerce, or embarrass them? These controversies (Kelman, 1968) led to the formulation of strict review procedures endorsed by the APA and administered by the federal government. These review procedures are designed to protect human participants in psychological research. Yet some psychologists feel that they may have had a chilling impact on the whole research enterprise (Festinger, 1980). One of the arguments psychologists have made in requesting latitude in the procedures they use to conduct research is that they must create situations of high impact in order to study important phenomena. A compelling example of the study of behavior in high-impact situations is the research on bystander intervention in emergencies, or helping behavior, initiated by John Darley and Bibb Latane in the 1960s (Darley and Latane, 1968; Latane and Darley, 1970). Darley and Latane were spurred by the famous case in 1964 of Kitty Genovese in New York City, where thirty-eight bystanders watched while Genovese was stabbed repeatedly and eventually killed in an incident that unfolded over a half-hour. Not one of the observers even called the police, although that would have been very simple. Why didn't people help? Darley and Latane explored these questions in a series of experiments that generated a large and lively research tradition on helping and altruism. They suggested a five-step model whereby intervening was dependent on noticing the emergency, interpreting it as a situation where help was needed, accepting responsibility for intervening oneself, knowing the appropriate form of assistance, and, finally, taking action. Studies suggested that misinterpretation and diffusion of responsibility were important variables in affecting people's behavior in such situations. Importantly, the presence of more than one observer dramatically increased the chances of both those variables depressing the rate of helping. Research by Jane and Irving Piliavin (Piliavin et al., 1969; Piliavin and Piliavin, 1972) approached helping behavior in terms of rewards and costs, once again bringing a reinforcement perspective to social psychology. Originally focusing on both the rewards and costs of both helping and not helping in various situations, the model evolved toward putting more emphasis on the costs of each course of action, especially helping. The latter variable seems to have most impact. Research on bystander intervention and helping raised basic questions about human values and human morality once again, questions that have been around since the ancient Greeks. Do people care for their fellow human beings? Can they cooperate, or are they doomed to compete? What mix of altruism and hedonism, or cooperation and competition, can we expect in social interaction? Questions of altruism are alive and well right now (Batson, 1998; Cialdini et al., 1987; Krebs and Miller, 1985). Similarly, questions of cooperation and competition, and, more generally, social justice are alive and well at present, largely due to influential work in the 1960s by Deutsch and Krauss (1960) on threat and cooperation and Lerner on people's belief in a just world (Lerner and Simmons, 1966). Morton Deutsch was heavily influenced by his mentor Kurt Lewin and productively explored conflict, cooperation, and competition for much of his career. Melvin Lerner's work on justice helped nurture and develop a tradition of concern with relative deprivation and social justice that had begun with the pioneering work in the 1940s and 1950s of Herbert Hyman (1942) on status and reference groups, Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues on the experiences of the American soldier (Stouffer et al., 1949), and Robert Merton on reference groups and relative deprivation (Merton and Kitt, 1950; cf. Pettigrew, 1967). Another line of social-influence research beginning in the 1960s concerned the risky shift and group polarization. Le Bon long ago noted the extremes to which people in groups would go, partly as a result of anonymity and diffusion of responsibility to a prestigious leader. Festinger et al. (1952) published a paper showing the kinds of deindividuation in groups that can result from these forces (Pepitone, 1999). Then a series of studies by Wallach, Kogan, and others focused on groups' tendencies to take more risk than could be expected from the risk-taking propensities of the members of the group (cf. Brown, 1965, 1986). Wallach and Kogan (Wallach et al., 1962) initially favored a diffusion of responsibility explanation of these findings, thus highlighting the broad importance of this phenomenon, already implicated in studies of obedience to authority, and soon to be applied to understanding bystander intervention. Later work seemed to establish quite clearly that diffusion of responsibility was less important than the fact that risk is a value. As a result, people compete to be as risky as similar others, and they advance and respond to persuasive arguments toward risk-taking (Burnstein, 1982; Goethals and Zanna, 1979). This line of research was entirely reconceptualized and redirected by an important study by Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) at the end of
the decade. Moscovici and Zavalloni argued that the risky shift was simply one manifestation of the general tendency, identified by Le Bon, for groups to become extreme. They argued that whenever a cultural value is relevant to a group discussion or group decision, whether that value be risk, democracy, favoring the in-group, or evaluating national icons, the views of group members will become more extreme. The group will polarize. They showed that high-school students in France discussing the French president, Charles de Gaulle, or American tourists produced polarized evaluations, positive in the case of de Gaulle, negative in the case of American tourists. Thus, the work of the 1960s underscored the rather dramatic lengths to which people would go as a result of influence from others, or as a result of their own group dynamics. The group polarization literature is especially interesting in raising once again decades-old and even century-old questions as to whether people are primarily governed by more rational or less rational, versus more emotional and motivational, processes.
The emergence of European social psychology
It is noteworthy that the Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) study cited above was conducted in Paris and inaugurated a series of studies by Moscovici and others that became one of the central, distinctly European contributions to social psychology (Moscovici, 1985). These studies emphasized novel forms of social influence overlooked in the North American tradition, particularly minority influence and innovation in groups. In his chapter on the recent history of social psychology in the 1985 Handbook of Social Psychology (Lindsey and Aronson, 1985), Edward E. Jones characterized modern social psychology as largely a North American enterprise. However, starting in the 1960s, with the work of Moscovici, Michael Argyle, Henri Tajfel, and others, a distinctly European social psychology took shape. The year 1969 marked the publication of Argyle's social psychology textbook, Social Interaction, and Tajfel's (1969) chapter, social and Cultural Factors in Perception, in the 1969 Handbook of Social Psychology. Argyle focused principally on interpersonal and small-group interaction, especially nonverbal communication (cf. Argyle and Dean, 1965), while Tajfel was beginning to develop the research that led to the creation of social identity theory (see below). Interestingly, American social psychologists played a significant role in the development of European social psychology, just as Europeans such as Heider, Lewin, and Asch had played a critical role in developing social psychology in North America, starting in the 1930s. John Thibaut, Harold Kelley, and others maintained close contact with European social psychologists and encouraged them to develop relationships among themselves. Thibaut involved European social psychologists in the founding of the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology in 1965 and facilitated the founding of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology (EAESP) in 1966, the year after the Society for Experimental Social Psychology was founded in the USA. In 1971, EAESP sponsored the establishment of the European Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. From then on, European social psychology became a force, doing leading research on intergroup relations, value orientations, and bargaining.
The 1970s: the rise of attribution theories
Research and theory on attribution processes that had been germinating since Fritz Heider's (1944) important paper, social Perception and Phenomenal Causality, took hold strongly in the late 1960s and dominated much of the 1970s. Heider's book (1958) on interpersonal relations flushed out his ideas on attribution and inspired highly influential treatments of attribution by Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967). In 1972, a group of attribution theorists published Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior, an edited volume that outlined theoretical treatments of attribution processes that still dominate research on the perception of causality in interpersonal perception (Jones et al., 1972). Heider's (1958) treatment discussed processes entailed in perceiving the other person and then the other person as perceiver. We perceive others, and they perceive us back. We, in turn, perceive their perceiving us to varying extents. Heider's treatment of the naive analysis of action discussed the way perceivers think about other people's performances, and the ways those performances reflect internal causes, such as other people's motivations (Heider's try variable) and their abilities (his can variable), as opposed to external causes such as task difficulty or luck. This approach led to a general consideration of the processes involved in making internal as opposed to external attributions, and in inferring personal qualities from behavior. Jones and Davis's paper, From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception, developed Heider's formulations into what became known as correspondent-inference theory. Jones and Davis considered the question of when a perceiver can attribute a behavior to an internal, personal cause. Such an attribution is called a correspondent inference. It holds that a behavior corresponds to an underlying, causal, personal disposition, such as an ability, attitude, or trait, as opposed to some external locus of causality, such as social norms. For example, if a person got angry, the perceiver might make the correspondent inference that he is an angry, hostile person. However, if social norms endorse anger in this situation (perhaps the actor was swindled), it is more difficult to make a correspondent inference. Harold Kelley's (1967) covariation analysis of attribution processes extended Heider's and Jones and Davis's work to consider especially how perceivers make internal as opposed to external attributions when they have observed an actor's behavior over time. Actions are attributed to causes with which they covary. If something is present when the action is performed and absent when the action is not performed, that something and the action covary. If anger erupts whenever Hank is present but peace prevails when Hank is absent, we attribute the hostility to Hank. For example, if Hank gets mad at everyone and everything, no matter what the circumstances are in which he encounters them, and no one else gets mad in any of those circumstances, the anger is attributed to Hank. However, if Hank got mad in response to only one provocation, and he gets consistently mad when similarly provoked, and other people get mad in that instance too, then Hank's anger is attributed to the provocation. Research by Leslie Zebrowitz (McArthur, 1972) supported Kelley's model. In a later paper, Kelley articulated the highly influential discounting and augmentation principles. Possible causes for an action are discounted if there are other plausible explanations for the action. Similar to the Jones and Davis analysis of correspondent inferences, causality is ambiguous when several possible explanations seem plausible. A student's indifference to a college course could not confidently be attributed to low motivation if the teacher is boring. In general, whenever there is some plausible external cause for a
behavior, the role of internal personal causes should be discounted. The augmentation principle works in the opposite way. When external factors make a response less likely, personal factors are given more attributional weight. Decades of research have shown that both discounting and augmentation do exist, as Kelley suggested, but even more impressive and intriguing are the scores, perhaps by now hundreds, of studies showing that people often fail to discount. The original study demonstrating the failure to discount was an attribution of attitudes study by Jones and Harris (1967), which showed that participants attributed proCastro attitudes to actors who were required to write pro-Castro essays, even though it was clear that the actors had no choice about the essay which they were to write. Jones and Harris explained this finding in terms of Heider's statement that behavior in particular has such salient properties it tends to engulf the total field (Heider, 1958: 54). That is, we simply do not notice or weigh sufficiently situational forces when the behavior itself captures so much attention. A range of other explanations have been offered for the basic findings. The idea that we make attributions to salient plausible causes (Taylor and Fiske, 1975) and the idea that discounting happens more often when people are cognitively busy (Gilbert et al., 1988) have both gained considerable support. The research demonstrating failure to discount was called the fundamental attribution error by Ross (1977). It is also widely known as the correspondence bias (Gilbert and Jones, 1986; Gilbert and Malone, 1995), reflecting the correspondent inference theory formulation that people are biased toward attributing behaviors to corresponding personal dispositions. These attributions give people a sense that they can predict and control other people. Gilbert (1998) has written masterfully about the varied and complex sources of error that give rise to this bias. Closely linked to the correspondence bias is another bias identified by Jones and Nisbett (1972), the actor-observer bias. While observers are prone toward making correspondent inferences, actors do not show a similar bias in interpreting their own behavior. Instead, actors are more apt to attribute their behavior to the external constraints inducing them to perform a particular behavior. Salience again seems to be an important part of the explanation. For observers, actors are salient, and they attribute behavior to dispositions of the actors. For actors, aspects of the environment or situation are salient, and they attribute their own actions to those attributes. Another vigorous line of attribution research explored how people perceive the causes of success and failure (Weiner et al., 1972). Very much influenced by Heider, this line of research explored how people attribute performances to internal versus external, stable versus unstable, controllable versus uncontrollable, and specific versus global loci of causality. Overall, attribution theories have generated a tremendous amount of research, and attribution studies are plentiful at this writing. In general, the work has outlined broad principles that people do or, in some cases, should follow in understanding causality, as well as the biases and errors that govern attribution processes. In addition to helping us understand social thinking, attribution work has also helped psychologists understand and, to some extent, treat psychological problems, such as depression (Abramson et al., 1986) and marital discord (Fincham, 1985).
The 1980s: social cognition, social identity, and the elaboration-likelihood model
The study of attribution in the late 1960s and 1970s can be seen as one part of a larger concern developing during the same time for returning to a detailed exploration of the role of cognitive processes in understanding attitudes, attributions, and intergroup processes. As noted above, questions concerning the human capacity to reason effectively and govern behavior rationally go back to ancient Greek times. They have dominated much of philosophical discourse since the Enlightenment. The two works we mark as the beginning of social psychology, Triplett's work on social facilitation and Le Bon's book on the crowd, paid little heed to the cognitive or rational side of human behavior. Instead they emphasized drives and unmediated stimulus-response contingencies. The same is true of the textbooks of 1908 by Ross and McDougall. The emphasis on stimulus-response contingencies gained more ground with Floyd Allport's Social Psychology textbook (1924). But during this time, the more cognitively oriented approach to social psychology was also alive and well, if pushed out of the spotlight. A major work appeared in 1932, Frederick Bartlett's Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology. His book is perhaps best remembered for the studies of the ghost story in which subjects read a somewhat obscure folk tale and reported to others what they read. Their accounts revealed active efforts to integrate the material into familiar ways of understanding the world that Bartlett called Schemas. Bartlett's work was important as an early example of experimental social psychology and as one which looked directly at cognitive processes in social communication and memory. It helped frame Allport and Postman's (1947) discussion of motivation and expectancy in perception, and students of Bartlett conducted studies of rumor transmission that were critical in the germination of cognitive-dissonance theory (Jones, 1985). The cognitive perspective received a substantial boost from the work of Gestalt psychologists that strongly influenced Asch, Heider, Lewin, and Sherif. As noted earlier, the active organizing of perceptions into good fits informed the way Asch understood conformity and Heider understood phenomenal causality. Lewin combined Gestalt principles with ideas from physics in developing field theory. At least some of the Yale-school attitude researchers emphasized the cognitive aspects of persuasion, often in combination with Hullian perspectives. A highly influential paper by Miller and Ross reintroduced the cognitive perspective with great force in 1975. Miller and Ross took on the conventional wisdom that apparently self-serving biases in attributions about the self reflected motivational forces, such as the desire to see oneself in a positive light. Their review of the literature helped define opposing sides in a motivation versus cognition debate about understanding a range of social phenomena for example, the question of whether dissonance findings should be understood in terms of drive or self-attribution (cf. Bem, 1972). As research in social cognition took hold, a wide range of issues was explored, including person memory, schema development, the role of cognition in persuasion, and social inference. There was an overall focus on the active, but not always accurate, cognitive construction of the social world. The social-cognition perspective reached full flower in 1984 with the publication of Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor's Social Cognition. Defining social cognition as the study of how people make sense of other people and themselves (Fiske and Taylor, 1991: 1), this book and its second edition of 1991 are truly impressive accounts of the entire domain of research in social cognition. The second edition has nearly 150 pages of references. The first edition contrasted the naive scientist with the cognitive miser models of social cognition, the latter emphasizing people's frequent reluctance to employ fully their abilities to perceive others accurately. The second
edition suggested a third model, the motivated tactician, a person who, when motivated, would be more energetic and effective in using his or her cognitive abilities. Fiske and Taylor argued that although people can seem lazy and gullible, when they have reason, they can be effective social thinkers: In short, people are no fools (Fiske and Taylor, 1991: 136). In addition to work on attribution, social-cognition researchers have studied social inference, schemas, person memory, and attention and consciousness. The overall importance of social cognition as a defining area of social psychology is signaled in the name of one of the two main social psychology sections of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Attitudes and Social Cognition.
Social-identity theory
Another significant influence in the 1980s was the full flowering of social-identity theory, and its development into self-categorization theory (Hogg, 2001). Social-identity theory was rooted in a series of studies on social categorization, ethnocentrism, and intergroup relations by Henri Tajfel, conducted during the 1960s and 1970s (Hogg, 2000). Many of these studies explored behavior in the minimal social situation in which groups of participants were arbitrarily divided into two groups and subsequently asked to allocate rewards to members of their own group and members of the other group, referred to as the in-group and the out-group. The basic finding was one of strong in-group favoritism. People allocated rewards in such a way that the difference between the outcomes for the in-group and outcomes for the out-group was maximized, in favor of the in-group. This occurred even if participants had to give lower absolute rewards to in-group members. For example, typically they would rather allocate 7 points to an in-group member and 1 point to an out-group member rather than 19 points to an in-group member and 25 to an out-group member (Tajfel et al., 1971). Grounded in these findings and other studies of in-group favoritism, Tajfel and his former student John Turner published two important papers which stated the basic tenets of social-identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986). Social-identity theory holds that self-esteem reflects both personal identity and social identity. The former is based on one's personal accomplishments while the latter is based on the groups to which one belongs and the value one attaches to those groups. People are motivated to maintain a positive self-evaluation and want to view their individual achievements and personal qualities as favorably as they can, and they similarly want to see the groups that they belong to in the most positive possible light. In addition, social-identity theory holds that people automatically categorize others into groups, and that on the basis of categorization the social world is divided into ingroups and out-groups. Furthermore, people tend to minimize the differences between people within groups, both in-group and outgroups, and accentuate or maximize the differences between individuals in different groups. Finally, people tend to maximize their social identity by doing all that they can, not only to view their own group positively, but also to view members of other groups relatively negatively. These tendencies produce in-group favoritism, as described above, behaviors designed to benefit the in-group and/or harm the out-group. Later theorizing by Turner (1985) develops the closely related self-categorization theory, which emphasizes depersonalization, or the tendency to see people in groups in relation to a prototype, a fuzzy set of attributes that define the ideal thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of members of those groups. Individuals are not perceived for their unique qualities. Rather, they are assimilated to the prototype of the group to which they belong, and differences between prototypical members of different groups are accentuated, forming the basis for stereotypes (cf. Hogg, 2001). Social-identity theory holds much in common with social-comparison theory. Social-identity theory focuses on how we evaluate the groups to which we belong. Social comparison focuses on how we evaluate ourselves as individuals within certain groups. Social-identity theory has a distinctly European flavor. Most modern social psychology is American, but the contributions of European, and then Australian, social psychologists, beginning with the work of Argyle, Moscovici, and Tajfel, has had an enormous impact on social psychology in recent years. At the turn of the century, the field of social psychology was becoming much more international.
The elaboration-likelihood model of persuasion
After an enormously creative burst of research on communication and persuasion generated by the Yale school in the decade or so following World War II, attitude research became somewhat less prominent in the 1960s and 1970s. Still, important work was being done on resistance to influence, the role of cognitive consistency in attitudes and attitude change, and the role of situational factors in influencing how people processed or yielded to persuasive attempts. A powerful and highly influential theoretical framing of the persuasion process and persuasion research was developed in the 1980s by Richard Petty and John Cacioppo. Their elaboration-likelihood model (ELM) distinguishes two routes to persuasion. One is a central route whereby persuasion is effected by thoughtful processing, or elaboration, of the content of a persuasive message. The other is a peripheral route whereby persuasion is effected not by the content of arguments themselves but by other peripheral cues that signal to an audience that a message should be yielded to. Similar to the ELM approach to persuasion is Chaiken's heuristic-processing model, which distinguishes systematic from heuristic processing, the latter marked by shortcuts and rules of thumb that guide a person toward judging the believability of a message. For example, in the ELM, the expertise or trustworthiness of a communicator is a peripheral cue that the message should be accepted. Similarly, a high number of arguments in a message is a cue that there is lots of ammunition supporting the message and that it should be believed. Sometimes peripheral cues act independently to affect persuasion. Sometimes they affect how carefully an audience elaborates or processes the actual arguments contained in the message. Cacioppo and Petty (1982) introduced an influential individual difference need for cognition measure to explore personal variations in how much people are motivated to think carefully about the arguments in a persuasive communication. These models of attitude change wrestle with the questions of rationality as opposed to irrationality that have been around for centuries. Obviously, people are both rational and irrational, depending on a host of personal and situational variables. The ELM and the heuristicprocessing model attempt to explore the way these diverse facets of the human condition combine to influence our responses to persuasive communications.
Recent developments in social psychology, and the future
It is difficult to anticipate what is of lasting importance from the social psychology of the last decade of the second millennium, and what trends will remain most vigorous in the new century. A number of lines of work seem particularly energetic and creative. First, there has been an explosion of interesting work on the self, beginning perhaps with questions of self-attribution, and the return to the exploration of social-comparison processes. Second, research and theory on prejudice and stereotypes seems particularly vigorous at this writing. Supported by advances in social cognition and by a greater understanding of cognitive and motivational elements of intergroup conflict and ethnic hostility (cf. Brown, 1986: part VI), research on stereotypes and prejudice has mushroomed. The work on stereotypes has been greatly influenced by a third development, namely, methodological and conceptual advances in the study of automatic information processing and responding. Fourth, there has been a recent and somewhat controversial body of work on evolutionary influences on social behavior. Fifth, there has also been a good deal of recent work on cultural differences in fundamental social psychological processes, with particular emphasis on differences between Western and Eastern societies. Finally, there continues to be great interest in questions of gender similarities and differences. These appear to be the major foci of social psychology in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
The self is one of the oldest topics in social psychology. William James's classic (1890) chapter on Conscious ness of Self introduced several of the major issues in the study of the self, and his views remain vibrant and influential today. James dealt with issues of selfpresentation, the unity as opposed to multiplicity of the self, self-esteem, and self-awareness. After World War II, important work on selfpresentation appeared, notably the paper On Face Work and the book The Presentation of Self 'by Erving Goffman (1955, 1959), and the book Ingratiation by Edward E. Jones (1964). Then the focus on self-attribution led to a resurgence of interest in the self. Important contributions included Wicklund's (1975) theory of objective self-awareness, the closely related work by Carver and Scheier (1981) on selfattention and self-regulation, and Higgins's (1987) work on self-discrepancy. All of these contributions focus on how people react to noting ways that they fall short of meeting ideal standards. Other important contributions include Tesser's (1988) self-evaluation maintenance model, exploring the divergent reactions of feeling threatened by or basking in the reflected glory of the achievements of those to whom we are close; Steele's (1988) self-affirmation theory, noted above, which offers a reinterpretation of cognitive-dissonance theory findings; and Linville's (1987) theory of the beneficial effects of self-complexity. Recent work on self-esteem and self-enhancement is particularly influential at this writing (Kernis and Waschull, 1995; Leary and Baumeister, 2000; Sedikides and Strube, 1997).
Prejudice and stereotypes
Recently, social identity and self-categorization theories have contributed a great deal to understanding the dynamics of both intergroup perception and intergroup interaction. The concepts of categorization, assimilation of perceptions of individuals within groups to prototypes, and accentuation of intergroup differences (Turner, 1999) are powerful explanatory concepts. An important study by Devine (1989) focused attention on the extent to which people automatically and unconsciously categorize people and apply stereotypical thinking to them. She showed that even if people do not believe stereotypes, they affect their perceptions. Devine's work dovetails with other work examining the automatic processing of information. For example, Uleman et al.'s (1996) work on spontaneous trait inferences shows that people make dispositional judgments about others immediately on observing their behavior, without a conscious and complex causal analysis. Their work connects once again with questions of rationality. In that vein, Fiske and Neuberg (1990) argue that sometimes people use handy cognitive shortcuts, specifically schemas, in judging others, but at times they pay close attention to the data, and process them carefully. In short, work on intergroup and also interpersonal perception is extremely vital, and it is examining more carefully than ever the relatively thoughtful as opposed to relatively effortless and unconscious contributions. Recent work has considered the role of language in prejudice and stereotypes (Maass, 1999; Ruscher, 1998), individual differences in prejudice (Duckitt, 2001), and the responses of targets of stereotypes (Steele et al., 2002).
Evolutionary approaches
In The Crowd, Gustave Le Bon put forth the view that even though humans had evolved into a superior species they were still capable of revealing their less noble animal ancestry. However, until recently, comparatively little work in social psychology considered the impact of evolution on human social behavior in everyday life. Starting with the publication of E.O. Wilson's Sociobiology in 1975, social psychologists began considering evolutionary perspectives with great energy (cf. Buss and Kenrick, 1998; Kenrick, 1994). One prominent example is the work that David Buss and his colleagues have done on human mating strategies, summarized in Buss's The Evolution of Desire (1994). Buss has tested a range of theoretical derivations from evolutionary principles, including the ideas that men attach high importance to women's physical attractiveness, since that can be taken as a clue to her fertility, while women attach more importance to men's economic capacity, status, dependability, and commitment, as these are signs that they have the motive and capacity to invest in the women's children (see also Berry, 2000). Other hypotheses have been derived concerning jealousy, casual sex, and points of harmony and conflict between the sexes. Critics of evolutionary social psychology abound. A basic criticism is that the approach is too deterministic and offers explanations that cannot be convincingly tested, or are better explained in terms of social forces, or both. Perhaps, for example, men attach high importance to physical attractiveness because they have power in nearly every society and do not need to be as pragmatic as women in their choice of mates. Evolutionary theorists argue that there is really no incompatibility between evolutionary and cultural approaches, but the critics disagree. Time will tell what kind of force this perspective remains or becomes in social psychology. At the moment, it appears to be thriving.
The role of culture
The theme of cultural differences has been significant in social psychology at least since the work of Muzafer Sherif in the 1930s. As an
immigrant from Turkey who had studied sociology and anthropology, Sherif was highly sensitive to the power of culture. This sensitivity informed his studies of group norm formation. Harry Triandis (1972) kept the concern with culture alive during much of the second half of the twentieth century. In recent years, a large number of social psychologists have studied cultural differences in basic social psychological processes, such as self-conception, emotion, and attribution, with particular emphasis on the differences between the individualistic, independent societies of North America and Europe and the interdependent societies of East Asia (Fiske et al., 1998; Kitayama and Markus, 2000). Intriguing findings include differences in the experience of emotions, with American participants experiencing emotions for a longer time and more intensely than their Japanese counterparts (Matsumoto et al., 1988), presumably due to American emphasis on themselves as individuals and their unique internal states. In addition, it appears that there are significant cultural differences in the correspondence bias. People in interdependent cultures are less prone to underestimate the force of situational contingencies on behavior (Fiske et al., 1998).
Questions about sex or gender differences have been explored for some time. Two early publications by Eleanor Maccoby (1966; Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974) explored the existing literature in great depth and pointed to reliable differences in aggression, and in verbal, mathematical, and spatial abilities, but precious little else. An influential book by Kay Deaux (1976), The Behavior of Women and Men, discussed a variety of differences between the social behavior of women and men for example, in attributions for success and failure (women are more apt than men to attribute their successes to nonability causal loci) but emphasized contextual influences and the potential of both sexes to behave flexibly and responsively in different situations. This perspective has been further developed by Deaux and Major (1987) and is discussed in greater depth in the more recent treatment of gender by Deaux and LaFrance (1998). Their emphasis is explicitly not on sex or gender differences but on the interaction of a range of factors in influencing both men and women. Another productive perspective on gender is the social-role theory of Alice Eagly (1987) and her colleagues. Combining this with metaanalytic techniques, they have explored questions such as gender differences in leadership effectiveness (overall, there are none) and highlighted the crucial role of gender expectations (sometimes called gender-role or sex-role spillover) in many domains (Eagly et al., 1995). It seems certain that gender will continue to be rich a field of study in the decades ahead, especially given the concerns of evolutionary social psychology and the study of the cultural matrix of social psychology (Fiske et al., 1998).
Basic questions about social behavior go back to the ancients. Are men and women capable of governing themselves? Is their behavior governed by internal dispositions or the requirements of society and culture? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic about human potential and human performance? Are people rational or irrational? What hope is there for independent thought and action in the face of group pressures? In reviewing the development of social psychology over the past 100 years or more, we are struck with the tremendous gain in knowledge combined with the intractability of the basic questions of human nature. We have learned a great deal about how people respond to social influence, about group dynamics and intergroup relations, and about social thought. The promise of learning more of real value is great. Further nuances of social behavior will be discovered, and the power of our thinking and methodologies will continue to generate new findings and continue to fascinate. However, basic questions, such as whether we should be more impressed with the shortcomings or the capacities of human social thought, will almost certainly remain unanswered. They are probably unanswerable. But the hunt for answers itself will engage us and enlighten us, and perhaps uplift us, for, if we are lucky, another 100 years.
This chapter tells an exciting story of intellectual discovery. At the start of the twentieth century, social psychology began addressing ageold philosophical questions using scientific methods. What was the nature of human nature, and did the human condition make it possible for people to work together for good rather than for evil? Social pschology first addressed these questions by looking at the overall impact of groups on individuals and then began to explore more refined questions about social influence and social perception. How do we understand persuasion, stereotypes and prejudice, differences between men and women, and how culture affects thoughts and behavior?
This chapter shows how psychology as a whole and then social psychology as part of the whole took shape in the twentieth century as scientific disciplines addressing fundamental philosophical questions of human nature. The earliest work focused on how groups influence individual performance. Later research explored conformity the formation of norms, and whether people are active and thoughtful or merely reactive to social influence. During World War II research concentrated on urgent problems of persuasion and the ways people perceive each other. In the second half of the century research began on cognitive dissonance and self-justification as well as some of the subtleties of social influence, including how minorities influence majorities. Asch's studies of conformity to unanimous majorities and Milgram's studies of obedience to authority made clear the importance of scientific research on human potential and human frailty. Much attention was given to attribution theory and the more general problems of human social thinking. By the end of the century theory and research focused more on gender, stereotypes, culture, and the self. New perspectives, such as evolutionary psychology, competed for attention with more traditional domains of investigation such as social cognition, attitudes, and group behavior.
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Questions and Comparisons: Methods of Research in Social Psychology
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Richard Gonzalez
This chapter is based on two fundamental premises. The first premise is that the task of the researcher is to ask questions. It is said that in real estate there are three key features for success: location, location, and location. But in research the three key features are questions, questions, and questions. The researcher should constantly be asking questions. What is the phenomenon I want to capture; for example, is it marital satisfaction or marital dysfunction? What is the best way to test my idea? What is the best measure to use? How do I want to explain the findings? Does the research design provide a fair test of this explanation? What other explanations might account for the findings? How should I analyze the data? Are my analyses consistent with the design I used? Does my written description adequately explain the model, the design and procedure, the analysis? Curiosity, excitement, and passion should drive the consideration of such questions. Simply consulting a checklist of standard questions for each new research project will not do. The researcher should play the role of the child at the Seder who asks the Four Questions (for example, On all other nights we eat herbs of every kind; on this night, why do we eat only bitter herbs?). If the phenomenon really captures the researcher's interest, inquisitiveness comes naturally. Answers to questions lead to new questions, and one of the intellectual attractions of research is that often one cannot predict the next two or three questions down the line. The feeling that one does not know the answer to a research question (but knows how to design a study to find an answer) is exactly what makes empirical research interesting and stimulating. That feeling of uncertainty is sometimes an obstacle for new researchers, who must learn to channel their sense of confusion and vagueness into a workable plan. Indeed, the elimination of confusion is a key motivator for many successful researchers. Of all the questions a researcher could ask, perhaps the most fundamental one is, What is the phenomenon I want to study? Am I interested in willing compliance or in the failure to resist pressure to conform? Do I think that attitudes can fundamentally change after a persuasive message, or do I think that attitudes remain stable and only the overt response changes? Before the researcher can begin to think clearly about which measures to use, which control variables to include, what the design should look like, how many subjects should be included, what should be counterbalanced, and so on, it is necessary to be clear about what the research phenomenon is. For any new research project, the best way to define the phenomenon under investigation or to frame questions about it may not be obvious, so it is useful to revisit the fundamental research question frequently. The basic message here is know thy research question. There is a legend among cognitive psychologists that Endel Tulving stumped first-year graduate students by asking them the question, How do you measure a potato? Thinking this question was an opportunity to demonstrate their creativity, the students generated multiple answers: you can weigh the potato, you can compute the potato's volume, you can measure its luminosity, its water content, its chemical composition, and so on. The list would grow quite long, until someone finally realized the point of the exercise. How can you measure something without knowing what interests you about it? What is it that you want to know about the potato? Once you know what it is you want to know about a potato, you can figure out the best way to measure it. This charming story makes a deep point. Students often ask us, What statistics should I use on my data?, What method should I use in my dissertation?, Which measure should I use in my next study? These questions are difficult to answer without knowing the answer to the fundamental question: What is the research question you want to answer? The second premise of this chapter is that comparison is essential in research and should be omnipresent. Our view of comparison is not limited to experimental designs, where, typically, one compares cell means to other cell means; the concept, as we use it, is more general. Predictions can be compared against a known or expected standard (such as Milgram's [1974] use of prediction by experts as a baseline comparison); hypotheses can be compared with each other (for example, Triplett's [1897] analysis of seven hypotheses that could account for social facilitation in bicycle racing); experimental conditions or interventions or subject groups can be compared; individuals can be compared across time; and measures of related/ correlated concepts can be compared to each other. A single research design need not include all types of comparison: which comparisons matter depends on the question being asked, but some form of comparison should be present in every research project. From the second premise (comparison is essential) follow two corollaries: (1) research should attempt to reduce the number of alternative explanations; (2) research programs should be based on multiple methods. We should compare possible explanations of research findings to see whether any of them can be ruled out. We should compare research methods to see whether analogous empirical findings emerge across different paradigms. One goal of social psychological research is to offer explanations for phenomena under investigation; these explanations sometimes take the form of process models (for example, stimulus Striggers psychological process P, which elicits behavioral response B). A social psychological finding typically can be explained by more than one process. A dissonance finding can be interpreted with a motivational explanation (Festinger, 1957), a behavioral explanation (Bem, 1967), or a self-threat explanation (Aronson, 1969; Steele and Lin, 1983). The emotional reaction to a sad event can be interpreted in terms of primacy of emotion or primacy of cognition (Lazarus, 1982; Zajonc, 1980). Carefully designed studies allow one to compare different explanations and, with a little luck, to distinguish between them. Studies that directly compare theoretical explanations by pitting one prediction against another are important for the advancement of theory in the field (Platt, 1964). Greenwald (2004) argues that comparing theoretical explanations has not managed to resolve many
theoretical disputes, and suggests that the field should focus instead on establishing the boundary (limiting) conditions of phenomena. We agree that boundary conditions (for example, how low does a low reward have to be in a dissonance paradigm) are important to know, but we also believe that theory has a role and that empirical research in social psychology should contribute to the development of theory (Kruglanski, 2001). If we ask what value social psychological research adds to our understanding and appreciation of phenomena that artists and novelists have grappled with for centuries, perhaps the best answer is that social psychology can offer theories that work. A theory should provide insight into a phenomenon. It should organize apparently disparate research findings. It should reveal why the observed boundary conditions are the way they are. Although it is rare that one theory emerges intact as the definitive winner, that does not really matter. What matters is that the confrontation or comparison of theories refines and redefines the questions and generates fresh questions that we might otherwise have been unable to imagine. What matters is the process of creation. In addition to alternative explanations of basic psychological processes, there are alternative explanations that arise merely because of limitations in a particular research design. Perhaps the reason that participants in the high-threat condition did not perform as well on a memory task as those in the low-threat condition was not because the two groups were differentially threatened, but because participants in the low-threat condition were bored and inattentive, or the high-threat participants were distracted. These types of alternative explanations are not as interesting as those that arise from alternative theories, but they can seriously limit the knowledge that emerges from a study. It is incumbent on the researcher to design a study that reduces the number of possible alternative explanations, both theoretical and methodological. Multiple methods force a type of comparison that is often neglected in social psychological research. The researcher who uses only one method to tackle a problem introduces a confound because all conclusions are conditional on that particular research strategy. Our point is deeper than the issue of whether a finding is generalizable, or robust across research methods. Consider a physicist studying the effect of gravity on objects in free fall. The physicist chooses to study this problem in the context of a vacuum so that extraneous factors can be controlled and derives interesting mathematical relations between variables such as time and the distance traveled by the object in free fall. This strategy, however, does not allow for the discovery of the effects of friction on objects in free fall (because the study is performed in a vacuum, without friction). The point is not merely that conclusions will not generalize to settings outside the vacuum but that the understanding of the underlying physical laws that can emerge from a single research technique is limited. The physicist could not discover more general laws involving the conservation of energy. One of the basic messages of social psychology is that the situation is a powerful determinant of behavior and that its influence usually is not salient to the perceiver. Like the ordinary perceiver who commits the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977) by not giving sufficient weight to situational factors, the researcher who holds the method constant (that is, the situation) will not be in a position to give sufficient weight to method. By using multiple methods, an investigator can detect these situational factors and hopefully develop a deeper understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. Social psychologists tend to favor experiments because of their potential for high internal validity (that is, their capacity to determine cause-effect relations); however, as we argue below, internal validity is only one of many criteria that research should satisfy. Even if internal validity were the only desideratum of research, the example of the objects in free fall shows that the use of a single paradigm, no matter how clean from an experimental view, precludes complete understanding of a phenomenon. Regardless of the method chosen, there are certain issues that all researchers must deal with as they progress through the various stages of the research process from generating an idea to writing up the results. In the remainder of the chapter, we will discuss these issues, following the researcher step by step through the process, noting how the choices made at each step constrain other options and describing how the process itself may differ depending on the type of question and the basic method chosen.
The life history of a research project in social psychology
Generating questions
Courses and textbooks on methods rarely have much to say about finding good research questions, forming hypotheses, or, least of all, generating theory. William J. McGuire (1973, 1997, 1999) has been a tireless advocate of the importance of hypothesis generation and has even provided a comprehensive list of tactics designed to stimulate would-be researchers who are looking for ideas. But these exhortations have had little impact on our discussions of research methods, probably because most people do have ideas about what they want to study. Turning a general idea into a researchable question, however, is not usually a simple, straightforward task, and here also our courses and textbooks provide little guidance. Most students begin their research careers in one of two ways (1) they work on a variation of a question that their adviser is studying, or (2) they discover a flaw in some study that they have read and design research to show that the conclusions of that study were wrong. Research usually leads to further research, and over the course of graduate school most students either find a topic that they care about or choose another career. A topic is not identical to a researchable question, however. Different researchers tend to prefer topics at different levels of abstraction and to favor different approaches to formulating research questions. Some naturally think in terms of conceptual variables and abstract constructs: inconsistency creates dissonance (Festinger, 1957); comparative judgments are more rational than absolute judgments (Hsee et al., 1999). Others go around noticing behaviors that seem surprising, irrational, or simply interesting: some people use a lot of hand gestures, others do not (Krauss et al., 1996); people get more upset when they miss a plane by two minutes than when they miss it by two hours (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982); I get mad at the inattentive driver who does not move when the light changes and honk my horn, but I also get mad at the guy who honks his horn at me when I am slow off the mark at the green light (Jones and Nisbett, 1972). Still others want to understand some general domain of behavior: what are the causes of aggression? (Berkowitz, 1993); what makes people happy? (Kahneman et al., 1999); what makes a decision good? (Hammond et al., 1999). None of these approaches is the right approach; none is the wrong approach. The examples we have given should make it clear that all can advance the field. But each one
raises a somewhat different set of methodological challenges (Brinberg and McGrath, 1985). Whatever one's approach, an important first step is to find out what other people have said about the topic and whether a body of empirical research already exists. This will be relatively easy if one is interested in a topic that has already been defined by the field stereotyping, aggression, or attitude change, for example but rather more difficult if one thinks one is onto something new. Suppose a person wants to study betrayal. A Psych Info search reveals that there is next to nothing listed under that term, but it would be wrong to conclude that there is no pertinent research. It may be that the person has merely coined a new term for an old concept and is at risk of wasting a great deal of time rediscovering familiar ideas (Kruglanski, 2001; Miller and Pederson, 1999). It is important to explore related topics trust, deception, honor, defection maybe even anger or expectancy disconfirmation. Even at the literature-search stage, it is important to consider alternatives. Doing so can help to refine or redefine the concept and may often help to turn a vague idea into a set of concrete questions. If it turns out that there really has not been much psychological research on a topic, the researcher in search of a question must try other strategies broader reading (of philosophers, biologists, novelists, or news reporters, for example), observation, and thinking. Research on lay reasoning has been influenced by the work of Francis Bacon (Nisbett and Ross, 1980); research on bystander intervention, by news reports of urban apathy (Latane and Darley, 1970). Anthropologists commonly go off to the field without a clear question in mind, allowing their questions to emerge from their observations on the scene. This is a strategy that makes sense at the initial stages of research about unfamiliar people or settings, since predetermined questions might turn out to be inappropriate in the new context. Focus groups and grounded theory methods (Kreuger and Casey, 2000; Strauss and Corbin, 1998) are also strategies for deriving concepts from observation. Finally, sooner or later, most of us who are trying to come to grips with a new topic spend a lot of time in intense thinking, alone or in conversation with others, in the car, in the kitchen, in the shower. In order to get on with the business of actually designing research, however, at some point our reading, observation, and thinking must coalesce into a manageable hypothesis or question. In some disciplines, a rich description is the end product; for social psychology, it is usually not; we are looking for meanings and ideas that can be tested with other methods and in other settings. A good question should be clear and comprehensible to ourselves and others. It should be neither intractable nor too easy: an answer should be possible but not self-evident. A good question should allow for several possible answers, whose relative correctness can be evaluated (Hastie, 200l; Hilbert, 1900).
The purpose of pilot testing is to capture the phenomenon embodied in your question to measure what you intend to measure, and to find or create conditions that match your conceptual variables. The intricate business of pilot testing is not much emphasized in current discussions of research methods, which seem to devote more and more attention to the final stages of the research process measurement and data analysis and less and less to the initial planning stages, where the design and procedures are worked out (Aronson, 2002; Ellsworth and Gonzalez, 2001). This is unfortunate. If the design is missing crucial controls, if the treatments and measures do not capture the intended meaning of the conceptual variables, if the participants are bored, or confused, or suspicious, no amount of sophisticated post-hoc statistical repair work can rescue the study. In recent years we have read MA and Ph.D. theses in which the treatments failed to have the intended effect the subjects did not believe that the race-neutral intelligence test was really race neutral; people given a positive mood induction felt no better than those in the control group; the researcher's idea of a highly credible communicator did not match the ideas of the population being studied. We have seen theses where there were floor or ceiling effects on the crucial measure everyone's test performance was excellent, almost everyone in all conditions thought the defendant was guilty. With careful pilot testing, none of these problems should occur in a completed study: they should have been discovered and corrected before the study was run. Pilot testing, like all fine craftsmanship, can be frustrating and time-consuming, but surely running an entire study that gets null results because of flaws that could have been corrected is an even more frustrating waste of time. Pilot testing is not a matter of running the whole experiment through from beginning to end to see if it works. It is an opportunity to test the separate components of a study to see whether they have the intended meaning. Brown and Steele (2001) discovered that it requires a fairly elaborate presentation to get African-American students to believe that an intellectual ability test is really race neutral: simply calling it an unbiased test is not enough. A mood indution used by another researcher, studying a different question in a different context, may not work for your question and your context. A heavy-handed prime for example, showing people a series of blonde bimbos right before testing their feminist attitudes may be easy for the participants to figure out: the technique designed to prime sexist attitudes may actually prime defensive self-presentation strategies. During pilot testing, it is possible to stop the study immediately after the treatment has been administered and assess its effects: what did the person being studied think of the race-neutral test? Has her mood improved? What does he think was the point of the bimbo pictures? What stands out about the study so far? It is often impossible to get information about questions like these during the actual experiment, and the information usually comes too late to be useful. Moreover, so-called manipulation checks can sometimes cause more problems than they solve. An immediate manipulation check can interfere with the psychological processes the researcher cares about; a delayed manipulation check may be so delayed that the effects it is designed to check have changed or vanished. For example, a verbal manipulation check immediately after the treatment might draw people's attention to the treatment and alter their responses to it, so that the real independent variable is not the one intended, but a combination of the independent variable and the probe. If there are several independent variables, the participant's experience becomes cluttered with distractions. Waiting until the end of the study to check on the manipulations is also problematic: other events and measures have taken place, and people may not be able to disentangle their current feelings from their earlier responses. Likewise, it is possible to pilot test possible measures, whether the research involves an experiment, a survey, or an open-ended interview study. Pilot-testing measures can accomplish several purposes. First, it is possible to test people's psychological reactions to the measures themselves. Do they understand the questions? Do they find them offensive? What do they think you are interested in? Second, it is possible to find out about baseline levels of response are there floor or ceiling effects? Is this a measure that is likely to vary with other variables in a correlational study, or to respond to changes in the situation? You may find that a task you thought was highly demanding is in fact very easy, that the criminal case you planned to use is overwhelmingly onesided. You may find that people consider some of your
questions to be too personal, and give neutral safe answers that do not reflect their actual beliefs (Visser et al., 2000). You may find that they think the questionnaire or interview is much too long and tedious, so that their earlier answers are much more careful than their later ones. People are unlikely to give you honest evaluations of your incomprehensible, offensive, or boring questions during the actual study, but during pilot testing, if you tell them (honestly, as it happens) that you are still developing the questionnaire and that you want their help in designing a measure that will be acceptable and meaningful to people like them, they may be more forthcoming. Often, they are eager to be involved in the design of new research and to make suggestions. All empirical research, even the most qualitative, involves measures, and pilot testing is the time to develop measures that are involving, that mean what we want them to mean, and that people will answer honestly. Especially for studies with manipulated independent variables, a few run-throughs of the whole experiment from beginning to end are useful not so much to find out whether the experiment is going to work, but to find out whether we have successfully translated our conceptual question into a coherent set of procedures that makes sense to people and holds their attention, and to find out whether the separate components work together. The pictures of blonde bimbos, for example, might be a perfectly good prime for sexist sentiments in some contexts, but not when followed by a dependent measure that is obviously a test of feminist attitudes. Either a subtler treatment or a subtler measure may be necessary to keep the subject from figuring out what you are trying to test. Pretest-posttest designs can raise similar issues: asking people how they feel about affirmative action at the beginning of the hour, and then presenting them with a communication designed to change their attitudes about affirmative action may be quite different from simply presenting the communication. The pretest may sensitize the subject to the communication (Smith, 2000), making its effects stronger or weaker, but in any case different than they would have been otherwise. If a pretest is necessary, it is generally better to administer it much earlier, in a context apparently unrelated to the research. Often, it is not necessary to pretest at all, since random assignment can be used to ensure equivalence among groups (Greenwald, 1976). Pilot testing is also the best opportunity to discover whether a study accords with ethical standards for research. One can find out whether the actual experience of participating in a particular study is upsetting, painful, or humiliating in a carefully monitored context where the experimenter is prepared to stop everything and talk to the participant at the first sign of distress. If some people find some of the emotionally arousing pictures too disturbing, or the task too embarrassing, or our questions too personal, or the deception unjustifiable, we must make changes. We can look for different stimuli or measures that still get at what we are interested in but that are less upsetting. Or we may learn that we need to screen out certain people, people whose life experiences might make them especially sensitive to some aspect of the research procedure. Occasionally, we may have to try a whole different approach to studying our question. Most human-subjects review boards emphasize informed consent and debriefing as the primary ethical requirements. Important as these are, they are brackets around the person's actual experience, far less important to the participants than what actually happens to them during the study. In order to write an honest informed consent request, it is necessary to know how real people have actually reacted to the procedures that is what participants need to know in order to be accurately informed. Of course, just as people may be reluctant to admit that they did not understand the questions or thought the experiment was stupid or transparent, they may be reluctant to admit that they were upset. Again, one way to elicit honest responses is to tell them that you are still developing the experiment, and ask them whether they think other people like them might be disturbed about some aspect of the procedure.
Generating alternative hypotheses
It is important to develop multiple working hypotheses early in the research process, (Platt, 1964). Sometimes, if the topic is very new, the very first study may be designed to discover whether the phenomenon exists: whether people conform to group pressure when it contradicts the evidence of their senses, whether people from different cultures agree on the meaning of emotional facial expressions, or whether people are more concerned about losses than gains. At this stage, a simple demonstration can be an important contribution. Even if the phenomenon is brand-new, the researcher still has to consider and rule out artifactual alternatives, as we will discuss below. Moreover, it is important to think carefully about how novel one's phenomenon actually is to ask, What are the most closely related phenomena that have been studied, and how can I argue that mine is really distinct? Or, What are the most closely related treatments (or definitions of the independent variable) that have been used, and can I differentiate my conceptual variable from the ones they were designed to study? If the researcher has gone beyond the simple demonstration of a phenomenon and is interested in causes, processes, moderators, or mediators, it is important to consider other possible causes, processes, moderators, or mediators. One technique is to imagine that we have already found the results that we expected, and consider other possible interpretations. If the researcher is invested in his or her own favorite hypothesis, it is often very hard to generate plausible alternatives (e.g., Griffin and Ross, 1991; Ross et al., 1977), but it is important to make a serious effort while there is still time to modify the design or procedures. Discussing the research with other people is a good way to get beyond one's own biases; for example, if you describe your study as though it were already finished and your hypothesis was confirmed, your colleagues, anticipating the responses of your reviewers, will often suggest numerous alternative explanations. These may not, at first blush, seem at all plausible to you, but they are worth considering because they are plausible to someone. McGuire's (1997) detailed advice on how to generate initial hypotheses is at least as useful for generating alternative hypotheses. Although only you yourself, aided by colleagues with whom you share your initial ideas and an open-minded literature search, can really judge the plausibility of alternative answers to the specific question you are posing, there are some generic, formal alternatives that should be considered, regardless of your question (cf. Brewer, 2000; Ellsworth, 1977). If your hypothesis is that X causes Y, a common alternative is that Y causes X. Ordinarily, when random assignment is possible, this will not be a plausible alternative (although in other settings, without random assignment, it might). In a correlational study of chronic attributes, reverse causality can be a serious rival. Does attractiveness lead to perceptions of competence, or vice versa? Or both? It is important to find a setting in which you can be sure that one precedes the other, or where you can introduce one independently of the other.
A second common alternative is the familiar third-variable correlation: X and Y occur together because some third variable, Z, is responsible for both. If a study finds that boys who are heavily involved in sports cry less often than boys who are not, it would be wrong to conclude that sports lead to stoic behavior or to happiness; one (of many) possibilities is that parents who have strong beliefs about appropriate sex-role behavior push their sons into sports and punish crying. Again, this alternative is generally ruled out in settings where people can be randomly assigned to the X treatment, but can be a serious problem in quasi-experimental and correlational designs. A third possibility is that X alone is not enough that X interacts with some other variable Z; that is, Z moderates the effects of X. Looking people in the eye makes them like you, but only in social contexts that are already positive; otherwise, it can be threatening (Ellsworth and Carlsmith, 1968). This kind of alternative cannot be ruled out by random assignment in a laboratory experiment. Typically, many features of the situation in a laboratory experiment are held constant, meaning that any one of them could potentially interact with the intended independent variable, but the interaction would not be discovered. If the experimenter studies only positive social interactions, she will conclude that eye contact is a positive signal; if only women are studied, if the communicator is always credible, or if the experimenter is extremely attractive, results that apparently confirm the hypothesis could actually be due to a combination of these constant variables with the variable the experimenter cares about. These are the most common formal alternatives, but they are not the only ones. For a more extensive discussion, see Cook and Campbell (1979) or Ellsworth (1977). In designing a study, it is useful to consider these various alternatives, substituting one's own variables for the Xs and Ys, thinking carefully about possible Zs, and building in controls (groups, measures, or occasions) to test any that seem to be plausible rivals. For any given question, some of the suggested rivals may be completely implausible the investigator will not be able to think of any credible alternative that takes that particular form (West et al., 2000). If the hypothesis is that males are more assertive than females, the reverse-causality hypothesis that assertiveness causes gender can instantly be ruled out. Similarly, in a situation where random assignment is not possible, the addition of measurement occasions may make the alternative explanation of time implausible (for example, three observations before the naturally occurring treatment followed by three observations afterwards help rule out alternative explanations if the only change seen in the dependent variable occurred between the third and fourth observations). Adding a second condition to a before/after design in which different participants respond to the pretest and posttest measures but do not experience the intervening intervention helps rule out alternative explanations such as the possibility that the effect is due to the same participants answering the same question twice. In addition to alternative hypotheses about the relationship among variables, it is also important to consider alternative hypotheses about the definition of the variables. These are problems of confounds and construct validity. (Usually, the term confound is used for a correlated variable that is specific to the research environment and relatively trivial, while construct validity is implicated if important variables are correlated in a wide range of settings.) If males behave more assertively than females in a given setting, for example, it may be due not to their gender per se, but to their greater power. Females who have become accustomed to power may be as assertive as males. (If men were given more resources in the context of a particular experiment, this would be a confound; the more general problem of males' power in the wider society raises questions about the construct validity of the concept of gender in relation to assertiveness.) Both independent and dependent variables may be correlated with other variables besides the one we care about, and so efforts must be made to vary or measure them independently.
Dull but serious alternative explanations
Finally, there is a set of boring but fatal alternatives that are a risk of the research process itself: methodological artifacts such as demand characteristics and experimenter bias. Demand characteristics are Subtle or not-so-subtle cues in the experimental setting that influence subjects' perceptions of what is expected of them, and that might systematically influence their behavior (Aronson et al., 1990: 347). Research participants usually know that they are being observed and studied, and they try to figure out what the research is about and what is expected of them. They may not take our treatments and measures at face value, but may instead interpret them in the light of our imagined intentions, and adjust their behavior accordingly. We may tell participants that they are participating in two entirely different studies or that there are no right or wrong answers to these questions, but the fact that we have said it does not guarantee that they believe it. Research participants are interested, curious human beings. Most of them associate psychology with tests of mental health and mental abilities, and they may be apprehensive about appearing smart, or sensitive, or normal, or whatever they think we are concerned about (evaluation apprehension; Rosenberg, 1969). If we expect differences among different groups of participants (whether randomly assigned or natural groups) and the demand characteristics are different across groups, we have no way of being sure that the results were due to our conceptual variables rather than to differences in demand characteristics. Demand characteristics can be discovered and remedied during pilot testing, when we can ask people what they think the questionnaire is getting at or what the treatment means, and how they think a normal, smart, successful person would respond.
Experimenter bias occurs when an experimenter unintentionally influences the participants to behave in a way that confirms the hypothesis. Neither the experimenter nor the subject has any awareness that this has taken place. Sometimes its causes can be easily identified for example, videotapes of pilot testing showed that one of our research assistants, when presenting an array of faces for children to choose from, inadvertently (and consistently) pointed to the one we expected would be chosen. More often, such cues are subtle, and cannot be identified, even though the effects are strong (Rosenthal, 1969). Experimenter bias is a serious, pervasive alternative explanation (Rosenthal and Rubin, 1978) that can occur in any kind of research involving interaction with human beings whether the research is qualitative or quantitative; observational, survey, or experimental and has even been demonstrated in studies of rats (Rosenthal and Fode, 1963). In fact, the first famous demonstration of the phenomenon was Clever Hans, the arithmetically gifted horse who could solve numerical problems by tapping out the right answers with his hoof. It turned out that his gifts were psychological rather than mathematical he was able to notice subtle changes in his trainer's posture and expression when he reached the right answer, and stopped tapping.
Pilot testing usually cannot diagnose experimenter bias. The design of the experiment must include controls to rule out this alternative explanation. A purely automated presentation of stimuli and measures can be effective, but it sacrifices the social aspect of many social psychological questions (and in any case is not a guarantee, because differences in the printed or recorded words across conditions can
also be a source of bias (Krauss and Chin, 1998). Having experimenters or interviewers or observers who are unaware of which experimental condition the participant is in provides complete protection, although it is sometimes hard to achieve. For example, if the study concerns obvious visible characteristics such as race or gender, experimenters may communicate different expectations even if the researcher does not tell them that the study is about race. Keeping the experimenters blind to one of the variables in a study protects against bias on that variable and on interactions with that variable. Keeping the experimenters unaware of the hypothesis may seem like an effective solution, but it is not. First, since the experimenters run all of the conditions and can observe the differences among them, and know what is being measured, the hypothesis may be pretty easy to figure out; second, even if the researcher tries to keep the experimenters in the dark, they will inevitably develop their own hypotheses and communicate those to the participants. Like the people being studied, research assistants are sentient human beings who want to know what is going on. (Protection against experimenter bias, though difficult, is achievable: fuller discussion may be found in Aronson et al., 1990.)
The independent variable
The term independent variable is often used to refer to the cause in a hypothesized cause-effect relationship, but it can also refer to any variable that predicts another. One might ask, for example, whether high levels of education predict better health; whether low popularity or high popularity is correlated with being a bully; whether moral standards vary with social class. Independent variables differ on how much latitude their definitions offer. Abstract conceptual variables, such as power, mood, or group cohesive ness, can carry several concrete representations. We could give participants descriptions of high- and low-power people, or bring them into the laboratory and assign some the role of boss and the others the role of subordinate, or go to actual workplaces and interview real bosses and subordinates, or do an observational study in a classroom to see who influences whom, or simply ask people how powerful they think they are. Each of these methods will raise a different set of alternative hypotheses, which must be ruled out in the design of the study. Using more than one definition over a series of studies greatly increases the researcher's confidence that the important variable is really power, and not some correlated variable, because the correlated variables are likely to be different for different operational izations of power. This provides convergent validity for the meaning of the independent variable. Other independent variables offer less freedom in definition. A researcher interested in gender differences or other demographic variables, or interested in a particular educational method (such as small class size), legal reform (such as allowing jurors to take notes; providing legal aid), or other social policy (such as a tax cut) has far fewer choices. But these obvious independent variables do not necessarily make the researcher's task easier. True, there is no question of how to operationalize the concept of woman as opposed to man, but there is still work to be done before one can conclude that gender is really the variable that matters. If a psychologist had decided to use Harvard and Radcliffe undergraduates to study gender differences in the 1960s, aside from the obvious problem of generalizability to the population at large, there would be a serious selection problem affecting the comparability of men and women even within this elite population. Harvard was large; Radcliffe was small. Given the norms of the time and the size of the classes admitted, the Radcliffe students represented a much more highly selected group than the Harvard students. Differences that looked like gender differences could have been differences in qualifications. Whether this would be a plausible alternative, of course, depends on the hypothesis. A finding that women had superior verbal skills would be suspect; however, the women's higher qualification would not be a plausible alternative explanation for Matina Horner's (1972) finding that women demonstrated fear of success. Again, one goal in research is to reduce the number of alternative explanations that can be attributed to an independent variable. One technique to reduce the number of alternative explanations is to show convergent validity show that you get qualitatively similar results under different definitions of the independent variable. Convergent validity is merely one criterion. The discussion of additional criteria requires a classification of predictor variables into those that can be manipulated, measured, or found.
Independent variables that can be manipulated
Traditionally, social psychologists have favored the manipulated independent variable with random assignment of participants to two or more conditions, and there are good reasons for this preference, especially if the researcher has a causal hypothesis. Random assignment of participants to conditions is an enormously powerful technique because it allows the researcher to rule out whole categories of alternative explanations at once and guarantees that, on average, all of the groups are the same before the treatment is given. If the researcher finds differences between the groups, these differences can be attributed to the independent variable the experimenter cares about, and not to differences in the participants' backgrounds, personalities, abilities, motivation, or anything else about themselves or their lives before the random assignment took place. Random assignment does not solve all problems, however. First, any differences in the experiences of the experimental group and the control group(s) that occur after the participants have been randomly assigned and that are not an essential feature of the treatment are possible alternative explanations for the results. If the participants in the experimental group interact with different people, work on a more interesting task, or have experiences that make them more confused or more suspicious, any of these differences could account for the results, rather than the independent variable the experimenter has in mind. In the ideal random assignment experiment, the experimental and control participants are given the same information, spend the same amount of time in the study, interact with the same people, and engage in the same activities, except for the introduction of the treatment. If the manipulation varies on many dimensions, it is difficult to pin down what it is really manipulating. Second, if participants are more likely to drop out of one condition than the other(s) after they have been randomly assigned, we can no longer be sure that the groups are equivalent. Suppose participants in the experimental group are to see a film of a rape trial and those in the control group a film of an assault trial involving two men, in a test of whether viewing violence against women affects feminist attitudes. If many more people withdraw from the study when they are told that the film involves a rape, one hypothesis is that these are the participants with the strongest attitudes about violence towards women. This means that even before the experimenter shows the films, the average feminist attitudes of the treatment group and the control group might already differ, and any differences on the
dependent variable measure might not be due to the rape film at all but to prior group differences. Note that if a study involved showing all participants a film of a rape trial, a high dropout rate is a less serious problem: it can raise questions about the generalizability of the results to people who are unwilling to view rape films, but not about their validity among the people who are willing. In a laboratory study, careful pilot testing can usually ensure that loss of participants is minimized and differential dropout is not a problem. In field studies, in those rare and precious instances where random assignment is possible, participant attrition or reassignment often poses a more serious threat. Parents may agitate to get their children moved out of racially integrated classrooms or into programs designed to improve school achievement, compromising the initial random assignment. Students or workers with weak skills may drop out of programs they find too challenging. The result is that the groups that are measured after the treatment are no longer the groups that were randomly assigned, and any differences found could be due to differences in the composition of the groups rather than to the intended independent variable (Cook and Campbell, 1979; West et al., 2000). Sometimes in field studies, random assignment may be undermined at the very outset, as when doctors surreptitiously assign their high-risk patients to a promising treatment group, perhaps furthering humanitarian goals, but invalidating the results of the study (Kopans, 1994). Unless the experimenter has full control over who gets into the various conditions of the experiment and who stays in them, random assignment may be an illusion, and it is important to keep track of the actual composition of the groups throughout the study. The most common use of random assignment in social psychology is in the laboratory study. A consequence of this preference is that our independent variables are often weak, our dependent variables often inconsequential, and our effects inevitably short term. This does not mean that our studies are invalid or unimportant. The insights and theories tested in laboratory studies about conformity, altruism, attitudes, expectancy effects, cognitive biases, and many other topics have proven to be powerful and often generalizable to a wide range of nonlaboratory settings. Still, working within such narrow confines, it is almost impossible to test the boundary conditions of our findings. Consider the manipulation of letting one student boss another around for 45 minutes, giving some ego-bolstering praise. If we find that participants given this brief power manipulation are likely to take the credit for successes and deny blame for failures (Tiedens et al., 2000), can we conclude that this is also true of government officials or CEOs who have experienced power on a daily basis for years? What do a few moments of criticism have in common with chronic low self-esteem? If the only attitudes we study are the sort of trivial attitudes that can be changed within the course of an hour, what have we learned about deep-seated ideological convictions? In fact, we may have learned a great deal it is as wrong to claim that laboratory results do not generalize to the real world as it is to claim that they do; as wrong to claim that short-term acute laboratory manipulations of variables are different from their real-world counterparts as it is to claim that they are the same. These are open questions, and only research that uses different methods in new settings can answer them.
Independent variables that are measured
When the independent variable is a measured variable, new problems arise. For example, when using self-report, the researcher must consider whether people can give an accurate assessment (for example, people may not be good judges of how powerful they are), as self-report measures can be woefully inaccurate (Reis and Gable, 2000; Wentland, 1993). Self-report measures can also make the variable salient in people's minds and bias future responses: a person who has just described herself as powerful might be especially likely to feel a burst of high self-esteem. Reverse causality and third-variable causality are also problems with measured variables; for example, low self-esteem may cause people to see themselves as powerless (or is it that not having power causes low self-esteem?). Thus, the problems with measured variables are first, construct validity are we really measuring the variable we care about and only that variable? and second, reactivity whenever people are aware that they are being measured and have any control over their responses, the measure can be affected by the image the participant wants to convey, rather than by the variable we care about. The techniques for dealing with construct validity and reactivity problems of measured predictor variables are the same techniques one uses with found independent variables, so we will review the solutions together in the next subsection.
Independent variables that are found
But what if the researcher is really interested in a variable that cannot be manipulated at all gender, for example, or social class, or culture. These are, by definition, found variables, although one's degree of gender, class, or cultural identification might be measured and might be relevant to some questions. In these cases, the strategy is to identify correlated variables, such as wealth or power, and attempt to rule them out, or to look for a variety of measures that might reflect the processes one cares about but that would not be affected by plausible third variables. A psychologist interested in the effects of power on self-esteem, for example, might go to the field and study high- and low-power people in a hierarchically organized workplace (found power). Studying people who occupy real positions of high and low power has an appealing real-world relevance, but there are many possible variables that could cause differences in self-esteem between people in real-world positions of power and their subordinates. People could have attained powerful positions because they are older, more skilled, more educated, richer, whiter, or male or even, perhaps, because they had higher self-esteem to begin with. Without random assignment, the researcher has to consider each of the plausible alternative hypotheses one by one and find ways to rule them out by finding an all-black female group; by comparing jury forepersons on juries where the role is randomly assigned to those on juries where the members elect the foreperson; by statistically controlling for age, income, education, and so on. Rarely are these co plete solutions. Thus, the problems with found variables are problems of non-random selection (self-selection or selection by others) and correlated variables income is correlated with success, health, power, and SAT scores, so in comparing people on any of these dimensions we have to worry about whether we are really comparing them on income. There are three common ways to rule out correlated variables. First, the researcher can use careful selection to make sure that the correlated variable does not vary. The third variable is held constant. You may have the hypothesis that women are more prone to depression than men, but you also know that women earn less money. Thus, the depression that appears to be due to gender could actually be due to lower income. So you attempt to hold income constant by studying only people within a narrow economic range. You lose generality by this method (that is the gender effect you have demonstrated may be limited to people in that narrow income range), but you gain confidence that gender (or, alas, something else that is correlated with gender but not with income) plays a role indepression.
Second, the researcher can construct a model that includes both variables, not only the one he or she cares about, but also the troublesome correlated variable (or several hypothesized variables and several correlated variables). This makes it possible to examine the effects of both variables separately. In actually conducting the research, you would have to find people in each of the groups you want to compare; in this case, women and men who were characterized by different levels of the correlated variable poor men and women, middle-income men and women, and rich men and women, for example. This is analogous to the technique of systematic variation in a random assignment study. If women are more depressed than men in all three income groups, you are more sure of your hypothesis; other patterns of results force you to consider new hypotheses. The main problem with this method is that it can be difficult to implement, especially if you want to rule out several correlated variables, as some combinations of variables may be quite rare (for example, very rich women). New statistical procedures based on propensity score techniques help make this problem tractable (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). Third, the researcher can use statistical methods, such as analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), to control for correlated variables. These methods, as typically implemented, control for the linear association of the third variable or set of variables. In effect, a linear regression is computed where the linear effect of the third variable on the independent variable is subtracted from the independent variable, and the remainder the residual is used as the independent variable instead of the original independent variable. When using these techniques, the researcher must be careful not to to make general pronouncements, such as we controlled for the effect of income. More precisely, what typically was controlled for is the linear effect of the covariate. The data may still contain nonlinear effects of the correlated variable or interactions between the third variable and the independent variable. We conclude this section on independent variables with this point: as long as a variable has been studied with only a single set of procedures, it is impossible to distinguish the role of the variable from the role of the procedures (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). The procedures, or the-variable-in-the-context-of-these-procedures, constitute an alternative explanation of the results that ordinarily cannot be ruled out in a single study. In order to make real progress, sooner or later it is important to study the same question by a different method to compare the measured version of a variable with the manipulated version, to use an entirely different manipulation, or to find an instance of the variable rather than creating one. If the results are different, the researcher is confronted with a whole new set of questions about why they are different, questions that can stimulate real theoretical progress and understanding that would otherwise be unlikely. For example, laboratory experiments on social comparison showed strong evidence that people tend to compare themselves to others who are slightly better than they are on whatever dimension they are concerned about (upward social comparison). However, in field research, Taylor (1983) found that breast-cancer patients tended to use downward social comparison, comparing themselves to patients who were not doing so well, with the result that almost all of the women thought that they were adjusting very well. These field data extended our understanding of social comparison processes in ways that were not suggested by the experimental research.
The dependent variable
Measured outcome variables raise the same issues as measured predictor variables. It is important to consider what else the measure might be tapping besides one's intended variable (construct validity). It is important to find out during pilot testing what sorts of motivations and interpretations participants experience when they encounter the measure (reactivity). And it is important to consider alternative explanations of the whole process, and include measures designed to assess other possible outcomes that might address these alternatives (tests of multiple working hypotheses) (John and Benet-Martinez, 2000). Sometimes the actual variable captured by the measure may be broader than the construct the researcher has in mind; for example, the researcher may be interested in favorable attitudes toward an outgroup, but the measure might actually reflect global good mood, in which case the predicted outcome is just a byproduct of a more general phenomenon. This possibility can be addressed by adding additional measures that are unaffected by mood, or additional measures that have nothing to do with the particular outgroup (known in the statistics literature as an instrumental variable). Sometimes the actual variable may be narrower than the researcher's concept. For example, the researcher may be interested in individualism as opposed to collectivism, but the scale may reflect only differences on the collectivism items while the groups are identical on the individualism items (Oyserman et al., 2002). This possibility can be assessed by looking for patterns and discrepancies in the individual items, for example, with confirmatory factor analysis. Sometimes the measure may tap a different variable altogether. For example, if one wants to measure knowledge or accuracy of perception, it is important to create a measure that is not affected by attitudes: if most of the correct answers on a person perception measure involve negative qualities, what looks like accuracy could actually just be simple dislike.
The reliability of a measure refers to its consistency: consistency over time, consistency over observers, or consistency over components of an overall measure, such as items on a questionnaire. All three are essential if one is trying to measure a stable attribute such as a personality trait, as is often the case when one is interested in a measured predictor variable (Bakeman, 2000; John and Benet-Martinez, 2000). Consistency over observers and consistency over components or items are analogous, in that both involve multiple attempts to measure the same thing at a given point in time. A researcher may use two or more observers to score how aggressively a person is behaving, how often dispositionalattributions occur in a narrative or a conversation, or any number of other variables. Or a researcher may ask several different questions all designed to tap aggression, the tendency to make dispositional attributions, or any number of other variables. If observers or items disagree, the measure is unreliable, and needs to be modified. Observers or coders may need further training (Bartholomew et al., 2000); items or coding categories may need to be revised or discarded. Generally, the more open-ended or unstructured the behavioral or verbal responses, and the more abstract and inferential the coding categories, the more difficult it is to develop a reliable measure. It is easier, for example, to measure competitiveness reliably in a game-like situation where there are only a few response alternatives, some competitive and some cooperative, than it is when observing playground behavior. It is easier to achieve reliability if one is measuring concrete behaviors (hits, kicks, or shoves) than more abstract categories (Shows aggression). While consistency over observers and measures is always essential in social psychological research, consistency over time is often not relevant. Very often we are interested in people's responses to an immediate situational stimulus a threat to self-esteem, a subliminal prime, or a persuasive argument. We do not expect lasting effects; in fact, we go out of our way to debrief the participants in order to
make sure that the effects are undone. A measure that is unreliable cannot be valid. If observers cannot agree on whether behaviors are aggressive or merely assertive, if the items on a test are uncorrelated, or if a person gets different scores from one day to the next on a measure of a supposedly stable trait such as IQ or extraversion, the measure is useless. (Of course, the fact that a construct we thought was coherent or stable turns out not to be so may lead us to new theoretical insights, but the measure is useless for its original purpose.) Thus, reliability must be established before a measure is used. A measure is valid if it measures what it is supposed to measure and nothing else. A reliable measure is not necessarily valid. A blood test, for example, may be a highly reliable (and valid) measure of whether people are HIV positive, but an invalid measure of whether they are immoral or gay. Validity is not easy to establish in social psychology, because our conceptual variables variables such as prejudice or anxiety often represent families of related variables rather than pure states, so there is no gold standard by which to measure them. Certain cognitive biases may be rigorously demonstrated as departures from a statistically correct response (Kahneman et al., 1982), but interpersonal biases are not so easily verified. Criterion-related validity often makes no sense for social psychological variables, at least at the current stage of development of the science, because there is no single criterion that definitively identifies most of our variables. A recent example is work attempting to develop a measure of attitude ambivalence (Breckler, 1994; Priester and Petty, 1996; Thompson et al., 1995). Researchers disagree about whether ambivalence should be measured from a structural point of view (that is, ambivalence as a combination of separately measured positive and negative attitudes) or from an experiential view (that is, the subjective phenomenology of attitude ambivalence). There is currently no clear criterion against which to assess the validity of the various proposed measures of ambivalence. For many of our variables, validity must be established slowly, by triangulation. If we want to use frowning as a measure of anger, for example, we might look to see whether frowning occurs with other variables plausibly associated with anger: with independent variables such as being thwarted or insulted, with dependent variables such as yelling, threatening, and slamming doors. This is the process of establishing convergent validity: many other indicators of the conceptual variable anger are associated with frowning. Just as important, we want to make sure that frowning is unique to anger, that it is not associated with other mental states. This is the process of establishing discriminant validity: demonstrating that a frown discriminates anger from other states such as fear or sorrow (Campbell and Fiske, 1959; Judd and McClelland, 1998). In fact, it does not; frowning is characteristic of various kinds of mental effort, uncertainty, and perceived obstacles. Thus, it would not be a very good measure of anger unless other supporting measures were included that were not related to mental effort, or unless the situation was structured so that none of the other mental states that go with frowning was plausible in context. What have we just said? We have said that frowning lacks discriminant validity as a measure of anger, but that in a context that rules out other types of uncertainty or obstacles, it could be a valid measure. There is an important general message here: that in social psychology many of our measures are not valid or invalid per se, but are valid or invalid in a particular context. Personality psychologists generally look for measures that are stable across time and context, but this is far less true of social psychologists. We are generally interested in situational variables, we expect our measures to be responsive to the particular situation, and therefore we should not expect to find measures that are universally valid or applicable. Just as the answers to individual questions (for example, Overall, how satisfied are you with your life in general?) can have different meanings depending on the questions that preceded them (Schwarz et al., 1998; Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988), so any measure might have different meanings in different contexts. Many social psychologists seem to have forgotten this important fact. Whenever a set of messages is sent out over the Social and Personality Psychology Listserver, for example, there are almost always some that ask whether anyone knows of a good off-the-shelf measure of some variable regret, ormistrust of authority, or vengeance as though any measure that someone used successfully in one context is a generally valid measure. Often, these are not intended to be used as measures of enduring traits, but as measures of responses to situational variables. Rarely do these questioners ask about the context in which the measure was used or describe the context in which they plan to use it. This is a serious mistake. First, the measure may not be appropriate in the new context; for example, questions about racial prejudice may elicit different answers in all-white groups than they do in mixed-race groups. Second, the researcher often has a wide range of measures to choose from, each appropriate to some contexts but not to others, and looking for a generic measure may prevent the researcher from finding or creating a measure that fits the particular context. Racial prejudice, for example, may be measured by questions about affirmative action, welfare mothers, or the guilt of a particular criminal defendant; or by eye contact, conformity, helping, or any number of behaviors that in other contexts might have nothing to do with racial prejudice. The analogous argument can be made about reliability. Social and personality psychologists often report the reliability of a scale (such as Cronbach's a) as though the value of the reliability measure is an inherent property of the scale. Our journal articles contain sentences such as scale X has been shown to have acceptable reliability, a=0.82, with a reference to another article. Typical measures of reliability are a function of error variance, so anything that changes the error structure of the data (change in subjects, change in experimenter, change in instructions, change in manipulation, change in task, change in length of the study, etc.) will change the reliability of the scale. Thus, the reliability of a scale should always be reported for that particular study; it is meaningless to claim that a scale is reliable in one context because it was found to be reliable in another. Many of our measures are open to multiple interpretations. A direct gaze, for example, can imply liking, subordination, disapproval, or simple attention. This does not mean that gaze direction is a bad or invalid measure; it can be an excellent measure of any of these concepts provided that that is the only meaning that makes sense in the particular context, that precautions have been taken to rule out alternative explanations. Nonverbal, behavioral measures (and manipulations) often come in for criticism because their link to the intended concept is less transparent than that of verbal measures. A scale that asks people to rate their anxiety on a seven-point scale seems to be a more direct measure of anxiety than a measure of speech hesitations or fidgeting. But this advantage is often more apparent than real. Verbal measures almost always come with built-in alternative explanations such as reactivity, social desirability, and cultural stereotypes or folk theories. Nonverbal measures are relatively free of these problems, because they are usually under less conscious control than verbal reports, and because it is often possible to keep the participant unaware that a measure is even being taken. For nonverbal measures (and sometimes for verbal measures as well) alternative explanations usually have to be figured out on an ad-hoc basis in each context.
Internal and external validity
If all of the procedures in this section are followed, an experiment should have high internal validity. Internal validity means that in this particular study, any differences observed between the participants in different conditions or groups are due to the treatment, not to any artifact or confounded variable: being given a high-status role caused participants to respond to failure with anger, and being given a lowstatus role caused participants to respond to failure with sadness. Of course, to make even this claim, we have to be sure that our status manipulation affected status and not some related construct, and our anger and sadness measures reflected anger and sadness, and not something else. If so, we know that our treatments were responsible for the outcomes.
External validity means that the results will generalize to other people and other settings (Brewer, 2000; Campbell, 1957). No single study can have external validity, since it is impossible to know whether the results will replicate in another context. The findings of a study using college students as participants may or may not generalize to senior citizens; the findings of a study using senior citizens may or may not generalize to college students. The results of a laboratory study of productivity may or may not generalize to telemarketers; the results of a study of telemarketers may or may not generalize to postal workers. External validity is always an empirical question, requiring further research. Thus, there is no trade-off between internal and external validity. If a study lacks internal validity, nothing has been learned, so there is nothing to generalize. If a study has internal validity, its external validity is always an open question.
Social psychologists are sometimes criticized because they hardly ever bother to use truly representative samples in their research, and often just use whatever participants are most ready to hand for many of us, this means college students who are taking a course in introductory psychology. There are serious costs to restricting our research to one small segment of the population, just as there are serious costs to relying on a single type of method. Any results we find could be peculiar to the college student population, or could represent an interaction between some feature of that population (youth, IQ, interest in psychology) and the variable we are interested in, rather than the variable itself (Sears, 1986). Ultimately, no result can be trusted as general or even as real until it has been tested on different kinds of people with different kinds of methods. However, conducting research on a truly representative sample of almost any population is enormously expensive. For some kinds of question, a representative sample is necessary; for others, it is not. It is important to think carefully about the kinds of samples that are appropriate for your research question and the kinds that are not. A representative sample a sample in which every member of some population has an equal chance of being included is imperative if you want to make valid statements about the absolute frequencies of various responses in that population. For example, in predicting the outcome of a national election, you want to make accurate estimates of how many people favor each candidate and how many are undecided. In order to do this, you must draw a representative sample of voters. Likewise, if you want to know how blacks, whites, Hispanics, and Asians feel about affirmative action, or how often men are victims of violent crime compared to women, you need a representative sample. But often in social psychology, our hypotheses are not about base-rate differences among groups, and often we are not concerned with the absolute percentages or exact numerical levels of the variables we measure. We ask questions such as: Can information people learn after an event change their memory for the event? (Loftus, 1979); Does sorrow lead to a perception that events in general are uncontrollable? (Keltner et al., 1993); Is a person more likely to help another when alone or when there are other people around? (Latane and Darley, 1970). We are interested in the effects of psychological variables on other psychological variables and behavior. We do not particularly want to make statements about the exact percentage of people whose memory will be distorted with and without new information, or the precise size of the decreases in perceived controllability caused by sorrow. To us, estimates like these do not even make sense there is no exact number: it will vary depending on the type of event, the type of new information, and all sorts of other factors. Testing a large random sample of Americans in one particular experiment designed to ask one of these questions would be a huge waste of time and money. Vastly more could be learned by a judicious choice of small, nonrepresentative samples in a variety of experimental contexts. This is not to say that college students are fine for all our questions. They are not. The examples described above were chosen partly because they were plausibly true of old and young people, rich and poor, male and female. For questions like these, there is no compelling reason not to start with college students, although later on in one's research program it is important to move on to other groups in order to test generality and boundary conditions. But for other questions, any old sample will not do. The researcher needs to consider what kind of sample will most likely provide useful answers to the question. The sample need not be representative, but it must meet certain specifications. Rather than a sample of convenience, a sample of forethought is needed. Sometimes the sample specifications are obvious. In research on aging, college students can only aspire to be in the control group; in research on cultural differences, you need people of different cultural backgrounds. But, at least at the outset, when you are trying to establish the existence of a relation between variables, you do not need representative samples of old and young people, or members of the cultures you want to compare. You must make sure to choose samples that are uncontaminated by correlated variables that might be alternative explanations for your results (e.g., you would not go to a hospital if you want old people, because they would be not only old but also unhealthy), and eventually you must test your hypotheses on different samples, but you do not need a fully representative sample. For these questions, the need for samples of forethought is obvious. For other questions, the need to seek out special samples may be important, but less obvious. College students have certain characteristics that make them a poor choice for some questions (Sears, 1986). Much social psychological research on racism and prejudice, for example, has shown surprisingly weak effects, at odds with what we know about pervasive racial segregation, poverty rates, and the racial populations of America's prisons. Some of this discrepancy is undoubtedly due to the fact that undergraduates in research universities are much less likely to express overt prejudice than are some other segments of the population (Sommers and Ellsworth, 2000). By sticking to the college student population, we have learned more about weak prejudice laced with liberal guilt than we have about the sort of strong prejudice that inspires hate crimes. Likewise, college students would not be a good population for a researcher interested in fundamentalist religious beliefs, or the joy, pain, and guilt that come with assuming a responsible adult position in society.
For other variables, college students may be a poor choice because there is so little variability among them: most college students are pretty high in self-esteem and pretty low in depression, for example, and show a highly restricted range on many other psychological variables that might interest us. A median split on a college student sample does not really yield high and low self-esteem groups, however the researcher labels them. Usually, the comparison is actually between a high self-esteem group and a moderately high selfesteem group. The main reason we overuse introductory psychology students is convenience, a reason which is scientifically unsound. But although it is extremely difficult and expensive to use a truly representative sample, it is relatively easy to find alternative samples that lack the drawbacks of college students. Researchers have recruited participants in airport waiting areas, departments of motor vehicles, courthouses, malls, and science museums. Especially in contexts where they are just waiting, people are usually quite willing to participate. If the study can be administered by telephone, community members can be used instead of college students. Of course, none of these are representative samples of anything except themselves (for example, airline passengers flying out of Detroit), but they are likely to be more representative of the general population than college students are, and to be relatively free of the particular problems with college students (politically correct attitudes, lack of serious responsibility, bright future, and many more).
After formulating the research question; thinking of alternative explanations; designing the study; pilot testing the procedures and materials; thinking about reliability, internal validity, and external validity; and selecting an optimal sample, you proceed with data collection. Then comes the stage of analyzing the data and reporting the results. There are excellent books and chapters on data analysis, so we need not reiterate those techniques here (e.g., Cohen and Cohen, 1984; Judd, 2000; Maxwell and Delaney, 1999; McClelland, 2000). Instead of reviewing specific procedures in basic data analysis, we provide a few prescriptions for reporting results. First, report descriptive statistics. The results of a study are not just a p-value. The most important purpose of data analysis is description. Simple summary scores such as measures of central tendency, measures of variability, measures of association, and plots are what should be highlighted in a results section. If a complicated statistical model is used, the parameters of that model should be emphasized and interpreted. Results sections should emphasize results, not statistical tests (the section is not called Statistical Tests). Sentences should begin with the results themselves Attitudes in the prime condition, M=5.2, sd=1.1, were more favorable than attitudes in the control condition, M=4.4, sd=1.3, t(130)=3.82, p<0.05 rather than with the statistical test (for example, A two-sample t-test reveals that mean scores in the two conditions differed, p<0.05). Use the test statistic (the t, the F, the chi-square) and its corresponding p-value as punctuation marks at the end of the sentence, giving the conventional stamp of approval on the pattern you observed. Second, be aware of the statistical assumptions you make when conducting a test and check that your data are consistent with those assumptions. All statistical tests invoke a model that makes assumptions. Social psychologists appear to ignore this fact and act as though their hypotheses are tested in some absolute Platonic sense. A significant two-sample t-test does not show that one mean differs from another; instead, it provides a criterion by which to compare the means of two distributions under the assumption of equal variances, independence, and normality, leading to a particularly defined type I error rate. In other words, the researcher never tests a research hypothesis in isolation, but tests the conjunction of the research hypothesis and the set of assumptions required by the statistical test. A test may fail to reach statistical significance not because the research hypothesis failed (or there was not sufficient power), but because the assumptions were violated. For a discussion of how to check statistical assumptions, see McClelland (2000). Inform the reader that you checked the statistical assumptions and explain how you dealt with any violations. Third, discuss a result in a manner consistent with the way you modeled it. An illustration of the violation of this prescription is seen in social psychologists' typical discussion of the Pearson correlation coefficient. Their usual language conveys an ordinal relation, in as the correlation shows that as anxiety increases, so does susceptibility to context effects. As the reader knows from introductory statistics, the actual model underlying the correlation is a straight line (linear) relation between two variables. Therefore, the Pearson correlation assesses the degree of fit (defined in a particular way) between one variable and a linear transformation of the other variable (for example, The high correlation supports the model that anxiety and depression are linearly related). If an ordinal relation is what the researcher wants to test, a different measure of association, one that measures the monotonic relation between two variables, should be used (e.g., Gonzalez and Nelson, 1996). It is possible for a Pearson correlation to be 0, and yet for the relation between those two variables to be systematic (that is, a Pearson correlation of 0 does not imply independence). Fourth, do not describe an effect size as a measure of the underlying relation between constructs. The effect size is a normalized descriptive statistic. For example, the difference between two means is a descriptive statistic. The effect-size measure normalizes that difference by dividing it by the standard deviation. The term effect size tends to convey more than the computation implies. We have seen researchers discuss effect sizes in a manner that implies a deep, fundamental relation. For example, in an experiment examining the effects of reward on performance, a researcher can easily fall into the trap of claiming to demonstrate the effect size of reward on performance. This language, which is at the level of constructs, suggests that the effect size has uncovered some underlying constant reward influences performance (two abstract constructs) with an effect size of 0.2. Indeed, the use of meta-analysis connotes that multiple studies each provide estimates of this effect size and that one can average over such studies to arrive at an even better estimate of effect size. In the physical sciences, there are examples of underlying constants that are invariant and can be estimated (for example, Planck's constant and the speed of light). Are there such constants in social psychology? We doubt it. So do not fall into the trap of reading more into an effect size than is warranted by the ingredients the descriptive statistics that created it. Data analysis should stay as close to the data and as close to the research hypothesis as possible. Present data and test the hypotheses that you have made (that is, if you made an ordinal prediction, use a test designed for ordinal hypotheses). Students frequently ask us to evaluate the proposed analyses section of their dissertation proposal to check whether they will be analyzing the data correctly. Such an evaluation is impossible for us to make out of context we need to see the introduction, the hypotheses, the materials, and the procedure before we can make an evaluation of the correctness of the analysis section. For us, a data-analysis plan is correct if it addresses the research question being asked and is consistent with the research design. All too often, researchers focus on only one of the two (for example, my design is within-subjects so I need to run a repeated-measures ANOVA).
The great contribution of social psychology has been to illuminate the ways in which people's beliefs, values, emotions, and behaviors are affected by their social context. Statistical tests, on the other hand, are designed to be relatively context-free, widely applicable, and sensitive only to crude psychological differences (is the variable one of frequency in a population or degree within individuals? is it dichotomous or continuous?) or to peculiarities in the underlying distribution of variables in a sample (for example, various departures from normality). From a statistical point of view, a person's response any response is a data point, and the challenges of statistical analysis involve problematic data points, not problematic people. Advances in statistical and computer methodology have benefitted our field enormously, but they have seriously skewed our recent writings on research methodology. We all know the old slogan of the computer analysts, Garbage in, garbage out, but, lately, we have said very little about what goes in. We seem to be impressed more with what we can now churn out of a fancy statistical package than in choosing our ingredients carefully.
The purpose of this chapter has been to rectify the dominance of analysis over design and procedure in methodological discussions; to remind ourselves and our students of the importance of the stages before the data are analyzed, indeed, even of the stages before the study is actually run. The most important phases of research are formulating a research question, creating a design that includes the comparisons required to answer it fairly and the comparisons required to test alternative possibilities, and devising a procedure that will represent that question in a way that is meaningful and involving for the people we are studying. Social psychology demands not just one talent, but many: cold logic, the free-ranging ability to see a problem from multiple points of view, and sympathetic human understanding. It demands them anew and in a different form, every time we plan a new study. Hackneyed research makes for dry social psychology. Intuition is not enough; we have to try out our methodological ideas on real people like the ones we plan to study before we can be sure that the ideas make sense. Often we have to revise them. Our questions are deep and difficult, and we have to sneak up on them through triangulation and intelligent compromise. Always we have to consider what else our results might mean, and design our next study to figure out which explanation is best. It is this combination of skills that has made our research a part of Western culture (Milgram's work on obedience, Asch's on conformity) and our technical terms a part of everyday discourse (dissonance, self-fulfilling prophecy), and it is the challenge of using all these skills together that makes our research so exciting.
We are grateful to Wendy Treynor and Alexandra Gross, who helped us to make the writing clearer, and to Barbara Zezulka Brown, who instantly incorporated our revisions, and made it possible to come close to meeting the deadline.
One of the most interesting and challenging aspects of social psychology is figuring out how to turn an interesting idea into a research question, and then how to turn the question into an actual study that will add to our understanding of human behavior. Designing a good study involves a whole range of skills from creative imagination to cold logic to interpersonal intuition. The social psychologist tries to create a situation that not only captures the essence of the scientific question, but is also meaningful and involving for the participants. This chapter will help you to get started.
No method is right in itself; what matters is whether it is appropriate for the researcher's question. All research requires some sort of comparison, and research that employs multiple methods and considers multiple alternative hypotheses is preferable to research that relies on the same method to address the question, or that simply asks whether a hypothesis has been confirmed or disconfirmed. Comparison can be across groups of people, time, circumstances, but some comparison is essential. We suggest ways to come up with researchable questions, and emphasize the importance of pilot testing in any kind of social psychological research pilot testing the measures, the treatments, and the whole experimental procedure to make sure that they make sense to the participants and mean what you intend them to mean. We discuss ways to create effective treatments when random assignment is possible, and what to do when it is not. Creative compromise and triangulation are usually essential, and the researcher who can represent the independent variable or the dependent variable in different ways (e.g., verbal, behavioral) can be much more confident that the findings are real and robust. All aspects of research (design, procedures, measure, and data analysis) have implications for each other and should be considered simultaneously.
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Social Inference and Social Memory: The Interplay Between Systems
Steven J. Sherman, Matthew T. Crawford, David L. Hamilton, Leonel GarciaMarques
Both social inference and social memory have a long history and tradition in social psychology. Early work in the area of social inferences focused on the taxonomy of inference types (see Hastie, 1983, for a review). In addition, the psychological processes underlying social inferences have been an important part of social psychological thinking and research since Anderson's (1968; 1981) early work. Newer information-processing models, many of which have been borrowed from cognitive psychology, have also been a recent focus of attention (Hastie and Park, 1986; Smith and DeCoster, 1998; Smith and Zarate, 1992; Wyer and Carlston, 1994). Another focus of attention of theory and research in the area of social inference concerns the direction in which these inferences are made (e.g., from the group to the individual versus the individual to the group; from the self to others versus from others to the self). For example, Hastie (1983) discussed differences between member-to-category inferences and category-to-member inferences. Beike and Sherman (1994) separated inductive, deductive, and analogical inferences. Finally, the content of inferences has been a major concern of social psychology for many years. Probabilistic inferences, stereotypes, causal inferences, moral inferences, social structural inferences, and trait inference all have a rich tradition in social psychology. Similarly, the study of social memory has blossomed during the past twenty years and has explored a variety of issues concerning how information from the social world is represented in memory and subsequently used in making judgments and guiding behavior. Research has investigated factors that influence the encoding and interpretation of information, attributions that are made as that information is processed, and how those processes influence the way that information is represented in memory (Wyer and Carlston, 1994). Several theories have been advanced regarding the way social information is represented as a mental structure, and these models have generated considerable research testing their implications (Carlston and Smith, 1996; Kihlstrom and Klein, 1994; Smith and Queller, 1999). Other research has investigated how these mental representations, once established, can guide the processing of new information. Finally, the question of how stored knowledge is retrieved from memory for later use has also been the focus of investigation (Hamilton and Sherman, 1994; Olson et al., 1996). The purpose of this chapter is to review and discuss research that illuminates the interplay between these two systems. It is clear that the content and process of social inference have important effects on memory, with regard to both the accuracy of memory and biases in memory. It is equally clear that memory structure and process affect in major ways inferences that are drawn about the social targets involved. We both examine the directions of effects and extract general principles by which social inference and social memory are linked.
Inference > memory
Inferences about individuals
The area of individual person perception has a long history in social psychology. This literature has reported extensively on specific mechanisms underlying impression formation of individual targets, especially emphasizing the ways in which information is encoded, integrated, and represented in memory. It has generally been concluded that people integrate trait or behavioral information about an individual into a strong dispositional impression (Anderson, 1966, 1981; Asch, 1946; Burnstein and Schul, 1982; Hastie and Park, 1986). In terms of the processes by which individual target information is encoded, Hastie and Park (1986) provide evidence that individual targets induce online information processing, in which early information serves as a basis of the impression and subsequently encountered information is assimilated to fit the impression. Because perceivers are integrating information into a coherent representation, information that is inconsistent with the overall impression receives greater attention as it is perceived, leading to a greater number of associative memory linkages. Consequently, these target-relevant inconsistencies show a greater likelihood of recall in a subsequent task (Lichtenstein and Srull, 1987; Srull et al., 1985; see discussion in a later section). Online processing is also associated with primacy effects in memory (Srull and Wyer, 1989) as well as generally low recall-judgment correlations, as the actual recall of information is unnecessary for making a judgment (Hastie and Park, 1986). Thus, it is clear that the process and outcome of individual impression formation are very much related to the amount and type of information that are retrieved about that individual. We now turn to an important kind of inference about individual social targets that has extensive effects on memory for facts about that individual, the inference about the traits of individuals.
Spontaneous trait inferences and memory
Considerable research has been conducted examining whether trait inferences from behavior can occur without explicit impressionformation instructions. Researchers argue that inferring traits from behavior is so ubiquitous and routinized that perceivers are able to do so spontaneously. If trait inferences are derived from behavior in a spontaneous fashion, these inferences should have important effects on memory for the behavior. The behaviors most important for the spontaneous trait inference should have an advantage in memory, as the trait will serve as a cue for these behaviors. Uleman and his colleagues (Newman and Uleman, 1989; Uleman et al., 1992; Winter and Uleman, 1984) provided initial evidence for the
spontaneity of trait inferences. In a first task, these researchers presented trait-implicative behavioral statements (for example, The accountant takes the orphans to the circus.). In a subsequent recall task, either a semantically related (such as numbers or fun) or a dispositional (such as kindhearted) retrieval cue preceded recall. Results indicated that dispositional cues had a significant advantage over semantic cues, as well as other kinds of cues, in their ability to elicit the original behavior. Tulving's encoding-specificity principle (Tulving and Thomson, 1973) holds that a cue can elicit the original material to the extent that it is used as an organizing principle at the time the information is encoded. The fact that dispositional cues were able to elicit the original trait-implicative behaviors indicates that the trait was spontaneously inferred at encoding and was thus available as an effective memory-retrieval cue (though some have questioned these conclusions: Bassili, 1989; Higgins and Bargh, 1987). These results clearly indicate the importance of trait inferences for the memory of the behaviors that served as the bases for those inferences. More recently, Carlston, Skowronski, and colleagues (Carlston and Skowronski, 1994; Carlston et al., 1995; Skowronski et al., 1998) have shown that the learning of a person-trait association is facilitated when that person was previously paired with a behavioral statement implying that same trait. Such enhanced learning supports the idea of spontaneous trait inference from behavior. Targets are first paired with self-descriptive behavioral statements that imply specific traits. In a later task, these same targets are paired with a single trait term, and participants must learn these target-trait pairings. Half of the trials constitute relearning trials, as the trait terms are the same as those implied by the original behaviors. The other half require the learning of a new target-trait association with a previously seen target. If the trait is spontaneously abstracted from the behavior in the first task, facilitation on the relearning task should occur. As predicted, performance on relearning trials was much greater than on learning trials, indicating that traits are abstracted spontaneously during the initial encoding phase. The savings in relearning occurred strongly even when participants were not given impression-formation instructions during the initial phase that paired targets with behaviors. Interestingly, in a subsequent recognition task, participants were unable to recognize the specific behaviors that first elicited the traits. It seems that, in this paradigm, once a trait is abstracted from the behavior, the behavior is unavailable to memory. Thus, sometimes a spontaneous trait inference enhances memory for behavior (Newman and Uleman, 1989), and at other times the abstraction of a trait leads the perceiver to forget the specific behavior that served as the basis for the trait inference (Carlston and Skowronski, 1994). The fact that the inferred trait can alternately facilitate or inhibit memory about the behaviors that allowed the trait inference raises questions regarding how both the behavioral and the trait information are stored in memory. Research by both Lingle and Ostrom (1979) and Carlston and Skowronski (1986) has shown that, even when a trait inference has been made, either the trait or the behavior can be accessed and used in a subsequent judgment. Another way in which trait inferences are linked to subsequent memory is that these inferences often require the initial retrieval of some information about the person. Imagine that you are given behavioral information about a person and are then asked to decide whether the person is introverted. According to Klein and Loftus (1993), this inference will require you to access some of the original behavioral information. If you are then asked to recall a specific incident in which the person behaved in a way relevant to introversion/ extraversion, the latency for answering should be less than if the original question simply asked you to define the word introverted. This is because answering the inference question required accessing times when the person behaved in an introversion-relevant way. Interestingly, if sufficient behavioral information is initially provided about the person so that traits are spontaneously ascribed to that person, the inference task will not require accessing of any of the original behaviors, and the recall of such information will not be facilitated (Sherman, 1996). In addition, even after enough behavioral information is initially presented to allow abstracted trait inferences to form, there is still a facilitation of memory for behavioral episodes that are inconsistent with the trait inference (Babey et al., 1998).
Trait inferences and memory organization
In addition to affecting the memory for the behavioral indicators of an individual's traits, trait inferences also act to organize and integrate in memory target-relevant behaviors that are related to each other. Of the types of memory models proposed, those utilizing an associative-network approach (Collins and Quillian, 1969) have continued to exert the most influence on social-psychological research and thinking. In its most basic formulation, associative networks contain concepts represented as nodes and connections between concepts as links between nodes (see Smith and Queller, 1999, for review of person-memory models). Research has attempted to clarify how the trait inferences and expectancies that one has about other people affect memory for information relevant to those inferences (Hastie, 1980; Srull, 1981, 1983; for a review, see Stangor and McMillan, 1992). One of the most common approaches to investigate inferences and social memory is the impression-formation paradigm in which participants are presented with behavioral information about a target and are asked to form an impression about that target. This experimental approach generally utilizes subsequent recall measures to examine the way that inferences lead per-ceivers to represent the target in memory. Hamilton and colleagues (Hamilton, 1981; Hamilton et al., 1980) proposed a model that integrated the representation of behaviors and traits. Some of their participants were given instructions to form inferences about the target actors (impression set), whereas others were given instructions intended to interfere with inference-making (memory set). Results indicated both heightened recall for behavioral information as well as greater trait clustering for impression-set than memory-set participants. Hamilton proposed that these differences in memory organization resulted from the greater tendency of the impression-set participants to infer traits from the behaviors and to represent target-relevant information around these inferred trait categories. Subsequent investigations have led to the development of associative-network models that further specify the manner in which traits and behaviors are represented in memory (Srull and Wyer, 1989; Wyer and Gordon, 1984; Wyer and Srull, 1989). These models all hold that the process of inferring traits from behavioral information establishes associations in memory between the inferred trait and the specific behavioral episode. Multiple behavioral episodes along the same trait dimension are linked in trait-behavior clusters so that behaviors are organized in memory according to the traits they exemplify. Thus, the inference of traits from behavior leads to greater organization in memory, resulting in overall greater recall as well as trait clustering in recall.
Trait inferences and biases in memory
To this point, we have focused on the role that trait inferences play in increasing the accuracy of memory for trait-relevant information.
However, there is another side to the effects of trait inferences on memory. In addition to increasing the accuracy of memory for certain kinds of information, these same trait inferences can also lead to large and predictable memory distortions and reconstructions. Cantor and Mischel (1977) described targets in ways that were indicative of either extraversion or introversion. For some participants, the targets were also explicitly labeled as extraverted or introverted. For other participants, there was no explicit label, and they had to infer the traits from the information provided. Whether the trait label was provided or inferred, participants made a large number of traitconsistent errors in recognition. That is, a greater number of concept-consistent, but nonpresented, trait items were endorsed as being previously seen than concept-inconsistent or irrelevant items. According to these authors, the inference of the targets' level of extraversion or introversion served as a prototype and resulted in the activation of related trait associations. In subsequent research (Cantor and Mischel, 1979), these authors provided evidence that this effect depends, in part, on the perceived prototypicality of the target. That is, inferences of high prototypicality led to better overall recall as well as more conceptually related, but non-presented, trait intrusions. Thus, the trait inference, as well as the inference of fit to prototype, serve to bias memory in a prototype-consistent manner. These findings have been used to support a schema model of encoding that assumes that expectations about social targets are represented in the form of schemata that then guide and bias the processing of subsequent social information. The meta-analysis by Stangor and McMillan (1992) reveals similar biasing effects of trait expectancies on memory. In addition, response biases toward congruent information are greater to the extent that the expectancy is strong, to the extent that processing resources are depleted, and to the extent that impression-formation goals are present. It is thus clear that trait inferences have both advantages and disadvantages for memory. On the one hand, such inferences generally increase the total amount of material recalled and lead to accuracy in filling in gaps where information is missing. On the other hand, these inferences also lead to biases in recall, generally toward consistent information. In the case of social targets, these memory biases have the effect of making it difficult to change existing inferences and expectations.
Effects of inferences about group membership on memory
Inferences about traits are perhaps the most studied of the inferences that social perceivers make about individual social targets. The fact that such inferences are made spontaneously and that they have such robust effects on memory and on judgments accounts for the central role of trait inferences in the social-psychology literature. However, there are also other kinds of inferences about social targets that have equally important and impressive effects on social memory. For example, one often makes inferences about the group memberships of individuals based on certain behavioral or featural information about them. Inferred memberships into broad social categories (such as, nationality, religion, or social class) are especially important in this regard. Such inferences might be based on physical appearance, behavioral mannerisms, or linguistic cues. For example, a social perceiver might infer that a young man is homosexual from certain behavioral mannerisms, that a woman is Italian from her accent, or that an older man is Muslim from his clothing. Once such inferences are made, the effects on memory should be very similar to the effects already discussed for trait inferences. That is, because social-category memberships bring with them many expectancies, often in the form of stereotypes, and because such memberships operate as schematic representations, they should enhance memory for certain kinds of information and also should bias memory in a category-consistent direction. An excellent example of the biasing effects on memory of social-category inferences is a study by Slusher and Anderson (1987). Participants were presented with the social-category memberships of certain targets (such as lawyer or artist). They were also asked to read some facts about the targets and to imagine certain scenes. For example, they might be asked to imagine a lawyer standing in front of his house. Slusher and Anderson (1987) found that participants tended to imagine events that were consistent with the stereotype of the social-category membership of the target. Thus, they were likely to imagine the lawyer standing in front of an expensive home or the artist standing in front of a funky cottage. Having incorporated stereotyped traits and situations into their imaginations, they then proceeded to confuse in memory what they had imagined with facts that they had actually been given about the social target. This failure of reality monitoring (Johnson and Raye, 1981) led participants to mis-remember the actual facts about the targets in a stereotype-confirming direction and to end up believing that reality matched their stereotypes (rather than recognizing that inferences based on their stereotypes created this reality in their memories). Such effects, of course, would help strengthen and maintain the very stereotypes that led to the biased memory effects. The imaginal confirmation of such social stereotypes thus contributes to the self-perpetuating nature of stereotypes.
Similar kinds of effects are likely for social-category memberships such as religion or nationality. The impact of initial inferences about category membership on memory and judgments can be powerful indeed. Such effects are particularly interesting when we consider the fact that all individuals are members of many different social categories. That is, we are all multiply categorizable. Thus, Mary may be at the same time a woman, a wife, a mother, a lawyer, a chess player, and a Catholic. The particular operative categorical inference for a social target at any point in time is likely to make more accessible in memory information that is related to and consistent with that categorical inference. Thus, when Mary is categorized as a lawyer, the facts that she was on the debate team in college and is argumentative would be highly accessible in memory. When she is momentarily categorized as a chess player, the fact that she has good spatial skills and is competitive would become highly accessible. The categorization of a person into a particular role or identity depends on both cognitive and motivational factors. Contextual cues implying stereotypes (Macrae et al., 1995), recently activated attitudes (Smith et al., 1996), or chronically accessible attitudes (Fazio and Dunton, 1997; Stangor et al., 1992) lead to the categorization of a multiply categorizable target in line with the context or attitude. For example, Macrae et al. (1995) presented a video of an Asian female either putting on lipstick (to achieve categorization as a female) or eating with chopsticks (to achieve categorization as an Asian). Participants in these experiments then responded more quickly to words that were consistent with the stereotype of the primed category, but, more interestingly, they responded more slowly than baseline to the nonprimed category evidence for the memorial inhibition of that alternative categorization. This indicates that the different possible categorizations of the same target can lead to quite different accessibilities of information about the target in memory.
Zarate and Smith (1990; Smith and Zarate, 1990; see also Stroessner, 1996) examined the effect of group memberships on the categorization of multiply categorizable targets and found that perceivers were more likely to categorize social targets along dimensions that differentiated them from the self. That is, targets were categorized by their nonshared group memberships, or by deviations from the societal norms. This would then have the effect of making accessible in memory those features associated with the category. From a motivational perspective, goals also affect the categorization of an object that belongs to more than one category (Gollwitzer and Moskowitz, 1996). In general, the activation of any schema, script, theme, or stereotype will lead to inferences about a person or event that go beyond the information given. These inferences will affect judgment, amount of recall and recognition, and memory biases in the manner discussed previously. Some of this work has focused on expectations of a person based on stereotypes. For example, Cohen (1981) categorized a target individual as either a waitress or a librarian. Features that were prototypic of the category activated were more accurately recognized than were inconsistent features. More recently, Skowronski et al. (1993) labeled a target as mentally retarded, and this overt labeling of the target led to enhanced recall of stimulus items incongruent with retardation. However, covert priming of retardation enhanced memory for items congruent with retardation. Other work has shown the important effects of expectancies and schemas on memory. Anderson and Pichert (1978) had participants read about a house. They read a story either within the framework of a robber casing the house or a potential buyer of the house. This activation of different scripts very much affected memory for details. In the robber script, items such as jewelry, an expensive television, and a broken window were remembered well. In the buyer script, participants remembered items such as hardwood floors and beautiful landscaping. Similar effects of schema representation on memory have been reported by Alba and Hasher (1983) and by Zadny and Gerard (1974).
Framing effects on memory
Framing refers to the idea that identical information can be presented in different ways such that there is a different focus or a different salience of certain aspects of the information (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Different framings lead to different interpretations of information and thus to different inferences about the value of certain decisions, the motives or goals of actors, and the attitudes or beliefs of those actors. Framing messages or events with a focus on gains versus losses (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), as promoting or preventing certain outcomes (Higgins, 1998), or as focusing on the positive aspects of doing something versus the negative aspects of not doing something (Rothman and Salovey, 1997) have all been shown to have effects on subsequent judgments and decisions. Because different frames make salient certain aspects of the information presented, allowing for different inferences, memory for information can be facilitated or inhibited, and biases in memory in a direction consistent with the framing are to be expected. Higgins and Tykocinski (1992) distinguished between people who chronically framed events in terms of the presence or absence of positive outcomes versus those who framed events in terms of the presence or absence of negative outcomes. They presented participants with a story in which the protagonist experienced or failed to experience various positive and negative events. The difference in chronic approaches to interpreting events led to significant differences in participants' memory for the events in the story. Events framed in ways consistent with chronic thinking were best recalled. One way in which framing can be used to ensure different interpretations of and inferences from information is through language. One can present the same basic information with slightly different words, and this difference can have significant effects on inferences as well as on subsequent judgments and memory. Research on the use of leading questions in eyewitness testimony is an excellent example of the use of language in this way. Loftus (1975; Loftus and Hall, 1982) has shown in many experiments that the framing of a question after an event can very much affect both interpretations of the event and memory for specific aspects of the event. In one such study, Loftus and Palmer (1974) showed participants a video of an automobile accident. After seeing the accident, some participants were asked, How fast were the cars going when they bumped? Other participants were asked How fast were the cars going when they smashed? The slight difference in wording very much affected participants' judgments of the speed of the cars. In addition, the difference in framing led to important differences in memory for information about the accident. For example, participants in the smashed condition remembered actually seeing shattered glass, although none had been present in the video. There are other ways in which linguistic framing can alter the interpretation of events and the inferences that are drawn from social information. Again, these differences in interpretation and inference will have subsequent effects on how the information is organized and represented in memory and on the items of information that are remembered and mis-remembered. Fiedler and Semin (1988) distinguished between state verbs and interpretative action verbs. State verbs (such as love or hate) tend to evoke object attributions of causality, whereas interpretive action verbs (such as help or cheat) evoke subject causal attributions. Sentence-framing did indeed lead to differences in whether the object or subject of a sentence was perceived as causal. In another study, Semin and Fielder (1988) distinguished among descriptive action verbs, interpretive action verbs, state verbs, and adjectives. There was a clear relation between the linguistic frame and the temporal stability of the quality expressed in a sentence, the sentence's informativeness about the subject, and the sentence's verifiability. All of these differences imply that linguistic framing would very much affect what was remembered and how well it was remembered. In support of this, Semin and Greenslade (1985) argue that these different linguistic forms fulfill different functions in the description of behaviors and persons. They found that, as a consequence, the different linguistic forms very much affected and distorted memory-based judgments. In a similar vein, Maass et al. (1989) investigated how the type of language used to describe in-group and out-group behaviors contributes to the persistence of stereotypes (see Maass, 1999, for a review). Their participants encoded and communicated desirable in-group and undesirable out-group behaviors more abstractly than undesirable in-group and desirable out-group behaviors the linguistic intergroup bias effect. Such abstract as opposed to concrete encoding and communication of events would play an important role in perpetuating stereotypes, in part by altering the memory for aspects of the events and the mental representation of those events.
Inferences about groups
In the first section, we focused on inferences about individuals that are likely to have effects on several aspects of memory content, organization, accuracy, and bias. We now turn to inferences about another important kind of social target, the group. As we outline the effects of inferences about groups on memory, we shall pay attention to the similarities with and differences from the effects of inferences about individuals. Historically, processes and outcomes involving group perceptions and stereotypes have been studied independently of research on person perception. Group perception and stereotype researchers have focused on processes of categorization (Allport, 1954; Bruner, 1957; Tajfel, 1969), perceptions of group variability (Linville et al., 1989; Park and Hastie, 1987), mental representation of group-level information (Klein and Loftus, 1990; Smith and Zarate, 1990), and the information-processing and social-judgment consequences of stereotypes (e.g., Bodenhausen and Wyer, 1985). Until recently, few researchers have attempted to integrate person perception and group perception into a single, more coherent framework (Hamilton and Sherman, 1996; Wyer et al., 1984). It is important, however, to consider the major similarities and differences that exist between individual and group perception.
Individual impression formation versus perception of groups: inferences of entitativity and online versus memory-based processing
One of the major points of demarcation between the areas of individual person perception and group perception involves the manner in which target information is processed (Hamilton and Sherman, 1996). As we discussed earlier, information about individual targets is processed in an online manner, in which later information is integrated into an abstracted initial impression (Hastie and Park, 1986). This integrative style of processing is associated with several memory effects that we have discussed, including primacy in recall (Srull and Wyer, 1989), the ability to make judgments without accessing behavioral exemplars (Hastie and Park, 1986), and greater attempts at resolving inconsistencies (Srull et al., 1985). Impressions of members of a group, however, appear to be made in a memory-based fashion. This less integrative processing involves storing pieces of information as they are received, until they are needed for a later judgment. Information is not integrated to form a coherent impression immediately, but each piece of information is stored as an exemplar for later use. The attempted inconsistency resolution associated with online processing does not occur when judgments are memory based. Consequently, recall of target-relevant inconsistencies is less likely when the target is a group. Because judgment relies on the recall of behavioral exemplars, the correlation between recall and judgment tends to be high (Hastie and Park, 1986). Additionally, memory-based judgments generally reflect recency effects, as the most recently encountered information remains the most highly accessible (Lichtenstein and Srull, 1987). In a direct test of this individual/group difference in processing, Susskind et al. (1999) investigated impression formation for individual and group targets. For individual targets, judgments were made more quickly, more extremely, and with greater confidence than for group targets. In addition, expectancy-inconsistent behaviors spontaneously triggered causal attributions to resolve the inconsistency for individual, but not group, targets. These results support the online versus memory-based judgments for individuals and group targets, respectively. In one series of experiments using a modified illusory correlation paradigm (Hamilton and Gifford, 1976), McConnell et al. (1994) found that perceivers tended to form online impressions of individuals but memory-based judgments of group targets. Individual targets resulted in better recall, especially for items presented early, and quicker recognition of statements associated with specific individual targets than did group targets. However, these findings were influenced by the processing goal of the perceiver. When instructions to form impressions increased integrative processing, perceivers showed evidence of online impression formation regardless of whether the target was an individual or a group. Memory-set instructions decreased integrative information-processing and led to memory-based judgments, again regardless of the target type. Thus, perceptions of individuals and groups can be based on differing processing characteristics. In an attempt to integrate and reconcile these processing differences, Hamilton and Sherman (1996) reintroduced the concept of entitativity (Campbell, 1958), the degree to which aggregates of individuals are perceived as social entities. They proposed that, when the expectations of coherence, consistency, and unity are made equivalent between individual and group targets, the processing online versus memory-based differences should disappear. That is, inferences about the entitativity of a target drives the manner in which information about that target is encoded, stored, and retrieved, not the type of target (individual or group). In order to support this contention, McConnell et al. (1997) presented individual and group targets that were described as being either relatively high or low in entitativity. As predicted, highly entitative targets, regardless of whether they were an individual or a group, resulted in better recall, primacy in recall, and low memory-judgment correlations, and a lack of the traditional illusory correlation effect. These effects are all indications of online, integrative information-processing. However, targets with low expectations of entitativity (both individual and group targets) showed the opposite pattern of results (poorer recall, recency effects in recall, high memory-judgment correlations, and the illusory correlation effect), indicating memory-based processing for these targets. Thus, McConnell et al. (1997) provided direct evidence that inferences about entitativity affect the manner in which information about social targets is processed and the way in which memory for target information is affected. As such, inferences about the degree of entitativity of group targets have clear implications for both memory and for social judgment. The previously discussed research indicates processing differences as a result of an inference about the level of entitativity of a target, but this inference should also affect the final product of the impression-formation process. Welbourne (1999) presented equal numbers of intelligent, unintelligent, and neutral (or kind, unkind, and neutral) behaviors to examine the abstraction of a unified impression in the face of inconsistent information. As in the findings of Susskind et al. (1999), an individual-group difference was found, indicating that, in the absence of an inference of high entitativity for groups, perceivers were more likely to attempt to resolve inconsistencies for individual, but not group, targets. However, when the entitativity of the targets was manipulated, perceivers were equally likely to attempt inconsistency resolution for high-entitativity targets regardless of whether the target was an individual or a group. Conversely, low-entitativity targets (both individuals and groups) resulted in a decreased attempt to resolve inconsistencies.
Inferences about group type and memory organization
In addition to inferences about the entitativity of groups, another important inference about groups that has effects on memory involves inferences about group type. In a recent paper, Lickel et al. (2000) had participants rate various groups on a wide variety of attributes that could be used to describe those groups (for example, entitativity, similarity of group members, amount of interaction, importance, duration, common goals and common fate, group size, and permeability of group boundaries). Results indicated the presence of three major, distinct group-type clusters: intimacy groups (such as friends and family), task-oriented groups (such as coworkers and sports teams), and social categories (such as gender, race, and nationality). These types of groups differed in the pattern of attributes that described them. Intimacy groups were rated higher in entitativity than task-oriented groups, which in turn were rated as more entitative than social categories. In addition, intimacy groups were perceived as showing high levels of interaction, similarity, and importance; shared goals; and low permeability. Task-oriented groups were seen as having small size, common goals, moderate entitativity, and high levels of importance, interaction, and permeability. Social categories were characterized as being rather low in entitativity, along with having low levels of importance, interaction, similarity, and common goals. Sherman et al. (2002) investigated the extent to which perceivers spontaneously use these group types to organize information in memory about various groups. They examined the spontaneous organization and representation of groups in memory by looking at errors in recognition when groups of various types were presented (Taylor et al., 1978). In a first phase of their experiment, participants were shown a series of sixty faces in random order, and each face was paired with one of six possible group labels. Two of the six labels were intimacy groups (family member and friend), two were task groups (jury and coworker), and two signified social categories (French and Presbyterian). In the following phase, the faces from the first phase were presented without labels, and participants were asked to supply the correct group label. If members of various groups are spontaneously classified according to their superordinate group typology, errors in recognition should reveal the use of these group types. Indeed, participants made significantly more within-group-type errors than between-groups-type errors. That is, confusions of members of different groups within the same type (for example, a face labeled as French in the first phase mislabeled as Presbyterian in the second phase) were more common than confusions of members of groups of different types (for example, a face labeled French in the first phase mislabeled as coworker, jury member, family member, or friend in the second phase). In another study, participants were presented with behaviors and group labels (again two groups of each group type), and were subsequently given a surprise free-recall task. Participants were asked to recall as many of the previously presented behaviors as possible. Recall protocols were analyzed to assess the organization of recalled behaviors, specifically with regard to within-group-type versus between-groups-type transitions in the behaviors recalled. If behaviors are clustered in memory by group type, there should be more within-group-type transitions (that is, recalling behaviors performed by members of groups of a single type sequentially) than betweengroups-type transitions (that is, transition from a behavior performed by a group member of one group type to a behavior performed by a group member of a different group type). As expected, within-group-type transitions occurred significantly more than between-groupstype transitions. Taken together, the results of the Sherman et al. (2002) study provide compelling evidence that the mental representation of groups is organized by group type. Inferences about group type can very much affect the organization of information about the group in memory, the accuracy of memory, and the particular kinds of errors of recognition and recall that are likely to occur.
Inferences about the self
We have now examined the ways in which and the conditions under which inferences about both individual and group targets affect accuracy and bias in recall as well as memory organization. We shall now consider the effects of inferences on memory for a third type of social target, the self. Of course, one can consider the self as just another case of an individual social target. The only difference is that, in the case of the self, the perceiver and the perceived target are in the same skin. Thus, our discussion and conclusions about inferences and memory for individual targets would apply for the most part to the self as well. However, the self is a rather special target in several ways. Obviously, the self is of special importance, with much emotion and motivation attached to self-knowledge. Moreover, because we are always with ourselves, we have more knowledge about the self than about any other individuals. Even though theorists have at times presented the self concept as a stable and unified structure (Kihlstrom and Cantor, 1984; Lecky, 1945), it is also recognized that there are many different aspects of the self. The self is multiply categorizable in the same way that any other person is. In addition, the traits applied to the self are not necessarily applied in a hard and fast way. At certain times, we might feel successful in our work, energetic, and cooperative. At other times, based on the context and surrounding circumstances, we might feel like failures in our work, lazy, and competitive. As with the perception of other social targets, the inferences that we draw about ourselves at any given time will affect the things that we recall about our past behaviors and outcomes. When we feel successful, we are likely more easily to recall past success experiences. When we feel competitive, we will have accessible those times in our lives when we competed with others. Klein and Loftus (1993) addressed the question of what factors determine the inferences that people make about themselves. More specifically, they were concerned with whether people answered questions about their own traits and attributes by accessing specific autobiographical memories of relevant behaviors or whether they accessed a summary abstract representation of the self without having to rely on specific episodes. The answers to their questions were important for specifying how the self is represented in memory. In addition, the process by which trait inferences about the self are made would affect the content and speed of memory for self-relevant events. Klein and Loftus (1993) employed a task-facilitation paradigm to address these issues. Participants first answered a question about whether a certain trait described them, or they were asked to define the trait. Next, they were asked to recall a time when they behaved in a way that was indicative of that trait. If people access specific past episodes in order to make inferences about their traits, they would
have to access such episodes to answer the describe question. This would then increase the speed at which they answered the next question about recalling a trait-supportive episode (relative to the speed of doing this after the define task). Klein and Loftus (1993) found no indication that, in general, people make self-inferences by accessing specific behaviors. Thus, making trait inferences did not affect memory for behavioral episodes. Interestingly, when making inferences about the traits of others, even well-known others, people do access specific behaviors. Thus, the initial describe task facilitates the speed at which behaviors of others are accessed. The findings of Klein and Loftus (1993) are important in suggesting that autobiographical and abstract self-knowledge is stored and accessed independently. Thus, inferences about and memory for either of these have no effect on the other. This is very different from the way in which episodes and abstract knowledge about other individuals (and groups) are stored and accessed. The relation between inferences and memory for the self and for others reflects these differences in storage and access. In addition to the effects of specific inferences in directing specific memories, there are also important general memory effects of making inferences about the self with regard to the presence or absence of traits and attributes. Rogers et al. (1977) had participants respond to a list of attributes. For each attribute, participants had to indicate either whether the attribute was true of some other person, was true of them, rhymed with a certain word, or was written in capital letters. In the next phase, participants were simply asked to recall all the words. When participants had made an inference about whether an attribute was true of the self, memory for the attribute was especially strong far better than for any other kind of processing of the attribute. Rogers et al. (1977) suggested that this self-referent effect is probably due to the fact that the self is such a rich and complex representation that making each trait inference with respect to the self leads to many associative links to the attribute in memory. However, Klein and his colleagues (Klein and Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein and Loftus, 1988) argued for an organizational processing interpretation, in which participants think about the trait-inference words on the stimulus list in relation to one another. This process of organizing the words about which self-inferences are made enhances memory by establishing inter-item associative paths and category labels. Klein and Loftus (1988) found evidence for both elaborative and organizational processes. Just as inferences and expectancies about other individuals and about groups can lead both to accurate memories and to biases and reconstructions in recall, the same effects can also occur for the self. In fact, given the importance and the amount of affect associated with the self, such biases may be even more prevalent. One line of work has focused especially on the general role of expectancies and inferences about the self on reconstructive memory. The bottom line of this work is that our remembered past is built on what we expect it must have been in light of our present beliefs. These current expectancies about the past are based on schemas about how events in our lives are supposed to unfold. These schemas inform us about the temporal flow of life's events. They thus both guide and bias our recall in line with the schema-driven expectancies and inferences. Work by Ross and his colleagues (Conway and Ross, 1984; McFarland et al., 1989; Ross et al., 1981) empirically demonstrates that recall of one's past is to a large extent determined by one's expectancies about how change occurs. For example, people tend to recall past attitudes as being much closer to present attitudes than they actually are (Ross et al., 1981). This is because people infer that attitudes must be stable over time, and this inference guides their memory. In other cases, people hold inferences and expectancies that behaviors or abilities should change over time. For example, after taking a self-help course, participants reported that their past situations were much worse than they actually were (Conway and Ross, 1984). This allows them to perceive that they have improved over time, a perception which is consistent with their inference about what should have happened over time given that they have taken a self-help course. Such misrecall of the past is also based on a motivation to see the self as better now than in the past, and thus to downgrade in memory one's past behaviors and achievements (Wilson and Ross, 2000). By using one's current standing as a benchmark, one then makes inferences about temporal change or stability, and remembers a past that fits these inferences. Hirt's research and his model of reconstructive memory strongly support these ideas (Hirt, 1990; Hirt et al., 1993). Finally, in recent years, there have been many instances of adults who claim to have recently experienced awakened memories of childhood sexual abuse. The claim is that these memories had been repressed for as long as twenty-five years or more. According to Loftus (1997a, 1997b), these represent false memories of events that had never actually occurred. She describes the process of false memory production as generally involving clients in therapy who are suffering from depression, anxiety, or some other psychological disorder. They are in pain and are searching for a causal explanation for that pain. If the client is led (usually by the therapist) to draw an inference that the cause of the pain must have been some traumatic event from childhood, this assumption leads quite smoothly to the development of false memories of early childhood abuse. The memories can often be very detailed and specific in nature. Loftus and Pickrell (1995) have succeeded in showing that false memories of childhood events can actually be implanted if certain interpretations of early life events are brought about.
Summary of principles involving the effects of social inference on memory
1. For individual targets, inferences are made online as information about the individual is received. Such inferences can lead to good overall memory for the information, primacy effects in recall, low memory-judgment correlations, and heightened memory for information inconsistent with the overall impression. 2. For group targets, inferences are generally memory based, formed after the original information has been received and stored. This judgment process leads to poor overall memory, recency effects in recall, high memory-judgment correlations, and heightened memory for information consistent with the overall impression. 3. The key to differences in processes of inference and memory for social targets is the perceived entitativity of the target. When individuals and groups have the same degree of perceived entitativity, whether high or low, processes and outcomes for inference and memory are the same. 4. Trait inference for individuals is done spontaneously, and this process leads to enhanced recall for behaviors that led to the trait inferences as well as to clustering in memory for behaviors that afforded the same trait inferences. 5. Spontaneous trait inferences can also cause memory distortions and reconstructions such that behaviors consistent with the inferred traits are wrongly recalled. 6. Inferences about the group membership of individuals (especially for groups that are stereotyped) lead to schematic representation of the individuals and have effects on both accuracy for certain stereotype-relevant information and biases in memory in a stereotype-consistent direction.
7. The framing of information causes differential salience of information, affecting the content of inferences as well as the subsequent accuracy and biasing of memory. 8. Inferences about group types affect the organization of group-relevant information in memory. This organization in turn affects the kinds of errors of recall and recognition that are made. 9. The principles of inference and memory for the self follow very closely the principles for individual social targets. However, the greater knowledge about the self, the greater affect associated with the self, and the special motivations that are self-relevant lead to even stronger effects of inferences on both memory accuracy and memory biases.
Memory > inference
Thus far, we have discussed a variety of ways in which social-inference processes can guide, influence, shape, and determine our memories for social information. This relationship between inference and memory, however, is a two-way street. In this section, we discuss several ways in which memory can guide and influence the inferences we make.
Accessibility of information in memory
The knowledge stored in memory is one's cognitive representation of information that has been previously processed. That information can be represented in various ways (Carlston and Smith, 1996) and, due to aspects of the way it was processed, not all information is represented equally. As a consequence, some information is potentially more easily retrievable than other information. Obviously, information that is easily accessible can have greater impact on subsequent judgments, inferences, and decisions than information not easily accessible. Hence, the accessibility of information from memory is an important factor that guides subsequent inference processes. This general effect has been manifested in numerous ways in social-psychological research. What makes some information more accessible in memory? There are several answers to that question.
Stimulus salience
As social cognizers, we process information that is available to us in the immediate social context. However, some aspects of that information capture our attention, engage our processing, or otherwise become highly salient to us. Information salience may be due to a stimulus being highly vivid, or it may achieve its salience simply as a function of the context in which it is encountered. Highly salient information not only is more likely to be attended to, processed, and stored than nonsalient aspects of the social situation, but also is likely to be easily accessible from memory at a later time. The enhanced accessibility of salient information has been shown to influence social inferences in a variety of contexts (e.g., McArthur and Post, 1977; Taylor and Fiske, 1978). Using a mock-jury paradigm, Reyes et al. (1980) manipulated the vividness of either the prosecution or defense evidence, and subsequently participants judged the defendant's guilt or innocence either immediately or 48 hours later. Because all of the evidential arguments were easily retrievable immediately following the presentation of evidence, there were no effects of salience on immediate judgments. However, after a 48-hour delay, judgments were biased by the greater availability of the more vivid evidential information. Participants had better recall for the vivid information, and their verdict judgments were consistent with those recall differences. Thus, with the passage of time, the salient information was more available and consequently had greater impact on judgments. Stimuli that occur infrequently often become salient simply due to their infrequency. The distinctiveness-based illusory correlation effect (Hamilton and Gifford, 1976) demonstrated that infrequently occurring stimuli can have greater impact on subsequent judgments and inferences than information that is more frequent. Participants read a series of statements, each one describing a behavior performed by a member of one of two groups. Most behaviors were desirable in nature, but approximately one-third were undesirable. Similarly, behaviors by members of one of the groups occurred twice as often as behaviors by members of the other group in the stimulus sentences. However, the two groups were equivalent in the proportion of desirable and undesirable behaviors performed by their members. Nevertheless, Hamilton and Gifford found that the co-occurrence of infrequent stimulus properties (undesirable behaviors performed by members of the smaller group) biased subsequent judgments. Specifically, participants estimated that members of the smaller group had performed a higher proportion of undesirable behaviors than the larger group, and they made less desirable evaluative ratings of the smaller group. Hamilton and Gifford (1976) explained these effects as due to the distinctiveness of the infrequently occurring stimulus items, which therefore become more accessible in memory and hence more available for use in subsequent judgment and inference tasks. Subsequent research has directly demonstrated the increased accessibility of these items (for a review of the research evidence and discussion of alternative explanations, see Hamilton and Sherman, 1989; Stroessner and Plaks, 2001).
The salience effects noted above are due to properties of the stimuli themselves within a particular context. Another factor that influences the accessibility of information in memory is priming. The activation of stored knowledge through experiences in the immediate context can make prime-relevant information more accessible in memory, and such recent construct activation can influence inferences, evaluations, and decisions on subsequent tasks (Bargh and Pietromonaco, 1982; Bargh et al., 1986; Devine, 1989; Higgins et al., 1977, 1985; Sherman et al., 1990; Srull and Wyer, 1979). A second factor that influences the accessibility of information in memory is the frequency with which a construct has been primed (Bargh and Pietromonaco, 1982; Srull and Wyer, 1979). Traits, attitudes, or stereotypes that have been frequently activated in past experience are more available in memory than those that have been less frequently primed. Such frequency of activation, if it occurs on a regular and continuing basis, can result in certain constructs becoming chronically accessible, such that no external priming in the immediate context is necessary to make them highly accessible (Higgins et al., 1982). Moreover, because people differ in the kinds of experiences they have that would generate such routine construct activation, individuals quite naturally differ in the particular constructs that are chronically accessible (Bargh et al., 1986; Markus, 1977). All of these factors increase the accessibility of information in memory, which in turn increases its availability for use in subsequent inference and judgment tasks (for a review of accessibility effects, see Higgins, 1996).
Beliefs and expectancies
Greater accessibility in memory due to priming is often the result of recent or frequent experiences. In addition, the information that we acquire and represent in memory varies in its accessibility due to its relevance to prior beliefs and expectancies. That is, the social perceiver is not incorporating new information into a mental vacuum, but rather is assimilating that information into a rich foundation of knowledge and beliefs that represent the wisdom that has accumulated from a lifetime of experiences. Those prior beliefs and expectancies can influence the processing of information in a variety of ways. For example, expectancies can influence the interpretation of new information, the inferences drawn from it, and the nature of attributions and descriptive judgments made about the target of that information (for a review, see Olson et al., 1996). One consequence of these effects on processing is that expectancy-relevant information can become more accessible for later use. However, that simple statement masks some complexities in what we have learned about this matter. Indeed, as we shall see, these effects of prior expectancies can be complex. There is a considerable body of research documenting that information that confirms prior expectancies is processed more easily and is subsequently more readily accessible (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1988; Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein, 1987; Cohen, 1981; Rothbart et al., 1979; for a review, see Hamilton and Sherman, 1994). It therefore exerts greater influence on subsequent inference processes than information that is unrelated to those expectancies. Participants in a study by Hamilton and Rose (1980) read information about members of three occupational groups, and were later asked to estimate how frequently various descriptive terms had been applied to members of each group. Results showed that participants consistently overestimated the frequency with which each of the groups had been characterized by stereotype-confirming items, compared to nonstereotypic information that had described those groups equally often in the stimulus descriptions. Thus, accessibility had a direct bearing on inferences. As discussed earlier, there is also a large body of evidence indicating that information that is incongruent with expectancies is better recalled than expectancy-congruent information, suggesting that such disconfirming information would have greater accessibility to influence subsequent judgments. Following a paradigm introduced by Hastie and Kumar (1979), an initial impression of a target person is established by providing participants with a set of trait-descriptive terms (such as friendly and sociable), and then presenting a series of sentences describing behaviors that are consistent or inconsistent with that impression. Numerous studies have found that, on a subsequent surprise recall task, expectancy-inconsistent behaviors are recalled with higher probability than expectancy-consistent or neutral behaviors (Bargh and Thein, 1985; Crocker et al., 1983; Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981; Srull et al., 1985; Wyer and Gordon, 1982; Wyer and Martin, 1986). The dominant explanation for this incongruency effect (recall advantage for inconsistent over consistent or neutral behaviors) is derived from an associative network model of social memory (Hastie, 1980; Srull, 1981) in which the behavioral items become attached to a person node representing the target person. Once an impression that the target is friendly has been formed, expectancy-consistent behaviors (for example, he gave directions to the visitors who were lost) are easily processed and represented in memory. In contrast, when an inconsistent behavior is encountered (he lost his temper over a minor disagreement), the perceiver attempts to understand this unexpected event by comparing it to other behavioral information previously learned about the target person. In doing so, these incongruent items form direct connections with those retrieved items in the network representation. These inter-item associations, all of which necessarily involve incongruent items, provide more retrieval routes leading to the incongruent items, therefore producing a greater likelihood of recalling those expectancy-inconsistent behaviors. Research has provided considerable support for the network model (Srull and Wyer, 1989). Stern et al. (1984) found that participants had longer processing times for incongruent than congruent items in a self-paced impression-formation task, supporting the hypothesis that some form of extra processing is triggered by expectancy-inconsistent information. What is the nature of that processing? Consistent with the model's assumptions, Sherman and Hamilton (1994) provided evidence that, as an incongruent item is processed, previously encountered information is activated and brought into working memory, thereby generating inter-item links. Moreover, evidence indicates that information that contradicts the existing impression spontaneously triggers the attribution process as the perceiver tries to understand the inconsistent behaviors (Clary and Tesser, 1983; Hastie, 1984; Susskind et al., 1999). Although the Hastie-Srull associative-network model is supported by studies using single-trait representations, the incongruency effect does not occur with increasingly complex multitrait presentation. Hamilton et al. (1989) presented behavior-descriptive sentences about multiple-trait imensions and found that both congruent and incongruent items from the same trait dimension were stored together and were directly associated in memory. Because of these associations, both types of information were recalled equally well. In addition, the effects of trait expectancies on memory depend on whether the dependent measure involves recognition or recall and on the cognitive resources available to the social perceiver. With adequate cognitive resources, for individual targets both recognition and recall show an advantage for incongruent behaviors. However, when cognitive load depletes the resources available, recognition-sensitivity measures continue to show an advantage for inconsistent behaviors whereas recall measures now show a memory advantage for consistent behaviors (Sherman and Frost, 2000; Stangor and McMillan, 1992). As discussed earlier, compared to the effects of inferences about individuals, inconsistency resolution for groups (especially loosely associated groups) is less likely to occur because there is no global expectancy for consistency or stability of traits across the various members of a group. Thus, perceivers will not be motivated to resolve inconsistencies in the case of groups (Susskind et al., 1999) and will not spend a greater amount of time processing inconsistent as opposed to consistent information (Stern et al., 1984). Therefore, the memory advantage for inconsistent information observed with individual targets has been shown not to emerge in forming impressions of groups (Srull, 1981; Srull et al., 1985; Wyer et al., 1984). This conclusion has been supported in a meta-analysis (Stangor and McMillan, 1992).
Self-relevance
If you watch sports often enough, you will notice that the way the coach accounts for success has mainly to do with the team's behavior, and the coach often cites episodes of the team's winning spirit. One might conjecture that the coach is simply trying to bolster the team's
merits. However, the same own-team single-mindedness seems to occur when the team loses. The outcome is then often accounted for by the self-defeating performance of the team, and, again, instances of this self-defeating attitude are abundantly described. One possible explanation is that, during the game, the coach focused on his own team's behavior and has mainly retained episodes diagnostic of his own team's performance. With the heightened accessibility of his own team's behavior, the coach will mainly refer to such information when asked to account for the outcome. As a general rule, the more attention one pays to a given episode or a given episode facet, the better will this episode or facet be retained and, in turn, be more accessible to influence later judgments. Research has provided evidence for this bias toward own or self-relevant behavior. For instance, each partner of a close relationship often attributes more credit to himself or herself for the events and activities in the relationship than the other partner is willing to grant. Ross and Sicoly (1979) indicated that these results could be due to (a) the informational disparity between partners, (b) the motivated or selfenhancing strategy of each partner, or (c) the greater accessibility of self-relevant information. Subsequent research favors the last account because this egocentric bias remains invariant across less visible, more stressful, and negative relationship domains or events (Thompson and Kelley, 1981).
Memory organization
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) asked participants whether there are more words in the English language with the letter r in the first position or the third position, and most people responded that there are more words beginning with r. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) argued that, because alphabet order is a strong organizer for verbal memory, word instances that begin with an r are more available in memory than instances of words with r in the third position, although the latter are actually more frequent in English. Subsequent research that directly manipulated memory accessibility has supported the notion that memory accessibility has a strong impact on judgment (Gabrielcik and Fazio, 1984; Garcia-Marques et al., 2002). A clear example of the impact of memory organization on judgment can be found in research by Sherman et al. (1992). In their study, participants were asked, for instance, to estimate the percentage of men who prefer chocolate to anchovies or the percentage of people who are men who prefer chocolate to anchovies. Sherman et al. (1992) argued that memory is much more likely to be compartmentalized according to gender than to food preference and therefore that the appropriate sampling should be more easily formed in the former case. In fact, the results showed that judgments concerning the more natural sampling space are much less biased and more coherent. In sum, memory organization makes some types of information more available than other types. As a consequence, this greater accessibility can facilitate subsequent retrieval and facilitate judgments that depend upon the more available information, while it can hinder retrieval and impair judgments that depend upon the less available information.
Misattributed memories
The effects of memory on judgment, inference, and decision are so pervasive that they often go unrecognized. Many authors have argued that the reprocessing of a given stimulus does not always result in recollection (Begg et al., 1992; Bornstein and D'Agostino, 1994; Jacoby and Dallas, 1981; Jacoby and Kelley, 1987; Jacoby et al., 1989b; Mandler et al., 1987). Often the enhanced processing fluency derived from stimulus familiarity is taken as a reflection of the objective nature of the stimulus, particularly when the occurrence of stimulus repetition is unnoticed (Bornstein, 1992). Repeated stimuli are thus often judged to have been presented for a longer duration (Witherspoon and Allan, 1985), in a less annoying context (Jacoby et al., 1988), or in more perceptively distinct manner (Mandler et al., 1987). Repeated names are often misjudged as famous (Jacoby et al., 1989a, 1989c), repeated sentences are taken to be more valid (Bacon, 1979; Begg et al., 1985), and repeated objects are considered more likeable (Bornstein, 1989; Zajonc, 1968). These results show that, although stimulus repetition has a considerable impact on judgment and inference, this impact is often unaccompanied by a corresponding recollective experience. This subtlety of the hidden influence of memory on judgment and inference makes it all the more easy to yield to.
Ease of retrieval
We have argued that memory accessibility is a factor that strongly affects judgment because only memories retrieved at the time of judgment can directly affect judgment. But memory accessibility effects go beyond the impact of the content of retrieved memories. The process of memory search by itself can inform judgment in a number of ways. Both an observer and the respondent often take a rapid answer to a given query as an indication of the respondent's expertise. Easily accessed answers are perceived as correct answers. However, what is less obvious is that, even though more easily retrieved memories have a greater impact on memory-based judgments then less easily retrieved ones, things other than the truth value of an item can affect its retrievability. In fact, research that we cited under the rubric of the availability heuristic has provided convincing examples showing that accessibility is often independent of truth. A good example of the effects of the ease of retrieval on judgments, independent of the content of retrieved memory, was reported by Schwarz et al. (1991). Participants recalled either six or twelve instances of their own assertive or unassertive behaviors. They then asked participants to rate themselves on assertiveness scales. Pretesting had revealed that generating six instances of such behaviors is generally easy, whereas retrieving twelve instances is generally difficult. Participants who had recalled six assertive (unassertive) instances rated themselves as more assertive (unassertive) than participants who had recalled twelve instances, even though the latter group had actually recalled a greater number of assertive (unassertive) behaviors. Thus, the ease of retrieving relevant instances (six versus twelve instances) was used as an indirect indication of the content of memory. In a related vein, other studies have demonstrated that easily retrieved (Lichtenstein et al., 1978) or easily imagined events are judged to be more frequent or more likely (Sherman et al., 1985).
Retrieval strategies
In one way or another, making inferences almost invariably involves the use of the knowledge stored in memory. That is, some portion of the information in memory is accessed and becomes the basis for inferences, evaluations, and decisions. As we have just seen, certain properties of the information itself can make some items of information more accessible than others. In addition, the individual searches (consciously or unconsciously) through memory to retrieve information for various purposes. The retrieval processes engaged in by the individual will therefore influence the information available for use and hence can become an important determinant of the nature of the
inferences and judgments made. One might prefer to view the individual as an impartial inquisitor searching through stored knowledge for the most reasonable basis for making judgments. However, although there may be times when this model is applicable (for example, when the decision is important), a number of factors can influence this process, making retrieval a less comprehensive and potentially more selective process. Consequently, when the retrieved information is used as the basis for subsequent processes (inferences, decisions), these aspects of the retrieval process can bias the resulting inferences. We have already discussed such biasing effects in research by McArthur and Post (1977), Taylor and Fiske (1978), Reyes et al. (1980), and Hamilton and Gifford (1976). Earlier in the chapter, we saw how inferences and expectancies can bias memory in such a way as to render memory consistent with inferences. Here we suggest that memory can bias inferences in a way to render inferences consistent with what is remembered.
Exhaustive and heuristic retrieval strategies: the TRAP model
We have discussed numerous factors that can influence and guide the search of memory in accordance with goals, contexts, and prior expectancies. These variables can have effects on both the amount of information retrieved and the content of that information. Of course, once memory is affected or certain aspects of memory become more accessible, the information retrieved will have important effects on subsequent inferences. We now turn to a somewhat different parameter in information retrieval, the strategy by which the individual searches memory for task-relevant information. Garcia-Marques and Hamilton (1996; Garcia-Marques et al., 2002; Hamilton and Garcia-Marques, 2003) introduced a distinction between two strategies for retrieving information from memory, exhaustive and heuristic retrieval. Exhaustive retrieval refers to the typical conception of memory search, as in the standard recall of learned information from memory. It is an effortful search process that searches sequentially through associative memory, using each retrieved item as a cue for the retrieval of other items in the most thorough possible way. Its output consists of the retrieval of a series of specific episodic traces. In contrast, heuristic retrieval represents an indirect way of probing memory. It uses the degree of fit between available retrieval cues and the stored memory traces as a whole as a clue to some aspect of memory content (such as the frequency of a given episodic feature). Its output is typically an overall summary judgment, such as a frequency estimate. The retrieval output of these two modes depends upon different factors. Exhaustive retrieval is a resourceconsuming process and therefore will be affected by cognitive load. Heuristic retrieval, however, is a relatively quick and low resourcedemanding retrieval technique that will be affected by memory accessibility (that is, recent and frequent priming) and cue salience. To investigate this distinction, Garcia-Marques and Hamilton (1996) combined the main features of the paradigms discussed previously specifically, those used by Hastie and Kumar (1979) and Hamilton and Rose (1980). Participants were given impression-formation instructions and were then presented with a list of behaviors performed by two social targets. Expectancies were induced implicitly by providing the target's occupation, and the two targets had occupations that generated opposite trait expectancies (for example, librariancultured; waitress-uncultured). One-third of the behaviors were expectancy-congruent, another third were expectancy-incongruent, and the final third were expectancy-neutral. Following a distracter task, participants were asked to (a) free-recall all the behaviors, (b) estimate the frequency of occurrence of behaviors illustrative of each trait, and (c) judge the target on several trait-rating scales. The results revealed the difference between the exhaustive strategy involved in free recall and the heuristic retrieval strategy that underlies frequency estimation and trait judgments. Incongruent behaviors were recalled better than congruent behaviors. In contrast, frequency estimates were higher for congruent behaviors than for incongruent behaviors, and trait judgments were more heavily influenced by the congruent information. Thus, the predicted dissociation between recall and judgment occurred. These results were interpreted as due to the different search processes engaged in free recall (exhaustive) and in frequency estimation and trait judgment (heuristic). These findings are particularly impressive in that these seemingly incompatible effects better recall of incongruent items and overestimation of congruent items were obtained on immediately successive tasks performed by the same participants. As discussed earlier, the incongruency effect in free recall has been obtained in numerous studies. However, it does not always occur, and the TRAP model's distinction between exhaustive and heuristic retrieval provides a framework for understanding these outcomes. Research has shown that, because exhaustive retrieval is cognitively demanding, the incongruency effect occurs only when a number of favorable cognitive factors are met (Garcia-Marques et al., 2002; Hamilton et al., 1989). Specifically, the incongruency effect will be evident when all acquired information pertains to only one trait dimension, when no distractions are present and sufficient processing resources are available, and when one later tries to recall any and all information about the person, in any order, with no concern for content themes. However, when the information pertains to more than one trait, when the perceiver is under cognitive load, or when retrieval is selectively aimed at certain facets of the information, the incongruency effect does not occur. These qualifications of the incongruency effect are important because impression formation typically occurs when the perceiver learns an array of information pertaining to several facets of the person's life. The perceiver is simultaneously coping with multiple demands on cognitive resources, and subsequent retrieval of specific information about the person will be for a given purpose that will guide the retrieval process to search for particular content. In other words, the conditions that limit the generality of the incongruency effect seem to be typical of many everyday social contexts. They also suggest the relative infrequency of exhaustive retrieval in day-to-day life. It seems likely that heuristic retrieval occurs much more commonly in everyday contexts, and therefore, that the corresponding procongruent memory and judgment effects will be more commonly observed (Hamilton and Garcia-Marques, 2003).
Relationship between memory and judgment
When a given judgment is called for, the reported judgment can be either computed at that time or simply retrieved (if it has been previously computed). This simple distinction has a number of consequences for the nature of the judgment and for its relationship to the available relevant memory content. Hastie and Park (1986) distinguished between online and memory-based judgments. Online judgments are computed at the time the relevant information is processed. Memory-based judgments are computed only after the relevant information has been processed and therefore are based on whatever relevant information is retrieved from memory at the time. Hastie and Park (1986) argued that memory-
based judgments should be strongly correlated with the output of free recall because the retrieval of relevant information is a necessary precondition for memory-based judgments. In contrast, no such correlation is expected for online judgments because the factors that affected the online judgment are not necessarily those that moderate the later availability of the relevant information in memory. Hastie and Park's (1986) distinction between online and memory-based judgments was a centrally important contribution. It has not only advanced our understanding of factors that govern the relationship between memory and judgment but has also broadened our perspective on what that relationship should look like, when, and why. The basic prediction from their analysis is clear-cut and important; in many cases, it represents a valid account of memory-judgment relationships. However, the TRAP model suggests that at least two amendments can be made. First, the designation memory-based judgment is a misnomer. Hastie and Park (1986) refer to free recall and not necessarily to memory. As we argued earlier, there are search processes in memory that are very different from the retrieval processes in free recall (that is, heuristic retrieval processes). Moreover, with our increasingly extended knowledge about memory dissociations, it is difficult to speak about a judgment being correlated with memory. There are a host of memory measures (for example, direct, indirect; implicit, explicit), and many of these memory indicators do not correlate well with each other (see Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork, 1988). For instance, Garcia-Marques and Hamilton (1996) found that, although impression judgments seldom correlated with the output of free recall (a memory measure), they were highly correlated with frequency estimation (another memory measure). Second, according to the TRAP model, free recall and impression judgments commonly depend upon different retrieval search processes (exhaustive versus heuristic retrieval). However, the independence often observed between free recall and judgment derives, according to the TRAP model, from the fact that their respective underlying search processes explore different features of the relevant cognitive representation. Exhaustive retrieval searches through item-to-item associations, whereas heuristic search mainly explores the associations between items and referent nodes. Thus, for instance, in standard impression-formation conditions, associative density among items and the association strength between items and referent nodes generate opposite implications, in that the former benefits expectancyincongruent retrieval and the latter benefits expectancy-congruent information. Under these conditions, impression judgments and free recall are independent. However, item-to-item associations are sometimes not developed at all (for example, when cognitive demands during encoding are high). Under other conditions, item-to-item associations are formed but they may not be explored during retrieval (for example, because of scarce resources, or because the recall goal is selective). In such cases, both exhaustive and heuristic retrieval are limited to searching via associations between items and referent nodes, and under these conditions high correlations between the output of free recall and impression judgments can emerge (Garcia-Marques and Hamilton, 1996; Garcia-Marques et al., 2002). In sum, the distinction put forth by Hastie and Park (1986) can be usefully deepened and extended if the diversity and complexity of retrieval processes are recognized.
Summary of principles involving the effects of memory on inference
1. Information accessible in memory has greater influence on inferences and judgments. Among the factors that can heighten the accessibility in memory are stimulus salience, priming, prior beliefs and expectancies, memory organization, and the self-relevance of information. 2. Information in memory that is easily retrieved and events that are easily imagined influence inferences and judgments more than memories that are less easily retrieved. 3. The processing effects of memory can be misattributed to features of the stimulus or of the context. The fluency that derives from reprocessing a stimulus can be attributed to its perceptive or evaluative nature. 4. Memory retrieval can affect judgment by the relative ease or difficulty of the retrieval process itself. The relative ease of retrieving an episode is often taken as an indication of its prevalence in memory. 5. Information can be retrieved from memory in different ways. Use of different retrieval strategies or modes can influence what information is accessed, which in turn can provide differing bases for subsequent inferences. 6. Inferences and judgments are sometimes based directly on recalled information (memory-based judgments), producing a positive relation between recall and judgment. Alternatively, many social inferences and judgments are formed as information is initially processed (online judgments), and these have no necessary relation to recalled memories.
We have reviewed and discussed a broad range of research and thinking concerning social inference and social memory. Most important, we have tried to demonstrate and clarify the interplay between the two. Just as the content and processes of social inference affect memory for social targets and events, memories of those targets and events have equally important effects on subsequent inferences. Because of this complex interplay between inferences and memory, it is difficult to end with a simple, neat conclusion that captures a bottom line in a pithy phrase or paragraph. Perhaps the best way to conclude is by adopting one of Carlston and Smith's (1996) principles of mental representation: the mental mush principle. Within this principle, Carlston and Smith (1996) recognize that stored knowledge affects interpretation. Likewise, they recognize the impact of this stored knowledge on memory. In addition, they propose that there are multiple mental representations, each having effects on attributions in both perception and memory. Rather than proposing a representational mental model that consists of each item represented in a separate file with independent access, they suggest that mental representations are superposed, so that accessing any item will access all items, and changing the representation of any item will change everything. Such a model forces one to exactly the conclusion that we have reached our perceptions, inferences, judgments, and memories are all constructed from the same information contained in multiple mental representations. These perceptions, inferences, judgments, and memories are all intertwined and interconnected. In fact, labeling an event as an inference, a perception, or a memory may be somewhat arbitrary and depend only on the existing context. While we might prefer a simpler view where the processes and representations are discrete and independent, how much more exciting it is to recognize the complexity involved and to unravel the complexity.
Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by National Institute of Mental Health Grant MH-40058 to SJ. Sherman and D.L. Hamilton, and by National Institute on Drug Abuse Grant K05DA00492 to SJ. Sherman.
How do you make predictions, judgments, or inferences about individuals that you know? About groups to which you do or do not belong? About yourself? Are these judgments always accurate? What things do you remember about other people? About groups? About yourself? Are these memories always accurate? This chapter is about the biases that enter into these kinds of judgments and memories. In addition, the judgments and memories affect each other. The judgments and inferences that you make affect your memories, and what you remember affects your judgments. This chapter explores the interplay between our social judgments and our memories.
Research and theory in the areas of social inference and social memory have played important roles in social psychology. In this chapter we discuss the ways in which these two systems interact. The content and process of social inference have significant effects on the content, accuracy, and biases of memory. Also, memory structure and process affect inferences about social targets. By examining both directions of effects, we extract general principles by which social inference and memory are linked. Regarding the effects of social inference on memory, we discuss inferences about individuals, groups, and the self. The key factor in differences in inference and memory for social targets is the perceived coherence of the target. Individuals generally have higher coherence, and information is processed online. Information about groups, which have lower coherence, is processed in a memory-based fashion. The greater knowledge and affect associated with the self render this a unique case with especially significant effects of inferences on memory. Regarding the effects of memory on inference, the key factors are the accessibility of information and the ease of the retrieval process itself. Different retrieval strategies have effects on the specific information that is retrieved as well as on subsequent inferences.
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Stereotyping and Impression Formation: How Categorical Thinking Shapes Person Perception
Kimberly A. Quinn, C. Neil Macrae, Galen V. Bodenhausen
In everyday life, we are repeatedly confronted with people with whom we must interact. In order to accomplish this goal, however, we must form an impression that captures the other person's characteristics in a coherent and meaningful manner. What is perhaps most remarkable about this process of impression formation is the ease and rapidity with which it is accomplished. Impressions often spring to mind so readily that it seems as though they directly reflect the immediately obvious, objective characteristics of the target person, without any active inferential construction of the impression on our part. In reality, research on impression formation has revealed a complex series of mental processes that are involved in construing the character of others and the meaning of their behavior. Impression formation begins with the observation of a target person by the social perceiver. This observation leads to the identification and categorization of the target's behavior. Through a process of attribution, this behavioral categorization leads to a characterization or inference about the actor, and these inferences may or may not be moderated by a process of correction in which the perceiver considers other (perhaps situational) factors that might have produced the behavior. Through a process of integration, the various inferences that are drawn about the behavior are combined into a coherent, organized impression of the target. Consider, for a moment, what kind of impression you may form of the first author's great aunt. She is an elderly woman, short, somewhat overweight, with stooped posture. She walks with a cane, wears thick-rimmed black glasses, and is soft-spoken. She never married, has no children, and has no family in the community in which she lives. She has very little money. Knowing all of this, you would probably expect her to be lonely and unhappy. As it turns out, however, Aunt Gertrude is a very caring, understanding individual who always appears to be satisfied. But how can this be? A brief interaction with Aunt Gertrude may be sufficient to resolve this puzzle. Aunt Gertrude is a Catholic nun who has devoted her life to charity. The immediate visual evidence provided by her nun's habit is all that it would take to enable you to make sense of her various attributes and to form a coherent impression of her. But the story is more complex. Aunt Gertrude loves romance novels, even the very sexy ones, the ones with cover illustrations of handsome men, shirtless and flexing under the adoring gaze of semiclad women. She absolutely devours them (the novels, that is!). How, then, can this revealing bit of information be reconciled with your impression of sweet, chaste, elderly Sister Gertrude?
Stereotypes and efficient person perception
Even simple examples such as the case of Aunt Gertrude underscore the complexity of the task facing social perceivers in considering the overwhelming amount of information that is available in our complex social world. In recognition of this complexity, recent approaches to impression formation have converged on a set of working assumptions, the most basic of which is that perceivers prefer simple, wellstructured impressions (Bodenhausen and Macrae, 1994) and that they achieve this coherence by regularly constructing and using categorical representations (such as stereotypes) in their attempts to understand others. By construing others not in terms of their unique constellations of attributes and inclinations but, rather, on the basis of the social categories to which they belong (such as race, age, sex, or occupation), perceivers can make use of the wealth of related stereotype-based mateial that resides in long-term memory. As Gilbert and Hixon (1991: 509) have noted, the ability to understand new and unique individuals in terms of old and general beliefs is among the handiest tools in the social perceiver's kit. A wealth of research has documented that when a particular categorization is made and associated stereotypes are activated, they influence impressions both directly and indirectly. The direct influences come from the activation of stereotypic beliefs themselves, which may be added (or averaged) into one's general impression of the target. More interesting, however, are the indirect effects that emerge when activated stereotypic concepts influence the selection and interpretation of other available information. Stereotypes appear to direct attention and influence which information gets encoded and how information is interpreted, such that people often notice instances that confirm their existing stereotype-based beliefs (Bodenhausen, 1988; Chapman and Chapman, 1967, 1969; Higgins and Bargh, 1987; Rothbart et al., 1979), interpret ambiguous information as confirming their stereotypes (Darley and Gross, 1983; Duncan, 1976; Jacobs and Eccles, 1992; Jones, 1990), and actively seek information that confirms their view of others (Snyder and Swann, 1978). The guiding assumption of contemporary models of impression formation, then, is that whenever we encounter someone and categorize him or her as a member of a particular group, stereotypes about this group will exert an influence on the interpretive processes involved in forming an impression of the person (Bodenhausen and Macrae, 1998; Bodenhausen et al., 1997; Brewer, 1988, 1996; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990; Hamilton et al., 1990; Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000). This categorical thinking is assumed to shape person perception in at least two important ways: categorical thinking enables perceivers, first, to use the activated knowledge structure to guide the processing (for example, encoding or representation) of any target-related information that is encountered and, second, to rely on the contents of the activated knowledge structure (for example, trait and behavioral expectancies) to derive evaluations and impressions of a target. Thus, at the categorization stage, stereotypes are assumed to be activated along with trait representations and situational scripts, enabling assimilative effects on attention and encoding. At the characterization stage, stereotypes are assumed to influence comprehension of the target's actions, producing assimilative influences on behavioral interpretation and inference generation, and permitting the selective processing of expectancy-consistent information. At the correction stage, it is assumed that social perceivers may attempt to take into account how stereotypes might be biasing their overall impressions. At each of these stages, stereotypes can have both facilitative and inhibitory influences on information processing, alternately enhancing or diminishing the stereotypicality of the system's outputs
(Bodenhausen and Macrae, 1998).
Categorization processes in impression formation: stereotype activation
Central to several influential models of person perception is the notion that the stereotypes associated with social categories are automatically activated in the mere presence of a triggering stimulus (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990). The origins of this notion can be traced to Allport's (1954) seminal writings on the nature of prejudice. The message that Allport forwarded was straightforward and powerful: to simplify the demands of daily interaction, mere exposure of a stimulus target is sufficient to stimulate categorical thinking and promote the emergence of its associated judgmental, memorial, and behavioral products (that is, stereotyped reactions). According to this account, then, categorical thinking is an unavoidable aspect of the person-perception process. Allport's ideas have enjoyed a revival in recent decades, prompted largely by a landmark paper by Devine (1989). Devine proposed that racial stereotypes are indeed activated automatically upon detection of a person's group membership. She argued that because people are inevitably exposed to the cultural transmission of stereotypical ideas during childhood socialization, social-category membership comes to be inextricably associated with stereotypical notions that spring to mind without any conscious intention on the part of the perceiver. Supporting this reasoning was work reported by Dovidio et al. (1986). In their research, they presented participants with a category label (such as Black or White), followed by a series of adjectives (such as musical or metallic) that were either stereotypical or nonstereotypical with respect to the presented category label. The participants' task was simply to report, as quickly as possible, whether each item could ever be true of the primed category. As expected, participants responded more rapidly when stereotypic rather than nonstereotypical items followed the priming label, suggesting that the categorical representation of the group was activated during the task. Nonetheless, because the participants' attention was directed toward the category label, this early demonstration failed to provide unequivocal evidence of automatic stereotype activation. However, in a series of more controlled tests of the automatic-activation hypothesis, Devine (1989) demonstrated that even preconscious presentation of racial material was sufficient to prompt the activation of stereotypical concepts. After exposure to preconscious primes pertaining to the category African-American, participants later judged an ambiguous target person in a decidedly stereotypical way. In more recent research, preconscious cues have also been shown to precipitate stereotype activation in the domains of sex, age, and occupation (Bargh, 1999). Following these initial demonstrations, an abundance of experiments emerged in which researchers measured the accessibility of categorical contents (that is, stereotypic traits) after the presentation of priming stimuli, usually (though not always) verbal labels (such as Asian). These subsequent investigations employed a variety of semantic priming techniques that attempted to obscure or conceal the relationship between the experimental primes and target stimuli. The logic of these studies is straightforward: if perceivers are unable to avoid stereotype activation when the triggering stimuli lie outside awareness or are seemingly irrelevant to the task at hand, then evidence of stereotype activation would corroborate the viewpoint that stereotype activation is unconditionally automatic. As it turns out, the available evidence tends to support this view (Bargh, 1999).
Conditional automaticity in categorization and stereotype activation
But does this really signal that stereotype activation is unconditionally automatic in the sense proposed by Allport (1954)? The answer to this question remained unclear, for at least two reasons. First, many of the social stereotypes that had attracted empirical attention were those linked to group memberships that could be discerned from a rudimentary visual appraisal of a stimulus target: sex, ethnicity, and age group. It seemed quite reasonable that perceivers might automatically categorize others into groups on the basis of these readily discernible visual cues; indeed, they have often been referred to as the Big Three in stereotyping (Fiske, 1998), and research on the white male norm hypothesis and related effects does provide evidence that race and sex categorizations occur quickly and effortlessly (e.g., Stroessner, 1996; Zarate and Smith, 1990). Nonetheless, it was less clear whether categorizations based on less rudimentary cues would also elicit mental activation of the stereotypes associated with the group in question. It was also unclear whether stereotypes were activated automatically by the strict definition of automaticity as involuntary, unintentional, effortless, and unconscious (Bargh, 1989). In fact, under empirical scrutiny, most mental operations fail to satisfy the multiple criteria required to specify a process as exclusively automatic in nature (Bargh, 1990, 1994, 1997; Kahneman and Treisman, 1984; Logan and Cowan, 1984); even prototypic examples of automatic mental processes fail in this respect. As Logan (1989: 70) has remarked, automatic reactions can be modulated by attention and intention; they can be inhibited and suppressed; and they can be coherent and planful. Given this state of affairs, a revised conception of automaticity has emerged in recent years, a conception that emphasizes not the unitary nature of the concept but, rather, the extent to which its various components (that is, awareness, intention, efficiency, and control) are independently implicated in the execution of specific mental operations. The possibility that stereotype activation is conditionally, rather than unconditionally, automatic has attracted considerable empirical attention in recent years and has engendered heated theoretical debate. Backed by a revised conception of automaticity, researchers have challenged the assumption that stereotypical representations are activated automatically in the presence of a stimulus target. As Bargh (199: 14) has argued, as with all preconscious processes, what determines whether the stereotype becomes automatically activated is whether it has been frequently and consistently active in the past in the presence of relevant social group features. Thus, if there is meaningful variation in the frequency and consistency of people's exposure to stereotypes, there may also be variation in the automatic component of stereotype activation as well. Indeed, this is precisely the message that is beginning to emerge in the literature on the subject. In one of the earliest challenges to Devine's (1989) argument, Lepore and Brown (1997) demonstrated that people high and low in prejudice respond similarly if stereotypes are activated, but that they respond differently to category activation. Although high- and lowprejudice participants demonstrated equivalent knowledge of the black stereotype and responded to stereotype activation with similarly negative impressions of the target individual, these similarities were not replicated when participants were primed subliminally with the category Black. Following priming of the category label, high-prejudice people exhibited the same negative impression of the target, relative to a control condition; low-prejudice people did not, suggesting that priming Black failed to lead to the activation of the black
stereotype (see also Kawakami et al., 1998; Lepore and Brown, 2002; Locke et al., 1994; Moskowitz et al., 1999). More recently, Livingston and Brewer (2002) reported evidence to suggest that even the presentation of black faces, which are presumably more meaningfully linked to the black stereotype than is the label Black, do not lead inevitably to activation of the black stereotype. Indeed, a host of variables have been shown to moderate the supposedly automatic nature of stereotype activation. Many of these variables reside within the social perceiver, influencing both the motivation and the ability to override stereotypical responding. Other variables, however, reside outside the perceiver, in the contextual constraints that make stereotypical information more or less relevant to the task at hand. (For a review, see Blair, 2002.)
Cognitive moderators of stereotype activation
In addition to evidence that prejudice level may moderate the automaticity of stereotype activation, other research has suggested that stereotype activation may also be constrained by a number of cognitive, or capacity-related, factors. One such factor is the perceiver's level of attentional resources. Most notably, Gilbert and Hixon (1991) reported evidence to suggest that stereotype activation may not occur when perceivers are resource-depleted. In their experiments, participants viewed a video depicting an Asian woman turning over a series of cards on which word fragments were written. The participants' task was simply to complete each word fragment with the first word that came to mind. The results demonstrated that participants did indeed tend to choose stereotypical word completions for the fragments (for example, rice rather than mice for ice), but only when they had sufficient attentional resources available to do so. Gilbert and Hixon concluded that stereotype activation is only conditionally automatic, in that its occurrence depends on the availability of attentional resources. Physiological processes may also moderate stereotype activation through their impact on arousal level and resultant information-processing resources. For example, Macrae et al. (2002a; see also Johnston et al., 2003, 2005) recently provided evidence of hormonal influences on social-cognitive functioning. From evidence that women are more attracted to facial symmetry and masculinity during ovulation, Macrae et al. reasoned that women should similarly be sensitive to category-level (that is, stereotypical) information during periods of high conception risk because of the relevance of this information to potential reproductive success. Indeed, they demonstrated that during high conception risk, women categorized male faces more quickly than they categorized female faces (demonstrating hormonally moderated categorization) and classified malestereotypical words more quickly than counterstereotypical words (demonstrating hormonally moderated stereotype activation).
Motivational moderators of stereotype activation
Other research has suggested that stereotype activation may also be constrained by motivational concerns (e.g., Blair, et al. 2004; Hugenberg and Bodenhausen, 2004; Richeson and Trawalter, 2005). Several researchers have sought to demonstrate that perceivers' immediate processing goals may be a more potent determinant of stereotype activation than the availability of attentional resources per se. Spencer et al. (1998), for example, have proposed that sufficiently motivated perceivers might be able to activate social stereotypes even under conditions of resource depletion. That is, they have demonstrated that even resource-depleted perceivers are capable of activating stereotypes if such activation can enhance their feelings of self-worth. Participants who received negative feedback responded more quickly to words denoting evalua-tor-relevant stereotypes than did participants who did not receive negative feedback, even when they were cognitively busy. Further evidence for goal-directed stereotype activation can be found in a study by Pendry and Macrae (1996), who demonstrated that the extent of stereotype activation is moderated by perceivers' level of involvement with a target. When relatively uninvolving processing objectives are in place (for example, estimating a target's height), stereotype activation typically occurs at the broadest (that is, superordinate) level of categorization. However, when complex interactional goals are operating (for example, accountability and outcome dependence), a target is categorized both in terms of a higher-order representation (for example, woman) and a more differentiated category subtype (for example, business woman). Stereotype activation thus appears to be goal-dependent, with its occurrence contingent on the interplay of both cognitive and motivational forces. Perceiver goals may also determine the nature of the processing undertaken when a target is encountered, with implications for categorization and thus stereotype activation. Macrae et al. (1997b; see also Wheeler and Fiske, 2005) demonstrated that the encoding operation that is undertaken when a person is encountered is a critical determinant of stereotype activation. Specifically, only the semantic appraisal of a person prompts the relevant categorical knowledge structures; presemantic processing orientations (for example, perceptual goals) are not sufficient to elicit stereotype activation. Thus, participants who judged the animacy of visual targets, determined the presence or absence of a white dot on those targets, or simply reported the detection of the targets were all equally accurate in a subsequent face-recognition task. Nonetheless, only participants who made the semantic (that is, animate-inanimate) judgments displayed stereotype activation.
Contextual moderators of stereotype activation
Stereotype activation is not moderated solely by the contents of the perceiver's mind. Contextual factors also play a role in determining whether stereotypes are activated in the presence of social category members (e.g., Castelli et al., 2004; Plant et al., 2005; Schaller et al., 2003). In particular, the situational context in which category members are encountered provides important input to the categorization process, as was demonstrated recently by Wittenbrink et al. (2001: Experiment 2). They used a sequential priming paradigm (following Fazio et al., 1995) in which participants responded to black and white face primes that were accompanied by positive or negative background scenes (a church interior or a street corner, respectively). The results indicated that in the negative context, black face primes produced disproportionately facilitated responses to negative items, particularly negative stereotypic items. In the positive context, however, there was no evidence of a prejudiced valence bias, suggesting that activation of the negative black stereotype was attenuated by its presentation in a negative-stereotype-incongruent context.
Work by Kurzban et al. (2001) also supports the role of contextual information in determining stereotype activation. Kurzban et al. sought to challenge race as one of the Big Three in social categorization (Fiske, 1998) and to demonstrate that the propensity of social perceivers to categorize according to race is a byproduct of the tendency for race and coalitional friend/enemy status to becorrelated. Kurzban et al. employed the category confusion paradigm (Taylor et al., 1978), asking participants to form impressions of a series of individuals through a set of materials pairing faces (of black and white individuals) with opinions ostensibly expressed by the individuals. In one experiment, the expressed opinions provided cues to coalitions and suggested two allegiances within the set of individuals. In a surprise recall test, participants continued to make more within-race errors than between-race errors, demonstrating a lack of differentiation among blacks and suggesting categorization on the basis of race. However, the same participants also exhibited category confusions on the basis of coalition, albeit less strongly. In a follow-up experiment, physical cues to allegiance were added to the verbal cues; in this case, there was a reversal in the importance of race versus coalition categorization such that race confusions decreased dramatically and coalition confusions increased just as dramatically. In another examination of how factors outside the perceiver affect stereotype activation, Macrae et al. (2002b) adopted a functionalist approach and speculated that the direction of the target's eye gaze would moderate stereotype activation. They reasoned that eye gaze acted as a cue through which perceivers could assess the relevance of the target, such that eye gaze directed toward the perceiver would be particularly relevant and would impel the perceiver to discern the intentions of the target. Importantly, assessing these intentions would be facilitated to the extent that any relevant information could be accessed, and categorical (that is, stereotypical) information could provide intention-relevant information. Indeed, their research demonstrated that gender categorization was faster for directgaze faces than for faces with averted gaze or faces with closed eyes. Furthermore, lexical decisions were faster when gender stereotypical words were preceded by directgaze faces than by laterally averted faces or faces with closed eyes, suggesting that gaze direction moderates both person categorization and stereotype activation. Other evidence also supports the role of target characteristics (e.g., Blair et al., 2002, 2004; Hugenberg and Bodenhausen, 2004; Locke et al., 2005; Maddox, 2004; Maddox and Gray, 2002).
Categorization and stereotype activation: the case of multiply categorizable targets
But what of social categorization in the real world, where category labels are not provided by an experimenter or where the target's identity reflects multiple category memberships? Upon encountering an individual, perceivers must make their own categorization, a categorization that can take many forms depending on the behaviors or features to which the social perceiver attends. Stereotypes will not influence thought or action if they are not activated, and they will not be activated if the target's membership in a stereotyped group is not detected, as may be the case when the target belongs to several groups (for example, gender, ethnic, occupational, and so on). How does the mind deal with the problem of multiple category memberships? One possibility is that the target will be classified in all possible ways and that each of the applicable stereotypes will be activated simultaneously. Perhaps, then, all of the stereotypes that happen to be associated with these various categorizations will be activated, and from this assortment of associations the perceiver will attempt to produce a meaningful, coherent, and well-structured impression of the target. One recent model (Kunda and Thagard, 1996) suggests that these disparate categorizations, and indeed anything else that is known about the target (that is, individuating information) will be activated simultaneously and will mutually constrain each other's meanings, eventually converging on a summary impression that can best accommodate the various elements composing one's knowledge of the target. When perceivers encounter a multiply categorizable target, all applicable categories are believed to be activated in parallel and a competition for mental dominance then ensues. Contextual salience (e.g., Biernat and Vescio, 1993), chronic and temporary category accessibility (e.g., Smith et al., 1996), comparative and normative fit (Oakes et al., 1991), and temporary goal states (e.g., Pendry and Macrae, 1996) are all factors that are likely to confer an activation advantage to particular categories in such a competition. This task could be daunting and counterproductive, however. Almost inevitably, some elements of the available information will work against these goals of simplicity and coherence, either by conflicting with other information (for example, the nun known to have taken the vow of chastity, but who was observed to spend many hours reading racy romance novels) or by distracting the perceiver from whatever dominant themes might emerge in her impressions (for example, the nun who displayed behaviors consistent with kindness and charity, but who was also seen to perform an interpretive belly dance). In light of this, recent approaches assume that the process of information selection in impression formation involves not only the facilitation of some information, but also the inhibition of interfering or irrelevant information. In this variation of the parallel-constraint-satisfaction view, mutual constraint refers not only to the contextualization of an attribute's meaning, given other known attributes, but also (under some circumstances) to the active inhibition of some attributes by others. That is, category selection is assumed to be facilitated through the implementation of basic inhibitory processes, such that potentially distracting categorizations are removed from the cognitive landscape through a process of spreading inhibition. The result is an impression that is coherent and straightforward, undiluted by distracting and complicating elements. Evidence for inhibitory processes in stereotype activation comes from Macrae et al. (1995; see also Dunn and Spellman, 2003). The studies involved the video presentation of an Asian woman who could be categorized in two salient ways (that is, on the basis of sex or ethnicity). In one study, prior to viewing the video and judging its edit quality, participants underwent a parafoveal priming manipulation in which either the category woman, the category Chinese, or no category was activated. After viewing the video, participants performed an allegedly unrelated lexical decision task in which the critical trials included words that were stereotypical of either women or Asians. With the control condition as a baseline, the data showed evidence of both activation of the primed stereotype and inhibition of the nonprimed stereotype: when the category woman had been primed, participants were both significantly faster to verify stereotypical associates of woman and significantly slower to verify stereotypical associates of Asian than controls. Conversely, when the category Chinese had been primed, participants were both significantly faster to verify stereotypic associates of Chinese and significantly slower to verify stereotypical associates of woman than controls. This basic pattern was replicated in a second experiment in which the salience of the particular categorization was manipulated with contextual cues rather than the parafoveal priming manipulation. (For evidence against category dominance, see Stroessner, 1996; Weeks and Lupfer 2004.) Interestingly, perceivers' motivational states also seem to play an influential role in the active inhibition of competing social categories (e.g., Kunda et al., 2002). In a provocative demonstration, Sinclair and Kunda (1999; see also Kunda and Sinclair, 1999) demonstrated that after participants received favorable feedback from a black doctor, associates of the category black became significantly less
accessible, while associates of the category doctor became significantly more accessible. In other words, when motivated to view the black doctor as competent, participants inhibited the category black and activated the category doctor. They did just the reverse, however, when the black doctor provided negative feedback and they were thus motivated to view him unfavorably, activating the category black and inhibiting the category doctor. Interestingly, a final experiment demonstrated that the tendency to inhibit the black stereotype following positive feedback was present only among high-prejudiced participants, who presumably had more reason than lowprejudice participants to avoid thinking positively of blacks. Motivational factors therefore appear to be as important in the inhibition as in the activation of stereotypes.
Characterization processes in impression formation: stereotype application
Given the challenges of monitoring a multiplicity of information in the social environment, perceivers may need to be selective in allocating attention. In addition to the problem of allocating limited attentional resources to the range of environmental stimuli available (either in the context or in the multiply categorizable target herself), perceivers are also confronted with the task of disambiguating the stimuli to which they attend. Human behavior is often complex and ambiguous and, therefore, open to multiple plausible interpretations. Stereotypical expectancies provide one way of selecting among competing interpretations and, in so doing, have a number of intriguing effects. Not surprisingly, when all one knows about an individual is that he or she belongs to a particular social category, the stereotype associated with that category can determine the perceiver's impression of that individual. Thus, a person described only by a male name may, when no other information is available, be viewed as more likely than a person described only by a female name to be characterized by a host of traits associated with masculinity (Heilman, 1984; Locksley et al., 1980). Students described by only their academic majors may be expected to behave differently in ways that are consistent with the stereotypes about their majors (Nisbett et al., 1981). Blacks portrayed only in photographs may be viewed as more superstitious, lazy, emotional, untidy, and immoral than whites portrayed in photographs (Secord et al., 1956). Stereotypes also appear to influence the perceiver's interpretation of behavior (e.g., Cameron and Trope, 2004; Jones and Kaplan, 2003; Maass et al., 2005; Ottati et al., 2005). When a person known to belong to a particular social category performs an ambiguous behavior, the stereotype associated with that category influences the apparent meaning of the behavior. Thus, a shove may be viewed as more violent when performed by a black individual than by a white individual (Duncan, 1976; Sagar and Schofield, 1980), a mixed performance on an academic test may be considered better when performed by a child of a higher rather than lower socioeconomic background (Darley and Gross, 1983), and the behavior hit someone who annoyed him or her may be interpreted as punched an adult when performed by a construction worker but as spanked a child when performed by a housewife (Kunda and Sherman-Williams, 1993). More recently, D'Agostino (2000) demonstrated that exposure to ambiguous sentences such as some felt that the politician's statements were untrue led participants later to manifest stereotypical (for example, politician-lied) than nonstereotypical (politician-erred) recall errors, suggesting that stereotypes had influenced the construal of the behaviors. Stereotypes also influence the meaning that a perceiver assigns to a particular trait. When a trait is used to describe a member of a stereotyped group, its meaning can be influenced by the group's stereotype. That is, the same trait can imply different behaviors when applied to members of different groups. Kunda et al. (1995) found that perceivers rated lawyers and construction workers as equally aggressive but nevertheless held very different expectations about their likely aggressive behaviors: lawyers were viewed as more likely to argue and complain and less likely to punch and yell insults than were construction workers. Several studies suggest that the assimilative effects of stereotyping extend even to situations in which apparently irrelevant information is available to supplement category membership information (e.g., Hilton and Fein, 1989; Krueger and Rothbart, 1988; Locksley et al., 1980; Raskinski et al., 1985). Darley and Gross (1983), for example, demonstrated that a child was viewed as possessing better liberal arts skills, cognitive ability, and emotional maturity when she was viewed on a brief video in a context implying high, rather than low, socioeconomic background (without the video evidence, however, these differential evaluations of the child did not emerge). Thus, ample evidence has accrued to demonstrate the effects of stereotypes on social judgment (e.g., Biernat et al., 1991; Duncan, 1976; Kunda and ShermanWilliams, 1993; Sagar and Schofield, 1980; Vallone et al., 1985). Similar outcomes have been observed in the context of jury decisionmaking (e.g., Bodenhausen and Wyer, 1985), and job-applicant evaluation studies (e.g., Heilman, 1984). As in the case of stereotype activation, stereotype-application effects are moderated by a host of cognitive variables. Some conditions that exacerbate the impact of stereotypical knowledge on judgment and memory include mental busyness (e.g., Macrae et al., 1993; Pendry and Macrae, 1994), task complexity (e.g., Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein, 1987), information overload (e.g., Pratto and Bargh, 1991; Rothbart et al., 1978), time pressure (e.g., Kruglanski and Freund, 1983), and low levels of cir cadian arousal (Bodenhausen, 1990).
Affect and stereotype application
In general, the cognitive moderators just discussed appear to confer greater importance to the activated stereotypical concepts in social judgment by undermining more evidence-based processing of the stimulus field. The impact of stereotypes on judgment and memory is also exacerbated by certain emotional states (for a review, see Bodenhausen et al., 2001). Initially, this work focused on valence-based mood effects in which the focal comparisons were on the differential effects of negative versus neutral versus positive affective states. An implicit assumption of this approach was the notion that different types of affect within a particular valence (for example, anger, sadness, and fear) produce functionally equivalent effects. Intuitively, one might expect to find that negative moods of any sort would be likely to promote greater use of negative stereotypes, whereas positive moods would have the opposite tendency. These common-sense intutitions, however, have proved to be incorrect. In general, positive moods appear to increase reliance on heuristics and generic knowledge structures (e.g., Bless et al., 1996a; Isen and Daubman, 1984; Isen and Means, 1983; Ottati et al., 1997; Schwarz et al., 1991; Worth and Mackie, 1987). In contrast, sadness seems to be associated with the avoidance or minimization of the use of heuristics, schemas, and other simplified processing strategies (e.g., Bless et al., 1990; Weary and Gannon, 1996). These findings clearly imply that happiness will likely be associated with greater reliance on stereotypes, whereas sadness may be associated with reduced reliance on them.
Much evidence supports this expectation. In general, category information has been found to exert a stronger effect on the judgments of happy than sad or neutral perceivers in several studies (e.g., Abele et al., 1998; Bless et al., 1996c; Blessum et al., 1998). Bodenhausen et al. (1994a) reported several experiments in which individuals in a positive mood were more likely than their neutral-mood counterparts to judge individual targets in ways that were stereotypic of their social groups. Park and Banaji (2000) showed that happy people are less likely to discriminate accurately among different members of a stereotyped group. Instead, they tend to set a lower threshold for drawing stereotypical conclusions and, hence, are more likely to remember incorrectly that specific group members possessed stereotypical traits. The fact that positive moods can increase perceivers' reliance on simplistic social stereotypes seems fairly counterintuitive. Closer examination of the relation between happiness and stereotyping, however, has provided some insight into these findings. Schwarz (1990) and Schwarz and Bless (1991) proposed that happy moods signal that everything is fine and that there is little need for careful analysis of the environment. Consequently, happy perceivers may generally prefer to conserve their mental resources rather than engaging in systematic thinking. This line of argument gains some support from evidence that the superficial forms of thinking observed among happy people can be readily eliminated when the situation provides other bases for effortful processing, such as relevance to personal outcomes (Forgas, 1989), accountability to a third party (Bodenhausen et al., 1994a), or task demands (Martin et al., 1993). Relatedly, Bless and colleagues (Bless and Fiedler, 1995; Bless et al., 1996a, 1996b, 1996c) suggested that happy perceivers are often content to rely on their general knowledge and to use it as a basis for constructive elaboration (Fiedler et al., 1991), but that they are reluctant to do so if it proves to be inadequate to make sense of the target (for example, when the available individuating information is unambiguously counterstereotypical, Bless et al., 1996c). Greater stereotype application under conditions of positive affect has thus been attributed to distraction, a general lack of epistemic motivation, and a generally greater confidence in generic knowledge structures. Happy people are generally neither unwilling nor unable to engage in systematic thinking. Rather, happy people appear to be flexible in their information-processing strategies. Although often content to rely on efficient, simplified bases for judgment (such as stereotypes), they are quite capable of engaging in more detail-oriented processing if personally involved or otherwise motivated for more systematic thinking, or if simplified processing fails to provide a satisfactory basis for judgment. With respect to sadness, there is less evidence, but the available studies are generally consistent with the idea that sad perceivers do not rely on generic knowledge (e.g., Edwards and Weary, 1993). Bodenhausen et al. (1994a), for example, demonstrated that sad participants did not differ from neutral participants in their tendency to rely on stereotypes. Park and Banaji (2000) found that sad participants were similar to neutral-mood participants in their sensitivity in distinguishing among category members and that they set a more stringent threshold for drawing stereotypic conclusions than did neutral-mood controls. Complementing their functional analysis of happy moods, Schwarz (1990) and Schwarz and Bless (1991) argued that sad moods suggest to perceivers that their environment is problematic and thereby promote more detail-oriented, careful thinking. Research by Lambert et al. (1997) shows that the fact that sad perceivers are less likely to rely on stereotypes is attributable to their tendency to engage in stereotype correction. Drawing on Schwarz's (1990) analysis, Lambert et al. argued that sadness should induce perceivers to scrutinize the use of stereotypes in the judgment process. Specifically, they assumed that sad perceivers should use stereotypes only in cases in which their use seemed appropriate to the judgment. They found, for example, that sad perceivers were more likely than controls to correct for negative but not positive stereotypes. Presumably, positive stereotypes were not considered an inappropriate basis for judgment. This kind of finding is consistent with the general idea that sad perceivers are likely to be careful, systematic thinkers (e.g., Schwarz, 1990; Weary, 1990), applying stereotypes only when it seems appropriate to do so; otherwise, they seem to take pains to avoid letting such biases influence their judgments. Importantly, the effects for sadness do not generalize to other negative moods: compared to neutral-mood controls, heightened stereotyping has been observed among both angry (Bodenhausen et al., 1994a; Keltner et al., 1993) and anxious (Baron et al., 1992; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999) individuals, presumably because the accompanying arousal levels interfere with processing capacity.
Motivation and stereotype application
In addition to the role of cognitive and affective moderators of stereotype application, a variety of motivational states also seem to be important. It is fairly well established that epistemic motivation undermines the use of stereotypes. Holding perceivers accountable for their judgments (e.g., Bodenhausen et al., 1994a), placing perceivers in a position of interdependence with (or dependence on) the target (e.g., Fiske and Depret, 1996), and making the judgment personally relevant or important to the perceiver (e.g., Kruglanski and Freund, 1983) also motivate perceivers to invest more effort in the judgmental process and lead to less stereotypical judgments. Causal uncertainty appears to have similar effects (Weary et al., 2001), as does experiencing a loss of control (Pittman and D'Agostino, 1989) and holding nonprejudiced attitudes (Wyer, 2004). In contrast, other motivational states such as prescriptive norms (Gill, 2004), prejudice (Hugenberg and Bodenhausen, 2003; Kawakami et al., 2002), and the need for ego defense serve to enhance the use of stereotypes in judgment. Sinclair and Kunda (2000), for example, demonstrated that participants viewed women as less competent than men after receiving negative, but not positive, evaluations from them, suggesting that participants' motivation to protect their self-views led them to use an available stereotype that they would not have used in the absence of this motivation (for similar arguments, see also Fein and Spencer, 1997; Spencer et al., 1998). Social judgeability concerns also moderate stereotype application: unless perceivers believe there is a legitimate informational basis for a stereotypical judgment (whether or not such a basis exists), they are unlikely to report category-based (that is, stereotypic) assessments. When the only information that is available to perceivers is the target's category membership or when the additional noncategorical information is deemed irrelevant to the judgment, perceivers are reluctant to rely on stereotypes. When additional pseudorelevant or subjectively individuating information is available, however, perceivers do allow stereotypic information to contribute to their judgments. Thus, perceivers render more stereotypical judgments only to the extent that their stereotypes are not perceived as being the main source of information for the judgments and to the extent that they feel entitled to judge the target (e.g., Yzerbyt et al., 1994, 1997, 1998).
Finally, implicit theories of personality influence stereotype application: people who hold an entity theory of human nature (and believe that traits are fixed and enduring) are more likely to render stereotypical judgments than are people who hold an incremental theory (and believe that traits are malleable, Levy and Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 1998; see Bastian and Haslam, 2006, for an alternative perspective). Theories about particular stereotypes also have implications for the construal of social information. In three studies, Wittenbrink et al. (1997; see also Wittenbrink et al., 1998) demonstrated that specific causal assumptions about the underlying socioeconomic disadvantage among African-Americans (as either personal or structural) influenced participants' construal of causality in a situation that involved a black target and that interfering with participants' ability to integrate the available information into a coherent representation on encoding reduced substantially the stereotyping effects. In a trial simulation, ascriptions of personal (rather than structural) causality of black disadvantage led to more guilty verdicts, longer sentencing recommendations, and more stereotypical trait ratings of the black defendant but only when participants were able to integrate the presented information.
Processes in stereotype application
An expansive literature has thus confirmed Walter Lippmann's (1922) suggestion that stereotype application is likely to occur when a perceiver lacks the motivation, time, or cognitive capacity to think deeply (and accurately) about others. The general pattern is that judgment becomes more stereotypical when either motivation or capacity is depleted, as long as there is not a demonstrably poor fit between the stereotypical expectations and the available target information. But what is the mechanism or process underlying these effects? Certainly, much of the evidence reviewed here suggests that interpretation is biased in the direction of the available stereotype. However, work by Bodenhausen (1988) has demonstrated that selective processing also contributes to the apparent assimilative effects of stereotype activation. In a series of studies, Bodenhausen compared biased interpretation and selective processing accounts of stereotyping. The biased interpretation account implies that the activation of a stereotype may lead perceivers to interpret all newly encountered information in a more stereotypical manner than they otherwise would. The selective processing account, however, implies that the activation of a stereotype may lead to differential processing of newly encountered evidence, favoring information that is consistent (rather than inconsistent) with the implications of the stereotype. In the context of a mock-jury decision-making task, participants read booklets containing information extracted from a hypothetical criminal trial in which the defendant was identified, either at the beginning or end of the transcript, as either Hispanic or ethnically nondescript. After considering the evidence, participants made judgments about the defendant's guilt and rated the relevance of each piece of evidence. After an intervening task, a surprise recall test was administered. Consistent with both the selective processing and the biased interpretation accounts, the results indicated that participants viewed the defendant as more likely to be guilty if he could be stereotyped. Results from the evidence-rating task indicated that participants viewed the evidence as more unfavorable when the defendant was Hispanic than when he was ethnically nondescript. This effect was not contingent on whether the stereotype was activated before or after the evidence was read, however, suggesting that biased interpretation of information as it is encountered could not account for the pattern of guilt judgments. Crucially, participants exhibited preferential recall of incriminating versus exculpating evidence but only when the stereotype was activated before the evidence was considered, consistent with the selective processing account. A second experiment confirmed the superiority of the selective-processing account over the interpretation account by providing evidence that a manipulation preventing selective processing also eliminated biases in judgment and recall.
Processes underlying the functional efficiency of stereotype application
Together, this abundance of research findings is suggestive of the basic benefits that a perceiver can accrue from the application of categorical thinking, especially during times of cognitive duress. Categorical thinking enables rapid inference generation and the efficient deployment of limited processes resources. But how is this efficiency achieved, and through which processing operations is it realized? According to the encoding flexibility model of Sherman et al. (1998), categorical thinking is efficient because it facilitates the encoding of both stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information, particularly when processing resources are limited. Following the activation of a categorical knowledge structure, expected material can be processed in a conceptually fluent manner, even when a perceiver's capacity is low. Any spare processing resources can therefore be directed toward unexpected material, material that is especially difficult to process and comprehend under conditions of attentional depletion. This encoding flexibility is functional because it promotes both stability and plasticity: categorical thinking allows expected information to be easily understood, thereby enabling perceivers to be alert to surprising events and facilitating the execution of an appropriate response. The benefits of categorical thinking are thus twofold: first, expected material is processed in a relatively effortless manner; second, residual resources are redirected to any unexpected information that is present, enabling perceivers to process (and remember) this potentially important material. Indeed, Macrae et al. (1994c) demonstrated that category activation enables rapid and efficient processing of stereotypical information, relative to nonstereotypical information, and provided some evidence that the efficiency of stereotypes allowed perceivers to devote more attention to other tasks. Macrae et al. (1994b) similarly provided evidence that stereotypes function as resource-saving devices. In three experiments, they demonstrated that participants who were given concurrent goals of forming an impression of a target and completing an unrelated (and stereotype-irrelevant) task performed better on the concurrent task when a stereotype was available to facilitate the impression-formation task than when it was not. Sherman et al. (1998) extended these findings to demonstrate that the efficiency conferred by stereotypes facilitates the processing not only of stereotype-irrelevant information, but also stereotype-inconsistent information (see also Sherman et al., 2003, 2004, 2005; Sherman and Frost, 2000; von Hippel et al., 1993, 1995; Wigboldus et al., 2004). If both stereotypical and counterstereotypical information is encountered, which kind of information will dominate the perceiver's reactions? In the domain of memory, at least, it is clear that counter stereotypical information is most likely to dominate subsequent processing, particularly during impression formation (see Stangor and McMillan, 1992, for a meta-analysis, and Ehrenberg and Klauer, 2005, for a multinomial model). This is a benefit of the cognitive system: an ability to deal with the unexpected is conducive to successful social interaction (when Sister Gertrude is observed with one of her romance novels, successful social interaction entails not displaying shock or disapproval). Recognizing the inconsistency confronting them in such instances, social perceivers need to make sense of the situation by resolving the inconsistency between prior expectancies and current actualities. In other words, they must individuate the target, organizing their memories around the individual's personal identity rather than in terms of his or her group membership.
But how exactly do perceivers do this? Recent research has speculated that these two crucial processes in person perception (that is, inconsistency resolution and individuation) come under the purview of executive cognitive functioning, a raft of higher-order cognitive operations that are involved in the planning, execution, and regulation of behavior (Macrae et al., 1999b; Payne, 2005). Indeed, Macrae et al. (1999b) have demonstrated that under conditions of executive impairment, perceivers' recollective preference for unexpected information is eliminated, such that they are no longer able to organize their memories of others in an individuated manner, and they were unable to identify the source of their recollections, particularly when these recollections were counterstereotypical in implication. When attentional depletion did not obstruct executive functioning, however, none of these effects emerged. These findings are theoretically noteworthy because they confirm that it is not attentional depletion per se that obstructs inconsistency resolution and individuation; rather, it is executive dysfunction. Mather et al. (1999) have also linked stereotyping to executive function, demonstrating that stereotype-related source confusions among elderly participants were correlated with processes based in brain regions typically associated with executive functioning. The finding that elderly perceivers are more prone to false stereotypical memories than are younger participants, and that this effect is mediated by executive function, was recently corroborated by Macrae et al. (2002d). This research demonstrated that when social perceivers remembered information that they never encountered, the information was more likely to be stereotype-consistent than inconsistent in nature. Importantly, results demonstrated that, among younger participants, this bias in recognition memory was exacerbated by executive dysfunction, leading them to exhibit similar memory confusions to those exhibited by older participants (for similar analyses, see Lenton et al., 2001; Sherman and Bessenoff, 1999). Recently, von Hippel et al. (2000) have linked these memory failures among the elderly to a failure in inhibitory processes, also purportedly governed by executive function. Indeed, Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1996) have provided evidence to suggest that efficient stereotype application does involve both facilitative and inhibitory processes. Specifically, when stereotypical attributes associated with a particular category become activated, it appears that stereotype-inconsistent attributes are actively inhibited. In one study, participants were primed either with a soccer hooligan stereotype or no stereotype and then completed an ostensibly unrelated lexical decision task. In line with previous demonstrations, primed participants were significantly faster to verify stereotype-consistent words, relative to controls. Of greater interest, however, primed participants were also significantly slower to verify stereotype-inconsistent words than were controls. This pattern was replicated in two additional experiments using different procedures to assess trait accessibility. Thus, it appears that once specific stereotypes are activated, they inhibit the processing of inconsistent data (see also Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg, 1995; van Knippenberg and Dijksterhuis, 1996; Wigboldus et al., 2003). The application-memory relation, however, is not invariant. Research by Macrae et al. (2002c), for example, suggests that stereotypes do prompt facilitated processing of consistent information and inhibit processing of inconsistent information but that the extent of these effects depends on the strength of association between the categorical cue and its stereotypic associates. More specifically, Macrae et al. conducted research in which strength of association, as reflected in participants' subjective estimates of cue stereotypicality, was manipulated. These studies employed forenames as categorical cues; these names differed in the degree to which they were gender-typed (for example, sarah is a more familiar female name than is Glenda). A semantic priming study demonstrated that, overall, participants responded more quickly to a stereotype-consistent target (for example, cosmetics) and less quickly to a stereotype-inconsistent target word (for example, hockey) when the target word was preceded by a gender-typed rather than neutral prime. Notably, however, the facilitation and inhibition effects were somewhat stronger when the primes were strongly, rather than weakly, associated gender-typed forenames. This demonstration underscores a further aspect of stereotype accessibility: not only are stereotypes only conditionally automatic, but they also vary in the extent to which they are activated by categorical cues, with resulting implications for the processing of consistent versus inconsistent information (for earlier evidence that exemplar typicality moderates stereotype activation, see Macrae et al., 1999a). Evidence is emerging to suggest that the differential possessing of consistent and inconsistent information is also moderated by a host of individual difference variables. Individuals high in need of closure, for example, recall (Dijksterhuis et al., 1996) and draw more trait inferences from (Maass et al., 2005) stereotype-consistent versus stereotype-inconsistent information than do individuals low in need of closure, leading them to judge target groups in a more stereotypical fashion. Need for cognition has also been shown to moderate stereotypical memory and judgment (Crawford and Skowronski, 1998), such that cognitively active individuals display enhanced memory for stereotype-consistent information but less evidence of stereotypical judgment than do cognitively lazy individuals. Motivational factors also appear to play a role. In particular, perceiver power leads to differential attention to stereotype-consistent and inconsistent information, reflecting the differential concerns of the parties involved in the power relationship. More specifically, powerful perceivers attend to the stereotype-consistent (especially negative) attributes of the powerless, presumably to justify the power inequity, whereas powerless perceivers attend to the stereotype-inconsistent attributes of the powerful, presumably to enhance their perceptions of control (Rodriguez-Bailon et al., 2000). Related research has suggested that the stereotyping patterns of the powerful have two bases: a lack of perceived dependence on the powerless, which allows the powerful to ignore the stereotype-inconsistent attributes of the powerless; and a motivation for continued control, which allows them to attend to system-justifying, stereotype-consistent attributes (Goodwin et al., 1998, 2000). Target power also has implications for stereotype application (Sekaquaptewa and Espinoza, 2004). Just as there are situations in which stereotype activation is likely to have a greater impact on construal processes, there may be a variety of circumstances under which the activation of stereotypical beliefs has little if any impact on construal. One limiting condition on stereotype activation is the presence of target information that is incompatible with stereotypical construals. When the target does not appear to fit the social category well, and this disconfirmatory information is not easily overlooked, he or she may not be subject to stereotypic impressions (for reviews, see Brewer, 1996; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990). Similarly, if diagnostic and nonstereotypical information about a target is readily available and perceivers are motivated and able to process this information, its influence may often dominate construals of the target, thereby minimizing stereotypical influences (for a review, see Kunda and Thagard, 1996). Another set of limiting conditions concerns the ways that perceivers may attempt to compensate for stereotypical biases, often in an explicit effort to avoid unfairly biased or discriminatory responses.
Correction processes in impression formation: stereotype suppression
The activation and application of stereotypes in no way guarantee that impressions and judgments will themselves be stereotypical. There are various reasons why a person might have the goal of avoiding stereotype use. With the rise of liberal democratic values and awareness of civil-rights issues, there has been a dramatic increase in the endorsement of the principle of egalitarianism. This change in the nature of prejudice (or, at least, its expression) has been recognized within several more contemporary models of prejudice, including symbolic racism (Kinder and Sears, 1981), aversive racism (Dovidio and Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986), racial ambivalence (Katz and Hass, 1988; Katz et al., 1986), and ambivalent sexism (Glick and Fiske, 1996, 2001). Although these models differ in several respects (for example, in terms of whether perceivers have access to their true attitudes), they all acknowledge that perceivers may attempt to prevent the expression of categorical thinking, either because legal sanctions may follow or because stereotyping violates their personal standards of fairness and equality. Whether the motivation arises from societal or personal sources, there may be many conditions in which perceivers desire to avoid the influence of activated stereotypes on their evaluations of others. The most influential research program investigating the motivation to avoid stereotyping has been conducted by Devine, Monteith, and their associates. Their work proceeds from the assumption that stereotyping is a largely automatic, conditioned process, even in those who deny the veracity of the stereotypes, but that it can be overcome by effortful processes if people are sufficiently motivated. Monteith's (1993) analysis of the self-regulation of stereotyping suggests that when people are committed to egalitarian, nonprejudiced standards and their behavior appears to violate these standards, they experience guilt and compunction and direct their efforts toward reducing this discrepancy (see also Czopp et al., 2006; Peruche and Plant, 2006). When people become cognizant of the potential for stereotypical bias in their reactions to others, a variety of regulatory procedures can be used. One possible strategy, for instance, is simply to make direct adjustments to social judgments in the direction opposite to that of the presumed bias. More ambitious, however, are self-regulatory strategies whereby perceivers actively attempt to prevent stereotypical thoughts from ever entering into their deliberations. Perceivers may attempt, for instance, to forget the stereotypical information that they believe confronts them. An example of this process comes from research using the directed-forgetting paradigm (Macrae et al., 1997a). In an adaptation of the procedure, participants who had been primed (or not) with a social category were presented with a list of words to learn; this list comprised words that were stereotypical of the social category. At the end of this task, participants were given a second list, comprised of stereotype-irrelevant words. Some participants were instructed that they should learn both lists. Other participants, however, learned that there had been a procedural error and that they should disregard the first list and learn the other. The results demonstrated that the encoding and retention of stereotypical information are indeed facilitated by stereotype activation, leading to greater difficulty in forgetting the stereotypical materials and interference in remembering the nonstereotypical material. When participants were primed with the category label, they exhibited better recall of stereotypical items (compared to nonprimed participants), regardless of being told to forget them. Moreover, constraining their processing resources further undermined their ability to succeed in their efforts to forget the stereotypical material: contrary to the forgetting instructions, busy, primed participants actually recalled more of the to-be-disregarded stereotypical items than they recalled of the to-be-remembered nonstereotypical items. These direct attempts at stereotype avoidance implicate the mechanisms of mental control identified by Wegner and his colleagues (e.g., Wegner, 1994; Wegner and Erber, 1992). Their model postulates that the goal of avoiding a certain type of thought (such as a stereotype) is realized by the joint operation of two cognitive processes. The first is a monitoring process that scans the mental environment looking for signs of the unwanted thought. If detected, a second operating process is initiated that directs consciousness away from the unwanted thought by focusing attention on a suitable distracter. Crucially, whereas the monitoring process is assumed to operate in a relatively automatic manner, the operating process is po tulated to be effortful and to require adequate cognitive resources for its successful execution. Thus, detecting the presence of stereotypical ideas is a task that can be accomplished with ease, independently of any other demands that are imposed on a perceiver's processing resources. Replacing these thoughts with suitable distracters, however, is an altogether more demanding affair that can happen only when sufficient attentional resources are available. One of the ironic aspects of mental control that is specified within this theoretical perspective is that trying to avoid a particular thought may result in its hyperaccessibility. That is, the very act of trying not to think in stereotypical terms may actually increase the extent of stereotype activation. To detect unwanted thoughts, one must keep in mind what it is one is trying to avoid, and so the monitoring process must involve at some level the mental activation of the to-be-avoided material (otherwise there would be no criterion on which to conduct the search of consciousness). Of course, as long as perceivers have adequate resources and consistent motivation, the operating process may be able to keep the focus of attention away from the stereotypical material. But if a perceiver is cognitively busy, distracted, or under time pressure, or, indeed, if the motivation for suppression has been relaxed for any reason, the hyperaccessibility created by suppression efforts may not be checked by the operating process. Several studies have documented the ironic consequences of stereotype suppression, as manifest in a perceiver's reactions (for example, evaluations, recollections, and behavior) toward stereotyped targets. Macrae et al. (1994a) provided the first demonstrations of stereotype rebound effects in social impressions. In each of a series of studies, participants were asked to view a picture of a target (who, on the basis of visual cues, could easily be categorized as a skinhead) and then write a passage about their impression of him. Half of the participants were instructed further not to rely on stereotypes. Consistent with the view that motivated perceivers with ample processing capacity can successfully regulate their impressions, the passages written by stereotype suppressors were significantly less stereotypical, as rated by independent coders, than those written by control participants. However, the same participants, when later asked to write about a second skinhead (this time without any suppression instructions), produced significantly more stereotypical descriptions of the second target than did control participants. Evidence for the role of stereotype hyperaccessibility came from another experiment (Macrae et al., 1994a: Experiment 3), in which participants completed an ostensibly unrelated lexical decision task following the passage-writing task. Although there was no difference between the control and suppression groups in verifying nonstereotypical words, the suppressors were significantly faster than the control group in verifying the stereotypical words. Ironic effects of this kind also extend to a perceiver's recollections of stereotyped targets. In another set of studies (Macrae et al., 1996), participants were given an unexpected memory test for the nonstereotypical details of the target description. The results confirmed that following the cessation of a well-intentioned period of suppression, perceivers display a recollective preference (both in recall and recognition) for the stereotypical material they were formerly trying to dismiss, as well as impaired memory for nonstereotypical
information. As is the case with other mental contents, it would appear that an explicit instruction to suppress stereotypes can actually serve to enhance the accessibility of this material in memory, thereby setting the stage for postsuppression rebound effects. The results of this research also support the assumption that thought suppression is effortful. In the Macrae et al. (1996) studies, participants performed a simultaneous probe reaction task while listening to the audiotape. This task was designed to assess the attentional load imposed by suppression. In the task, participants were to hit the space bar on the computer keyboard every time an illuminated light bulb appeared on the computer screen; the speed of response on this task is an indicator of the amount of free processing resources available. Probe reaction times were significantly longer among suppressors than among control participants, particularly when the amount of stereotypical material to be suppressed was relatively high, suggesting that they were distracted by their thought-control attempts. Inhibitory efficiency can also be undermined by such diverse factors as depressive affect and the cognitive changes associated with aging (von Hippel et al., 2000). If the inhibitory system is compromised, whatever the reason, the intention to avoid biased judgments and reactions may backfire, producing even more of the unwanted reaction than would otherwise have been the case. Thus, although the road to stereotype avoidance may be paved with good intentions, without consistent motivation and processing capacity, these laudable goals may be unsatisfied and, indeed, even reversed. With stereotypic concepts highly accessible and no operating process in place to direct attention elsewhere, construals of social targets are driven by stereotype-based preconceptions, often to a degree that is greater than if a perceiver had never sought to suppress the stereotype in the first place.
Moderators of stereotype suppression and rebound
Although a compelling phenomenon with important implications, the generality of stereotype rebound has been questioned (for a review, see Monteith et al., 1998a). One limitation of early research on this topic was that it employed stereotypes that perceivers are not highly motivated to avoid (such as skinheads). Thus, the question remained as to whether rebound effects would emerge for groups where there are strong personal or societal prohibitions against stereotyping (for example, African-Americans, women, and homosexuals). As it turns out, the evidence on this issue is equivocal. Evidence that suppression can increase stereotyping for even socially sensitive groups can be garnered from recent work by Sherman et al. (1997) and Wyer et al. (1998). In each of these studies, racial stereotyping was exacerbated following a period of suppression. However, Monteith et al. (1998b) reported evidence that participants with low-prejudice attitudes toward gays were not susceptible to rebound effects (on either overt or covert measures of stereotyping) following a period of suppression. In contrast, suppression did prompt the hyperac cessibility of stereotypes among participants who were prejudiced toward gays. Moreover, recent work reported by Wyer et al. (2000) suggests that people may be more consistent in their efforts to avoid stereotyping highly sensitive social groups. Because consistency of suppression motivation is an important factor in the avoidance of ironic suppression effects, this work does suggest that rebound effects arising from the suspension of suppression motivation may indeed be less likely when a highly sensitive social category is involved. Ambiguity also surrounds the conditions under which self-regulatory processes are initiated by perceivers. Despite growing interest in the topic of stereotype suppression, surprisingly little is known about how and when inhibitory processes are spontaneously implemented. A characteristic feature of much of the available research on this topic is that the intention to suppress a particular thought or impulse is provided to participants by the experimenter in the form of an explicit instruction not to think about a particular person in a stereotypebased manner. Although such a strategy offers obvious methodological advantages, it does sidestep a number of important theoretical questions, most notably the spontaneity issue. It is one thing to suppress stereotypes in response to an explicit experimental instruction, but it may be an entirely different matter to do so spontaneously. So when, exactly, does a perceiver attempt to regulate the expression of stereotypical thinking? Insight into the determinants of uninstructed self-censorship can be gleaned from the work of Devine et al. (1991) and Monteith (1993). Monteith, for example, has shown that attempts at self-regulation are implemented when perceivers experience a discrepancy between their internalized standards and actual behavior. When people are committed to egalitarian, nonprejudiced standards and their behavior apparently violates these standards, they feel guilty, experience compunction, become self-focused, and direct their efforts at reducing this discrepancy. That is, having reacted in an ostensibly prejudiced manner, a perceiver implements self-regulatory procedures in an attempt to avoid a potential repetition of the action. Although this idea has yet to be tested directly, it also seems plausible that self-regulation of stereotyping is likely to be moderated in different ways by internal versus external motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant and Devine, 1998; Devine et al., 2002).
But is the commission of a prejudiced action, or, indeed, the belief that such an action has occurred, a necessary precursor of stereotype inhibition? Recent research would tend to suggest not. Wyer et al. (2000) have suggested that any cue that makes salient social norms (personal or societal) against stereotyping is likely to promote the spontaneous suppression of stereotypical thinking. Indeed, heightened self-focus (that is, self-directed attention) appears to be sufficient to trigger the spontaneous suppression of unwanted stereotypic thoughts. A common experimental finding is that when the self becomes the focus of attention, per-ceivers are especially likely to behave in accordance with internalized standards and norms; stereotype suppression has also been shown to operate in such a manner (Macrae et al., 1998). Thus, task context, the presence of others, and current information-processing goals are factors that are likely to moderate stereotype suppression (Wyer et al., 2000). Triggered by situational cues, stereotype suppression does not demand a conscious inhibitory intention on the part of a perceiver. To date, much of the research on stereotype avoidance paints a picture of self-regulation that is disheartening. Wegner (1994), however, has suggested that mental control can improve with practice, whereby effortful processes gradually become more and more automatized and resource independent. Although little research exists to document this progression through the suppression paradigm, research by Kawakami et al. (2000) demonstrates that practice in negating (that is, saying no to) stereotypes can lead to a subsequent decrease in stereotype accessibility. Although it is worth noting that the mechanism underlying Kawakami et al.'s effects is unknown, in that it remains unclear as to whether the negation training decreases the accessibility of the stereotype or (more likely) increases the accessibility of a non-stereotypical response, it is nonetheless encouraging to note that conscientious social perceivers can learn to control their
stereotypical responding.
A fundamental set of questions in social psychology concerns how, why, and when stereotypes influence people's impressions of others. In this chapter, we have attempted to provide at least a partial account of the facilitative and inhibitory mechanisms associated with stereotyping and the conditions under which they influence each stage of the impression-formation process. The picture is certainly not complete, however, and there is much to be learned about the intricacies of stereotyping and impression formation. The goal of future research in the field will undoubtedly be the accumulation of more detailed and specific knowledge about the boundary conditions and moderators of the various mechanisms reviewed in this chapter. What we are advocating is an integrative approach to these future investigations, one that encourages multiple levels of analysis and that involves a complete theoretical decomposition of stereotyping and the intergroup context.
Levels of analysis in stereotyping research
In a recent review of the literature on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, Fiske (1998) highlighted two levels of analyses that have been invoked to explain stereotyping and prejudice. As Fiske pointed out, many early approaches adopted either the individual or the society as the appropriate level of analysis, emphasizing personality differences (for example, authoritarianism; Adorno et al., 1950) or structural conditions (for example, intergroup contact; Amir, 1969), respectively, as the roots of prejudice and stereotype endorsement. Both of these levels of analysis yielded data that were compelling and informative regarding the motivational and situational concomitants of intergroup conflict. The advent of the cognitive evolution, however, and the motivated cognition approach that followed, both served to situate stereotyping and prejudice more firmly in the mind of the social perceiver. This newer level of analysis is more dynamic than the earlier approaches, in that it examines processes that vary both within and between individuals can account for the psychological underpinnings of responses arising from social, structural, and personality variables. We advocate adding another level of analysis to our conceptualizations of categorical thinking and person perception: social neuroscience (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1992, 1996; Ochsner and Lieberman, 2001). Acknowledging the obvious necessity of studying overt behavioral and attitudinal responses to answer questions about complex behavior, we nonetheless believe that a complete understanding of the component processes of stereotyping requires the additional specification of how neural systems are organized. At the very least, social psychological theorizing can benefit from theory and findings from neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Macrae et al., 2002d; von Hippel et al., 2000; Sanders et al., 2004; Zarate et al., 2000). That is, neuroscience data can provide valuable constraints on theory. The functional organization of the brain can suggest specific processes that are recruited by various social-cognitive activities, and the time course of activation patterns can suggest sequencing of those processes. The story of theoretical progress is always a story of establishing better empirical constraints, and this new level of analysis brings a new set of useful constraints to the table. Adopting the techniques of neuroscience, such as split-brain studies (e.g., Mason and Macrae, 2004), event-related potentials (ERP; e.g., Ito et al., 2004) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) may also provide social psychologists with more sensitive measures of constructs of interest. Examples of how research from neuroscientific methods can inform social psychological investigations of prejudice and stereotyping comes from recent studies using fMRI to examine brain activity in the amygdala. Hart et al. (2000), for example, found that white participants exhibited differential activation in the amygdala in response to white versus black faces such that, over time, amygdalar activation in response to white (in-group) faces was attenuated, whereas amygdalar activation in response to black (out-group) faces showed no change. Research by Phelps et al. (2000) demonstrated further that the extent of amygdalar activation exhibited by white participants viewing black versus white faces correlated with the extent to which these participants manifested implicit bias against black versus white stimuli on an implicit association test (Greenwald et al., 1998). Importantly, this correlation is attenuated when the black faces in question belonged to familiar and positively evaluated black celebrities (Phelps et al., 2000) and when perceivers have alternative processing goals (Wheeler and Fiske, 2005). Interestingly, the amygdala is a subcortical structure known to play a role in nonconscious emotional evaluation and learning, especially with regard to fear and threat (LeDoux, 2000). Although it may come as no surprise that implicit bias would be related to fear or threat appraisals, it is potentially more informative that conscious emotional learning does not necessarily implicate the amygdala; this knowledge, which could not be garnered without neuroscientific evidence and techniques, might be useful for understanding the boundary conditions on conscious strategies for stereotype control. (For a review of the social neuroscience of person construal, see Mitchell et al., 2006.)
Functional analyses of stereotyping and the intergroup context
The use of neuroscientific evidence and techniques is but one avenue for future investigation. Advancing our understanding of the moderators of categorical thinking will also benefit from more careful theoretical decomposition of stereotyping and of the intergroup context itself. In an approach somewhat analogous to the components-of-processing approach to the study of memory (Moskovitch, 1994), in which memory tasks are decomposed into (and subsequently investigated according to) the various processes that are believed to be necessary for successful task completion, we advocate a more thorough analysis of the dynamics of social interaction to include not only an analysis of the social perceiver's expectancies and attitudes, but also analysis of the target of perception and of the context in which categorical thinking occurs. Indeed, this component-processing approach to categorical thinking is already taking hold in social cognition. As we have already reviewed, research by Wittenbrink et al. (2001), for example, has demonstrated the importance of considering the context in investigations of stereotype activation. Researchers have also begun to acknowledge the complexity of social stimuli, relying less on verbal labels and more on visual stimuli (e.g., Barden et al., 2004; Blair et al., 2002, 2004, 2005; Eberhardt et al., 2004; Hugenberg and Bodenhausen, 2003, 2004; Macrae et al., 2005; 2002; Maddox and Gray, Quinn and Macrae, 2005), in recognition that the mere perception of a stimulus person is not always sufficient to trigger a stereotype (Gilbert and Hixon, 1991; Macrae et al., 1995) and that a stimulus person can inevitably be categorized in many ways (Dunn and Spellman, 2003; Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000; Macrae et al., 1995; Quinn and
Macrae, 2005; Sinclair and Kunda, 1999; Smith et al., 1996). What these examples suggest is encouraging: there is an increasing recognition that understanding the complexity of the social landscape is critical to understanding social cognition, and that empirical investigation should be sensitive to these complexities. Even these studies, however, relied on relatively impoverished stimuli and constrained the categorizations and responses that participants were able to make. As a result, the early evidence for category dominance and contextual variation in stereotype activation provides only a hint of how the informational processing unfolds to address the complexity of the social situation. The issue goes beyond ecological validity. Social categorization develops in the real world, where the target can be viewed in many ways and where the significance of the target to the perceiver depends on a multitude of chronic and current factors. The component-process analysis that we advocate involves a dissection of the entire social interaction, including the significance of the target to the perceiver not only in general but also in the specific context in which the perceiver encounters the target. This analysis of the entire context of impression formation may provide insight into many questions in social cognition, including the question of how the social perceiver forms an impression of a multiply categorizable target. Exactly how does the social perceiver cope with the multiplicity of identity? How do perceivers select relevant categories when any given target of perception could be categorized in seemingly infinite ways? How, or how efficiently, do perceivers identify the various features of the target and the various features of the context to their basic security and affiliation goals as well as to any other concurrently active epistemic or directional goals? And once these contextual or motivational factors have been identified, how are they evaluated and ranked? Do perceivers routinely categorize people simultaneously along multiple dimensions, or does a single category tend to dominate perceptions in many everyday circumstances, as the early evidence suggests? And when a categorization is made whether the individual is categorized according to one particular group membership or a conjunction of memberships what happens to the information relevant to the nonchosen categorization? And what of the role of the particular affect that is experienced during the interaction? Does the target or the context have a particular relation to the perceiver (for example, target as friend versus foe, context as familiar versus unfamiliar) that would elicit particular emotions with predictable cognitive and motivational implications for categorization and stereotype activation? Interestingly, analyses of mood and stereotyping have often been characterized by the type of functionalist analysis we advocate, with theory being derived from assumptions about what the particular emotional state in question would signal to the perceiver (e.g., Clore et al., 2001). The role of affect in categorical thinking can be clarified, however, by extending the analysis from incidental to integral affect; that is, from the impact of affective states that arise for reasons having nothing to do with the intergroup context itself to the impact of affective states that are elicited by the group itself and the social situations within which the group is encountered (Bodenhausen, 1993; see also Bodenhausen and Moreno, 2000; Moreno and Bodenhausen, 2001). Would the findings regarding incidental affect generalize to integral affect? Or are there aspects of integral affect that might augment or diminish the impact of stereotypes on social impressions and behavior? It seems reasonable to expect that the emotions that are experienced directly as a result of an intergroup encounter would be more focused than incidental affect would be and, thus, that integral emotion would be more likely to contribute to relevant appraisal and attribution processes. Would these supplemental processes lead simply to differences in the amount of stereotyping that would be observed? Or would the appraisal involve component processes such as the alignment of the affective state with the emotional content of the group stereotype that could change the apparent significance of the affective state and thus the apparent applicability of the stereotype in that context? Investigations of these issues will be important to theoretical progress.
Although the processes involved in person perception may occasionally backfire, in that they sometimes lead to judgmental and memorial biases and errors, they nonetheless provide the social perceiver with a very handy set of tools for the construction of stable person impressions and the efficient navigation of social interaction. Social perceivers, with little or no effort, spontaneously categorize targets according to their social groups (Aunt Gertrude is a Catholic nun), activate relevant group stereotypes (she's chaste and virtuous), and use those stereotypes to provide working impressions of those targets. This sequence, however, is not invariant. As our review suggests, a host of variables chronic and situational, cognitive and motivational affect the output of person perception at all processing stages, alternately augmenting or reducing the stereotypicality of the final judgment (But she's not as proper as I would have expected!). The direction of future research in this area will be to place these various moderators into their functional context, in order to provide a complete account of how the social perceiver manages the myriad goals activated during social interaction.
To engage in successful social interaction, we must form impressions that capture other people's characteristics coherently and meaningfully. What is perhaps most remarkable about this process is the ease with which it is accomplished: Impressions often spring to mind so readily that they seem to directly reflect the immediately obvious, objective characteristics of the target person, without any active inferential construction or bias on our part. In reality, however, research on impression formation has revealed a complex series of mental processes most notably, stereotyping that are involved in construing the character of others and the meaning of their behavior.
To facilitate social interaction, social perceivers prefer simple, well-structured impressions of others, and they achieve this coherence by regularly using categorical representations (that is, stereotypes) as a basis for their impressions. By construing others not in terms of their unique constellations of attributes and inclinations but, rather, on the basis of the social categories to which they belong (such as race, age, sex, or occupation), perceivers can make use of a wealth of stereotype-based information stored in long-term memory to guide processing and thus forgo the challenge of processing the full complexity of the social world. This chapter reviews the mental processes
(automatic and controlled) that are involved in the categorical construal of others and their behavior, including identification and categorization of the target, reliance on activated stereotypes to guide attention to and comprehension of the target, and attempts to control stereotypes and their influence on impressions and judgment. We review evidence that stereotypes can have both facilitative and inhibitory influences on information processing at each of these stages, alternately enhancing or diminishing the stereotypicality of the system's outputs. In tandem with other cognitive, affective, motivational, and contextual factors, stereotype-based processing facilitates subjectively coherent and meaningful impressions of others.
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Portraits of the Self
Constantine Sedikides, Aiden P. Gregg
The self manages to be wholly familiar and frustratingly elusive at the same time. At first blush, it appears that, if I know anything at all, then I know that I am a self-aware being, an I that not only thinks, as Descartes famously asserted, but that also senses, feels, desires, intends, and acts. Yet, establishing exactly what this I is, and how it manages to do what it does, is an excellent way to pass an otherwise interminable journey on British Rail. Indeed, so slippery has the self seemed to some that they have concluded it is merely a grammatical fiction or a cultural artifact (Gergen, 1991; Wittgenstein, 1953). An insubstantial self of this sort could never be the object of scientific scrutiny: it could only be an empty construct for linguists to parse or for postmodernists to critique. Social psychologists who study the self reject such deflationary interpretations, however. They start from the full-blooded assumption that the self is real (Baumeister, 1998; Sedikides and Brewer, 2001; Tesser, 2001) and that, although it may contain an element of subjectivity liable to awe and mystify (Nagel, 1974; Tallis, 1999), it nonetheless lends itself to objective empirical investigation. This being the case, we define the self as the totality of interrelated yet distinct psychological phenomena that either underlie, causally interact with, or depend upon reflexive consciousness. The merit of this inclusive, if somewhat wordy, definition is that it does not describe the self as some arcane unity about which nothing further can be said. Rather, it describes the self as a set of properties and processes, each of which can be conceptually defined and empirically indexed. This opens the door to scientific progress: social psychologists can seek greater insight into the nature of selfhood by studying particular manifestations of the self, as well as their correlates, causes, and consequences. They can come up with testable theories that link self-related phenomena to one another and to phenomena beyond the self. Two brief refinements of this definition are nonetheless in order. First, the properties and processes that collectively compose the self are themselves fairly complex. Although more primitive aspects of mental functioning may distantly affect or be affected by reflexive consciousness, the psychology of the self is typically pitched at a molar rather than at a molecular level of analysis. Second, the self operates predominantly within the social world. This means that the psychological phenomena that fall under its umbrella typically arise in interaction with others, real or imagined. Consequently, the self, though rooted in an individual brain, is dynamically responsive to social context.
Having sketched out what we think the self is, that is, the psychological domains that it covers, we aim to provide a taste of what empirical research has revealed about it. Unfortunately, this can be only a taste, given the sheer breadth of the literature and the space limitations imposed by a volume of this sort. Hence, we will concentrate on two heavily researched topics: the motivational and affective aspects of the self specifically, self-motives and self-esteem. As we describe the cardinal findings in the area, and the theories put forward to explain them, we hope to show compellingly that the scientific study of the self substantially illuminates our understanding of human beings.
Self-motives
If humans entirely lacked emotion, like the perfectly rational android Data on Star Trek, selfhood would involve little more than the disinterested encoding, storage, and retrieval of self-related information, either as a means of acquiring accurate knowledge or of carrying out effective action. However, as anyone who has never been an android knows, selfhood is a far more colorful, visceral affair. Motivation is a case in point: the self is immersed in a variety of motives. Indeed, several taxonomies of self-motives have been proposed by social psychologists (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Epstein and Morling, 1995; Sedikides and Strube, 1997). We start with the selfenhancement motive, as it is arguably the pre-eminent one (Sedikides, 1993). Next, we move on to discussing various other self-motives in the light of it, either as notable instances where it has been subverted, or as tactical means of satisfying it. Finally, we consider the correlates and consequences of self-esteem, a psychological attribute that, in its abundance or shortage, can be understood as the habitual ability or inability to satisfy the key self-motive for self-enhancement.
Self-enhancement
Self-enhancement denotes the drive to affirm the self (Steele, 1988), that is, to convince ourselves, and any significant others in the vicinity, that we are intrinsically meritorious persons: worthwhile, attractive, competent, lovable, and moral. Although the term selfenhancement suggests the pursuit of a more positive self-view (self-promotion), it is also understood technically as covering attempts to maintain or defend an already positive self-view (self-protection) (Sedikides and Strube, 1997).
Research amply bears out what astute observers have long suspected: that people self-enhance with enthusiasm and ingenuity (Brown and Dutton, 1995; Greenwald, 1980; Taylor and Brown, 1988). Indeed, the manifestations of self-enhancement are so manifold that the label zoo has been drolly applied to them (Tesser et al., 1996). A brief inventory of the inmates of this zoo, some familiar, others exotic, is in order.
The self-enhancing triad: the above-average effect, illusions of control, and unrealistic optimism
By and large, people hold flattering views of their own attributes. Most university students, for example, regard themselves as well above the fiftieth percentile in the degree to which they exhibit such sought-after attributes as social grace, athletic prowess, and leadership ability (Alicke, 1985; College Board, 1976-7; Dunning et al., 1989). Even conspicuously low (twelfth percentile) achievers in such domains as grammar and logic consider themselves to be relatively high (sixty-second percentile) achievers (Kruger and Dunning, 1999). No less immune to vanity, 94 percent of university professors regard their teaching ability as above average (Cross, 1977). Such self-ascriptions must, at least for a subset of respondents, be false, assuming that the sample tested is representative of the sample that respondents broadly envisage and that average is taken to imply either the mean of a symmetric distribution or the median of a nonsymmetric one (Brown, 1998). The robustness of the above-average effect is borne out by the fact that, even when the criteria on which people base judgments of self and others are made identical, they still rate themselves more favorably (Alicke et al., 2001). All the more ironic, then, that people should consider themselves less susceptible to motivational and cognitive biases than their peers, even when explicitly informed about them (Pronin et al., 2002). Finally, anything close to the self basks in the glow of this perceived superiority: people value their close relationships (Murray, 1999; Rusbult et al., 2000) and their personal possessions (Nesselroade et al., 1999) above those of others. People also overestimate their degree of control over outcomes and contingencies. Such illusions of control (Langer, 1975) are apparent in people's conviction that they can influence the outcome of inherently random systems such as lotteries, card-drawings, and dice-throws, especially when such systems are accompanied by features conventionally associated with skill-based tasks (for example, choosing one's own lottery number, practicing guessing the outcome of a dice throw, or competing against a nervous opponent). Even when a degree of contingency does exist between actions and outcomes, people still overestimate the strength of that contingency (Jenkins and Ward, 1965). Moreover, people think that fate will smile upon them. They believe, in particular, that a greater number of positive life experiences (such as having a gifted child or living to a ripe old age) and a lesser number of negative life experiences (such as being a victim of crime or falling ill) lie in store for them than for similar others (Helweg-Larsen and Shepperd, 2001; Weinstein, 1980; Weinstein and Klein, 1995). Such unrealistic optimism is extended, albeit to a lesser degree, to others closely linked to the self, such as friends (Regan et al., 1995). In addition, people both overestimate their ability to predict the future (Vallone et al., 1990) and underestimate how long it will take to complete a variety of tasks (Buelher et al., 1994). As if that were not enough, people also overestimate the accuracy of their social predictions (Dunning et al., 1990).
The self-serving bias in attribution
Self-enhancement infects not only comparative judgments but also causal explanations for social outcomes, in that people manifest a selfserving bias when they explain the origin of events in which they personally had a hand or a stake (Campbell and Sedikides, 1999; Zuckerman, 1979). Specifically, they attribute positive outcomes internally to themselves, but negative outcomes externally to others (or to circumstance), thus making it possible to claim credit for successes but to disclaim responsibility for failures. The self-serving bias is a robust phenomenon, occurring in private as well as public (Greenberg et al., 1982; Schlenker and Miller, 1977), and even when a premium is placed on honesty (Riess et al., 1981). People's explanations for moral transgressions follow a similar self-serving pattern (Baumeister et al., 1990; Gonzales et al., 1990). Perhaps even the ultimate attribution error (Pettigrew, 2001), the tendency to regard negative acts by the outgroup and positive acts by the ingroup as essential to their nature, may simply reflect the operation of the self-serving bias refracted through the prism of social identification (Cialdini et al., 1976; Gramzow et al., 2001).
Mnemic neglect, selective attention, and selective exposure
People sometimes self-enhance by expediently remembering their strengths better than their weaknesses. For example, Sedikides and Green (2000) found that, following false feedback in the form of behaviors of mixed valence allegedly predicted by a bogus personality test, participants recalled more positive behaviors than negative ones, but only when those behaviors exemplified central traits, not peripheral ones, and only when the feedback pertained to themselves, not to other people. We label this pattern of selective forgetting mnemic neglect. Broadly similar findings have emerged when the to-be-recalled information takes the form of personaity traits (Mischel et al.,1976), relationship-promoting or relationship-undermining behaviors (van Lange et al., 1999), frequencies of social acts (Gosling et al., 1998), and autobiographical memories (Skowronski et al., 1991). The processing mechanisms underlying mnemic neglect may involve bias at encoding, retrieval, or retention. First, at encoding, people conveniently avoid attending to unflattering information (Baumeister and Cairns, 1982; Sedikides and Green, 2000: Experiment 3), thereby impeding its registration. The pattern of selective attention exhibited often follows a mobilization-minimization trajectory: a brief initial orientation towards the threat followed by a more prolonged evasion of it (Taylor, 1991). In addition, such selective attention manifests itself in overt behavior. For example, people selectively expose themselves to information that justifies important prior decisions (Festinger, 1957), at least when this information is perceived to be valid, and the decision freely made and irreversible (Frey, 1986). Moreover, when people suspect that they might possess characteristics of which they disapprove, they strive to avoid those who exhibit them (Schimel et al., 2000). Second, at retrieval, people bring to mind a biased sample of congenial memories. Such selective recall has been found for behaviors that exemplify desirable personality traits (Sanitioso et al., 1990), harmonious interpersonal relationships (Murray and Holmes, 1993), or healthenhancing habits (Ross et al., 1981). Finally, affect associated with unpleasant memories fades faster than affect associated with pleasant memories (Walker et al., 2003), possibly due to the various behind-the-scenes activities of the psychological immune system (Gilbert et al., 1998).
Selective acceptance and refutation
Where the ego-threatening information cannot be easily ignored, or where it looks open to challenge, people will spend time and psychological resources trying to refute it. This is evident in the adoption of a more critical attitude towards blame and a more lenient one
towards praise (Ditto and Boardman, 1995; Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1987), and in the tendency to counterargue uncongenial information energetically but to accept congenial information at face value (Ditto and Lopez, 1992; Ditto et al., 1998). A familiar example is of the student who unthinkingly accepts as valid an examination on which he performed well (selective acceptance) but mindfully searches for reasons to reject as invalid an examination on which he performed poorly (selective refutation) (Arkin and Maruyama, 1979; Greenwald, 2002). Often, selective refutation involves generating serviceable theories that enable criticism to be credibly defused. For example, members of stigmatized groups can, by imputing prejudice to those who derogate either them or their group, maintain high levels of self-esteem (Crocker and Major, 1989).
Strategic social comparison
Self-evaluation is a comparative rather than absolute affair: it takes place not in a self-contained psyche but in the social world thronged with individuals of varying merit. Consequently, although many social comparisons may be objectively forced upon people by circumstance, their minds can nonetheless exploit whatever subjective leeway remains to satisfy the self-enhancement motive. Most notably, despite a well-documented tendency to compare themselves to roughly similar or slightly superior others (Gruder, 1971; Miller et al., 1988), people are often disposed to downwardly compare themselves to relevantly inferior others, in order to capitalize upon an ego-defensive contrast effect (Biernat and Billings, 2001; Suls and Wills, 1991). Notably, even lateral comparisons and upward comparisons can further self-enhancement goals. For example, lateral ingroup comparisons, especially among members of disadvantaged groups, can protect self-esteem (Crocker et al., 1991). Moreover, upward comparison to superior others with whom one feels affinity can prompt self-enhancement through assimilation (Collins, 1996), at least where the gap is not unduly or unexpectedly large (Wheeler, 1966), the target's skill or successes are seen as attainable (Lockwood and Kunda, 1997), and the target is not viewed as a competitor (Wood, 1989). Indeed, self-esteem moderates the beneficial evaluative consequences of comparisons to both inferior and superior others. This is possibly because people with higher self-esteem are more optimistic about both evading the failures and misfortunes of their inferiors, and about securing the success and good fortune of their superiors (Buunk et al., 1990).
Strategic construal
The concepts that people use to understand themselves and their social world are characteristically loose and fuzzy, lacking necessary and sufficient defining conditions (Cantor and Mischel, 1979). Consequently, people can, when making social comparisons or estimations, subtly shift their construal of the meaning of those concepts in order to self-enhance. For example, people's interpretation of what counts as virtue or talent is slanted in favor of attributes they possess, and of what counts as vice or deficiency, in favor of attributes they lack (Dunning et al., 1991). Such strategic construal, affirming the self by semantic adjustment, is exacerbated following negative feedback, thereby implicating the ego in its genesis (Dunning et al., 1995). Thematic variations of the phenomenon include playing up the importance of skills in domains of competence (Story and Dunning, 1998) while downplaying those in domains of incompetence (Tesser and Paulhus, 1983). Though psychically soothing (Simon et al., 1995), such strategies may sometimes prove materially counterproductive. For example, members of minority groups, who, due to an inhospitable cultural climate, perform poorly in academic settings, subsequently disengage psychologically from, and disidentify with, academic pursuits in general, thereby safeguarding their self-esteem but imperilling their socioeconomic prospects (Crocker et al., 1998). Strategic construal can operate in a more devious manner still: people make self-aggrandizing interpretations, not only of their own attributes, but also of others, in order to cast themselves in a comparatively favorable light. For example, couch potatoes construe everyone as fairly athletic, whereas gym gerbils see athleticism as a singular attribute (Dunning and Cohen, 1992). In addition, low achievers in a domain are liable to regard the accomplishments of high achievers as exceptional, thereby lessening the shame of their own ineptitude (Alicke et al., 1997). In experimental settings, too, after positive or negative feedback, people with high, but not low, selfesteem, conveniently adjust their perceptions of others, of varying ability and performance, in a self-enhancing direction (Dunning and Beauregard, 2000). Moreover, not only is the meaning of categories subject to strategic construal, but also the degree to which they are believed to characterize other people. Over and above the general tendency to assume that others share their characteristics (Ross et al., 1977), people overestimate the prevalence of their shortcomings (for example, show an enhanced false consensus effect) and underestimate the prevalence of their strengths (for example, show a contrary false uniqueness effect) (Mullen and Goethals, 1990). In summary, people's representations of self and others are not determined merely by impartial computation. Instead, they are transformed, in idiosyncratic ways, to satisfy self-enhancing prerogatives.
Behavioral implications of self-enhancement
Self-enhancement is not just confined to the intrapsychic sphere: it also has ramifications for how people behave. We outline below how self-enhancement influences behavior in two important ways.
Self-evaluation maintenance
Self-evaluation maintenance theory specifies how self-enhancement waxes and wanes as a function of one's ability level in the context of interpersonal relationships, and how this, in turn, influences interpersonal attitudes and behavior (Tesser, 1988). The theory specifies three relevant factors: the closeness of a relationship, the personal relevance of a particular ability, and one's level of performance in that ability domain. First, comparisons of one's own performance with that of others are more likely to occur, and, when they occur, are more consequential in cases where others are close rather than distant. Second, the nature of that comparison will differ depending on whether others' performance is or is not in an ability domain relevant to oneself. When the ability domain is not personally relevant, reflection will occur: one will undergo self-enhancement (pride) if others perform well but self-derogation (shame) if others perform poorly. However, when the ability domain is personally relevant, comparison will occur: one will undergo self-derogation (humiliation) if others perform poorly but self-enhancement (triumph) if others perform well.
As a consequence of interpersonal self-enhancement or self-derogation, and the affective correlates, people adopt a variety of coping strategies. They choose as associates, friends, and partners those who excel, but not in the same domains as they do (Beach and Tesser, 1993); they withhold information that is likely to improve the performance of close others on personally relevant domains (Pemberton and Sedikides, 2001); they alter the relevance of the performance domain by changing their self-concept, thereby moderating the impact of the reflection and comparison processes (Tesser and Paulhus, 1983); and they broaden or narrow the gap between themselves and others, even by deliberately altering the difficulty of domain-relevant tasks (Tesser and Smith, 1980).
Behavioral self-handicapping
Behavioral self-handicapping refers to the act of erecting obstacles to task success in order to deflect the evaluative implications of unhindered task performance (Jones and Berglas, 1978). Self-handicapping permits self-enhancement to occur in two ways (Feick and Rhodewalt, 1997). First, in the case of failure, one can protect one's self-esteem by attributing failure to the obstacle that one has erected (discounting); second, in the case of success, one can promote one's self-esteem by attributing that success to oneself despite the obstacle erected (augmenting). People low in self-esteem opt for the former self-protective route, to avoid being perceived as incompetent, whereas people high in self-esteem preferentially select the latter self-promoting route, to enhance perceptions of competence (Rhodewalt et al., 1991; Tice, 1991). The word perceptions is important, as self-handicapping, though still present when task performance is private (Rhodewalt and Fairfield, 1991), is magnified by public scrutiny (Tice and Baumeister, 1990). Yet, from a selfpresentational point of view, self-handicapping is also a risky strategy: if found out, those who use it face the censure of others (Rhodewalt et al., 1995).
What factors prompt self-handicapping? One is a sense of uncertainty over whether good performance can be attained, due to limited control over similar task outcomes, or an insecure sense of self generally (Arkin and Oleson, 1998). Another is the tendency to hold fixedentity as opposed to incremental theories of domain competency (Dweck, 1999): believing that improvement is impossible prompts evasive self-enhancing maneuvers. Third, self-handicapping occurs only when a task or evaluation is important (Shepperd and Arkin, 1991). Finally, negative feedback makes self-handicapping more likely, allowing the wounded ego the chance to protect or promote itself (Rhodewalt and Tragakis, 2002). Regardless, whatever the antecedents of self-handicapping, the self-defeating end result is the same: outcome quality is compromised in order to make the meaning of that outcome more palatable. Indeed, students who report a proneness to use self-handicapping strategies also underperform relative to their aptitude, with poor examination preparation mediating the effect (Zuckerman et al., 1998).
Constraints on self-enhancement
Self-enhancement comes in many shapes and forms. However, it would be an exaggeration to say that self-enhancement is always the dominant self-motive, that mental life is ruled by nothing else. Indeed, there are identifiable conditions under which self-enhancement is contained or in which other motives assume priority. Competing motives involved in self-evaluation include self-assessment (the desire to know the truth about oneself), self-verification (the desire to confirm pre-existing views about oneself), and self-improvement (the desire to expand one's abilities and become a better person) (Sedikides and Strube, 1997). We will begin by discussing specific factors that constrain self-enhancement and gradually move into a discussion of how these other motives are implicated in such constraints.
Plausibility constraints
Much self-enhancement thrives upon the vagueness or ambiguity of the evidence. For example, the above-average effect subsides when the trait being judged is clearly defined and easily verified (for example, punctual as opposed to sensitive) (van Lange and Sedikides, 1998). In addition, the tendency to selectively recall instances of desirable traits is held in check by one's actual standing on those traits (Sanitioso et al., 1990). Finally, unpalatable evidence is reluctantly taken on board when there is no room for interpretative maneuver (Doosje et al., 1995). Such deference to reality is advantageous. Unqualified self-aggrandizement would preclude any informed assessment of one's strengths and weakness, a deficit that would hamstring effective social functioning as the interpersonal abrasiveness of narcissists attests (Morf and Rhodewalt, 2001). Unless one is minimally committed to the facts at hand, which occasionally imply ugly truths about the self, one cannot exploit self-enhancing biases. This is because such biases operate effectively only under the veneer of rationality: to own up to a bias is to undermine any grounds for believing in the comforting conclusions it implies (Gilbert et al., 1998). Self-presentation is characterized by similar favorability/ plausibility tradeoffs: people self-enhance to the degree that they believe they can get away with it (Sedikides et al., 2002; Tice et al., 1995). Another relevant finding in this connection is that ambicausal introspection, namely, the deliberate attempt to generate possible reasons for why one might either possess or lack a personality trait, attenuates self-enhancement, especially when people commit those reasons to paper (Horton and Sedikides, 2002). Ambicausal introspection works by undermining the certainty that one possesses positive traits and lacks negative traits. Of course, people are sometimes motivated to seek out accurate, diagnostic information about themselves (Trope, 1986). Such unbiased self-assessment has obvious advantages. Knowing one's objective strengths and limitations, one's likes and dislikes, allows one to set and pursue personal goals that are both realistically achievable and personally beneficial (Oettingen and Gollwitzer, 2001). Unsurprisingly, then, people sometimes choose tasks believed to provide diagnostic information about the self, even when these tasks are difficult (Trope, 1979) or the information they transmit unflattering (Trope, 1980). Indeed, people invest effort in tasks to the extent that they believe those tasks will yield diagnostic information. This tendency is furthermore exacerbated by prior manipulations that increase uncertainty about the self, showing that it is the thirst for self-knowledge that underlies it (Trope, 1982).
This brings us neatly to mood as a moderator of self-enhancement. The initial experience of success, or the induction of a positive mood, will make people even more receptive to negative diagnostic feedback. Indeed, people will review their past successes in expectation of receiving such feedback, presumably to shore up their mood (Trope and Neter, 1994). Such findings suggest that state self-esteem, or the mood that accompanies it, serves as a resource that can be deployed to cope with ego threat (Pyszczynski et al., 1997; Steele, 1988). If positive mood curtails self-enhancement, then, ironically, so does negative mood. For example, although immodesty is usually evident in discrepancies between people's estimates of their own virtues and the estimates of neutral observers, a depressive disposition decreases the discrepancy (Campbell and Fehr, 1990; Lewinsohn et al., 1980). In addition, illusions of control are moderated by melancholy (Alloy and Abramson, 1988), and Pollyannaish prognostications are diluted by dysphoria (Pyszczynski et al., 1987). Finally, depressives seem to be less resolute self-enhancers in response to negative feedback than do normals (Blaine and Crocker, 1993; Kuiper, 1978). The divergent effects of mood may be best explained by negative mood making one less able to deploy self-enhancing tactics, and positive mood making their deployment less necessary. This raises the interesting possibility that not all manifestations of self-enhancement will positively correlate with one another. However, contrary to some early suggestions (Alloy and Abramson, 1979), sadder does not always mean wiser (Dunning and Story, 1991; Ruehlman et al., 1985). For example, although the self-ratings of depressives are more in line with those of neutral observers than the self-ratings of normals, the self-ratings of normals are nonetheless more in line with those of friends and family than the self-ratings of depressives (Campbell and Fehr, 1990). Hence, so-called depressive realism may merely be the inadvertent consequence of viewing life through bluetinted spectacles rather than the reliable result of greater self-insight (Shrauger et al., 1998; Wood et al., 1998).
When people interact with close others, the self-enhancement motive appears to be enfeebled. For example, when friends, or previous strangers whose intimacy levels have been experimentally enhanced, cooperate on a joint task, they do not manifest the self-serving bias, unlike casual acquaintances or continued strangers who do (Sedikides et al., 2002). People's graciousness in the presence of close others appears to be mediated by mutual liking and expectations of reciprocity, reflecting a communal rather than an exchange orientation (Clark and Mills, 1979). Indeed, a betrayal of trust reinstates the self-serving bias, which tallies with the real-world finding that relationship satisfaction is inversely correlated with such betrayal (Fincham and Bradbury, 1989). In addition, although people are inclined to selfpresent boastfully in front of strangers, they curtail their conceit in front of friends (Tice et al., 1995). Finally, others close to the self tend to be more highly evaluated than distant others (Murray et al., 1996a), a state of affairs that can be interpreted as the concept of the other being subsumed under the self-concept (Aron et al., 1991).
It has become a virtual truism that psychological functioning is moderated by the influence of culture (Fiske et al., 1998; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis and Suh, 2002). Principal among the claims made has been that Eastern and Western cultures fundamentally diverge, in that the former, being more collectivistic prioritizes interdependence (interpersonal harmony, group cohesion, and social duty), whereas the latter, being more individualistic prioritizes independence (separate identity, private fulfillment, and greater autonomy). It has further been claimed that, due to the greater emphasis laid on internal attributes in the West, self-enhancement tends to overshadow selfcriticism, where as the opposite tends to happen, due to the greater emphasis laid on relational attributes, in the East (Kitayama et al., 1995a). In other words, self-enhancement, for all its manifold manifestations, is a phenomenon largely limited to the West, where social ties are looser. Indeed, this would be roughly consistent with experimental findings showing that relationship closeness constrains selfenhancement (Sedikides et al., 2002). Taken at face value, there is much evidence to support this culture-specific view of self-enhancement. For example, when describing themselves, Easterners spontaneously use more negative terms than Westerners do (Kanagawa et al., 2001), and provide less inflated ratings of their own merits (Kitayama et al., 1997). In addition, Easterners indulge in self-deprecatory social comparisons (Takata, 1987), entertain less unrealistically optimistic visions of the future (Heine and Lehman, 1995), and show a self-serving attributional bias that is attenuated, absent and even reversed, (Kitayama et al., 1995b). It also seems that East Asians manifest a greater desire for self-improvement through self-criticism than Westerners do (Heine et al., 1999). They are reluctant, rather than eager, to conclude that they have performed better than an average classmate (Heine et al., 2000) and readily acknowledge, rather than reflexively discount, negative feedback (Heine et al., 2001a). They also persist more after initial failure than success, rather than vice versa, and consider tasks on which they fail to be more diagnostic of merit, not less (Heine et al., 2001b). More generally, the self-improvement motive, as an aspiration towards a possible self (Markus and Nurius, 1986), may moderate a variety of psychological processes, in both independent and inter-dependent cultures (Sedikides, 1999). Yet, there are signs that self-enhancement is not altogether absent from interdependent cultures. Easterners self-efface on only some personality dimensions, not others (Yik et al., 1998). For example, Chinese schoolchildren rate themselves highly on the dimension of competence (Falbo et al., 1997) and Taiwanese employees rate themselves more favorably than their employers do (Fahr et al., 1991). On a more profound level, it may be that cultural differences in self-enhancement phenomena stem not from variations in the strength of the underlying motive, but rather from differences in how candidly or tactically that motive is acted upon (Sedikides and Strube, 1997), and in terms of what characteristics are deemed important by individuals as they strive to fulfill the roles that their culture prescribes. There is evidence, for example, that Westerners self-enhance on individualistic attributes while Easterners self-enhance on collectivistic attributes (Kurman, 2001; Sedikides et al., 2003), and that this difference is explained at least partly in terms of the relative importance that members of each culture place on these attributes (Sedikides et al., 2003).
Self-verification
It has been argued that people desire not merely to know how great they are (self-enhancement), or what they are really like (self-
assessment), but also to confirm that they are the type of people they already thought they were. In other words, people seek to selfverify (Swann, 1987, 1990). The idea is that self-verification serves to stabilize self-views, and that stable self-views, in turn, increase the predictability and controllability of future events in the social world. More specifically, self-verification may be pursued for one of two reasons: epistemic, to induce or preserve a sense of cognitive coherence; and pragmatic, to allow interpersonal interactions to proceed smoothly. So, if people's sense of identity is undermined, or society takes a view of them discordant with their own, their psychological functioning will be impaired. Hence, people will be motivated to seek information that confirms their pre-existing self-views, as well as the company of other people who will provide them with such self-confirmatory information. For self-views of neutral valence, there is some evidence that this is true, particularly when those self-views are confidently held (Pelham and Swann, 1994). Note that, because people are already inclined to believe that they possess positive traits (Alicke, 1985), they could prefer to receive (or actively seek) positive feedback (or individuals likely to provide it) either to self-enhance or to self-verify. For example, if people already believed that they were extraverted, a normatively positive trait, the observation that they sought to confirm this fact, say, by correcting evaluators' misperceptions, would not by itself furnish evidence of self-verification (Swann and Ely, 1984; see McNulty and Swann, 1994, and Swann et al., 2000, for similarly ambiguous findings). The acid test for self-verification is whether people will prefer and seek negative feedback, or the people who provide it, when such feedback is consistent with a negative view of self. Much research appears to pass this acid test. For example, people choose to interact with evaluators who give them confirmatory feedback about their worst attribute (Swann et al., 1989), or about their negative self-views in general (Swann et al., 1992a), even when they have the twin alternatives of either interacting with an evaluator who will provide them with positive information, or opting out of the study altogether (Swann et al., 1992d). In addition, people are prepared to act in such a way as to confirm existing self-perceptions. Those who regard themselves as dislikable will strive to disabuse an evaluator who likes them of his flattering misconceptions (Swann and Read, 1981). Married people, when provided with bogus evaluations supposedly from their spouses, reject those evaluations when they clash with others obtained from a previous session, even when the new evaluation is comparatively positive (that is, more favorable than the previous ratings implied) (De La Ronde and Swann, 1998). There is even a suggestion that spouses (but not dating partners) who confirm each other's self-views are more intimate with one another (Swann et al., 1994; though see Murray et al., 1996a). Finally, people with negative self-views seem to gravitate towards those who view them negatively (Swann et al., 1992c). Although these results show that people may opt to receive information congruent with negative self-views, and opt to interact with those who provide it, they do not in themselves establish the motivation that underlies the choosing of that option. People self-verify, certainly. But do they want to self-verify? Some light is shed on the matter by the think-aloud protocols of participants deliberating over which interaction partner to choose. In one study (Swann et al., 1992a), participants mostly mentioned that having a partner who agreed with them was important, a response which the researchers classified as an epistemic reason for making a choice; next, they mentioned being concerned that the interaction would take place smoothly (classified as a pragmatic reason); finally, they noted that a perceptive partner would be most desirable (classified as a concern with accuracy). Unfortunately, the most often mentioned reason leaves moot the underlying motivation (participants' noted agreement was crucial, but why?), and the last reason could have more to do with wanting a competent interaction partner than obtaining additional accurate self-assessment. Moreover, self-reports of motivations are suspect, as they may reflect a lack of introspective access (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977), expectancy effects (Rosenthal and Rubin, 1978), and selfpresentation or self-deception (Paulhus, 1991). Furthermore, there are at least two credible explanations, apart from bolstering a pre-existing view of self, for why people might prefer interaction partners who concur with their negative view of self. First, people like, and are drawn to, others who are similar to them and who share their views (Byrne, 1997). Although one might explain the effects of similarity in terms of a desire for verification, it cannot be ruled out, a priori, that other factors, such as an inchoate sense of familiarity (Bornstein, 1989), or a generalization of response from related past examples of attitude similarity, could also be responsible. Second, people with negative self-views who are glowingly evaluated by imminent interaction partners are likely to chafe at the prospect of disappointing those partners' upbeat expectations. They may react in this way because they are risk-averse in general (Baumeister et al., 1989) and are most upset by patterns of feedback that start out positive but then turn negative (Brown et al., 2002). This, of course, still does not explain why participants would seek out negative information in the absence of any future interaction (Giesler et al., 1996; Swann et al., 1990). However, even here, the evidence clearly points to the fact that people with negative self-views do not want negative feedback. Much has been made of the assertion that affective responses to feedback are governed by self-enhancement whereas cognitive responses to feedback are governed by self-verification (or self-consistency) (McFarlin and Blascovich, 1981; Shrauger, 1975; Swann et al., 1987). However, this boils down to claiming that when people think about it, they generally cannot find sufficient reason to dispute the accuracy of feedback consistent with their self-view, positive or negative, although they still would prefer to receive positive feedback. A further elegant confirmation of this is that when people's cognitive resources are taxed, and their rational thought disrupted, they choose interaction partners on the basis of congeniality alone (Swann et al., 1990). But if people regard information consistent with their self-view as more credible, is it any surprise that they choose it in preference to information inconsistent with their self-view that they consider less credible? Why would they opt for positive information, or choose interaction partners who provide it, if they are incapable of believing it? Self-verification effects may simply be due to ubiquitous plausibility constraints. It is therefore a challenge for future research to implicate directly a drive for cognitive coherence in self-verification effects, an enterprise that would be aided by the development of specific measures and manipulations of such coherence.
Relative self-motive strength
In our discussion so far, some reference has been made to how the self-evaluation motives self-enhancement, self-assessment, selfverification, and self-improvement vie with one another, although the evidence is sometimes open to different interpretations. In one study, however, a direct attempt was made to compare the relative strength of various motives (excluding self-improvement) in the neutral context of a self-reflection task (Sedikides, 1993). Participants chose the question that they would be most likely to ask themselves in order to determine whether or not they possessed a particular type of personality trait. Questions varied in terms of the valence (positive/negative), diagnosticity (high/low), and importance (central/ peripheral) of the answers they elicited. Participants' yes/no answers to the questions were also noted. It turned out that, on the whole, participants self-enhanced more than they self-assessed or self-
verified. For example, they chose higher diagnosticity questions concerning central positive traits than central negative ones and answered yes more often to central positive questions than central negative questions. However, participants also self-verified more than they selfassessed, in that they chose more questions overall concerning (relatively certain) central traits than (relatively uncertain) peripheral traits. Nonetheless, the strength of activation of particular motives, and hence their relative strength, is likely to be situation-or state-specific. It has already been mentioned how an acutely positive mood makes people more capable of taking on board negative information, thereby facilitating even-handed self-assessment (Trope and Neter, 1994). Another factor that matters is timing. Prior to having made a decision, people may impartially muse upon the merits of deciding either way, but once they have made up their minds, and start acting accordingly, they move from a deliberative to an implementational mindset (Gollwizer and Kinney, 1989) and are likely to prefer selfenhancing information that justifies their prior decision. The classical research literature is peppered with examples of post-choice rationalization (Aronson and Mills, 1959; Brehm, 1956; Staw, 1976). Of course, having made a decision, one no longer has control over whether or not to make it. To the extent that one retains control over outcome, one may be less inclined to self-enhance. This is illustrated with regard to people's theories with respect to whether a particular characteristic is malleable or fixed (Dauenheimer et al., 2002). For example, if people believe that an important personality trait cannot be altered, they show a self-enhancing pattern, welcoming feedback on that trait after initial success, but not failure at displaying it. However, if people believe that this trait can be altered (that is, that it is partly under their control), they show a self-assessment pattern, welcoming feedback regardless of initial success or failure (Dunning, 1995). Similarly, the controllability of trait is one factor that attenuates the above-average effect (van Lange and Sedikides, 1998). It should not be assumed, however, that the different self-motives are implacably opposed to one another. For example, it could be argued that self-assessment and self-improvement can be classified as different manifestations of a single learning motive (Sedikides and Skowronski, 2000). In addition, it has been proposed that self-enhancement is the master motive and that all the others represent tactical as opposed to candid ways of satisfying it (Sedikides and Strube, 1997). On this view, all the motives are ultimately on the same team.
Some people are more successful at self-enhancing than others; the affective correlate (and potential cause or effect) is level of selfesteem. Self-esteem can be manifest either as an underlying dispositional tendency (trait self-esteem) or as a transient psychological condition (state self-esteem). As the former, it is typically measured by self-report scales (Fleming and Courtney, 1984; Rosenberg, 1965), whereas, as the latter, it is typically induced by administering favorable or unfavorable feedback (Brown, 1993; Tesser, 1988), although reliable measures of state self-esteem also exist (Heatherton and Polivy, 1991). Trait and state self-esteem correlate substantially with one another (Heatherton and Ambady, 1993), and the latter can be construed as a temporary positive or negative departure from the former. Although self-esteem occupies a privileged position in popular psychological discourse, social psychologists have long debated, and continue to debate, its meaning, origin, and implications. Nonetheless, few theorists would dispute that self-esteem involves something akin to an attitude towards oneself (Banaji and Prentice, 1994). As an attitude, self-esteem is associated with numerous self-beliefs (Markus and Wurf, 1987) that pertain either to the self as a whole (I am likable) or to its particular attributes (I make people laugh). Importantly, such self-beliefs are evaluative in nature (for example, being likable, or making people laugh, is good); that is, self-knowledge is experienced, not dispassionately, but as intrinsically positive or negative. Moreover, self-esteem is associated with feelings about oneself (Brown, 1998), again pertaining either globally to the self (I am fabulous) or locally to certain attributes (I like my elegant sense of dressing). In the general population, feelings about the global self are positively biased and rarely blatantly negative (Baumeister et al., 1989; Brown, 1986), an unsurprising state of affairs given the strength of the self-enhancement motive. Although such feelings might appear to be entirely a function of evaluative self-beliefs, the effect is probably bidirectional, given that people believe what they desire to be true (McGuire, 1990), and exploit semantic ambiguity to do so (Dunning, 1999; Kunda, 1990). Opinion is divided on the subject of whether global self-beliefs and feelings derive, bottom-up, from local ones (Marsh, 1990; Pelham and Swann, 1989) or whether local self-beliefs and feelings derive, top-down, from global ones (Baumeister et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2001). Conceivably, the causality involved could again be bidirectional. However, bottom-up models that weight self-attributes by their idiosyncratic importance oddly fail to predict global self-esteem any better than models that do without such weighting (Marsh, 1995; Pelham, 1995). There are several possible explanations for this oddity, including the inaccuracy of self-reported importance ratings (Brown, 1998), but if a globally positive self-view promotes above-average perceptions across the board, then ratings of peripheral traits should mirror that self-view and, therefore, correlate with global self-ratings. Also relevant to this connection is the fact that the higher their selfesteem, the more people regard themselves as possessing flattering attributes to an illusory degree (Baumeister et al., 2002). Given that illusory is here defined in terms of disagreement with peers, there would seem to be no basis for self-ascribing such attributes apart from a subjective sense of overall merit (Brown, 1998). That said, people do differ measurably in terms of their preconditions for feeling good about themselves, and feedback affects them profoundly depending on whether it does or does not pertain to such preconditions (Crocker and Wolfe, 2001).
High self-esteem: correlates, benefits, and drawbacks
In modern Western culture, global self-esteem has been regarded as a psychological attribute of cardinal importance. In abundance, it is hailed as a panacea for psychosocial ills such as bullying, delinquency, and neurosis; in dearth, it is derided as a prescription for them (Branden, 1988; Mackay and Fanning, 2000; Mruk, 1999; National Association for Self-Esteem, 2002). Yet the argument has been made that this view may generalize neither culturally (Heine et al., 1999; but see Sedikides et al., 2003) nor historically (Baumeister, 1987; Exline et al., 2002; Twenge and Campbell, 2001; but see Sedikides and Skowronski, 1997, 2002). Moreover, academic skepticism regarding the validity of self-esteem has increased as research findings have accumulated (Baumeister et al., 2002; Dawes, 1994).
Methodological issues
Drawing summary conclusions about the correlates and alleged benefits of self-esteem poses problems. Care is needed to distill reality
from perception, because self-esteem distorts the outlook on life in general, and many studies rely on subjective perceptions and verbal reports. Thus, an artifactual relation between self-esteem and, say, toe-tapping ability, might emerge simply because people with high self-esteem, seeing themselves through rosetinted spectacles, conclude that they are talented toe-tappers, whereas people with low selfesteem, seeing themselves through blue or nontinted spectacles, conclude that their toe-tapping ability leaves a lot to be desired. When objective measures of predicted outcomes are used, correlations with self-esteem decline dramatically or vanish altogether (Gabriel et al., 1994; Miller and Downey, 1999). For example, although self-reported physical attractiveness correlates substantially (r=.59) with selfesteem, observer-rated physical attractiveness correlates with it hardly at all (r5 =.00 to .14, depending on the aspect of appearance in question) (Diener et al., 1995). Moreover, even if a genuine correlation obtains between self-esteem and a variable of interest, in the absence of further experimentation, longitudinal prediction, or structural equation analysis, the direction of causation remains unclear. From an a-priori standpoint, it is at least as plausible that possessing a characteristic of objective significance will boost self-esteem as that high self-esteem will promote the development of such a characteristic. Take extraversion, for instance: although it reliably accompanies self-esteem (Robins et al., 2002), it is not clear which (if either) is the antecedent of the other. Furthermore, even if it is established that self-esteem is the antecedent rather than the consequence of some variable of interest, another background factor might still account, either statistically or causally, for self-esteem's predictive capacity. For example, suppose that selfesteem predicted extraversion over time but that the inverse prediction was not observed. Self-esteem might nonetheless fail to predict over time any extraversion that was not also predicted over time by, say, social inclusion. Considerations like these act as salutary checks on overzealous interpretations of correlations between measures of self-esteem and desirable outcome variables.
Achievement and performance
The cautionary preamble out of the way, we can now inquire what self-esteem relates to (causally or otherwise) and whether it lives up to its sterling reputation. For starters, the evidence that self-esteem improves performance in academic settings is weak. Correlations are typically variable and exceedingly modest on average (Davies and Brember, 1999; Robins and Beer, 2001; Ross and Broh, 2000). Moreover, self-esteem seems to be an effect rather than a cause and explains little beyond what other background variables do (Bachman and O'Malley, 1986; Midgett et al., 2002; Pottebaum et al., 1986). Furthermore, interventions designed to raise self-esteem may either fail to influence academic performance (Scheirer and Kraut, 1979) or actually undermine it, by encouraging complacency (Forsyth and Kerr, 1999). The general picture is not different for performance in other domains (Judge and Bono, 2001; Wallace and Baumeister, 2002), although differences between people with high and low self-esteem may become apparent only as time goes by (Di Paula and Campbell, 2001) or in the wake of ego threat (Brockner et al., 1983; Campbell and Fairey, 1989). High self-esteem people do spontaneously show greater persistence (McFarlin, 1985; McFarlin et al., 1984; Shrauger and Sorman, 1977) and, importantly, more judicious persistence (Di Paula and Campbell, 2001; Sandelands et al., 1998) in the face of adversity than people with low self-esteem. However, ego threat can also goad people with high (but not low) self-esteem into persisting overoptimistically and fruitlessly (Baumeister et al., 1993). One might expect self-esteem to be an important predictor of leadership ability, given the initiative and confidence that leadership requires. Although significant correlations do emerge for example, in studies of military recruits incorporating multiple and objective dependent measures (Chemers et al., 2000) these correlations mostly dwindle into insignificance when placed in statistical competition with other predictors. Nevertheless, some evidence does suggest that high self-esteem is associated with willingness to speak out critically in a variety of occupational groups (LePine and Van Dyne, 1998) and that people with high (though not grandiose) self-esteem are valued as work-group contributors (Paulhus, 1998). It may also be the case that, being such a nonspecific variable, self-esteem predicts overall success in life better than success in any particular domain. We could find no pertinent data addressing this issue, however.
If self-esteem does not seem to propel forcefully achievement or performance, might it nonetheless promote physical health? The existing evidence does support the hypothesis, both directly for overall health (Forthofer et al., 2001; Nirkko et al., 1982) and indirectly for biological predictors of health (Prussner et al., 1998; Seeman et al., 1995). Moreover, although positive life events improve the overall health (both self-reported and objectively measured) of people with high self-esteem, they paradoxically impair the health of people with low self-esteem, possibly by disrupting their fragile identity (Brown and McGill, 1989). With regard to specific health behaviors, however, the picture is less clear. On the one hand, low self-esteem features as a prominent clinical correlate of anorexia (Bers and Quinlan, 1992), bulimia (Mintz and Betz, 1988) or eating disorders generally (French et al., 2001; Williams et al., 1993), and longitudinal data suggest that it may play a causal role (Button et al., 1996; van der Ham et al., 1998), although the bidirectional effects of disordered eating and self-esteem on each other may also be responsible for spiraling symptoms (Heatherton and Polivy, 1992). In addition, low self-esteem may exert its effects only in complex interaction with other risk factors, such as perfectionism and body dissatisfaction (Vohs et al., 1999, 2001). However, several large studies, both cross-sectional and prospective in design, find neither a simple nor a complex relation between selfesteem and smoking (Glendinning and Inglis, 1999; Koval and Pederson, 1999; McGee and Williams, 2000), except perhaps for females (Abernathy et al., 1995; Lewis et al., 2001). Comparable studies examining the link between self-esteem and alcohol consumption find either no effect (Hill et al., 2000; McGee and Williams, 2000; Poikolainen et al., 2001) or only complex and equivocal effects (Jackson et al., 1997; Scheirer et al., 2000). The same goes for sexual behavior: self-esteem does not reliably predict pregnancy or early sexual activity (Berry et al., 2000; McGee and Williams, 2000; Paul et al., 2000) and its relation to safer-sex activities is far from proven (Hollar and Snizek, 1996; Langer and Tubman, 1997). High self-esteem may simply dispose one to more sex of whatever type (Herold and Way, 1993). Part of the reason for the lack of clear findings for sex and drugs may be that self-esteem exerts contrary effects, on the one hand, affording people the self-confidence to resist social pressure (Brockner, 1984) or escapist temptations (Baumeister, 1991), but, on the other hand, affording them the initiative to try more risky or forbidden activities (Brockner and Elkind, 1985) under self-serving illusions of
invulnerability (Gerrard et al., 2000). Indeed, people with high self-esteem who relapse into smoking after a period of abstention are more adept at rationalizing their relapse (Gibbons et al., 1997).
The clearest correlate of self-esteem is subjective well-being. Self-esteem strongly and consistently predicts self-reported life satisfaction and assorted measures of happiness (Diener and Diener, 1995; Furnham and Cheng, 2000; Lyubomirsky and Lepper, 1995; Shackleford, 2001). Admittedly, such data remain to be supplemented by others based on more objective indices (such as peer ratings) and on designs capable of disambiguating causal links. Nonetheless, diverging patterns of correlation with other variables already indicate that happiness and self-esteem are not merely redundant constructs. Self-esteem also strongly and consistently predicts, in a negative direction, various manifestations of psychological distress, such as anxiety (Greenberg et al., 1992; Leary and Kowalski, 1995), depression (Tennen and Affleck, 1993; Tennen and Herzberger, 1987), hopelessness (Crocker et al., 1994), and neuroticism (Horner, 2001), although variance shared with neuroticism may account, in part, for self-esteem's predictive power (Judge and Bono, 2001; Neiss et al., 2002). In addition, levels of self-esteem are associated with greater positive affect, and less variable affect, in the course of everyday life, and in reaction to much the same external events (Campbell et al., 1991). Longitudinal and experimental studies also suggest that self-esteem promotes coping. Some studies find a simple adaptive benefit (Murrell et al., 1991; Robinson et al., 1995), others that high self-esteem acts as a buffer in times of high stress (Bonanno et al., 2002; Corning, 2002), and still others that low self-esteem acts as a spoiler in times of low stress (Ralph and Mineka, 1998; Whisman and Kwon, 1993). Despite the complexity of these findings, they are unanimous that high self-esteem is adaptive. One reason why coping may be difficult for people with low self-esteem is that they are more prone to demoralization as a result of inauspicious feedback. Whereas people, regardless of their level of self-esteem, feel elated by success and saddened by failure, only those with low self-esteem experience substantial fluctuations in their underlying sense of self-worth (Brown and Dutton, 1995). Such fluctuations may be due to a greater tendency to see a specific poor performance as a reflection of general underlying ability: people low in self-esteem show less pronounced self-serving attributional biases (Blaine and Crocker, 1993) and indeed regard positive and negative feedback as equally credible (Shrauger, 1975). For people low in self-esteem, failure in a specific domain has wide psychological implications (Epstein, 1992; Heyman et al., 1992). It prompts them to lower their estimates of ability in unrelated domains, whereas their high self-esteem counterparts are prompted to raise their estimates by way of compensation (Brown et al., 2001; Rhodewalt and Eddings, 2002). The above divergent pattern emerges elsewhere. With regard to expectations of future performance, people with low self-esteem, following failure, expect to fail again, whereas people with high self-esteem become paradoxically more optimistic about success (McFarlin and Blascovich, 1981). Moreover, following the activation of self-doubt, people with low self-esteem perceive their relationship partners as less fond and forgiving and report needing the relationship less, whereas people with high self-esteem perceive their partners as more fond and forgiving and report needing the relationship more (Murray et al., 1998). It seems that, because such individuals strongly link personal faults and failings to rejection, they are unable to use intimate relationships as a self-affirmational resource (Murray et al., 2001a). One final consequence of their demoralization may be self-regulatory paralysis: people with low self-esteem seem relatively less likely to deploy mood-repair tactics, even when they know that they would be effective (Heimpel et al., 2002). The greater affective vulnerability of people with low self-esteem is accompanied by, and possibly stems from, self-conceptions that are more tentative and less coherent (Baumeister, 1993; Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990; Campbell and Lavallee, 1993; Greenwald et al., 1988). Relative to those with low self-esteem, people with high self-esteem: (i) rate themselves faster and more extremely; (ii) give more definite ratings; (that is, report narrower confidence intervals) and express more confidence in the accuracy of these ratings; (iii) provide ratings that are internally consistent (that is, respond identically to synonyms) and also consistent over time; (iv) behave more consistently with those ratings; and (v) furnish more detailed and extensive open-ended self-reports. All this suggests more certain, accurate, and thorough self-knowledge. Hence, it is not so much that people low in self-esteem despise themselves in fact, they give intermediate and even sporadically favorable ratings of themselves (Baumeister et al., 1989; Pelham, 1993) but rather that they lack the enduring, firmly held, and richly supported positive identities that people high in self-esteem have. Given the greater affective vulnerability and cognitive irresolution of people with low self-esteem, it is unsurprising that they prefer to proceed with caution, conserving their precious reserves of self-worth and safeguarding their fragile identity, whereas people with high self-esteem, being psychologically robust, prefer to court risk, their ego being able to stomach some minor devaluation and their identity some light revision. Another way of putting this is to say that, whereas people with low self-esteem seek to affirm the self by using subtle, self-protective strategies, people with high self-esteem seek to affirm the self by using overt, self-promoting strategies (Baumeister et al., 1989; Tice, 1993; Wolfe et al., 1986), the difference being mediated by the availability of self-affirmatory resources (Spencer et al., 1993). Examples of this principle abound. People with low self-esteem make decisions carefully in order to minimize the possibility of future regret and embarrassment, whereas those with high self-esteem are prepared to carelessly spin the wheel (Josephs et al., 1992). Additionally, people with high self-esteem have fewer qualms about openly declaring their positive qualities to an audience (Baumeister, 1982), whereas their low-esteem counterparts prefer to self-enhance more indirectly, through association rather than competition (Schuetz and Tice, 1997). Indeed, assertive self-presentation comes so naturally to people with high self-esteem, and modest self-presentation so naturally to those with low, that instructing either to go against their inclination impairs their memory for the relevant social interaction (Baumeister et al., 1989). In addition, people behaviorally self-handicap only when the advantages of doing so match their preferred risk-orientation (Rhodewalt et al., 1991). For example, people with low self-esteem refrain from practicing for a test if that test is described as indexing only stupidity, whereas people with high self-esteem refrain from practicing for it if it is described as indexing only genius (Tice, 1991). Moreover, how people act after success or failure reflects their risk-orientation: people high in self-esteem persist after success and desist after failure (going for glory and hiding from shame) whereas those low in self-esteem desist after success and persist after failure (fearing to
jeopardize success and striving to remedy deficiencies) (Baumeister and Tice, 1985). This finding also squares with another one: high selfesteem people are most upset by repeated failure and low self-esteem people by failure that follows initial success (Brown et al., 2002).
Interpersonal behavior
Clearly, self-esteem is beneficial for an individual insofar as it feels good to have it. But what are its social implications? Is the oftrepeated popular psychological shibboleth true, namely, that, in order to love other people (for example, live in harmony with them), one must first love oneself? The evidence suggests not. People with high self-esteem consider themselves to be more popular (Battistich et al., 1993), to have superior friendships (Keefe and Berndt, 1996), to get along better with workmates (Frone, 2000), to enjoy more pleasant social interactions and to experience greater social support. But are such benefits merely in the eye of the beholder? Apparently so, given that both sociometric studies, in which all participants systematically rate both themselves and one another (Bishop and Inderbitzen, 1995; Dolcini and Adler, 1994), and independent criterion studies, in which ratings are provided by observers such as teachers and peers (Adams et al., 2000; Buhrmester et al., 1988), show no evidence of such benefits. The results of get-acquainted studies in the laboratory only confirm that people high in selfesteem, despite their pretensions, are not better liked than people low in it (Brockner and Lloyd, 1986; Campbell and Fehr, 1990) and, after ego threat, are actually disliked more, because they compensate by assertively deemphasizing their interdependence with others (Vohs and Heatherton, 2001). There is little direct evidence that high self-esteem promotes the quality or durability of intimate relationships, and, theoretically, matters would work both ways. On the one hand, low self-esteem contaminates regard for one's partner and the partner's views of self (Murray et al., 2001b), thereby acting as a midwife for unmerited distrust, excessive reassurance-seeking, and relational conflict (Murray et al., 1996b), all of which are likely to lower relationship satisfaction and increase the likelihood of relationship dissolution (Hendrick et al., 1988). On the other hand, people with high self-esteem are more likely to opt for exit responses to relationship problems, by deciding to leave, seek other partners, and otherwise eschew constructive attempts to solve relationship problems (Rusbult et al., 1987). Perhaps lacking initiative and confidence, low self-esteem persons are more willing to passively endure relationship problems.
Aggression and violence
Conventional wisdom, rooted in clinical impressions, had it that low self-esteem was a key cause of aggression and violence, though the underlying psychological mechanism was left unspecified. However, the weight of the evidence suggests that those who perpetrate aggression delinquents, spouse-beaters, child-beaters, murderers, assaulters, rapists, torturers, psychopaths, and warriors are in fact rather fond of themselves (Baumeister et al., 1996). Such a correlation makes sense, for two reasons. First, people with high self-esteem, in view of their habitually positive self-appraisals, are more likely to perceive a discrepancy when others appraise them negatively. Second, people with high self-esteem, given the choice between shamefully accepting or angrily rejecting those negative appraisals, will opt for the latter course of action, given their greater self-confidence and initiative. However, this threatened egoism model may apply only to people whose self-esteem, as well as being high, is at the same time fragile (Kernis, 2003). That is, although aggressive and violent people have high rather than low self-esteem, people with high self-esteem are not necessarily aggressive and violent. This conclusion is supported by studies showing that self-esteem, on its own, does not predict aggression or defensiveness in response to insults or ego threat: narcissism (Bushman and Baumeister, 1998) or self-esteem instability (Kernis et al., 1989) must also be present. In fact, people with high selfesteem may show the least aggression and defensiveness when their self-esteem is not fragile. This conclusion is further supported by non-experimental evidence from several domains. For example, there is no simple link between self-esteem and bullying (Olweus, 1991; Slee and Rigby, 1993). However, one large sociometric study, featuring measures of self-esteem, peer-rated self-esteem, and defensive self-esteem (a combination of high scores on the first two measures combined with high scores on a separate defensive egoism scale) found that bullies had high defensive self-esteem, those who thwarted their bullying had high nondefensive self-esteem, and the bullied themselves had low self-esteem (Salmivalli et al., 1999). As for delinquency, the evidence is equally mixed. Some studies find no link (Joon and Thornberry, 1998), others find a link explained away by background variables (Neumark-Sztainer et al., 1997), and still others find an independent link (Trzesniewski et al., 2002: Study 1). Complicating factors include the possibility that becoming delinquent may raise previously low levels of self-esteem (Rosenberg et al., 1989) and that elinquency is mostly measured by self-reports. However, one longitudinal study using objective measures does suggest that self-esteem offers causal protection against the development of delinquency (Trzesniewski et al., 2002: Study 2).
The correlates, benefits, and drawbacks of self-esteem can be succinctly summarized. First, self-esteem is only tangentially related to many of the objective benefits it has traditionally been held to cause. Second, self-esteem is, nonetheless, strongly correlated with subjective well-being. Third, high self-esteem, particularly when fragile or extreme, can be socially disruptive. Given these findings, why has self-esteem been ballyhooed as an unqualified good for so many years, at least in Western societies? It may partly be historical accident, an offshoot of twentieth-century social and economic individualism (Baumeister, 1986). Alternatively, the fact that self-esteem feels so good and prompts the self-ascription of illusory virtues (Brown, 1991) may have contributed to an overestimation of its objective merit, even among the psychological community.
Beyond self-esteem
Research suggests, then, that high self-reported self-esteem does not quite merit its traditionally sterling reputation. Might it be possible to go beyond traditional measures of self-esteem to distinguish between individuals with fragile and secure self-esteem? We will focus here on three relevant lines of inquiry: implicit self-esteem, contingent self-esteem, and self-esteem stability.
Implicit self-esteem
Awareness has grown about the limitations and pitfalls of self-report instruments (Paulhus, 2002). In particular, self-report measures of self-esteem are biased by self-presentation (Schlenker, 1980), self-deception (Paulhus, 1984), and self-ignorance (Wilson et al., 2000). Regarding self-presentation, people self-aggrandize in front of strangers but self-efface in front of friends (Tice et al., 1995). Regarding self-deception, people may be reluctant to admit to themselves that they harbor self-doubt, a reluctance they can express in socially desirable responses (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). Indeed, people who are, on an anonymous questionnaire, loath to self-ascribe common vices but keen to self-ascribe uncommon virtues, are more likely, following subsequent failure feedback, to present themselves in glowing terms to an audience, presumably in an attempt to affirm publicly a shaky self-image (Schneider and Turkat, 1975). Regarding selfignorance, a theoretical distinction can be drawn between explicit self-esteem, rooted in the rational mind (that is, conscious, controlled, intentional, effortful, verbal, rule-based, slow-processing, and fast-changing), and implicit self-esteem, rooted in the experiential mind (that is, unconscious, automatic, unintentional, effortless, nonverbal, associationist, fast-processing, and slow-changing) (Smith and DeCoster, 2000). Explicit self-esteem has been all but equated with responses to traditional self-report measures, and implicit self-esteem with responses to one of several indirect, subtle, and unobtrusive measures. The latter include the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998), the Go No-Go Association Test (GNAT; Nosek and Banaji, 2001), the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2002), the Name Letter Task (NLT; Koole et al., 2001), the Self-Apperception Test (SAT; Aidman, 1999), evaluative priming paradigms (Fazio, 2001), and word-fragment completion tasks (Hetts et al., 1999). Yet, for all their diversity, implicit measures of self-esteem operate on the premise that stimuli intimately associated with the self (for example, first and last names, reflexive pronouns) reflect the valence of the self (Beggan, 1992; Hoorens and Nuttin, 1993). Hence, by assessing the valence of self-related stimuli, the underlying valence of the self can be inferred, free from the distortions of self-presentation, self-deception, and self-ignorance. What, then, do implicit measures reveal? The matter remains controversial. Certainly, implicit measures readily replicate, at a mean level, preferences for self shown on explicit measures. At the same time, implicit measures either show no, or only modest, correlations with explicit measures (Bosson et al., 2000; Jordan et al., 2001). This finding could indicate, significantly, that explicit and implicit measures of self-esteem tap into different underlying constructs, or, mundanely, that the reliability of the latter is poor (Cunningham et al., 2001; Lane et al., 2001). Nonetheless, consistent with theoretical expectation, the correspondence between explicit and implicit measures is increased if cognitive resources are made scarce during explicit responding (Koole et al., 2001; Wilson et al., 2000). Unfortunately, simply presenting explicit measures first also has the same effect (Bosson et al., 2000), calling into question the autonomy of implicit measures. Also problematic is the fact that implicit measures of self-esteem habitually fail to intercor-relate (Bosson et al., 2000; Jordan et al., 2001), again perhaps due to low reliability, but also perhaps to meaningful structural differences between tasks, the precise modus operandi of which remains under debate (De Houwer, 2000; Gregg, 2003; Klinger et al., 2000). The generic label implicit may hide substantial heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the IAT does appear to index automatic associations between self, valence, and social identity that bear out the predictions of classical balance theory (Heider, 1958) better than explicit measures of the same constructs, suggesting that implicit measures may yet prove to be useful windows on the soul (Greenwald et al., 2002). As regards the predictive validity of implicit self-esteem, the findings are promising but mixed. On the one hand, implicit self-esteem has failed to predict reasonable validity criteria. These include independent ratings of self-esteem and interpretations of ambiguous statements (Bosson et al., 2000), as well as a wide array of self-related constructs, including well-being, psychiatric symptoms, loneliness, selfconstrual, and personality traits (Gregg and Sedikides, 2002). On the other hand, implicit self-esteem has predicted nonverbal anxiety in an interview situation where explicit self-esteem proved unsuccessful (Spalding and Hardin, 1999). In addition, an IAT measure of implicit self-esteem has independently predicted greater psychological robustness in the face of failure (Jordan et al., 2001), suggesting that the IAT is diagnostic of fragile self-esteem. Perhaps the most striking predictive findings to date pertain to the name-letter effect (the preference for letters in one's name over letters not in it, controlling for normative letter-liking; Nuttin, 1987). A person (for example, Scott) is disproportionately likely to reside in or move to a location (for example, Scotland) and to hold or pursue an occupation (for example, scoutmaster) whose name resembles his or her own (Pelham et al., 2002). In summary, research on implicit self-esteem has yielded some promising findings consistent with its reflecting secure self-esteem. However, issues involving both the coherence and interpretation of these findings persist. Future research incorporating manipulations as well as measures of explicit and implicit self-esteem may help clarify such issues. It has already been found that explicit and implicit factors combine in interesting ways to predict defensiveness (Jones et al., 2002) and self-serving biases (Kernis et al., 2000).
Contingent self-esteem
A distinction can be drawn between whether self-esteem is high or low and the extent to which self-esteem depends on particular conditions being met. In other words, self-esteem can vary not only in level but also in how contingent it is. When people with dispositionally contingent self-esteem do not meet specific standards and expectations, their sense of self-worth suffers, and feelings of shame result. Such people, therefore, require continual validation and spend a great deal of time defending their frail egos against looming threats. In contrast, people with noncontingent self-esteem, though they certainly savor successes and lament failures, do not undergo comparable fluctuations in their sense of self-worth. Their core attitude towards themselves remains stable and positive (Deci and Ryan, 1995). It has been theorized that such stable positive self-regard derives from the satisfaction of people's fundamental needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Deci and Ryan, 2000). This happens when their actions spring from intrinsic desires rather than extrinsic demands, when their actions prove to be habitually efficacious, and where they manage to forge and maintain meaningful and harmonious relationships. Sure enough, studies find that intrinsic aspirations (personal growth, meaningful relationships, and community aspirations) predict several dimensions of well-being, whereas extrinsic motivations (money, fame, and wealth) predict several dimensions
of ill-being (Kasser and Ryan, 1996). Along with an effort to identify the bases of contingent self-esteem, relevant research has progressed along three directions. First, an attempt has been made to characterize, as an individual difference, the degree to which one's self-esteem is contingent or noncontingent (Paradise and Kernis, 1999). When we control for level of trait self-esteem, contingent self-esteem, as expected, predicts less anger and hostility in response to insulting feedback, as well as the choice of better anger-management strategies in hypothetical scenarios (Kernis, 2003). Second, an attempt has been made to locate the various dimensions on which self-esteem is contingent (Crocker and Wolfe, 2001). These dimensions include approval, acceptance, family, God, power, self-reliance, identity, morality, appearance, and academic ability (Crocker et al., 1999). As predicted, state self-esteem fluctuates to a greater or less extent depending on whether an important or unimportant contingency of self-worth has been targeted by feedback (Crocker et al., 2000; Lun and Wolfe, 1999). Interestingly, however, basing one's self-esteem on dimensions such as God, family, and morality is associated with greater noncontingency of self-esteem overall (Jordan et al., 2001). Finally, researchers have attempted to qualify the extent to which interpersonal acceptance and rejection (closely linked to self-esteem; Leary and Baumeister, 2000) are considered to be contingent upon success and failure (Baldwin and Sinclair, 1996). High trait self-esteem is associated with weaker if-then contingencies of this sort, as assessed by priming paradigms. The strength of such contingencies can be acutely reinforced or weakened by cuing people with thoughts of relationships in which another person's esteem for the self is contingent, so-called relationship schemas, or by having them experience success and failure experiences directly (Baldwin and Meunier, 1999; Baldwin and Sinclair, 1996). Although research on if-then contingencies has not been expressly conducted with a view to going beyond self-reported self-esteem, it could be used for that purpose. What complicates the picture somewhat is that, like self-esteem, contingencies of self-worth also fluctuate with external events.
Self-esteem stability
Self-esteem stability can be defined as the absence of variation in self-reported self-esteem over either the short term or the long term; alternatively, it can be defined as the absence of variation in departures of momentary state self-esteem from resting levels of trait selfesteem. Either way, self-esteem stability has been typically indexed by the standard deviation of scores across multiple modified measures of self-esteem over several days (Kernis et al., 1992). Self-esteem stability correlates moderately, but not redundantly, with self-esteem level. Theoretically, one might expect self-esteem instability to be the result of contingent self-esteem: to the extent that one's sense of selfworth is precarious, it is liable to wax and wane with everyday triumphs and disappointments. Indeed, there is evidence that unstable selfesteem is linked to the placing of greater importance upon particular sources of self-esteem (Kernis et al., 1993) and to fears of social rejection (Greenier et al., 1999). Furthermore, unstable self-esteem predisposes people to react antisocially in a manner indicative of psychological fragility. For example, self-esteem level and self-esteem stability interact in an interesting way to predict self-reported proneness to anger and hostility: people with high and unstable self-esteem report the greatest proneness, and people with high and stable self-esteem, the least (Kernis et al., 1989). A similar pattern of interaction characterizes psychological reactions to valenced feedback and mental simulations of doing well or poorly. Specifically, people whose self-esteem is both high and stable are relatively unaffected, whereas those whose self-esteem is high but unstable become self-aggrandizing or self-defensive (Kernis et al., 1997). For people low in self-esteem, the pattern is less clear-cut, though instability may be predictive of reduced defensiveness. In other words, self-esteem instability may not be wholly negative when self-esteem is low. Indeed, although self-esteem instability is concurrently associated with greater depression among people with high selfesteem, it is associated with less depression among those with low (Kernis et al., 1991). Perhaps people with low/unstable self-esteem are better able to mobilize self-protective strategies than those with low/stable self-esteem. One study (Kernis et al., 1992) found that the former were more likely than the latter to use excuses to mitigate negative feedback, a practice which could guard against persistent dysphoria. In contrast, people with high/unstable self-esteem were more likely than those with high/stable self-esteem to use excuses to magnify positive feedback. This discrepancy suggests that self-esteem instability drives some of the self-protection/ self-enhancement discrepancies usually attributed to levels of self-esteem per se (Tice, 1993). However, self-esteem instability is hardly a blessing. Over and above self-esteem level, it correlates with deficits in intrinsic motivation and self-determination (Kernis et al., 2000), predicts depression longitudinally in interaction with daily hassles (Kernis et al., 1998), and predicts more extreme reactions to negative events (Greenier et al., 1999). Explorations of the links between self-esteem instability and other indices of fragile self-esteem stability will prove a fertile area of future research.
The self is a key locus of motivation and affect (Gaertner et al., 2002; Sedikides and Brewer, 2001). Our intent in this chapter has been to document some interesting ways in which social psychology has shown this to be so and, thereby, to highlight the value of empirical forays into the nature of the self. Unfortunately, we had no space even to summarize, much less scrutinize, the equally wide-ranging and intriguing research literatures, both classic and contemporary, on the semantic/representational and the executive/ self-regulatory aspects of self (see Baumeister, 1998, 2000). We nonetheless hope to have conveyed to our readers a vibrant sense of what social psychology has told us about selfhood and of its potential to tell us ever more about it in the years ahead.
The self has long fascinated writers, poets, and philosophers. More recently, scientists have begun to investigate it empirically, using
rigorous and inventive methodologies. The focus here is on the motivational and affective components of selfhood. In general, the evidence suggests that people regard the self as their most prized possession: they go to great lengths to protect and promote it, playing up personal strengths and playing down personal weaknesses. However, some people are better at this than others. The result is differences in self-esteem. Having high self-esteem feels good; however, contrary to popular belief, it also has some definite drawbacks.
Selfhood in self-conscious human beings can be divided into three main components: self-concept, self-evaluation, and self-regulation. The second component is of primary interest here. Although people are motivated to discover the facts about themselves to self-assess they are also motivated to discover that those facts are positive to self-enhance. Flattering self-evaluations feel good and critical selfevaluations feel bad. Hence, within the constraints of plausibility (and some other constraints), people's minds work unconsciously to generate flattering self-evaluations, processing social information in various biased ways. For instance, people generally regard themselves as above average, attribute successes to themselves and failures to chance, and preferentially forget negative feedback. However, people also differ in how successfully they self-enhance: some are more able to do so than others. The upshot is differences in self-esteem. In general, having high self-esteem yields subjective benefits, including greater well-being and mental health. However, having high selfesteem yields a mixture of objective benefits and costs. So, although people with high self-esteem are, say, healthier, they are also, say, more prone to aggression. Recent research has shifted from studying sheer quantity of self-esteem towards studying its underlying quality, exploring how it varies, what it depends on, and whether it is automatic.
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Attitudes: Foundations, Functions, and Consequences
Russell H. Fazio, Michael A. Olson
It is difficult to imagine a psychological world without attitudes. One would go about daily life without the ability to think in terms of good and bad, desirable and undesirable, or approach and avoid. There would be no activation of positivity or approach tendencies upon encountering objects that would engender positive outcomes, but, perhaps more seriously, there would also be no mental faculty for avoiding negative objects in one's environment. Our environment would make little sense to us; the world would be a cacophony of meaningless blessings and curses. Existence would be truly chaotic, and probably quite short. For these reasons, the attitude construct has proven indispensable in social psychology's understanding of why we think, feel, and do the things we do. Indeed, the field of social psychology was once defined as the study of attitudes (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918). Even a quick perusal of the various books and review chapters on the attitude construct reveals that virtually everyone begins with broad assertions about how pervasive evaluation is in everyday life (e.g., Fazio, 2001; Petty and Cacioppo, 1981). Osgood et al. (1957) showed that most of the meaning in language comes from evaluation. Certainly, attitudes have occupied a central position in social psychology for decades (Allport, 1935; Doob, 1947; McGuire, 1985). How do we come to evaluate objects in our environment as positive or negative? What are the functions of these evaluations? How are they represented in memory, and how does this representation affect the ways they operate in predicting behavior? History has proven these questions to be some of the most important, and challenging, of social psychology. Our goal in this chapter is to describe some of the ways in which researchers have approached these questions about the nature of attitudes and to relate some of the insights that the field has collected in nearly 100 years. We do not aspire to be exhaustive. But we do hope to provide a broad coverage of attitude function and consequences, enough to stimulate the reader's thinking in ways that might later prove useful in filling some of the gaps of understanding that challenge the field. We discuss the classic tripartite view of attitudes and some more recent developments concerning how attitudes might be conceptualized. Next, some important qualities of attitudes, including various indices of attitude strength, are covered. We then turn to the question of why people form and hold attitudes; that is, what functions attitudes serve. Finally, we address the attitude-behavior relation and provide a framework for thinking about the conditions under which attitudes are more likely to guide behavior.
The classic three-component view
Historically, the most prominent framework for the study of attitudes has been the tripartite, or three-component model (Katz and Stotland, 1959; Rosenberg and Hovland, 1960). In this view, the attitude is an unobservable psychological construct which can manifest itself in relevant beliefs, feelings, and behavioral components (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Because the attitude exists only within the mind of the person, one must look for it in more observable realms (MacCorquodale and Meehl, 1948). So, for example, one's positive attitude toward chocolate might appear in favorable beliefs (A good piece of chocolate really improves my day), feelings (Chocolate melting in my mouth brings me such a tranquil feeling), and behavior (I'm eating chocolate now). At first glance, the tripartite view seems to be a foregone conclusion for several reasons. First, it provides a way of cataloguing various attitudinal responses and a framework for their study (e.g., Breckler, 1984). Second, it has served as a road map for guiding research on attitude formation and change (see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, for a review). Third, it matches fairly well the intuitive distinction between the components. Indeed, the heart-head dichotomy has roots as far back as Plato and has enjoyed privileged status in many popular psychological theories (McGuire, 1969, 1985). It also seems to exhaust the universe of possibilities of attitudinal responses (one would be hard pressed to invent a response that could not fit somewhere in one of the three categories). However, the tripartite view includes several assumptions about the nature of attitudes that might better be left unmade (Zanna and Rempel, 1988). Indeed, these questions should remain open as empirical questions worthy of investigation. Specifically, the tripartite view suggests that while one cannot get into the head of the attitude-holder to study his or her attitude toward, say, abortion, that attitude should be observable in reported thoughts, feelings, and behavior toward the topic of abortion. That is, the attitude should manifest in all three ways (Rosenberg and Hovland, 1960). By this definition, all three components must be present for an evaluative tendency to exist. However, research suggests that attitudes can form as a result of any one (or combination) of the three components, and, moreover, that which forms the roots of the attitude has implications for the strength and persistence of the attitude (e.g., Abelson et al., 1982; Bem, 1972; Chaiken et al., 1995; Fazio and Zanna, 1981; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Tyler and Rasinski, 1984; van den Berg et al., 2006). The tripartite view also makes the dubious assumption that the three classes of evaluative responding must be consistent with each other, given their common dependency on an underlying construct. However, it is easy to imagine someone who believes that reproductive rights should be protected but whose emotional reactions to the issue of abortion are quite negative (Breckler and Wiggins, 1989; Rosenberg, 1968). Such inconsistencies between affective and cognitive responses to an attitude object have important implications (which we discuss later), but they risk being overlooked (or the attitude would not really be considered an attitude) within a traditional tripartite model. Finally, and perhaps most problematic, is the assumption of attitude-behavior consistency. The assumption that attitudes always guide behavior not only rails against common sense, but also inhibits some important questions from being asked regarding the conditions under which attitudes might best predict behavior, as we shall see later in the section on attitude-behavior relation. With such ambiguity surrounding the tripartite model, it is not surprising that several researchers have attempted to reduce the number of
components to two or even one. For example, some advocates of a one-component view argue that cognition forms the foundation of all attitudes, and that feelings and behaviors toward the attitude object simply derive from beliefs, as when, on the basis of cool-headed hard evidence, one decides to prefer Macintosh to Windows computer operating systems (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Fishbein and Middlestadt, 1995). Others have insisted that feelings need no inferences, and that one's affective reactions to an object can precede any beliefs about it, as when one has a bad feeling about a new acquaintance but cannot seem to say why (e.g., Monahan et al., 2000; Zajonc, 1980). Finally, evidence exists that, in the absence of either beliefs or feelings about the attitude object, one can infer an attitude into existence from past behavior toward the attitude object, as when one author of this chapter noticed that he consistently bought olivecolored shirts and, therefore, must like the color olive (e.g., Bem, 1972; Fazio, 1987). In any case, in light of several decades of evidence to the contrary, the assumption that all three components must be present and in agreement seems dubious indeed. Zanna and Rempel (1988) re-examined some of the assumptions of earlier models of attitudes, including the tripartite view, and arrived at a less presumptuous formulation of the attitude construct. First, they regard attitudes simply as categorizations of an object or issue along an evaluative dimension. Essentially, this definition accords with Thurstone's (1946: 39) classic, single-factor view of attitudes as the intensity of positive or negative affect for or against a psychological object. Second, Zanna and Rempel (1988) retain the notion that attitudes can form and manifest themselves from beliefs, feelings, and behavior but strip away with the problematic assumptions of the traditional tripartite model. In their view, attitudes can be based on any combination of the three components, and they leave the issue of agreement between the three components as an empirical question. Thus, an attitude might develop through cognitive, affective, or behavioral processes, and no assumptions are made about which component might predominate, how the components interact in determining an overall evaluation of an attitude object, or how the components might affect one another. A similar approach is evident in the view of attitudes proposed by Fazio and his colleagues (Fazio, 1990, 1995; Fazio et al., 1982). Here, attitudes are viewed as associations in memory between attitude objects and their evaluation (Fazio, 1990, 1995). These associations are based on cognitive, affective, and/or behavioral knowledge of the attitude object, from which is derived a summary evaluation. The strength of the association between an attitude object and its evaluation becomes an important quality of the attitude, one that will be discussed later (Fazio, 1995).
Cognitive, affective, and behavioral processes of attitude formation
Newer conceptualizations of the attitude construct advance the possibility that attitudes can form in multiple ways. The three key means of attitude formation we discuss implicate cognitive, affective, or behavioral processes.
Cognitive routes
An attitude is formed on the basis of cognitions when one comes to believe either that the attitude object possesses (un)desirable attributes, or that the attitude object will bring about (un)desired outcomes. Like the example of computer operating systems mentioned earlier, such an attitude is marked by an emphasis on beliefs about the attitude object. Perhaps the best known cognitive model is Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) expectancy-value model. They argue that an attitude toward a given object is the sum of the expected value of the attributes of the object. Expectancy is defined as the estimate of the probability that the object has a given attribute, and the value of an attribute is simply one's evaluation of it. For each attribute, an expected value is computed by multiplying the expectancy and the value of the attribute. An overall attitude toward the object is reached by taking the sum of the expected values of all the attributes an attitude object is thought to have (e.g., Smith and Clark, 1973). Other models, such as Anderson's (1991) information-integration theory, also describe attitude formation as a function of combinations of various beliefs and their evaluative implications (e.g., Anderson, 1981, 1982). This all sounds very cerebral, and indeed it is. Surprisingly, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) make the claim that all attitudes are based on beliefs about the attitude object, and that all attitudes are formed via the summation of subjective probabilities and values (see Fishbein and Middlestadt, 1995, for a recent argument to this effect). But while beliefs about attitude objects certainly contribute to our evaluations of them, and while some evidence supports the model's account of how beliefs about attitude objects combine (e.g., Cronen and Conville, 1975), the model fails to address some important issues. Correspondence between the model's predictions and empirical data implies nothing about the process by which those attitudes are derived. Whether people actually engage in the probability assessment and summation processes these theorists describe is another question, and there are certainly ways other than their expected value equation that people arrive at the same attitude (see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, for a critique of the model). Moreover, as evidence we will discuss below indicates, evaluations can form in the absence of beliefs about the object. Other cognitive models focus more on the qualitative aspects of belief-based attitude change. The cognitive-response model addresses questions of how perceivers react to and elaborate on information (in the form of persuasive arguments) relating to an attitude object (Greenwald, 1981; Petty et al., 1981). Such models lack the precision of the mathematical models, but address some of the person, situation, and message variables that affect attitude development and change (for a review, see Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Cognitiveresponse models have been studied mostly within persuasion settings, and so the reader is referred to Chapter 9 to read more about this and its more modern descendants.
Affective routes
Attitudes formed from affect stem from emotional reactions to the attitude object. Like the example of chocolate mentioned earlier, one can be said to have an affectively based attitude when either positive or negative feelings are evoked when considering the attitude object. Social psychologists have uncovered three primary ways in which attitudes might be formed on the basis of affect: operant conditioning, classical conditioning, and mere exposure. Traditionally, operant conditioning has been used by experimental psychologists interested in basic learning principles, and is typically defined by the frequency of a response positive outcomes increase the rate of response, and negative outcomes decrease it (e.g., Hull, 1951; Thorndike, 1932). Attitudes can be learned in a similar way when considered as a response. Attitudinal responses that lead to positive outcomes are more likely to occur again in the future, and attitudinal
responses that lead to negative outcomes are less likely to occur. In a classic example, Hildum and Brown (1956) telephoned university students and acted as survey researchers interested in attitudes toward policies at their school. Some students' responses were answered with a good! by the surveyors (responses that suggested a positive attitude toward a university policy). These researchers found that positively reinforced responses were more likely to occur later students whose positive responses toward a university policy were reinforced voiced more positive responses to university policies later. Insko (1965) found that reinforced responses were more likely to occur even when tested a week later in a different setting. Classical conditioning is similar to operant conditioning, but the response emitted is thought to be internal. That is, no overt response is necessary to learn through classical conditioning; one need only attend to covariations between objects in one's environment. Through repeated pairings of some attitude object (such as a new beverage) and other clearly positive or negative objects (such as a sexy model), the affect associated with the second object comes to be associated with the attitude object. For example, Staats and Staats (1958) paired national names (such as swedish) with positive or negative words and found that the nation paired with positive words was evaluated more positively than the nation paired with negative words. Others have paired the onset or offset of shock with other words and have shown similar effects (Zanna et al., 1970). While some researchers have questioned whether this evaluative conditioning can occur in the absence of awareness of the between the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli contingencies (e.g., Field, 2000), there is now evidence to suggest that people are quite good at encoding environmental covariations in memory even if they never consciously notice them (for a review, see Seger, 1994). For example, Olson and Fazio (2001), in the context of a study about attention and surveillance, told participants that they would see a variety of random words and images on the computer screen and that they should press a response button whenever they saw a predetermined target item appear. While they were being vigilant for the target items, several other words and images were presented, supposedly as distracters to make the task more challenging. Embedded in this stream of random images were critical pairings of novel objects (Pokemon cartoon creatures) with either positive or negative words and images. Tests of explicit memory indicated that participants were completely unaware of the systematic pairings, but a surprise evaluation task indicated that they found the Pokemon creature paired with positive items more pleasant than the Pokemon creature paired with negative items (see also Olson and Fazio, 2002, 2006). Because these attitudes can form in the absence of conscious beliefs about the attitude object, classical conditioning stands to be a potentially ubiquitous form of attitudes in the real world (for a review, see De Houwer et al., 2001). The evidence regarding operant and classical conditioning argues for the existence of attitudes on the basis of only affect. So does research concerning the mere exposure effect. The underlying premise of the effect is that simply making an object accessible to the individual's perception increases liking for it (Zajonc, 1968: 1). In a now classic experiment, Zajonc presented nonsense words (which he presented as Turkish words; for example, biweejni), Chinese ideographs, or yearbook photos, to participants in varying numbers of repetitions. Participants were then asked to guess the meaning of the Turkish/nonsense words or Chinese ideographs, or to estimate how much they might like a person in one of the yearbook photos. His simple finding was that the more participants were exposed to a given item, the more favorably they evaluated it. Later researchers found that the effect generalized to many other attitude objects, and that it is most robust when the exposure is subliminal (Harmon-Jones and Allen, 2001; Monahan et al., 2000; see Bornstein, 1989; Zajonc, 2001, for reviews). Thus, short of the minimal amount of (probably nonconscious) cognitive work required to categorize the repeatedly presented items as familiar, familiarity appears to breed liking even in the absence of beliefs about the object.
Behavioral routes
Without either clear feelings or beliefs about a potential attitude object, one may have still had past experience with it, as in the example mentioned earlier of one author's tendency to purchase olive-colored clothing. Bem (1972) claimed that this past behavior can be used to infer an attitude toward an object through self-perception. For example, Bandler et al. (1968) exposed participants to electric shocks and induced them to either escape (that is, terminate) the shock or not. Although the shocks were of equal intensity, participants reported the shocks from which they had escaped to be more painful. Presumably, they inferred from their termination of the shocks that they must have been painful. Self-perception can also lead one to discount one's behavior as a source of information about one's attitudes, as when an intrinsically rewarding behavior comes to be associated with external rewards. For example, Lepper et al. (1973) found that children who had earlier freely engaged in an enjoyable activity enjoyed it less after having experienced an event in which they engaged in the activity in order to receive a reward (see Chapter 10, this volume, for a more in-depth discussion of self-perception and related processes). In summary, attitudes can be based on either affect, cognition, or behavior, and the existence of an evaluation based on one of the elements need not imply the existence of the other two elements. Attitude researchers have taken Zanna and Rempel's advice and have spent a good deal of energy in exploring the complex structural relationships between the three bases of attitudes and how these bases affect the nature and behavior of attitudes (e.g., Edwards, 1990; Fabrigar and Petty, 1999; Millar and Millar, 1990; van den Berg et al., 2006). In fact, some of the most exciting work on attitudes premises itself on the often conflictual relationships between the elements. We describe some of these dynamics below in our discussion of the structural qualities of attitudes.
Qualities of attitudes
When prompted with a political survey question, two individuals might both rate George W Bush as a 2 on a ?3-to-+3 scale. However, even though their reported attitudes might look the same, their underlying evaluations may be very different. For example, one individual might have to think about it for a while before settling on an answer, whereas the other might explode with a vehement 2! immediately after being asked. For one individual, the attitude may stem primarily from affect, whereas for the other it may involve a thoughtful consideration of Bush's stands on important national issues. Such differences in the underlying qualities may have important implications for attitude function. Despite their numeric equivalence, one person's attitude might be stronger than the other's. Many indices of attitude strength have been proposed. Among them are attitude certainty, importance, and centrality, as well as ego involvement, knowledge, commitment, and conviction. There is certainly overlap between the various strength measures, but, as of yet, there is little consensus on whether the many measures might be reduced to a simple few (see Bassili, 1996; Petty and Krosnick, 1995, Visser et al., 2003). In the interest of brevity, we will focus on only a few of these measures, beginning with attitude accessibility.
Attitude accessibility
Recall that in the framework described by Fazio et al. (1982), an attitude is seen as an association in memory between an attitude object and its summary evaluation. The strength of that association can vary, and all attitudes are thought to exist somewhere along this strength continuum (Fazio, 1990, 1995). One end of the continuum is marked by nonattitudes (Converse, 1970); these are evaluations that simply are not available in memory. When prompted to make an attitudinal response, someone with a nonattitude toward a given object must construct one based on any currently known or observable attributes of the object. The other end of the continuum is characterized by strong associations in memory between attitude objects and their respective evaluations. Such attitudes are capable of being automatically activated upon encountering the attitude object (Fazio, 1995). So, whereas the sight of an obscure brand of juice activates little from memory, and an evaluation of that juice must be based on whatever is known or might be learned about it at the time, the mere sight or aroma of coffee activates an impressive rush of positivity in many a coffee drinker. This reasoning underlies a common measurement of associative strength, latency to respond to attitudinal inquiries, or attitude accessibility (e.g., Powell and Fazio, 1984). In this procedure, participants are presented with labels or images of several attitude objects and are asked to indicate, as each object is presented, whether they like or dislike the attitude object by pressing one of two response keys as quickly as possible. Because strong attitudes require less cognitive work to report, they are responded to much more quickly than weaker ones. Thus, response latencies to attitudinal judgments serve as an indicator of associative strength. Because strong attitudes are capable of automatic activation, the mere presentation of the attitude object can activate positivity or negativity, depending on the attitude. Borrowing from work in cognitive psychology on automatic activation (e.g., Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977), Fazio and colleagues (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986) reasoned that if an attitude object's presentation automatically activates, say, positivity, responses to other positive items should be facilitated. Measurement of the activation of some other positive item in memory after presentation of the first positive item could then serve as an indirect indicator of the extent to which positivity is automatically activated in response to the first item (Fazio et al., 1986, 1995). In this paradigm, an attitude object, say, coffee, is presented for a short duration (usually 100-300 milliseconds), and it is followed by either a positive or a negative adjective. The participant's task is to indicate whether the adjective means good or bad by pressing one of two corresponding response keys. If the attitude toward coffee is sufficiently strong (and positive), and is followed by the word awesome, one should be quicker to identify awesome as a positive word. Analogously, one should be slower to identify a negative word, say, horrible, as negative. In their first demonstration of the paradigm, Fazio et al. (1986) presented attitude objects as primes that had been idiosyncratically selected for each participant as strong and weak. In a later experiment, accessibility was manipulated by having participants repeatedly express their evaluations of some attitude objects in an earlier phase of the procedure. In both cases, attitudes characterized by stronger object-evaluation associations were relatively more capable of automatic activation. For these relatively accessible attitudes, participants were quicker to identify evaluatively congruent target adjectives that followed the presentation of the attitude object (see Fazio, 2001, for a review of recent developments concerning the affective priming paradigm and automatic attitude activation). These relatively strong attitudes are then more likely to direct attention to the attitude object, affect perceptions of it, and guide behavior toward it, as we shall see later.
Any given attitude object may be characterized by both positive and negative qualities. To the extent that such inconsistencies are unresolved, an individual may possess both positive and negative evaluations of the attitude object. In other words, the individual's attitude can be viewed as ambivalent (Kaplan, 1972). Traditional measures of attitudes assume that attitudes exist somewhere between absolutely negative and absolutely positive and require respondents to place their attitude toward a given object somewhere on a single dimension scale, typically anchored at one end with dislike, and at the other end with like (Himmelfarb, 1993; Thurstone, 1928; see Cacioppo et al., 1997, for a bidimensional conception of attitudes). Such scales deny the possibility that someone might feel both positively and negatively toward a given object (that is, ambivalent), or neither positively nor negatively toward a given object (that is, indifferent). The meaning of the zero or neutral point on the scale then becomes questionable, because, presumably, respondents would respond somewhere near the zero or neutral point whether they feel both positivity and negativity, or neither (Converse, 1970; Kaplan, 1972). As one might suspect, there are important differences between the two cases that we will discuss below. Researchers interested in ambivalence have circumvented this problem by requiring respondents to make two estimates toward a given object one with regard to the positivity they feel toward the object, and another with regard to the negativity they feel toward the object. A variety of methods exists for computing indices of ambivalence based on these responses, but all agree that ambivalence exists to the extent that respondents indicate feeling some degree of both positivity and negativity toward the object (Kaplan, 1972; Priester and Petty, 1996; Thompson et al., 1995). Many researchers would argue that ambivalence is an unstable and subjectively uncomfortable state (e.g., Newby-Clark et al., 2002), and some of the consequences of ambivalence are based on this premise (Katz, 1981; Katz and Hass, 1988). One such consequence is ambivalence amplification, which is the notion that behavior toward the attitude object is amplified, or extremitized, in either the positive or negative direction, in an effort to reduce ambivalence (e.g., Hass et al., 1994). For example, Katz and Hass (1988) argue that many whites hold ambivalent attitudes toward blacks they believe that blacks deserve egalitarian treatment and respect as individuals, but they simultaneously believe that blacks violate the American values of hard work and independence. The result is often exaggeratedly positive or negative treatment of blacks. Ambivalent attitudes are marked by other important qualities as well. Because ambivalence is thought to be an unstable state, ambivalent attitudes are prone to change (Bargh et al., 1992; Bassili, 1996) and are relatively less predictive of behavior (Armitage and Conner, 2000). They are also more context dependent, meaning that whether the positive or the negative component is activated depends on the particular situation (Moore, 1980).
Evaluative-cognitive consistency
As Zanna and Rempel (1988) note, numerous permutations of agreement or disagreement between affect, cognition, and behavior, as well as the overall summary attitude, are theoretically possible and interesting. For example, the heart (affect) and mind (cognition) may not cohere perfectly, or the summary evaluation may correspond more closely to affect than to cognition, or vice versa. One such form of potential inconsistency within the structure of an attitude has received much more attention than others. Although originally labeled affective-cognitive consistency, the research is more appropriately referred to as involving evaluative-cognitive consistency, as Chaiken et al. (1995) have argued. The research concerns the degree of consistency between an individual's overall evaluation of an attitude object and the evaluative implications of his or her beliefs about the object. Beginning with the work of Rosenberg (1960, 1968), interesting relations have been observed between the extent of such correspondence and indications of attitude strength. Chaiken and Baldwin (1981) found that individuals whose attitudes were characterized by greater evaluative-cognitive consistency were less influenced by the implications of a linguistically biased questionnaire that made salient either their pro- or antienvironment behaviors. Whereas participants with initial attitudes characterized by low consistency displayed attitude change in the direction of the salient behavioral information, those with higher evaluative-cognitive consistency were unaffected. Their attitudes remained stable. In a parallel manner, Rosenberg (1968) obtained evidence that greater evaluative-cognitive consistency was associated with greater resistance to counterpersuasion, and Norman (1975) found such intra attitudinal correspondence to be associated with greater consistency between attitudes and subsequent behavior. Chaiken et al. (1995) provide a more detailed and comprehensive review of research concerning such measures of structural consistency and their relation to attitude strength. We have reviewed a few important qualities of attitudes: attitude accessibility, ambivalence, and evaluative-cognitive consistency. Much more work has been done on these and other qualities of attitudes, and, more generally, on various indices of attitude strength (Petty and Krosnick, 1995). Likewise, ambivalence can take additional forms beyond those mentioned here (Zanna and Rempel, 1988). Our review has been necessarily selective, but we hope we have succeeded in communicating at least some of the important complexities of attitude structure. Next we address the functions that attitudes serve; that is, why we evaluate.
Attitude function: then and now
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, psychologists divided themselves rather decisively into two camps: structuralists and functionalists. Structuralists believed that psychology's purpose should be merely to describe the phenomena of the human mind and not speculate why these phenomena exist (e.g., Titchener, 1910). Functionalists, however, were interested in the adaptive significance of psychological phenomena and held that understanding human psychology required an appreciation of the premise that the human mind has evolved to solve certain adaptive problems that psychological phenomena have specific functions (e.g., James, 1952). We would agree that, in the case of attitudes, understanding why we evalute is a crucial component to understanding attitudes more generally.
Consideration of the functions served by attitudes began in the 1950s. Smith et al. (1956) and Katz (1960) each proposed a series of attitudinal functions aimed at covering the various reasons why people evaluate objects in their environment. Katz's taxonomy included a utilitarian, knowledge, ego-defensive, and value-expressive function. The utilitarian function is premised in the behaviorist principle of seeking rewards and avoiding punishment in one's environment. In this sense, attitudes help to ensure the organism's survival, but, more broadly, any attitude based on an interest in maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain for oneself can be considered utilitarian (Green and Gerken, 1989). The knowledge function is related to the utilitarian function in that it helps in navigating one's environment, but, according to Katz, it also fulfills a specific need to organize one's world and make sense of an otherwise daunting information environment (see also Allport, 1935). Dividing the world into likes and dislikes provides the kind of order and predictability that, according to Katz, we all crave. Smith et al. (1956) proposed an object-appraisal function, which can be thought of as a combination of Katz's utilitarian and knowledge functions. They argue that such an attitude provides a way of sizing up objects in one's environment, saving the time and energy that would be required constantly to compute new attitudes toward objects. Such ready-aids allow organisms to navigate more efficiently their environment and quickly decide whether an object should be approached or avoided. We have more to say about this particular function later. Katz's ego-defensive function and what Smith et al. called the externalization function are quite similar. Both are rooted in psychoanalytic defense mechanisms such as repression and projection, which are argued to provide a means of preserving the self-concept in the face of some threat. For example, Katz (1960) argued that prejudice is often the result of one's own feelings of inferiority and that derogating an out-group can make the individual feel better by comparison. Beyond prejudice, ego-defensive attitudes can serve to protect the self under conditions of any threat (such as economic depression and health risks; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Value-expressive attitudes are thought to affirm the self and one's identity. Katz and others (e.g., McGuire, 1985; Steele, 1988) propose that people have an inherent need to solidify their beliefs about who they are, and that expressing important aspects of the self verifies one's identity. Some attitudes ones of great importance to the individual become a kind of realization of one's identity when expressed. A firmly held conviction, such as opposing all forms of war, should lead one to adopt proattitudinal positions and perform proattitudinal behaviors for the purpose of affirming the self. But while value-expressive attitudes perform important functions at an individual level, we would say that the attitude is performing what Smith et al. (1956) termed the social adjustive function when one's antiwar stance wins praise and promotes friendship with like-minded others. Such attitudes can influence relationships and fulfill the need to relate to others.
Empirical progress
Perhaps owing to its intuitive appeal, functional theory was readily accepted by researchers interested in attitudes. However, the theory actually stimulated surprisingly little research (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Indeed, until recently, there was little experimental evidence to support some of the fundamental tenets of functional theory. This lack of empirical progress may have been due to a lack of adequate measures and operationalizations of function. Without some means of assessing the function that was being served by a given attitude,
little could be decided either way on the merits of functional theory (Herek, 1986). Fortunately, progress is apparent in more recent work. Some of these advances include approaches to the assessment of attitude functions (e.g., Herek, 1987), consideration of individual differences concerning attitude functions (e.g., Snyder and DeBono, 1987), and examination of the ego-defensive (e.g., Fein and Spencer, 1997) and object-appraisal (e.g., Fazio, 2000) functions in particular. Each will be reviewed in turn. Herek (1987) derived an open-ended measure of assessing attitude function. Essays that participants wrote about their attitudes were content-analyzed for their functional themes. Although Herek's original formulation was aimed at assessing the functional orientations of attitudes toward stigmatized groups, theoretically, it could be applied to other attitude objects as well (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Indeed, related open-ended, thought-listing measures of function have been fruitfully employed to study a wide array of attitude objects (e.g., Prentice, 1987; Shavitt, 1990). Others have taken an individual-difference approach to the study of attitude function. Snyder and colleagues argue that self-monitoring, the extent to which one is concerned with how appropriate his or her behavior is in others' presence, has implications for attitude function (Lavine and Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 1974, Snyder and DeBono, 1987). They argue that high self-monitors' attitudes are more likely to serve a social adjustive function, and that low self-monitors' attitudes are more likely to serve a value-expressive function. As evidence for this assertion, DeBono (1987) presented arguments against the deinstitutionalization of mentally ill patients to high and low self-monitoring college students who were in favor of deinstitutionalization. One set of statements emphasized that most students were opposed to deinstitutionalization (thus appealing to the social adjustive function), while another set emphasized that opposing deinstitutionalization was consistent with important personal values (thus appealing to the value-expressive function). The intent of this design was to test an idea that came from early theorizing on attitude function and persuasion: the functional matching hypothesis the idea that persuasive arguments will lead to greater attitude change if they match the functional basis of the attitude. Consistent with this hypothesis, high selfmonitors were more swayed by the social adjustive statements, and low self-monitors were more convinced by the value-expressive arguments. Petty and Wegener (1998) later showed that this effect of functional matching was the result of greater scrutiny of arguments that match the function of the attitude, and, hence, is limited to messages employing strong arguments. In a different twist on the individual difference approach, Prentice (1987) argues that people differ in their functional orientations in general specifically, that functional orientations toward their valued possessions indicate functional orientations of their attitudes more generally. She derived participants' functional orientations through their open-ended descriptions of why they valued their favorite possessions and was able to determine the degree to which a given individual was symbolic (that is, value-oriented) or instrumental in orientation. For example, some people may say that they love their car because it symbolizes their freedom, and others may simply appreciate its performance or reliability. Knowing their functional orientations, Prentice then presented people with different arguments about a variety of attitudinal issues. Consistent with the functional matching hypothesis, symbolically oriented individuals were more receptive of symbolic arguments, and instrumentally oriented individuals were more receptive of instrumental arguments. However, Shavitt (1990) has shown that attitude objects themselves promote different kinds of functions. Using thought-listing procedures, she identified attitude objects for which attitude function inhered to the object. For example, attitudes toward perfume and greeting cards usually serve a social-adjustive, or what Shavitt refers to as a social-identity, function, whereas attitudes toward air conditioners and coffee are utilitarian in nature. Persuasive messages that matched the typical function of the attitude object proved more effective than mismatched arguments did. Thus, not only can specific attitudes differ in their symbolic or instrumental functions, but people differ in their symbolic or instrumental orientations toward objects in general, and objects themselves can lend themselves to different attitude functions. Other recent advances concerning attitude function come from work on the ego-defensive function of prejudice. Fein and Spencer (1997) argue that derogating a member of an out-group can provide a boost to the self-image after it has been threatened, but is less likely if one has recently experienced self-affirmation. Participants who had been given self-esteem-damaging feedback regarding their performance on an intelligence test were more likely to derogate a job candidate in a later task. Moreover, mediational analyses indicated that to the extent that these threatened participants derogated the candidate, their self-esteem improved. Fein and Spencer (1997) also found that participants who had recently affirmed their core values were less likely to derogate a job candidate on the basis of ethnicity or sexual orientation. More recently, these authors have shown that the automatic activation of negativity toward a member of a stereotyped group can be mediated by threats to the self (Spencer et al., 1998). Several studies in social cognition suggest that stereotypes of out-groups can be activated automatically, but only in cases where participants are not under cognitive load, that is, distracted by some additional task. Spencer et al. (1998) exposed participants to either an Asian-American (Experiment 1) or an African-American (Experiments 2 and 3) while under cognitive load and assessed the degree to which negative stereotypes were activated, using a word fragment completion task (for example, s-y might be completed as shy, showing activation of the Asian stereotype). Earlier, participants had completed an intelligence test, and half were told that they performed poorly on it (thus evoking a self-image threat), while the other half were told that they performed relatively well. Only the participants who had received negative feedback showed evidence of stereotype activation, suggesting that they were prepared to apply their stereotypes to the Asian- and African-American targets in ego defense. These studies by Fein and Spencer (1997) and Spencer et al. (1997) provide strong evidence that negative evaluations of members of outgroups can serve an ego-defensive function. Interestingly, very recent work suggests that evaluations of out-group members can be positive in cases where the out-group member reacts favorably to the perceiver, and negative in cases where the out-group members reacts negatively to the perceiver (Sinclair and Kunda, 1999). Thus, it appears that evaluations of out-group members might be used flexibly to arrive at whatever best suits the ego in a given situation.
The object-appraisal function
So far we have shown evidence that liking or disliking a given attitude object can serve one of several psychological functions, and that function drives the direction of the attitude, whether the attitude assumes a positive or negative valence. That is, the function served by a given object for a given individual forms the basis of the attitude. The object-appraisal function, however, is unique in that it implies that
merely having an attitude, regardless of its valence, is functional for the individual (Fazio, 1995; Fazio et al., 1992; for a more extensive review, see Fazio, 2000). As suggested in the opening of this chapter, having precomputed evaluations allows one to navigate one's environment efficiently, without being forced to decide, upon encountering each new object, whether it should be approached or avoided. Indeed, object appraisal is the most primary and widely applicable of the attitude functions. Accessible attitudes in particular are likely to serve this object-appraisal function (Fazio, 2000). Recall that these attitudes are characterized by strong object-evaluation associations and, hence, are most easily brought to mind in the presence of the attitude object. The stronger the object-evaluation association is for a given object, the less work one must do in sizing up the object when presented with it. As we shall see, the functional benefits of accessible attitudes span from guiding attention to important objects in one's environment to arriving at better-quality decisions and to free up resources to deal with other environmental stimuli.
Visual attention
Considering the number of objects in one's visual environment at any given time, some items must be filtered out of perception as unimportant, and others must be focused on because of their hedonic value. Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio (1992) hypothesized that attitude objects toward which people hold accessible attitudes perform this basic perceptual function by guiding attention toward hedonically relevant stimuli in the environment. They either measured attitude accessibility (using the response latency technique mentioned earlier) or increased the accessibility of attitudes with a manipulation whereby participants were induced to rehearse their attitudes repeatedly. The attitude objects used were simple line drawings of objects, and participants were shown several such drawings in a visual array (some of which included the drawings toward which attitudes were highly accessible). Whether attitude accessibility was measured or manipulated, participants were quicker to notice objects toward which they had accessible attitudes. These attitude objects were more likely to attract attention even when they were presented as distracters in a task where their presence was completely irrelevant. Thus, objects toward which people have accessible attitudes are at an advantage to be noticed (much like when a coffee drinker is quick to notice the aroma of coffee in the air). These attitudes simply affect what we see, and such a function is valuable in a world filled with distractions. Objects that have been associated with positive or negative outcomes in the past are important to attend to in order to ready approach or avoidance responses, and accessible attitudes fulfill this attentional function.
Objects can be categorized in multiple ways, and the categories into which they fall can affect further information-processing and behavior. For example, a cigarette can be thought of as a much needed fix to a smoker, an annoyance to a nonsmoker, or a serious health hazard to an asthmatic. How an object is categorized can depend on one's attitudes. Smith et al. (1996) reasoned that the presentation of an attitude object activates, at least to some extent, each category into which it might be placed, and that which category predominates depends on the attitudes one has toward the categories. The category associated with the most accessible attitude toward it is likely to guide attention toward the relevant aspects of the stimulus and encourage categorization of the object into that category. So in the same way that attitude-evoking objects attract attention, attitude-evoking categories increase the likelihood that they will be used to categorize objects that may fit into them. Smith et al.'s (1996) experiments focused on a given attitude object and two potential categories into which it might fit (for example, yogurt might be a dairy product or a health food). Attitudes were rehearsed for one category (say, health foods) through repeated expression to increase their accessibility, and judgments of whether the category was animate or inanimate were made for the other category (say, dairy products). Participants performed this task for several categories. Later in the experiment, participants were presented with the attitude object (yogurt) for the first time and were instructed to use it as a cue to remember the earlier items. Recall the earlier reasoning that each category into which an object might be placed should receive some activation. If the attitude toward the category health food was made more accessible, greater attention should be drawn to the health-food-relevant attributes of yogurt. The result would be a greater tendency to categorize yogurt as a health food, which would then serve as a recall cue for the earlier rehearsed items. This is exactly what Smith et al., found categories toward which participants had more accessible attitudes were more effectively cued by attitude objects that could be members of the category. Analogous results were found even when there was a one-week delay between the attitude-rehearsal phase and the cued recall phase. Thus, accessible attitudes promote the construal of objects in a manner that is hedonically meaningful for the perceiver. A similar study replicated these same basic results using people of various races as attitude objects (Fazio and Dunton, 1997). To assess the extent to which race was attitude-evoking, Fazio and Dunton (1997) adapted the priming measure of attitudes mentioned earlier, using black and white faces as primes (Fazio et al., 1995). Participants then took part in a second experiment, where they made similarity judgments about many combinations of pairs of individual photos that varied on a number of dimensions, including race. Fazio and Dunton found that the attention of participants for whom race was attitude-evoking (whether it was a positive or a negative attitude) was drawn to the races of the photo pairs, which led them to use race to categorize the faces and make their similarity estimates. Arguably, that act of categorizing the faces by their race could then affect perceptions, judgments, and later behavior toward the targets.
Perhaps the most direct evidence that accessible attitudes satisfy the object-appraisal function would be a demonstration that decisionmaking that allows for the use of accessible attitudes is less effortful than decision-making that does not. Fazio et al. (1992) did this by measuring participants' blood pressure while they were forced to make pair-wise preference ratings in a rapidly presented series of abstract paintings. Some participants had rehearsed their attitudes toward the individual paintings before the preference task, thus increasing the accessibility of their attitudes toward the paintings. The task was much easier for these participants, as indicated by their lower blood pressure while performing it, as compared to those who did not rehearse their attitudes (see also Blascovich et al., 1993). This research not only indicated that accessible attitudes ease decision-making but also provided evidence that they increase the quality of decision-making. After completing the pair-wise preference task, participants were asked to rank order the paintings at their leisure
(providing unlimited time to offer their evaluations of the paintings presumably allowed participants to be more accurate). Their rank orderings were then compared to the preferences reported in the speeded pair-wise preference task. Greater correspondence between the preferences reported in the pair-wise task and the ranking task was found for those whoseattitudes had been made more accessible. So, when the environment demands rapid reactions, accessible attitudes not only reduce the stress of decision-making but also enhance the quality of the decisions.
Freeing resources for coping with other stressors
These findings illustrate the various ways in which accessible attitudes make navigating one's environment an easier task. But, more broadly, having accessible attitudes toward a variety of objects can free up one's cognitive resources considerably resources that may then be used to deal with other environmental stressors. One's first semester incol-lege is filled with stressors, and Fazio and Powell (1997) investigated whether entering college with accessible attitudes towards college-related activities helped reduce the impact of these stressors. They measured the accessibility of a variety of college-related attitudes (such as studying in the library, pulling an all-nighter, and potential majors) of incoming freshmen, using the latency to respond to attitudinal inquiries measure. Comparing students' response latencies to items concerning college activities to other filler issues, they were able to derive a general estimate of the extent to which each student arrived at college pre-equipped with accessible attitudes toward a variety of stressors they were soon to face. Students also reported a wealth of information about their current levels of stress, depression, and other mental-health-related states, as well as information about their current physical health. Two months later, they returned and completed the same mental and physical health measures. The relationship between these measures from time 1 and time 2 varied as a function of having accessible attitudes. For those students who began college with relatively poor health, the number of stressors they were experiencing affected their recovery in that fewer stressors at time 1 led to better health at time 2. However, the relationship between stressors and improved health was moderated by attitude accessibility those students with accessible college-related attitudes and fewer stressors at time 1 improved more. For students who began college in relatively good health, more stressors at time 1 led to poorer health later. But for those who had accessible attitudes, the negative effect of stressors on later health was diminished. Thus, having a reservoir of accessible attitudes to draw from frees one's energies for dealing with other stressors, and the deeper the reservoir, the more energy one will have for dealing with whatever life might present.
Costs of accessible attitudes
So far, we have seen that attitudes perform important functions for the perceiver, and that accessible attitudes in particular are well suited to serve the object-appraisal function. However, recent research suggests that the efficiency with which accessible attitudes allow one to navigate the environment might come at some cost. For example, the generally adaptive ability of accessible attitudes to guide one's attention to the attitude object (Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio, 1992) presumably cannot be turned off in situations where attending to the object distracts one from more pressing tasks. Such might be the case when the proverbial male driver runs into a parked car after his attention is automatically drawn to an attractive female pedestrian. Thus, the relevance of the attitude object to the immediate task concerns is critical as to whether possession of the attitude proves beneficial or costly. If the objects to which they pertain are relevant to the immediate task goal, accessible attitudes may facilitate performance. If irrelevant, they may impair task performance. If no pressing task demands are occupying the perceiver, having attention automatically drawn to attitude-evoking objects can orient the individual to objects in the immediate environment that are potentially rewarding or harmful. A somewhat different cost of accessible attitudes may arise in some special circumstances. Accessible attitudes may color one's perceptions at a very fundamental level, such that the world is forced to fit the view implied by the attitudes. At the level of a specific attitude object, a strong attitude might do the work of perception such that the perceiver is unable to notice new qualities of the object. Fazio et al. (2000) investigated this possibility in a series of experiments in which participants viewed several photographs of faces while either rehearsing their attitudes toward the faces (and thus making the attitudes more accessible) or performing a control task. In a later detection phase, they were shown a variety of faces and were asked to indicate whether each face they saw was the same or different in some way from a face they had seen earlier. Some of the faces were, in fact, exactly the same as those they had seen earlier. Some, however, were morphs of earlier faces with other faces they had not seen. Some of the morphs were relatively close to the original (for example, a composite of 63 percent of the original face and 37 percent of a new face), while others were quite different from the originals (for example, 13 percent original and 87 percent new). Participants naturally found it more difficult to identify morphs that most closely resembled the original photos. However, for those who had rehearsed their attitudes toward the original photos, the task was apparently much more difficult. These participants took much longer to identify a morphed face as different from the original, and took especially long to perform the task in cases where the morph was close to the original. Apparently, their accessible attitudes interfered with their ability to perceive accurately whether the faces had changed or not. In subsequent experiments, participants with relatively accessible attitudes toward the faces made more errors in identifying the morphs, and, perhaps most telling, perceived less change in the morphed images than did control participants. The former were more likely to view a morphed image as a different photo of a person they had seen earlier than as a photo of a new person. Thus, like lenses designed to view particular objects, accessible attitudes have the tendency to color one's perceptions and decrease the likelihood of noticing changes in the objects. To the extent that an object remains relatively stable over time, this potential cost should be minimal and well offset by the many functional benefits of attitudes we have already discussed. However, in cases where the object has undergone some change since the time that the attitudes were formed, our attitudes risk leading us astray. In summary, we have seen that attitudes can serve a variety of functions, from affirming and protecting the self (the value-expressive and ego-defensive functions), to securing relationships with others (the social-adjustive function). We have spent considerable time on the object-appraisal function, for this function is the most basic and adaptive. We have seen how attitudes, especially accessible ones, can guide attention and categorization, ease and improve decision-making, and facilitate the navigation of a novel environment but that these functions can come at a cost. The field has seen advances in function measurement and identifying functions in individuals, as well as in our understanding of the functional matching hypothesis. We have also seen how functions vary by individual, attitude object, and situation. For a much more extensive treatment of the functions served by attitudes, see Maio and Olson (2000).
The attitude-behavior relation
It's fitting that the final section of our chapter addresses the end product of attitudes: behavior. The two have suffered a troubled history together, and their relation can be a tenuous one (see McGuire, 1985, for a review). For a long time, and in no small part due to the very definition of attitudes, it had been assumed that attitudes predict subsequent behavior. Indeed, the very value of the attitude construct would be called into question if this were not the case. However, coffee drinkers often say no to a cup of coffee, staunch Democrats sometimes vote Republican, and social psychologists have been known to get people to eat worms (e.g., Comer and Laird, 1975). That is, attitudes sometimes do not predict behavior. When the assumption of attitude-behavior correspondence began to receive serious scrutiny in the late 1960s and early 1970s, such instances of low attitude-behavior correlations were regarded as very problematic. In fact, some advocated abandoning the attitude construct altogether (LaPiere, 1934; Wicker, 1971). However, while it may be the case that attitudes often do not predict behavior, there is ample evidence that they sometimes do. Eventually, researchers (e.g., Regan and Fazio, 1977; Zanna and Fazio, 1982) began calling for research asking not whether attitudes predict behavior, but, rather, when attitudes predict behavior. That is, under what conditions might we expect an attitude-behavior relation? This question has occupied a sizable chunk of the attitude literature and has been addressed from a variety of angles, including characteristics of the individual, the situation, and the attitude itself. Characteristics of the individual have probably been the least studied approach to the question of attitude-behavior consistency, so we will just briefly touch on some examples. Self-monitoring, mentioned earlier with respect to its relationship to attitude functions, also can affect the attitude-behavior relation. Evidence suggests that because high self-monitors are more sensitive to their social situation, they are more affected by it. Hence, they are more likely to be influenced more by situational pressures than their own attitudes (Snyder, 1974). Low self-monitors, however, display greater attitude-behavior consistency (e.g., Snyder and Swann, 1976; Zanna et al., 1980). Selfawareness has a kind of opposite affect people who are more self-aware are more attuned to their internal states, including their own attitudes. Thus, greater self-awareness has been shown to lead to greater attitude-behavior consistency (Carver, 1975). Some of the poor predictive power of attitudes on behavior can be accounted for by a lack of correspondence in specificity between the two. Most research has attempted to predict a specific behavior, say, consuming chocolate today, based on a global attitude, say, toward chocolate. However, a number of influences other than attitudes might affect chocolate consumption today, and Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) made just this point when they advocated what they called the correspondence principle. According to the principle, attitudes and behavior correspond when their degree of specificity corresponds. For example, if we were interested in predicting whether or not someone might consume chocolate today, we should ask about his or her attitude toward consuming chocolate today. Consistent with this reasoning, reviews of the literature have shown that the predictive power of attitudes is greater when the level of specificity between attitudes and the behavior they purport to predict are better matched (e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; Davidson and Jaccard, 1979; Kraus, 1995). Another approach has been to look at behavior aggregated across several instances. Thus, in order best to predict our chocolate consumer's behavior from his or her attitude, we should use his or her global attitude toward chocolate to predict behavior not only today but across a longer time span. Improved predictive power comes from this aggregation approach as well (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1974; Weigel and Newman, 1976). Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) theory of reasoned action takes into account the correspondence principle and contextual influences on behavior. In their model, behavior is proximally determined by behavioral intentions, and these behavioral intentions are, in turn, determined by two families of variables, attitudes toward the behavior and subjective norms. The attitude toward the behavior is the product of the expectancy-value equation mentioned earlier. Subjective norms are similarly computed, based upon the expected value of the perceived social consequences of performing the behavior. The values of both attitudes toward the behavior and subjective norms can be either positive or negative, increasing or decreasing, respectively, the likelihood of forming a behavioral intention. In sum, the model proposes that attitudes toward the behavior and subjective norms cause the formation of a behavioral intention. The behavioral intention then determines the behavior to be performed. Ajzen (1991) later added the notion of perceived behavioral control, the extent to which people believe they could perform the behavior. This variable is argued to affect attitudes toward the behavior and perceived subjective norms, as well as have a direct effect on both behavioral intentions and the behavior itself. For example, if one is too busy or lacks the money to buy chocolate, a positive attitude toward the behavior is less likely to develop, a behavioral intention is less likely to form, and the behavior itself is less likely to occur. Especially with respect to challenging behaviors, the inclusion of perceived behavioral control has been found to increase the predictive power of the model (e.g., Ajzen and Madden, 1986; Kelly and Breinlinger, 1995; see Bandura, 1982, for a related discussion on selfefficacy). Although these models have received considerable empirical support, they suffer from some shortcomings. At the definitional level, attitudes become increasingly specific in these models, a feature which risks turning the attitude-behavior relation into a tautology. For example, it would be rather unimpressive to demonstrate that an attitude toward eating the chocolate on the counter within the next two minutes could reliably predict such a behavior. In these models, attitudes risk becoming temporary constructions, mere layovers on the flight to behavior, and general, enduring attitudes are relatively ignored. The most problematic assumption of these models, however, is that behavior is treated as intentional, thoughtful, and based on the output of deliberate consideration of expected values of the behavior. Certainly, this is not always, and perhaps not even usually, the case. In fact, we have already seen evidence that attitudes can exert a direct impact on judgments and behavior, unmediated by thought, let alone intentions. In our section on attitude function, we saw how attitudes can affect fundamental processes such as visual attention and categorization. Accessible attitudes in particular are thought to affect judgments and behaviors through a spontaneous process. This is not to say that attitudes do not often exert their influence via the deliberative route described earlier. Indeed, the literature on judgment and decision-making provides a host of examples of very thoughtful, deliberate judgment and behavior processes, characterized by weighing of decision alternatives, attention to the self and social implications of a particular act and attention to the attributes of the attitude object (e.g., Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981). Clearly, people sometimes make deliberate decisions, but often their judgments and
behaviors flow more spontaneously from their attitudes. The critical distinction between these two processes is whether decisions are datadriven, where the perceiver goes through the effortful process of attending to, analyzing, and interpreting relevant information, or relatively more theory-driven and spontaneous, where the perceiver's decision is more directly based on the attitude that is automatically activated from memory. The model we describe next addresses the issue of whether and when one process or the other is likely to occur.
The MODE model
MODE is an acronym based on M otivation and O pportunity as DEterminants of the attitude-behavior relation these are the two variables argued to determine whether a spontaneous or deliberate attitude-behavior process might occur. The basic premise is that when both are adequately present, behavior will be driven by deliberative processes, but when either is absent, any impact of attitudes on behavior will occur via a more spontaneous process (for more extensive reviews, see Fazio, 1990; Fazio and Towles-Schwen, 2000). Motivation can mean a variety of things, but integral to its definition is the exertion of effort. This effort can be focused on making the best, most accurate decision, or a fear of coming to an invalid conclusion, and would be reflected in a thorough consideration of the behavior's potential consequences (e.g., Kruglanski and Webster, 1996). For example, our chocolate lover might have the rare opportunity to visit an exclusive candy store in another country and, on this special occasion, engage in a systematic appraisal of each potential purchase before making a decision. Here, the motivation to make the best choice is high, suggesting that greater attention will be given to the attributes of each potential purchase. However, our chocolate lover must have ample time to peruse each item before making a selection. That is, there must be enough opportunity to engage in the deliberative decision-making process. If either motivation or opportunity is lacking, the decision will more likely be based on whatever attitude is activated from memory. So if our chocolate lover is tired and unmotivated to investigate systematically each selection, or is in a hurry, it is likely that whatever attitude is activated will guide behavior spontaneously. For example, the first chocolate bar encountered might activate positivity, and then be purchased. Several studies provide evidence of the MODE model's assumptions. Sanbonmatsu and Fazio (1990) presented participants with information on two department stores, and participants were asked to decide on which they would go to buy a camera. One store was good in all respects but one the camera department. The other store had a good camera department, but was of poor quality overall. Whether participants chose the first or the second store provided an indicator of whether they were using their global attitudes toward the store as the basis for their decision (if they chose the first one) or were focusing on the relevant attributes of the store (if they chose the second). To manipulate motivation, some participants were provided with an extra incentive to be accurate they were told that they would have to justify their answers to the experimenter and other participants later. Others were not given these instructions. To manipulate opportunity, some participants were given a short time limit to reach a conclusion, while others had ample opportunity to investigate each department store. The MODE model's predictions were confirmed in that only participants in the high-motivation, high-opportunity condition chose the department store with the better camera department. In other words, only with both motivation and opportunity did a deliberative decision-making process ensue, one that involved effortfully retrieving the specific attributes of each department store from memory. Participants without motivation or opportunity relied on their global attitudes toward the stores (see Fabrigar et al., 2006, for related findings). Earlier, we discussed the tendency to judge information consistent with one's attitude more favorably. Schuette and Fazio (1995) investigated this effect within the context of the MODE model. Using a paradigm developed by Lord et al. (1979), they provided participants with information on two empirical studies that were supposedly conducted to investigate whether capital punishment was an effective deterrent, one that supported the death penalty, and one that opposed it. After reading about the studies, participants were asked to judge their quality. Motivation was manipulated similarly to the Sanbonmatsu and Fazio (1990) study. Attitude accessibility was also manipulated in Schuette and Fazio's experiment through the repeated expression manipulation mentioned earlier. They found that participants' judgments were biased by their attitudes studies that were consistent with their attitudes were seen as higher in quality. However, this effect occurred only for those with low motivation and more accessible attitudes. More motivated participants, and those with less accessible attitudes, presumably attended more to the specific features of the studies, as opposed to their conclusions, when judging the quality of the research. That attitude accessibility played a role in this study is an important point. Recall that accessible attitudes are more likely to be activated in the presence of the attitude object and more likely to have a host of influences on perception, categorization, and so on. Indeed, as we have argued, the less accessible the attitude is toward a given object, the more the individual will be forced to follow a more deliberative process of evaluating it. It is this interplay between the relatively automatic processes associated with a spontaneous decision route, and the more deliberative, attribute-based decision route that is at the center of the MODE model. Without an accessible attitude, a deliberative decision-making process is the only alternative. With it, it is a matter of whether motivation and opportunity are present as to which process will occur. Given sufficient motivation and opportunity, individuals can overcome the effects of an accessible attitude. This latter point is relevant to a postulate of the MODE model. The model argues that many decisions are based on mixed processes, those that include both automatic and deliberative components. Take, for example, an attitude that has been automatically activated in the face of the attitude object. If motivated and able, the individual may try to correct for the influence of the attitude and reach a less biased conclusion (see Wegener and Petty, 1995). Such a process may have occurred in Schuette and Fazio's study (1995) for those participants whose attitudes toward the death penalty were made more accessible but who had the motivation to be accurate. Their attitudes were probably activated when presented with the death-penalty studies. However, their motivation to be accurate may have led them to consider more carefully the features of the studies they were judging and to attempt to curb the influence of their attitudes while doing so. Racial prejudice is a domain where the interplay of automatically activated attitudes and motivation to avoid their biasing effects is particularly applicable. For example, many white Americans feel negativity toward blacks but are motivated to avoid being biased by race. The interaction between attitudes and motivation in this case stands to be particularly informative as to when and how racial prejudice appears in society. Research testing the MODE model's predictions in the domain of racial prejudice has utilized a priming measure of racial attitudes (Fazio et al., 1995). In this version of the priming task, photos of faces of various races serve as potential primes, and response latencies to identify the connotation of positive and negative adjectives serve as a measure of activation of either positivity or
negativity. For example, on a given trial, a black face might appear on the screen, followed by the adjective awful. If negativity is activated in response to the black prime, identifying awful as a negative word should occur relatively quickly. An overall attitude estimate can be derived toward blacks and whites by comparing response latencies to positive and negative adjectives following black primes to those following white primes. The benefits of this method of attitude measurement over traditional paper-pencil measures are several. First, the priming measure is unobtrusive, which allows the measurement of attitudes participants may be unwilling to report honestly. Moreover, the strength of evaluative associations is being measured in this procedure, not merely the valence of the attitude (see Fazio and Olson, 2003, for a review). The priming measure is also well suited to test whether race-related judgments can be driven by the spontaneous attitude-to-behavior process posited by the MODE model. Evidence for this assertion comes from several relevant studies. For example, after completing the measure, participants in one study were given a mock debriefing by a black experimenter, who then completed friendliness ratings for each participant (Fazio et al., 1995). The ratings were related to attitude estimates derived from the priming measure those with more negative automatically activated attitudes were seen as less friendly toward the black experimenter. In another study (Jackson, 1997), these attitude estimates were reflected in judgments of the quality of an essay purportedly written by a black undergraduate. Similarly, they also predicted participants' ratings of a black relative to a white applicant for a volunteer position in the Peace Corps (Olson and Fazio, 1999). So far we have evidence of the priming measure's predictive validity, and, consequently, that race-related judgments can be influenced by relatively spontaneous processes, largely driven by the attitude that is automatically activated. But according to the MODE model, such attitudes should have less influence on judgments and behaviors when there is adequate motivation and opportunity. Regarding motivation, Dunton and Fazio (1997) developed a measure of motivation to control prejudiced reactions, a seventeen-item scale that contains items such as, I feel guilty when I have a negative thought or feeling about a black person and, In today's society, it is important that one not be perceived as prejudiced in any manner. By assessing racial attitudes with the priming measure, and motivation to control prejudiced reactions, both automatic and deliberate contributions to race-related judgments and behaviors can be examined. Evaluations of a typical black male undergraduate were collected in Dunton and Fazio's (1997) study, and attitude estimates and motivation scores were jointly used to predict them. Confirming the MODE model's predictions, racial attitudes and motivation to control prejudice interacted to predict the evaluations. For participants with little motivation, racial attitude estimates predicted evaluations such that more negative evaluations of the typical black male undergraduate were found for those with negative attitude estimates. This relation was attenuated, and eventually reversed, as motivation increased. Motivated individuals with negative automatically activated racial attitudes exhibited positive evaluations of the black man, indicating that participants with negative attitudes were able to overcome the influence of their attitudes if properly motivated. Similar evidence for correction of automatically activated attitudes was found by Olson and Fazio (2004), where the targets about which participants formed impressions consisted of a variety of photos of people of various races in various occupational roles. Automatically activated racial attitudes predicted the impressions of black relative to white targets made by low-motivation participants, suggesting a spontaneous attitude-to-behavior process. The more positive the attitude, the more favorable the impression. However, more motivated participants for whom negativity was automatically activated expressed relatively favorable evaluations of the black targets. In sum, sometimes judgments and behavior appear to be driven by relatively automatic attitude-to-behavior processes. Nevertheless, given proper motivation and opportunity, people are able to overcome their attitudes in the judgments they make. We have not, however, addressed the role of opportunity in this domain of race. While there is little research that systematically investigates the role of opportunity with respect to racial prejudice, there is evidence to suggest that some behaviors are more controllable than others. Nonverbal behavior, such as eye contact, smiling, and shoulder orientation, can be difficult to control (for a review, see DePaulo and Friedman, 1998). In the MODE model's terms, the lack of control that people have over their nonverbal behavior can be characterized as a lack of opportunity if negativity is automatically activated, it may appear in behavior despite one's intentions. Recent research has indicated that these less controllable behaviors do relate more strongly to automatically activated racial attitudes than do more controllable verbal responses (e.g., Bessenoff and Sherman, 2000; Dovidio et al., 1997, 2002).
Closing commentary: attitudes as stable entities versus momentary constructions
We have reviewed a considerable amount of evidence illustrating that not all attitudes are equal. Both the functional value of attitudes and the influence that they exert on judgments and behavior can vary. In particular, the evidence indicates that attitudes characterized by stronger object-evaluation associations in memory and, hence, greater accessibility, are relatively more functional, in the sense that they ease decision-making, orient visual attention and categorization processes in a useful manner, and free resources for coping with stressors. Likewise, such attitudes are relatively more powerful in terms of the influence that they have on information-processing and, ultimately, behavior. Recently, some scientists have proposed a view of attitudes as momentary constructions (Schwarz and Bohner, 2001; see also Wilson and Hodges, 1992, and Zaller and Feldman, 1992). These formulations contrast with Allport's (1935) classic view of attitudes as enduring entities that determine behavioral responses. Instead, attitudes are viewed as evaluative judgments that are always computed from scratch on the basis of information accessible at that moment. Indeed, the dependence of verbal self-reports of attitude on context is cited as evidence for the theoretical perspective. As an example of such contextual dependence, we can consider Stapel and Schwarz's (1998) research concerning General Colin Powell's decision in 1995 to join the Republican Party but not seek the party's presidential nomination. By asking participants to indicate either which political party Powell had recently joined, or which party's overtures that he run as a candidate he had rejected, the researchers induced participants to include or exclude the highly respected Colin Powell in their mental representation of the Republican Party. The respondents evaluated the Republican Party more favorably when the preceding question invited Powell's inclusion rather than exclusion from the representation of the party. Such evidence is cited as support for the idea that attitudes are momentary constructions. While it is unquestionably provocative, we think the constructionist viewpoint is at variance with the accumulation of evidence that we
summarized earlier. Although attitudinal reports certainly are dependent on context, findings such as Stapel and Schwarz's (1998) do not rule out the possibility that pre-existing memorial associations influence the production of these reports. Verbal reports of one's attitude are always constructions in that they involve, as Schwarz and Bohner (2001) articulate, issues of question comprehension, scale interprety ation, and the identification and employment of appropriate standards of comparison. However, our theoretical perspective is that such reports can be influenced by previously formed attitudinal judgments, and the extent to which this occurs will vary as a function of the accessibility of the attitude from memory. Is it at all plausible to expect the attitude of a die-hard Republican, one who has voted Republican his or her entire life and donated time and money to party activities, to change as a function of whether Colin Powell is or is not momentarily construed as a loyal party member? Is there any reason to believe that an individual with an allergy to peanuts would need to construct anew a negative attitude toward peanut butter each time a judgment is called for? Much like the attitude of the infamous Dr Seuss character describing green eggs and ham, attitudes are sometimes remarkably unaffected by context: I would not like them here or there. I would not like them anywhere. I do not like green eggs and ham. I do not like them, Sam-I-am I would not, could not, in the rain. Not in the dark. Not on a train. Not in a car. Not in a tree. I do not like them, Sam, you see. In fact, the influence of momentarily salient contextual features on attitude reports has been found to vary as a function of the degree to which individuals' attitudes are accessible from memory (Hodges and Wilson, 1993). Verbal reports are less influenced by momentarily salient information when attitudes are relatively more accessible from memory (see Chaiken and Baldwin, 1981, for similar evidence regarding the moderating effects of evaluative-cognitive consistency on attitude reports). The same is true for behavioral decisions (Fazio et al., 1989, 1992). Relatedly, the stability and persistence of attitudes over time and/or in resistance to counterinformation has been found to increase as attitude accessibility increases (Bassili, 1996; Bassili and Fletcher, 1991; Fazio and Williams, 1986; Zanna et al., 1994). Finally, a logical problem inherent to the constructionist perspective should be noted. Consider again the influence of Colin Powell's inclusion or exclusion from the mental representation of the Republican Party on evaluations of the party. The phenomenon hinges on Powell himself being positively evaluated. Were the positive attitudes toward Powell not themselves a pre-existing evaluative association in memory? If so, then some attitudes clearly are not constructed anew each time the object is encountered. If not, then the attitudes toward Powell, as well as the Republican Party, needed to be constructed on the spot, a fact which opens the entire formulation to a problem of infinite regress. Ultimately, some relevant evaluation has itself to be represented in memory. From our theoretical perspective, the constructionist view of attitudes is just as implausibly extreme as the classic, but now outdated, view of attitudes as omnipotent determinants of perception, judgment, and behavior. Clearly, an adequate resolution has to lie somewhere between these two extremes. Attitudes vary in terms of the strength of their object-evaluation associations in memory. The resultant accessibility of the attitude from memory determines not only the power and functionality of the attitude, but also the extent to which construction processes are involved in response to any situational need to evaluate the object in question.
We have spanned a wide range of attitude phenomena in this chapter. From how we define attitudes, to their origins, to their functions and consequences, we hope to have communicated an appreciation of what has become a vast literature, capable of occupying at least these authors' careers. To the question, How much have we learned about attitudes over the years?, the answer is an emphatic, a lot. To the question, How much about attitudes is still unknown?, the answer is also an emphatic, a lot. Attitudes have been viewed as the shining star of social psychology, as well as its problem child. Time has told, however, that the attitude construct is indispensable to social psychology and an essential variable in understanding human behavior.
Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by Senior Scientist Award MH01646 and Grant MH38832 from the National Institute of Mental Health. The authors thank Julie Brown and Suzanne Miller for valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this chapter.
Likes and dislikes form an integral part of daily life. For this very reason, attitudes have long been one of the major domains of inquiry in the field of social psychology. This chapter discusses classic and current conceptualizations of the attitude construct. Theory and research concerning the cognitive, affective, and/or behavioral bases of attitudes are reviewed, as well as ways in which attitudes can vary in their strength. We then turn to various functions that attitudes have been posited to serve, emphasizing their value as tools for quick and efficient object appraisal. Finally, we consider the multiple processes by which attitudes can influence judgments and behavior.
Largely out of concern about some dubious assumptions made by the classic three-component framework, most current researchers have adopted a view of attitudes as overall evaluations of some object, person, or issue. These evaluations may stem from a consideration of the attributes of the object (as in the expectancy-value framework), from the emotional reactions the object evokes, or from inferences regard in one's freely chosen behavior. Attitudes also can vary in their strength, including their accessibility in memory and the extent to which they are characterized by some form of ambivalence. Attitudes have been shown to serve a variety of functions, including affirming and protecting the self. However, their most pervasive function is as efficient tools for object appraisal. To the extent that they are readily accessible from memory, attitudes orient visual
attention and categorization processes in a functional manner, ease decision-making, and free resources for coping with other stressors that one is experiencing. Finally, attitudes have the potential to influence judgments and behavior via multiple processes, varying from the relatively spontaneous to the very deliberative. Whereas the former involve no effortful reflection, the latter require that the individual be both motivated to deliberate and have the opportunity to do so.
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Affect and Emotion
Joseph P. Forgas, Craig A. Smith
Social life is imbued with affect. Every interaction with others can influence our emotional state, and affect, in turn, plays an important role in the way we form judgments and behave in strategic social situations. Yet social psychologists have, until quite recently, remained surprisingly ignorant about the widespread role that affective states play in interpersonal behavior. It was not until the early 1980s that affect was rediscovered in social psychology (Zajonc, 1980), partly as a result of renewed interest in affect by cognitive psychologists (Bower, 1981). The past two decades saw a dramatic increase in research on affect by social psychologists. This progress has been achieved against considerable odds. The very definition of what we mean by affect and emotion remains problematic, and the relationship between affect and cognition continues to be the subject of debate (Zajonc, 1998). Why has affect been neglected for so long? One explanation offered by Hilgard (1980) is that affect remained the most neglected member of the historical tripartite division of the human mind into cognition, affect, and conation, due to the dominance of first the behaviorist and later the cognitivist paradigms in psychology. A contributing factor may have been the long-dominant view that affect was a dangerous, invasive force that subverts rational thinking and behavior. This idea has a long history in Western philosophy, going back to the works of Plato, who saw emotions as characteristic of a more primitive, subhuman way of functioning. Freud's psychoanalytic theories further emphasized this view of affect as a subconscious, invasive force that needs to be controlled and subjugated. Fortunately, the past few decades saw a radical change in our view of affect. As a result of advances in physiology and neuroanatomy, several lines of evidence now indicate that affect is often an essential and adaptive component of response to social situations (Adolphs and Damasio, 2001; Forgas, 1995a, 2002; Ito and Cacioppo, 2001; Zajonc, 2000). Thus, the past two decades saw an affective revolution in social-psychological research, as investigators explored both the antecedents (Smith and Kirby, 2000) and the consequences (Forgas, 2002) of affective states in social life. However, there remains a fundamental division in the literature. On the one hand, some researchers are interested in discovering the cognitive appraisals social actors engage in to understand the emotional significance of social situations; their focus is on the cognitive antecedents of emotions (e.g., Smith and Kirby, 2000). On the other hand, other researchers ask a complementary question: once affect is experienced, what will be the cognitive and behavioral consequences? Their focus is on the consequences of affect, often quite mild moods (e.g., Eich et al., 2001; Forgas, 2001). This review seeks to summarize what we now know about both the antecedents and the consequences of affect for social thinking and behavior. Ultimately, these two orientations should converge and so help answer one of the most intriguing questions about our species: what is the relationship between the rational and the emotional aspects of human nature (Hilgard, 1980)? This review begins with an historical overview of research on affect and social behavior, followed by a summary of contemporary theories about how affective states are appraised and elicited. We then review research on the consequences of affective states for social judgments and behaviors, including effects on social memory, self-perception, inter-group relations and stereotyping, and attitudes and attitude change. The role of different information-processing strategies in mediating these effects receives special attention.
Historical background and antecedents
Few theories had such a stultifying influence on psychology for so long, and for so little ultimate gain, as behaviorism. Radical behaviorism explicitly excluded the study of mental phenomena such as affect from psychology. Affectivity, if studied at all, was often equated with fundamental drive states, crudely manipulated through electric shocks and food or drink deprivation. Measuring the amount of feces deposited by a scared rat was a standard method for assessing emotionality in the animal. Not surprisingly, radical behaviorists contributed relatively little to our understanding of the everyday role of affect in social judgments and behaviors. Unfortunately, as Hilgard (1980) argued, the emergence of the cognitive paradigm in the 1960s produced little improvement. Most information-processing theories, until quite recently, assumed that the proper objective of cognitive research was to study cold, affectless thinking. From the cognitivist perspective, affect was mostly seen as a source of disruption and noise until the early 1980s (Bower, 1981; Neisser, 1982; Zajonc, 1980). Most research on social thinking, judgments, impression formation, and attributions also emphasized the rational, logical aspects of responding to the social world to the exclusion of affective influences. Surprisingly, even Heider's (1958) phenomenological analysis of interpersonal behavior largely ignored affectivity and focused on a logical-scientific model of attributions instead. Despite decades of research, until very recently, few studies looked at the role of feelings, emotions, and moods in causal attributions (Forgas et al., 1990, 1994). The change in social psychology's approach to affect came in the early 1980s, due to several developments. Zajonc (1980) was among the first to argue that affective reactions often constitute the primary response to social stimuli, requiring no prior inferential processing as suggested by Schachter and Singer (1962). Twenty years later, Zajonc (2000) concluded that affect indeed functions as an independent, primary, and often dominant force in how people respond to social situations. What evidence supports this conclusion? First, people may readily and rapidly acquire an affective response towards social stimuli even when they have little time to process information and have little awareness of having encountered it at all (Zajonc, 1980, 2000). Second, such evaluative preferences often leave an enduring trace, influencing subsequent responses. Does this mean that affect constitutes a separate and primary mode of responding to the social world, independent of cognitive appraisals? Not necessarily. As Lazarus (1984) pointed out, some low-level cognitive processing is necessary just to identify correctly stimulus objects, before any affective response can occur. Affect is a critically important component of reactions to social stimuli; however, it typically operates in conjunction with other cognitive processes (Niedenthal and Halberstadt, 2000).
Affect and mental representations
The uniquely human ability to represent symbolically social events lies at the heart of social behaviour (Forgas et al., 2001; Mead, 1934), and affect appears to play a major role in how people represent and structure their social experiences (Forgas, 1979, 1982). For example, in several investigations, groups of students, housewives, sports teams, or workers recorded their daily interactions in a diary. Subsequently people's implicit representations of these episodes were assessed by analyzing their ratings of the perceived similarity between their interactions. Affective reactions such as feelings of anxiety, confidence, intimacy, pleasure, or discomfort were primary in determining cognitive representation of social episodes. Thus, completely different events (such as visiting a dentist and attending a tutorial) often were mentally represented by people as highly similar because of the similar affective responses they elicited. Recently, the role of affect in mental representations was further confirmed by Niedenthal and Halberstadt (2000: 381), who argue that stimuli can cohere as a category even when they have nothing in common other than the emotional responses they elicit. Similar ideas were proposed several decades ago by Pervin (1976: 471), who pointed out that what is striking is the extent to which situations are described in terms of affects (e.g., threatening, warm, interesting, dull, tense, calm, rejecting) and organized in terms of similarity of affects aroused by them. Thus, affective responses play a critical role in determining how mental representations about the social world are created and maintained in memory. The close interdependence between the affective and cognitive domains is well illustrated by the extensive literature on emotion-appraisal processes. Attempts to understand the range and variety of affective experiences have focused on the subtle cognitive strategies people use in order to identify the appropriateness of various emotional reactions to complex social situations (Ortony et al., 1988). Next, we will review the current status of this major area of affect research.
On the antecedents of emotion: the appraisal approach
The appraisal approach to emotion addresses the fundamental issue of how specific emotions such as anger, sadness, and fear are elicited, and the motivational functions they serve in particular social situations (see also Roseman and Smith, 2001). For example, anger is elicited under conditions in which someone or something is thwarting one's goals; people respond with fear under conditions of danger; sadness arises under conditions involving irreparable harm; and so on. Understanding how emotions are elicited has been complicated by the fact that emotions are not simple, reflexive responses to a stimulus situation (but see Zajonc, 2000, for a contrary view). It is relatively easy to show that the same objective circumstances can evoke very different emotions across individuals. Thus, an upcoming examination that produces anxiety in a weak student might be a welcome challenge to a competent one, or may elicit indifference in one who is about to quit school. Depending on such appraisals, different affective reactions and different physiological responses will follow (Blascovich and Mendes, 2000). Such heterogeneity of response does not reflect a disorganized or chaotic system. Appraisal theorists assume that emotional reactions are relational and reflect what the circumstances that confront an individual imply given his or her personal hopes, desires, and abilities. The elicitation mechanism that gives emotion this relational character is one of appraisal, originally defined by Arnold (1960) as an evaluation of the potential harms or benefits presented in any given situation. Beyond being relational, appraisal is also meaning-based, and evaluative. Because appraisal combines properties of the stimulus situation with those of the person, it cannot be a simple or reflexive response. Instead, appraisal reflects what the stimulus means to the individual. Appraisal is also evaluative. It is not a cold analysis of the situation. Rather, it is a personal assessment of whether the situation is good or bad, beneficial or harmful. That this evaluation is meaning-based provides the emotion-appraisal system with considerable flexibility and adaptational power. Not only will different individuals react to very similar situations with different emotions, but objectively different situations can elicit the same emotions if they imply the same meaning to the individuals appraising them. For example, research on perceptions of social situations showed that people will classify very different social situations as similar if they are appraised as having a similar emotional impact (Forgas, 1979, 1982). Additionally, an individual can react differently to the same situation over time if changes in desires and abilities alter the implications of that situation for his or her well-being. A further assumption is that appraisal occurs continuously. That is, humans constantly engage in a meaning analysis in which the adaptational significance of their relationship to the social environment is appraised (see also Leary, 2000). The goal is to avoid or alleviate actual or potential harm, or to seek or maximize actual or potential benefit (e.g., Smith and Ellsworth, 1987; Smith and Lazarus, 1990). Emotional responses are part of an important motivational system that has evolved to alert the individual when he or she is confronted by adaptationally relevant circumstances. To serve this alerting function, the emotion-elicitation mechanism must be constantly on guard to be able to signal such circumstances whenever they arise. It is important to note that appraisal theorists do not assert that this continuous appraisal process need be conscious or deliberate; instead, they have consistently maintained that appraisal can occur automatically outside awareness (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1968; Leventhal and Scherer, 1987; Smith and Lazarus, 1990). A final assumption is that the emotion system is highly organized and differentiated. Appraisal theorists recognize that the same basic approach/avoid dichotomy that characterizes drives and reflexes (Cannon, 1929) is fundamental to emotional responses. However, they emphasize that emotion is far more differentiated than a simple view of this dichotomy would allow. There are different types of harm and benefit, each having different implications for how one might best contend with it. This is especially true for actual and potential harms, where, depending on the circumstances, the most adaptive course might be to avoid the situation, but also could include active attack, reprimanding oneself, or accepting and enduring the harm. Appraisal theorists tend to conceptualize different emotions as different modes of action readiness (Frijda, 1986), each of which is a response to a particular type of adaptationally relevant situation, and each of which physically and motivationally prepares the individual to contend with those circumstances in a certain way (for example, to attack in anger, to avoid or flee in fear, to accept and heal in sadness, and so on; cf. Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1977). Within this differentiated system, the fundamental role of appraisal, again, is to call forth the appropriate emotion(s) when the individual is confronted with personally adaptationally relevant circumstances. The construct of appraisal, as outlined above, has considerable power and appeal when it comes to understanding affective responses to
social situations. It has the power to drive a highly flexible and adaptive emotion system. However, to be of practical and theoretical utility, the construct needs to be fleshed out in at least two ways. First, the contents of appraisal need to be described. Specific models need to be developed to detail the appraisals responsible for the elicitation of the different emotions. Second, the cognitive processes underlying appraisal need to be described. This is especially important, since these processes are not necessarily conscious or deliberate, as critics of appraisal theory (e.g., Izard, 1993; Zajonc, 1980) have often assumed. Considerable effort has been devoted to the first issue, leading to the development and testing of several different structural models of appraisal. In addition, relatively recently, some appraisal theorists (e.g., Leventhal and Scherer, 1987; Smith and Kirby, 2000) have begun to develop process models of appraisal. Below we discuss developments along both of these fronts in turn.
Structural models of appraisal
Several models have been proposed to identify the dimensions of appraisal and to describe how evaluations along these dimensions distinguish among distinct emotional experiences (e.g., Roseman, 1984, 1991; Scherer, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Smith and Lazarus, 1990). Many studies have now asked subjects to report on both their appraisals and a wide array of emotions across a variety of contexts, including diverse retrospectively remembered experiences (Ellsworth and Smith, 1988a, 1988b; Frijda et al., 1989; Scherer, 1997; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985), hypothetical vignettes (e.g., Roseman, 1991; Smith and Lazarus, 1993), and even ongoing meaningful experiences (e.g., Griner and Smith, 2000; Smith and Ellsworth, 1987; Smith and Kirby, 2001). In these studies, experiences of different emotions have been consistently found to be reliably and systematically associated with different appraisals, and the specific relations observed have largely been in line with the theoretical predictions of the models. Although the various structural appraisal models differ in a number of respects (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Smith and Lazarus, 1990; see also Scherer, 1988, for a comparison of these models), far more telling is the fact that, overall, they are highly similar in the appraisal dimensions they propose. These similarities reflect the fact that all appraisal theories seek to solve a common problem to identify the evaluations that link the various modes of action readiness, serving different adaptational functions, to the circumstances in which those functions were called for. It is not so surprising, then, that they happened to hit upon similar solutions to that problem. Thus, existing appraisal models generally include an evaluation of how important or relevant the stimulus situation is to the person, whether it is desirable or undesirable, whether and to what degree the person is able to cope with the situation, and who or what caused or is responsible for the situation. Different patterns of outcomes along such dimensions are hypothesized to result in different emotions. Moreover, the pattern of appraisal that produces a given emotion is conceptually closely linked to the functions served by that emotion. The model of Smith and Lazarus (1990) can be used to illustrate how these models are organized. According to this model, situations are evaluated along seven dimensions: motivational relevance, motivational congruence, problemfocused coping potential, emotion-focused coping potential, self-accountability, other-accountability, and future expectancy. Each of these dimensions can be thought of as a question that the person evaluates in determining the affective significance of his or her circumstances. The major questions represented by the appraisal dimensions are depicted in Table 7.1. According to the model, different patterns of outcomes along these dimensions (having different adaptational implications) result in the experience of different emotions (serving different adaptational functions). Thus, these appraisal dimensions are held to be responsible for the differentiation of emotional experience. The first two dimensions, motivational relevance and motivational congruence, are relevant to every emotional encounter and are sometimes referred to as dimensions of primary appraisal (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Smith and Lazarus, 1990). By themselves, they can distinguish between situations that are irrelevant to well-being (low motivational relevance), and thus are not emotionally evocative, and those that are either beneficial (high motivational relevance and motivational congruence) or stressful (high motivational relevance and motivational incongruence). The additional appraisal dimensions concerning accountability and coping potential (often referred to as secondary appraisals in the terminology of Lazarus [1991] and colleagues) give appraisal theory the power to account for considerable further differentiation among emotional states, particularly in the case of stressful situations (that is, those appraised as both motivationally relevant and motivationally incongruent; see also Blascovich and Mendes, 2000; Smith, 1991; Smith and Lazarus, 1990). Table 7.1 Issues evaluated by the seven appraisal dimensions in the Smith and Lazarus (1990) model Primary appraisal 1. Motivational relevance How relevant (important) is what is happening in this situation to my needs and goals? 2. Motivational congruence Is this congruent with my goals (good)? Or is it incongruent with them (bad)? Secondary appraisal 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Self-accountability To what extent am I responsible for what is happening in this situation? Other-accountability To what extent is someone or something else responsible for what is happening in this situation? Problem-focused coping potential To what extent can I act on this situation to make (or keep) it more like what I want? Emotion-focused coping potential To what extent can I handle and adjust to this situation however it might turn out? Future expectancy To what extent do I expect this situation to improve, or get worse, for any reason?
Thus, if a stressful situation is appraised as being caused by someone else (other-accountability) anger will result, motivating the person to act toward the perceived cause to fix the situation. If, however, the situation is appraised as being caused by oneself (selfaccountability), shame or guilt results, motivating the person to make amends for the bad situation and to prevent the situation from happening again. If the situation is one that the person is unsure he or she can handle (low emotion-focused coping potential), fear or anxiety results, motivating the person to be cautious and to get rid of or avoid the potential harm. If the stressful situation is one in which the harm is perceived as unavoidable and irreparable (low problem-focused coping potential), sadness results, motivating the person to
seek help and to adapt to the inevitable harm. Finally, the emotions associated with primary appraisals of stress are not always unpleasant or negative. If one is in a stressful situation where one does not have something one wants but perceives that with effort one can achieve one's goals (high coping potential), a state of challenge will result that motivates the person to stay engaged and to persevere to achieve his or her goals. As Blascovich and Mendes (2000) have shown, such challenge appraisals can automatically trigger appropriate physiological responses, preparing the organism for action. Even if problem-focused coping potential is low, hope might result if the person believes that, somehow, things might work out in the end (high future expectancy). In sum, different components of secondary appraisal combine with the same stress-related components of primary appraisal to yield a range of distinct emotional reactions that differ dramatically in their subjective and motivational properties. Furthermore, secondary appraisals can also mediate adaptive physiological responses to emotional situations (Blascovich and Mendes, 2000). Structural models can contribute much to our understanding of emotional experiences in social life by linking specific patterns of appraisal to different emotions and the adaptational functions they serve. However, structural models have been largely silent with respect to the cognitive processes responsible for producing the appraisals. We now turn our attention to the nature of these cognitive processes.
Process considerations
Although structural appraisal models have been quite successful in describing cognitive antecedents of emotion, taken by themselves they create a potential problem for appraisal theory. By emphasizing the complex relational information, this work could give the impression that appraisal is ponderous and slow. In fact, appraisal theory has often been criticized on the grounds that the structural descriptions of appraisal imply that the process of appraisal is deliberate, slow, inferential, and verbally mediated. Such a mechanism would fly in the face of common observations that emotions can be elicited very quickly, unbidden, often with a minimum of cognitive effort, and sometimes with little or no awareness of the nature of the emotion-eliciting stimulus (e.g., Izard, 1993; Zajonc, 1980, 2000). Appraisal theorists have been aware of this difficulty, and, to our knowledge, none have claimed that appraisal need be performed consciously or that the information evaluated in appraisal need be represented verbally. On the contrary, beginning with Magda Arnold (1960: 173), for whom appraisal was direct, immediate, [and] intuitive, most appraisal theorists have explicitly maintained that appraisal can occur automatically and outside focal awareness (e.g., Lazarus, 1968; Leventhal and Scherer, 1987; Smith and Lazarus, 1990). Only recently, however, have there been attempts to develop explicit process models of appraisal that would explain how appraisals can occur in this manner (e.g., Lazarus, 1991: ch. 4; Leventhal and Scherer, 1987; Robinson, 1998; Smith and Kirby, 2000). These models are still in their infancy, and there are few studies to address their validity. Nonetheless, we provide a brief overview of one such model (that of Smith and Kirby, 2000) because it illustrates how appraisal might occur continuously and automatically. Instead of conceptualizing appraisal as a single process, this model draws upon current cognitive theories and posits multiple appraisal processes that can occur in parallel and involve distinct cognitive mechanisms. Two distinct modes of cognitive processing have been emphasized associative processing, which involves priming and the activation of memories that can occur quickly and automatically, and reasoning, which involves a more controlled and deliberate thinking process that is more flexible than associative processing, but is relatively slow and attention intensive. The distinction between these modes of processing is quite common in the cognitive psychological literature (cf. Sloman, 1996; Smith and DeCoster, 2000). According to the model, appraisals produced by both of these types of cognitive processes can elicit emotions. Associative processing is a fast, automatic, memory-based mode of processing that involves priming and spreading activation (Bargh, 1989; Bower, 1981). Based on perceptual or conceptual similarities with one's current circumstances, or due to associations with other memories that are already activated, memories of prior experiences can become activated quickly, automatically, in parallel, outside focal awareness, and with a minimum of attentional resources. As these memories are activated, any appraised meanings associated with them are also activated, and can influence the person's emotional state. Several assumptions concerning associative processing should be emphasized. First, it is assumed that anything that can be represented in memory, ranging from concrete representations of physical sensations, sounds, smells, tastes, and images to representations of highly abstract concepts, is subject to this form of processing. Thus, cues that can activate appraisal-laden memories include not only concrete stimuli, such as sensations, images, and sounds, but also highly conceptual stimuli, such as abstract ideas or the appraisal meanings themselves. Second, it is assumed that through principles of priming and spreading activation, full-blown appraisals associated with prior experiences can be activated very quickly and automatically. Therefore, highly differentiated emotional reactions can be elicited almost instantaneously. Third, it is assumed that the activation threshold at which appraisal information starts to produce emotional feelings is somewhat less than the threshold at which the appraisal information and its associated memories become accessible to focal awareness and/or working memory. Through this assumption, it becomes possible that adaptationally relevant circumstances in one's environment, of which one is focally unaware, can activate memories and produce a rapid emotional reaction. In this way, the first conscious indication to the person that he or she might be in an adaptationally relevant situation can be the perception of the subjective feeling state associated with the associatively elicited emotional reaction. Finally, we assume that the processes of memory activation, priming, and spreading activation occur continuously and automatically. Thus, the person can be characterized as continuously appraising his or her circumstances for their implications for well-being, albeit not in a conscious, attention-intensive manner. In contrast, reasoning is a relatively slow, controlled process that is effortful, requires considerable attention and focal awareness, and is largely verbally mediated. Moreover, whereas associative processing is largely passive, reasoning is much more constructive, whereby the contents of focal awareness are actively operated on and transformed to produce the appraisal meanings. Thus, reasoning corresponds closely to the active posing and evaluating of appraisal questions that have sometimes incorrectly been assumed to encompass all of appraisal. Because reasoning is active and highly resource-intensive, it comes at a price. In addition to being relatively slow, this mode of processing is somewhat limited in the forms of information it can access. In contrast to associative processing, which can operate on any form of information stored in memory, only semantically encoded information is readily accessible to reasoning (Anderson, 1983; Paivio, 1971). That is, sensations, images, sounds, and so on, are relatively inaccessible to reasoning unless and until they have been associated with some sort of semantic meaning. This means that while associative processing has access to all of the information available to the
reasoning process, the reverse is not true. Despite these limitations, reasoning is extremely important because it enables the emotion system to utilize the full power of our highly developed and abstract thinking abilities. Emotion-eliciting situations can be thoroughly analyzed and their meanings reappraised (Lazarus, 1968, 1991). Initial associatively elicited appraisals that might not fully fit the current circumstances can be modified to provide a more appropriate evaluation and emotional response. New connections can be forged between one's present circumstances and past experiences. It is even possible that appraisal meanings associated with past experiences in memory can be re-evaluated and changed. In addition, the cognitive work represented by reasoning the results of the interpretation and reinter-pretation of the emotion-eliciting situation can be stored in memory as part of the emotion-eliciting event and thus become available for subsequent associative processing. This last fact is vital, as it provides a mechanism by which the emotion system can learn and, through associative processing, can quickly and automatically produce the highly differentiated, information-rich signals that the motivational functions served by emotion seem to require. So far, we have seen that emotional responses to social situations seem to be the product of the continuous monitoring of the environment and the rapid, automatic or slow, inferential appraisal of the available cues for their significance for our safety and wellbeing. Clearly, appraisal research represents a very promising framework for understanding the subtle social origins and antecedents of affective experiences. An equally interesting and complementary question has occupied researchers for several decades now: once an affective state is elicited, what are its consequences for the way people think, form judgments, and behave in social situations? We shall now turn to reviewing this complementary research tradition.
Early explanations of affective influences on thinking and behavior
The idea that affect may influence the online perception and interpretation of logically unrelated social information has been around for a long time. Several early studies suggested that positive and negative moods often produce affect-congruent responses in unrelated judgments. For example, feeling good might make our judgments more positive, and feeling bad may distort the evaluation of neutral social stimuli in a negative direction (Feshbach and Singer, 1957; Razran, 1940). How and why does such affect infusion occur, and what are the psychological mechanisms that facilitate or inhibit its occurrence? We shall next survey traditional and contemporary theoretical explanations of affective influences on thinking and behavior and, subsequently, discuss the empirical evidence for these effects. The earliest psychological explanations of affective influences on judgments and behavior relied on either psychoanalytic, or conditioning theories.
The psychoanalytic account of affect infusion
The psychoanalytic speculations of Freud were influential in suggesting that affect has a dynamic quality and can invade people's thinking and judgments unless psychological resources are deployed by the individual to control these impulses. In one early study, Feshbach and Singer (1957) relied on psychoanalytic theories to predict that attempts to suppress affect should paradoxically increase the pressure for affect to infuse unrelated attitudes and judgments. They induced affect (fear) through electric shocks, and some participants were later instructed to suppress their fear. Interpersonal judgments after this manipulation were significantly influenced by affect. Fearful persons were more likely to see another person as fearful and anxious (Feshbach abd Singer 1957: 286), and this pattern was greater when judges were trying to suppress their fear. This, according to Feshbach and Singer (1957: 286), can be explained in terms of the infusion of temporary affect into an unrelated judgment, because suppression of fear facilitates the tendency to project fear onto another social object.
The conditioning account of affect infusion
An alternative explanation for affect infusion was provided by conditioning theories. Although radical behaviorism denied the value of studying internal mental phenomena such as affect, the associationist approach nevertheless exerted an important influence on subsequent research. Watson's little Albert studies were among the first to show that attitudes towards a previously neutral object, such as a furry rabbit, can be rapidly influenced by associating fear-arousing stimuli, such as a loud noise, with it (Watson and Rayner, 1920). Such patterns of cumulative associations are responsible for all our acquired affective reactions throughout life, according to Watson. Several experiments found some support for this associationist account of affect infusion. Some sixty years ago, Razran (1940) found that people who were made to feel bad or good (being exposed to highly aversive smells, or receiving a free lunch) spontaneously reported significantly more negative or positive attitudes towards sociopolitical slogans. A similar conditioning approach to understanding affective influences on attitudes and judgments was later used by Byrne and Clore (1970) and Clore and Byrne (1974) to account for affect infusion into interpersonal attitudes. Within a classical conditioning framework, researchers argued that when people encounter a neutral attitude object, the affective reaction elicited by the environment will become associated with the new target and will influence attitudes and evaluations (a conditioned response). According to this view, simple temporal and spatial contiguity is enough to link an affective state and an incidentally encountered stimulus. Several studies demonstrated just such a conditioning effect (Gouaux, 1971; Gouaux and Summers, 1973; Griffitt, 1970). More recently, Berkowitz and his colleagues (Berkowitz et al., 2000) have reached back to early associationist theories and proposed a neoassociationist account of affective influences on attitudes and judgments. Thus, the idea that incidentally elicited affective states can coincidentally influence evaluative responses remains an important influence on some contemporary affect theories (Clore et al., 2001; Eich et al., 2001).
Contemporary cognitive theories of affective influences
In contrast to traditional conditioning and psychoanalytic explanations, contemporary cognitive theories offer a more finely grained account of the mechanisms responsible for the infusion of affect into thinking, judgments, and behaviors. Two different kinds of cognitive
mechanisms have been proposed to explain affect infusion. According to the inferential affect-as-information model, people may mistakenly rely on their prevailing affective state as a relevant cue to infer their evaluative reactions to ambiguous, neutral, or indeterminate social situations (e.g., Clore et al., 1994). Alternatively, memory-based accounts posit an automatic, subconscious process whereby affective states can influence unrelated thoughts and judgments (for example, the affect priming model; see Bower and Forgas, 2001). We should note that there is a direct parallel between these two processes of affect infusion and the two processes of affect appraisal (associative priming, and reasoning) discussed above. In addition to models that deal with how affect informs the content of cognition, several theories also emphasize the influence of affect on how social information is processed. We briefly review each of these three theoretical frameworks below.
Inferential accounts
Certain kinds of affective influences on judgments may occur because rather than computing a judgment on the basis of recalled features of a target, individuals may [] ask themselves: How do I feel about it? and in doing so, they may mistake feelings due to a pre-existing state as a reaction to the target (Schwarz, 1990: 529) This how-do-I-feel-about-it? model suggests that affective states can influence evaluations and judgments because of an inferential error: people misread their affective states as informative about their reactions to an unrelated target. This idea has its roots in at least three different research traditions. Earlier conditioning theories already suggested that unrelated affective states can become linked to new stimuli (Clore and Byrne, 1974). Whereas conditioning explanation emphasized a direct associative link between affect and judgments, the affect-as-information model rather less parsimoniously relies on an internal inferential process to produce this effect (cf. Berkowitz et al., 2000). A second source of the affect-as-information model is research on misattribution and self-attribution processes. According to this view, people have no privileged access to internal reactions and so need to infer responses based on salient but often irrelevant cues such as their prevailing affective state. Thus, only previously unattributed affective states can inform subsequent judgments. Finally, this model also shows some affinity with research on judgmental heuristics, in the sense that a temporary affective state functions as a heuristic cue in informing judgments. Evidence suggests that people seem to rely on their affective state as a heuristic cue only in special circumstances. This is most likely when the judgmental target is unfamiliar or unimportant, there is no prior evaluation to fall back on, personal involvement is low, and cognitive resources are limited. Just such a situation was created in an experiment by Schwarz and Clore (1983), who telephoned strangers and asked them unexpected and unfamiliar questions. As respondents presumably had little personal involvement and lacked motivation, time, or cognitive resources to engage in extensive processing, they may well have relied on their temporary mood to inform their responses. Other studies also found significant affect infusion into social judgments in similar circumstances. In one study, almost 1,000 people who were feeling good or bad after seeing happy or sad films were asked to complete a series of judgments after leaving a movie theater (Forgas and Moylan, 1987). Again, involvement and motivation were low, and subjects did seem to rely on their temporary affect as a heuristic cue to infer a judgment. There are several issues to consider in evaluating this theory. First, it is not clear whether the how do I feel about it? process implies a conscious, inferential search for a response, or an implicit, automatic mechanism. Another conceptual problem is that the model says nothing about how cues other than affect, such as the available external stimulus information, and internal knowledge structures are combined in producing a response. Thus, this is really a theory of misjudgment, or nonjudgment, or aborted judgment rather than a genuine theory of judgment. Schwarz and Clore (1983, 1988; Clore et al., 1994) also claim that their model is falsifiable because it asserts the absence of affect congruence in judgments when the affective state is already attributed. Indeed, several studies found that when people's attention is called to the source of their affect, affect congruence is reduced or eliminated (Berkowitz et al., 2000; Clore et al., 1994; Schwarz and Clore, 1983, 1988). However, such findings do not provide support for the theory, as is often claimed. Logically, the fact that an effect can be eliminated by additional manipulations (such as emphasizing the correct source of their affect) says nothing about how the effect is produced in the first place in the absence of the manipulation. Focusing people's attention on their internal states can also reverse affect congruence when caused by affect priming effects (Berkowitz et al., 2000). Furthermore, affect congruence is not always eliminated just because the correct source of affect is known, as found in many experiments that use transparent and obvious mood manipulations (autobiographical recall and false feedback; see Forgas, 1995a, 2002, for reviews). Several critics of the affect-as-information model, such as Abele and Petzold (1994), also argue that affect is just one among many information inputs that must be integrated in order to produce a judgment. A similar point is made by Martin (2000), who argued that the informational value of an affective state is unlikely to be constant. The same affective state can mean different things in different contexts. If the informational value of affect is not given, it can hardly be the source of invariant information as the model assumes. For example, a positive mood may inform us that a positive response is appropriate (if the setting happens to be a cabaret), but the same mood may send the opposite informational signal in a different setting, such as a funeral. It now appears that realistic responses which require some degree of elaboration and processing are more likely to be influenced by affect priming than the affect-as-information process.
The memory-based account: the affect-priming model
Affect may influence thought, judgments, and behavior through selectively facilitating access to, and the use of, affect-congruent memory structures that people rely on when constructively interpreting social information. The most influential memory-based account was put forward by Bower (1981), who proposed that affect, cognition, and attitudes are linked within an associative network of mental representations. Experiencing an affective state should selectively and automatically prime associated thoughts and representations which are more likely to be used in constructive cognitive tasks. Such tasks involve the active elaboration and transformation of the available stimulus information, require the activation and use of previous knowledge structures, and result in the creation of new knowledge from the combination of stored information and new stimulus details. Early experiments provided encouraging evidence for mood-congruent effects in a number of situations, as predicted by associative network theories (Bower, 1981; Clark and Isen, 1982; Fiedler and Stroehm, 1986; Forgas and Bower, 1987; Isen, 1984, 1987). Subsequent research showed, however, that affect priming and affect-congruent judgments are subject to important boundary conditions
(Eich and Macauley, 2000; Forgas, 1995a). In their experiments exploring mood effects on memory, Eric Eich and his collaborators (Eich and Forgas, 2003; Eich and Macauley, 2000) demonstrated that mood-state dependence in memory is more likely in circumstances when the affective state induced is strong, salient, and self-relevant. Furthermore, these effects are stronger when the task requires the active generation and elaboration of information rather than mere reproduction of stimulus details. It is probably for this reason that mood-state dependence has been more difficult to demonstrate with tasks that are abstract and uninvolving, such as the word-list-learning experiments often preferred by cognitive researchers (Eich and Macauley, 2000). However, affect congruence in memory, judgments, and behaviors has been reliably found in social cognitive experiments where the task and information to be processed are more complex, realistic, and involving (Forgas, 1994; Forgas and Bower, 1987; Sedikides, 1995). A similar point was made by Fiedler (1991, 2001), who distinguished between constructive and reconstructive cognitive processes and argued that affect congruence should be most likely when a task requires open, constructive elaboration of stimulus details and the combination of new information with stored knowledge structures. Tasks that require recognizing a stimulus or retrieving a prestructured response involve no constructive thinking, so there is little opportunity to use affectively primed information, and we should find little affect congruence. For example, recognition memory is typically far less influenced by a person's affective state than recall memory which requires more constructive processing. Thus, the nature and extent of affective influences on thinking and judgments should depend on the information-processing strategy people employ in a particular situation. The consequence of affect priming is affect infusion, as long as an open, elaborate information-processing strategy is used that promotes the incidental use of affectively primed information (Fiedler, 1991, 2000; Forgas, 1995a, 2002a; Sedikides, 1995). Affect priming, rather than affect-as-information mechanisms, is largely responsible for affect infusion in most realistic tasks that require some degree of involvement and elaborate processing. There is now much empirical evidence for this prediction, and recent integrative theories explicitly focus on the role of different information-processing strategies in moderating affect congruence (Forgas, 1995a, 2002a).
Affective influences on information-processing strategies
In addition to having an informational effect (influencing what people think), affect may also influence the process of cognition, or how people think (Clark and Isen, 1982; Fiedler and Forgas, 1988; Forgas, 2000, 2001a). Early evidence indicated that people in a positive mood seemed to reach decisions faster, used less information, avoided demanding, systematic thinking, and showed greater confidence in their decisions, suggesting that positive affect might produce a more superficial, less systematic, and less effortful processing style. In contrast, negative affect seemed to trigger a more effortful, systematic, analytic, and vigilant processing style (Clark and Isen, 1982; Isen, 1984, 1987; Mackie and Worth, 1989; Schwarz, 1990). These processing differences were explained in terms of three alternative theories. One early idea emphasized affective influences on processing capacity. Ellis and his colleagues suggested, for example, that negative affect reduces attentional resources and processing capacity (Ellis and Ashbrook, 1988). In contrast, Mackie and Worth (1989) proposed that it is positive affect that sometimes reduces information-processing capacity. As the processing consequences of affect are clearly asymmetrical positive and negative affect reliably promote very different thinking styles it is unlikely that the explanations put forward by Ellis and Ashbrook (1988) and Mackie and Worth (1989) could both be correct. It remains unclear when and how cognitive capacity might play an role in mediating affective influences on information processing. An alternative explanation emphasized the motivational consequences of positive and negative affect. According to some versions of this view (Clark and Isen, 1982; Isen, 1984, 1987), people in a positive mood may try to maintain this pleasant state by refraining from effortful activity. Negative affect in turn should motivate people to engage in vigilant, effortful processing as an adaptive response to improve an aversive state. Schwarz (1990) offered a slightly different account, suggesting that positive and negative affects have a signaling/tuning function, and their role is to automatically inform the person of whether a relaxed, effort-minimizing (positive affect) or a vigilant, effortful (negative affect) processing style is appropriate. In recent years, a more differentiated picture began to emerge. Several experiments found that positive affect may have distinct processing advantages (Bless, 2000; Fiedler, 2001). People in a positive mood often adopt more creative, flexible, open, and inclusive thinking styles and perform more effectively on secondary tasks (Bless, 2000; Fiedler, 2000; Hertel and Fiedler, 1994). Affective influences on processing are thus not simply a matter of increasing or decreasing the effort, vigilance, and elaborateness of information-processing. Rather, as Bless (2000) and Fiedler (2000) showed, the fundamental evolutionary significance of positive and negative affective states is not simply to influence processing effort but to recruit more internally driven, top-down (positive affect), or externally oriented, bottom-up processing styles (Bless and Fiedler, 2006).
Integrative theories
Affective states can have an informational, and a processing influence on the way people remember, interpret, judge, and respond to social information. However, these effects are context sensitive and often depend on the particular task or judgment to be performed. A more comprehensive explanation of these effects needs to specify the circumstances that promote or inhibit affect congruence and should define the conditions that lead to affect priming, or the affect-as-information mechanisms. Several attempts were made in recent years to propose such integrative theories (Fiedler, 2001; Martin, 2000). We will describe one such comprehensive theory, the affect infusion model (AIM) (Forgas, 1995a, 2002). This theory predicts that affect infusion should occur only in circumstances that promote open, constructive processing that involves active elaboration of the available stimulus details and use of memory-based information in this process. The AIM assumes that affect infusion should be dependent on the kind of processing strategy that is used and identifies four alternative processing strategies: direct access, motivated, heuristic, and substantive processing. The first two strategies, direct access and motivated processing, call for highly targeted and predetermined patterns of information search and selection, which limit the scope for incidental affect infusion. In contrast, heuristic and substantive processing are more open, involve some constructive thinking and may thus produce affect infusion. These four strategies also differ in terms of two basic dimensions: the degree of effort exerted in seeking a solution, and the degree of openness and constructiveness of the information-search strategy. Thus, substantive processing involves high effort and
open, constructive thinking, motivated processing involves high effort but closed, predetermined information search, heuristic processing is characterized by low effort but open, constructive thinking, and direct access processing represents low processing effort and closed information search. The model also predicts that the use of these processing strategies is triggered by contextual variables related to the task, the person, and the situation that jointly influence processing choices. For example, the direct access strategy involves the direct retrieval of a pre-existing response and is most likely when the task is highly familiar, and when no strong cognitive, affective, situational, or motivational cues call for elaborate processing. Thus, when asked to produce a judgment about a well-known person, a previous response can be readily retrieved and used. Most of us possess a rich store of such pre-formed judgments. As such standard responses require no constructive processing, affect infusion should be absent, as found in a number of experiments (Sedikides, 1995). The motivated processing strategy involves highly selective and targeted thinking that is dominated by a particular motivational objective that precludes open information search, limiting affect infusion (Clark and Isen, 1982). For example, if during a job interview you are asked about your attitude towards the company you want to join, the response will be dominated by the motivation to produce an acceptable response rather than genuinely open and constructive thinking. Motivated processing may also produce a reversal of affect infusion and lead to mood-incongruent outcomes, when people wish to control or reverse their moods (Berkowitz et al., 2000; Forgas, 1991; Forgas and Ciarrochi, 2002; Forgas and Fiedler, 1996). The other two processing strategies identified by the AIM, heuristic and substantive processing, require more constructive and open-ended information search strategies and can thus produce affect infusion. Heuristic processing is most likely when the task is simple, familiar, and of little personal relevance; cognitive capacity is limited; and there are no motivational pressures. In such cases, people may rely on simplifying heuristics like their mood to infer a response. For example, when people are asked to respond to a telephone survey (Clore et al., 1994), or asked to reply to a questionnaire on the street (Forgas and Moylan, 1987), heuristic processing can lead to affect infusion if respondents rely on the how do I feel about it? heuristic. Finally, substantive processing should be adopted when the task is demanding, atypical, complex, novel, or personally relevant; there are no direct access responses available; there are no clear motivational goals to guide processing; and there is adequate time and other processing resources available to engage in elaborate processing. Substantive processing is an open and constructive strategy, and affect may selectively prime access to, and facilitate the use of, related thoughts, ideas, memories, and interpretations. The AIM makes the interesting and counterintuitive prediction that affect infusion (and mood congruence) should be increased when more extensive and elaborate processing is required to deal with more complex, demanding, or novel tasks, a pattern that has been confirmed in several experiments (Fiedler and Stroehm, 1986; Forgas, 1992b, 1993, 1995b, 1998a, 1998b; Forgas and Bower, 1987; Sedikides, 1995). An important feature of the AIM is that it recognizes that affect itself can also influence processing choices. As we have seen before (e.g., Bless, 2000; Fiedler, 2000; Bless and Fiedler, 2006), positive affect typically generates a more top-down, schema-driven processing style, and negative affect often triggers piecemeal, bottom-up processing strategies focusing attention on external details. The key contribution of integrative models such as the AIM is that they can predict the absence of affect infusion when direct access or motivated processing is used, and the presence of affect infusion during heuristic and substantive processing. The implications of this model have been supported in a number of the experiments, some of which will be considered below.
The empirical evidence
There are thus good theoretical reasons to expect that affect has a significant influence on how people represent the social world and the memories and constructs they use to interpret complex information. Typically, experiments in this field involve a two-stage procedure. Participants are first induced to experience an affective state by methods such as hypnotic suggestions, exposure to happy or sad movies, music, autobiographic memories, or positive or negative feedback about performance. After mood induction, judgments, memories, and behaviors are assessed in what participants believe is a separate, unrelated experiment (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1992a, 1995a). In some field experiments, naturally occurring moods elicited by the weather, movies, sports events, and the like can be used to study mood effects on cognition and behavior (Forgas and Moylan, 1987; Mayer et al., 1992). In this section, we will review a range of empirical studies demonstrating affective influences on social cognition and behavior. The review will focus on several areas where the role of affect on judgments and behavior has been demonstrated, including affective influences on (a) social memory, (b) social judgments, (c) self-perception, (d) stereotyping and intergroup judgments, (e) attitudes and persuasion, and (f) interpersonal behaviors.
Affective influences on social memory
Mood-state-dependent retrieval is one of the key mechanisms responsible for affective influences on social memory, suggesting that memory should be enhanced whenever retrieval mood matches the original encoding mood, consistent with the encoding specificity principle proposed by Tulving (1983). Several experiments found that people are better at remembering social events and autobiographical memories when their recall mood matches the mood they experienced when the event occurred. For example, people in a positive mood recall more happy events from their childhood, and those in a bad mood remember more negative episodes (Bower, 1981). In another study, participants remembered significantly more mood-consistent than inconsistent episodes from the events they recorded in their diary the previous week, as predicted by the affect priming model (Bower, 1981; Bower and Forgas, 2001). Depressed people show a similar pattern, preferentially remembering aversive childhood experiences, a memory bias that disappears once depression is brought under control. However, these mood-state-dependent memory effects are less reliable when the material to be remembered is abstract and uninvolving, such as word lists (Bower and Mayer, 1989). Studies that used more complex and relevant social stimuli presented in more realistic encoding and recall contexts have most reliably produced mood-state-dependent retrieval (Fiedler, 1990, 1991; Forgas, 1991a, 1992b, 1993; Forgas and Bower, 1987). It is these studies that are most likely to allow affective cues to function as a differentiating context in learning and recall, as originally suggested by Bower (1981). Mood-congruent retrieval is a related memory effect that occurs when an affective state facilitates the recall of affectively congruent material from memory, irrespective of encoding mood. For example, depressed subjects take less time to retrieve unpleasant rather than pleasant memories, while nondepressed subjects show the opposite pattern (Lloyd and Lishman, 1975; Teasdale and Fogarty, 1979).
However, some of these studies may confound mood-state-dependent retrieval with mood-congruent retrieval, as encoding mood is not always controlled for. A more convincing demonstration of mood-congruent retrieval requires that subjects experience no specific affect during encoding, yet still show better recall for mood-congruent information. Such results were obtained, for example, by Teasdale and Russell (1983), consistent with affect-priming predictions. Research using implicit memory tasks provides particularly clear support for affective influences on memory. For example, depressed people tend to complete word stems to produce negative rather than positive words they have seen before (Ruiz-Caballero and Gonzalez, 1994). Stem-completion and sentence-completion tasks were also found to indicate an implicit memory bias by Tobias and Kihlstrom (1992). However, mood-priming effects often seem difficult to demonstrate in word-recognition tasks (but see Niedenthal and Setterlund, 1994).
Mood effects on learning and selective attention
Many social tasks involve information overload, when people need to select a small sample of information for further processing (Heider, 1958). Affect should have an influence on what people will pay attention to, according to affect-priming theories (Niedenthal and Setterlund, 1994). Due to the activation of a mood-related associative base, affect-congruent social information should receive greater attention and deeper processing (Bower, 1981; Forgas and Bower, 1987). Several experiments found that people spend longer reading affect-congruent social information, linking it into a richer network of primed associations, and, as a result, are better at remembering such information (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1992b; Forgas and Bower, 1987). These effects occur because concepts, words, themes, and rules of inference that are associated with that emotion will become primed and highly available for use/in/top-down or expectation-driven processing/acting/as interpretive filters of reality (Bower, 1983: 395). Thus, people often process mood-congruent material more deeply, with greater associative elaboration and, thus, learn it better (Forgas and Bower, 1987). These experiments suggest that information that is congruent with prevailing affect is easier to access and use in social tasks (Anderson, 1983; Forgas, 1992a). Depressed psychiatric patients, for example, tend to show better learning and memory for negative information (Watkins et al., 1992), a bias that disappears once the depressive episode is over (Bradley and Mathews, 1983). However, mood-congruent learning seems a less robust phenomenon in patients suffering from anxiety (Burke and Mathews, 1992; Watts and Dalgleish, 1991), perhaps because anxious patients use particularly vigilant processing strategies to defend against anxiety-arousing information (Mathews and McLeod, 1994). Thus, processing strategies could play a crucial role in mediating affect-priming processes, as suggested by the affect infusion model (AIM) (Forgas, 1995a).
Mood effects on associations and interpretations
Interpersonal behavior often requires us to go beyond the information given, and rely on memories, associations, and inferences to make sense of complex and ambiguous social information (Heider, 1958). Affect can prime the kind of associations we rely on. For example, in word associations to an ambiguous word such as life, happy subjects think of more positive associations (love and freedom), while sad subjects produce words such as struggle and death (Bower, 1981). Mood-congruent associations also emerge when emotional subjects daydream or make up stories about fictional characters on the Thematic Apperception Test (Bower, 1981). These associative effects also produce affect-congruent distortions in many real-life situations due to naturally occurring moods (Mayer and Volanth, 1985; Mayer et al., 1992). Associative mood effects can also affect various social judgments, such as perceptions of human faces (Schiffenbauer, 1974), impressions about people (Forgas et al., 1984; Forgas and Bower, 1987), and self-perceptions (Sedikides, 1995). However, some recent experiments suggest that this associative effect is diminished as targets to be judged become more clear-cut and require less constructive processing (Forgas, 1994b, 1995b, 1997b, 1997c). This diminution in the associative consequences of mood with increasing stimulus clarity again suggests that open, constructive processing is an important prerequisite for affect-priming effects to occur (Fiedler, 1991, 2001).
Affective influences on eyewitness memory
Recent evidence suggests that affective influences on memory may have important practical consequences, for example in the area of eyewitness memory. To evaluate the role of affect in eyewitness memory, we asked people to witness complex social events presented on videotapes (such as a wedding scene or a robbery). A week later, good or bad mood was induced by films, and witnesses were then questioned about what they saw. The questions either included or did not include planted, misleading information about the scenes (Forgas, 2001c). When eyewitness memory for the incidents was later tested, misleading information was more likely to be incorporated in the event and mistaken for a real experience by those who were in a positive mood when the false information was presented. Negative mood reduced this memory distortion. The same effects were also observed in a field study, where students witnessed and later recalled a staged incident during a lecture (Forgas, 2001c).
Affective influences on social judgments
Forming accurate judgments about others is an important prerequisite for successful interpersonal behavior (Forgas, 1985). Early experiments suggested that temporary moods might have a simple, mood-congruent influence on social judgments, an effect initially explained by psychoanalytic or conditioning principles (Clore and Byrne, 1974; Feshbach and Singer, 1957; Griffitt, 1970). Recent studies based on cognitive principles were also able to explore the boundary conditions for these effects.
Affective influences on making sense of observed behaviors
Interpreting ongoing social behaviors is perhaps the most fundamental judgment people make in everyday life. Such judgments typically require inferential processing and should be open to affect-infusion effects. This prediction was first evaluated by asking participants who were feeling happy or sad after a hypnotic mood induction to watch a videotape of their own social interactions with a partner from the previous day (Forgas et al., 1984). Participants were asked to make a series of rapid, online judgments evaluating the behaviours of
themselves and their partner's as skilled, positive or unskilled, negative. Affect had a highly significant influence on judgments. Happy persons saw more positive, skilled and fewer negative, unskilled behaviors in both themselves and their partners than did sad subjects. Objective observers who received no mood induction showed no such affective biases. Thus, even mild affective states can have a strong influence on the way complex and ambiguous interpersonal behaviors are interpreted, even when judgments are based on objective, videotaped evidence. These effects are most likely to occur because affect priming influences the kinds of memory-based interpretations, constructs, and associations people use as they interpret complex social behaviors. For example, the same smile seen as friendly by a happy person could be judged as awkward or condescending when the observer experiences negative affect. In subsequent experiments, happy or sad people were asked to form attitudes about target persons who possessed a number of positive and negative qualities presented on a computer screen, so reading and judgmental latencies could be recorded (Forgas and Bower, 1987). Again, there was strong evidence for an affect-congruent bias: happy judges formed more positive judgments, and sad judges were more critical. Analysis of processing latencies produced a pattern consistent with the affect-priming explanation. Judges spent more time reading, thinking about, and encoding information that was congruent with their affective state. This is consistent with the affect-priming account that predicts that when people learn new information, affect priming produces a richer activated knowledge base and, thus, increases the time taken to link new information to this more elaborate memory structure. In contrast, people took less time when producing affect-congruent judgments, because the relevant response is already primed by the affective state.
Does elaborate processing increase affect infusion in judgments?
If affect infusion requires more substantive processing, then the more people need to think in order to compute a judgment, the greater the likelihood that affectively primed thoughts and associations will influence their judgments. Several experiments tested this paradoxical prediction by manipulating the complexity of the judgmental task to create more or less demand for extensive, elaborate processing (Forgas, 1993, 1994, 1995b). In one set of experiments (Forgas, 1993, 1995b), happy or sad participants were asked to form impressions about couples presented in pictures who were either highly typical and well-matched or atypical and badly matched for physical attractiveness. As expected, there was an affect-congruent influence on judgments, as happy participants formed more positive, lenient, and generous impressions than did sad participants. These mood effects were significantly greater when the couples were unusual and badly matched, so that forming a judgment required more extensive processing. Similar results were obtained when judges were asked to form judgments based on verbal descriptions (Forgas, 1992b). Furthermore, an analysis of processing latency and recall memory data confirmed that unusual, atypical persons took longer to process, and there was greater affect infusion into these elaborate judgments. To what extent does affect infusion also occur in realistic interpersonal judgments? Several experiments evaluated the effects of mood on judgments about people's real-life relationships (Forgas, 1994). Results showed that people made more mood-congruent judgments about their intimate partners and about events in their long-term intimate relationships. Again, these mood effects were consistently greater when the events judged were more complex and serious and required more elaborate, constructive processing. This evidence suggests that judgments about highly familiar people are also prone to affect infusion, and these effects are magnified when more elaborate processing strategies are used.
Affective influences on judgmental biases
As feeling good seems to produce a thinking style that relies more heavily on internal thoughts and dispositions, happy people may pay less attention to external information and be more prone to certain judgmental errors (Bless, 2000; Bless and Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler, 2001), such as the fundamental attribution error (FAE) that occurs when people ignore external influences on behavior (Forgas, 1998c). In several studies, happy or sad people read essays that were freely chosen or coerced and then judged the underlying attitudes of the writers (Forgas, 1998c). Happy persons largely assumed that the essay reflected the writer's attitudes, thus committing the FAE. Those in a negative mood showed reduced bias and paid better attention to the available information and tended to discount coerced essays as indicative of the writer's real views. Many important decisions in everyday life require similar attention to situational details. For example, in a series of recent studies, Moylan (2001) showed that positive mood tends to increase, and negative mood tends to decrease, the incidence of a variety of errors and distortions in performance assessments in organizations. More generally, mood may also influence the use of various judgemental heuristics, such as anchoring, availability, and representativeness (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Recent research provides partial support for this hypothesis (Chan and Forgas, 2001). People in a positive and negative mood were asked to make judgments about acceptable levels of risk in a variety of scenarios and were also provided with heuristic cues, such as anchors, before performing the judgment. Happy judges tended to rely more on the anchoring heuristic when the situation was hypothetical and relatively unfamiliar. When the situation at hand was more personally relevant, it was people in a negative mood who were more susceptible to judgmental heuristics. It seems that the nature and familiarity of the task mediates mood effects on heuristic use, so, it appears that the processing strategy recruited by a situation has a large influence on the nature and extent of affective influences (Forgas, 2002; Forgas et al., 2005).
Affective influences on self-perception
The self represents a particularly complex and elaborate cognitive schema incorporating rich information accumulated throughout a lifetime about our positive and negative social experiences. Affect should thus have a strong influence on self-related judgments whenever constructive, substantive processing is adopted (Forgas, 1995a, 2001a; Sedikides, 1992, 1995). Most research suggests a fundamental affect-congruent pattern: positive affect improves and negative affect impairs the valence of self-conceptions (Abele-Brehm and Hermer, 1993; Nasby, 1994, 1996). For example, when students were asked to make judgments about their success or failure on a recent examination, induced positive or negative mood had a significant mood-congruent influence. Those in a negative mood blamed themselves more when failing, and took less credit for their successes, whereas those in a positive mood claimed credit for success but refused to accept responsibility for their failures (Forgas et al., 1990).
However, recent studies indicate a more complex picture, suggesting that the nature of the judgmental task moderates mood effects on self-judgments. For example, Nasby (1994) asked participants to make affirmative or nonaffirmative judgments about how a series of trait adjectives applied to them. Later, recall memory for these self-descriptions was tested. Happy persons remembered more positive and sad persons remembered more negative self-traits, but only when prior ratings required an affirmative format. This result indicates that the different processing strategies required by affirmative and nonaffirmative trait judgments mediate the effect. Rejecting a trait as not applicable to ourselves may be a simple and direct process that requires no elaborate thinking. In contrast, affirming that a trait does apply to the self requires more elaborate thinking, enhancing the likelihood of affective influences. It also appears that central and peripheral aspects of the self are differentially sensitive to affective influences (Sedikides, 1995). People's central self-conceptions are more salient, detailed and certain, representing the core of what people believe is their true self, and are affirmed more strongly than peripheral features (Markus, 1977; Pelham, 1991; Sedikides, 1995; Sedikides and Strube, 1997; Swann, 1990). Judgments about the central self should require less online elaboration and should be less open to affect infusion. Sedikides (1995) confirmed this pattern, finding that affect had no influence on judgments related to central traits, but had a significant mood-congruent influence on judgments related to peripheral traits. Later experiments showed that encouraging people to think more extensively about peripheral self-conceptions further increased affective influences on these judgments.
Individual traits such as self-esteem also mediate mood effects on self-judgments (Baumeister, 1993, 1998; Rusting, 1998, 2001). People with low self-esteem generally have less certain and stable self-conceptions (Campbell et al., 1996; Kernis and Waschull, 1996). Affect may thus have a greater influence on the self-judgments of low self-esteem individuals, as found by Brown and Mankowski (1993). In another study, Smith and Petty (1995) induced happy and sad mood in high and low self-esteem participants, who were then asked to report on memories from their school years. Mood influenced the quantity and quality of responses by the low, but not by the high, selfesteem group. It seems that people with high self-esteem have a more stable self-concept and respond to self-related questions by directly accessing this stable knowledge, thus inhibiting the incidental infusion of affect into judgments. Affect intensity may be another individual difference variable that influences mood congruency effects on self-judgments (Larsen and Diener, 1987). Mood congruency may be stronger among high affect-intensity persons (Haddock et al., 1994) and among people who score higher on measures assessing openness to feelings as a personality trait (Ciarrochi and Forgas, 2000). In some instances, negative affect infusion can have a debilitating and self-perpetuating influence on self-judgments. Extreme stress and anxiety can produce a dangerous neurotic cascade of reverberating negative affect and negative thinking (Suls, 2001). In this state, minor problems may be magnified out of all proportion so that people sometimes set unreasonable targets, show decreased flexibility in adjusting their goals, and inadvertently produce more negative experiences. To break this cycle of negative affectivity, a conscious effort is often required. Motivational variables may also influence self-judgments. For example, Cervone et al. (1994) found a mood-congruent pattern in performance ratings: sad participants were more critical of the same level of performance than neutral participants. However, the opposite effect occurred on judgments of performance standards: sad participants now expressed higher personal standards than neutral-mood participants, perhaps as a motivated, defensive strategy to justify their expected failure, in a process somewhat similar to selfhandicapping attributions. Motivational processes may also limit the negativity of self-judgments. In one study by Sedikides (1994), happy, neutral, or sad participants wrote a series of self-descriptive statements. Initially, judgments were affect congruent, but with the passage of time, negative self-judgments were spontaneously reversed, suggesting something like automatic mood-management strategy. We further investigated this spontaneous mood management hypothesis (Forgas and Ciarrochi, 2002; Forgas et al., 2000) and also found that negative-mood effects on self-descriptions were spontaneously reversed over time. People who scored high on self-esteem were able to eliminate the negativity of their self-judgments very rapidly, while low self-esteem individuals continued to persevere with negative selfdescriptions longer. It seems that there are automatic cognitive strategies people use to manage everyday mood fluctuations, spontaneously reversing affect congruence once a threshold value of affectivity is reached (Forgas and Ciarrochi, 2002).
Affect as a resource
Interestingly, positive affect may serve as an important resource when people deal with aversive information about themselves. Feeling good may allow people to overcome defensiveness when dealing with potentially threatening information (Trope et al., 2001). Facing negative feedback often produces conflict, as we need to balance the cost of facing criticism with the benefits of acquiring useful feedback (Leary, 2000; Trope, 1986). Trope and Neter (1994) found that mood influences the relative weight people assign to the costs versus benefits of receiving negative feedback. Feeling good makes it easier to deal with threatening but diagnostic information, suggesting that positive mood functions as a resource. Additional experiments by Trope and Pomerantz (1998) and by Aspinwall (1998; Reed and Aspinwall, 1998) further confirmed that positive mood plays a role in facilitating the acquisition of useful self-knowledge. However, it is only when the negative feedback is seen as potentially useful and constructive that people willingly undergo the emotional cost of acquiring it (Trope and Gervey, 1998). These effects may have important applied consequences, for example, when it comes to dealing with unwelcome but useful health-related messages (Raghunathan and Trope, 1999). It turns out that people in a positive mood not only selectively sought but also processed in greater detail and remembered better negatively valenced arguments about potential health risks.
Some applied consequences: affect and health-related judgments
Affective influences on self-judgments can be especially important when it comes to health-related judgments (Salovey et al., 2001). Positive affect may promote more optimistic and adaptive attitudes, reduce the perceived severity of symptoms and also influence physical
well-being (Salovey and Birnbaum, 1989). In contrast, illness is typically associated with more negative moods, thoughts, and judgments. Individuals experiencing negative affect also report more severe physical symptoms (Abele and Hermer, 1993; Croyle and Uretsky, 1987). Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) found that students who were suffering from cold or flu reported more severe symptoms and nearly twice as many aches and pains when made to feel sad than those made to feel happy even though there were no differences between the two groups before the mood induction. Happy persons typically judge themselves as better able to carry out health-promoting behaviors (Salovey and Birnbaum, 1989) and form more optimistic expectations (Forgas and Moylan, 1987; Mayer et al., 1992). Affective states may also influence the immune system and susceptibility to disease. In conclusion, affect may have a strong mood-congruent influence on many self-related judgments, but these effects occur only when a degree of open and constructive processing is required, and there are no motivational forces to override affect congruence. Affect infusion seems to be greater in people who have low self-esteem, when judgments are related to peripheral rather than central self-conceptions, and when judgments require elaborate rather than simple processing. In addition to its dynamic influence on self-judgments, affect also plays an important role in the structure and organization of the self-concept (Deseno and Salovey, 1997; Niedenthal and Halberstadt, 2000) and people's ability to cope with adverse information (Trope et al., 2001).
Affective influences on intergroup judgments and stereotyping
It has long been assumed that affect plays an important role in stereotyping and prejudice (for reviews, see Cooper, 1959; Haddock et al., 1993; Stangor et al., 1991). From psychoanalytic ideas and the frustration-aggression hypothesis, it was assumed that negative affect might contribute to intergroup discrimination and prejudice. Conditioning processes may also play a role in explaining how regularly encountering and associating certain groups in aversive situations can elicit negative emotions such as anger and resentment (Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986; Katz, 1976), just as evaluative reactions to individuals can be influenced by conditioning (Clore and Byrne, 1974; Griffitt, 1970; Zanna et al., 1970). Recently, cognitive theories have been invoked to explain similar effects. For example, Fiske and Pavelchak (1986) proposed that it is affective tags linked to group representations that trigger an emotional response. In turn, linking contact with out-group members to positive feelings may reduce negative attitudes and improve intergroup relations, according to the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; Brewer and Miller, 1996; Jones, 1997; Stephan and Stephan, 1996). Furthermore, positive affect may also promote more inclusive cognitive categorizations, thus reducing intergroup distinctions (Dovidio et al., 1998; Isen et al., 1992). However, whether this effect is beneficial depends on whether the categories used are positive or negative and whether they are used to discriminate between or unify out-groups and in-groups. According to some recent studies, when group membership is of low relevance, positive mood may facilitate the use of in-group as opposed to out-group categories and increase intergroup discrimination (Forgas and Fiedler, 1996). The experience of anxiety may also amplify reliance on stereotypes, increasing the tendency to see out-groups in stereotypic ways (Stephan and Stephan, 1985, Wilder and Shapiro, 1989). Recent experiments also found that trait anxiety can moderate the influence of negative affect on intergroup judgments (Ciarrochi and Forgas, 1999). Low trait-anxious whites in the USA reacted more negatively to a threatening black out-group when experiencing aversive mood. However, high trait-anxious individuals produced more positive judgments, suggesting that the combination of trait anxiety and negative affect triggered a more controlled, motivated processing strategy, leading to the reversal of socially undesirable intergroup judgments. Different negative affective states have different effects on intergroup judgments. For example, sadness reduces, but anger and anxiety may increase, reliance on stereotypes (Bodenhausen et al., 1994b; Keltner et al., 1993; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999). The process of stereotyping itself may involve at least four distinct cognitive operations (Gilbert and Hixon, 1991): the identification of the applicable category, activation of its contents, applying stereotyped features to the target, and correcting for stereotyping. Affect may influence stereotyping at each of the four stages of the stereotyping process. For example, since positive moods often facilitate top-down, schematic processing (Bless, 2000; Bless and Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler, 2000), happy persons may produce less accurate social judgments (Forgas, 1998c; Sinclair and Mark, 1995) and are more likely to rely on stereotype information (Abele et al., 1998; Bless et al., 1996; Bodenhausen et al., 1994a; Forgas and Fiedler, 1996: Experiment 1; Park and Banaji, 1999). However, negative states other than sadness, such as anger or anxiety, may also increase reliance on stereotyping, according to evidence from several experiments (e.g., Bodenhausen et al., 1994b). Once a category is activated, affect may also influence the amount of stereotyped information people access. If processing resources are limited, fewer stereotyped details may be retrieved (Gilbert and Hixson, 1991). Given the highly prepared and automatic activation of stereotyped knowledge, affect may have only a limited influence on the amount of stereotyped knowledge activated. In the simplest instance, once activated, stereotypic beliefs can be directly used as the basis for a judgment, by functioning as a heuristic cue that eliminates the need for further processing. For example, we found that positive mood increased reliance on simple group stereotypes when making reward allocation judgments, but only when group membership was of low relevance (Forgas and Fiedler, 1996). At other times, stereotyped knowledge provides an initial influence on judgments that are likely to be supplemented and modified by other information (Bodenhausen et al., 1999; Chaiken and Maheswaran, 1994; Duncan, 1976). Ultimately, a motivated tendency to correct judgments also influences stereotyping (Bodenhausen et al., 1998), as people correct or recompute what appears to be an undesirable judgment (Strack, 1992). Negative affect may facilitate a cautious, defensive interpersonal style (Forgas, 1999a, 1999b), and persons feeling sad, guilty or anxious seem to be more likely to engage in stereotype correction (Devine and Monteith, 1993; Lambert et al., 1997). Thus, negative affect sometimes functions as a warning, indicating the need for a motivated reassessment of potentially undesirable responses (Monteith, 1993). This alerting effect of negative mood is particularly strong for individuals high on trait anxiety (Ciarrochi and Forgas, 1999). Thus, affect plays a complex role in intergroup judgments, potentially influencing every stage of the stereotyping process. Contextual and situational factors again play a critical role in mediating these effects (Forgas, 1995a; 2002; Forgas et al., 2005; Martin, 2000).
Affect and attitudes
Attitudes have long been regarded as a key construct in social psychology (Allport, 1954), comprising distinct cognitive, affective, and conative (behavioral) components (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; see Chapter 7, this volume). Despite the affective character of attitudes, not enough is known about how affective states influence the generation, maintainance, organization, and expression of attitudes. Affective influences on attitude change and responses to persuasion received more attention (Petty et al., 2001) following early interest in the effectiveness of fear-arousing messages in producing attitude change (Boster and Mongeau, 1984; Ditto and Lopez, 1992; Janis and Feshbach, 1953). Practitioners of rhetoric and persuasion have long believed that inducing an affective response is helpful in achieving attitude change. Studies confirmed that inducing positive affect promotes a positive response to persuasive messages (McGuire, 1985; Petty et al., 1991; Razran, 1940), although this effect is subject to important limitations (Bless et al., 1990; Mackie and Worth, 1989; Wegener et al., 1995). Affective influences on reactions to persuasion largely depend on how the message is processed (Petty et al., 1991, 2001). When people rely on superficial processing, affect might function as a heuristic cue and produce a mood-congruent response to the message. Such predictions can be derived either from conditioning theories (Clore and Byrne, 1974; Griffitt, 1970; Razran, 1940), or from the affectas-information model proposed by Clore et al. (1994, 2001) and others. Sinclair and Mark (1995) found that students were more likely to agree with a persuasive message about comprehensive examinations when they were feeling good (on a pleasant, sunny day) rather than feeling bad (asked on an unpleasant, rainy day). However, when people think more carefully about the message (for example, because the topic is involving), their reactions may be influenced by memory-based mechanisms. Petty et al. (1993) found that persuasive messages about a pen produced a more positive response when the audience was happy. However, when people were highly involved because they expected to choose and keep a pen, the effect was linked to more affect-congruent thoughts primed by the mood induction instead of heuristic thinking. Individual differences are also important; people who habitually adopt elaborate thinking styles (they score high on need for cognition; Cacioppo and Petty, 1982) may be particularly prone to affect infusion when responding to persuasive arguments. The consequences of affective states may also be modified as a result of motivational factors. Theories such as the flexible correction model (FCM) proposed by Petty and Wegener (1993; Wegener and Petty, 1997) and integrative theories such as the affect-infusion model (Forgas, 2001a, 2001b) seek to explain the circumstances when motivated processing is likely to occur. Perceived discrepancy or dissonance between attitudes and behaviors is another source of attitude change (Cooper and Fazio, 1984; Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones, 2001; Zanna and Cooper, 1974; see Chapter 10, this volume). Dissonance usually involves feelings of arousal and aversive affect, as discrepancy indicates uncertainty about the world (Harmon-Jones, 1999a, 2001; Harmon-Jones et al., 1996). Some versions of dissonance theory suggest that all dissonance is aversive; others suggest that dissonance is aversive only when consequences are real and there is personal involvement (Cooper and Fazio, 1984). Evidence from appraisal research suggests that imagined consequences are often sufficient to trigger an affective reaction (Scherer, 1999). Other studies also found that negative affect increases dissonance reduction and attitude change even if the source of affect is unrelated (Kidd and Berkowitz, 1976; Rhodewalt and Comer, 1979). Once consonance is restored, the affective state also tends to improve (Burris et al., 1997; Elliot and Devine, 1994). High self-esteem individuals seem better able to handle aversive affective states (Forgas et al., 2000; Harmon-Jones, 2001). We also know from self-discrepancy theory that different kinds of self-discrepancies evoke qualitatively distinct affective reactions (Higgins, 1989, 2001). Some studies suggest a direct link between discrepancy-produced negative affect and subsequent attitude change (Zanna and Cooper, 1974). Others, however, failed to find such a link (Elliot and Devine, 1994; Higgins et al., 1979), and even measures of arousal are not necessarily indicative of dissonance and attitude change (Elkin and Leippe, 1986; Harmon-Jones et al., 1996; Losch and Cacioppo, 1990). In conclusion, affect plays an important role in attitude change, influencing how people respond to persuasive messages, and how they resolve attitude-behaviour discrepancies, but these effects are again highly context sensitive.
Affective influences on interpersonal behaviors
Humans are a gregarious species, and coordinating our interpersonal behaviors can be a demanding cognitive task (Heider, 1958; Pinker, 1997). As social interaction often demands open, constructive thinking, affective states may infuse our thoughts, plans, and, ultimately, behaviors. Positive affect may prime positive interpretations and produce more confident, friendly, and cooperative approach' behaviors, whereas negative affect may facilitate access to negative memories and produce more avoidant, defensive, or unfriendly attitudes and behaviors (Bower and Forgas, 2001; Eich and Macauley, 2000; Forgas, 1995a). The behavioral consequences of affect are now receiving increasing attention (Forgas, 2002). It seems that it is the very complexity and indeterminacy of many social situations that facilitate open, elaborate thinking, and promote the use of affectively primed interpretations in producing a response (Forgas, 2002). We found, for example (Forgas and Gunawardena, 2001), that female undergraduates who were feeling good after watching a film behaved in a much more positive manner in a subsequent, unrelated interaction. They smiled more, communicated more effectively, disclosed more personal information, and generally behaved in a more poised, skilled, and rewarding manner, according to raters blind to the affect condition. Sad participants were rated as being less friendly, confident, relaxed, comfortable, active, interested, and competent than were happy participants. In other words, the mild affective consequences of watching a brief film seemed to have a significant subsequent influence on interpersonal behaviors that was readily detectable by observers.
How does affect influence strategic interpersonal behaviors, such as making a request? Requesting is a complex interpersonal task characterized by uncertainty and should thus require open, elaborate processing. Positive mood should prime a more confident, direct requesting style, and negative mood should lead to more cautious, polite requests (Forgas, 1999a). When happy or sad persons were asked to select among more or less polite requests they would use in easy or difficult social situations (Forgas, 1999a: Experiment 1), happy participants preferred more direct, impolite requests, while sad persons preferred more cautious and polite requests. Furthermore,
mood effects on requesting were much stronger when the request situation was difficult and thus required more extensive, substantive processing. Mood had the same effect on open-ended requests (Forgas, 1999a: Experiment 2). Do these mood effects also occur in real-life interactions? In an unobtrusive experiment (Forgas, 1999b: Experiment 2), participants first viewed happy or sad films. Next, in an apparently impromptu development, the experimenter casually asked them to get a file from a neighboring office. Their words in making the request were recorded by a concealed tape recorder, and the requests were subsequently analyzed for politeness and other qualities. Negative mood resulted in significantly more polite, elaborate, and hedging requests, whereas those in a positive mood used more direct and less polite strategies. An analysis of participants' later recall memory for the requests (indicating the extent of elaborate processing) showed that more elaborately processed requests were remembered better and were also more influenced by mood as predicted by models such as the AIM (Forgas, 2002).
Responding to others
Spontaneous, impromptu reactions to social events also require constructive processing and should also be subject to affect infusion. For example, people are more willing to help others when feeling good after finding a coin in a telephone booth (Isen, 1984). Several recent field experiments carried out in a university library confirmed this prediction (Forgas, 1998b). Affect was induced by leaving folders containing funny or sad pictures (or text) on some unoccupied library desks. Students occupying the desks were surreptitiously observed as they exposed themselves to the mood induction. A few minutes later, another student (a confederate) made an unexpected polite or impolite request for several sheets of paper. Their responses were noted, and soon after, a second confederate asked them to complete a brief questionnaire assessing their perception and memory of the request and the requester. There was a clear mood-congruent pattern in responses. Sad people were less inclined to help, and evaluated the request and the requester more negatively. These mood effects were greater when the request was impolite and unconventional and thus required more elaborate and substantive processing. These results confirm that affect infusion into interpersonal behaviors is a real phenomenon that depends on how much constructive processing is required, in this case, to respond to more or less unusual, unconventional request forms.
Even carefully planned social encounters such as negotiations may be open to affect infusion (Forgas, 1998a). In a series of studies, mood was induced before participants engaged in highly realistic interpersonal and intergroup negotiation. Happy participants were more confident, formed higher expectations about their success and made more optimistic and cooperative plans than did control or negativemood participants. Furthermore, happy participants also achieved better outcomes. Interestingly, individuals who scored high on measures such as Machiavellianism and need for approval were less influenced by mood. It seems that affect infusion into interpersonal behaviors is reduced for individuals who habitually approach interpersonal tasks from a motivated, predetermined perspective that limits the degree of open, constructive thinking they employ. These findings support the principle that mood effects on social behaviors are dependent on processing strategies, often linked to enduring personality traits (Ciarrochi and Forgas, 1999, 2000; Ciarrochi et al., 2001).
Being persuasive
Producing effective persuasive arguments is an important everyday task. We know that affect can influence information-processing strategies (Bless, 2000; Fiedler, 2000; Forgas, 1998a, 1998b), and it may be that negative affect may improve the quality of persuasive messages by focusing attention on situational details (Forgas et al., 2001). When we asked students feeling happy or sad to produce persuasive arguments either for or against popular or unpopular positions, mood had a significant influence on argument quality, as rated by observers. Negative mood produced higher quality and more persuasive arguments, consistent with the expected more externally oriented and bottom-up processing style associated with negative affect (Bless, 2000; Fiedler, 2001). In another experiment, participants produced persuasive arguments in an interactive situation, writing their messages on a computer keyboard as if exchanging emails (Forgas, in press). Motivation was also manipulated, by offering some participants a significant reward for doing well (the chance to win highly desired movie passes). The persuasion task involved convincing the partner to participate in a boring experiment. Those in a negative mood again generated significantly higher quality arguments than the positive group. However, the provision of a reward reduced the size of mood effects on argument quality by imposing a strong motivational influence on how the task was approached.
Self-disclosure is a critical aspect of skilled interpersonal behavior and essential for the development of rewarding intimate relationships (Forgas, 1985). Affective influences on self-disclosure were demonstrated in several experiments (Forgas, 2001b), when happy or sad participants indicated the order in which they would feel comfortable disclosing increasingly intimate information about themselves to a person they have just met. Happy people preferred more intimate disclosure topics, suggesting a generally more confident and optimistic interpersonal style. In subsequent experiments, participants interacted with another person in a neighboring room through a computer keyboard, as if exchanging emails. Using this bogus partner method, the computer was preprogrammed to respond in ways that indicated either consistently high or low levels of self-disclosure. Individuals in a positive mood produced more intimate disclosure, revealed more positive information about themselves, and formed more positive impressions about the partner, but only when the partner was also disclosing. Positive mood did not increase the intimacy of self-disclosure when the partner was not disclosing. Why do these effects occur? In uncertain and unpredictable social encounters, we need to rely on open, constructive thinking to formulate our plans and guide their interpersonal behaviors. Affect can prime access to more affect-congruent thoughts, and these ideas should ultimately influence plans and behaviors. Thus, affective influences on social behaviors depend on how much open, constructive processing is required to deal with a demanding interpersonal task. Whenever motivated, closed information processing is used, mood effects are reduced. The same mechanisms of affect infusion seem to influence the way people formulate personal requests, the way they respond to approaches by others, the way they plan and execute negotiations, and the way they produce persuasive messages and self-disclose
(Forgas, 1998b, 1998c, 1999a, 1999b).
Summary and conclusions
This chapter reviewed evidence for the critical role that affective states play in social thinking and behavior. We considered both the cognitive antecedents and the consequences of affect in social situations. Many social encounters elicit powerful emotional responses, and we reviewed the role of appraisal processes in producing affective reactions. Affective states also have a significant influence on how people perceive and interpret social situations, the judgments they form, and how they plan and execute strategic interpersonal behaviors. Many of these effects are highly context sensitive, and there is also growing evidence that different information-processing strategies play a critical role in explaining the presence or absence of affect infusion into social thinking and behavior. Integrative theories, such as the affect-infusion model (Forgas, 1995a), offer a process-based explanation of when, how, and why affect infusion occurs. A number of the studies indicate that, surprisingly, more extensive, substantive processing often enhances mood congruity effects (Forgas, 1992b, 1994, 1995b; Nasby, 1994, 1996; Sedikides, 1995). However, affect infusion is often absent when a social task can be performed by either a direct-access or a motivated-processing strategy that limits the use of affectively primed information in producing a response (Fiedler, 1991; Forgas, 1995a). These effects are not limited to controlled laboratory environments, as unobtrusive field experiments showed that affect infusion occurs in many real-life situations. Most investigations of the cognitive and behavioral consequences of affect looked at mild, undifferentiated mood states, whereas research on the antecedents of emotion covers a wide variety of specific affective states beyond positivity and negativity. We believe that an important direction for future research is to integrate more explicitly research on the elicitation of emotion into the study of the influences of emotion on social-cognitive processes. Research on the social antecedents of emotion highlighted the distinctive motivational functions that discrete emotional states may serve. However, the judgmental and behavioral consequences of specific appraised emotions received far less attention. When different emotions of the same valence (for example, anger versus sadness versus fear) have been compared (e.g., Bodenhausen et al., 1994a; Keltner et al., 1993; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999), the results show that they produce different cognitive consequences, just as discrete-emotion theorists assumed (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1977). Integrative models such as the AIM (e.g., Forgas, 1995a, 2002) can handle the subtlety and context dependence of affective influences on social cognition and behavior. An extension of such models to incorporate our growing understanding of the motivational properties of distinct emotional states should produce a welcome integration across these two branches of affect research. In conclusion, evidence suggests a closely interactive relationship between affective states and information-processing strategies as the key to understanding affective influences on thinking, judgments, and interpersonal behavior. Cognitive processes are intimately involved in the generation of affective responses (Smith and Kirby, 2000), and the production of affective influences on judgments and behavior (Forgas, 2002). A number of contextual influences mediate and moderate these effects. In view of the fact that most of the research on affect in social psychology is less than twenty years old, a great deal has been achieved. However, we are still far from fully understanding the multifaceted influences that affect has on social thinking, judgments, and interpersonal behavior. Hopefully, this handbook, and the present chapter in particular, will stimulate further interest in this fascinating and rapidly developing area of inquiry.
This work was supported by a Special Investigator award from the Australian Research Council, and the Research Prize by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation to Joseph P. Forgas. For further information on this research project, see also website at http:/ / www.psy.unsw.edu.au/ ~joef/ jforgas.htm.
Since time immemorial, people have been fascinated by the strange duality of human nature. On the one hand we are rational, logical creatures capable of impressive analytic thinking, yet many of our everyday judgments and behaviors seem to be driven by subconscious affective impulses that are still poorly understood. The past twenty years have produced an impressive expansion in our knowledge of affectivity. This chapter surveys some of the most recent achievements in experimental research on affect and demonstrates how affective states have a subtle yet significant influence on both the content and the process of everyday thinking and behavior.
This chapter reviewed the most recent developments in research of affectivity and how affect influences everyday thinking and behavior. We saw that the interpretation and appraisal of affective states involves complex cognitive processes, and that the experience of affective states is closely linked to the social situations in which they arise. We have also surveyed historical approaches to studying affect, including the psychoanalytic, conditioning, and cognitive frameworks. We have seen that even mild and unconscious affective states, such as moods, can have a significant and predictable influence on the content of people's thinking and judgments (what they think), as well as the process of how they deal with social information (how they think). We have seen that mood states can influence the content of people's memories, associations and judgments, and the way they evaluate themselves and their social relationships. In the second half of the chapter, we surveyed a number of experiments showing that mood states also influence strategic interpersonal behaviors, such as the way people communicate with each other, make requests, use bargaining strategies, and disclose personal information to others. These effects can have a major influence on social behavior, both in our working and in our private lives.
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Flyboys: A True Story of Courage
by James BradleyJames Bradley
Hardcover(Large Print)
FLYBOYS is the true story of young American airmen who were shot down over Chichi Jima. Eight of these young men were captured by Japanese troops and taken prisoner. Another was rescued by an American submarine and went on to become president. The reality of what happened to the eight prisoners has remained a secret for almost 60 years. After the war, the American and Japanese governments conspired to cover up the shocking truth. Not even the families of the airmen were informed what had happened to their sons. It has remained a mysteryuntil now. Critics called James Bradley's last book "the best book on battle ever written." FLYBOYS is even better: more ambitious, more powerful, and more moving. On the island of Chichi Jima those young men would face the ultimate test. Their storya tale of courage and daring, of war and of death, of men and of hopewill make you proud, and it will break your heart.
James Bradley is the author of Flags of Our Fathers and the son of one of the men who raised the American flag on Iwo Jima. He lives in Westchester County, New York.
By James Bradley
Copyright © 2003 James Bradley
All these years I had this nagging feeling these guys wanted their story told.
The e-mail was from Iris Chang, author of the groundbreaking bestseller The Rape of Nanking. Iris and I had developed a professional relationship after the publication of my first book, Flags of Our Fathers. In her e-mail, Iris suggested I contact a man named Bill Doran in Iowa. She said Bill had some "interesting" information.
This was in early February 2001. I was hearing many "interesting" war stories at that point. Flags of Our Fathers had been published recently. The book was about the six Iwo Jima flagraisers. One of them was my father.
Indeed, scarcely a day passed without someone suggesting a topic for my next book. So I was curious as I touched his Iowa number on my New York telephone keypad.
Bill quickly focused our call on a tall stack of papers on his kitchen table. Within twenty minutes I knew I had to look Bill in the eye and see that stack. I asked if I could catch the first plane out the next day.
"Sure. I'll pick you up at the airport," Bill offered. "Stay at my place. It's just me and Stripe, my hunting dog, here. I have three empty bedrooms. You can sleep in one."
Riding from the Des Moines airport in Bill's truck, I learned that Stripe was the best hunting dog in the world and that his seventy-six year-old owner was a retired lawyer. Bill and Stripe spent their days hunting and fishing. Soon Bill and I were seated at his Formica-topped kitchen table. Between us was a pile of paper, a bowl of popcorn, and two gin and tonics.
The papers were the transcript of a secret war crimes trial held on Guam in 1946. Fifty-five years earlier, Bill, a recent U.S. Naval Academy graduate, had been ordered to attend the trial as an observer. Bill was instructed to report to the "courtroom," a huge Quonset hut. At the entrance, a Marine guard eyed the twenty-one-year-old. After finding Bill's name on the approved list, he shoved a piece of paper across a table.
"Sign this," the Marine ordered matter-of-factly. Everybody was required to.
Bill read the single-spaced navy document. The legal and binding language informed young Bill that he was never to reveal what he would hear in that steaming Quonset hut / courtroom.
Bill signed the secrecy oath and he signed another copy late that afternoon when he left the trial. He would repeat this process every morning and every afternoon for the trial's duration. And when it was over, Bill returned home to Iowa. He kept silent but could not forget what he had heard.
Then, in 1997, Bill noticed a tiny newspaper item announcing that vast stashes of government documents from 1946 had been declassified. "When I realized the trial was declassified," Bill said, "I thought, Maybe I can do something for these guys now."
As a lawyer, Bill had spent his professional life ferreting out documents. He made some inquiries and dedicated eleven months to following where they led. Then one day, a boxed transcript arrived in the mail from Washington. Bill told Stripe they weren't going hunting that day.
The transcript contained the full proceedings of a trial establishing the fates of eight American airmen-Flyboys-downed in waters in the vicinity of Iwo Jima during World War II. Each was shot down during bombing runs against Chichi Jima, the next island north of Iwo Jima. Iwo Jima was coveted for its airstrips, Chichi Jima for its communications stations. Powerful short- and long-wave receivers and transmitters atop Chichi's Mount Yoake and Mount Asahi were the critical communications link between Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo and Japanese troops in the Pacific. The radio stations had to be destroyed, the U.S. military decided, and the Flyboys had been charged with doing so.
A stack of papers my brother found in my dad's office closet after his death in 1994 had launched me on a quest to find my father's past. Now, on Bill's table, I was looking at the stack of papers that would become the first step in another journey.
On the same day my father and his buddies raised that flag on Iwo Jima, Flyboys were held prisoner just 150 miles away on Chichi Jima. But while everyone knows the famous Iwo Jima photo, no one knew the story of these eight Chichi Jima Flyboys.
Nobody knew for a reason: For over two generations, the truth about their demise was kept secret. The U.S. government decided the facts were so horrible that the families were never told. Over the decades, relatives of the airmen wrote letters and even traveled to Washington, D.C., in search of the truth. Well-meaning bureaucrats turned them away with vague cover stories.
"All those years I had this nagging feeling these guys wanted their story told," Bill said.
Eight mothers had gone to their graves not knowing the fates of their lost sons. Sitting at Bill's table, I suddenly realized that now I knew what the Flyboys' mothers had never learned.
History buffs know that 22,000 Japanese soldiers defended Iwo Jima. Few realize that neighboring Chichi Jima was defended by even more-Japanese troops numbering 25,000. Whereas Iwo had flat areas suitable for assault from the sea, Chichi had a hilly inland and a craggy coast. One Marine who later examined the defenses of both islands told me, "Iwo was hell. Chichi would have been impossible." Land troops-Marines-would neutralize Iwo's threat. But it was up to the Flyboys to take out Chichi.
The U.S. tried to blow up Chichi Jima's communications stations for quite some time. Beginning in June of 1944, eight months before the Iwo Jima invasion, American aircraft carriers surrounded Chichi Jima. These floating airports catapulted steel-encased Flyboys off their decks into the air. The mission of these young airmen was to fly into the teeth of Chichi Jima's lethal antiaircraft guns, somehow dodge the hot metal aimed at them, and release their loads of bombs onto the reinforced concrete communications cubes atop the island's twin peaks.
The WWII Flyboys were the first to engage in combat aviation in large numbers. In bomber jackets, posing with thumbs up, they epitomized masculine glamour. They were cool, and they knew it, and any earthbound fool had to know it too. Their planes were named after girlfriends and pinups, whose curvy forms or pretty faces sometimes adorned their sides. And inside the cockpit, the Flyboys were lone knights in an age of mass warfare.
In the North Pacific in 1945, the Flyboys flew the original "missions impossible." Climbing into 1940s-era tin cans with bombs strapped below their feet, they hurtled off carrier decks into howling winds or took off from island airfields. Sandwiched between blue expanses of sky and sea, Flyboys would wing toward distant targets, dive into flak shot from huge guns, and drop their lethal payloads. With their hearts in their throats, adrenaline pumping through their veins, the Flyboys then had to dead-reckon their way back to a tiny speck of landing deck or to a distant airfield their often-damaged planes never made it to.
The Flyboys were part of an air war that dwarfed the land war below. In 1945, the endgame in the northern Pacific was the incineration of Japan. This required two layers of bombers in the sky-huge B-29s lumbering high above with their cargo of napalm to burn cities, and smaller, lower-flying carrier-based planes to neutralize threats to the B-29s. My father on Iwo Jima shared the same mission with the Chichi Jima Flyboys: to make the skies safe for the B-29s.
Japanese military experts would later agree that the napalm dropped by these B-29s had more to do with Japan's surrender than the atomic bombs. Certainly, napalm killed more Japanese civilians than died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.
Most of the Chichi Jima Flyboys fought and died during the worst killing month in the history of all warfare-a thirty-day period in February and March of 1945 when the dying in WWII reached its climax. If you look at a graph charting casualties over the four years of the Pacific war, you will see the line jump dramatically beginning with the battle of Iwo Jima and the Flyboys' assaults against mainland Japan. And few realize the U.S. killed more Japanese civilians than Japanese soldiers and sailors. This was war at its most disturbing intensity.
It was a time of obscene casualties, a time when grandparents burned to death in cities aflame, and kamikaze sons swooped out of the sky to immolate themselves against American ships. It was the time of the worst battle in the history of the United States Marine Corps, the most decorated month in U.S. history, a valorous and brutish time of all-out slaughter.
By February of 1945, logical, technocratic American military experts had concluded that Japan was beaten. Yet the empire would not surrender. Americans judged the Japanese to be "fanatic" in their willingness to fight with no hope of victory. But Japan was not fighting a logical war. Japan, an island nation, existed in its own moral universe, enclosed in a separate ethical biosphere. Japanese leaders believed that "Japanese spirit" was the key to beating back the barbarians at their door. They fought because they believed they could not lose.
And while America cheered its flyers as its best and brightest, the Japanese had a very different view of those who wreaked havoc from the skies. To them, airmen who dropped napalm on defenseless civilians living in paper houses were the nonhuman devils.
This is a story of war, so it is a story of death. But it is not a story of defeat. I have tracked down the eight Flyboys' brothers and sisters, girlfriends, and aviator buddies who drilled and drank with them. Their relatives and friends gave me photos, letters, and medals. I have scoured yearbooks, logbooks, and little black books to find out who they were and what they mean to us today. I read and reread six thousand pages of trial documents and conducted hundreds of interviews in the U.S. and Japan.
The families and friends of the Flyboys could only tell me so much. Their hometown buddies and relatives had stories of their youth and enlistment. Their military comrades had remembrances from training camp up until they disappeared. But none of them-not even the next of kin or the bunkmates who served in the Pacific with them-knew exactly what happened to these eight on Chichi Jima. It was all a dark hole, an unfathomable secret.
In Japan, some knew, but they had kept their silence. I met Japanese soldiers who knew the Flyboys as prisoners. I heard stories about how they were treated, about their interrogations, about how some of the Flyboys had lived among their captors for weeks. I met soldiers who swapped jokes with them, who slept in the same rooms.
And I ventured to Chichi Jima. Chichi Jima is part of an island chain due south of Tokyo the Japanese call the Ogasawara Islands. On English maps the chain is called the Bonin Islands. The name Bonin is a French cartographer's corruption of the old Japanese word munin, which means "no man." These islands were uninhabited for most of Japan's existence. They literally contained "no peoples" or "no mans." So Bonin translates loosely into English as No Mans Land.
I hacked through forest growth in No Mans Land to uncover the last days of the Flyboys. I stood on cliffs with Japanese veterans who pointed to where they saw the Flyboys parachute into the Pacific. I strode where Flyboys had walked. I heard from eyewitnesses who told me much. Others revealed a great deal by refusing to tell me anything.
Eventually, I understood the facts about what happened to Dick, Marve, Glenn, Grady, Jimmy, Floyd, Warren Earl, and the Unknown Airman. I comprehended the "what" of their fates.
But to determine the "why" of their story, I had to embark upon another journey. A trip back in time, back 149 years, to another century. Back to when the first American military men walked in No Mans Land.
Excerpted from Flyboys by James Bradley Copyright © 2003 by James Bradley. Excerpted by permission.
1. Declassified 3
2. Civilize-ation 9
3. Spirit War 29
4. The Third Dimension 41
5. The Rape of China 52
6. The ABCD Encirclement 63
7. Flyboys 79
8. Doing the Impossible 98
9. Airpower 118
10. Yellow Devils, White Devils 133
11. To the Pacific 151
12. Carrier War 168
13. No Mans Land 181
14. No Surrender 202
15. Kichiku 218
16. Fire War 248
17. Enduring the Unendurable 278
18. Casualties of War 306
Afterword to the Paperback Edition 337
Acknowledgments 343
Bibliography 377
In 1945, eight young American pilots were shot down over Chichi Jima. Seven of these officers were captured by Japanese troops and taken prisoner. The eighth, George H. W. Bush, was rescued by an American submarine -- decades later, he became president of the United States. In Flyboys, James Bradley reveals the never-before-told story of the seven brave airmen who subsequently disappeared from history. This is not only an arresting story of humans under astonishing adversity; it is the riveting account of a U.S. government cover-up that persisted for two generations.
The author of Flags of Our Fathers achieves considerable but not equal success in this new Pacific War-themed history. Again he approaches the conflict focused on a small group of men: nine American Navy and Marine aviators who were shot down off the Japanese-held island of Chichi Jima in February 1945. All of them were eventually executed by the Japanese; several of the guilty parties were tried and condemned as war criminals. When the book keeps its eye on the aviators-growing up under a variety of conditions before the war, entering service, serving as the U. S. Navy's spearhead aboard the fast carriers, or facing captivity and death-it is as compelling as its predecessor. However, a chapter on prewar aviation is an uncritical panegyric to WWI aerial bombing advocate Billy Mitchell, who was eventually court-martialed for criticizing armed forces brass. More problematic is that Bradley tries to encompass not only the whole history of the Pacific War, but the whole history of the cultures of the two opposing countries that led to the racial attitudes which both sides brought to the war. Those attitudes, Bradley argues, played a large role in the brutal training of the Japanese army, which led to atrocities that in turn sharpened already keen American hostility. Some readers' hackles will rise at the discussion of the guilt of both sides, but, despite some missteps, Bradley attempts to strike an informed balance with the perspective of more than half a century. And with a CNN prime-time documentary to air at publication and a 25-city author tour, he should have no trouble reaching all comers. (Sept.) Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information.
How can you follow up a blockbuster like Flags of Our Fathers? With a book that reveals what happened to seven U.S. airmen shot down over Chichi Jima and captured by Japanese troops, never to be seen again. An eighth airman who managed to escape happened to be named George H.W. Bush. Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information.
An episodic account of a little-covered arena in the much-covered genre of WWII: close air combat in the war against Japan. Bestselling Bradley (Flags of Our Fathers, 2001) renders due homage to the exploits of long-distance bomber crews in the Pacific campaign, and particularly the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo in 1942, the net effect of which, along with 90-odd burned buildings, was that "Japanese belief in their invincibility had been rudely shaken." At the same time, half a year after Pearl Harbor, Americans got a good morale boost out of the bombing, and young men rushed to become flyerswho were already, thanks to Charles Lindbergh and company, perceived as "the coolest of the cool." Bradley’s account centers on the new crop of pilots, many of them teenagers when the war broke out, who piloted fighters and dive bombers against the Japanese in the last two years of the war. Most famous of the nine men he treats in detail is George H.W. Bush, who was shot down over the island of Chichi Jima in 1944, but not before delivering his payload of bombs. Bush survived, was awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross for his heroism under fire, and went on, of course, to the White House. Bush’s eight fellow pilots were not so lucky: they were captured, and treated so brutally that the US Navy effectively whitewashed their story, offering only a censored version of events to their families while executing many of the Japanese captors for their war crimes. Bradley writes vigorously, if graphically, about torture, beheading, disemboweling, and other unpleasant realities of POW life on Chichi Jima, though he takes great care to air those events from the Japanese point of view, one that equated surrenderwith dishonor and that did not honor the Geneva Convention. Yet, American pilots acknowledged, they, too, behaved similarly in the name of duty. Said one survivor, wisely, "I believe any culture can be indoctrinated into any attitude that the leaders want to teach them." A memorable portrait of men in battle. Author tour. Agent: Owen Laster/William Morris
"Bradley combines his tenacious detective skills with his gifts as a master storyteller to produce a tragic epic of two empires." Iris Chang, author of The Rape of Nanking
"Flyboys is not just a 'true story of courage' but a frightening reminder of the savagery human beings are capable of and the terrible moral choices nations at war must make." James D. Fairbanks, Houston Chronicle
"A gripping story.... Bradley tackles thorny issues head-on." Mark Lewis, Los Angeles Times
"Bradley has written a clear-eyed, heartfelt approach to a little-known corner of the 20th century's largest and most violent upheaval, while at the same time shining a light on some of that generation's finest." Tom Walker, Denver Post
Flyboys 4 out of 5 based on 0 ratings. 379 reviews.
Based on the cover and what you can read on the back of the book, it would seem that Flyboys is centered solely on some of the experiences that American fighter pilots endured in the Pacific during World War II. But, to say that this is all the book covers would be quite a misstatement. Before and between the stories about heroic American pilots, author James Bradley provides historical events that help the reader to understand why the war fought the way it was. Although major portions of the book are dedicated to the brave actions of the flyboys, I would say that the major theme of the book is actually about understanding why the war was fought. Bradley not only includes information about the fanatical culture that engulfed Japan during the war, but also provides examples of events centuries ago that helped lead Japan and the World towards WWII. I found that these insights into Japanese life in the early 20th century were among the most interesting parts of the book to me. One part of the book I wasn¿t fond of was the way that Bradley seemed to sympathize with the actions of the Japanese by blaming them on American actions. Although I think Bradley does a good job of supporting the major theme of the book, understanding the war based on historical facts, I do not always agree with the conclusions he reaches. For instance, attributes Japan¿s actions in China far more than I do to the actions of the United States in places like Hawaii and Central America. It is clear that Bradley did extensive research to write this book, talking to many of the flyboys and their families and friends, and even interviewed George H.W. Bush about what their life was life before during and after the war. Overall I would say that this was a pretty good book that included a lot of interesting historical info that you don¿t hear a lot about from many other places. I would recommend this book to anyone that wants to learn more about the Pacific Campaign in WWII and won¿t be overly offended by certain ideas that contradict many mainstream views of the war. I would not recommend this book to the squeamish however as some of the horrific actions depicted in the book can only be described as grisly.
This book truly surpasses Flags of our Father. The true characters of the book gave it the ability to be part of the story. Enjoyed every minute of it.
The footnotes are not fitted to the text. The quoted text is tied together by questionable interlineations and interpretations. For example to quote George Washington (calling Native Americans 'wolves') as if this were equivalent to the racism of Tojo and Hitler is obnoxious in the extreme. Washington learned his military lessons from the allied French and Indians and knew them to be fierce opponents. The attempt to balance the Japanese perspective with the view that we were once just as bad may as well be an attempt to justify Hitler on the basis that he was no worse than barbarians of centuries past. 'Civilization' takes a pounding in this book that seems to ignore that there are civilizing forces at work in the world that in the long term improve our lives.
Shellsers More than 1 year ago
It was clear from early on in the book that I would have to be very stoic to get through the descriptions of the horrendous war crimes. This book is very fair to both sides and gives a unique perspective on how easily morality is blurred when engaged in war. This book was heartbreaking and stirred feelings inside of me that I have never felt from any other war account. At the end of the book I felt like I was mourning with the families of those Flyboys who were so brutally murdered. But my tears were also tears of gratitude for these brave boys who were forced to become men at such a young age. I wish I could have known them, and I thank God for them and pray that America will always be worthy of their sacrifice. Every American who is old enough and mature enough to handle the graphic descriptions in this book should read about these heroic men.
During my 18th & 19th years I was what Bradley called, a 'Flyboy'. I read and enjoyed Flags of Our Fathers, as well as Flyboys which I just finished. But I must tell you I am surprised and shocked about how----and mystified by why---- he made such an effort to equate American military actions toward Japan with the brutal treatment, including enslavement,by the Japanese of Allied POWs. In my case, the war was ended----and the killing stopped----just as I was finishing Bombardier School and slated to go to the Pacific in the nose of a B-25. Except for the B-29 battering of Japan by Gen LeMay and the dropping of the A-Bomb----both of which he seems to suggest to be at least quasi-atrocities----I , along with many thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of other teenaged Americans would have become candidates for the same fate as the eight he wrote about. Mr Bradley is obviously a brilliant man and a gifted writer. Hence ----whether he will admit it or not----- he is surely aware of the absurdity of these comparisons. I have searched my mind for a wholesome reason for his actions and I am truly sad to have to say that the only reason that makes any sense (but dubious morality) is that he is pandering to the Japanese market in order to sell books. In doing so he insults the memory of every American who sacrificed so much---many with their very lives----in World War II to preserve his right to do so.
Wow powerful I learned more from this book then all the other books I read combined. What a story I mark dozen of pages so I can go back. A must read for anyonr
A fantastic novel covering multiple stories that keeps your interest.
While the subject matter could have been very interesting and Bradley did approach the subject in new ways, his complete absence of respect for the United States military is appalling. Its one thing to try to see from another point of view, its something completely different to attempt to change recorded history.
Great book. Told a great story and was filled with good facts about the war. Some of the facts are not known by most people, i think. Its a good book goes great with Flags of our Fathers. Its a great read for someone who wants to learn about the war or someone who just wants to read a good book. Not for young kids though, sometimes a little gory and gruesome. All in all a pretty nifty book.
Maybe the best book on WWII I've ever read...very informative...very inspiring...very humbling. My two sons are now 20 and 17. I cannot begin to imagine them going through the hell those boys, and many thousands of other like them, had to go through...for a cause much bigger than themselves...what sacrifice...what loss...what a tremendous loss to their families...they were just boys. The book left me numb and speechless, but it also instilled a deeper appreciation of my freedom earned by the supreme sacrifices of those who went before me. This book touched my every emotion. War should never be portrayed a a glorious event...makes me wonder why a major war zone is refered to a a 'theatre'. Thank you veterans for your hardships endured for those of us who will hopefully never have to experience war...you were just boys...thank you.
While his overall goal is worthy, Bradley's style, inaccuracies, and lack of solid authority make this book more of a miss than a hit. He should have stuck to the basic story of the downed flyers on Chichi Jima, a story which he tells well. The preface, which attempts to explain Japanese-American relations for the past 200 years, is sophomoric and in need of deeper inquiry. The Washington Post review of the book sums it best.
¿Flyboys¿ is an excellently researched and very informative book. The title is somewhat misleading as I was expecting the book to be about the flyers like other books I have read in this genera such as, ¿War¿s End¿ by Charles Sweeny and ¿Flight of the Enola Gay¿ by Paul Tibbets. However I was not disappointed in the story that Mr. Bradley chose to tell. The book begins by illustrating the events that led to war with Japan and the strategical significance of Chichi Jima in that war. This information is interesting but it does make the beginning of the book a little slow. I urge the reader to keep reading, the rest of the book will make the effort worthwhile. Mr. Bradley then introduces the reader to a group of common young men, typical of those who fought and died in WWII. After a short background is established on each he tells their story, and how their story fits with the bigger story of the war. Mr. Bradley has taken a great deal of care to use direct quotes from eyewitnesses to the events wherever possible. His writing style tends to be more of a textbook style than that of a novel, but in doing so he has paid the respect to the events that they deserve, without adding much of his personal feelings about the events. I have known many WWII veterans and several of them were Flyboys, this book accurately portrays what many of them have expressed to me. Parts of this book are disturbing to read, but it will provide the reader with a better understanding of the events leading up to the beginning, and the end of WWII.
Bradley told it as it was!! The brutality of the Japanese captors as well as the ruthless tactics of the Americans. War is a filthy buisness and Bradley detailed it all. I learned a lot about Japan as it evolved towards WWII and what the citzenry endoured. I enjoyed this book cover to cover.
Amazing account of a group of flyboys in the Pacific Theatre during the madness that was the destruction of the war against Japan. Bradley also introduces the fact that the hatred that culminated in Pearl Habor and ultimatley the Atomic Bombs had its beiginnings when Commodore Matthew Perry landed in Japan in 1853, unknowingly bringing an isolationist Japan into the forfront as an industrialized nation. Also, the book refelcts the facts that both governments viewed each other as 'uncivilized barbarians' and pushed these feelings into the minds of the public through propaganda, fueling the hatred. The human element is also brought into the equation from both sides with horrifying accounts from the U.S. fire bombing of Tokyo, which killed 100,000 civilians in one night, to the atrocities Japan brought upon our captured flyboys and other military personnal. Definatley a great read and a lesson for generations to come that war is not as glorious for the winners as well as for the losers.
It's surprising that the man who wrote such a beautiful book as Flags of Our Fathers could turn on the memory of America's honorable military veterans and write a book that equates their actions with the brutality of the Japanese. Mr. Bradley makes no bones about his view that America's military conduct in wars dating to the 19th century is as brutal and illegal as the Axis nations'. Any WW2 vet should be outraged by this moral equivalency. 'Flyboys' insults their memory.
Mr Bradley lived in Japan for a few years and has let his experiences and admiration for the Japanese people color his acceptance of the Japanese Army in WW2. His attempt to justify their actions is hard to take. Please try reading 'The Rape of Nanking' by Iris Chang to get a real picture of the actions of the Japanese Army. Mr. Bradley's father never forgave them for what he saw on Iwo Jima.
I have to say that the book is very powerful that I couldn't put it down after I started to reading. Caution: Chapter 15 is very digusting and I suggest you don't eat while you are reading Chapter 15. Nine young men actually boys left to do their duties only one who came back alive. I can understand why President Bush never stop wondering what jad happened to his friends who never came back alive and how they actually died and etc. I hope that those brave Flyboys are finally at the peace.
dharper1 on LibraryThing More than 1 year ago
Good book, great insight to some of the key events of the Pacific theater during WW2.
DirtPriest on LibraryThing More than 1 year ago
It's pretty rare when the nice lady at your local bookstore (Sleepy Hollow Books in Midland MI) loans you a book that she wants you to read. Joey asked me to read this and I put it off for a while because I knew that there would be alot about the war atrocities on both sides of the Pacific War. I was right. This book tells the long hidden tale of several carrier pilots that were shot down near Chichi Jima and held prisoner on the island. Chichi is the next island after Iwo on the way to Japan. Their few days on the island were not very cool at all. There are similarities with Flags of our Fathers in that the author interviewed many people who knew these airmen when they were alive, but the background depth and set-up is much more extensive. This is to set the stage for explaining the extreme barbarism on both sides of this sad conflict. Bradley goes so far as to describe how the US sent armed warships into Tokyo bay after Japan had closed its borders for over a century to the West, the US invasion of the Phillippines (kill everyone over age ten), and the evolution of the Westernized Japanese military. Oh, and the whole Rape of Nanking thing. Lots of gruesome deeds are described, but as a history buff, sometimes you have to walk through the blood to try and understand why man can be so animalistic to his fellow man. It's actually really outstanding historical writing.
irishliberator on LibraryThing More than 1 year ago
this is a book that has the downfall of great nation
PeterFWarren on LibraryThing More than 1 year ago
Recently read this book and overall I liked it. It revealed the brutality that Japanese soldiers showed to our flyers when they were captured. Our men were decapitated and cannabilized by their capturers. Well written by Bradley and it contained some recently released information that had been kept from the public for years.
ckoller on LibraryThing More than 1 year ago
Terrific story about Flyboys of the pacific theater in WWII. It was a great sotry which incorporated a great amount of resources and information about other aspects of the war. I really loved this book.
lamour on LibraryThing More than 1 year ago
This is more than a description of what happen to eight fliers (including George Bush, Sr.) who were shot down over Chichi Jima in 1945. It is a history of US foreign policy in the Pacific, an analysis of how Japan became militaristic in the early 20th Century and an examination of the Allies war crime trials in Japan.
apelph on LibraryThing More than 1 year ago
I really enjoyed this book, but be warned that it is not a feel-good story, as you might think from the title. The basic story of the 5 downed US pilots is just a vehicle for a very well written look at the atrocities of war and how they came to be. It illustrates very well the moral ambiguity of war, and how ethnic, political, social, and military development of a society can propel individuals who may be either good or evil at baseline to perform horrible acts. I agree with another reviewer that it should be read by mature readers only - I wouldn't want my son to read it until he was in (or already out of) college. I think a person needs to be well secure in the belief that humans are basically good before they read something like this that will severely challenge that belief.
peggyar on LibraryThing More than 1 year ago
An engrossing and sometimes gross story about the Pacific battle against Japan during W.W.II. Gives a lot of insight into the mindset of the Japanese and what led up to the war and the disastrous consequences for all.
large print law
book by james bradley
redirect changing the stories we live
little brown and company book
book by evelyn waugh
book by dean king
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“What good does it do to be able to eat at a lunch counter if you can’t buy a hamburger?”
American minister and civil rights activist Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968), referencing the restaurant sit-ins for civil rights, was reported calling for economic justice in a United Press International (UPI) story at a strike in Atlanta, Georgia, on December 20, 1964:
“Dr. King, who returned here last week after accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Norway, asked, ‘What good does it do a man to have integrated lunch counters if he can’t buy a hamburger?’”
A UPI story published on July 7, 1965, from Petersburg, Virginia, mentioned the “hamburger” saying again:
“‘What does it profit a man to go to an integrated lunch counter without enough money to buy a hamburger?’ he asked.”
Martin Luther King Jr. used the “hamburger” saying a third time, in an economic protest in Washington, DC, as reported in the New York (NY) Times on August 5, 1965:
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was signed into law the next day, on August 6th. King would use the “hamburger” saying right before his death, in Memphis, Tennessee, during a garbage workers strike. The Associated Press reported on March 19, 1968:
“‘But what does it profit a man to be able to eat at an integrated lunch counter if he can’t afford a hamburger and a cup of coffee?’ he asked.”
Wikipedia: Martin Luther King Jr.
Martin Luther King Jr. (born Michael King Jr., January 15, 1929 – April 4, 1968) was an American Baptist minister and activist who was a leader in the Civil Rights Movement. He is best known for his role in the advancement of civil rights using nonviolent civil disobedience based on his Christian beliefs.
21 December 1964, New York (NY) Times, “King Threatens Boycott To Aid Scripto Strikers,” pg. 33, col. 1:
ATLANTA, Dec. 20 (UPI)—The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. said today the “civil rights movement and the labor movement must stick together,” and threatened a national boycott to aid workers striking against an Atlanta concern.
Dr. King, who returned here last week after accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Norway, asked, “What good does it do a man to have integrated lunch counters if he can’t buy a hamburger?”
3 July 1965, Los Angeles (CA) Times, “Dr. King Calls Vietnam Negotiation Essential,” pt. 5, pg. 4, cols. 1-2:
PETERSBURG, Va. (UPI)—Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. said Friday night the United States must negotiate a settlement in Vietnam and announced he was considering joining in peace rallies and teach-ins.
King said the employment section of the civil rights bill would not totally solve the problem. He said civil rights organizations would have to make sure the law was implemented.
“We must get rid of economic injustice,” he said.
“What does it profit a man to go to an integrated lunch counter without enough money to buy a hamburger?” he asked.
5 August 1965, New York (NY) Times, pg. 12, col. 5:
Economic Freedom for Negroes Stressed by Dr. King in Capital
Crowds Hear Leader Proclaim New Cry of Civil Rights Movement, While Urging Home Rule in Washington
Special to The New York Times.
WASHINGTON, Aug. 4—Ignoring Nazi pickets and bomb threats, the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. moved into Washington’s ghettoes today and told crowds of his admirers that economic freedom was the new cry of the civil rights movement.
Speaking at street corner rallies, to an assembly of ministers and in a Virginia suburb, the Southern civil rights leader stressed that “economic freedom” was one of the immediate goals of the Negro revolution.
“What good does it do to be able to eat at a lunch counter if you can’t buy a hamburger?” he asked. “What good is it to live in integrated housing if you can’t afford to take your family on a vacation? Why be able to stay in hotels and restaurants if you don’t have the money to take your wife out to dinner?”
19 March 1968, Cumberland (MD) Evening Times, “Civil Rights Leader Backs Refuse Issue,” pg. 2, col. 3:
MEMPHIS, Tenn. (AP)—Dr. Martin Luther King told striking garbage workers and their supporters Monday night that “genuine equality means economic equality.”
He told the alternatively shouting, applauding audience—a number of white people sprinkled throughout—that civil rights had mainly been won.
“But what does it profit a man to be able to eat at an integrated lunch counter if he can’t afford a hamburger and a cup of coffee?” he asked.
Feeding Texas
@FeedingTexas
“What good is having the right to sit at a lunch counter if you can’t afford to buy a hamburger?”—Martin Luther King, Jr. #hunger #MLK
8:18 AM - 17 Jan 2011
Martin Luther King, Jr.: ‘Our struggle is for genuine equality, which means economic equality’
By Laura Clawson
Monday Jan 21, 2013 · 2:21 PM EST
As Meteor Blades describes, for King, the fight for civil rights didn’t end with black people being allowed to eat at lunch counters without being attacked. It didn’t end with the right to vote (not that voting is by any means an uncontested right today). Time and time again, he made clear that civil rights and labor rights were tightly linked, saying, for instance, to strikers in Memphis, Tennessee, in March 1968:
Now our struggle is for genuine equality, which means economic equality. For we know now, that it isn’t enough to integrate lunch counters. What does it profit a man to be able to eat at an integrated lunch counter if he doesn’t have enough money to buy a hamburger? What does it profit a man to be able to eat at the swankest integrated restaurant when he doesn’t even earn enough money to take his wife out to dine? What does it profit one to have access to the hotels of our cities, and the hotels of our highways, when we don’t earn enough money to take our family on a vacation? What does it profit one to be able to attend an integrated school, when he doesn’t earn enough money to buy his children school clothes?
Aviva Shen
New Orleans-based journalist, focusing on criminal justice.
4 Ways Martin Luther King Was More Radical Than You Thought
2. He was a critic of capitalism and materialism. King was a strident critic of capitalism and materialistic society, and urged Americans to “move toward a democratic socialism.” Referring to the now iconic Greensboro Lunch Counter sit-ins, he asked, “What good is having the right to sit at a lunch counter if you can’t afford to buy a hamburger?”
Occupy Wall Street
@OccupyWallStNYC
“What good is having the right to sit at a lunch counter if you can’t afford to buy a hamburger?” - Martin Luther King Jr
9:52 PM - 16 Aug 2015
Published on Thursday, February 11, 2016 by Common Dreams
Reality Check for Democrats: Would Martin Luther King Be Supporting Bernie?
byJeff Cohen
1965: After passage of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965, King became even more vocal about economic rights: “What good is having the right to sit at a lunch counter if you can’t afford to buy a hamburger?”
Felesia Bowen
@felesiabowen
“What good is it to sit at the lunch counter if you can’t buy a hamburger” Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. #SDOH @PublicHealth @TuskegeeUniv
9:10 PM - 15 Nov 2016 from Jackson, NJ
New York City • Government/Law/Politics/Military • Sunday, May 28, 2017 • Permalink
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Aryabhatta (476–550 CE) was the first of the major mathematician-astronomers from the classical age of Indian mathematics and Indian astronomy.
His works include the Āryabhaṭīya (499 CE, when he was 23 years old) and the Arya-siddhanta.
He was born in 476 CE in Bihar. He studied at the University of Nalanda. He flourished in Kusumapura—near Patalipurta (Patna), then the capital of the Gupta dynasty.
GREATEST MATHEMATICIAN
Aryabhata mentions in the Aryabhatiya that it was composed 3,600 years into the Kali Yuga, when he was 23 years old. This corresponds to 499 CE, and implies that he was born in 476.
Bhāskara I describes Aryabhata as āśmakīya, “one belonging to the Aśmaka country.
It is fairly certain that, at some point, he went to Kusumapura for advanced studies and lived there for some time. Both Hindu and Buddhist tradition, as well as Bhāskara I (CE 629), identify Kusumapura as Pāṭaliputra, modern Patna.
A verse mentions that Aryabhata was the head of an institution (kulapa) at Kusumapura, and, because the university of Nalanda was in Pataliputra at the time and had an astronomical observatory, it is speculated that Aryabhata might have been the head of the Nalanda university as well.
Aryabhata is the author of several treatises on mathematics and astronomy, some of which are lost.
His major work, Aryabhatiya, a compendium of mathematics and astronomy, was extensively referred to in the Indian mathematical literature and has survived to modern times.
The mathematical part of the Aryabhatiya covers arithmetic, algebra, plane trigonometry, and spherical trigonometry. It also contains continued fractions, quadratic equations, sums-of-power series, and a table of sines.
The Arya-siddhanta, a lost work on astronomical computations, is known through the writings of Aryabhata’s contemporary.It contained a description of several astronomical instruments.
A third text, which may have survived in the Arabic translation, is Al ntf or Al-nanf. It claims that it is a translation by Aryabhata, but the Sanskrit name of this work is not known.
ARYABHATIYA
It is written in style typical of sutra literature, in which each line is an aid to memory for a complex system. The text consists of the 108 verses and 13 introductory verses, and is divided into four pādas or chapters:
Gitikapada: (13 verses): large units of time.There is also a table of sines (jya), given in a single verse. The duration of the planetary revolutions during a mahayuga is given as 4.32 million years.
Ganitapada (33 verses): covering mensuration (kṣetra vyāvahāra), arithmetic and geometric progressions, simple, quadratic, simultaneous, and indeterminate equations (kuṭṭaka).
Kalakriyapada (25 verses): different units of time and a method for determining the positions of planets for a given day.
Golapada (50 verses): Geometric/trigonometric aspects of the celestial sphere, features of the ecliptic, celestial equator, node, shape of the earth, cause of day and night, rising of zodiacal signs on horizon, etc
FOUNDATION OF MATHEMATICS
Place value system and zero
Approximation of π – This implies that the ratio of the circumference to the diameter is ((4 + 100) × 8 + 62000)/20000 = 62832/20000 = 3.1416, which is accurate to five significant figures.
Trigonometry In Ganitapada 6, Aryabhata gives the area of a triangle
Indeterminate equations
Astronomy,eclipses,heliocentrism, Sidereal periods
In 1960, he suffered a heart attack. He was treated by top doctors in India, including his friend Dr Bidhan Chandra Roy, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal.
His health started deteriorating and he died on 7 March 1961 at the age of 74, from a cerebral stroke. At that time he was still in office as the Home Minister of India.
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Home Businesses urged to Vote ‘YES’ for Blackburn BID
Businesses urged to Vote ‘YES’ for Blackburn BID
4th October 2018 5th June 2019 , Business News & Events, News
Blackburn town centre businesses are being urged to vote ‘YES’ for a new term for Blackburn Business Improvement District (BID).
The Blackburn BID comes to the end of its first five-year term at the end of 2018 and voting papers for a new term to run from 2019 are currently being delivered to around 350 town centre businesses.
The Blackburn BID, which is funded directly by town centre businesses, has delivered a diverse range of projects for the town over the last five years from award winning events to improvements to the safety and security of the town centre.
Events and Marketing
Blackburn BID has been at the forefront of creating and delivering innovative events in Blackburn. Visitors from across the region have enjoyed events such as Blackburn Heritage Festival, Countryside Comes to Town and The Blackburn Vintage Carnival. The BID has delivered over 25 events and campaigns and supported key events such as The Blackburn Cathedral Flower Festival and The National Festival of Making.
Last year saw a Blackburn Magazine delivered to thousands of addresses across Lancashire and this year an exciting Christmas programme of events is planned to include a four-week Christmas Market.
The BID is conscious that being safe when you visit Blackburn is very important and over the last five years have funded town centre PCSOs, installed new CCTV cameras as well as joined up the town’s cameras. Support for Blackburn Business Against Crime and radios for retailers has also been funded by the BID.
Cleaner & Greener
Visitors could not fail to have noticed the spectacular floral displays in Blackburn and these have been as a direct result of a partnership between the BID and Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council. The town has been the proud recipient of national and regional gold medals from the RHS Britain in Bloom Campaign.
In 2016, Blackburn was named Great British High Street of the Year in a national competition that saw Blackburn beat over 900 entries. The judges praised the positive partnerships between the BID, the Council, Blackburn College and The Mall in forging great strides towards making Blackburn Town Centre a better place to do business.
These are just a few examples of the initiatives that the BID has made possible and businesses are being urged to read the full Business Plan for 2019 – 2023 which outlines more of these achievements as well as laying out plans for five more years of investment. Businesses are reminded that without a majority ‘YES’ vote the BID and all their initiatives will end.
Nicola Clayton, Chair of Blackburn BID, said, “We are urging every business in the town centre to vote ‘YES’ for a new term for the BID. Blackburn BID has demonstrated that we can make a positive impact on our town centre and without the BID our vibrant programme of events and marketing, safety initiatives and environmental improvements will end. A ‘YES’ vote will ensure we can continue the work on behalf of the town centre businesses.”
Phil Riley, Executive Member for Regeneration at Blackburn with Darwen Council said, “All the major town centre stakeholders pulling together has been a key component in winning awards like the Great British High Street and in the ongoing regeneration of Blackburn town centre and the Blackburn BID has played a vital role in bringing local businesses together to take part in that work. It is vital that the BID receives a strong ‘YES’ vote in this month’s election so that this sense of positivity can continue and grow.”
Loraine Jones, General Manager of The Mall Blackburn, added, “As General Manager of The Mall, we have worked in partnership with the BID over the last five years on a range of successful initiatives including events, marketing, security and, of course, Christmas. We are supporting the renewal of the BID, as we need to continue to make Blackburn a more attractive and safer place for people to visit and continue to change perceptions to a wider audience.”
The voting process has now begun and businesses, who are eligible to vote, will receive ballot papers by post. The election is conducted by Electoral Reform Services. Businesses have until the 2nd November 2018 to return their ballot papers and the result will be announced in early November.
To find out more about the Business Plans for 2019 -2023 visit the Blackburn BID website www.blackburnbid.co.uk or email info@blackburnbid.co.uk
Support the YES Vote with our Digital AssetsThe BID Highlights their Events and Campaigns
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US8725241B2 - Visualization of physiological data for virtual electrodes - Google Patents
Visualization of physiological data for virtual electrodes Download PDF
surface region
graphical representation
Charulatha Ramanathan
Harold M. Wodlinger
Ping Jia
Harris Gasparakis
John E. Anderson
Steven G. Arless
Cardioinsight Technologies Inc
2009-11-09 Application filed by Cardioinsight Technologies Inc filed Critical Cardioinsight Technologies Inc
2011-08-23 Assigned to CARDIOINSIGHT TECHNOLOGIES, INC. reassignment CARDIOINSIGHT TECHNOLOGIES, INC. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: RAMANATHAN, CHARULATHA, ANDERSON, JOHN E., ARLESS, STEVEN G., PING, JIA, WODLINGER, HAROLD M., GASPARAKIS, HARRIS
A61B5/0402—Electrocardiography, i.e. ECG
A61B5/042—Electrodes specially adapted therefor for introducing into the body
A61B5/04021—ECG simulator circuits
G16—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR SPECIFIC APPLICATION FIELDS
G16H—HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, i.e. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR THE HANDLING OR PROCESSING OF MEDICAL OR HEALTHCARE DATA
G16H40/00—ICT specially adapted for the management or administration of healthcare resources or facilities; ICT specially adapted for the management or operation of medical equipment or devices
G16H40/60—ICT specially adapted for the management or administration of healthcare resources or facilities; ICT specially adapted for the management or operation of medical equipment or devices for the operation of medical equipment or devices
G16H40/63—ICT specially adapted for the management or administration of healthcare resources or facilities; ICT specially adapted for the management or operation of medical equipment or devices for the operation of medical equipment or devices for local operation
G16H50/00—ICT specially adapted for medical diagnosis, medical simulation or medical data mining; ICT specially adapted for detecting, monitoring or modelling epidemics or pandemics
G16H50/50—ICT specially adapted for medical diagnosis, medical simulation or medical data mining; ICT specially adapted for detecting, monitoring or modelling epidemics or pandemics for simulation or modelling of medical disorders
A61B2018/00839—Bioelectrical parameters, e.g. ECG, EEG
Systems and methods can be utilized to visualize physiological data relative to a surface region (e.g., an organ) of a patient. A computer-implemented method can include storing electroanatomic data in memory representing electrical activity for a predetermined surface region of the patient and providing an interactive graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient. A user input is received to define location data corresponding to a user-selected location for at least one virtual electrode on the graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient. A visual representation of physiological data for the predetermined surface region of the patient is generated based on the location data and the electroanatomic data.
This application is a U.S. national stage entry under 35 U.S.C. 371 of International Application No. PCT/US2009/063737, which claims priority to claims benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/112,494, which was filed on Nov. 7, 2008, and entitled VISUALIZATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA FOR VIRTUAL ELECTRODES. The entire contents of each of the above-identified applications is incorporated herein by reference.
The invention relates generally to systems and methods for visualizing physiological data for a surface region of a patient.
Various electrophysiology techniques have been developed for collecting electrophysiology data for a patient. Direct measurement techniques typically involve placing one or more electrodes into contact with biological tissue. For example, an electrophysiology catheter or probe contains one or more electrodes at its distal end, each electrode being able to record electrical activity at the location of said electrode. Thus, by placing the catheter at a particular location relative to a patient's organ, such as the heart, organ-specific electrical activity can be recorded. Signal processing, such as band-pass filtering, can be applied on any such signal to remove noise or otherwise enhance the recorded activity.
As a further example, catheters come in a variety of shapes and with a different number of electrodes (2, 4, 8 etc). Linear catheters are typically used to inspect the progression of the depolarization wave along the anatomy, and they are typically placed in well defined locations: The high right atrial (HRA) catheter monitors the progression of depolarization as it (typically) emanates from the sinoatrial (SA) node; the His catheter monitors progression of depolarization from the atria to the ventricles (typically through the His bundle); etc. A circular multipolar catheter may be placed proximal to or around a pulmonary vein to measure depolarization emanating from the pulmonary vein. Multi-electrode basket catheters may be placed in a chamber, and wholesale collect a plurality of data.
Electroanatomic electrophysiology mapping is a method by which acquired electrophysiology data is spatially depicted on a representation of an organ or body surface, which representation may be referred to as an “Electroanatomic Map”. Examples of Electroanatomic Maps include the spatial depiction of cardiac activation time (also referred to as an isochrone map) or potential distribution on the cardiac surface, possibly as a function of time (potential map). Electroanatomic maps may also depict derived quantities, such as frequency domain analysis (e.g., dominant frequency distributions), cycle length maps, complex fractionated atrial electrogram (CFAE) distributions, regularity index distributions, as well as spatial correlation measures in either the time or frequency domain.
The invention relates generally to systems and methods for visualizing physiological data for a surface region of a patient, such as a surface of an organ.
One aspect of the invention provides a computer-implemented method that includes storing electroanatomic data in memory representing electrical activity for a predetermined surface region of the patient and providing an interactive graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient. A user input is received to define location data corresponding to a user-selected location for at least one virtual electrode on the graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient. A visual representation of physiological data for the predetermined surface region of the patient is generated based on the location data and the electroanatomic data.
Another aspect of the invention provides a system for visualizing physiological data relative to an organ of a patient. The system includes electroanatomic data for the patient stored in memory. A patient geometry model is stored as patient geometry data in the memory. The patient geometry data representing at least one surface region of the organ of the patient. A location selector is programmed to generate location data in response to a user input corresponding to a user-selected virtual electrode location positioned relative to the patient geometry model. An output generator that generates a visual representation of physiological data for the virtual electrode that is determined as a function of the location data and the electroanatomic data.
FIG. 1 depicts a block diagram of a system for visualizing physiological data in accordance with an aspect of the invention.
FIG. 2 depicts a block diagram of a system for visualizing physiological data for one or more virtual electrodes in accordance with another aspect of the invention.
FIG. 3 depicts an example of a GUI that can be implemented for use in conjunction with performing preprocessing in a visualization system according to an aspect of the invention.
FIG. 4 depicts an example of a graphical user interface for a visualization system that employs virtual electrodes in accordance with an aspect of the invention.
FIG. 5 depicts an example block diagram of user interface controls that can be utilized for configuring a virtual electrode from a predefined arrangement of electrodes in accordance with an aspect of the invention.
FIG. 6 depicts an example block diagram of user interface controls that can be utilized for configuring a virtual electrode in accordance with an aspect of the invention.
FIG. 7 depicts an example of a block diagram of controls and associated methods that can be utilized for configuring virtual electrodes in accordance with an aspect of the invention.
FIG. 8 depicts an example of a graphical user interface for a visualization system that implementing a roving virtual electrode in accordance with an aspect of the invention.
FIG. 9 depicts an example of a graphical user interface for a visualization system implementing a multi-pole virtual electrode on the coronary sinus in accordance with an aspect of the invention.
FIG. 10 depicts an example of a graphical user interface for a visualization system implementing another embodiment of a multi-pole ring virtual electrode around the pulmonary vein in accordance with an aspect of the invention.
FIG. 11 depicts an example of a graphical user interface for a visualization system illustrating frequency information that can be implemented in accordance with an aspect of the invention.
FIG. 12 depicts an example of a graphical user interface for a visualization system illustrating region of interest analysis that can be implemented in accordance with an aspect of the invention.
FIG. 13 depicts an example of a computer operating environment that can implement systems and methods according to an aspect of the invention.
This invention relates generally to a system and method for visualization of electrical data for one or more virtual electrode. Electroanatomic data for a surface region of the patient is stored in memory. A user can select a location for one or more virtual electrode on a representation of a surface region of the patient (e.g., represented graphically as a surface model of an organ, such as the heart). A corresponding visual representation of physiological data for the surface region is generated based on the selected location and the electroanatomic data. The visual representation of physiological data can be generated in a separate window or superimposed on or be rendered near the representation of a surface region of the patient. For the example context of electrocardiographic imaging, the visual representation for each selected virtual electrode location can be in the form of one or more of a voltage potential, power spectrum (amplitude vs. frequency), unipolar electrograms, bipolar electrograms, statistical information, cycle length, synchrony index, conduction velocity or the like.
As used herein, the term “virtual” in the context of electrodes or other selected anatomical locations means that the selected location or structure is not a physical electrode construction, but instead is parameterized by data (e.g., as mathematical model) at a point, a collection of points or a surface region that is selected by a user. The resulting visual representation of the physiological data for a given virtual electrode thus can represent electrophysiology data that has been acquired, that has been computed or a combination of acquired and computed data for a set of one or more geometrical points associated with a surface region of the patient.
Those skilled in the art will appreciate that portions of the invention may be embodied as a method, data processing system, or computer program product. Accordingly, these portions of the invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Furthermore, portions of the invention may be a computer program product on a computer-usable storage medium having computer readable program code on the medium. Any suitable computer-readable medium may be utilized including, but not limited to, static and dynamic storage devices, hard disks, optical storage devices, and magnetic storage devices.
Certain embodiments of the invention are described herein with reference to flowchart illustrations of methods, systems, and computer program products. It will be understood that blocks of the illustrations, and combinations of blocks in the illustrations, can be implemented by computer-executable instructions. These computer-executable instructions may be provided to one or more processors of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus (or a combination of devices and circuits) to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor, implement the functions specified in the block or blocks.
These computer-executable instructions may also be stored in computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory result in an article of manufacture including instructions which implement the function specified in the flowchart block or blocks. The computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus (see, e.g., FIG. 13) to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart block or blocks.
FIG. 1 depicts an example of a system 10 for visualizing physiological data of a patient. The system 10 can be implemented in a standalone computer, a workstation, an application specific machine, or in a network environment in which one or more of the modules or data can reside locally or remotely relative to where a user interacts with the system 10.
The system 10 employs electroanatomic data 12 for a patient, such as can be stored in an associated memory device (e.g., locally or remotely). For instance, the electroanatomic data 12 can represent electrical information for a plurality of points, each of which is indexed or otherwise associated with an anatomical geometry of the patient, such as can be embodied as a patient geometry model 14. In one embodiment, the patient geometry model can be a surface of model of a patient's organ, such as the heart, which can be graphically rendered a two- or three-dimensional representation.
The patient electroanatomic data 12 can be raw data, such as has been collected from an electrophysiology mapping catheter or other means that can be utilized to gather electrophysiology data for a selected region of a patient (e.g., of an organ, such as the heart). Additionally or alternatively, the electroanatomic data 12 can correspond to processed data, such as can be computed from raw data to provide electrophysiology information for the selected region of the patient (e.g., a surface of an organ, such as the heart).
By way of example, a contact or non-contact electrophysiology catheter can be placed in a patient's heart and collect electrophysiology data at a plurality of spatial locations over time, such as during a number of one or more cardiac intervals. Such data can be spatially and temporarily aggregated in conjunction with image data for the patient's heart to provide the electroanatomic data 12 for the patient's heart. Alternatively, other devices (e.g., catheters or patches) can be placed on or near a patient's heart, endocardially and/or epicardially, such as during open chest and minimally invasive procedures, to record electrical activity data, which can be mapped to a representation of the patient's heart to provide similar corresponding electroanatomic data.
As another example, non-invasive electrophysiological mapping (e.g., electrocardiographic imaging for the heart) can be performed on the patient to generate the electroanatomic surface data 12. This technique can generate electrophysiological data by combining body surface electrical measurements with patient geometry information through an inverse method programmed to reconstruct the electrical activity for a predetermined surface region of the patient's organ. Thus the results of the inverse method can provide the corresponding electroanatomic data 12 that is registered with (or indexed) relative to patient geometry model 14.
Those skilled in the art will understand and appreciate that the system 10 is equally applicable to patient electroanatomic data 12 that can be gathered and/or derived by any of these or other approaches, which may be invasive or non-invasive. Additionally, it will be understood and appreciated that the electroanatomic data 12 can be provided in any form and converted into an appropriate form for processing in the system 10.
In addition to the patient electroanatomic data 12 related to the patient's organ, the system 10 also employs a patient geometry model 14, such as can represent a predetermined surface region of an anatomical structure. For example, the patient geometry model 14 can correspond to a patient-specific representation of a surface of an organ or other structure to which the patient electroanatomical data has been registered. For instance, the patient geometry model 14 may be in the form of a graphical representation of a region of the patient's organ, such as can be generated by appropriate imaging processing of image data acquired for the patient. Such image processing can include extraction and segmentation of an organ from a digital image set. The segmented image data thus can be converted into a two-dimensional or three-dimensional graphical representation of a surface region of the patient's organ. Alternatively, the patient geometry model 14 can correspond to a mathematical model of the patient's organ that has been constructed based on image data for the patient's organ. Appropriate anatomical or other landmarks can be associated with the organ represented by the anatomical data for the organ to facilitate subsequent processing and visualization in the system 10.
As mentioned above, the electroanatomic data 12 can be registered into a common coordinate system with the patient geometry model 14. For instance, the electroanatomic data 12 can be stored in a data structure of rows (corresponding to different anatomical points) and columns (corresponding to samples) in which the rows of data have the same index as (or are registered to) respective points residing on patient geometry model 14. This registration or indexed relationship between the electrical data 12 and the patient geometry model 14 is indicated by a dashed line at 16. In one embodiment the samples in each of the columns can represent simultaneous information across the entire surface region (e.g., the heart) of the patient.
The patient geometry model 14 can be generated from image data that is acquired using nearly any imaging modality. Examples of imaging modalities include ultrasound, computed tomography (CT), 3D Rotational angiography (3DRA), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), x-ray, positron emission tomography (PET), and the like. Such imaging can be performed separately (e.g., before or after the measurements) utilized to generate the electroanatomic data 12. Alternatively, imaging may be performed concurrently with recording the electrical activity that is utilized to generate the patient electroanatomic data 12 or the imaging. It will be understood and appreciated by those skilled in the art that the system 10 is equally applicable to employ anatomical data that may be acquired by any one of these or other imaging modalities.
Alternatively or additionally, the patient geometry model 14 can correspond to a generic or custom representation of an organ, which may not be the patient's own organ. In such a case, the electroanatomic data 12 can be mapped (via registration 16) to the representation of the organ according to identified anatomical landmarks. A manual, semi-automatic or automatic registration process can be employed in order to register the anatomical model with the signal acquisition system, if any.
It further will be understood and appreciated that depending upon the format and type of input data appropriate formatting and conversion to a corresponding type of representation can be implemented by the system 10. For instance, the patient electrical data 16 and anatomical data 18 can be provided to the system 10 in a known format or be converted to a standard format for processing by the system. As a further example, the electrical data 16 and the anatomical data 18 can be combined to provide an aggregate set of electroanatomical data for the patient.
The system 10 also includes a location selector 18 that is programmed to select a location on a graphical representation of the patient geometry model 14. The selected location is translated to location data 20. The location data 20 can correspond to a three-dimensional position in a coordinate system that is associated with the patient geometry model 14. As an example, a user can employ a cursor via a pointing device (e.g., a mouse) to identify and select a location on the two-dimensional graphical representation of the patient geometry model 14. The 2-D screen location can be translated to a corresponding 3-D position on the model 14 according to the selected location.
An output generator 22 is programmed to generate a visual representation 24 of physiological data based on the location data 20 and the electroanatomic data 12. If the selected location does not correspond exactly to location at which physiological data had been acquired or derived for the electroanatomic data, the output generator can locate a nearest point (or points) from which the desired physiological data can be determined.
The output generator 22 can be programmed to provide a variety of different types and formats of physiological information. For example, the information can be in the form of graphs, text or numerical values, which can be provided in separate windows adjacent to the graphical representation of the patient geometry model 14. Additionally or alternatively, the output generator 22 can provide a visual representation (e.g., in the form of a graph or numerical value that is rendered as an object graphically superimposed relative to the graphical representation of the patient geometry model 14, indicated by arrow 26.
The output generator 22 can be programmed to provide any number of one or more visual representations 24 of physiological data such as in response to a user selecting one or more virtual electrode locations on the patient geometry model 14. In one operating mode (referred to herein as a roving virtual electrode mode or a roving mode) the output generator 22 can provide the visual representation 24 (e.g., in the form of an electrogram or power spectrum or otherwise) that is superimposed on the graphical representation of the geometry model 14 at or near the current location of the cursor. For example, as a user moves the cursor relative to the representation of the surface model 14 on the display, a corresponding visual representation for the virtual electrode is continuously displayed at or near the current cursor location. Thus, the information presented in a visual representation for a roving virtual electrode changes as a function of the position of the cursor on the anatomical model 14. The output generator 22 can also include controls to allow a user to pin or fix the corresponding visual representation at a desired current location through activation of a suitable user interface element (e.g., context menu or the like).
FIG. 2 depicts an example of another system 50 for visualizing physiological data for a patient. In the example of FIG. 2, features of the system 50 for performing preprocessing as well as analysis and generation of visual representations are depicted. The preprocessing portions of the system 50 can be utilized to preprocess and convert the data to an appropriate form for an appropriate time interval such as can include one or more beats. The system 50 includes a preprocessing graphical user interface (GUI) 52 that is responsive to user inputs. The preprocessing GUI 52 can include a plurality of selection mechanisms each of which can activate corresponding preprocessing methods 54.
In the example of FIG. 2, the preprocessing GUI 52 includes an interval selector 56 that can be utilized to select one or more time intervals that may be of interest to the user. For example of electrocardiographic analysis, the intervals can correspond to beats or cardiac cycles any user defined time interval (e.g., a portion of one or more cycles) over which electrical data 58 has been acquired.
As described herein with respect to FIG. 1, the patient electrical data can be acquired by various techniques, including invasive as well as non-invasive approaches. Thus, the patient electrical data 58 can correspond to substantially raw data that has been acquired for the patient, such as representing signals acquired for each of a plurality of electrodes.
The preprocessing GUI 52 can also include an electrode selector 60 that is utilized to select which electrode or electrodes are to be utilized to populate an output result set for use in further processing and analysis. The electrode selection can be automated, manual or a combination of manual and automated. The electrode selector 60 can be provided via a GUI that allows a user to selectively enable or disable each of the plurality of electrodes that have been utilized to acquire patient electrical data at a corresponding anatomic location. As an example, a plurality of electrodes can be distributed over a patient's torso for acquiring electrical information during a sampling period. Thus, the electrode selector can be employed to set which sensor or sensors will be utilized to acquire and define the subset of the patient electrical data 58. Automated methods can also be utilized to detect and remove bad channels.
The preprocessing GUI 52 can also include a filter selector 62 that can be utilized to select one or more preprocessing filters 64 for the selected set of patient electrical data 58. The preprocessing filters, for example, can include software methods programmed to filter the electrical data 58, such as including a low pass filter, DC removal filter, a de-trending filter, or a Wilson Central Terminal (WCT) filter. Those skilled in the art will understand and appreciate other types of filters 64 that can be selectively activated or deactivated via the filter selector 62.
As the filters are turned on or off or otherwise adjusted (parametrically), the filter methods 64 can be applied to the electrical data 58 and generate a corresponding filtered set of the patient electrical data (as also may be reduced according to the selected interval(s) and the electrodes that has been selected). After the filtering, electrode/channel selection and time interval selection have been implemented, the preprocessing GUI 52 (or other means or activation) can be utilized to activate an inverse method 66, such as described herein. The inverse method 66 utilizes geometry data 68 along with the modified patient electrode data (for the selected time interval, selected channels and filtered) to generate corresponding electrical anatomic surface data 70. The electroanatomic data 70 is indexed or registered relative to predefined surface region of a patient, such as an epicardial surface or an endocardial surface of a patient's heart.
Examples of inverse methods suitable for use with body surface electrodes are disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 6,772,004, entitled System and Method for Non-invasive Electrocardiographic Imaging and U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/996,441, (now U.S. Pat. No. 7,983,743) entitled System and Method for Non-invasive Electrocardiographic Imaging, both of which are incorporated herein by reference. It will be appreciated that other approaches can be utilized to generate the electroanatomic data, which further may vary according to the mechanism utilized to acquire the patient electrical data 58.
FIG. 3 depicts an example of a portion of a pre-processing GUI 30 that can be implemented for the system 50 of FIG. 2. The preprocessing GUI 30 includes interval selection and filter selection GUI elements. In the example of FIG. 3, an interval is shown by calipers 32 and 34 in the waveform window 36. While two waveforms are illustrated in the window 36 in this example, those skilled in the art will appreciate and understand that any number of such waveforms can be depicted in the GUI 30 and that the number of waveforms can be selected by the user. The interval calipers 32 and 34 can be initially positioned at a given location in the waveform window 36, such as in response to activating an interval selection user interface element. A user can adjust the caliper positions via a cursor (or other pointing element) 38. Thus, by adjusting the distance between the respective calipers 32 and 34 a desired interval or beat can be selected by the user for further processing as described herein. While a single interval is illustrated in FIG. 3 by calipers 32 and 34, it is to be understood and appreciated that any number of one or more such intervals can be selected, for additional types of processing.
Also depicted in FIG. 3 are filter selection GUI elements 40, such as corresponding to the filter selector 62 of FIG. 2. In the example of FIG. 3, various types of corrections and filtering can be selectively performed on patient electrical data, including are the WCT reference filter, low pass filtering, DC removal filter, de-trending filter, a high pass filter and baseline drift correction.
Additionally, bad channel correction may be implemented via GUI elements 42, such as if data appears outside of expected operating parameters. The bad channel correction GUI elements 42 can be activated to implement an automatic method that detects and selects waveforms determined to correspond to bad channels (or bad electrodes). Additionally, waveforms can be selected manually from the corresponding graphical waveform window 44 if they appear anomalous relative to the other waveforms. Those skilled in the art will appreciate various approaches that can be implemented to remove the anomalies or bad channels can be removed from the sensor data.
Returning to FIG. 2, the visualization system 50 also includes analysis methods 72 that are programmed to provide results data for generating a representation 74 of physiological data relating to the patient's organ. The representation 74 can be generated based the electroanatomic data 70 for the patient. The representation 74 may include graphics, text information, or a combination of graphics and text. It will be appreciated that the representation 74 provided by the system 50 is not limited to quantities actually measured or otherwise provided in the electroanatomic data 70, but can also correspond to electrophysiology data for a one or more virtual electrodes as may be selectively positioned by a user.
The analysis methods 72 can provide results data to an output generator 76 based on parameters established by a user, or preconfigured either by physician preferences possibly per procedure type. The output generator 76 is programmed to provide the representation(s) 74 in one or more forms, which can vary depending on the type of data being displayed.
As one example, the output generator 76 includes a virtual electrode (VE) generator 78 for providing the visual representation 74 responsive to a user selecting one or more locations in a predetermined surface region of a patient. Each selected location can correspond to a location in a coordinate system that can be defined or represented by the geometry data 68. For instance by selecting a location in a patient geometry coordinate system, corresponding electrical information in the electroanatomic data 70 for the nearest geometrical point (or a collection of nearest points) can be utilized by the analysis methods 72 to provide the results. The virtual electrode generator 78 in turn generates the corresponding representation of physiological data from the results of the analysis.
The representations 74 provided by the virtual electrode generator 78 can be considered spatially localized in response to a user selection, such as for providing data at a selected point (in the case of each single point virtual electrode) as well as along a plurality of user-selected locations corresponding to a multi-point or multi-dimensional virtual electrode. The representation of physiological data 74 generated for each virtual electrode can be in the form of graph, text/numerical information or a combination of graphs and text/numerical information. Any number of one or more representations can be generated for each virtual electrode.
The output generator 76 also includes a map generator 80 that is programmed for generating physiological data in the form of an electroanatomic map that is superimposed over the predetermined surface region of the patient's organ. For example, the map generator 80 can render one or more maps over the entire surface representation of the patient's organ, such as can be a two-dimensional or three-dimensional representation thereof. For instance, the map generator 80 can be programmable in response to a user-selection (e.g., via drop down context menu) to select which type of electroanatomic map will be generated.
The output generator 76 can provide the representation 74 as including information similar to that which might be generated based on electroanatomic data 70 provided according to any of the mechanisms described herein, including temporal and spatial characteristics that can be determined from acquired patient electrical data. As described herein, however, the system 50 enables the user to define a configuration of one or more virtual electrodes of a defined type and a location of such catheter(s) relative to the organ for which the representation 74 will be generated.
Additionally or alternatively, the configuration and placement of the virtual electrodes can be automatically selected by the analysis methods 72, such as to place an arrangement of one or more virtual electrodes at desired anatomic locations (e.g., landmarks), which can be defined by user-defined parameters. The user can also set parameters and properties to define what type of output or outputs the representation 74 will include. Thus, once the electrophysiology data has been acquired for a patient (using any technique) and stored in memory as the electroanatomic data 70, a user can employ the system 50 to virtualize physiological data of interest for the patient's organ. These results can be accomplished without requiring the user of the system 50 to actually acquire any new electrophysiology data from the patient. Thus, the system 50 can be a powerful addition to existing electrophysiology systems as well as can be utilized as a standalone system.
The system 50 includes an analysis user interface GUI 82 that is programmed to provide a human-machine interface for controlling and activating the analysis methods 72. A user can employ the GUI 82 via a user input device (e.g., a mouse, keyboard, touch screen or the like) to enter user inputs to set parameters and variables as well as to control display techniques and algorithms utilized by the analysis methods 72.
The user interface 82 can include a configuration component 84 that is utilized to define a configuration and arrangement of one or more electrodes for which one or more of the resulting representations 74 will be constructed. For example, the configuration component 84 can provide the user with an electrode configuration data set that includes a plurality of predefined electrode types. The predefined electrode configurations can correspond to any number of one or more electrophysiology catheters, which may correspond to commercially available products. For example, the predefined electrode configurations can correspond to any number of one or more electrode configurations that have been previously defined or constructed by a user or otherwise stored in memory as a library of available virtual electrode configurations. As described herein, the available electrode configurations can range from a single electrode (corresponding to a single point) or a linear arrangement of electrodes (such as disposed along a catheter or probe), two-dimensional (e.g., a patch or surface configuration) or three-dimensional electrode configurations (e.g., representing a volumetric arrangement of electrodes). These and other virtual electrode structures can be defined via the electrode configuration component 84. A user can also specify the number of electrodes and spatial distribution of such electrodes for a given configuration. As an example, a single electrode may be defined as a default setting for a virtual electrode, which can be modified to a different configuration via the configuration GUI 84.
The user interface 82 also includes a location selection component 86. The location selection component 86 can be utilized to identify one or more locations at which the selected electrode configuration (e.g., comprising one or more electrodes) is to be positioned relative to the patient's organ. For example, the location selection component 86 can employ a GUI element, such as a cursor, that a user can position with a pointing device (e.g., a mouse, touch screen and the like) to select a corresponding anatomical location on a graphical depiction of the patient's geometry. For example, the location can be on a selected surface region of an organ, in the organ or proximal to the organ. As described above, the representation 74 can be generated for the selected location based on the location data, electroanatomic data 70 for a given virtual electrode configuration.
As an example, in response to the user input, the location selection component 86 can cause a graphical representation of the selected electrode configuration (e.g., a single virtual electrode or an arrangement virtual electrodes, such as in the form of a catheter, a patch or other type electrophysiology measuring device) to be positioned at the selected location. The location selection component 86 can also be utilized to adjust the orientation (e.g., rotate) and position of the selected electrode structure relative to a two-dimensional or three-dimensional coordinate system for an anatomical model of the patient's organ. That is, as described herein, the selected location of a cursor on an image can be translated to a position (e.g., in a three dimensional coordinate system) relative to known patient geometry. Additionally or alternatively, the location selection component 86 can provide a list of one or more predefined common anatomical locations. The common locations can be programmable and include user-defined locations as well as those known in the art to be useful locations for visualizing electrical activity for the organ.
As a further example, in situations where a user is to define the virtual electrode configuration as a catheter having a single electrode or having a plurality of electrodes, the location selection component 86 can be utilized to identify a location at which the catheter is to be positioned. In response to the user identifying the location, the identified location can be populated with a graphical representation of the virtual electrode structure superimposed over the graphical representation of the interactive surface region of patient anatomy. Additionally or alternatively, the cursor itself can also take on the form of the selected virtual electrode construct, such as while it moves across a window in which the organ model is being displayed.
In addition to selecting a desired location at which a virtual electrode is to be positioned, the location selection GUI 86 can provide means for a user to draw a contour or a closed surface at a desired location on the graphical representation of the patient's organ (e.g., on the left ventricle of the heart). The resulting contour or closed surface can identify a corresponding path or boundary for a virtual electrode structure. For a contour, the length of the contour can be automatically populated with an arrangement of virtual electrodes. Similarly, an interior of the patch boundary can be automatically populated with an arrangement of electrodes. The spatial distribution and number of electrodes can be specified by the user (via the electrode configuration component 84). The arrangement and spatial distribution of electrodes for a given configuration can be uniform (e.g., as a default setting) or it may be non-uniform, as programmed by a user.
The user interface 82 can also include an output control component 88 that is utilized to set output parameters and properties for each representation 74 that is generated. The output control component 88 can be utilized to select one or more measured or derived electrophysiology parameters that can be provided as part of the representation 74 based on the electrode configuration data and location data for each virtual electrode electrode configuration. The output control 88 can be programmed to provide the employ the same algorithm for each virtual electrode or, alternatively, different algorithms or constraints can be defined for each virtual electrode. The results set for the selected output control can include electrical potentials (e.g., unipolar or bipolar electrograms, activation times, frequency information (e.g., power spectrum), and statistics relating to these as well other derived quantities.
Another application of the output control component 88 can be to selectively swap electrode configurations for comparative purposes. For example, the output control component 88, individually or in combination with the electrode configuration component 84, can be employed to add or remove as well as to reposition two or more selected catheters relative to the representation of the patient's organ to modify the results provided in the output representation 74.
The output control 88 further may be utilized to implement comparative functions between algorithms, between temporal sets of different electrophysiology data or to otherwise constrain the resulting output data that is to be visualized on the output device.
By way of example, the output representation 74 may include the statistics of activation within a region of the patient's organ (e.g., as defined by placement of a 2-D virtual electrode or a virtual patch), including a minimum, a maximum, an average, and a standard deviation of activation time, a minimum, maximum, average and a standard deviation of the electrical potential. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that other statistical analyses or properties may be part of or derived from the electroanatomical data 70.
As a further example, the output control 88 can be utilized to control or establish a filter that controls what information will be utilized by the analysis methods 72 to generate a corresponding output representation 74. For instance, a user can employ the output control 88 to set an interval for ascertaining activation time or other constraints for each virtual electrode. As another example, an interval can be set by a user that is utilized to determine a dominant frequency for each virtual electrode. A corresponding dominant frequency map can also be generated. Thus based on such constraints, locations (corresponding to anatomical positions) that satisfy such time limits or other constraints can be determined and provided to the output device for display graphically (or otherwise) on a graphical representation of the organ. It will be thus appreciated that any type of data that can be measured or computed for an electrode arrangement positioned relative to a patient's organ can be computed and be provided in a virtual environment based on electroanatomic data 70.
FIG. 4 depicts an example of a GUI 90 in which a plurality of virtual electrodes 91A, 91B, 91C, 91D, 91E, 91F, 91G and 91H have been positioned at user-selected locations on the graphical representation of a surface of a patient's heart 92. It will be appreciated that, as described herein, any number of virtual electrodes can be positioned on the surface. Adjacent to the window in which the surface representation 92 is depicted, are additional analysis and evaluation tools.
In the example of FIG. 4, an electrogram window 93 is populated with an electrogram 94A, 94B, 94C, 94D, 94E, 94F, 94G and 94H for each of the virtual electrodes 91A, 91B, 91C, 91D, 91E, 91F, 91G and 91H, respectively. Thus, each electrogram displays the electrical activity (voltage versus time) according to the electroanatomical data determined for each point at which the respective virtual electrodes are positioned.
Additionally depicted in FIG. 4 is a window 95 that includes power spectrums graphs 96A, 96B, 96C, 96D, 96E, 96F, 96G and 96H for each of the virtual electrodes 91A, 91B, 91C, 91D, 91E, 91F, 91G and 91H. Power spectrum demonstrates frequency versus amplitude, such as can be computed from the electrograms 94A, 94B, 94C, 94D, 94E, 94F, 94G and 94H associated with each of the respective virtual electrodes 91A, 91B, 91C, 91D, 91E, 91F, 91G and 91H.
Additionally in the example of FIG. 4, a coordinate axis Al is depicted adjacent to the surface model demonstrating the relative orientation of the patient's heart model 92. A user can further rotate the three-dimensional surface model 92 (e.g., via the cursor or other image controls) to a desired orientation for selecting and applying virtual electrodes to one or more selected surface region.
FIG. 4 also depicts an example of an isochrone map 97 superimposed on heart model 92. The isochrone map 97 depicts activation times that have been computed as a function of an interval selected (via GUI element or button) in the electrogram window 94. Similar to the interval selection shown and described in FIG. 3, a user can employ the cursor to selectively adjust calipers 98 to adjust an interval in the displayed electrograms. As the calipers 98 are adjusted, a corresponding activation time can be computed and contemporaneously displayed in the isochrone map. A graphical scale (or key) 99 can be provided adjacent to the isochrone map 97 to inform the user of what each shade or color in the map represents.
By way of example, the activation time can be computed by analyzing the change in voltage over time (e.g., dV/dt) within the selected time interval. Alternatively, such as depending upon the type of waveform, wavelet analysis can be performed to ascertain the activation time for a given waveform. The corresponding activation times are rendered as a graphical representation that is superimposed on the patient's heart model. A corresponding color code or gray scale can be provided to enable the user to determine the activation time for each portion of the patient's heart. A user further may actively modify the time interval with resulting in corresponding changes to the activation time being displayed in the activation map that is superimposed on the patient's heart.
FIG. 5 depicts an example of an electrode configuration module 100 that can be employed by a user for selecting from among a plurality of predefined different electrode configurations. Configuration data 102 is associated with the electrode configuration element 100 and includes data 122 that parameterizes a plurality of different virtual electrode configurations.
As depicted in FIG. 5 the configuration data 102 can include one or more sets of electrodes 104 and 106, indicated at ELECTRODE SET 1 and ELECTRODE SET M, where M is an integer denoting a number of different sets of electrode configurations in the configuration data 102. Each of the electrodes 104-106 can include an arrangement of one-dimensional, two-dimensional or three-dimensional electrodes having a particular spatial distribution and electrical properties associated therewith, which can be represented as a mathematical model for each configuration.
The configuration data 102 can also be programmed to parameterize a plurality of electrophysiology catheters 108 and 110, indicated at CATHETER 1 through CATHETER N, where N is an integer denoting the number of different catheters to chose from in the configuration data. Each of the catheters 108-110 includes a set of parameters that defines the spatial distribution of one or more electrodes on each respective catheter 108 and 110 as well as other parameters (e.g., electrical parameters such as capacitance, resistivity or the like) that may affect measurements that would be made by the catheters.
The configuration data 102 can also include one or more patches 112 and 114, indicated at PATCH 1 through PATCH P, where P is an integer denoting the number of available predefined patch configurations in the configuration data 102. Each patch 112-114 can have a different predefined configuration of electrodes distributed across a two-dimensional surface. The surface can be planar or it can be curved. Alternatively, the patch surface can be conformable such that it varies according to the surface geometry of the surface region where the patch is positioned. Thus, each electrode in a conformable patch will, when positioned on a representation of a patient model, conform its position to the adjacent surface, thereby allowing tortuous curved anatomical surfaces to be evaluated.
Catheters 108-110, electrodes 104-106 or patches 112-114 may include configurations of commercially available devices. A user can employ the system 10 (FIG. 1) to generate a representation of physiological data commensurate with that which can be generated by physically placing a selected commercially available product (e.g., patch or electrophysiology catheter) in or near a patient's organ, but can now obtain such information in a non-invasive manner without actually placing such electrodes, or catheters or patches within the patient's body. That is, as described herein, systems and methods implementing the invention can employ electrophysiology data from any source and provide a representation that is consistent with data that may be derived from any type of electrode configuration (or configurations), which can be defined by the user or otherwise generated by the system.
As an example, a user can employ the electrode configuration module 100 to select from one of the plurality of predefined electrode configurations 104-114. The user can also modify the selected electrode configuration as desired to provide a user-defined or modified version thereof. For instance, a user can select the MODIFY interface element 118 and be provided a dialog box or other user-entry element that can be used to change parameters, such as the number of electrodes and/or the spatial distribution of electrodes for a given selected electrode configuration. Additionally, the configuration component 100 can include a new user interface element 120 that can be employed to define and generate a new user-defined electrode configuration. The new configuration can be defined in terms of its geometry, electrical and other properties.
Configuration data for each virtual electrode structure available to the user can employ a data structure 122 for storing parameters and metadata associated with the electrode configuration. For example, as depicted in FIG. 5, the data structure 122 can include type data, number of electrodes, a spatial distribution of the electrodes as well as a textual description. The textual description can be editable by the user as is known in the art.
As a further example, FIG. 6 depicts an example of a functional block diagram of a system 130 that can be employed to configure one or more user-defined electrode. The system 130 includes an electrode configuration generator component 132 that includes or otherwise employs functions and methods programmed to facilitate construction of a virtual electrode structure having user-defined characteristics and parameters. The electrode configuration generator 132 can provide user interface elements 134, 136 and 138, such as in the form of graphical buttons, tabs or the like, which can access functions for parameterizing different types of custom configurations. The user interface element 134 can access methods for generating a new linear type of electrode configuration. The user interface element 136 can access methods for defining a new two-dimensional electrode configuration (e.g., a patch). The user interface element 138 can be utilized for constructing a new three-dimensional electrode configuration. In response to selecting any of such user interface elements 134, 136 or 138, an appropriate dialog or other user interface mechanism, schematically indicated at 140, can be provided to the user for entering configuration information.
In the example of FIG. 6, the dialog 140 can be provided to the user to selectively enter respective parameters appropriate to the type of electrode configuration selected by the user. That is, the dialog 140 and the information requested from the user can vary depending on the type of electrode configuration. For instance, a user can define the length of the electrode structure, indicated at 142, a width of the structure, indicated at 144, and a diameter of the device, indicated at 146. The device parameters dialog 140 can also allow the user to identify and define the number of electrodes, indicated at user entry 148, as well as the spatial distribution of the electrodes, indicated at 150.
As a further example, the spatial distribution 150 of electrodes further may be fixed by defining a distance between electrodes, which distance may be uniform or variable along the device. Alternatively or additionally, the geometry and placement of electrodes can be defined based on anatomical features of the representation of the heart (patient specific or a general model), such as by arranging electrode according to selected anatomical landmarks. In addition to or as another alternative, the arrangement and distribution of electrodes can be determined dynamically based on electrical data for the patient.
The user can also input a name for the electrode configuration in a name entry element 152. If the user does not enter such a name, a name can automatically be generated for each electrode configuration that the user defines. Upon setting the set of parameters, a user can save the device by activating a “save” user interface element 154. Once a configuration has been created, such configuration can be available subsequently for selection as a predefined electrode configuration, such as described herein.
The device parameters 140 can also include a shape parameter 156, which can be utilized to define a shape of the virtual structure, such as a loop, a spiral, a rectangle or annular shape. Those skilled in the art will understand and appreciate various other types of information and different mechanism that can be employed by a user to enter similar types of user-defined configuration data, including both graphical and textual methods.
FIG. 7 depicts an example of an output control module 160 that can be utilized to control the type of information provided in a virtual electrode output representation as well as the form and content in the representation. The output control 160 can include an algorithm selector 162 that is programmed to provide a user interface element, schematically indicated at 164, that enables a user to select one or more algorithms that are used to perform computations for use in populating an output representation generated in accordance with an aspect of the invention.
In the example of FIG. 7, the algorithm user interface element 164 is depicted as including a plurality of predefined algorithms that a user can select and program to generate corresponding physiological data that can be visually represented to the user. For instance, the algorithm user interface element 164 includes a list of algorithms 166, indicated at ALGORITHM 1, 2 through ALGORITHM R, where R is a positive integer denoting the number of algorithms. Each of the algorithms 166 can be programmed to compute corresponding physiological data for an assigned virtual electrode (based on electrode configuration data) that has been positioned relative to a representation of the patient's organ (based on position data) such as described herein. Furthermore, the user can dynamically assign one or more algorithms, including digital signal processing algorithms or other computations, for each virtual electrode. The results set for each computation or signal processing can be employed to generate a corresponding representation for each virtual electrode. Alternatively or additionally, a general computation, such as statistical and/or comparative analysis, can be performed on all or a selected portion of the virtual electrodes.
In the example of FIG. 7, a user can select a respective algorithm to be active, such as by turning “ON” the algorithm by checking an appropriate check box, indicated at 168 for each algorithm. Those skilled in the art will understand and appreciate that various other user interface elements (e.g., context menus or buttons) can be utilized to selectively control the algorithms. Each of the algorithms can include a user interface element, indicated at 170, such as a graphical feature for activating a drop down context menu or dialog. For instance, in response to activating the user interface element 170 for a given algorithm, a user can access to a corresponding programming dialog, which the user can employ to define properties 172 associated with the selected algorithm. The properties 172 can include setting one or more time intervals, or selecting one or more data set that the associated algorithm will utilize for generating a corresponding set of results. A user-entry dialog, indicated at 174, can also be provided through which the user can enter associated constraints associated with the selected algorithm. The constraints entry dialog 174 for a given algorithm can include a mechanism to select a subset of the electrodes as well as to define input or output limits or other parameters associated with the algorithm.
Each of the algorithms can define a type of information to be provided in the resulting output representation. The algorithms can range in complexity from providing types of data that can be measured or computed easily by an actual electrode (e.g., electrical potential, activation time) to providing more complex statistical and comparative types of information. One type of data can be considered a look-up or measured value, such as including electric potential activation time, frequency of the electrophysiological signals for the selected electrode configuration. Other types of data can provide information that can be computed based upon such measured variables, such as including a gradient of any variable or the statistics of variables, such as including a mean, maximum or minimum. It is to be appreciated that any such variables or statistics thereof can be computed spatially with respect to the organ and the virtual electrode configuration that is positioned relative to the organ as well as temporally over a time period or selected interval thereof during which the electrophysiology data has been acquired. The temporal range can be defined as part of the constraints 174 or properties 172 for a given selected algorithm.
In a situation where multiple electrode configurations or electrophysiology catheters have been virtually positioned at selected anatomical positions, a set of one or more algorithms can be assigned to each respective virtual electrode for displaying corresponding data to the user as part of the output representation. Thus, there can be multiple output representations and an arrangement of displays depending on the type of information that is being displayed can be controlled via the output control 160 and, in particular, by a display type element 176. The display type element 176 can be utilized to access graphics control methods that are programmed to control, for example, whether the output is in a text based form or a graphical form that is superimposed over the select organ and relative to a graphical representation of the selected electrode configuration and/or waveform representation.
In addition to affording the user an opportunity to select any number of one or more algorithms and apply such algorithms to any number of one or more virtual electrode configurations, the output control 150 includes a compare interface element 178 that can access methods and functions programmed to generate comparative data. The comparative data can be a spatial comparison (e.g., between different virtual electrodes or different anatomic positions), a temporal comparison (e.g., the same virtual electrodes at different instances in time), or a spatial-temporal comparison (e.g., different virtual electrodes at different time instances), which can vary depending on the type of data that is being compared. The compared data further can compare similar types of information derived for different virtual electrode configurations.
As an example of temporal comparative data, the compare interface element 178 can be utilized to compare one or more measured values for a same given anatomic location (e.g., corresponding to the same virtual electrode configuration) for different cardiac intervals. For instance, a user can employ the compare user interface element 166 to provide a comparison of earliest activation time for a first interval relative to the earliest activation time for a second user-defined interval, which results can be displayed on an output representation either superimposed on the same representation or as a side-by-side comparison on two separate representations. Corresponding isochrone maps can be provided for each of the intervals being compared to provide further comparative information.
As yet a further example, bipolar data can be constructed from unipolar electrograms data, such as by subtracting electrophysiology data that had been determined between two different virtual electrodes. The two different virtual electrodes can be chosen automatically, such as each pair being chosen by applying a nearest neighbor algorithm. Alternatively, the electrode pairs can be user definable, such as by using a pointer and selecting the electrodes or by identifying the electrodes by name in a text based data entry method.
One or more algorithms can also be utilized to dynamically determine or identify one or more anatomical meeting user-defined criteria, such as according to a user-selected an algorithm or function range. As an example, a user may set activation time limits, and a virtual patch electrode configuration which satisfies the activation time limits can be dynamically constructed and displayed to the user as positions of interest.
As a further example, criteria can be set to find all dominant frequencies over the entire organ or a selected region of the organ. All points and locations meeting the defined criteria thus can be represented (e.g., graphically) to the user. For instance, the results can be employed to dynamically construct a graphical representation of a virtual electrode configuration that identifies which parts of the organ satisfy the criteria.
Alternatively or additionally, a user can employ the identified locations and select one or more virtual electrode configurations that can be placed at the identified locations for subsequent processing an application of one or more selected algorithms. Thus, it is to be appreciated that the output controls 162 can be programmed to locate regions of interest (based on user-defined criteria) that can be utilized for further evaluation in a non-invasive manner. Those skilled in the art will appreciate other criteria (e.g., a set of one or more algorithms or functions) can be utilized to dynamically construct a set of electrodes satisfying such criteria.
The output control 150 can also include a virtual electrode mode control element 180. The virtual electrode mode control 180 allows the user to select from one of a plurality of different virtual electrode modes, each of which can control how resulting physiological information is presented. For example, the virtual electrode mode 180 can include a rove or roving control 182 that can be activated to implement a roving mode. In the roving mode, the cursor or other graphical object, such as a graphical representation of a selected virtual electrode structure, can be moved relative to the graphical representation of the surface region (e.g., of the patient's heart) such that the system dynamically generates a graphical representation of the physiological data as a function of the current location of the cursor relative to the surface region. Thus, as the cursor or other graphical object is moved across the surface region, the output graphical representation is modified to reflect changes in electrical information for the current location. The output can also move commensurate with movement of the cursor or other graphical object.
An example GUI 200 that demonstrates the roving mode relative to a three-dimensional surface model of a heart 202 is depicted in the example of FIG. 8. In FIG. 8, a plurality of virtual electrodes 204A, 204B, 204C, 204D, 204E, 204F, 204G and 204H have been placed at desired locations across the graphical electrical representation of the three-dimensional surface 202. For each (or at least a portion) of the virtual electrodes 204A, 204B, 204C, 204D, 204E, 204F, 204G and 204H positioned on the surface region 202 one or more corresponding output graphical representations are displayed. For example, a first window 206 can be utilized to display an electrogram 208A, 208B, 208C, 208D, 208E, 208F, 208G and 208H for each of the virtual electrodes 204A, 204B, 204C, 204D, 204E, 204F, 204G and 204H.
Adjacent to the electrogram window 206 in the example of FIG. 8 is a frequency window 210 that includes a power spectrums 212A, 2128, 212C, 212D, 212E, 212F, 212G and 212H (demonstrated in amplitude versus frequency) for each of the virtual electrodes 204A, 204B, 204C, 204D, 204E, 204F, 204G and 204H.
FIG. 8 also depicts an output graphical representation of physiological data (an electrogram), indicated at 214, which corresponds to electrical activity at a position defined by the position of the cursor 216. In this example, the electrogram 214 is partially superimposed on the surface region patient's heart 202. It would be appreciated that, if the cursor were to move across the surface of the heart 202, the physiological data being displayed in the window would vary according to the position. Additionally, the representation can move commensurate with the movement of the cursor 216, as to remain adjacent to the cursor during the roving mode. In this way a user can scan across the surface of the organ and rapidly ascertain variations in the electrogram or other electrophysiological data that can be displayed.
Referring back to FIG. 7, the virtual electrode mode 180 can also display a region of interest mode 184 in which a user can define a series of points or virtual electrodes in one region and then another set of points in another region. Methods can be employed to analyze and compare selected information relative to each other to provide additional information to the user.
FIG. 9 depicts an example of another GUI 230 for another virtual electrode structure configured as a linear catheter 232 positioned on a patient's heart model 234. In the example of FIG. 9, the virtual catheter 232 includes a linear arrangement of virtual electrodes 236A, 236B, 236C, 236D, 236E, 236F, 236G and 236H distributed along its length. For example, the virtual electrode structure 232 can correspond to a linear catheter configuration that has been placed over coronary sinus (CS) 238 of the patient's heart 234. For the coronary sinus catheter configuration, one or more corresponding representation of physiological data can be provided for each respective electrode in the catheter structure. For example, a first window 238 can provide electrograms 240A, 240B, 240C, 240D, 240E, 240F, 240G and 240H generated based on location data for each of the respective virtual electrodes 236A, 236B, 236C, 236D, 236E, 236F, 236G and 236H on the structure 232. Similarly, a second window 244 can include power spectrum plots 246A, 246B, 246C, 246D, 246E, 246F, 246G and 246H generated for each of the electrodes 236A, 236B, 236C, 236D, 236E, 236F, 236G and 236H in the virtual structure 232.
The virtual electrodes 236A, 236B, 236C, 236D, 236E, 236F, 236G and 236H in the catheter structure 232 can conform to the surface of the heart 234 at which the virtual electrode structure is positioned. Thus in the example of FIG. 9, the virtual electrode corresponding to electrogram CS6 is partially obstructed as it is recessed at a corresponding recessed surface location in the coronary sinus.
FIG. 10 illustrates an example of another GUI 260 depicting a surface model representation 262 of a patient's heart for another type of catheter, indicated at 264. The catheter 264 is configured in an annular or ring configuration and is positioned in a circumscribing relationship around the pulmonary vein 266. For example, a virtual catheter of this type can be positioned around the pulmonary vein and measure potentials such as for lesion confirmation associated with an atrial fibrillation procedure, which may occur concurrently with the display in FIG. 10. Thus as described herein, the data set can be acquired previously or the data being utilized can be acquired in real time and converted to the corresponding electrode anatomical surface data for which the resulting display is shown and modified in real time accordingly.
The ring-shaped virtual catheter structure 264 includes an arrangement of virtual electrodes 268A, 268B, 268C, 268D, 268E, 268F, 268G and 268H distributed along the ring-shaped configuration. In the example of FIG. 10, one or more corresponding representation of physiological data can be provided for each respective electrode in the catheter structure. For example, a first window 270 can display electrograms 270A, 2708, 270C, 270D, 270E, 270F, 270G and 270H generated based on location data for each of the respective virtual electrodes 268A, 268B, 268C, 268D, 268E, 268F, 268G and 268H. Similarly, a second window 272 can include power spectrum plots 274A, 274B, 274C, 274D, 274E, 274F, 274G and 274H generated for each of the electrodes 268A, 268B, 268C, 268D, 268E, 268F, 268G and 268H.
FIG. 11 depicts an example GUI 300 in which mapping controls have been activated to depict a dominant frequency map superimposed on the graphical representation of the patient's heart, indicated at 302. In the example of FIG. 11, four virtual electrodes 304A, 304B, 304C and 304D are positioned at desired locations on a patient's heart. Corresponding electrograms 306A, 306B, 306C and 306D and power spectrum plots 308A, 308B, 308C and 308D are depicted in respective windows 310 and 312.
Additionally in FIG. 11, the dominant frequency map provides spatial information about the dominant frequency over the surface of the heart 302 according to a corresponding to a scale 314, such as can be implemented as a color code or gray scale code. Thus, reference to the scale 314 when viewing the dominant frequency map of the heart 302 demonstrates to the user the dominant frequency for each region of the heart. The dominant frequency can vary according to the interval for which the dominant frequency is computed. Thus in FIG. 11, caliper user interface elements 318 can be provided in the electrogram window, for example, to enable a user via a pointer or cursor to select or vary a time interval for which the dominant frequency is calculated. The caliper user interface element 318 can be activated for selecting the interval in response to activating a corresponding interval selector element 320, such as a button or other user interface feature.
Also depicted in FIG. 11 is a user interface element (e.g., a drop down context menu) 322 that defines what type of electroanatomic map is superimposed on the heart 302. Thus, in the example of FIG. 11, dominant frequency is selected, resulting in the map shown. It will be appreciated that other types of maps could be selected by a user (via the user interface element 322) for display superimposed on the heart, such as shown and described herein.
FIG. 12 depicts an example GUI 350 in which region of interest analysis has been activated for evaluation of electrophysiology of one or more regions on a surface of a patient's heart 352. In the example of FIG. 12 two regions have been identified for evaluation, indicated by dashed lines 354 and 356. Those skilled in the art will appreciate various methods that can be utilized to select the regions. As one example, a user can position individual virtual electrodes on each region of interest 354 and 356, such as placing electrodes 358 in region 354 and virtual electrodes 360 in region 356. In the illustrated example, the region 354 corresponds to the patient's left ventricle and the region 356 corresponds to the patient's right ventricle.
GUI controls 362 can be provided in an adjacent window, such as to control the color, size and method utilized to mark each region of interest with the virtual electrodes. The GUI controls 362 can also be utilized to selectively remove or edit placement virtual electrodes or portions of each region.
By way of example, a selection mode can be entered for a given region by selecting a begin user interface element (e.g., a button) 364. After placing a desired number of virtual electrodes on the region, a user end the placement mode for that region via another user interface element 366. Another user interface element 368 can be utilized for editing the number or distribution of virtual electrodes for a given region.
Other approaches can be employed to mark a region for analysis. For instance, a user can employ a drawing tool or similar user interface feature to identify each one or more region 354 and 356 on the heart 352. Each identified region can then be automatically populated with an arrangement of virtual electrodes 358 and 360. The number and spatial distribution of electrodes can be programmed by the user. As yet another alternative approach, a list of predefined anatomical landmarks (based on patient geometry data) can be provided to the user for selection. Each selected landmark can be automatically populated with a set of one or more virtual electrodes for analysis.
Once a region 354, 356 has been configured as a virtual electrode structure, electrical information can be displayed in an adjacent display window 370. Information associated with the electrical activity of each region can be provided according to the configuration and placement of virtual electrodes. The information can include statistical information for each region, such as the average, maximum and minimum activation time. A corresponding electroanatomical map can also be superimposed on the surface of the heart 352 (e.g., an isochrone map depicted in the example of FIG. 12). Those skilled in the art will understand and appreciate various other types of information that can be computed and presented to the user based on the arrangement of virtual electrodes 358 and 360, which can include numerical values as well as graphical information.
FIG. 13 depicts an example of computer system 400 of the type that can be utilized to implement one or more embodiments of the systems and methods described herein for visualizing physiological data relating to a patient's organ. The computer system 400 can be implemented on one or more general purpose networked computer systems, embedded computer systems, routers, switches, server devices, client devices, various intermediate devices/nodes and/or stand alone computer systems. Additionally, the computer system 400 or portions thereof can be implemented on various mobile or portable clients such as, for example, a laptop or notebook computer, a personal digital assistant (PDA), and the like.
The system bus 408 may be any of several types of bus structure including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of conventional bus architectures such as PCI, VESA, Microchannel, ISA, and EISA, to name a few. The system memory 406 includes read only memory (ROM) 410 and random access memory (RAM) 412. A basic input/output system (BIOS), containing the basic routines that help to transfer information between elements within the computer 402, such as during start-up, is stored in ROM 410.
The computer 402 also may include, for example, a hard disk drive 414, a magnetic disk drive 416, e.g., to read from or write to a removable disk 418, and an optical disk drive 420, e.g., for reading from or writing to a CD-ROM disk 422 or other optical media. The hard disk drive 414, magnetic disk drive 416, and optical disk drive 420 are connected to the system bus 408 by a hard disk drive interface 424, a magnetic disk drive interface 426, and an optical disk drive interface 428, respectively. The drives and their associated computer-readable media provide nonvolatile storage of data, data structures, computer-executable instructions, etc. for the computer 402. Although the description of computer-readable media above refers to a hard disk, a removable magnetic disk and a CD, it should be appreciated by those skilled in the art that other types of media which are readable by a computer, such as magnetic cassettes, flash memory cards, digital video disks, Bernoulli cartridges, and the like, may also be used in the exemplary operating environment 400, and further that any such media may contain computer-executable instructions for performing the methods of the present invention.
A number of program modules may be stored in the drives and RAM 412, including an operating system 430, one or more application programs 432, other program modules 434, and program data 436. The operating system 430 in the computer 402 could be any suitable operating system or combinations of operating systems. The application programs 416, other program modules 417, and program data 418 can cooperate to provide a visualization of output results for a patient's organ, such as shown and described herein.
A user may enter commands and information into the computer 402 through one or more user input devices, such as a keyboard 438 and a pointing device (e.g., a mouse 440). Other input devices (not shown) may include a microphone, a joystick, a game pad, a satellite dish, a scanner, or the like. These and other input devices are often connected to the processing unit 404 through a serial port interface 442 that is coupled to the system bus 408, but may be connected by other interfaces, such as a parallel port, a game port or a universal serial bus (USB). A monitor 444 or other type of display device is also connected to the system bus 408 via an interface, such as a video adapter 446. In addition to the monitor 444, the computer 402 may include other peripheral output devices (not shown), such as speakers, printers, etc. Thus, the output representation for a virtual electrode is not limited to a graphical representation on a display.
The computer 402 may operate in a networked environment using logical connections to one or more remote computers 460. The remote computer 460 may be a workstation, a server computer, a router, a peer device, or other common network node, and typically includes many or all of the elements described relative to the computer 402, although, for purposes of brevity, only a memory storage device 462 is illustrated in FIG. 15. The logical connections depicted in FIG. 15 may include a local area network (LAN) 464 and a wide area network (WAN) 466. Such networking environments are commonplace in offices, enterprise-wide computer networks, intranets, and the Internet.
When used in a LAN networking environment, the computer 402 is connected to the local network 464 through a network interface or adapter 468. When used in a WAN networking environment, the computer 402 typically includes a modem 470, or is connected to a communications server on an associated LAN, or has other means for establishing communications over the WAN 466, such as the Internet. The modem 470, which may be internal or external, is connected to the system bus 408 via the serial port interface 442. In a networked environment, program modules depicted relative to the computer 402, or portions thereof, may be stored in the remote memory storage device 462. It will be appreciated that the network connections shown are exemplary and other means of establishing a communications link between the computers 402 and 460 may be used.
In accordance with the practices of persons skilled in the art of computer programming, the present invention has been described with reference to acts and symbolic representations of operations that are performed by a computer, such as the computer 402 or remote computer 460, unless otherwise indicated. Such acts and operations are sometimes referred to as being computer-executed. It will be appreciated that the acts and symbolically represented operations include the manipulation by the processing unit 404 of electrical signals representing data bits which causes a resulting transformation or reduction of the electrical signal representation, and the maintenance of data bits at memory locations in the memory system (including the system memory 406, hard drive 414, floppy disks 418, CD-ROM 422, and shared storage system 410) to thereby reconfigure or otherwise alter the computer system's operation, as well as other processing of signals. The memory locations where such data bits are maintained are physical locations that have particular electrical, magnetic, or optical properties corresponding to the data bits.
Those skilled in the art will understand and appreciated various modifications and implementations of virtual electrodes that can be utilized. For example, an arrangement of one or more virtual electrodes may be transient or persistent. A transient or persistent virtual electrode structure can be created by a mouse click and drag operation, depending on the GUI mode. Thus, the transient virtual electrode or algorithms being applied can be modified and corresponding outputs being provided to the user via the GUI, while the parameters and output for the persistent arrangement remain fixed.
Furthermore, a virtual electrode structure may be hierarchically aggregated from a plurality of component virtual catheters, each performing its own computations, with the aggregate virtual catheter aggregating and further manipulating the results of its constituents. That is, each general algorithm being applied can correspond to a parent algorithm that is functionally defined as an aggregate of child algorithms. Each child algorithm can be computed for each respective electrode according to electrophysiology data and its anatomical position.
As an example, a dyssynchrony virtual electrode arrangement may correspond to a parent algorithm programmed to compare mean activation times from two separate virtual surface patches (as described above) placed on the left ventricle (LC) and right ventricle (RV) (e.g. free walls), and display on the GUI a difference between the mean activation times. Each of the virtual surface patches LV and RV can include child algorithms for each of the respective electrodes LV_1, LV_2 . . . LV_P (where P is the number of electrodes on the LV patch) and RV_1, RV_2 . . . RV_Q (where Q is the number of electrodes on the RV patch). The results of mean activation times computed for each of LV_1, LV_2 . . . LV_P can be compared to RV_1, RV_2 . . . RV_Q with the results of the comparison provided as a graphical representation superimposed on the patient's heart.
In view of the foregoing, those skilled in the art will appreciate the versatility and power of the systems and methods described herein. For example, methods can be programmed to dynamically create a virtual electrode structure based on inverse look-up based on any electrophysiological property or combinations thereof. The configuration and properties of such dynamically created electrode structures can be ascertained according to a set of parameters that satisfy particular constraints or extrema conditions. The constraints and conditions may be set, for instance, depending on patient electrophysiological information for a particular time or time interval of interest. The analysis can be performed in the time domain or in the frequency domain, for example, depending on the constraints and conditions being employed.
Systems and methods described herein can also utilize algorithms that can be fixed or they can be created dynamically. For example, the system can include programmed functionality that employs in-place editing and a scripting interface to mathematical libraries (e.g., similar to matlab or python) embedded in the system.
Those skilled in the art will further understand that the systems and methods described herein can be programmed to display temporal or frequency content or a histogram of any electrophysiological quantity. For example, corresponding user interface elements can be programmed to access functions and methods so that a user can select a set of one or more electrodes, in response to which various display can be generated corresponding to graphical and/or textual representations of corresponding electrophysiological parameters, such as including in a waveform view, a power spectra view, or histogram view to name a few.
What have been described above are examples and embodiments of the invention. It is, of course, not possible to describe every conceivable combination of components or methodologies for purposes of describing the invention, but one of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that many further combinations and permutations of the invention are possible. Accordingly, the invention is intended to embrace all such alterations, modifications and variations that fall within the scope of the appended claims. In the claims, unless otherwise indicated, the article “a” is to refer to “one or more than one.”
1. A computer-implemented method for visualizing physiological data of a patient, the method comprising:
storing in memory electroanatomic data representing electrical activity for a predetermined surface region of the patient;
providing an interactive graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient;
receiving a user input that defines location data corresponding to a user-selected location for at least one roving virtual electrode on the graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient; and
dynamically generating a graphical representation of the physiological data corresponding to a current location of the roving virtual electrode relative to the graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient, such that the graphical representation of the physiological data is modified continuously responsive to changes in the current location of the roving virtual electrode as the roving virtual electrode is moved.
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising superimposing a graphical representation of the at least one roving virtual electrode on the interactive graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient in response to the receiving of the user input.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the graphical representation of the physiological data corresponding to the current location of the user interface pointing element is generated adjacent to the current location of the user interface pointing element.
receiving a user input that defines location data corresponding to a user-selected location for at least one virtual electrode on the graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient; and
dynamically generating a graphical representation of the physiological data corresponding to a current location of a user interface pointing element relative to the predetermined surface region of the patient, such that the graphical representation is modified automatically responsive to changes in the current location of the user interface pointing element;
in response to receiving a corresponding user input, the graphical representation of the physiological data corresponding to user selected location location being maintained as a first graphical representation for a fixed virtual electrode at the user selected current location regardless of movement of the user interface pointing element; and
dynamically generating a second graphical representation of the physiological data corresponding to a roving virtual electrode that is modified continuously responsive to changes in the current location of the roving virtual electrode as the roving virtual electrode is moved.
assigning a configuration of the at least one virtual electrode; and
storing the assigned configuration as electrode configuration data for the at least one virtual electrode, such that the visual representation of physiological data for the predetermined surface region is generated based on the location data, the electroanatomic data and the electrode configuration data.
6. The method of claim 5, wherein the electrode configuration data for the at least one virtual electrode further comprises a type of electrode configuration and a resolution that defines a number of one or more electrodes and a spatial relationship of the one or more electrodes.
storing electrode template data that represents a plurality of predefined electrode templates corresponding to different electrode configurations; and
setting the configuration data as corresponding to one of the plurality of different predefined electrode types in response to a user input selecting a respective one of the plurality of predefined electrode templates.
8. The method of claim 5, further comprising generating a graphical representation of the at least one virtual electrode based on the configuration data, the graphical representation of the at least one virtual electrode being independently moveable relative to the interactive graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient.
9. The method of claim 7, wherein at least one of the plurality of predefined electrode templates further comprises different types of electrophysiology catheters.
10. The method of claim 7, wherein at least one of the plurality of predefined electrode templates further comprises a multi-dimensional arrangement of electrodes, the multi-dimensional surface conforming to a contour of the predetermined surface region of the patient at the user-selected location where the arrangement of electrodes is positioned such that each of the electrodes has a respective location corresponding to a location on the predetermined surface region of the patient.
11. The method of claim 1, wherein the electroanatomic data further comprises electroanatomic data computed for a plurality of points distributed across the predetermined surface region of the patient based on electrical data acquired from the patient.
12. The method of claim 11, further comprising selecting at least one time interval for the electroanatomical data in response to a user input, such that the visual representation of physiological data for the predetermined surface region of the patient comprises a graphical representation of patient electrical activity that is generated based on the location data and the electroanatomical data for the selected at least one time interval.
13. The method of claim 12, further comprising generating a graphical representation of an electroanatomic map superimposed on the interactive graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient based on the electroanatomical data for the selected at least one time interval.
14. The method of claim 12, further comprising applying an inverse method to compute the electroanatomical data for the predetermined surface region based on patient electrical data acquired for the patient via non-invasive body surface electrodes and patient geometry data acquired for the patient.
15. The method of claim 14, wherein the computed electroanatomical data corresponds to simultaneous electrical activity that is time indexed over the selected at least one time interval for each of the plurality of points distributed across the predetermined surface region of the patient.
16. The method of claim 15, wherein the predetermined surface region of the patient comprises a surface of the patient's heart.
17. The method of claim 11, further comprising computing the electroanatomical data for the predetermined surface region of the patient based on patient electrical data collected from electrodes disposed on at least one electrophysiology catheter while in vivo within the patient relative to a corresponding surface of the patient's organ.
18. The method of claim 1, wherein the predetermined surface region comprises a three-dimensional surface of an organ of the patient, and
wherein the representation of physiological data further comprises a representation of physiological information spatially visualized on a graphical representation of the organ.
19. The method of claim 18, wherein the location data that defines the anatomical position for the representation of the at least one virtual electrode is received in response to selecting the anatomical position on a model of the organ via a graphical user interface element.
20. The method of claim 19, wherein the graphical user interface element comprises a graphical representation of the at least one virtual electrode.
21. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
selecting the user-selected location as at least one region of interest comprising a plurality of points on the graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient; and
computing statistical information based on the electroanatomic data for plurality of points in the selected at least one region of interest.
22. A system for visualizing physiological data relative to an organ of a patient, the system comprising:
electroanatomic data for the patient stored in memory;
a patient geometry model stored as patient geometry data in the memory, the patient geometry data representing at least one surface region of the organ of the patient;
computer readable instructions stored in the memory, the computer readable instructions comprising:
a location selector programmed to generate location data as a function of a position of at least one roving virtual electrode location relative to the patient geometry model; and
an output generator that generates a visual representation of physiological data for the roving virtual electrode that is determined as a function of the location data and the electroanatomic data, the representation of physiological data for the roving virtual electrode being updated continuously responsive to changes in the current location of the roving virtual electrode as the roving virtual electrode is moved.
23. A system for visualizing physiological data for a patient, the system comprising:
means for storing electroanatomic data representing electrical activity for at least a portion of an organ of the patient;
means for storing patient geometry data that defines geometry for at least the portion of the organ;
means for providing a graphical representation of patient anatomy based on the geometry data;
means for receiving a user input corresponding to position on the graphical representation of patient anatomy, the user input varying as a function of the position of user interface pointing element, corresponding to a roving virtual electrode, and for providing corresponding location data that varies as a function of the position of the user interface pointing element as the user interface pointing element is moved relative to the graphical representation of patient anatomy;
means for computing physiological results data for the at least one user-selected location based on the location data and the electroanatomic data.
24. A computer-implemented method for visualizing physiological data of a patient, the method comprising:
assigning a configuration of at least one virtual electrode in response to a user input, the assigned configuration specifying a number of one or more electrodes and a spatial relationship for each of the one or more electrodes for the at least one virtual electrode; and
storing the assigned configuration as electrode configuration data for the at least one virtual electrode;
receiving a user input that defines location data corresponding to a user-selected location for the at least one virtual electrode on the graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient; and
generating a visual representation of the physiological data for the predetermined surface region for each virtual electrode based on the location data, the electroanatomic data and the assignment data.
25. The method of claim 24, wherein the at least one virtual electrode comprises a roving virtual electrode, the method further comprising:
dynamically modifying the visual representation of the physiological data in response to changes in a current location of a roving virtual electrode corresponding to the roving virtual electrode as the roving virtual electrode is moved relative to the graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient.
26. The system of claim 22, wherein the computer readable instructions further comprise:
a virtual electrode generator programmed for generating the visual representation of the roving virtual electrode in response to selecting one or more locations in the at least one surface region via a user interface pointing element, which defines the location data, the output generator dynamically modifying the visual representation of the physiological data according to changes in the location data representing an anatomical position of the roving virtual electrode relative to the graphical representation of the predetermined surface region of the patient.
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Owner name: CARDIOINSIGHT TECHNOLOGIES, INC., OHIO
Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:RAMANATHAN, CHARULATHA;WODLINGER, HAROLD M.;PING, JIA;AND OTHERS;SIGNING DATES FROM 20110729 TO 20110816;REEL/FRAME:026792/0721
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Justia Patents Network Configuration DeterminationUS Patent Application for MARKETPLACE FOR CLOUD SERVICES RESOURCES Patent Application (Application #20080080396)
MARKETPLACE FOR CLOUD SERVICES RESOURCES
Dec 20, 2006 - Microsoft
The claimed subject matter provides systems and/or methods that facilitate dynamically allocating resources (e.g., hardware, software, . . . ) supported by a third party service provider. The third party service provider can support any number of services that can be concurrently requested by several clients without user perception of degraded computing performance as compared to conventional systems/techniques due to improved connectivity and mitigated latencies. An interface component can receive a request from a client device. Further, a dynamic allocation component can apportion resources (e.g., hardware resources) supported by the third party service provider to process and respond to the request based at least in part upon subscription data. Moreover, a user state evaluator can determine a state associated with a user and/or the client device; the state can be utilized by the dynamic allocation component to tailor resource allocation.
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This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/536,534, entitled “HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE FOR CLOUD SERVICES” and filed on Sep. 28, 2006. The entirety of the aforementioned application is incorporated herein by reference.
Conventionally, most computational tasks are performed upon a client or a server within a proprietary intranet. For example, a software application resident upon a client can be utilized by the client to effectuate operations such as creating data, obtaining data, manipulating data and/or storing data in memory associated with the client. Further, corporate entities and universities oftentimes employ one or more servers to perform tasks such as data storage/retrieval, data warehousing/analysis, electronic mail and/or backup. These clients and/or servers within the proprietary intranet can include software applications that provide functionality such as network browsing, word processing, electronic mail management, and so forth.
In typical client-server architectures, hardware resources of clients and servers on proprietary intranets are utilized to effectuate the aforementioned computationally intensive tasks. However, client and server hardware resources can be expensive, difficult and time consuming to install, update, troubleshoot and maintain. According to an illustration, upgrading server hardware of corporate entities can lead to lengthy downtimes during which electronic mail communications are halted, employees are unable to access data retained on the servers, customers are unable to view content or effectuate online commercial transactions with the corporate entities, and the like; thus, in addition to costs associated with purchasing the hardware, the corporate entity is faced with lost profits, customer frustration, diminished employee productivity, and so forth.
Moreover, conventional client devices can be constrained by limited storage, processing power, security, bandwidth, redundancy, graphical display rendering capabilities, etc. Upgrading hardware resources associated with client devices can be effectuated by purchasing replacement client devices or components of the client devices that can be installed such as central processing units (CPUs), random access memory (RAM), hard disks, video display controllers, and the like; however, upgraded client devices can still be constrained by the above-noted limitations. For example, typical cellular telephones or personal digital assistants (PDAs) may be unable to store large libraries of video files in memory of such devices. Thus, desired computational tasks can be omitted due to limitations of hardware resources.
The following presents a simplified summary in order to provide a basic understanding of some aspects described herein. This summary is not an extensive overview of the claimed subject matter. It is intended to neither identify key or critical elements of the claimed subject matter nor delineate the scope thereof. Its sole purpose is to present some concepts in a simplified form as a prelude to the more detailed description that is presented later.
The claimed subject matter relates to systems and/or methods that facilitate dynamically allocating resources (e.g., hardware, software, . . . ) supported by a third party service provider. The third party service provider can support any number of services that can be concurrently requested by several clients without user perception of degraded computing performance as compared to conventional systems/techniques due to improved connectivity and mitigated latencies. An interface component can receive a request from a client device. Further, a dynamic allocation component can apportion resources (e.g., hardware resources) supported by the third party service provider to process and respond to the request based at least in part upon subscription data. Moreover, a user state evaluator can determine a state associated with a user and/or the client device; the state can be utilized by the dynamic allocation component to tailor resource allocation.
In accordance with various aspects of the claimed subject matter, hardware resources (e.g., related to processing, storage, connectivity, caching, . . . ) supported by a third party service provider can be allocated dynamically, for example, based upon subscription related data. Additionally or alternatively, resources can be allotted as a function of time based upon user need, user frustration, number of requests, identity of requesting users, subscriptions associated with requesting users, type of resources requested, time of day, geographic location, cost/benefit analysis, client device capabilities, and the like. Resources hosted by the third party service provider can be leveraged to mitigate constraints such as hardware limitations (e.g., limited storage, processing power, bandwidth, connectivity, . . . ), expensive and time-consuming maintenance and upgrading, and the like, which can be typically associated with client-side devices and/or servers within proprietary intranets.
Pursuant to one or more aspects of the claimed subject matter, an amount of memory allotted for a particular user can be dependent upon the user's subscription. According to a further example, a user may purchase a number of central processing unit (CPU) cycles hosted by the third party service provider, and the CPU cycles can be employed in connection with processing request(s). Also, redundancy can be allocated based upon a subscription, and thus, hardware resource utilization can be accordingly apportioned; thus, a subscription can enable persistently storing copies of a subscriber's data in memory of data store(s) supported by the third party service provider. Moreover, alternative communication paths (e.g., between a client and the third party service provider, between disparate third party service providers, . . . ) can be allocated based on a subscription for utilization upon failure of a primary communication path.
In accordance with various aspects of the claimed subject matter, a third party service provider can support resources by utilizing centralized data center(s) where computations and data can be hosted, for instance. Additionally or alternatively, computing resources can be spread across a network and the third party service provider can broker computing resources by matching supply with demand. Pursuant to this example, individuals can add hardware (e.g., computing power, storage, . . . ) to the network that other people can utilize. Further to this example, the third party service provider can guarantee a certain level of service to its subscribers; for example, the third party service provider can provide resources itself and/or contract with sub-providers.
The following description and the annexed drawings set forth in detail certain illustrative aspects of the claimed subject matter. These aspects are indicative, however, of but a few of the various ways in which the principles of such matter may be employed and the claimed subject matter is intended to include all such aspects and their equivalents. Other advantages and novel features will become apparent from the following detailed description when considered in conjunction with the drawings.
FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of an exemplary system that facilitates adjusting utilization and/or allocation of hardware resource(s) to remote clients.
FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagram of an exemplary system that apportions resource(s) based upon considerations of user state.
FIG. 3 illustrates a block diagram of an exemplary system that employs load balancing to optimize utilization of resources.
FIG. 4 illustrates a block diagram of an exemplary system that archives and/or analyzes data utilizing a third party service provider.
FIG. 5 illustrates a block diagram of an exemplary system that interconnects distributed data retained at various geographic locations.
FIG. 6 illustrates a block diagram of an exemplary system that provides various resources supported by a third party service provider.
FIG. 7 illustrates a block diagram of an exemplary system that infers a state associated with a device and/or user, and the state can be utilized to dynamically adjust an allocation of resource(s).
FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary methodology that facilitates allotting and utilizing resources hosted by a third party service provider.
FIG. 9 illustrates an exemplary methodology that facilitates altering resource allocation based upon a state (e.g., associated with user(s) and/or client device(s)).
FIG. 10 illustrates an exemplary methodology that facilitates that facilitates searching distributed data retained in allocated memory.
FIG. 11 illustrates an exemplary networking environment, wherein the novel aspects of the claimed subject matter can be employed.
FIG. 12 illustrates an exemplary operating environment that can be employed in accordance with the claimed subject matter.
The claimed subject matter is described with reference to the drawings, wherein like reference numerals are used to refer to like elements throughout. In the following description, for purposes of explanation, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the subject innovation. It may be evident, however, that the claimed subject matter may be practiced without these specific details. In other instances, well-known structures and devices are shown in block diagram form in order to facilitate describing the subject innovation.
As utilized herein, terms “component,” “system,” and the like are intended to refer to a computer-related entity, either hardware, software (e.g., in execution), and/or firmware. For example, a component can be a process running on a processor, a processor, an object, an executable, a program, and/or a computer. By way of illustration, both an application running on a server and the server can be a component. One or more components can reside within a process and a component can be localized on one computer and/or distributed between two or more computers.
Furthermore, the claimed subject matter may be implemented as a method, apparatus, or article of manufacture using standard programming and/or engineering techniques to produce software, firmware, hardware, or any combination thereof to control a computer to implement the disclosed subject matter. The term “article of manufacture” as used herein is intended to encompass a computer program accessible from any computer-readable device, carrier, or media. For example, computer readable media can include but are not limited to magnetic storage devices (e.g., hard disk, floppy disk, magnetic strips, . . . ), optical disks (e.g., compact disk (CD), digital versatile disk (DVD), . . . ), smart cards, and flash memory devices (e.g., card, stick, key drive, . . . ). Additionally it should be appreciated that a carrier wave can be employed to carry computer-readable electronic data such as those used in transmitting and receiving electronic mail or in accessing a network such as the Internet or a local area network (LAN). Of course, those skilled in the art will recognize many modifications may be made to this configuration without departing from the scope or spirit of the claimed subject matter. Moreover, the word “exemplary” is used herein to mean serving as an example, instance, or illustration. Any aspect or design described herein as “exemplary” is not necessarily to be construed as preferred or advantageous over other aspects or designs.
Now turning to the figures, FIG. 1 illustrates a system 100 that facilitates adjusting utilization and/or allocation of hardware resource(s) to remote clients. The system 100 includes a third party service provider 102 that can concurrently service requests from several clients without user perception of degraded computing performance as compared to conventional techniques where computational tasks can be performed upon a client or a server within a proprietary intranet. The third party service provider 102 (e.g., “cloud”) supports a collection of hardware and/or software resources 104. The hardware and/or software resources 104 can be maintained by an off-premises party, and the resources 104 can be accessed and utilized by identified users over a network (e.g., Internet, WAN, . . . ). Resources 104 provided by the third party service provider 102 can be centrally located and/or distributed at various geographic locations. For example, the third party service provider 102 can include any number of data center machines that provide resources 104. The data center machines can be utilized for storing/retrieving data, effectuating computational tasks, rendering graphical outputs, routing data, and so forth.
According to an illustration, the third party service provider 102 can provide any number of resources 104 such as data storage services, computational services, word processing services, electronic mail services, presentation services, spreadsheet services, gaming services, web syndication services (e.g., subscribing to a RSS feed), and any other services or applications that are conventionally associated with personal computers and/or local servers. Further, utilization of any number of third party service providers similar to the third party service provider 102 is contemplated. According to an illustration, disparate third party service providers can be maintained by differing off-premise parties and a user can employ (e.g., concurrently, at different times, . . . ) all or a subset of the third party service providers.
By leveraging resources 104 supported by the third party service provider 102, limitations commonly encountered with respect to hardware associated with clients and servers within proprietary intranets can be mitigated. Off-premises parties, instead of users of clients or network administrators of servers within proprietary intranets, can maintain, troubleshoot, replace and update the hardware resources 104. Further, for example, lengthy downtimes can be mitigated by the third party service provider 102 utilizing redundant resources 104; thus, if a subset of the resources 104 are being updated or replaced, the remainder of the resources 104 can be utilized to service requests from users. According to this example, the resources 104 can be modular in nature, and thus, resources 104 can be added, removed, tested, modified, etc. while the remainder of the resources 104 can support servicing user requests. Moreover, hardware resources 104 supported by the third party service provider 102 can encounter fewer constraints with respect to storage, processing power, security, bandwidth, redundancy, graphical display rendering capabilities, etc. as compared to conventional hardware associated with clients and servers within proprietary intranets.
The system 100 can include a client device 106 that employs resources 104 of the third party service provider 102. Although one client device 106 is depicted, it is to be appreciated that the system 100 can include any number of client devices similar to the client device 106, and the plurality of client devices can concurrently utilize supported resources 104. By way of illustration, the client device 106 can be a desktop device (e.g., personal computer), portable device (e.g., laptop, tablet, handheld such as a personal digital assistant (PDA), portable music player, portable gaming device, . . . ), mobile phone, home media center, and the like. Further, the client device 106 can be an embedded system that can be physically limited, and hence, it can be beneficial to leverage resources 104 of the third party service provider 102; for example, the embedded system can be included in a car, a global positioning system (GPS) navigation system, an intelligent agricultural watering system, buoy sensors in the ocean, a household appliance, medical equipment, industrial machinery, and so forth. According to another example, the client device 106 can be associated with surface(s) (e.g., walls that can be interactive screens within buildings such as houses, offices, retail establishments, . . . ) that can interact with user(s) (e.g., by displaying data and/or obtaining user input, . . . ). The client device 106 can be a thin client utilized to access services hosted by the third party service provider 102 with minimal latency. Further, the client device 106 can interact with a user (e.g., receive user input, output content from the third party service provider 102, . . . ).
Resources 104 can be shared amongst a plurality of client devices subscribing to the third party service provider 102 (however, it is contemplated that the claimed subject matter is not limited to allocating resources 104 based upon subscriptions). According to an illustration, one of the resources 104 can be at least one central processing unit (CPU), where CPU cycles can be employed to effectuate computational tasks requested by the client device 106. Pursuant to this illustration, the client device 106 can be allocated a subset of an overall total number of CPU cycles, while the remainder of the CPU cycles can be allocated to disparate client device(s). Additionally or alternatively, the subset of the overall total number of CPU cycles allocated to the client device 106 can vary over time. Further, a number of CPU cycles can be purchased by the user of the client device 106. In accordance with another example, the resources 104 can include data store(s) that can be employed by the client device 106 to retain data. The user employing the client device 106 can have access to a portion of the data store(s) supported by the third party service provider 102, while access can be denied to remaining portions of the data store(s) (e.g., the data store(s) can selectively mask memory based upon user/device identity, permissions, . . . ). It is contemplated that any additional types of resources 104 can likewise be shared.
The third party service provider 102 can further include an interface component 108 that can receive input(s) from the client device 106 and/or enable transferring a response to such input(s) to the client device 106 (as well as perform similar communications with any disparate client devices). According to an example, the input(s) can be request(s), data, executable program(s), etc. For instance, request(s) from the client device 106 can relate to effectuating a computational task, storing/retrieving data, rendering a user interface, and the like via employing one or more resources 104. Further, the interface component 108 can obtain and/or transmit data over a network connection. According to an illustration, executable code can be received and/or sent by the interface component 108 over the network connection. Pursuant to another example, a user (e.g., employing the client device 106) can issue commands via the interface component 108 (e.g., “run this application”, “delete this file”, . . . ).
Moreover, the third party service provider 102 includes a dynamic allocation component 110 that apportions resources 104 (e.g., hardware resource(s)) supported by the third party service provider 102 to process and respond to the input(s) (e.g., request(s), data, executable program(s), . . . ) obtained from the client device 106. The dynamic allocation component 110 can allot resources 104 based upon subscription data. Further, the resource allotment provided by the dynamic allocation component 110 can vary as a function of time based on considerations such as needs of users, authorization level, upcoming events (e.g., evinced by calendars, meeting requests, indications of time frames, . . . ), frustrations of users, availability of resources 104, number of requests (e.g., from particular user(s), group(s) of users, all users, . . . ), identity of requesting users, subscriptions associated with requesting users (e.g., subscription level), type of resource(s) 104 requested, time of day, day, geographic location, cost/benefit analysis, client device 106 capabilities, and so forth.
Users can subscribe to utilize resources 104 hosted by the third party service provider 102. According to an illustration, disparate subscription levels can be offered in connection with resources 104 of the third party service provider 102. For instance, a higher level subscription can provide increased processing power, bandwidth, storage capacity, services, and so forth as compared to a lower level subscription. Pursuant to a further example, each subscription level can provide a corresponding minimum level of resource assignment by the dynamic allocation component 110; however, if fewer requests by subscribers with high level subscriptions are obtained at a particular time, the dynamic allocation component 110 can alter the resource assignment above the minimum level. Further, subscriptions can be obtained for individual users and/or groups of users. Thus, corporate entities can purchase subscriptions that can be utilized by their respective employees.
Subscription data (e.g., that can be retained by the third party service provider 102, included and/or altered with input(s) from the client device 106, . . . ) can be utilized to distribute the resources 104. For instance, an amount and/or type of memory allotted for a particular user can be dependent upon the user's subscription data. Moreover, a user may purchase a number of CPU cycles associated with a data center machine, which can be employed in connection with processing input(s). Also, redundancy can be allocated based upon subscription data, and thus, hardware resource utilization can be accordingly apportioned; therefore, a subscription can provide for persistently storing copies of a subscriber's data in memory of more than one data center machine. Moreover, the dynamic allocation component 110 can allocate alternative communication paths (e.g., between the client device 106 and the interface 108 of the third party service provider 102, between the third party service provider 102 and disparate third party service provider(s), . . . ) based upon subscription data (e.g., upon failure of a primary communication path). Further, resources such as, for instance, communication bandwidth, security levels, archival length, etc. can be allotted by the dynamic allocation component 110. It is to be appreciated, however, that the claimed subject matter is not limited to the aforementioned examples.
According to another example, subscriptions need not be utilized in connection with allocating resources 104 of the third party service provider 102. Pursuant to this example, resources 104 can be allotted by the dynamic allocation component 110 in association with advertising. Thus, advertisements can be generated, stored, provided by, etc. the third party service provider 102 (e.g., via employing apportioned resources 104) to the client device 106, while the client device 106 (and/or the user) need not have a subscription. In accordance with an example, the dynamic allocation component 110 can enable providing targeted advertising by tailoring resources 104 utilized for yielding advertisements for disparate users based upon considerations such as transaction history, user attentional status, user schedule, location, and so forth.
Pursuant to a further example, users can employ resources 104 of the third party service provider 102 anonymously and/or on a pay-as-you go basis. For instance, a user can pay a one time fee to convert a library of .wma files into .mp3 files without revealing her identity and without subscribing to the third party service provider 102.
According to one or more examples, the third party service provider 102 can employ one or more centralized data centers that can host computations, data, and so forth. Pursuant to another example, the third party service provider 102 can be a distributed system where computing resources 104 (or a portion of the computing resources 104) can be spread across a network. Thus, for instance, a user can add resources 104 (e.g., hardware) to the network that can be utilized by disparate users. Pursuant to an illustration, when the user is not employing a hardware resource 104 (e.g., associated with her client device 106, . . . ) and thus the hardware resource 104 is unutilized or underutilized, the resource 104 can be added to the network (e.g., with the dynamic allocation component 110). A subscriber that adds resources 104 can receive a credit on her account for resources 104 employed by other users, for instance. Examples of resources 104 that can be added by users can be storage, computing power, and so forth. When employing a distributed system, the third party service provider 102 can act as a computing broker by matching supply and demand. Further, the third party service provider 102 can provide for security, billing, privacy, and the like in relation to such a distributed architecture. Moreover, the third party service provider 102 can guarantee a certain level of service to subscribers (e.g., by providing resources itself, contracting with sub-providers, . . . ). It is to be appreciated, however, that the claimed subject matter is not limited to the aforementioned examples.
Although the interface component 108 is depicted as being separate from the dynamic allocation component 110, it is contemplated that the dynamic allocation component 110 can include the interface component 108 or a portion thereof. Also, the interface component 108 can provide various adaptors, connectors, channels, communication paths, etc. to enable interaction with the dynamic allocation component 110.
With reference to FIG. 2, illustrated is a system 200 that apportions resource(s) based upon considerations of user state. The system 200 includes the third party service provider 102 that supports any number of resources 104 (e.g., hardware, software, firmware, . . . ) that can be employed by the client device 106 (and/or disparate client device(s) (not shown)). The third party service provider 102 further comprises the interface component 108 that receives resource utilization requests (e.g., requests to effectuate operations utilizing resources 104 supported by the third party service provider 102) from the client device 106 and the dynamic allocation component 110 that partitions resources 104 (e.g., between users, devices, computational tasks, . . . ). Moreover, the dynamic allocation component 110 can further include a user state evaluator 202, an enhancement component 204 and an auction component 206.
The user state evaluator 202 can determine a state associated with a user and/or the client device 106 employed by the user, where the state can relate to a set of properties such as behaviors, frustrations, needs, configurations, attributes, conditions, preferences, contexts, information content, authorization levels, capabilities, and/or roles. For instance, the user state evaluator 202 can analyze explicit and/or implicit information obtained from the client device 106 (e.g., via the interface component 108) and/or retrieved from memory associated with the third party service provider 102 (e.g., preferences indicated in subscription data). State related data yielded by the user state evaluator 202 can be utilized by the dynamic allocation component 110 to tailor the apportionment of resources 104.
By way of example, the user state evaluator 202 can determine user frustration. According to this example, the user state evaluator 202 can infer frustration from delays, failures, errors, and the like associated with requests from the client device 106 to employ resources 104. Further, the user state evaluator 202 can analyze variations in frequency of user input (e.g., user repeatedly providing the same input such as depressing a key on a keyboard or a mouse button with a high frequency prior to obtaining a response to the input), tone of input (e.g., intonation in user speech evaluated with speech recognition), physical movements and/or actions (e.g., sensor in a screen that detects when users hit the screen from frustration), facial expressions, and so forth to deduce user frustration. Additionally or alternatively, the client device 106 can obtain explicit user input related to his or her frustration level (e.g., user can select a button that indicates she is frustrated with performance of a requested service supported by the third party service provider 102, . . . ). As a level of frustration of the user increases as determined by the user state evaluator 202, the dynamic allocation component 110 can provide the user with an increased share of resources 104, and the share can be reduced as the analyzed frustration level diminishes.
According to another illustration, the user state evaluator 202 can consider characteristics of the client device 106, which can be used to apportion resources 104 by the dynamic allocation component 110. For instance, the user state evaluator 202 can identify that the client device 106 is a cellular telephone with limited display area. Thus, the dynamic allocation component 110 can employ this information to reduce resources 104 utilized to render an image upon the client device 106 since the cellular telephone may be unable to display a rich graphical user interface. Further, the user state evaluator 202 can perform a cost/benefit analysis based upon characteristics of the client device 106. For example, if minimal benefit is derived from increasing an allocation of resources 104 to the client device 106 (e.g., due to limited processing power, display real estate, bandwidth, memory, and so forth of the client device 106) while increasing costs (e.g., opportunity costs associated with not allotting such resources 104 to disparate client devices, computational tasks, and the like), then the user state evaluator 202 can provide an output to the dynamic allocation component 110 that enables limiting share(s) of resources 104 related to client devices unable to fully utilize such resources 104.
Other examples of information that the user state evaluator 202 can evaluate include a number of concurrent requests from the client device 106, corporate hierarchy (e.g., provide a corporate CEO with more resources as compared to a new employee when both individuals utilize a common subscription, . . . ), and characteristics of computational tasks (e.g., importance of the tasks, upcoming deadlines/events by which the tasks are needed, . . . ). For instance, the client device 106 can be utilized to download a video file for persistent storage upon the client device 106. The client device 106 can be employed to indicate an expected viewing time for the video file (and/or a time by which the download is desired to be completed); thus, if the video is to be viewed within thirty minutes, more bandwidth can be allocated as compared to when the video is expected to be viewed in two days. Pursuant to this example, differential billing can be utilized to charge more for a quicker download. It is to be appreciated that the user state evaluator 202 can additionally or alternatively consider any disparate types of information to effectuate state analysis.
Moreover, the enhancement component 204 can facilitate increasing an allocation of resources 104 for a particular user and/or client device 106. For instance, the enhancement component 204 can receive explicit input to increase the amount and/or alter the type of resources utilized with the client device 106 (e.g., Supersize Me!). According to an example, an icon can be displayed as part of a graphical user interface rendered upon the client device 106, and selection of the icon can increase (e.g., temporarily, permanently, . . . ) resources 104 assigned to the client device 106. Pursuant to this example, additional monetary charges in addition to subscription costs can be applied to the user's account. Additionally or alternatively, subscriptions can include a preset number of opportunities to dynamically increase allocation of resources 104.
Further, the auction component 206 can enable users to auction unutilized resources 104. For instance, if a user (temporarily) utilizes less than all the resources 104 he is entitled to (e.g., according to the subscription data, as distributed by the dynamic allocation component 110, . . . ), that user can offer them to other users that need additional resources 104. Thus, unutilized resources 104 can be sold, bartered, donated, traded, exchanged, auctioned, etc. to disparate users. According to an example, the unutilized resources 104 can be dynamically priced. For instance, pricing of the resources 104 can vary over time based upon supply of available resources 104 (e.g., amount of resources 104 for sale, auction, trade, or the like by a plurality of users) and/or demand for the available resources 104. Moreover, depending upon a subscription level, unutilized resources 104 offered for transfer with a higher level subscription can be priced higher as compared to unutilized resources 104 associated with a lower level subscription. Upon a disparate user obtaining the resources 104 (e.g., by way of purchase, auction, trade, . . . ), the dynamic allocation component 110 can apportion these newly obtained resources 104 to the disparate user. Further, a market (e.g., stock market) can be built upon the transfer of the resources 104; thus, options, hedge bets, and the like can be traded based upon this market.
The auction component 206 can obtain user input indicating a user's resources 104 to offer to disparate users. Thus, the user can designate a subset or all of the resources 104 (to which he is entitled) to be offered for transfer via the auction component 206. According to another example, the auction component 206 can automatically offer resources 104 to disparate users. For instance, if unused resources 104 are set to expire at an upcoming time, the auction component 206 can automatically offer to sell, trade, auction, etc. these resources (and/or provide a suggestion to the user to offer the unused resources). Moreover, the auction component 206 can evaluate historical trends associated with resource 104 utilization to determine whether the user has an excess amount of allocated resources, and thereafter offer or suggest to offer the resources 104 (or a portion of the resources 104) to disparate users. According to another example, the auction component 206 can evaluate that a first user is not utilizing a portion or all of his apportioned resources 104, while a second user needs additional resources 104; thus, the auction component 206 can automatically broker a trade of resources 104 between the users. For instance, the auction component 206 can trade resources 104 to be utilized within a short time frame for resources 104 to be employed at a later time. Additionally or alternatively, the auction component 206 can trade a first type of resource 104 for a second type of resource 104 (e.g., trade bandwidth for CPU cycles). In accordance with another example, the auction component 206 can enable selling resources 104 back to the third party service provider 102 (e.g., in return for a refund of a portion of a subscription fee, . . . ).
Pursuant to a further example, the auction component 206 can enable a buyer to indicate an interest in purchasing resources 104. Thus, the buyer can employ the auction component 206 to provide information related to desired resources 104 (e.g., type of resource 104, time for resource 104 utilization, desired resource 104 amount, . . . ). According to this example, the auction component 206 can enable a user with unused resources 104 to sell, trade, barter, etc. the resources 104 to the buyer (e.g., by accepting the offer, counter offering, . . . ). In accordance with a further example, the auction component 206 can effectuate an auction whereby sellers bid for a price at which they will sell the resources 104 to buyers. Moreover, the auction component 206 can enable negotiating between parties involved in potential transactions related to resources 104 (e.g., provide a forum in which the parties can provide counteroffers to each other). Additionally, the auction component 206 can determine a fair market price for resources 104 involved in a transfer (e.g., based upon historical transaction data, supply of resources 104 being offered by a plurality of users, demand for resources 104, . . . ); thus, a buyer and a seller can agree to an exchange and the auction component 206 can set the price. However, it is to be appreciated that the claimed subject matter is not limited to the aforementioned examples.
Referring to FIG. 3, illustrated is a system 300 that employs load balancing to optimize utilization of resources 104. The system 300 includes the third party service provider 102 that communicates with the client device 106 (and/or any disparate client device(s) and/or disparate third party service provider(s)). The third party service provider 102 can include the interface component 108 that transmits and/or receives data from the client device 106 and the dynamic allocation component 110 that allots resources 104 (e.g., provides shared access to hardware resources 104 to the client device 106 based at least in part upon subscription data). The dynamic allocation component 110 can further comprise a load balancing component 302 that optimizes utilization of resources 104. By employing the load balancing component 302, overall capacity associated with the third party service provider 102 can be increased. Pursuant to an example, the load balancing component 302 can dynamically adjust prices of resources 104 based upon global demand. In accordance with this example, a long running job (e.g., compressing a video stream, . . . ) can be scheduled to “steal” cycles when demand is low; thus, leftover resources 104 during times of lower demand can be allocated by the load balancing component 302.
According to an example, the load balancing component 302 can yield an output that enables the dynamic allocation component 110 to allocate resources 104 based on geographic location and/or time of day associated with the geographic location. Pursuant to this example, the load balancing component 302 can enable assigning increased percentages of overall resources 104 to client device(s) in a geographic location during typical business hours and decreased percentages at nighttime. For instance, at 9:00 AM EST (6:00 AM PST), the load balancing component 302 can determine to allocate more bandwidth (e.g., resource 104) to client device(s) located in New York versus client device(s) positioned in California.
In accordance with another illustration, the third party service provider 102 can enable enterprises to work with multiple offices and thereby allow for forming virtual enterprises. With virtual enterprises, people need not be physically located in particular locations, yet can have full access to resources 104. Further, members associated with the virtual enterprises (e.g., employees, . . . ) can utilize a common subscription associated with the enterprise and/or any number of disparate subscriptions. A subscription for a group of users at various locations (e.g., members associated with virtual enterprises) can provide a minimum level of resources 104 for the group while the load balancing component 302 can optimize allotment of resources 104 between the group members (e.g., shift shared resources 104 between group members utilizing a common subscription).
Moreover, the load balancing component 302 can monitor resources 104 of the third party service provider 102 to detect failures. If a subset of the resources 104 fails, the load balancing component 302 can continue to optimize the remaining resources 104. Thus, if a portion of the total number of processors fails, the load balancing component 302 can enable redistributing cycles associated with the non-failing processors.
Now turning to FIG. 4, illustrated is a system 400 that archives and/or analyzes data utilizing the third party service provider 102. The third party service provider 102 can include the interface component 108 that enables communicating with the client device 106. Further, the third party service provider 102 comprises the dynamic allocation component 110 that can apportion data retention resources, for example. Moreover, the third party service provider 102 can include an archive component 402 and any number of data store(s) 404. Access to and/or utilization of the archive component 402 and/or the data store(s) 404 by the client device 106 (and/or any disparate client device(s)) can be controlled by the dynamic allocation component 110. The data store(s) 404 can be centrally located and/or positioned at differing geographic locations. Further, the archive component 404 can include a management component 406, a versioning component 408, a security component 410, a permission component 412, an aggregation component 414, and/or a restoration component 416.
The data store(s) 404 can be, for example, either volatile memory or nonvolatile memory, or can include both volatile and nonvolatile memory. By way of illustration, and not limitation, nonvolatile memory can include read only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM), which acts as external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in many forms such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), Synchlink DRAM (SLDRAM), Rambus direct RAM (RDRAM), direct Rambus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and Rambus dynamic RAM (RDRAM). The data store(s) 404 of the subject systems and methods is intended to comprise, without being limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory. In addition, it is to be appreciated that the data store(s) 404 can be a server, a database, a hard drive, and the like.
The management component 406 facilitates administering data retained in the data store(s) 404. The management component 406 can enable providing multi-tiered storage within the data store(s) 404, for example. According to this example, unused data can be aged-out to slower disks and important data used more frequently can be moved to faster disks; however, the claimed subject matter is not so limited. Further, the management component 406 can be utilized (e.g., by the client device 106) to organize, annotate, and otherwise reference content without making it local to the client device 106. Pursuant to an illustration, enormous video files can be tagged via utilizing a cell phone. Moreover, the management component 406 enables the client device 106 to bind metadata, which can be local to the client device 106, to file streams (e.g., retained in the data store(s) 404); the management component 406 can enforce and maintain these bindings.
Additionally or alternatively, the management component 406 can allow for sharing data retained in the data store(s) 404 with disparate users and/or client devices. For example, fine-grained sharing can be supported by the management component 406 (e.g., a user can input “share this document with Alex” or “share all appointments with Teresa”, . . . ). Also, the management component 406 can mitigate accidental editing of a user's document regardless of a level of permissions; instead, the management component 406 can yield a notification that new version(s) exist, and the user can organize, annotate, or delete those versions independently of other version(s). According to a further example, the management component 406 can provide file synchronization.
Moreover, the management component 406 can enable browsing and/or searching for data retained in the data store(s) 404. A user's data can be heterogeneously distributed in the data store(s) 404. For instance, subsets of the user data can be stored in data store(s) 404 as well as disparate data store(s) hosted by differing off-premises parties. The management component 406 can enable searching and/or browsing the user data without consideration of the physical topology of the storage devices utilized to retain the data. Thus, browsing effectuated with the management component 406 of “all my pictures” allows a user to view all pictures stored upon any data store (e.g., hosted by any number of third party service providers, . . . ).
The management component 406 additionally can enable metadata and content to be treated differently. For instance, asking a question about a 700 Mb movie need not imply that the user desires to copy the movie to her hard drive. Further, looking for a document remotely on a home machine does not mean that the user wants to copy all documents to her office machine. Thus, schedule and policy for synchronization of metadata and for synchronization of file streams can be orthogonal.
The versioning component 408 can enable retaining and/or tracking versions of data. For instance, the versioning component 408 can identify a latest version of a document (regardless of a saved location within data store(s) 404). Additionally, upon saving a document, the versioning component 408 can create a new version of the document and link the versions. Thus, the versioning component 408 can enable retaining data (e.g., all versions of a document) unless an explicit instruction to delete data is obtained (e.g., from the user of the client device 106). Further, the versioning component 408 can facilitate continuously auto-saving data.
The security component 410 limits availability of resources based on user identity and/or authorization level. For example, the security component 410 can protect against unauthorized access and/or use of data retained by the archive component 402. The security component 410 enhances confidentiality, integrity and availability of the archived data. For instance, the security component 410 can encrypt data transferred to the client device 106 and/or decrypt data obtained from the client device 106. Moreover, the security component 410 can certify and/or authenticate data retained by the archive component 402. According to an example, the security component 410 can analyze whether a user can access and/or use data based upon an identity determined from usernames, passwords, personal identification numbers, personal status, management positions, occupation hierarchy, biometric indicia (e.g., voice recognition, fingerprint analysis, retina analysis, . . . ), and the like. Additionally or alternatively, the security component 410 can limit access to other resources; for example, the security component 410 can mitigate an ability of a computation to use unbounded amounts of memory and/or CPU cycles (e.g., denial of service), or run any program (or parts thereof).
The permission component 412 can enable a user to assign arbitrary access permissions to various users, groups of users and/or all users. For instance, the permission component 412 can obtain explicit preferences (e.g., from the client device 106, included with subscription data, . . . ) related to granting of permissions from a user, which can be enforced. Additionally or alternatively, the permissions can be implied and/or inferred by the permission component 412 based upon considerations related to the user's history, permissions set by disparate users, type of content, and so forth.
Further, the aggregation component 414 assembles and/or analyzes collections of data. The aggregation component 414 can seamless incorporate third party data into a particular user's data. Additionally, the aggregation component 414 can combine data from any number of users that employ the third party service component 102 and/or disparate sources (e.g., sensors, cameras, . . . ) and perform data correlation across service platforms and/or applications. According to an example, the aggregation component 414 can track motion of objects monitored with RFID devices (e.g., utilizing RFID with cloud services tags), and an analysis performed upon the motion data by the aggregation component 414 can identify bottlenecks in shipping. Moreover, the aggregation component 414 can effectuate data mining on the collected data. However, the claimed subject matter is not limited to the aforementioned examples.
Moreover, the restoration component 416 rolls back data retained by the archive component 402. For example, the restoration component 416 can continuously record an environment associated with the third party service provider 102. Further, the restoration component 416 can playback the recording.
Turning to FIG. 5, illustrated is a system 500 that interconnects distributed data retained at various geographic locations. The system 500 includes the third party service provider 102 that can include any number of data stores 502 (e.g., the data store(s) 404 of FIG. 4). Further, the third party service provider 102 can include a distributed data interconnection component 504 that can communicate with remotely hosted data store(s) 506 (e.g., data store(s) hosted by disparate off-premises parties).
The data stores 502 can be positioned at any geographic location with respect to one another; for example, a subset of the data stores 502 can be clustered together at a physical location and a disparate subset of the data stores 502 can be positioned at a geographically distinct location. According to an example, the data stores 502 can communicate with each other (and/or any disparate component(s) (not shown) utilized to access data retained in the data stores 502) via wireless connections. For instance, line of sight, non-wired communication lasers (e.g., utilizing digital light processing (DLP) mirrors, . . . ) can be employed to wirelessly communicate between the data stores 502. Additionally or alternatively, wired connections can be utilized between data stores 502. Pursuant to another illustration, the data stores 502 can utilize solid state storage with no moving parts; however, the subject claims are not so limited. In accordance with a further example, the data stores 502 can utilize optimized silicon that addresses the storage architecture associated with the third party service provider 102.
The distributed data interconnection component 504 enables communicating with remotely hosted data store(s) 506. By way of example, a search can be performed over a user's data retained by the data stores 502 and the remotely hosted data store(s) 506. The distributed data interconnection component 504 can allow for seamless interaction such as searching, browsing, editing, and so forth of data stored in the remotely hosted data store(s) 506. Thus, a common repository (e.g., hosted by a single third party service provider, . . . ) for all user data need not be employed.
With reference to FIG. 6, illustrated is a system 600 that provides various resources supported by a third party service provider. The system 600 includes the client device 106 and/or the third party service provider 102, which can further comprise the interface component 108 and the dynamic allocation component 110. Moreover, the third party service provider 102 can additionally include resources (e.g., resources 104 of FIG. 1) such as a service component 602, a rendering component 604, and/or a pipelining component 606.
The service component 602 can effectuate performing service(s) supported by the third party service provider 102. The service component 602 can enable storing, collecting, manipulating, outputting, etc. data. According to an example, the service component 602 can provide a machine translation service that can translate speech to text, a first language to a second language (e.g., English to Chinese, . . . ), and so forth; however, the claimed subject matter is not limited to the aforementioned example.
The rendering component 604 can enable the client device 106 to generate an output that can be yielded to a user. For instance, the rendering component 604 can facilitate displaying a graphical user interface with the client device 106. Moreover, the rendering component 604 can be a real time render farm that can include a plurality of graphics processing units (GPUs). The rendering component 604 can yield a high resolution graphics image that can be transmitted from the third party service provider 102 to the client device 106 via the interface component 108. Further, the rendering component 604 can tailor the rendered user interface based upon characteristics associated with the client device 106 (and/or any disparate client device(s)); accordingly, the rendering component 604 can consider characteristics such as display size and/or processing limitations, and can transfer data to the client device 106 as a function of these characteristics.
Moreover, the pipelining component 606 can enable selectively piping data from the third party service provider 102 to the client device 106. The pipelining component 606 can push subsets of large amounts of data. For instance, the client device 106 can be employed to view an image; upon zooming into a portion of the image, the pipelining component 606 can intelligently pass data to the client device 106 to enable viewing the zoomed portion of the image.
Turning to FIG. 7, illustrated is a system 700 that infers a state associated with a device and/or user, and the state can be utilized to dynamically adjust an allocation of resource(s) 104. The system 700 can include the third party service provider 102, resource(s) 104, and the dynamic allocation component 110, each of which can be substantially similar to respective components described above. The system 700 can further include an intelligent component 702. The intelligent component 702 can be utilized by the dynamic allocation component 110 to infer user frustration and/or need. According to an example, the intelligent component 702 can deduce that user frustration is above a threshold level; thus, the dynamic allocation component 110 can modify an allotment of the resource(s) 104 corresponding to the particular user. The intelligent component 702 can effectuate this inference based upon user input, historical data, failures, errors, delays, and so forth. Pursuant to another illustration, the intelligent component 702 can perform inferences related to trends in requests for resource(s) 104. Thus, the intelligent component 702 can determine likelihoods associated with types of resource(s) 104 requested, amounts of resource(s) requested, time of day of requests, source of requests, and so forth. Based upon the inferred trends, the dynamic allocation component 110 can partition resource(s) 104 to various users and/or client devices.
It is to be understood that the intelligent component 602 can provide for reasoning about or infer states of the system, environment, and/or user from a set of observations as captured via events and/or data. Inference can be employed to identify a specific context or action, or can generate a probability distribution over states, for example. The inference can be probabilistic—that is, the computation of a probability distribution over states of interest based on a consideration of data and events. Inference can also refer to techniques employed for composing higher-level events from a set of events and/or data. Such inference results in the construction of new events or actions from a set of observed events and/or stored event data, whether or not the events are correlated in close temporal proximity, and whether the events and data come from one or several event and data sources. Various classification (explicitly and/or implicitly trained) schemes and/or systems (e.g., support vector machines, neural networks, expert systems, Bayesian belief networks, fuzzy logic, data fusion engines . . . ) can be employed in connection with performing automatic and/or inferred action in connection with the claimed subject matter.
A classifier is a function that maps an input attribute vector, x=(x1, x2, x3, x4, xn), to a confidence that the input belongs to a class, that is, f(x)=confidence(class). Such classification can employ a probabilistic and/or statistical-based analysis (e.g., factoring into the analysis utilities and costs) to prognose or infer an action that a user desires to be automatically performed. A support vector machine (SVM) is an example of a classifier that can be employed. The SVM operates by finding a hypersurface in the space of possible inputs, which hypersurface attempts to split the triggering criteria from the non-triggering events. Intuitively, this makes the classification correct for testing data that is near, but not identical to training data. Other directed and undirected model classification approaches include, e.g., naïve Bayes, Bayesian networks, decision trees, neural networks, fuzzy logic models, and probabilistic classification models providing different patterns of independence can be employed. Classification as used herein also is inclusive of statistical regression that is utilized to develop models of priority.
FIGS. 8-10 illustrate methodologies in accordance with the claimed subject matter. For simplicity of explanation, the methodologies are depicted and described as a series of acts. It is to be understood and appreciated that the subject innovation is not limited by the acts illustrated and/or by the order of acts, for example acts can occur in various orders and/or concurrently, and with other acts not presented and described herein. Furthermore, not all illustrated acts may be required to implement the methodologies in accordance with the claimed subject matter. In addition, those skilled in the art will understand and appreciate that the methodologies could alternatively be represented as a series of interrelated states via a state diagram or events.
With reference to FIG. 8, illustrated is a methodology 800 that facilitates allotting and utilizing resources hosted by a third party service provider. At 802, a request for a resource (and/or a plurality of resources) supported by a third party service provider can be received. The resource can be a hardware and/or software resource. For instance, the resource can enable storing and/or retrieving data, effectuating computational tasks, rendering graphical outputs, routing data, and so forth. Further, the resource can be shared by any number of disparate users and/or remote client devices. At 804, the resource (and/or plurality of resources) can be dynamically allocated based at least in part upon a subscription. For instance, the subscription can provide a minimum allocation of the resource (e.g., minimum allotted bandwidth, CPU cycles, memory, . . . ). Further, resource allocation can vary over time based upon user need, user frustration, number of requests, identity of requesting users, subscriptions associated with requesting users, type of resource requested, time of day, geographic location, cost/benefit analysis, client device capabilities, and the like. At 806, the request can be responded to by utilizing the allocated resources. For instance, the allocated resources can be employed to effectuate a computational task, store data, retrieve data, manipulate data, render a displayed output, transfer data, and so forth.
Turning to FIG. 9, illustrated is a methodology 900 that facilitates altering resource allocation based upon a state (e.g., associated with user(s) and/or client device(s)). At 902, a state associated with a client device (and/or a user) can be evaluated. For example, the state can relate to user frustration, characteristics of the client device (e.g., limitations in processing power, display real estate, bandwidth, memory, . . . ), concurrent requests from the client device, a corporate hierarchy, and/or characteristics of a computational task requested by the client device. At 904, a resource allotment can be dynamically altered based upon the state. According to an illustration, as user frustration increases, the resource allotment can provide an increased share of resources (e.g., more CPU cycles, increased bandwidth, additional caching, . . . ). At 906, a computational task can be effectuated utilizing the resource allotment.
Turning to FIG. 10, illustrated is a methodology 1000 that facilitates searching distributed data retained in allocated memory. At 1002, a query can be obtained at a third party service provider. The query can be, for instance, associated with a search request. At 1004, data stores hosted by the third party service provider and remotely hosted data stores can be concurrently searched based upon the query. For instance, searches associated with the data stores hosted by the third party service provider can be effectuated by communicating between the data stores via wireless connections. Further, searching can be effectuated over allocated portions of the data stores and/or remotely hosted data stores (e.g., allotted to a user, shared with the user, . . . ). Moreover, searching can be performed without migrating data from the remotely hosted data stores to the data stores associated with the third party service provider. At 1006, a search result corresponding to the query can be generated. The generated search result can be returned to a client device that provided the query, for instance.
In order to provide additional context for implementing various aspects of the claimed subject matter, FIGS. 11-12 and the following discussion is intended to provide a brief, general description of a suitable computing environment in which the various aspects of the subject innovation may be implemented. For instance, FIGS. 11-12 set forth a suitable computing environment that can be employed in connection with dynamically allocating resource(s) supported by a third party service provider to client device(s). While the claimed subject matter has been described above in the general context of computer-executable instructions of a computer program that runs on a local computer and/or remote computer, those skilled in the art will recognize that the subject innovation also may be implemented in combination with other program modules. Generally, program modules include routines, programs, components, data structures, etc., that perform particular tasks and/or implement particular abstract data types.
Moreover, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the inventive methods may be practiced with other computer system configurations, including single-processor or multi-processor computer systems, minicomputers, mainframe computers, as well as personal computers, hand-held computing devices, microprocessor-based and/or programmable consumer electronics, and the like, each of which may operatively communicate with one or more associated devices. The illustrated aspects of the claimed subject matter may also be practiced in distributed computing environments where certain tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network. However, some, if not all, aspects of the subject innovation may be practiced on stand-alone computers. In a distributed computing environment, program modules may be located in local and/or remote memory storage devices.
FIG. 11 is a schematic block diagram of a sample-computing environment 1100 with which the claimed subject matter can interact. The system 1100 includes one or more client(s) 1110. The client(s) 1110 can be hardware and/or software (e.g., threads, processes, computing devices). The system 1100 also includes one or more server(s) 1120. The server(s) 1120 can be hardware and/or software (e.g., threads, processes, computing devices). The servers 1120 can house threads to perform transformations by employing the subject innovation, for example.
One possible communication between a client 1110 and a server 1120 can be in the form of a data packet adapted to be transmitted between two or more computer processes. The system 1100 includes a communication framework 1140 that can be employed to facilitate communications between the client(s) 1110 and the server(s) 1120. The client(s) 1110 are operably connected to one or more client data store(s) 1150 that can be employed to store information local to the client(s) 1110. Similarly, the server(s) 1120 are operably connected to one or more server data store(s) 1130 that can be employed to store information local to the servers 1120.
With reference to FIG. 12, an exemplary environment 1200 for implementing various aspects of the claimed subject matter includes a computer 1212. The computer 1212 includes a processing unit 1214, a system memory 1216, and a system bus 1218. The system bus 1218 couples system components including, but not limited to, the system memory 1216 to the processing unit 1214. The processing unit 1214 can be any of various available processors. Dual microprocessors and other multiprocessor architectures also can be employed as the processing unit 1214.
The system bus 1218 can be any of several types of bus structure(s) including the memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus or external bus, and/or a local bus using any variety of available bus architectures including, but not limited to, Industrial Standard Architecture (ISA), Micro-Channel Architecture (MSA), Extended ISA (EISA), Intelligent Drive Electronics (IDE), VESA Local Bus (VLB), Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI), Card Bus, Universal Serial Bus (USB), Advanced Graphics Port (AGP), Personal Computer Memory Card International Association bus (PCMCIA), Firewire (IEEE 1394), and Small Computer Systems Interface (SCSI).
The system memory 1216 includes volatile memory 1220 and nonvolatile memory 1222. The basic input/output system (BIOS), containing the basic routines to transfer information between elements within the computer 1212, such as during start-up, is stored in nonvolatile memory 1222. By way of illustration, and not limitation, nonvolatile memory 1222 can include read only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory 1220 includes random access memory (RAM), which acts as external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in many forms such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), Synchlink DRAM (SLDRAM), Rambus direct RAM (RDRAM), direct Rambus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and Rambus dynamic RAM (RDRAM).
Computer 1212 also includes removable/non-removable, volatile/non-volatile computer storage media. FIG. 12 illustrates, for example a disk storage 1224. Disk storage 1224 includes, but is not limited to, devices like a magnetic disk drive, floppy disk drive, tape drive, Jaz drive, Zip drive, LS-100 drive, flash memory card, or memory stick. In addition, disk storage 1224 can include storage media separately or in combination with other storage media including, but not limited to, an optical disk drive such as a compact disk ROM device (CD-ROM), CD recordable drive (CD-R Drive), CD rewritable drive (CD-RW Drive) or a digital versatile disk ROM drive (DVD-ROM). To facilitate connection of the disk storage devices 1224 to the system bus 1218, a removable or non-removable interface is typically used such as interface 1226.
It is to be appreciated that FIG. 12 describes software that acts as an intermediary between users and the basic computer resources described in the suitable operating environment 1200. Such software includes an operating system 1228. Operating system 1228, which can be stored on disk storage 1224, acts to control and allocate resources of the computer system 1212. System applications 1230 take advantage of the management of resources by operating system 1228 through program modules 1232 and program data 1234 stored either in system memory 1216 or on disk storage 1224. It is to be appreciated that the claimed subject matter can be implemented with various operating systems or combinations of operating systems.
A user enters commands or information into the computer 1212 through input device(s) 1236. Input devices 1236 include, but are not limited to, a pointing device such as a mouse, trackball, stylus, touch pad, keyboard, microphone, joystick, game pad, satellite dish, scanner, TV tuner card, digital camera, digital video camera, web camera, and the like. These and other input devices connect to the processing unit 1214 through the system bus 1218 via interface port(s) 1238. Interface port(s) 1238 include, for example, a serial port, a parallel port, a game port, and a universal serial bus (USB). Output device(s) 1240 use some of the same type of ports as input device(s) 1236. Thus, for example, a USB port may be used to provide input to computer 1212, and to output information from computer 1212 to an output device 1240. Output adapter 1242 is provided to illustrate that there are some output devices 1240 like monitors, speakers, and printers, among other output devices 1240, which require special adapters. The output adapters 1242 include, by way of illustration and not limitation, video and sound cards that provide a means of connection between the output device 1240 and the system bus 1218. It should be noted that other devices and/or systems of devices provide both input and output capabilities such as remote computer(s) 1244.
Computer 1212 can operate in a networked environment using logical connections to one or more remote computers, such as remote computer(s) 1244. The remote computer(s) 1244 can be a personal computer, a server, a router, a network PC, a workstation, a microprocessor based appliance, a peer device or other common network node and the like, and typically includes many or all of the elements described relative to computer 1212. For purposes of brevity, only a memory storage device 1246 is illustrated with remote computer(s) 1244. Remote computer(s) 1244 is logically connected to computer 1212 through a network interface 1248 and then physically connected via communication connection 1250. Network interface 1248 encompasses wire and/or wireless communication networks such as local-area networks (LAN) and wide-area networks (WAN). LAN technologies include Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI), Copper Distributed Data Interface (CDDI), Ethernet, Token Ring and the like. WAN technologies include, but are not limited to, point-to-point links, circuit switching networks like Integrated Services Digital Networks (ISDN) and variations thereon, packet switching networks, and Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL).
Communication connection(s) 1250 refers to the hardware/software employed to connect the network interface 1248 to the bus 1218. While communication connection 1250 is shown for illustrative clarity inside computer 1212, it can also be external to computer 1212. The hardware/software necessary for connection to the network interface 1248 includes, for exemplary purposes only, internal and external technologies such as, modems including regular telephone grade modems, cable modems and DSL modems, ISDN adapters, and Ethernet cards.
What has been described above includes examples of the subject innovation. It is, of course, not possible to describe every conceivable combination of components or methodologies for purposes of describing the claimed subject matter, but one of ordinary skill in the art may recognize that many further combinations and permutations of the subject innovation are possible. Accordingly, the claimed subject matter is intended to embrace all such alterations, modifications, and variations that fall within the spirit and scope of the appended claims.
In particular and in regard to the various functions performed by the above described components, devices, circuits, systems and the like, the terms (including a reference to a “means”) used to describe such components are intended to correspond, unless otherwise indicated, to any component which performs the specified function of the described component (e.g., a functional equivalent), even though not structurally equivalent to the disclosed structure, which performs the function in the herein illustrated exemplary aspects of the claimed subject matter. In this regard, it will also be recognized that the innovation includes a system as well as a computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions for performing the acts and/or events of the various methods of the claimed subject matter.
In addition, while a particular feature of the subject innovation may have been disclosed with respect to only one of several implementations, such feature may be combined with one or more other features of the other implementations as may be desired and advantageous for any given or particular application. Furthermore, to the extent that the terms “includes,” and “including” and variants thereof are used in either the detailed description or the claims, these terms are intended to be inclusive in a manner similar to the term “comprising.”
1. A system that facilitates transferring resources, comprising:
a third party service provider that supports distributed hardware resources spread across a network to process and respond to an input; and
a dynamic allocation component that adds available hardware resources from one or more client devices.
2. The system of claim 1, the dynamic allocation component adds available hardware resources from the one or more client devices when such hardware resources are one of unutilized and underutilized.
3. The system of claim 1, the dynamic allocation component credits an account of a subscriber based upon the added available hardware resources.
4. The system of claim 1, the dynamic allocation component brokers the hardware resources to match supply and demand.
5. The system of claim 1, the third party service provider guarantees a minimum level of service by at least one of providing a subset of the hardware resources and contracting with sub-providers.
6. The system of claim 1, the dynamic allocation component dynamically allots the supported hardware resources.
7. The system of claim 6, further comprising an auction component that transfers at least a subset of the allotted resources that are unutilized.
8. The system of claim 7, the auction component facilitates at least one of selling, bartering, donating, trading, exchanging, and auctioning the unutilized, allotted resources.
9. The system of claim 7, the auction component dynamically prices the unutilized, allotted resources over time based upon one or more of a supply, a demand, and characteristics of the unutilized, allotted resources.
10. The system of claim 7, the auction component obtains user input that indicates the unutilized, allotted resources offered to be transferred.
11. The system of claim 7, the auction component automatically selects the unutilized, allotted resources available for transfer.
12. The system of claim 7, the auction component suggests to make available the unutilized, allotted resources for transfer.
13. The system of claim 7, the auction component determines a fair market price for the unutilized, allotted resources involved in the transfer.
14. A method that facilitates transferring resources, comprising:
dynamically apportioning distributed hardware resources supported by a third party service provider; and
adding disparate hardware resources available from one or more client devices, the disparate hardware resources thereafter being dynamically apportioned.
15. The method of claim 14, adding disparate hardware resources when such hardware resources are one of unutilized and underutilized by the one or more client devices.
16. The method of claim 14, further comprising crediting an account of a subscriber based upon the added disparate hardware resources.
17. The method of claim 14, further comprising guaranteeing a minimum level of service associated with the third party service provider.
18. The method of claim 14, further comprising trading a subset of the apportioned distributed hardware resources.
19. The method of claim 18, trading further comprises one or more of selling, bartering, donating, exchanging, and auctioning the subset of the apportioned resources.
20. A system that facilitates transferring distributed hardware resources supported by a third party service provider, comprising:
means for adding hardware resources supported by the third party service provider, the added hardware resources being hardware resources of one or more client devices; and
means for allotting the hardware resources based at least in part upon subscription data.
Filed: Dec 20, 2006
Publication Date: Apr 3, 2008
Applicant: MICROSOFT CORPORATION (Redmond, WA)
Inventors: Henricus Johannes Maria Meijer (Mercer Island, WA), William H. Gates (Medina, WA), Gary W. Flake (Bellevue, WA), William J. Bolosky (Issaquah, WA), Nishant V. Dani (Redmond, WA), Daniel S. Glasser (Mercer Island, WA), Alexander G. Gounares (Kirkland, WA), James R. Larus (Mercer Island, WA), Matthew B. MacLaurin (Woodinville, WA)
Current U.S. Class: Network Configuration Determination (370/254)
International Classification: H04L 12/00 (20060101);
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Justia Patents TriangulationUS Patent for Method and apparatus for radar measurement of ball in play Patent (Patent # 5,138,322)
Method and apparatus for radar measurement of ball in play
A system for continuously and precisely measuring the positions of a generally symmetrical object, e.g., a tennis ball, in motion in a predefined three-dimensional region, e.g., a tennis court, which transmits multiple radar signals from first, second, and third, spaced antenna devices, respectively, into the three-dimensional region. Multiple return signals are sensed and are compared with the transmitted signals to determine the phases of the return signals, to thereby obtain ambiguous ranges of the object. Ambiguities are removed by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem to obtain less-ambiguous ranges. Time-of-arrival range information is used in conjuction with the less-ambiguous ranges to provide unambiguous ranges over the range of interest. The unambiguous ranges are used to compute three-dimensional coordinates of the object that are accurate to within approximately 0.1 inches. A mathematical model defining boundaries of the three-dimensional region is completed by placing signal reflector devices on various boundary points of the three-dimensional region, and transmitting the radar signals when the object is not in the three-dimensional region. Coordinates of a projected trajectory are computed and compared with the actual coordinatres of the object, and certain characteristics are computed therefrom. Calibration of the system is maintained by placing signal reflector devices at various fixed locations within the region of interest and the return signals are processed to obtain an initial survey of the region and then to periodically resurvey the region.
The invention relates to precision radar range measurements of an object, or objects, (such as a tennis ball or baseball in play hereinafter referred to as the "object") based on the phase of the radar return from the "object", with measurements made at multiple frequencies, the Chinese Remainder Theorem being used to remove the range ambiguity inherent in using the phase as a measurement of range, and the radar return of the "object" of interest being separated from the radar return of competing clutter.
For fifteen years or more, the professional tennis community has been seeking a device to automatically call the lines in tennis matches, thus replacing up to eleven line umpires (including the net judge) per match and reducing the number of altercations during a match. Many devices have been built but most, if not all, have had some failing or limitation which made them unacceptable. It is highly probable that radar was considered by many of those attempting to find a solution. A radar solution probably was not given serious consideration because standard radar technology is incapable of achieving the required accuracy. The present invention removes this limitation.
For baseball, at least one attempt has been made to provide electronic tracking of a pitched ball. U.S. Pat. No. 4,545,576 discloses such a device using video cameras. To date, while partially successful, it has not proven sufficiently accurate to call balls and strikes (See UNIX Today! Mar. 18, 1991).
Standard radar techniques use the time of arrival of the return from an "object" as the basis of a range measurement. One-foot accuracy with such techniques is considered to be excellent. Also with such standard techniques, the radar-return's pulse-to-pulse phase difference is used for Doppler frequency measurements, but not to improve range measurement accuracy. However, as far as it is known, the phase of the return in conjunction with multiple transmitter frequencies and the Chinese Remainder Theorem has never before been used to make precision measurements of the range to an "object" (such as a tennis ball or baseball in flight).
The Chinese Remainder Theorem is presently used in some radar systems to resolve range ambiguities. But again, the range measurements are based on the time of arrival of the radar-return. In addition, the radar's pulse-repetition frequency (not the transmitted frequency as proposed herein) is the parameter which is varied to provide the necessary information for the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
In the field of laser range finders, the use of multiple laser modulating frequencies, phase detection and the Chinese Remainder Theorem has been proposed in U.S. Pat. No. 4,537,502. This prior art also mentions direct use of multiple frequencies instead of modulating a laser beam. This prior art specifically requires a "counting frequency f.sub.o " such that the multiple frequencies are related by:
f.sub.o =N.sub.r .multidot.N.sub.1 .multidot.f.sub.1 =N.sub.r .multidot.N.sub.2 .multidot.f.sub.2 =. . .
This prior art relates the accuracy of the technique to the size of N.sub.r and thus to the size of f.sub.o. To obtain the accuracies sought with the current invention, such a counting frequency would be required to be in the order of 200 GigaHertz, which is well beyond the state of the art for the practical use of such a counting frequency. The need for such a counting frequency and the resulting restrictions is considered to be unique to the proposed instrumentation of the prior art and does not apply to the present invention.
It is an object of the invention to provide a radar tracking device for precise measurement of the position of an object with an accuracy of less than a tenth of an inch.
Another object of the invention is to combine sets of range measurements so as to measure the three-dimensional position of an object with an accuracy of less than a tenth of an inch.
Another object of the invention is to provide a technique for precisely measuring the distance from a radar sensor to a symmetrical object with a precision to within a small fraction of a wavelength of the radiated energy and to avoid inaccuracy caused by competing clutter.
Another object of the invention is to provide a technique for reducing controversy and altercations during sporting events by eliminating human error in making calls.
Another object of the invention is to provide an accurate, almost instant, automatic technique for calling points in a tennis match, strikes in baseball, etc.
Briefly described, and in accordance with one embodiment thereof, the invention provides a system for continuously (tens of thousands of measurements per second) and precisely measuring the position of a generally symmetrical object in motion (the "object") in a predefined three-dimensional region in which multiple radar signals are transmitted from each of first, second, and third spaced antenna devices, respectively, into the three-dimensional region. The first, second, and third spaced antenna devices must not be collinear, or nearly collinear, in order to obtain accurate position measurements by trilateration. Furthermore, if the object approaches the plane defined by the positions of the first, second, and third, spaced antenna devices, then the measured position accuracy is reduced. The addition of a fourth antenna device not located in the same plane as the other three can alleviate such a reduction of accuracy. The object reflects multiple return signals corresponding to the multiple radar signals. The multiple return signals are sensed by means of receivers connected to the first, second, and third antenna devices, respectively. The multiple return signals are compared with the multiple radar signals, respectively, t determine the phases of the multiple return signals relative to the phases of the multiple radar signals, respectively, to thereby obtain ambiguous representations of ranges of the object relative to the first, second, and third antenna devices. Ambiguities of the first, second, and third ranges are removed by using modular arithmetic (with the use of the Chinese Remainder Theorem being the method of choice) to obtain first, second, and third less-ambiguous ranges relative to the antenna devices. First, second, and third time-of-arrival information is used in conjunction with the less-ambiguous ranges to obtain first, second, and third unambiguous ranges of the "object". Three-dimensional coordinates of the object are then computed using the unambiguous ranges. In the described embodiment, the object is a tennis ball and the three-dimensional region includes a tennis court. The first, second, and third antenna devices are located outside of the tennis court. Radar signals are transmitted from a plurality of additional spaced antenna devices, and the foregoing techniques are used to obtain additional unambiguous three-dimensional coordinates of the object, to allow averaging of multiple corresponding values of each of the three-dimensional coordinates to obtain final three-dimensional coordinates of the object. A "sanity check" may also be used to eliminate from the average those coordinate estimates which are not consistent with the majority of estimates or of previous estimates.
The accuracy to which the position of each antenna device is known directly affects the accuracy of the position measurement of the object. As an alternative to precision surveying for obtaining the position of each antenna device, a plurality of signal reflectors are placed at various fixed positions relative to the three-dimensional region, and each attenna device transmits the multiple radar signals at a time or times convenient for such activity. The foregoing techniques are performed to obtain the unambiguous distance from each antenna device to each signal reflector device, from which the three-dimensional coordinates of each of the antenna devices and signal reflector devices can be computed by solving multiple equations in multiple unknowns. A minimum of four antenna devices are required for use of this procedure. There is also a minimum number of signal reflector devices required. The minimum number of signal reflector devices depends upon the number of antenna devices. The first time this is performed, it effectively creates a precise survey of the antenna device positions. For additional occasions on which this technique is performed, each of the coordinates of each antenna device is then compared to a prior value of that coordinate to determine an amount by which the position of that antenna device has changed, for example due to temperature change.
Similarly, as an alternative to precision surveying, a mathematical model defining boundaries of the three-dimensional region is completed by placing signal reflector devices on various boundary points of the three-dimensional region, and transmitting the multiple radar signals at a time or times convenient for such defining measurements. The foregoing techniques are performed to obtain unambiguous three-dimensional coordinates of each of the signal reflector devices and thus of the boundary model. The above method of obtaining the model of the three-dimensional region is generally forgiving of some device imperfections since some of these same errors are also embedded in the model.
Unambiguous three-dimensional coordinates of the "object" in motion in the three-dimensional region are continuously compared to court-model boundaries determined by the mathematical model, and indications (e.g., audio signals) are produced when a three-dimensional coordinate of the "object" in motion exceeds a boundary of the mathematical model, e.g., when the ball is out of bounds. Coordinates of a projected trajectory of the "object" in motion (the tennis ball) are computed and compared with the actual coordinates of the "object" in motion, and a preselected characteristic (e.g., ball spin, net ball) of the "object" is computed from the differences.
FIG. 1 is a basic block diagram of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a perspective schematic diagram illustrating locations of multiple antenna devices relative to an "object" of interest.
FIG. 3 is a perspective diagram of an embodiment of the invention for tracking the flight of a tennis ball during play on a tennis court.
FIG. 4 is a block diagram useful in describing the invention.
FIG. 5 is a block diagram useful in describing the sensor set selection.
FIG. 6 is a block diagram of the typical functions of the exploitation computer box in FIG. 4.
FIG. 7 is a simple block diagram of one sensor in FIG. 4.
FIG. 8 is a block diagram of the transmitter in FIG. 7.
FIG. 9 is a timing diagram showing the resultant signals produced by three waveform generators in FIG. 8 after being switched between three sensors.
FIG. 10 is a block diagram of the data processor in the diagram of FIG. 7.
FIG. 11 is a block diagram of a subsystem in FIG. 10 for static-clutter reduction.
FIG. 12 is a diagram of frequency versus time for the receiver output in response to one pulse of one sensor.
FIG. 13 is a block diagram of the range processing box in FIG. 10.
FIG. 14 is a block diagram useful in explaining the use of Fast Fourier Transformation for interpolation in the system of FIG. 10.
FIG. 15 is a diagram illustrating the frequency responses of all the filters within a Doppler filter bank in FIG. 10.
FIG. 16 is a diagram illustrating a range/Doppler array output for a tennis ball in flight.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT OF THE INVENTION
The invention includes a radar device for precision measurement of the distance from the sensor to the object as previously defined. Using multiple sensors, the multidimensional position of the object can be determined to good precision via trilateration. Such measurements can be made at a rapid rate (tens of thousands of times per second). Thus the object can be tracked in its (or their) motion to very high precision.
The device of the invention uses the phase of the radar-return from the object to measure the precise but ambiguous distance from the sensor to the object. The device makes multiple range measurements using two or more transmitted frequencies. Then it uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to resolve the range ambiguity over the spatial field of interest. The accuracy of such measurements can be a small fraction of a wavelength of the radiated energy.
To obtain the desired precision, the radar-return from the object must be made large compared to noise and the return from competing clutter by a selection of suitable noise and clutter reduction techniques. Using sufficient transmitter power and/or using a low-noise-figure receiver and/or coherent Doppler processing ensures that the return from the object is large compared to noise. (See Skolnik, Merrill I., "Radar Handbook", Chapter 23, McGraw-Hill, N.Y., 1970.)
There are many ways to reduce the return from clutter. These techniques can be used individually or in combinations to reduce the competing clutter return. One such technique is to control the radiation pattern so as to minimize the energy transmitted to or received from objects outside the area or spatial domain of interest. Another technique is to cover competing objects with radar absorbing and/or deflecting material. A third is to range-gate the return thus eliminating all clutter at ranges sufficiently different from that of the object. A fourth is to pass the return through a Doppler filter, eliminating clutter that has a sufficiently different Doppler frequency than that of the object. If the clutter return is static, a fifth technique is to determine an estimate of the return from the clutter alone and then subtract the estimated clutter return from the combined return of the clutter and the object.
Potential applications of the object-tracking device of the invention include:
1. Calling the lines in tennis matches. The device can call all lines as well as service lets with no modification to the ball or court. The device can track the entire flight of the ball, giving such auxiliary data as ball speed, ball acceleration, height of ball travel, depth of ball travel, whether the player is hitting on the rise, how deep the ball is when it is struck, what type of spin (top, under, or side spin), and how much spin the player placed on the ball, etc.
2. Calling pitches (balls and strikes) and foul balls at baseball games. Again, the ball-tracking device can track the entire flight of the ball giving such auxiliary data as ball speed, ball acceleration, location of each pitch with respect to the strike zone, whether the pitch is a fast-ball, curve-ball, slider, and quantify the amount of curve on a pitch, etc. The device can also determine the depth of hits such as home runs.
3. Making goal-tending calls at basketball games.
4. Making line calls at such other games as jai alai, volleyball, racquetball, handball, squash, etc. Again, the device can provide auxiliary information similar to that described above for tennis and baseball.
5. Tracking golf balls. The device can provide ball-flight characteristic information for the players and/or the media, such as length of each shot, the height of each shot, the amount and type of spin, etc.
6. Scoring skeet and trapshooting. A sensor, or sensors, can track the clay pigeon. If a chip is removed from the target by a pellet, the apparent motion is modified and could be detected by the sensor. For this application, it may not be necessary to know the unambiguous range so, it may not be essential to use the multiple frequencies and Chinese Remainder Theorem.
7. Scoring accuracy of projectiles in artillery ranges and bombing ranges.
FIG. 1 is a basic block diagram of the invention. The object is designated by numeral 100. One or more sensors 110, 112, etc. each measure the distance from its antenna's phase center to the object. A sensor performs this measurement by using two or more transmitters and receivers 130, 132, etc., each of which is at a different frequency. All the transmitters and receivers for a given sensor use the same antenna aperture 120. The signal from each receiver contains the returns from everything within the antenna beam. The returns from the object must be isolated from the return of the clutter. This is accomplished with isolation circuits 140, 142, etc. by using some or all of the techniques listed earlier.
The output of each of the isolation circuits 140, 142, etc. is the phase of the return 150, 152, etc. from the object and the crude range to the object as measured by the time of arrival 151, 153, etc. As mentioned earlier, the phase of the radar-return from the object is used to measure the precise but ambiguous distance from each sensor to the object. The basic equation for relating range and the phase of the return is: ##EQU1## or, alternatively ##EQU2## Where Mod(A,B)=A-B.multidot.Int(A/B)=The modulo function.
Int(X)=The largest integer less than or equal to X.
.pi.=3.14159265 . . .
R.sub.a =The range from the a-th sensor to the object. Some deterministic corrections may be required, such as for the transmitter/receiver delays and the distance from the object's center to its return phase center.
.lambda..sub.1a =c/f.sub.1a =The wavelength of the first frequency of the a-th sensor.
c=The speed of light in the medium of interest.
f=The first frequency of the a-th sensor.
.phi..sub.1a =The phase of the object's return relative to the reference signal plus corrections for deterministic effects such as transmitter and receiver delays, etc.
The subscript letter refers to the sensor and the subscript number refers to the frequency within a sensor. There are similar equations for all of the other frequencies and sensors.
Also, as mentioned earlier, a sensor uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem executed by computing circuitry in Block 160 to greatly enlarge the unambiguous range interval. The Chinese Remainder Theorem uses the multiple ambiguous range measurements as provided by the use of the multiple transmitted frequencies.
An example is perhaps the easiest way to illustrate the principle of the Chinese Remainder Theorem: A man is in an enclosed room with no windows. He takes a sleeping pill and falls asleep. When he wakes up, he wants to know how long he has been asleep. To provide this information, he has two clocks in the room. One is a standard clock with 12 hours per revolution. The second is a special clock that has only 11 hours per revolution. When he went to sleep both clocks were at zero o'clock (12 o'clock for the standard clock and 11 o'clock for the special clock). When he wakes up the standard clock reads 3 o'clock and the special clock reads 5 o'clock. The solution of this problem can be obtained without the use of the Chinese Remainder Theorem, however the Chinese Remainder Theorem provides a simple straightforward solution and thus its use is the method of choice. The Chinese Remainder Theorem is used to determine how long he was asleep provided he was not asleep for more than 132 (11 times 12) hours.
First set N.sub.1 =12, the modulus of the first clock, and N.sub.2 =11, the modulus of the second clock. Now let R.sub.a, the number of hours he was asleep, be an integer less than N.sub.1 times N.sub.2 (i.e., 132). Assume that the value of R.sub.a is unknown, but for the example it is chosen to be 27. The values of m.sub.1a and m.sub.2a are the readings of the two clocks when he awoke. For the numbers in the example,
m.sub.1a =3=Mod(R.sub.a, N.sub.1)
Then, the Chinese Remainder Theorem specifies that there are numbers M.sub.1 and M.sub.2 such that R.sub.a is given by
Mod(Ra,N.sub.1 .multidot.N.sub.2)=Mod(m.sub.1a .multidot.M.sub.1 +m.sub.2a .multidot.M.sub.2, N.sub.1 .multidot.N.sub.1)
For the case of N.sub.1 =12 and N.sub.2 =11, the corresponding values of M.sub.1 and M.sub.2 which satisfy the theorem are M.sub.1 =121, and M.sub.2 =12. That is:
Mod(R.sub.a, 132)=Mod(423, 132)=27
for m.sub.1a =3 and m.sub.2a =5
The congruence in the Chinese Remainder Theorem becomes an equation for any value of R.sub.a less than N.sub.1 times N.sub.2.
More clocks can be used if even larger unambiguous intervals are desired. The number of N's increases with the number of clocks. For any given set of N's, there is a corresponding set of M's which is used to determine R.sub.a. The values of the M's can be derived deterministically using the Euclidean Algorithm- see Niven, Ivan Zuckerman, Herbert S., "An Introduction To The Theory Of Numbers", Third Edition, John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York, 1972 (Theorem 1.11 on p. 7), however, they can also be derived easily by trial and error with the aid of the following facts. ##EQU3##
The values of p.sub.1, p.sub.2, . . . are all integers which can be determined by trial and error such that their corresponding M modulos are 1.
Throughout this document, the values of the N's and M's are assumed to be the same for all sensors. While this would generally be the case, it is not essential. They could be different for each sensor.
For simplification, it will be assumed herein that there are three values of N and three corresponding values of M. The values of the N's and M's are assumed to be: ##EQU4##
With this example as background, the application of the Chinese Remainder Theorem to the invention will now be explained. To accommodate the Chinese Remainder Theorem, the wavelengths of the transmitted frequencies for a sensor are related to each other by a common distance, .DELTA.X.sub.a, via the following equations: ##EQU5## where N.sub.1, N.sub.2, . . . are each integers with no common factors, i.e., they are (pairwise) relatively prime. As mentioned above, it is assumed that there are three values of N as given above. The unambiguous range interval after the application of the Chinese Remainder Theorem is ##EQU6##
The values assumed above imply that .DELTA.X.sub.a =0.0333 inches.
The actual number of different frequencies (and thus the number of N's) is determined by the extent of the required unambiguous range. The resultant unambiguous range interval after the application of the Chinese Remainder Theorem should be larger than the range uncertainty remaining from the time-of-arrival range measurement, or some other measurement, or from a priori knowledge.
The values of .DELTA.X.sub.a, N.sub.1, N.sub.2, . . . are selected at the designer's discretion as long as the values of N.sub.1, N.sub.2, . . . are relatively prime. The range to the object is then given by the Chinese Remainder Theorem as:
Mod(R.sub.a, .DELTA.X.sub.a .multidot.N.sub.1 .multidot.N.sub.2 .multidot.. . . .multidot.N.sub.N)=.DELTA.=Mod[.DELTA.X.sub.a .multidot.(m.sub.1a .multidot.M.sub.1 +m.sub.2a .multidot.M.sub.2 +. . . +m.sub.Na .multidot.M.sub.N +Frac.sub.a), .DELTA.X.sub.a .multidot.N.sub.1 .multidot.N.sub.2 .multidot.. . . .multidot.N.sub.N ]
With ##EQU7##
N=The number of different frequencies used. ##EQU8##
Except for noise and other contamination, the values of Frac.sub.1a, Frac.sub.2a, . . . , Frac.sub.Na should all be the same. (In the example of the clocks, the minute hands should read the same.) Care should be taken to ensure that they are close to the same value by adjusting the values of the m's. As an example, let Frac.sub.1a =0.01, Frac.sub.2a =0.02, and Frac.sub.3a =0.99, then m.sub.3a should be incremented by 1 which then makes Frac.sub.3a =0.01.
This completes the description of the use of multiple frequencies in conjunction with the Chinese Remainder Theorem and the resultant precision range measurement. The discussion now returns to Block 160 of FIG. 1, for Precision Range Calculation With Ambiguity Removal. The precise but ambiguous range is computed for each frequency channel using the phase of the object's return. The circuitry in Block 160 then uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to greatly expand the unambiguous range interval. Other information, including the time-of-arrival range measurement, can be used to even further increase the unambiguous range interval. The unambiguous range measurement from each sensor 162, 164, . . . goes to the position computation circuit 170 where the three-dimensional position of the object is computed. This precise position information goes to the exploitation computer 180, the details of which are application-dependent; in most cases it includes the virtually continuous comparison of the object's position relative to the playing area. The output 190 of the exploitation computer 180 goes to the user or users.
The required accuracy for many applications demands that the sensors are calibrated with great precision and that the playing area be surveyed with great precision.
Another aspect of this invention is a mechanism for alleviating the required calibration and surveying precision. This mechanism is to use the tracking system itself to survey the playing area.
At least three sensors are used for trilateration. The actual number of sensors would vary depending upon the application. Six antenna devices 200, 202, 204, 206, 208, and 210, one for each of six sensors, are shown in FIG. 2. Each sensor precisely measures the distance from its antenna phase center to the object 2220. Since only three measurements are required for trilateration, the extra sensors cover additional area, are used to ensure that at least three sensors have adequate signal-to-noise and signal-to-clutter ratios, are used to provide even more accuracy to the position measurement, etc.
The trilateration used to convert the range measurements from multiple sensors to a three-dimensional position measurement is not unique to this invention (see Skolnik, Merrill I., "Radar Handbook", Chapter 36.8, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1970).
FIG. 3 illustrates a more specific example for the tennis application. A tennis court 300 is shown with eight antenna devices 200 through 214 more or less symmetrically located around it. The positioning of the antenna devices is not extremely critical, but they should be significantly elevated above the court surface to ensure sufficient position accuracy when the ball is close to the court surface and to minimize beam blockage. They could be mounted on poles, as shown, or they could be mounted on the stadium structure, etc. The positions of the antenna devices, once they are in place, must be calibrated to good precision. As conditions such as temperature change, the positions of the antenna devices may change and a new calibration may be required. One way to alleviate the need for such new calibrations is to use the device to recalibrate its own position. Immediately after the initial calibration, each sensor measures the distance from its antenna phase center to each of the quad-corner-reflectors 320 through 325. As conditions change, each sensor again measures the distance from its antenna phase center to each of the quad-corner-reflectors. The differences between the new measurements and the old measurements can be used to determine how much and in which directions the sensors and the corner reflectors have moved to allow correction for such motion. In the example there are 48 (8 sensors times 6 quad-corner-reflectors) measurements taken and 42 (3 degrees of motion for each of the 8 antenna phase centers and 6 quad-corner-reflectors) unknowns to be determined. Standard algebra and/or numerical analysis can provide the estimates of all 42 unknowns i.e., an estimate of the displacement of each sensor and each quad-corner-reflector. This recalibration can be performed during breaks in play. The placement of the corner reflectors should be somewhat symmetrical as shown; however, care must be exercised to ensure that no two corner reflectors occupy the same range bin in any sensor, or that the corner reflectors are all normally kept covered and are uncovered, during calibration or recalibration, one at a time. In this way, the radar-returns from every corner reflector can be detected by each sensor.
The initial position calibration could be performed with precision surveying equipment, but the preferred method is to use the above recalibration technique. The equations are non-linear and difficult to solve explicitly. The Newton-Raphson method for iterative approximations is one technique to solve such equations. (See William H. Press et al., "Numerical Recipes", Cambridge University Press, 1986.) The difference between the initial calibration and the recalibration is the number of iterations of the Newton-Raphson technique. Many iterations will normally be required for the initial calibration due to the inaccuracy of the first estimate of the positions of the corner reflectors and the antenna devices. One iteration would normally suffice for the recalibration.
Returning to FIG. 3, Processor 330 also contains the common components shared by multiple sensors. Cables 331-338 connect the processor 330 to the various antenna devices. Each such cable could be replaced with an optical or other kind of link. Block 340 contains the interface and control box for the umpire. Cable 350 connects the processor 330 to television- and radio-media broadcasting equipment.
FIG. 4 is a basic block diagram of the electronic equipment. Each sensor 110, 112, etc. measures the distance to the object with an accuracy of a small fraction, e.g. one-thirtieth, of the radar wavelength. This measurement can be repeated at a very high rate. The effective pulse-repetition-rate (PRF) can be tens or even hundreds of thousands of times per second. A substantial amount of hardware can be shared between the sensors 110, 112, etc. A more detailed description of the sensors is given later.
The outputs 162, 164, etc. of the sensors 110, 112, etc. are the precision range measurements.
Position Computation Circuit 170 performs the trilateration and outputs a signal 172 representing the object's position in three dimensions. The signal 172 is input to an exploitation computer 180. The accuracy of the trilateration is a function of the position of the sensors relative to the object, so some thought should be given to the sensor placement. The equations for trilateration (see Skolnik, Merrill I., "Radar Handbook", Chapter 36.8, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1970) are available elsewhere. The trilateration function as well as other processing functions (discussed later) could be performed in easily-designed application-specific hardware, in a general-purpose computer, or in a combination of the two, depending upon the rate and number of calculations desired.
In most cases there will be more sensors than just the minimum required for the multi-dimensional position calculations. In the tennis example there are 8 sensors, although, as mentioned earlier, only 3 are required for trilateration. One choice is to use the extra sensors to obtain even more accuracy. This could be done by using the sensors, three at a time, in most of the possible combinations (about 50 for the tennis example), to obtain multiple estimates of the object's position. Each estimate is given a "sanity check", and all estimates not consistent with the majority of other estimates or previous estimates are discarded. The remaining estimates are averaged to obtain the final estimate. Another choice for the use of the extra sensors is to just use the required number and ignore the rest. Under this condition, another task to be performed by Position Computation Circuit 170 is the selection of which sensors to use for the position computation.
FIG. 5 is a chart illustrating one method for the selection of sensors. Signal 500 is the last estimate of the three-dimensional position of the object or the estimate of where the object will appear. This position information 500 is used as the address in a simple look-up table 510 which yields the ordered preference for the sensor set to be used. Look-Up Table Output 520 is the preferred sensor set, Look-Up Table Output 521 is the second-choice sensor set and so on through Look-Up Table Outputs 522, 523, 524, and 525. The final sensor-set selection 540 is made between these choices, as indicated by Block 530, where the set of available sensors 540 is compared with the ordered preference of sensor sets. The sensor-set selection is rechecked any time the output of the look-up table changes or the available sensors change. A discussion of how the availability of a sensor is determined is given later in the discussion of the sensor.
Returning to FIG. 4, the exploitation computer 180 receives the position information and outputs its decisions and/or auxiliary data to the user or users. The details of this function are dependent on the application and even then the details may vary considerably from one user to another. An example will be given here for the tennis case.
Referring to FIG. 6, which shows the functions implemented by a typical exploitation computer, each point played in tennis starts with a serve. The comparator 602 tracks the flight of the ball using its three-dimensional position, represented by Signal 172, as it changes with time. In the vicinity of the net, the comparator 602 checks for velocity anomalies indicating that the ball touched the net. In any event, the comparator 602 continues to track the ball until it strikes the court surface, at which time a comparison is made between the ball's position and the service-box boundaries of the tennis-court model 606. A "fault" is called if the ball is outside the service-box boundary. A "let" is called if the serve touched the net but still landed inside the service box. If the serve was not a "let" nor a "fault", then the comparator 602 continues to track the flight of the ball and checks each time the ball strikes the court surface whether it was outside the playing area. If it lands outside, an "out-ball" is called. The comparator 602 has inputs from the court model 606 and from the umpire interface 604. The umpire indicates which service-box model to use and whether the singles or doubles court model should be used. The device is capable of automatically keeping score and keeping track of which service box-model to use, however, the umpire must be able to override any automatic operation.
The accuracy, in determining whether the tennis ball is inside or outside the boundary, would generally be enhanced by curve fitting a trajectory to the ball's position data received over a short period (a few milliseconds) prior to the ball's striking the court and again over a short period after the ball leaves the court. Such trajectory information would then be used to indicate where the ball first touched the court and last touched the court. (The accuracy of the ball's position measurement is generally at its worst when the ball is in contact with the court due to the ball's distortion and changing velocity.)
The model of the court is obtained at the same time as the sensor positions are calibrated. The positions of all the lines in the court could be obtained by precision surveying, however, the preferred method is to use the sensors themselves to obtain the court model. This is accomplished by placing a precision corner reflector sequentially at many positions along each line and then using the radar sensors (in sets of three at a time) to measure the three-dimensional position of the corner reflector at each position. The resultant models (one for each combination of three sensors) are stored in the non volatile memory of the exploitation computer 180. The great advantage of using the sensors to obtain the court model is that it relieves the sensor-calibration accuracy requirements. This is a result of the imperfections in the sensors being effectively neutralized by the same errors in the court model. There are many ways the exploitation computer 180 can handle the court model 606. One straightforward way is to enter the line positions in look-up tables stored in memory. When the ball nears the court surface, its position 172 is used as the address to a particular look-up table to determine the positions of the line or lines in the vicinity. Different look-up tables would be used for each combination of three sensors. The court need not be perfect, it can be humped, sloped, have curved lines or other anomalies.
Auxiliary data for the media and statistics keeping is also derived from the ball's position 172 as a function of time, as indicated by Block 608. The velocity of the ball is determined by comparing successive ball position measurements. The ball's flight with the expected flight if only gravity and drag were acting on the ball. Wind could affect the accuracy of the spin calculations. The direction and speed of ball travel after striking the court is another indication of spin. Other items of interest might include the depth of shots, the height of the ball's travel over the net, whether the player is hitting the ball on the rise, the position of the ball at the time the player strikes the ball, etc. This auxiliary data (along with the output of the comparator) can be made available to the media interface 610 and the statistics keeper 612.
FIG. 7 is a simple block diagram of one sensor. As with any other radar system, a sensor consists of a transmitter(s) 700, an antenna or antennas 120, a receiver(s) 710, and a signal processor 730.
Following is a list of steps describing the microwave portions of the sensor's operation.
1. A pulse is (or multiple pulses are) transmitted from each sensor and the echo (reflection or return) from the object (as well as all other scatterers in the antenna beam) is returned to the receiver. In most cases a stream of pulses is transmitted at an appropriate pulse-repetition-frequency (PRF). The multiple pulses generally improve the signal-to-noise ratio and allow Doppler filtering to aid in isolating the return of the nominally moving object from that of all other scatterers within the radar beam.
2. The transmission of multiple (three are assumed) frequencies is required for use with the Chinese Remainder Theorem. This is illustrated in FIG. 8, which is a simple block diagram of the transmitter 700 in FIG. 7. Waveform Generator 800 produces an output that is centered at the first frequency. Waveform Generator 802 produces an output that is centered at the second frequency, etc. The bandwidth of each of these waveform generators depends upon the desired time-of-arrival range resolution used for range-gating the data to reduce the clutter energy which could compete with the return from the object. Typical time-of-arrival range resolutions would be from 1 to 10 feet corresponding to a bandwidth between 600 Mhz and 60 Mhz with weighting (windowing). The frequency stability of these generators is critical since the range measurement (based upon the phase of the return) is inversely scaled with frequency.
The outputs of these generators 810, 812, etc. go to the switching network 820. All frequencies could be summed together and transmitted simultaneously, but it generally saves hardware to time-share the transmitter with the multiple frequencies. Thus the PRF would be multiplied by three (the number of frequencies) and a set of pulses (one for each frequency) would be transmitted at the original PRF. This time-sharing case is assumed for the rest of this discussion.
The power amplifier is thus time-shared between the multiple frequencies. In turn, each of the three waveform generators can be shared between three sensors as shown in FIG. 9. Thus the switching network 820 of FIG. 8 has three outputs, one for each of three sensors. Output 704.sub.a for Sensor a of the switching network 820 goes to Power Amplifier 830.sub.a. It also goes to the receiver 710 of FIG. 7 where it is used as the reference for the radar-return signal.
Output 702.sub.a of the power amplifier 830.sub.a goes to the antenna system 120 of FIG. 7. The antenna system 120 has either one or two antennas. In the case of a single antenna, this one antenna is used for both transmitting and receiving. Some type of transmit/receive switch or circulator device would be used in this case. Two antennas are used in this preferred embodiment. With two antennas, one antenna is used for transmitting and the second for receiving. The received signal 722 goes to the receiver 710.
3. To avoid interference, no two sensors are allowed to transmit the same frequency during the same pulse interval. In the time-shared case, three (the number of frequencies) sensors can share the same set of three frequencies by staggering the order of transmission among the sensors. Again, this is illustrated in FIG. 9. Other sensors would have a different set of frequencies.
4. In the receiver 710, the return from each pulse is compared (mixed) with a coherent reference signal (or signals) to produce a video signal. The conversion of the radio-frequency (RF) return to video can be done in one step or in multiple steps using intermediate-frequency (IF) stages. For this preferred embodiment, it is converted in one step.
FIG. 10 shows a simple expansion of Data Processor 730 in FIG. 7. This is the processor for only one sensor. Only one input 712 is shown, which is consistent with the case of time-shared transmission between the multiple frequencies. The first processing operation is the reduction of the return from static clutter performed in the static-clutter reduction circuit 1002. This static-clutter reduction is not essential to the operation of the device but it does reduce the required dynamic range of the subsequent processing. FIG. 11 illustrates one method of instrumenting the static-clutter reduction. The static-clutter model 1100, if available, is stored digitally in the device. In synchronism with the radar return, the data of Model 1100 is read from memory, converted to a time-varying analog voltage in Digital-to-Analog Converter (DAC) 1102 and subtracted from the received signal 712 in the subtraction network 1106. The analog signal 1108 out of the subtraction network is converted to a sequence of digital words in Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) 1110. The DAC 1102 and the ADC 1110 use the same clock.
One method for obtaining the clutter model is to operate the system when the object of interest is not present. The sequence of words out of the ADC 1110 is then added (with appropriate scaling) to the current static-clutter model 1100. This operation could be repeated several times to ensure the convergence of the ADC output to near zero. If a long time-constant is used (a very small-scaling number is used) in the above collection process, then the clutter model can be continuously updated even when the object is present since, for most applications, the object would be at any given range position for a very small percentage of the time. Using this last technique requires the clutter to be only quasi-static.
The output 1004 of the static-clutter reduction circuit 1002 goes to the range-processing circuit 1006. The details of the range processing vary with the details of the transmitted waveform and how it was converted to a video signal. For this preferred embodiment, the waveforms shown in FIG. 9 are used. This is a linear-frequency-modulated/continuous-wave (linear fm-cw). The time between the frequency switching transients is one "transmitter pulse". The same waveform is used as the reference in the receiver's mixer. The resultant receiver output waveform is shown in FIG. 12. The return from the object is virtually at a constant frequency. Clutter at a different range is also virtually at a constant but different frequency. The range processing is now provided by passing each return pulse through a bank of filters which can be easily implemented. FIG. 13 illustrates range processing operations including a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) based instrumentation of such a filter bank. The Fourier-transform of Block 1330 converts the time-domain data points to frequency-domain data points (see Skolnik, Merrill I., "Radar Handbook", Chapter 3.2, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1970). The real multiplier 1310 weights (windows) the incoming data to shape the filter's frequency response. Typical weighting functions 1320 would be Taylor, Hamming, or Hanning functions. The data are folded before and after the FFT. Only positive frequencies are kept at the FFT's output. The negative frequencies are discarded since they are just the complex conjugates of the positive frequencies, which is the result from passing real data through an FFT. The FFT's output data points are complex numbers with both a real and an imaginary part. Each data point out of the FFT represents a different range as per the following equation:
R=c.multidot.f/(2.multidot.fmRate)
f=The frequency point out of the FFT
fmRate=The frequency-vs.-time slope of the transmitted waveform.
The complex multiplier 1340 provides a phase rotation of the data points as a function of range. This is a correction for the fact that the center data point (the zeroth data point) does not occur at the time represented by the transmitter's center frequency for the pulse. The tilted line 1200 in FIG. 12 represents the position (time) of the center frequency as a function of range or frequency. The equation for this correction is: ##EQU9## Where: Exp(x)=The Napierian constant, 2.718281828 . . . , raised to the power x.
R.sub.0 =The range at which the zeroth data point lines up with the transmitter's center frequency.
j=The square root of minus one.
Each complex number from the range processor represents the return energy from all scatterers within a given range interval (or cell) from the sensor. The size of this range cell depends upon the bandwidth of the transmitted signal. As mentioned earlier it typically will be between 1 and 10 feet. This information is the "time of arrival" range estimate.
The output of the range-processing device 1008 goes to the distribution circuit 1020. The distribution circuit 1020 separates the single time-shared data stream into multiple data streams, one for each of the different frequencies. Each output from the distribution circuit, except the first output 1022, goes to Interpolation Network 1030, etc., where the effective pulse-transmission times are changed to correspond to the transmission time of the first channel. The interpolation is between data from different pulses, not data within a pulse. This interpolation compensates for the fact that the pulses for the multiple frequency channels were not transmitted simultaneously due to the time-sharing.
Most standard interpolation techniques could be used. Even linear interpolation could be used in some cases. Better interpolation is provided by the use of spline functions or resampling filters. The technique of choice is to use Fast-Fourier-Transform technology as illustrated in FIG. 14. This technique uses the principle that a time shift in the time domain is equivalent to a linear-phase-vs.-frequency shift in the frequency domain. FFTs 1410, 1412, etc. transform the data from the time domain to the frequency domain and Inverse FFTs 1440, 1442, etc. transform the data from the frequency domain back to the time domain. For each frequency channel (except the first), data 1024, 1026, etc. from a single range cell over many pulses (128 pulses as an example) are supplied to the FFT circuits 1410, 1412, etc. This input data set is numbered from -64 to +63, for example. Likewise, the FFT output data set is numbered from -64 to +63. This is sometimes referred to as "folding" the FFT input and output data sets. The transformed data are sent to the complex multipliers 1420, 1422, etc. where the data are given a Doppler-frequency-dependent phase rotation by multiplying by Signals 1430, 1432, etc. These are indicated by: ##EQU10## Where FTSz=The size of the FFT.=128 for the example.
i=The number of the FFT output sample. For the example, i is between -64 and +63.
A2=The amount of shift, in transmitter pulse intervals, needed to make the second-frequency data align with the first-frequency data. As an example, if there are three frequencies then A2 would typically be 1/3.
A3=The amount of shift, in slow-time samples, needed to make the third-frequency data align with the first-frequency data. For the same example, A3 would typically be 2/3.
These multiplications are followed by the inverse Fourier transforms 1440, 1442, etc., again with the input and output data folded. This procedure is repeated for each range cell of interest. Then, some of the data (about half for example) are replaced with new data returned from the next set of 64 pulses and the procedure is started over. Since only half the data is replaced, only half the output data points from the previous inverse FFT are kept (those numbered from -32 to +31).
On a pulse-by-pulse basis, the input to an interpolation box can be thought of as being stored in a first-in, first-out (FIFO) buffer. After the first iteration, where 128 pulses are needed to fill the buffer, the next 64 pulses are brought into the buffer. Each iteration produces 64 output data points for each range cell, the center points from the inverse FFT.
Returning to FIG. 10, the data 1040, etc. from the interpolation networks plus the data 1022 from the first output of the distribution circuit each go to a Doppler filter bank 1050 or 1052 etc. Each data channel contains a complete bank of filters. As with the FFTs discussed earlier, the Doppler filters, easily implemented by those skilled in the art, operate on data across pulses rather than along pulses, i.e., data from each range cell is filtered over many transmitter pulses.
FIG. 15 illustrates the typical response of all the filters within the bank. A typical value for the pulse-repetition frequency (PRF) is 10,000 pulses per second. The number of filters shown, 32, is for illustration only. A more typical number would be 128. The phase characteristics of the filters are important since phase is used for the range measurement. Because of this, finite-impulse-response (FIR) filters with symmetric impulse responses are the preferred choice. Another choice would be the use of a Fourier-transform instrumentation of such FIR filter banks. Such filters can be designed to have perfectly linear-phase-versus-frequency characteristics.
The output of any filter bank 1060 or 1062 or etc. is a three dimensional set of data. The three dimensions are range, Doppler frequency, and pulse-to-pulse time (i.e., "slow" time). Each digital number represents the return from a specific range cell, a specific Doppler cell (Doppler-frequency interval), and at a specific time. It is convenient to keep in mind that the return in a specific Doppler cell is the return from scatterers that are traveling at a specific velocity with respect to the sensor's antenna phase center.
FIG. 16 illustrates what a range/Doppler array output might look like at one point in time for a tennis ball. The purpose of this array of data is to be able to separate the return of the object from the return of all other objects (clutter) in the antenna beam. In any application there is a very high probability that the object's return will occupy a unique range and Doppler cell with no competing clutter within that cell. By using redundant sensors, then the probability can be made minuscule that the object is not separable in at least three sensors. A particular sensor is declared available for use in measuring the object's position if the ratio of the energy of the cell containing the object's return to that in surrounding cells is greater than a specified threshold.
Data 1060 from the first Doppler filter bank (it could be any filter bank or more than one) goes to the object location and tracking circuit 1070 in FIG. 10 where all a priori knowledge of the range and Doppler frequency of the object is used (along with the known return characteristics of the object) to locate the range/Doppler cell which contains the return of the object. Once located, the object is tracked in range and Doppler frequency until there is an abrupt change, such as a tennis ball being struck with a racquet or a baseball with a bat, at which time a new search is instigated.
The new search may only need to be across Doppler cells since an abrupt position change is usually not encountered because of the high PRF. The location of the cell containing the return signal 1072 of the ball is sent to the range and Doppler cell selection circuits 1080, 1082, etc. to indicate which data cells are to be selected. The Doppler cells to be selected change between transmitter-frequency channels, since Doppler frequency is also a function of the transmitted frequency.
The outputs 1060, 1062, etc. of the Doppler filter banks also go to the range and Doppler cell selection boxes 1080, 1082, etc. where the cells (one or more from each transmitter-frequency channel for each pulse) which contain the return of the object of interest are selected and passed on to the range measurement circuit 160. While data from only one range interval are generally required, there may be times when data from multiple Doppler cells at that one range interval are desired. Such times would be when a tennis ball strikes the court. At this time the return energy from the ball is spread across several Doppler cells. During this interval of time, it may be more accurate to use the data from all Doppler cells containing return energy from the ball and add them together prior to determining the phase of the return. This operation is performed in the range and Doppler cell selection box. The proper addition of data from different Doppler cells places another restriction on the Doppler filter bank design. The filter band-pass characteristics should be designed such that when the outputs of adjacent filters are added together, the resultant filter characteristic is still nominally flat, just wider. This condition is easily met.
The range-cell-location part 151 of Signal 1072 also goes to the range-measurement circuit 160 to give the crude (time-of-arrival) range to the object. The range-measurement box 160 first determines the precise but ambiguous range from the phase of the data in each channel. The equations for this are: ##EQU11## With ##EQU12##
These above results are then used by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, as outlined previously, to change the range ambiguity from {.lambda..sub.1a /2, .lambda..sub.2a /2, . . . } to {(.lambda..sub.1a /2).multidot.(N.sub.2 .multidot.N.sub.3 .multidot.. . . )}, where N.sub.1, N.sub.2, . . . are the integers used in selecting the transmitter frequencies.
The unambiguous range for this one sensor (the a-th sensor) is finally given by (there are, of course, similar equations for the other sensors) ##EQU13## Where ##EQU14## Rounded to nearest integer and:
ChR.sub.a =The range as determined by the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
RngC.sub.a =The number of the range cell that contained the return of the object (the zeroth cell is at zero range.)
CellSp=The spacing between range cells.
ObC=The calibrated distance from the phase center of the object's return to the center of the object.
This precision-range-measurement output signal 162, for each sensor, is sent to the position-measurement circuit 170 of FIG. 4. This completes the discussion on the processor.
Thus, the invention provides a radar device with a unique method of precision range measurements to an object, such as a moving tennis ball, in a region, such as a tennis court, based on the phase of the radar-return from the object. Multiple frequencies and the Chinese Remainder Theorem are used to remove the range ambiguity inherent in using phase as a measurement of range. The radar-return signals from the object are separated from clutter return signals, which can be aided by controlling the antenna illumination pattern, range gating, Doppler filtering, clutter cancellation techniques, etc. In this invention no "counting frequency" is required and the accuracy can be a very small fraction of the transmitting wavelength, restricted only by receiver noise and other anomalies.
While the invention has been described with reference to several particular embodiments thereof, those skilled in the art will be able to make the various modifications to the described embodiments of the invention without departing from the true spirit and scope of the invention. It is intended that all combinations of elements and steps which perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve the same result are within the scope of the invention.
1. A method of precisely measuring the positions of a generally symmetrical object in motion, in a predefined three-dimensional region, comprising the steps of:
(a) transmitting multiple radar signals from each of first, second, and third spaced antenna devices, respectively, into the three-dimensional region, the object reflecting multiple return signals corresponding to the multiple radar signals, respectively;
(b) sensing the return signals by means of receivers connected to the first, second, and third antenna devices, respectively;
(c) comparing the return signals with the corresponding transmitted multiple radar signals, respectively, to determine phases of the return signals relative to phases of the corresponding transmitted multiple radar signals, respectively, to obtain ambiguous representations of first, second, and third ranges of the object relative to the first, second, and third antenna devices, respectively;
(d) removing ambiguities of the first, second, and third ranges using modular arithmetic to obtain first, second, and third less-ambiguous ranges or unambiguous ranges of the object relative to the first, second, and third antenna devices, respectively;
(e) if the ambiguities removed in step (d) do not result in an unambiguous region sufficiently large to define first, second, and third unambiguous ranges of the object, using first, second, and third time of arrival range information and/or a priori information in conjunction with the first, second, and third less ambiguous ranges to obtain the first, second, and third unambiguous ranges of the object; and
(f) computing three-dimensional coordinates of the object using the first, second, and third unambiguous ranges and the coordinates of the first, second, and third antenna devices.
2. The method of claim 1 including transmitting multiple radar signals from one or more additional spaced antenna devices, and performing steps similar to steps (a)-(f) to obtain additional three-dimensional coordinates of the object, and averaging corresponding values of each of the three-dimensional coordinates to obtain more-robust three-dimensional coordinates of the object.
3. The method of claim 2 including eliminating three-dimensional coordinates the error of which exceeds a preselected value.
4. The method of claim 1 including repetitively comparing three-dimensional coordinates of the object in motion in the three-dimensional region to model boundaries determined by a mathematical-boundary model and producing indications of the object's position relative to such boundaries.
5. The method of claim 1 including computing projected trajectory coordinates of the object in motion, comparing actual coordinates of the object in motion with the corresponding projected coordinates, and computing preselected characteristics of the object from differences therebetween.
6. A method of precisely measuring the three-dimensional positions of a set of at least four spaced antenna devices and a set of spaced signal reflectors at various fixed positions relative to a three-dimensional region of interest, comprising the steps of:
(a) taking the position of one of the antenna devices or signal reflectors as the origin of the three dimensional coordinate system and taking the line between this origin and one other antenna device or corner reflector as one of a plurality of coordinate axes;
(b) transmitting multiple radar signals from each of the spaced antenna devices, respectively, into the three-dimensional region containing the set of signal reflectors, each signal reflector reflecting multiple return signals corresponding to the multiple radar signals, respectively;
(c) sensing the return signals of each signal reflector by means of receivers connected to each of the set of antenna devices, respectively;
(d) comparing the return signals from each of the signal reflectors with the corresponding transmitted multiple radar signals, respectively, to determine phases of the return signals relative to phases of the corresponding transmitted multiple radar signals, respectively, to obtain ambiguous representations of the range of each antenna device relative to each signal reflector;
(e) removing ambiguities of each of the set of ranges using modular arithmetic to obtain a less-ambiguous range or unambiguous range from each of the set of antenna devices to each of the set of signal reflectors;
(f) if the ambiguities removed in step (e) do not result in an unambiguous region sufficiently large to define the above set of unambiguous ranges, using time-of-arrival range information from each antenna device to each signal reflector and/or a priori information in conjunction with the less-ambiguous range from each antenna device to each signal reflector to obtain the unambiguous range from each antenna device to each signal reflector;
(g) obtaining crude three dimensional coordinates of each of all antenna devices and all signal reflectors from a priori information, and computing, using the unambiguous ranges and the crude three-dimensional coordinates, more precise three-dimensional coordinates of each antenna device and each signal reflector;
(h) periodically repeating the sequence of steps (b)-(g) to update all the three dimensional positions as ambient conditions change.
7. A method for obtaining a mathematical-boundary-model of a three-dimensional region of interest, comprising the steps of:
(a) placing signal reflectors, either simultaneously or in sequence, on various boundary points of the region;
(b) transmitting multiple radar signals from each of a set of at least three spaced antenna devices, respectively, into the three-dimensional region containing the signal reflectors, each signal reflector reflecting multiple return signals corresponding to the multiple radar signals, respectively;
(g) computing, using the unambiguous ranges and the three-dimensional coordinates of the antenna devices, the three-dimensional coordinates of each of the signal reflectors and thereby the boundary points; and
(h) generating a mathematical-boundary-model using the boundary points obtained in step (g), for each combination of three antenna devices.
8. A system for precisely measuring the positions of a generally symmetrical object in motion, in a predefined three-dimensional region, comprising in combination:
(a) first, second, and third spaced antenna devices;
(b) means for transmitting multiple radar signals from each of first, second, and third spaced antenna devices, respectively, into the three-dimensional region, the object reflecting multiple return signals corresponding to the multiple radar signals, respectively;
(c) means for sensing the return signals by means of receivers connected to the first, second, and third antenna devices, respectively;
(d) means for comparing the return signals with the corresponding transmitted multiple radar signals, respectively, to determine phases of the return signals relative to phases of the corresponding transmitted multiple radar signals, respectively, to obtain ambiguous representations of first, second, and third ranges of the object relative to the first, second, and third antenna devices, respectively;
(e) means for removing ambiguities of the first, second, and third ranges using modular arithmetic to obtain first, second, and third less-ambiguous ranges or unambiguous ranges of the object relative to the first, second, and third antenna devices, respectively;
(f) means for computing first, second, and third unambiguous ranges of the object, using first, second, and third time-of-arrival range information and/or a priori information in conjunction with the first, second, and third less ambiguous ranges if the ambiguities removed in step (e) do not result in an unambiguous region sufficiently large to define first, second, and third unambiguous ranges of the object; and
(g) means for computing three-dimensional coordinates of the object using the first, second, and third unambiguous ranges and the coordinates of the first, second, and third antenna devices.
9. The system of claim 8 including one or more additional spaced antenna devices, means for transmitting multiple radar signals from the one or more additional spaced antenna devices, and means for computing additional three-dimensional coordinates of the object, and averaging corresponding values of each of the three-dimensional coordinates to obtain more-robust three-dimensional coordinates of the object.
10. The system of claim 9 including means for eliminating three-dimensional coordinates the error of which exceeds a preselected value.
11. The system of claim 8 including means for obtaining a mathematical-boundary-model, means for repetitively comparing three-dimensional coordinates of the object in motion in the three-dimensional region to court model boundaries determined by the mathematical-boundary-model and producing indications of the object's position relative to such boundaries.
12. The system of claim 8 including means for computing projected trajectory coordinates of the object in motion, means for comparing actual coordinates of the object in motion with the corresponding projected coordinates, and means for computing preselected characteristics of the object from differences therebetween.
13. A system for precisely measuring the three-dimensional positions of a set of at least four spaced antenna devices and a set of spaced signal reflectors at various fixed positions relative to a three-dimensional region of interest, comprising in combination:
(a) a set of at least four antenna devices and a set of signal reflectors;
(b) means for taking a position of one of the antenna devices or signal reflectors as the origin of the three-dimensional coordinate system and taking a line between this origin and one other antenna device or corner reflector as one of the coordinate axes;
(c) means for transmitting multiple radar signals from each of the set of spaced antenna devices, respectively, into the three-dimensional region containing the set of signal reflectors, means for each signal reflector reflecting multiple return signals corresponding to the multiple radar signals, respectively;
(d) means for sensing the return signals of each signal reflector by means of receivers connected to each of the set of antenna devices, respectively;
(e) means for comparing the return signals from each of the signal reflectors with the corresponding transmitted multiple radar signals, respectively, to determine phases of the return signals relative to phases of the corresponding transmitted multiple radar signals, respectively, to obtain ambiguous representations of the range of each antenna device relative to each signal reflector;
(f) means for removing ambiguities of each of the set of ranges using modular arithmetic to obtain a less-ambiguous range or unambiguous range from each of the set of antenna devices to each of the set of signal reflectors;
(g) means for using time-of-arrival range information from each antenna device to each signal reflector and/or a priori information in conjunction with the less-ambiguous range from each antenna device to each signal reflector to obtain the unambiguous range from each antenna device to each signal reflector, if the ambiguities removed by the means of step (f) do not result in an unambiguous region sufficiently large to define the above set of unambiguous ranges;
(h) means for obtaining the crude three dimensional coordinates of each of the antenna devices and all signal reflectors from a priori information, and means for computing, using the unambiguous ranges and the crude three-dimensional coordinates, more precise three-dimensional coordinates of each antenna device and each signal reflector.
14. A system for obtaining a mathematical-boundary-model of the region of interest, comprising in combination:
(a) a set of at least three antenna devices and at least one signal reflector;
(b) means for placing signal reflectors, either simultaneously or in sequence, on various boundary points of the three-dimensional region;
(c) means for transmitting multiple radar signals from each of a set of at least three spaced antenna devices, respectively, into the three-dimensional region containing the signal reflectors, means for each signal reflector reflecting multiple return signals corresponding to the multiple radar signals, respectively;
(g) means for using time-of-arrival range information from each antenna device to each signal reflector and/or a priori information in conjunction with the less-ambiguous range from each antenna device to each signal reflector to obtain the unambiguous range from each antenna device to each signal reflector, if the ambiguities removed by means of step (f) do not result in an unambiguous region sufficiently large to define the above set of unambiguous ranges;
(h) means for computing, using the unambiguous ranges and the three-dimensional coordinates of the antenna devices, the three-dimensional coordinates of each of the signal reflectors and thereby the boundary points for each combination of three antenna devices; and
(i) means for generating a mathematical-boundary-model using the boundary points.
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Filed: Aug 20, 1991
Date of Patent: Aug 11, 1992
Assignee: Matrix Engineering, Inc. (Midvale, UT)
Inventor: Jerry A. Nuttall (Midvale, UT)
Primary Examiner: Gilberto Barron, Jr.
Law Firm: Cahill, Sutton & Thomas
Current U.S. Class: Triangulation (342/126); Phase Comparison (342/127); Plural Frequencies Transmitted (342/129); Having Plural Transmitters Or Receivers (342/463); 273/29R
International Classification: G01S 1338; G01S 506;
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Reality and Mirages in Egypt
and the Arab world! - 2
by K. Gajendra Singh
Continued from Previous Page
RAND and Kefaya
No less a US defense establishment think-tank than the RAND Corporation has conducted a detailed study of Kefaya. The Kefaya study as RAND themselves note, was "sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community." [11]
A nicer bunch of democratically-oriented gentlemen and women could hardly be found.
In their 2008 report to the Pentagon, the RAND researchers noted the following in relation to Egypt's Kefaya:
"The United States has professed an interest in greater democratization in the Arab world, particularly since the September 2001 attacks by terrorists from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Lebanon. This interest has been part of an effort to reduce destabilizing political violence and terrorism. As President George W. Bush noted in a 2003 address to the National Endowment for Democracy, “As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export” (The White House, 2003). The United States has used varying means to pursue democratization, including a military intervention that, though launched for other reasons, had the installation of a democratic government as one of its end goals.
However, indigenous reform movements are best positioned to advance democratization in their own country." [12]RAND researchers have spent years perfecting techniques of unconventional regime change under the name "swarming," the method of deploying mass mobs of digitally-linked youth in hit-and-run protest formations moving like swarms of bees.[13]
Washington and the stable of "human rights" and "democracy" and "non-violence" NGOs it oversees, over the past decade or more has increasingly relied on sophisticated "spontaneous" nurturing of local indigenous protest movements to create pro-Washington regime change and to advance the Pentagon agenda of global Full Spectrum Dominance. As the RAND study of Kefaya states in its concluding recommendations to the Pentagon:
"The US government already supports reform efforts through organizations such as the US Agency for International Development and the United Nations Development Programme. Given the current negative popular standing of the United States in the region, US support for reform initiatives is best carried out through nongovernmental and nonprofit institutions." [14]The RAND 2008 study was even more concrete about future US Government support for Egyptian and other "reform" movements:
"The US government should encourage nongovernmental organizations to offer training to reformers, including guidance on coalition building and how to deal with internal differences in pursuit of democratic reform. Academic institutions (or even nongovernmental organizations associated with US political parties, such as the International Republican Institute or the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs) could carry out such training, which would equip reform leaders to reconcile their differences peacefully and democratically.
"Fourth, the United States should help reformers obtain and use information technology, perhaps by offering incentives for US companies to invest in the region’s communications infrastructure and information technology. US information technology companies could also help ensure that the Web sites of reformers can remain in operation and could invest in technologies such as anonymizers that could offer some shelter from government scrutiny. This could also be accomplished by employing technological safeguards to prevent regimes from sabotaging the Web sites of reformers. “[15] As their Kefaya monograph states, it was prepared in 2008 by the "RAND National Security Research Division’s Alternative Strategy Initiative, sponsored by the Rapid Reaction Technology Office in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
The Alternative Strategy Initiative, just to underscore the point, includes "research on creative use of the media, radicalization of youth, civic involvement to stem sectarian violence, the provision of social services to mobilize aggrieved sectors of indigenous populations, and the topic of this volume, alternative movements." [16]In May 2009 just before Obama's Cairo trip to meet Mubarak, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hosted a number of the young Egyptian activists in Washington under the auspices of Freedom House, another "human rights" Washington-based NGO with a long history of involvement in US-sponsored regime change from Serbia to Georgia to Ukraine and other Color Revolutions. Clinton and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman met the sixteen activists at the end of a two-month "fellowship" organized by Freedom House’s New Generation program. [17]
Freedom House and Washington's government-funded regime change NGO, National Endowment for Democracy (NED) are at the heart of the uprisings now sweeping across the Islamic world. They fit the geographic context of what George W. Bush proclaimed after 2001 as his Greater Middle East Project to bring "democracy" and "liberal free market" economic reform to the Islamic countries from Afghanistan to Morocco. When Washington talks about introducing “liberal free market reform” people should watch out. It is little more than code for bringing those economies under the yoke of the dollar system and all that implies.
Washington's NED in a larger agenda: If we make a list of the countries in the region which are undergoing mass-based protest movements since the Tunisian and Egyptian events and overlay them onto a map, we find an almost perfect convergence between the protest countries today and the original map of the Washington Greater Middle East Project that was first unveiled during the George W. Bush Presidency after 2001.
Washington's NED has been quietly engaged in preparing a wave of regime destabilizations across North Africa and the Middle East since the 2001-2003 US military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The list of where the NED is active is revealing. Its website lists Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Sudan as well, interestingly, as Israel. Coincidentally these countries are almost all today subject to "spontaneous" popular regime-change uprisings.
The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs mentioned by the RAND document study of Kefaya are subsidiary organizations of the Washington-based and US Congress-financed National Endowment for Democracy.
The NED is the coordinating Washington agency for regime destabilization and change. It is active from Tibet to Ukraine, from Venezuela to Tunisia, from Kuwait to Morocco in reshaping the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union into what George H.W. Bush in a 1991 speech to Congress proclaimed triumphantly as the dawn of a New World Order. [18]As the architect and first head of the NED, Allen Weinstein told the Washington Post in 1991 that, "a lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA"[19]The NED Board of Directors includes or has included former Defense Secretary and CIA Deputy head, Frank Carlucci of the Carlyle Group; retired General Wesley Clark of NATO; neo-conservative warhawk Zalmay Khalilzad who was architect of George W. Bush's Afghan invasion and later ambassador to Afghanistan as well as to occupied Iraq. Another NED board member, Vin Weber, co-chaired a major independent task force on US Policy toward Reform in the Arab World with former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and was a founding member of the ultra-hawkish Project for a New American Century think-tank with Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld, which advocated forced regime change in Iraq as early as 1998. [20]
The NED is supposedly a private, non-government, non-profit foundation, but it receives a yearly appropriation for its international work from the US Congress. The National Endowment for Democracy is dependent on the US taxpayer for funding, but because NED is not a government agency, it is not subject to normal Congressional oversight.
NED money is channeled into target countries through four “core foundations”—the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, linked to the Democratic Party; the International Republican Institute tied to the Republican Party; the American Center for International Labor Solidarity linked to the AFL-CIO US labor federation as well as the US State Department; and the Center for International Private Enterprise linked to the free-market US Chamber of Commerce.
The late political analyst Barbara Conry noted that,
"NED has taken advantage of its alleged private status to influence foreign elections, an activity that is beyond the scope of AID or USIA and would otherwise be possible only through a CIA covert operation. Such activities, it may also be worth noting, would be illegal for foreign groups operating in the United States." [21]
Significantly the NED details its various projects today in Islamic countries, including in addition to Egypt, in Tunisia, Yemen, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Iran and Afghanistan. In short, most every country which is presently feeling the earthquake effects of the reform protests sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa is a target of NED. [22]
In 2005 US President George W. Bush made a speech to the NED. In a long, rambling discourse which equated "Islamic radicalism" with the evils of communism as the new enemy, and using a deliberately softer term "broader Middle East" for the term Greater Middle East that had aroused much distrust in the Islamic world, Bush stated,
"The fifth element of our strategy in the war on terror is to deny the militants future recruits by replacing hatred and resentment with democracy and hope across the broader Middle East. This is a difficult and long-term project, yet there's no alternative to it. Our future and the future of that region are linked. If the broader Middle East is left to grow in bitterness, if countries remain in misery, while radicals stir the resentments of millions, then that part of the world will be a source of endless conflict and mounting danger, and for our generation and the next. If the peoples of that region are permitted to choose their own destiny, and advance by their own energy and by their participation as free men and women, then the extremists will be marginalized, and the flow of violent radicalism to the rest of the world will slow, and eventually end...We're encouraging our friends in the Middle East, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to take the path of reform, to strengthen their own societies in the fight against terror by respecting the rights and choices of their own people. We're standing with dissidents and exiles against oppressive regimes, because we know that the dissidents of today will be the democratic leaders of tomorrow..." [23]
The US Project for a 'Greater Middle East'
The spreading regime change operations Washington from Tunisia to Sudan, from Yemen to Egypt to Syria are best viewed in the context of a long-standing Pentagon and State Department strategy for the entire Islamic world from Kabul in Afghanistan to Rabat in Morocco.
The rough outlines of the Washington strategy, based in part on their successful regime change operations in the former Warsaw Pact communist bloc of Eastern Europe, were drawn up by former Pentagon consultant and neo-conservative, Richard Perle and later Bush official Douglas Feith in a white paper they drew up for the then-new Israeli Likud regime of Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996.
That policy recommendation was titled A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm. It was the first Washington think-tank paper to openly call for removing Saddam Hussein in Iraq, for an aggressive military stance toward the Palestinians, striking Syria and Syrian targets in Lebanon. [24] Reportedly, the Netanyahu government at that time buried the Perle-Feith report, as being far too risky.
By the time of the events of September 11, 2001 and the return to Washington of the arch-warhawk neoconservatives around Perle and others, the Bush Administration put highest priority on an expanded version of the Perle-Feith paper, calling it their Greater Middle East Project. Feith was named Bush’s Under Secretary of Defense.
Behind the facade of proclaiming democratic reforms of autocratic regimes in the entire region, the Greater Middle East was and is a blueprint to extend US military control and to break open the statist economies in the entire span of states from Morocco to the borders of China and Russia.
In May 2009, before the rubble from the US bombing of Baghdad had cleared, George W. Bush, a President not remembered as a great friend of democracy, proclaimed a policy of "spreading democracy" to the entire region and explicitly noted that that meant "the establishment of a US-Middle East free trade area within a decade." [25]Prior to the June 2004 G8 Summit on Sea Island, Georgia, Washington issued a working paper, "G8-Greater Middle East Partnership." Under the section titled Economic Opportunities was Washington's dramatic call for "an economic transformation similar in magnitude to that undertaken by the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe."
The US paper said that the key to this would be the strengthening of the private sector as the way to prosperity and democracy. It misleadingly claimed it would be done via the miracle of microfinance whereas the paper put it, "a mere $100 million a year for five years will lift 1.2 million entrepreneurs (750,000 of them women) out of poverty, through $400 loans to each." [26]
The US plan envisioned takeover of regional banking and financial affairs by new institutions ostensibly international but, like World Bank and IMF, de facto controlled by Washington, including WTO. The goal of Washington’s long-term project is to completely control the oil, to completely control the oil revenue flows, to completely control the entire economies of the region, from Morocco to the borders of China and all in between. It is a project as bold as it is desperate.
Once the G8 US paper was leaked in 2004 in the Arabic Al-Hayat, opposition to it spread widely across the region, with a major protest to the US definition of the Greater Middle East. As an article in the French Le Monde Diplomatique in April 2004 noted, "besides the Arab countries, it covers Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Israel, whose only common denominator is that they lie in the zone where hostility to the US is strongest, in which Islamic fundamentalism in its anti-Western form is most rife." [27] It should be noted that the NED is also active inside Israel with a number of programs.
Notably, in 2004 it was vehement opposition from two Middle East leaders—Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and the King of Saudi Arabia—that forced the ideological zealots of the Bush Administration to temporarily put the Project for the Greater Middle East on a back burner.
Will it work?
At this writing it is unclear what the ultimate upshot of the latest US-led destabilizations across the Islamic world will bring. It is not clear what will result for Washington and the advocates of a US-dominated New World Order. Their agenda is clearly one of creating a Greater Middle East under firm US grip as a major control of the capital flows and energy flows of a future China, Russia and a European Union that might one day entertain thoughts of drifting away from that American order.
It has huge potential implications for the future of Israel as well. As one US commentator put it, "The Israeli calculation today is that if 'Mubarak goes' (which is usually stated as 'If America lets Mubarak go'), Egypt goes. If Tunisia goes (same elaboration), Morocco and Algeria go. Turkey has already gone (for which the Israelis have only themselves to blame). Syria is gone (in part because Israel wanted to cut it off from Sea of Galilee water access). Gaza has gone to Hamas, and the Palestine Authority might soon be gone too (to Hamas?). That leaves Israel amid the ruins of a policy of military domination of the region." [28]
The Washington strategy of "creative destruction" is clearly causing sleepless nights not only in the Islamic world but also reportedly in Tel Aviv, and ultimately by now also in Beijing and Moscow and across Central Asia.
* F. William Engdahl is author of Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order. His book, A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order has just been reissued in a new edition. He may be contacted via his website, www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net.
[1] DEBKA, Mubarak believes a US-backed Egyptian military faction plotted his ouster, February 4, 2011, accessed in www.debka.com/weekly/480/. DEBKA is open about its good ties to Israeli intelligence and security agencies. While its writings must be read with that in mind, certain reports they publish often contain interesting leads for further investigation.
[3] The Center for Grassroots Oversight, 1954-1970: CIA and the Muslim Brotherhood ally to oppose Egyptian President Nasser, www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=western_support_for_islamic_militancy_202700&scale=0. According to the late Miles Copeland, a CIA official stationed in Egypt during the Nasser era, the CIA allied with the Muslim Brotherhood which was opposed to Nasser's secular regime as well as his nationalist opposition to brotherhood pan-Islamic ideology.
[4] Jijo Jacob, What is Egypt's April 6 Movement? February 1, 2011, accessed in http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/107387/20110201/what-is-egypt-s-april-6-movement.htm
[6] Janine Zacharia, Opposition groups rally around Mohamed ElBaradei, Washington Post, January 31, 2011, accessed in http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/31/AR2011013103470_2.html?sid=ST2011013003319.
[7] National Endowment for Democracy, Middle East and North Africa Program Highlights 2009, accessed in http://www.ned.org/where-we-work/middle-east-and-northern-africa/middle-east-and-north-africa-highlights.
[8] Amitabh Pal, Gene Sharp: The Progressive Interview, The Progressive, March 1, 2007.
[9] Emmanuel Sivan, Why Radical Muslims Aren't Taking over Governments, Middle East Quarterly, December 1997, pp. 3-9
[10] Carnegie Endowment, The Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya), accessed in http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/22/the-egyptian-movement-for-change-kifaya
[11] Nadia Oweidat, et al, The Kefaya Movement: A Case Study of a Grassroots Reform Initiative, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Santa Monica, Ca., RAND_778.pdf, 2008, p. iv.
[13] For a more detailed discussion of the RAND "swarming" techniques see F. William Engdahl, Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order, edition.engdahl, 2009, pp. 34-41.
[14] Nadia Oweidat et al, op. cit., p. 48.
[15] Ibid., p. 50.
[16] Ibid., p. iii.
[17] Michel Chossudovsky, The Protest Movement in Egypt: "Dictators" do not Dictate, They Obey Orders, January 29, 2011, accessed in http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=22993
[18] George Herbert Walker Bush, State of the Union Address to Congress, 29 January 1991. In the speech Bush at one point declared in a triumphant air of celebration of the collapse of the Soviet Union, "What is at stake is more than one small country, it is a big idea—a new world order..."
[19] Allen Weinstein, quoted in David Ignatius, Openness is the Secret to Democracy, Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 30 September 1991, pp. 24-25.
[20] National Endowment for Democracy, Board of Directors, accessed in http://www.ned.org/about/board
[21] Barbara Conry, Loose Cannon: The National Endowment for Democracy, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 27, November 8, 1993, accessed in http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-027.html.
[22] National Endowment for Democracy, 2009 Annual Report, Middle East and North Africa, accessed in http://www.ned.org/publications/annual-reports/2009-annual-report.
[23] George W. Bush, Speech at the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC, October 6, 2005, accessed in http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.06.05.html.
[24] Richard Perle, Douglas Feith et al, A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm, 1996, Washington and Tel Aviv, The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, accessed in www.iasps.org/strat1.htm
[25] George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina, White House, 9 May 2003.
[26] Gilbert Achcar, Fantasy of a Region that Doesn't Exist: Greater Middle East, the US plan, Le Monde Diplomatique, April 4, 2004, accessed in http://mondediplo.com/2004/04/04world
[28] William Pfaff, American-Israel Policy Tested by Arab Uprisings, accessed in http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/american-israeli_policy_tested_by_arab_uprisings_20110201/
More by : K. Gajendra Singh
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Sawbones
Interest age: 11+
Reading age: 11+
Author: Catherine Johnson
Publisher: Walker Books
In 18th century London, 16-year-old Ezra is working as apprentice to a highly respected surgeon, William McAdam. He knows that his impressive knowledge of anatomy and skill at the dissection table will ensure he has a trade for life. Yet whilst he is grateful to his master, who rescued him from a life of slavery, Ezra is eager for independence and to be his own man.
Then a strange series of events changes everything. Now, McAdam is dead, and Ezra is alone - except for the unconventional Miss Loveday Finch, daughter of a magician, who is looking for answers about her father's death. Soon, the pair find themselves tangled in an adventure featuring grave-robbing, body-switching and political intrigue, which takes them a journey across London from the Operating Theatre at St Bart's, to the vaults of Newgate Prison, to the shadowy Ottoman Embassy.
This exciting mystery story has plenty of gore from its opening pages, and is sure to grab the attention of young readers who enjoy gripping crime thrillers. Yet Sawbones also offers much more than blood and guts: Catherine Johnson has penned a clever historical novel that provides a fascinating insight into an aspect of the 18th century, which is likely to be unfamiliar to many readers. The pragmatic, scientifically-minded Ezra and the wild, tempestuous Loveday perfectly capture two sides of 18th century thought - empiricism and romanticism - and Johnson clearly takes pleasure in subverting conventional stereotypes of race and gender. Both thought-provoking and accessible, this is an impressive historical adventure.
Catherine Johnson, of Jamaican-Welsh heritage, grew up in north London. She has written over 20 novels for young readers. Her most recent historical novels were nominated for the Carnegie Medal. Sawbones won the Young Quills Award for best historical fiction for 12+, and The Curious Tale of The Lady Caraboo was shortlisted for the Booksellers' Young Adult Prize.
She has also written for TV including Rough Crossings for BBC2 with Simon Schama and popular continuing drama Holby City on BBC1. Her film work includes the award-winning Bullet Boy (2004), and her radio play, Fresh Berries, was shortlisted for the Prix Italia. She has been a Reader in Residence at the London Southbank Centre's Imagine Children's Literature Festival. Catherine lives in Hastings.
Older children and teenagers will enjoy these compelling stories set in times past - from exciting adventures to thought-provoking tales of troubled times.
A Nest Of Vipers
We meet Cato Hopkins in Newgate Prison in September 1712, on the morning of the day he is due to be hanged for fraud.
Read more about A Nest Of Vipers
Fleshmarket
Author: Nicola Morgan
When Essie and Robbie’s mother dies, following a failed operation, they are abandoned by their father and left to fend for themselves in nineteenth-century Edinburgh.
Read more about Fleshmarket
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Previous ShowNext ShowBack to 2000 Shows
Later With Cynthia Garrett
NBC Studio 5, Burbank, CA, United States
Monday, March 6, 2000 at 7:00pm PST
Ben Harper was the featured guest on the late night talk show, "Later." Host Cynthia Garrett bombarded Ben with questions ranging from life as a musician to life as a father. During the breaks from the interview, the show featured live clips of "Steal My Kisses", "Forgiven" (both from 10/19/99), "Burn To Shine", and "Alone" (the latter two from "Sessions At West 54th"). After the interview, The Innocent Criminals joined Ben to perform "Steal My Kisses." Following the break, Ben closed the show with an acoustic "Beloved One."
David Leach
Dean Butterworth
Juan Nelson
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1 - Now in the third year of Hoshea son of Elah king of Israel, Hezekiah the son of Ahaz king of Judah began to reign.
2 - He was twenty-five years old when he began to reign, and he reigned twenty-nine years in Jerusalem. His mother's name was Abi the daughter of Zechariah.
3 - He did that which was right in The LORD's eyes, according to all that David his father had done.
4 - He removed the high places, and broke the pillars, and cut down the Asherah. He also broke in pieces the bronze serpent that Moses had made, because in those days the children of Israel burned incense to it; and he called it Nehushtan.
5 - He trusted in The LORD, the God of Israel; so that after him was no one like him among all the kings of Judah, nor among them that were before him.
6 - For he joined with The LORD. He didn't depart from following him, but kept his commandments, which the LORD commanded Moses.
7 - The LORD was with him. Wherever he went, he prospered. He rebelled against the king of Assyria, and didn't serve him.
8 - He struck the Philistines to Gaza and its borders, from the tower of the watchmen to the fortified city.
9 - In the fourth year of king Hezekiah, which was the seventh year of Hoshea son of Elah king of Israel, Shalmaneser king of Assyria came up against Samaria, and besieged it.
10 - At the end of three years they took it. In the sixth year of Hezekiah, which was the ninth year of Hoshea king of Israel, Samaria was taken.
11 - The king of Assyria carried Israel away to Assyria, and put them in Halah, and on the Habor, the river of Gozan, and in the cities of the Medes,
12 - because they didn't obey the LORD their God's voice, but transgressed his covenant, even all that Moses the servant of the LORD commanded, and would not hear it or do it.
13 - Now in the fourteenth year of king Hezekiah, Sennacherib king of Assyria came up against all the fortified cities of Judah, and took them.
14 - Hezekiah king of Judah sent to the king of Assyria to Lachish, saying, "I have offended you. Return from me. That which you put on me, I will bear." The king of Assyria appointed to Hezekiah king of Judah three hundred talents of silver and thirty talents of gold.
15 - Hezekiah gave him all the silver that was found in The LORD's house, and in the treasures of the king's house.
16 - At that time, Hezekiah cut off the gold from the doors of The LORD's temple, and from the pillars which Hezekiah king of Judah had overlaid, and gave it to the king of Assyria.
17 - The king of Assyria sent Tartan and Rabsaris and Rabshakeh from Lachish to king Hezekiah with a great army to Jerusalem. They went up and came to Jerusalem. When they had come up, they came and stood by the conduit of the upper pool, which is in the highway of the fuller's field.
18 - When they had called to the king, Eliakim the son of Hilkiah, who was over the household, and Shebnah the scribe, and Joah the son of Asaph the recorder came out to them.
19 - Rabshakeh said to them, "Say now to Hezekiah, 'Thus says the great king, the king of Assyria, "What confidence is this in which you trust?
20 - You say (but they are but vain words), 'There is counsel and strength for war.' Now on whom do you trust, that you have rebelled against me?
21 - Now, behold, you trust in the staff of this bruised reed, even in Egypt. If a man leans on it, it will go into his hand, and pierce it. So is Pharaoh king of Egypt to all who trust on him.
22 - But if you tell me, 'We trust in the LORD our God;' isn't that he whose high places and whose altars Hezekiah has taken away, and has said to Judah and to Jerusalem, 'You shall worship before this altar in Jerusalem?'
23 - Now therefore, please give pledges to my master the king of Assyria, and I will give you two thousand horses, if you are able on your part to set riders on them.
24 - How then can you turn away the face of one captain of the least of my master's servants, and put your trust on Egypt for chariots and for horsemen?
25 - Have I now come up without the LORD against this place to destroy it? the LORD said to me, 'Go up against this land, and destroy it.'"'"
26 - Then Eliakim the son of Hilkiah, Shebnah, and Joah, said to Rabshakeh, "Please speak to your servants in the Syrian language, for we understand it. Don't speak with us in the Jews' language, in the hearing of the people who are on the wall."
27 - But Rabshakeh said to them, "Has my master sent me to your master and to you, to speak these words? Hasn't he sent me to the men who sit on the wall, to eat their own dung, and to drink their own urine with you?"
28 - Then Rabshakeh stood, and cried with a loud voice in the Jews' language, and spoke, saying, "Hear the word of the great king, the king of Assyria.
29 - Thus says the king, 'Don't let Hezekiah deceive you; for he will not be able to deliver you out of his hand.
30 - Don't let Hezekiah make you trust in The LORD, saying, "The LORD will surely deliver us, and this city shall not be given into the hand of the king of Assyria."
31 - Don't listen to Hezekiah.' For thus says the king of Assyria, 'Make your peace with me, and come out to me; and everyone of you eat from his own vine, and everyone from his own fig tree, and everyone drink water from his own cistern;
32 - until I come and take you away to a land like your own land, a land of grain and new wine, a land of bread and vineyards, a land of olive trees and of honey, that you may live, and not die. Don't listen to Hezekiah, when he persuades you, saying, "The LORD will deliver us."
33 - Has any of the gods of the nations ever delivered his land out of the hand of the king of Assyria?
34 - Where are the gods of Hamath, and of Arpad? Where are the gods of Sepharvaim, of Hena, and Ivvah? Have they delivered Samaria out of my hand?
35 - Who are they among all the gods of the countries, that have delivered their country out of my hand, that the LORD should deliver Jerusalem out of my hand?'"
36 - But the people stayed quiet, and answered him not a word; for the king's commandment was, "Don't answer him."
37 - Then Eliakim the son of Hilkiah, who was over the household, came with Shebna the scribe, and Joah the son of Asaph the recorder, to Hezekiah with their clothes torn, and told him Rabshakeh's words.
2 Kings 1 | 2 Kings 2 | 2 Kings 3 | 2 Kings 4 | 2 Kings 5 | 2 Kings 6 | 2 Kings 7 | 2 Kings 8 | 2 Kings 9 | 2 Kings 10 | 2 Kings 11 | 2 Kings 12 | 2 Kings 13 | 2 Kings 14 | 2 Kings 15 | 2 Kings 16 | 2 Kings 17 | 2 Kings 18 | 2 Kings 19 | 2 Kings 20 | 2 Kings 21 | 2 Kings 22 | 2 Kings 23 | 2 Kings 24 | 2 Kings 25 |
2 Kings Images and Notes
The Books of 2 Kings
2 Kings 17:13 - Yet the LORD testified against Israel, and against Judah, by all the prophets, [and by] all the seers, saying, Turn ye from your evil ways, and keep my commandments [and] my statutes, according to all the law which I commanded your fathers, and which I sent to you by my servants the prophets.
2 Kings 17:14 - Notwithstanding they would not hear, but hardened their necks, like to the neck of their fathers, that did not believe in the LORD their God.
Bible Survey - Kings
Hebrew Name - Melechim "kings"
Greek Name - basilia (Greek form of the Hebrew)
Author - Jeremiah (According to Tradition)
Date - From 1015-562 BC Approximately
Theme of 1 Kings - The division of the kingdom
Theme of 2 Kings - The history of Israel and Judah
Types and Shadows - In Kings Jesus is the peaceful King
Summary of The Books of Kings
The books of Kings were originally one book in the ancient Hebrew manuscripts, and the writers of the Septuagint divided them. They were called the Third and Fourth Books of Kingdoms, although in the Hebrew manuscript the title was called Kings, exactly the same as we have in our English Bible. The books of Kings follow the books of Samuel chronologically.
The time period extends from the anointing of King Solomon (1015 BC) throughout the history of Israel and Judah all the way to the death of Jehoiachin after he was freed from Babylonian imprisonment (561 BC). The book of 1 Kings begins with Solomon, and not David or Saul because the books of Samuel cover their lives. Under King Solomon the dominion of Israel extended from the Euphrates River all the way to the Mediterranean Sea and down to the Egyptian border (1 Kings 4:21). At the end of each the kingdoms of Israel and Judah the remaining kings were not seeking God and became a sad remnant who were puppets of either Egypt or Assyria or Babylon until they were finally uprooted and taken away. The beginning of all of their problems happened after the death of Solomon when his sons Rehoboam and Jeroboam divided the kingdom, 10 of the tribes went with Jeroboam to the north (Israel), and 2 of the tribes remained with Rehoboam in the south (Judah). All 19 of Israel's Kings followed the heathen nations and were idol worshipers and evil, leading Israel into sin bringing upon themselves the wrath of God. They were destroyed and taken captive to Assyria in 722 BC. In the southern kingdom of Judah 8 out of their 20 Kings sought the Lord and the rest forsook him also bring the wrath of God when the Babylonian captivity took place under King Nebuchadnezzar in 586 BC.
It is difficult to give a precise chronology of the books of Kings. According to Hebrew tradition Jeremiah was the author, and wrote shortly after the events have taken place. The Books of Chronicles record the events of the same time period from a different perspective.
The books of Kings may be arranged with this quick outline:
Outline of the Books of Kings
I. The Reign of Solomon (1 Kings 1:1 -14:43)
1) The last days of David (1 Kings 1:1-2:11). Adonijah usurps David's throne, but flees after the anointing of Solomon. David dies and is buried in Jerusalem.
2) Solomon's formal accession to the throne and the early days of his reign (1 Kings 2:12-46).
3) Solomon's request for wisdom and his sagacious decision concerning the disputed child (1 Kings 3).
4) A description of Solomon's power, wealth, and wisdom (1 Kings 4). In this section we learn that Solomon wrote over 3,000 proverbs and 105 songs. For a further discussion of this, see the introduction to Proverbs.
5) The erection of Solomon's temple (1 Kings 5-8).
6) A further description of the splendor of Solomon's kingdom (1 Kings 9-10). After mentioning the stables, the navy and the great riches of the kingdom, the narrative records the visit of the queen of Sheba, who was so impressed by the scene that she remarked, "Howbeit I believed not the words, until I came, and mine eyes had seen it; and, behold, the half was not told me: thy wisdom and prosperity exceedeth the fame which heard" (1 Kings 10:7).
7) Solomon's wives and apostasy (1 Kings 11). One cannot read this chapter seriously without being saddened. In his search for wealth and pleasure, Solomon contracted a large number of foreign wives�many, no doubt, for political reasons. These women brought their foreign deities with them and eventually Solomon's heart was turned away from the Lord "and his heart was not perfect with the Lord his God, as was the heart of David his father" (1 Kings 11:4). Whether or not Solomon was "the preacher" of Ecclesiastes cannot be proved beyond doubt. If he was, however, surely the situation to which this chapter bears witness would lead him to the statement of cynicism and despair: "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity, saith the preacher" (Ecclesiastes 1:2).
II. The Divided Kingdom (1 Kings 12:1-2 Kings 17:41)
1) The division of the kingdom (1 Kings 12). After Solomon's death, his son Rehoboam became king. Instead of lightening the heavy tax burden which Solomon's extravagances had forced on the people, Rehoboam decided to increase it. Disgruntled, the ten northern tribes chose Jeroboam as their leader and seceded from the union with the tribes of Judah and Benjamin. In order to keep his people from returning to worship in Jerusalem, where they might be influenced to stand with Rehoboam, the king of the North instituted the worship of the golden calf. This act of political expediency was the major factor in Israel's ultimate humiliation.
2) The remainder of Jeroboam's reign (1 Kings 13:1-14-20). This section includes a rebuke to Jeroboam by a man of God which contains an amazing prophecy concerning the reformation of Josiah (v. 2), which was not to be fulfilled for over 300 years (2 Kings 23:15-18).
3) Rehoboam, Abijam and Asa, kings of Judah (1 Kings 14:21-15:24).
4) Kings of Israel from Nadab to Omri (1 Kings 14:25-16:28).
5) Ahab, Jezebel and Elijah (1 Kings 16:29-22:40). These three individuals stand out as among the more memorable in all the history of Israel, the first two for their consummate wickedness and the latter for his fiery zeal and courageous efforts in the service of God. 1 Kings 17 tells of the feeding of Elijah by the ravens and his boarding at the house of the widow of Zarephath during the three and a half year drought which was on the land. 1 Kings 18 informs us that Jezebel's wickedness prompted her to subsidize Baal worship and a cult of heathen prophets, while she strove to exterminate the prophets of God (verse 13). Also contained in this chapter is the magnificent story of Elijah's "duel" with the prophets of Baal atop Mt. Carmel. 1 Kings 19 records the anger of Jezebel at Elijah's having slain her prophets and her threat upon his life. Elijah is reduced to desperation, but is comforted by the "still, small voice" (verses 11, 12). 1 Kings 20-22 relate other incidents concerning Ahab, including his brutal treatment of Naboth and his death at the hands of the Syrians.
6) Jehoshaphat of Judah (1 Kings 22:41-50).
7) Ahaziah of Israel (1 Kings 22:51-2 Kings 1:18).
8) Elijah's translation and the imparting of his spirit to Elisha (2 Kings 2).
9) Jehoram of Israel (2 Kings 3).
10) The ministry of Elisha the prophet (2 Kings 4-7). Elisha's ministry was characterized by a considerable number of miracles, including the resurrection from the dead of the son of the Shunammite woman, the healing of Naaman's leprosy, and the floating axe head. Ch. 8 records the strange phenomenon of a prophet's anointing the head of a foreign king to punish the prophet's own people. Instructions to this effect had been given to Elijah (I Kings 19:15).
11) Jehoram and Ahaziah of Judah (2 Kings 8:16-29).
12) Jehu, king of Israel (2 Kings 9-10). Having been anointed by Elisha to punish the house of Ahab for its great wickedness, Jehu set about his task with a frightening zeal. Everything which is known of him can be characterized by the statement in 2 Kings 9:20:"he driveth furiously."
13) Miscellaneous kings of Israel and Judah (2 Kings 11-16). During his period Israel reached a period of great prosperity under Jeroboam II, regaining many of the areas which she had previously lost.
14) The captivity of Israel by Assyria in 722 BC (2 Kings 17). The last king of Israel was Hoshea. He, like the nineteen kings before him, was guilty of idolatrous worship. Finally, after repeated efforts by the prophets to turn the people from their idols, God allowed the ten tribes of Israel to be carried out of their homeland.
III. The Kingdom of Judah Alone (2 Kings 18-25)
This section contains an account of the last nine kings of Judah and the fall of Jerusalem. Also see the introduction to the books of Chronicles. Although the books of Kings contain a great deal of historical material, history is not their primary concern. In the Hebrew canon, they are classified, along with Joshua, Judges and the books of Samuel, as "The Prophets." The message is more spiritual than political. The writers of these books have written their history with a focus on devotion to God, the factual information is mentioned for illustration and confirmation. Examining the writings of the prophets is important when researching history, especially Isaiah and Jeremiah. An intimate acquaintance with these prophets is essential for a clear grasp of the meaning of these books.
Quick Reference Maps - 2 Kings
2 Kings Resources
Saul, Israel's First King
More About the Book of 1 Kings
1 Kings in the Picture Study Bible
Bible History Online - Picture Study Bible, King James Version. New York: American Bible Society: www.bible-history.com, 1995-2013. Bible History Picture Study Bible. Jul 20, 2019.
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Isaiah 30:7 Even Egypt, whose help is vain and empty. Therefore, I have called her "Rahab who has been exterminated."
< Isaiah 30:6
Isaiah 30:8 >
7. "Egypt is vanity, and to no purpose will they help" [G. V. SMITH].
strength--Hebrew, Rabah, a designation for Egypt (Isa 51:9; Ps 87:4), implying her haughty fierceness; translate, "Therefore I call her Arrogance that sitteth still." She who boasted of the help she would give, when it came to the test, sat still (Isa 36:6). English Version agrees with Isa 30:15; Isa 7:4.
JFB.
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Isaiah Images and Notes
The Book of Isaiah
Isaiah 6:1-3 - In the year that king Uzziah died I saw also the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the seraphims: each one had six wings; with twain he covered his face, and with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly. And one cried unto another, and said, Holy, holy, holy, [is] the LORD of hosts: the whole earth [is] full of his glory.
Isaiah 9:1-7 - Nevertheless the dimness [shall] not [be] such as [was] in her vexation, when at the first he lightly afflicted the land of Zebulun and the land of Naphtali, and afterward did more grievously afflict [her by] the way of the sea, beyond Jordan, in Galilee of the nations. The people that walked in darkness have seen a great light: they that dwell in the land of the shadow of death, upon them hath the light shined. Thou hast multiplied the nation, [and] not increased the joy: they joy before thee according to the joy in harvest, [and] as [men] rejoice when they divide the spoil. For thou hast broken the yoke of his burden, and the staff of his shoulder, the rod of his oppressor, as in the day of Midian. For every battle of the warrior [is] with confused noise, and garments rolled in blood; but [this] shall be with burning [and] fuel of fire. For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given: and the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, The mighty God, The everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace. Of the increase of [his] government and peace [there shall be] no end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice from henceforth even for ever. The zeal of the LORD of hosts will perform this.
Isaiah 53:1-7- Who hath believed our report? and to whom is the arm of the LORD revealed? For he shall grow up before him as a tender plant, and as a root out of a dry ground: he hath no form nor comeliness; and when we shall see him, [there is] no beauty that we should desire him. He is despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief: and we hid as it were [our] faces from him; he was despised, and we esteemed him not. Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows: yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But he [was] wounded for our transgressions, [he was] bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace [was] upon him; and with his stripes we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the LORD hath laid on him the iniquity of us all. He was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth: he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he openeth not his mouth.
Bible Survey - Isaiah
Hebrew Name - Yeshayahu "Yah is salvation"
Greek Name - Esaias (Greek form of the Hebrew)
Author - Isaiah (According to Tradition)
Date - 760 BC Approximately
Theme - The kingdom of the Messiah
Types and Shadows - In Isaiah Jesus is the suffering servant
Summary of The Book of Isaiah
Isaiah prophesied during one of the worst times in the history of Israel. The Israelites had become so corrupt God was going to remove them out of His sight. He raised up the Assyrian army to be an unmerciful, barbaric, ruthless, an unstoppable war machine. Their military tactics are still applauded today by those who understand the art of war. God called them from their distant land to come and destroy the Jews living in the north, and take them away from their homeland. Isaiah was living in Judah, in the city of Jerusalem during a time when King Uzziah had died. Isaiah prophesied during the reign of King Uzziah, King Jotham, King Ahaz, King Hezekiah, and probably King Manasseh of Judah. His prophetic ministry lasted from about 760 BC until about 720 BC. Isaiah chapter 6 records a powerful vision that Isaiah received of God the King on his throne, and the king called Isaiah to prophesy to His people. This was Isaiah's call to ministry as a prophet of God and it is interesting that it was at a time when king Uzziah had just died. King Uzziah was faithful servant of the Lord and people felt secure under his leadership, but when he died there was almost a panic. This is when the Lord showed Isaiah who was really on the throne. Isaiah was terrified at the sight of God's holiness (Isaiah 6) and when the Lord called him and asked him who will go with this message and Isaiah said "here am I, send me." Isaiah warned Jerusalem about her idolatry, and her foreign alliances, but they scorned him. They did not listen to his warnings and quickly destroy their instruments of idolatry. He prophesied about the Assyrians who would destroy the northern kingdom, they were also good to come to Jerusalem but God would deliver them. But he also told them that eventually the city will be destroyed and captured by the Babylonians, and that a Persian ruler named Cyrus would release the Jews from captivity. Isaiah prophesied more about the Messiah than any other book in the Old Testament. He also described in great detail the blessings of the future kingdom of the Messiah. His coming would be as a lion bringing the day of God's wrath, but he would also first come as a savior who would die for the sins of the people. This was Isaiah's message, the humility and beauty of the Savior. - The above text is © Rusty Russell - Bible History Online and must be sourced for use on a website.
"Surely He has borne our griefs and carried our sorrows; yet we esteemed Him stricken, smitten by God, and afflicted. But He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement for our peace was upon Him, and by His stripes we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned, every one, to his own way; and the LORD has laid on Him the iniquity of us all." Isaiah Isaiah 53:4-6
The book of Isaiah contains the prophecies of Isaiah who was the son of Amoz (Isaiah 1:1). Isaiah prophesied during the reign of King Uzziah, King Jotham, King Ahaz, King Hezekiah, and probably King Manasseh of Judah. His prophetic ministry lasted from about 760 BC until about 720 BC. Isaiah chapter 6 records a powerful vision that Isaiah received of God the King on his throne, and the king called Isaiah to prophesy to His people. This was Isaiah's call to ministry as a prophet of God and it is interesting that it was at a time when king Uzziah had just died. King Uzziah was faithful servant of the Lord and people felt secure under his leadership, but when he died there was almost a panic. This is when the Lord showed Isaiah who was really on the throne. Isaiah was terrified at the sight of God's holiness (Isaiah 6) and when the Lord called him and asked him who will go with this message and Isaiah said "here am I, send me."
The word prophet in the Hebrew means a "mouthpiece", and Isaiah was truly the mouthpiece of God. He was entirely dedicated to this cause even in the midst of rejection (Isaiah 6:9-13). As his ministry developed he warned the people about various problems within the kingdom. Judah had gone through many reforms, but had become corrupt along the way forgetting about the great privilege of being chosen by God, and their religious ceremonies became vain rituals. Uzziah's son Jotham succeeded his father on the throne and try to encourage the people to worship Yahweh, but failed to break down the high places of idolatrous worship. After him Ahaz followed on the throne of Judah and he was determined to bring about the heathen idolatrous practices of the nations around him. He was rebuked by Isaiah and chose to lead the people further into idolatry which ultimately would bring about their ruin. Then Hezekiah came to the throne and he was the greatest king to ever reign in the southern kingdom of Judah. He began ruling by "removing the high places and breaking down the pillars, and cutting down the Asherah (2 Kings 18:4, 22). Hezekiah restored faith in Judah and the people celebrated in Jerusalem a Passover that would be remembered forever in history. Isaiah was respected as a prophet of the Lord and King Hezekiah made Isaiah famous in the land and his prophecies were encouraged. But the kingdom of Judah had not fully recovered from their past ways. It was during the time of Hezekiah that the northern kingdom of Israel, Judah's brothers, were carried away into captivity in 722 BC. Judah had barely escaped destruction by paying heavy tribute to the Assyrian king. Later Sennacherib of Assyria sent his armies to destroy many nations and their lands and he came to the land of Judah to reproach the living God (2 Kings 19:16). When Hezekiah heard the words of the king of Assyria he sought the Lord and prayed. That night the angel of the Lord (God himself) came into the camp of the Assyrians and slew 185,000 soldiers (2 Kings 19:35). King Sennacherib returned back to his palace at Nineveh without his mighty army and while he was worshiping his gods, two of his sons slew him with the sword. Many of the details surrounding this event have been verified historically with the discovery of Sennacherib's Hexagonal Prism discovered among the ruins of ancient Nineveh. It contains the war campaigns of this king and this time period and can be seen today on display in the British Museum in London. The Southern Kingdom of Judah had their moments of glory during certain times after this, but it was just a matter of time until the seeds that had been sown would reap a harvest of destruction. Judah would come to an end and Jerusalem and her Temple would be destroyed, which took place in 586 BC under King Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon. Isaiah had prophesied throughout this whole time period and even spoke of the coming kingdom of the Messiah.
There is little information about the personal life of the Prophet Isaiah. He was married to a woman called the "prophetess" (Isaiah 8:3), she bore him two sons (Isaiah 7:3 and Isaiah 8:3). According to Jewish tradition Isaiah was martyred by the wicked King Manasseh who placed him in the hollow trunk of a carob tree and was sawn in two. many believe also that it was Isaiah who was referred to in the book of Hebrews in the New Testament regarding a hero of faith "sawn asunder" (Hebrews 11:37).
Was There a Deutero-Isaiah or Second Isaiah?
There have been many critics who challenged the historicity of the Scriptures, and implied that the Bible is not the word of God. This is also true with the book of Isaiah, critics have identified problems in the books unity and authorship. A large number of critics make a case that Isaiah 1-39 and Isaiah 40-66 are two separate books written by two entirely different men. They refer to the second book as "Deutero-Isaiah" or "Second Isaiah" and they speculate that it was written during the Babylonian captivity, and the people that the author is addressing our different than in the first book. They also maintain that Isaiah is never mentioned as the author in the second book. but there are too many reasons for believing that Isaiah was the author of the whole book from Isaiah 1 through Isaiah 66. Jewish history and Jewish tradition never recognized anything other than one book, and one author. The discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls identify Isaiah as one scroll, and thus one book. Judaism and Christianity also recognize Isaiah as one book and one author. The writing style of Isaiah is seen throughout both sections, and the people who are being addressed would apply more to Judah went to those captive in Babylon. There is also mention of Temple services in existence, which were not in existence what they were captive in Babylon. For these reasons and others, and for the fact that Jesus never recognized more than one Isaiah we must conclude that Isaiah was the author of his one book. It is important to understand this about the book of Isaiah because critics are always looking for something in which they might attack the Bible, especially the book of Isaiah because there are so many prophecies pointing to the life and ministry and even the death of the Lord Jesus Christ.
The contents of Isaiah may be outlined as follows :
Outline of the Book of Isaiah
Section 1: Isaiah 1:39
1 ) Prophecies centered around Judah and Jerusalem (Isaiah 1:1-12:6). Included in this section are a description of the glories of the Messianic Age (Isaiah 2-4 ) and the account of the call of Isaiah (Isaiah 6 ). In Isaiah 7-12, although Isaiah is dealing primarily with various invasions which threaten Judah, reference is made to the wonderful child "Immanuel" and to the glorious age when a king of the Davidic line would institute a benevolent rule over a world without discord and wars.
2 ) Prophecies of judgment on the foreign and hostile nations of Babylon, Philistia, Moab, Damascus, Ethiopia, Egypt, Dumah, Arabia and Tyre (Isaiah 3-23 ).
3 ) The Apocalypse of Isaiah: the judgment of God against the world's sin and the ultimate destruction of the earth (Isaiah 24-27). Despite the dreadful nature of the punishment which was to come, this section is marked by a note of triumph and trust (see Isaiah 26).
4) Prophecies concerning the relations of Judah and Jerusalem to Egypt and Assyria (Isaiah 28-33). In this section is contained a series of six messages of woe, directed first against one and then another of the weaknesses of Judah's national life (Isaiah 28:1-29; 29:1-14; 29:15-24; 30:1-17; 31:1- 32 : 20; 33 : 1-24). The character of the Messianic Age is also further described (Isaiah 32:1-18).
5 ) The doom of Edom and the redemption of Israel (Isaiah 34-35). Isaiah 35 is a beautiful picture of the ultimate triumph of the spiritual Zion.
6 ) The reign of Hezekiah (Isaiah 36-39 ). This section is in the nature of an historical appendix recording the overthrow of the Assyrian army (Isaiah 36- 37), Hezekiah's sickness and recovery (Isaiah 38), and containing a prophecy of the Babylonian captivity (Isaiah 39 ).
Section II: Isaiah 40-66
7 ) God's sovereign and providential control over history, which will be manifest in his ultimate overthrow of Babylon at the hands of Cyrus (Isaiah 40:18). Two passages of especial interest in this section are the first "suffering servant" passage, apparently alluding to the office of the Messiah (Isaiah 42:1-9), and Isaiah's sarcastic appraisal of the folly of idol worship (Isaiah 44:6-23).
8 ) The redemption which is possible through suffering and sacrifice (Isaiah 49-55).. This division centers mainly around the three "suffering servant" passages which it contains The first is concerned with the difficulty of his task and his rejection by those to whom he is sent (Isaiah 44:1-13). The second (Isaiah 50:4-9) speaks of the obedience and trust of the "servant" and the blessings which are to follow his work. The third is the classic passage from Isaiah 52:13-53:12, which describes the life, suffering and ultimate triumph of the servant.
9 ) The triumph of the kingdom of God and God's universal reign (Isaiah 56-66). The sins which are prevalent in Isaiah's day are discussed in chs. 56-59. A glorious song of the Messianic Age fills Isaiah 60-62. The book closes, with a prayer for mercy and pardon (Isaiah 63-64) and God's answer to this prayer in the form of the promise of a new heaven and a new earth (Isaiah 65-66).
Quick Reference Maps - Isaiah
Judah During the Time of Hezekiah
The New Babylonian Empire and Isaiah
Isaiah Resources
The Return From Babylon
More About the Book of Isaiah
Isaiah in the Picture Study Bible
Bible History Online Picture Study Bible, King James Version. New York: American Bible Society: www.bible-history.com, 1995-2013. Bible History Picture Study Bible. Jul 20, 2019.
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Bible > Hebrews > Chapter 1 > Verse 8
◄ Hebrews 1:8 ►
But about the Son he says, "Your throne, O God, will last for ever and ever; a scepter of justice will be the scepter of your kingdom.
But to the Son he says, “Your throne, O God, endures forever and ever. You rule with a scepter of justice.
But of the Son he says, “Your throne, O God, is forever and ever, the scepter of uprightness is the scepter of your kingdom.
But about the Son He says: “Your throne, O God, endures forever and ever, and justice is the scepter of Your kingdom.
But unto the Son: "Your throne, O God, is to the age of the age, and the scepter of righteousness is the scepter of Your kingdom.
But of the Son He says, "YOUR THRONE, O GOD, IS FOREVER AND EVER, AND THE RIGHTEOUS SCEPTER IS THE SCEPTER OF HIS KINGDOM.
But unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of thy kingdom.
but to the Son: Your throne, O God, is forever and ever, and the scepter of your kingdom is a scepter of justice.
But God says about his Son, "You are God, and you will rule as King forever! Your royal power brings about justice.
About the Son, however, God said: "Your kingdom, O God, will last forever and ever! You rule over your people with justice.
but to the Son: Your throne, God, is forever and ever, and the scepter of Your kingdom is a scepter of justice.
But about the Son he says, "Your throne, O God, is forever and ever, and the scepter of your kingdom is a righteous scepter.
but of the Son he says, "Your throne, O God, is forever and ever, and a righteous scepter is the scepter of your kingdom.
But of the Son he says, "Your throne, O God, is forever and ever, and the righteous scepter is the scepter of your Kingdom.
But concerning The Son, he said, “Your throne, oh God, is to the eternity of eternities. A straight scepter is the scepter of your Kingdom.”
But God said about his Son, "Your throne, O God, is forever and ever. The scepter in your kingdom is a scepter for justice.
But of the Son He says, “THY THRONE, O GOD, IS FOREVER AND EVER, AND THE RIGHTEOUS SCEPTER IS THE SCEPTER OF HIS KINGDOM.
But unto the Son he said, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: a rod of equity is the sceptre of thy kingdom.
But unto the Son he says, Your throne, O God, is forever and ever: a scepter of righteousness is the scepter of your kingdom.
But to the Son he said, Your throne, O God, is for ever and ever: a scepter of righteousness is the scepter of your kingdom.
but of the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever; And the sceptre of uprightness is the sceptre of thy kingdom.
But to the Son: Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: a sceptre of justice is the sceptre of thy kingdom.
but as to the Son, Thy throne, O God, [is] to the age of the age, and a sceptre of uprightness [is] the sceptre of thy kingdom.
But to the Son, he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: a scepter of righteousness is the scepter of thy kingdom.
But of His Son, He says, "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and for ever, and the sceptre of Thy Kingdom is a sceptre of absolute justice.
But of the Son he says, "Your throne, O God, is forever and ever. The scepter of uprightness is the scepter of your Kingdom.
and unto the Son: 'Thy throne, O God, is to the age of the age; a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of thy reign;
The Supremacy of the Son
…7Now about the angels He says: “He makes His angels winds, His servants flames of fire.” 8But about the Son He says: “Your throne, O God, endures forever and ever, and justice is the scepter of Your kingdom. 9You have loved righteousness and hated wickedness; therefore God, Your God, has anointed You above Your companions with the oil of joy.”…
Your throne, O God, endures forever and ever, and justice is the scepter of Your kingdom.
in holiness and righteousness before Him all the days of our lives.
Thy throne.
Psalm 45:6,7
Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: the sceptre of thy kingdom is a right sceptre…
O God.
Hebrews 3:3,4
For this man was counted worthy of more glory than Moses, inasmuch as he who hath builded the house hath more honour than the house…
Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel.
Isaiah 9:6,7
For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given: and the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counseller, The mighty God, The everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace…
Thy kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and thy dominion endureth throughout all generations.
Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice from henceforth even for ever. The zeal of the LORD of hosts will perform this.
Only unto the land of the children of Ammon thou camest not, nor unto any place of the river Jabbok, nor unto the cities in the mountains, nor unto whatsoever the LORD our God forbad us.
a sceptre.
The God of Israel said, the Rock of Israel spake to me, He that ruleth over men must be just, ruling in the fear of God.
Psalm 72:1-4,7,11-14
A Psalm for Solomon. Give the king thy judgments, O God, and thy righteousness unto the king's son…
The king's strength also loveth judgment; thou dost establish equity, thou executest judgment and righteousness in Jacob.
righteousness.
δὲ (de)
Strong's Greek 1161: A primary particle; but, and, etc.
Πρὸς (Pros)
Strong's Greek 4314: To, towards, with. A strengthened form of pro; a preposition of direction; forward to, i.e. Toward.
Son [He says]:
Υἱόν (Huion)
Strong's Greek 5207: A son, descendent. Apparently a primary word; a 'son', used very widely of immediate, remote or figuratively, kinship.
σου (sou)
Personal / Possessive Pronoun - Genitive 2nd Person Singular
throne,
θρόνος (thronos)
Noun - Nominative Masculine Singular
Strong's Greek 2362: From thrao; a stately seat; by implication, power or a potentate.
ὁ (ho)
Article - Vocative Masculine Singular
God,
Θεὸς (Theos)
[endures] forever
εἰς (eis)
Strong's Greek 1519: A primary preposition; to or into, of place, time, or purpose; also in adverbial phrases.
and ever,
αἰῶνος (aiōnos)
Noun - Genitive Masculine Singular
Strong's Greek 165: From the same as aei; properly, an age; by extension, perpetuity; by implication, the world; specially a Messianic period.
justice [is]
εὐθύτητος (euthytētos)
Strong's Greek 2118: Straightness, uprightness. From euthus; rectitude.
the scepter
ῥάβδος (rhabdos)
Noun - Nominative Feminine Singular
Strong's Greek 4464: A rod, staff, staff of authority, scepter. From the base of rhapizo; a stick or wand.
τῆς (tēs)
Article - Genitive Feminine Singular
kingdom.
βασιλείας (basileias)
Strong's Greek 932: From basileus; properly, royalty, i.e. rule, or a realm.
(8) Unto.--Rather, of. The connection with Hebrews 1:7 is so close ("Whereas of the angels He saith . . . of the Son He saith"), that we must not vary the rendering of the preposition. The passage which follows is taken from Psalm 45:6-7. As the words stand in the ordinary Greek text, they agree exactly with the LXX.; but certain alterations of reading are required by the best evidence. After the words "for ever and ever" and must be restored, and in the following clause the and a must change places. The latter change is of moment only as it affects the former. Were the words in all other respects cited with perfect exactness, the introduction of and would probably indicate that the writer intended to split up the quotation into two parts, each significant for his purpose. (Comp. Hebrews 2:13.) As, however, we note other minor changes, the insertion of the connecting word is probably accidental. A third reading is of much greater importance. At the close of the verse the two oldest of our Greek MSS. agree in reading "His kingdom:" to this we will return afterwards.
We have every reason to believe that the application of Psalms 45 which is here made was fully received by the ancient Jews; thus in the Targum on the Psalm Hebrews 1:7 is taken as a direct address to the King Messiah. Hence the readers of this Epistle would at once recognise the argument which the words contain. It is strongly maintained by some that the Psalm (like Psalms 110, see below, on Hebrews 1:13) is altogether prophetic, the promised Messiah alone being in the Psalmist's thought. There appear to be insuperable objections to this view, from particular expressions used (in the later verses especially), and from the general structure and colouring of the Psalm. It is in every way more probable that the second Psalm (see Note on Hebrews 1:5), rather than Psalms 110, represents the class to which Psalms 45 belongs. Originally writing in celebration of the marriage of a king of David's line (we know not whom, but many of the arguments urged against the possible reference to Solomon have no great weight), the inspired Psalmist uses words which bear their full meaning only when applied to that Son of David of whose kingdom there shall be no end. The promises made to David (2 Samuel 7) are before the writer's mind in the first verses of the Psalm. The king appointed by God is His representative to God's people; his cause is that of truth and righteousness; his dominion will continually advance. It is at this moment that, with the promise of a divine sonship (Psalms 2) in his thought, he suddenly addresses the sing as Elohim (Hebrews 1:7), a divine king who receives from God the reward of righteousness (Hebrews 1:8). There are in the Old Testament examples of the use of Elohim which diminish the difficulty of its application to an earthly king (such as Psalm 82:1; Psalm 95:3; 1Samuel 28:13; Exodus 7:1); but it must still be acknowledged that the passage stands alone. This difficulty, however, relates only to the primary application. As the higher and true reference of the words became revealed, all earthly limitations disappeared; the Christian readers of the Psalm recognised in the Messiah of whom it speaks a King who is God.
The reading "His kingdom" has seemed to require a different rendering of the words in the first part of the verse: God is Thy throne for ever and ever. This rendering, however, will suit either reading of the Greek, and is equally admissible as a rendering of the Hebrew. Nor is it really inconsistent with the position in which the verse here stands: in contrast with the ministry of angels is set, on this view, not indeed a direct address to the Son as God, but the sovereign rule which the Son receives from God. The objections raised against it are: (1) such an expression as "God is Thy throne" is contrary to the analogy of Scripture language; (2) the ordinary rendering has the support of almost all ancient authority, Jewish writers and ancient versions being apparently united in its favour. The former argument is not very strong in face of Psalm 90:1, and similar passages; but the latter is so weighty that we hesitate to accept the change, helpful as it would be in making clear the original and typical reference of Hebrews 1:7. It should be said that the reading "His kingdom" is not inconsistent with the ordinary translation of the preceding words; for a sudden transition from "Thy throne, O God" to "His kingdom" is in full accordance with the usage of Hebrew poetry. (See Psalm 43:4; Psalm 67:5-6; Psalm 104:4-6, et al.) There are other renderings which would require discussion if we were concerned with the Hebrew text of the Psalm: the two given above are the only possible translations of the Greek.
A sceptre . . .--Rather, the sceptre of uprightness is a sceptre of Thy (or, His) kingdom. Righteousness itself (so to speak, the very ideal of righteous government) bears sway in Thy kingdom.
Verses 8-13. - Two more quotations from the psalms with reference to the SON adduced in contrast. Verses 8, 9. - But unto the Son he saith. The preposition here translated "unto" is πρὸς, as in ver. 7, there translated "of." As is evident from its use in ver. 7, it does not imply of necessity that the persons spoken of are addressed in the quotations, though it is so in this second case. The force of the preposition itself need only be "in reference to." The first quotation is from Psalm 45:6, 7. The psalm was evidently written originally as an epithalamium on the occasion of the marriage of some king of Israel to some foreign princess. The general and probable opinion is that the king was Solomon. His marriage with Pharaoh's daughter may have been the occasion. The view taken by some (as Hengstenberg), that the psalm had no original reference to an actual marriage, being purely a Messianic prophecy, is inconsistent both with its own contents and with the analogy of other Messianic psalms (see what was said on this head with reference to Psalm 2.). Those who enter into the view of Messianic prophecy that has been given above, will have no difficulty in perceiving the justness of the application of this psalm to Christ, notwithstanding its primary import. Like Psalm 2, it presents (in parts at least) an ideal picture, suggested only and imperfectly realized by the temporary type; an ideal of which we find the germ in 2 Samuel 7, and the amplification in later prophecy. Further, the title, "For the precentor" (" To the chief musician," A.V.), shows that the psalm was used in the temple services, and thus, whatever might be the occasion of its composition, was understood by the Jews of old as having an ulterior meaning. Further, there is possibly (as Delitzsch points out) a reference to the psalm as Messianic in Isaiah 61:1-3, where "the Servant of Jehovah," "the Anointed," gives the "oil of gladness" for mourning; and in Isaiah 9:5, where the words of the psalm," God" (ver. 6) and "mighty" (ver. 3) are compounded for a designation of the Messiah; also in Zechariah 12:8, where it is prophesied that in the latter days" the house of David" shall be "as God." The Messianic interpretation is undoubtedly ancient. The Chaldee paraphrast (on ver. 3) writes, "Thy beauty, O King Messiah, is greater than that of the sons of men." Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever. Attempts have been made to evade the conclusion that the king is here addressed as "God,"
(1) by taking the clause as a parenthetic address to God himself;
(2) by regarding" God" as appended to "throne," or as the predicate of the sentence; i.e. translating either "Thy throne of God is," etc. (according to the sense of 1 Chronicles 29:23, "Solomon sat on the throne of the LORD as king"), or "Thy throne is God [i.e. Divine] for ever and ever." As to
(1), the context repudiates it. As to
(2), it is a question whether the Hebrew is patient of the supposed construction. At any rate, "God" is understood as a vocative in the LXX. as well as in the Epistle, in which the LXX. is quoted (for the use of the nominative form, ὁ Θεὸς, in a vocative sense, cf. Luke 18:11, 13; Matthew 27:29; Mark 9:25; Luke 8:54; Luke 12:32);' and in the Chaldee paraphrase, and all ancient versions, it is understood so also. Probably no other interpretation would have been thought of but for the difficulty of supposing an earthly king to be thus addressed. It is to be observed, however, that the other rendering would express essentially the same idea, and be sufficient for the argument. In either case the throne of the SON is represented as God's throne, and eternal. The only difference is that the vocative rendering makes more marked and manifest the ideal view of his subject taken by the psalmist. For it is most unlikely that a bard of the sanctuary, a worshipper of the jealous God of Israel, would have so apostrophized any earthly king except as prefiguring "a greater than Solomon" to come. It is true that kings are elsewhere called "gods" in the plural (as in Psalm 82:6, referred to by our Lord, John 10:35); but the solemn addressing of an individual king by this title is (if the vocative rendering be correct) peculiar to this psalm. The passage (1 Samuel 28:13) adduced in abatement of the significance of the title, where the apparition of Samuel is described by the witch of Endor as "Elohim ascending out of the earth," is not a parallel case. The word "Elohim" has a comprehensive meaning, depending on context for its precise significance. If vocatively used in a solemn address to a king sitting upon an everlasting throne, it surely implies the assigning of Divine honors to the king so addressed. In this case still more is implied than in Psalm 2, where the King is spoken of as God's Son, enthroned on Zion, the Son being here addressed as himself "Elohim." It may be that the inspiring Spirit suggested language to the psalmist beyond his own comprehension at the time of utterance (see 1 Peter 1:10, 11). It may be added that the ultimate Messianic reference of the expression is confirmed by Isaiah 9:6, where the title El-Gibber ("Mighty God," A.V.) distinctly used of God himself in Isaiah 10:21 (cf. Deuteronomy 10:17; Jeremiah 32:18; Nehemiah 9:32; Psalm 24:8), is applied to the Messiah. A scepter of righteousness is the scepter of thy kingdom. In this and the following clause is expressed the important idea that the ideal throne of the SON is founded on righteousness, whence comes also his peculiar unction with "the oil of gladness." Only so far as Solomon or other theocratic kings exemplified the Divine righteousness, did they approach the ideal position assigned to the Son. cf. the latter part of ver. 14 in the original promise, 2 Samuel 7, and especially 2 Samuel 23:3, etc., in the "last words of David." Observe also the prominence of the idea in Psalm 72. and in later prophecy (cf. Isaiah 9:7; Isaiah 11:2, etc.). Therefore, God, even thy God. The first "God" here may be again in the vocative, as in the preceding verse, or it may be as the A.V. takes it (cf. Psalm 43:4; Psalm 50:7). Hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows. The primary reference is, not to the king's coronation (as in Psalm 89:20), but to unction as symbolical of blessing and joy, connected with the custom of anointing the head at feasts (cf. Deuteronomy 28:40; Psalm 23:5; Psalm 92:10; Song of Solomon 1:12; Matthew 6:17). "Thy fellows," in its original reference, seems most naturally to mean "thy associates in royalty," "other kings;" cf. Psalm 79:27, "I will make him my Firstborn, higher than the kings of the earth." Or it might mean the companions of the bridegroom, the παρανύμφιοι. The latter reference lends itself readily to the fulfillment in Christ, the Bridegroom of the Church, whose παρανύμφιοι the redeemed are; themselves also being, after their measure, χριστοί (cf. 1 John 2:20, 27). But they are also made "kings and priests unto God" by Christ (Revelation 1:6; Revelation 5:10); so that either of the supposed original references may be shown to be typical, if it be thought necessary to find a definite fulfillment of all the details of the address to the theocratic king. The view that in the fulfillment the angels are to be understood as Christ's μετόχοι is inadmissible. There is nothing in the psalm to suggest the thought of them, nor does the way in which they are contrasted with the SON in this chapter admit of their being here spoken of as his μετόχοι. Men, in the next chapter, are so spoken of.
1:4-14 Many Jews had a superstitious or idolatrous respect for angels, because they had received the law and other tidings of the Divine will by their ministry. They looked upon them as mediators between God and men, and some went so far as to pay them a kind of religious homage or worship. Thus it was necessary that the apostle should insist, not only on Christ's being the Creator of all things, and therefore of angels themselves, but as being the risen and exalted Messiah in human nature, to whom angels, authorities, and powers are made subject. To prove this, several passages are brought from the Old Testament. On comparing what God there says of the angels, with what he says to Christ, the inferiority of the angels to Christ plainly appears. Here is the office of the angels; they are God's ministers or servants, to do his pleasure. But, how much greater things are said of Christ by the Father! And let us own and honour him as God; for if he had not been God, he had never done the Mediator's work, and had never worn the Mediator's crown. It is declared how Christ was qualified for the office of Mediator, and how he was confirmed in it: he has the name Messiah from his being anointed. Only as Man he has his fellows, and as anointed with the Holy Spirit; but he is above all prophets, priests, and kings, that ever were employed in the service of God on earth. Another passage of Scripture, Ps 102:25-27, is recited, in which the Almighty power of the Lord Jesus Christ is declared, both in creating the world and in changing it. Christ will fold up this world as a garment, not to be abused any longer, not to be used as it has been. As a sovereign, when his garments of state are folded and put away, is a sovereign still, so our Lord, when he has laid aside the earth and heavens like a vesture, shall be still the same. Let us not then set our hearts upon that which is not what we take it to be, and will not be what it now is. Sin has made a great change in the world for the worse, and Christ will make a great change in it for the better. Let the thoughts of this make us watchful, diligent, and desirous of that better world. The Saviour has done much to make all men his friends, yet he has enemies. But they shall be made his footstool, by humble submission, or by utter destruction. Christ shall go on conquering and to conquer. The most exalted angels are but ministering spirits, mere servants of Christ, to execute his commands. The saints, at present, are heirs, not yet come into possession. The angels minister to them in opposing the malice and power of evil spirits, in protecting and keeping their bodies, instructing and comforting their souls, under Christ and the Holy Ghost. Angels shall gather all the saints together at the last day, when all whose hearts and hopes are set upon perishing treasures and fading glories, will be driven from Christ's presence into everlasting misery.
Hebrews 1:8 Commentaries
Absolute Age Forever Justice Kingdom Last Power Reign Righteous Righteousness Rod Scepter Sceptre Seat Throne Uprightness
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Alphabetical: about and be But ever for forever God he His is kingdom last O of righteous righteousness says scepter Son the throne will Your
NT Letters: Hebrews 1:8 But of the Son he says Your (Heb. He. Hb) Christian Bible Study Resources, Dictionary, Concordance and Search Tools
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NCAA National Championship fans are in for a "colossal" treat
Chris Lawyer
Related Event
Colossus TV may be the world's largest outdoor, center-hung, 4-side video display, but come tonight, it's also going to provide the ultimate viewing experience for fans attending the NCAA National Championship between Villanova and Michigan.
Fans at the Alamodome in San Antonio will see a version of Colossus TV hanging from the ceiling, but the rest of the monstrous structure is being used at the scoring tables, music festivals, fan areas and at other sporting events, like the recent Women's Final Four scorer's table in Columbus, Ohio.
The center hung structure for the tournament will feature an LED top ribbon that is 6 feet tall. The structure features eight total sides, four video screens that are 18 feet tall by 32 feet wide and four statistics screens that are 18 feet tall by 24 video wide.
In addition, panels from Colossus TV were used in the Sunset Station Turner Sports Plaza as well as the March Madness Music Festival, the largest three-day free concert in the country, featuring Jason Aldean, Imagine Dragons and Maroon 5. Five massive screens were erected for the main concert stage.
Overall, there are 3,946 feet of LED between 1,866 panels and a total of 35,120,099 total pixels from Colossus being used during the events.
"The power and intensity of Colossus TV is a must see for any sports fan," said Jerry Caldwell, executive vice president and general manager of Bristol Motor Speedway. "The NCAA National Championship game will give the thousands of fans in attendance and millions of fans watching around the world a state-of-the-art look at Colossus."
Colossus, completed prior to the 2016 Food City 500, has the highest viewing quality of any permanent outdoor stadium display in the world, featuring 2880 x 1350 lines of resolution. Compare that to the average home HD TV screen at 1920 x 1080. It currently hosts nearly 54 million LEDs and 18 million pixels, which are grouped tighter than the large-scale outdoor displays in Times Square.
The actual structure is even more impressive. Each LED screen at BMS is 29.5 feet tall and 62.9 feet wide, equaling approximately 1,145 50-inch televisions. The unit also features a lower viewing ring that measures five feet 11 inches high by almost 189 feet in circumference. The entire structure weighs nearly 700 tons and includes suspension cables that are larger than the vertical cables supporting the Golden Gate Bridge.
In addition to being present at the NCAA Final Four, sections of Colossus have also been used for the Ryder Cup and Austin City Limits Music Festival.
Race fans need not worry as Colossus TV will return to The Last Great Colosseum for re-installation just in time for the Food City 500, April 13-15. To purchase tickets to the Food City 500, please call 423-BRISTOL or buy them online at www.BRISTOLTIX.com.
07/10/19 Justin Haley's first Cup win and Ross Chastain's watermelon smash highlight exciting NASCAR week
07/01/19 NASCAR Social Chatter: July 1 Edition
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Taylor Swift Just Dropped ANOTHER New Single and Fans Think It’s All About BF Joe Alwyn
Barbara Pavone · Sep 3, 2017
We’ve barely had time to decode all of the crazy intricate references in Taylor Swift’s “Look What You Made Me Do” video, but already, the 27-year-old has given us a brand new track to dissect. After teasing the second single off her upcoming album, Reputation, during Saturday night’s Alabama-Florida college football game, Tay dropped “…Ready For It?” at 8am sharp this morning, and boy, is it a doozy!
In a total 180 from the vengeful tone of “LWYMMD,” this new tune takes a turn for the steamy. Naturally, everyone wants to know who inspired the track, with one seemingly obvious subject in mind: Could it be that Swifty’s new man, 26-year-old actor Joe Alwyn, has already joined the ranks of Joe Jonas and Harry Styles by being immortalized in the Grammy winner’s song catalog? It sure sounds like it!
While Elle points out that the track was co-written with Ali Payami, Shellback, and Max Martin, meaning the instant hit could very well be written from a multi-perspective view, signs point to the singer’s new beau from the very first line: “Knew he was a killer first time that I saw him,” she croons (ICYMI, the social activist was spotted with the British actor at the screening of his war film, Billy Lynn’s Long Halftime Walk in which he plays a private: i.e. a killer).
She goes on to talk about a man “Younger than my exes but he act like such a man, though” which would also implicate her new flame, who is just 26 compared to Calvin Harris’ 33 years and Tom Hiddleston’s 36. What’s more, the upbeat track seems to dismiss her former boyfriends completely, saying, “Every lover known in comparison is a failure, I forget their names now, I’m so very tame now, ever be the same now.”
A second glance into #reputation...ready for it? Link in bio.
A post shared by Taylor Swift (@taylorswift) on Sep 3, 2017 at 5:04am PDT
Given the fact that the pair has managed to keep their relationship super quiet (“I can be a phantom holding him for ransom”), many are also pointing to lines like “No one has to know” and “I know I’m gonna be with you so I take my time” as a nod to Swift’s new approach to dating.
By the same token, “Baby, let the games begin,” may be referencing the fact that they’re finally ready to go public and that the young actor has to brace himself for all the paparazzi games that will follow. In that case, the “it” in the single’s title would most likely relate to the media blitz that comes with dating the young pop star.
We, for one, are DEFINITELY ready for it: Welcome back, Tay!
Listen to the track in full here.
What do you think “…Ready For It?” is all about? Tweet us @BritandCo.
(Photo via Gustavo Caballero/Getty)
Barbara Pavone
Barbara Pavone is a pop culture-obsessed writer based in beautiful (but ridiculously cold) Montreal, Canada. When she's not working, she's sipping on a Pimm's Cup and daydreaming about her celebrity hero, Saint West.
love, Music, Entertainment
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Alternative Title: Erpesfurt
Erfurt, city, capital of Thuringia Land (state), central Germany. It is located in the Thuringian Basin, on the Gera River, 200 miles (320 km) southwest of Berlin. It was first mentioned in 724 as Erpesfurt, the site of an abbey and a royal residence at a ford (Furt) on the Gera (originally named Erpf) River. Boniface founded a bishopric there in 742. By 805 it was a military strong point and an administrative and commercial centre on the eastern border of the Frankish empire. It was granted municipal rights about 1250 by the archbishop of Mainz and controlled extensive territories in the Middle Ages. Joining the Hanseatic League in the 15th century, it was until about 1600 a great commercial centre for woad, a plant then used for its blue dye extract. The University of Erfurt, established in 1392 as Germany’s third university, was one of the preeminent centres of learning in the German-speaking world; it was closed in 1816 and reopened in 1994. Occupied by a Swedish garrison during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48), the city became part of the electorate of Mainz in 1664. It passed to Prussia in 1802, forming part of Prussian Saxony until 1945, except for a period of French domination (1806–13). In 1808 the Congress of Erfurt was attended by Napoleon, Tsar Alexander I of Russia, and the kings of Bavaria, Saxony, Westphalia, and Württemberg. In 1850 a conference of the short-lived Prussian Union was held in Erfurt.
The cathedral and the Church of St. Severus in Erfurt, Germany. W. Krammisch—Bruce Coleman Inc.
Erfurt is an important road and railway junction and a commercial centre, with an airport 3 miles (5 km) northwest. Industries include metalworking and the manufacture of electrical products. Erfurt is also an important centre of high technology within eastern Germany. Known for the cultivation of a wide variety of flowers and vegetables—an industry that originated in the large gardens attached to the monasteries—it exports seeds and processed foods; the city hosts an annual garden show (first held in 1838) and features a gardening museum.
Market square, Erfurt, Ger. © Bundesbildstelle/Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany
Erfurt is dominated by the cathedral and the Church of St. Severus, which stand side-by-side atop a hill called Domberg (“Cathedral Hill”). The cathedral (1154–1476) contains 15th-century glass and numerous notable works of art. Other buildings of note in the city include the Augustinian monastery where Martin Luther was a monk (1505–08), now an orphanage; the Krämerbrücke (“Merchant Bridge”; 1325), lined with houses and shops; the Angermuseum, located in a former custom house of the electorate of Mainz (1705–11), which features Thuringian porcelain and china and paintings by German artists; the palace of the governor of the electorate of Mainz (1711–20); the Teaching Institute (1953–59); and the Medical Academy (1954–59). There is a scientific library containing the Amplonian collection of 1400 and earlier, as well as a library of municipal archives and a natural-history museum. Erfurt also features a municipal zoo. Pop. (2003 est.) 201,645.
This article was most recently revised and updated by Jeff Wallenfeldt, Manager, Geography and History.
Thuringia, historic region and Land (state) of east-central Germany. Thuringia is surrounded by the German states of Lower Saxony to the northwest, Saxony-Anhalt to the northeast, Saxony to the southeast, Bavaria to the south, and Hessen to the west. The capital is Erfurt. Area 6,244 square miles (16,172…
Germany, country of north-central Europe, traversing the continent’s main physical divisions, from the outer ranges of the Alps northward across the varied landscape of the Central German Uplands and then across the North German Plain.…
Thuringian Basin
Thuringian Basin, fertile agricultural region of Germany, between the Harz mountains on the north and the Thuringian Forest range on the south. It extends westward from the Saxon lowland. The basin’s eastward-flowing streams, tributaries of the Saale River, swell—and sometimes flood—with snowmelt in the spring. The climate…
Berlin, capital and chief urban centre of Germany. The city lies at the heart of the North German Plain, athwart an east-west commercial and geographic axis that helped make it the capital of the kingdom of Prussia and then, from 1871, of a unified Germany. Berlin’s former glory ended in…
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Paul C. Light
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Paul C. Light is the Paulette Goddard Professor of Public Service at New York University's Robert F. Wagner School of Public Service. Before joining NYU, he was vice president and director of Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, Douglas Dillon Senior Fellow, and founding director of its Center for Public Service. He has held teaching posts at the University of Virginia, University of Minnesota, and Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He was also senior adviser to Sen. John Glenn and the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee from 1987-1989, and director of the public policy program at the Pew Charitable Trusts from 1995-1998. Light has written 25 books, and is an expert on government reform, public service, veterans policy, social security, and social innovation.
Paul C. Light is the Paulette Goddard Professor of Public Service at New York University’s Robert F. Wagner School of Public Service. Before joining NYU, he was vice president and director of Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, Douglas Dillon Senior Fellow, and founding director of its Center for Public Service. He has held teaching posts at the University of Virginia, University of Minnesota, and Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He was also senior adviser to Sen. John Glenn and the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee from 1987-1989, and director of the public policy program at the Pew Charitable Trusts from 1995-1998. Light has written 25 books, and is an expert on government reform, public service, veterans policy, social security, and social innovation.
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Home Career The 10 highes...
The 10 highest-paid YouTubers include the Paul brothers and a 7-year-old toy reviewer — here’s the full list
Kevin Webb, Business Insider US
Forbes recently released its list of the highest-paid YouTube stars of 2018, based on data and interviews with industry insiders.
The list is exclusively male, and half of the top-earning YouTubers share a focus on video games.
Collectively, the 10 top-earning YouTubers take home more than $180 million a year.
YouTube’s impact on pop culture can’t be ignored – the platform’s top stars become the world’s premier influencers, coveted by media outlets and advertisers for their ability to reach tens of millions of followers on a daily basis.
As influencers become more valuable, many popular YouTubers have been able to turn their personal brands into million-dollar businesses. While the formula for YouTube success varies between channels, the most successful YouTubers have been able to find new sources of income beyond the ad revenue on their videos. For some, that means personal clothing lines and TV appearances, while others have capitalized on their success with sold-out live tours and custom toy brands.
Forbes recently released its list of the highest-paid YouTubers, based on their earnings from June 1, 2017, to June 1, 2018.
Here’s how they rank:
10. Logan Paul — $14.5 million
Nicholas Hunt/Getty Images
Vlogger Logan Paul was YouTube’s fourth-highest earner last year. But his personal brand took a tumble after he uploaded a video of a dead body he found in Japan’s Aokigahara forest, a location that is notorious for suicides.
As a result, YouTube removed Paul from the Google Preferred program, impacting his ad revenue. However, his channel continued to rack up subscribers, and he continues to earn income from his personal merchandise and celebrity appearances. Despite the scandal in Japan, Paul was able to increase his earnings by $2 million in the course of a year.
One of Paul’s most watched stunts this year was a pay-per-view boxing match against British YouTuber KSI held in London. The fight ended in a draw, and the internet stars are planning a rematch for next year.
9. PewDiePie — $15.5 million
In past years, Felix “PewDiePie” Kjellberg was, without question, the world’s most successful YouTuber.
But recent scandals accusing the video-game commenter of racism and anti-Semitism have led to a slight decline in his sponsorships. Still, like Logan Paul, PewDiePie managed to increase his overall earnings by about $3.5 million between June 2017 and June 2018.
PewDiePie still has the most subscribers of any single account on YouTube with more than 92 million, but the Bollywood-focused YouTube channel T-Series briefly dethroned him in late March.
8. Jacksepticeye — $16 million
Irish video-game streamer Sean “Jacksepticeye” McLoughlin was one of the first YouTubers to be a part of PewDiePie’s Disney-sponsored Revelmode network, earning him a giant following.
While Disney eventually dumped Revelmode, McLoughlin was eventually signed to create original programming for Disney XD, a TV channel marketed toward children and teens. McLoughlin also serves as a host and stage personality for a number of live events and tours in Europe and North America.
7. VanossGaming — $17 million
Vanoss Gaming
VanossGaming is a channel run by Canadian gamer Evan Fong, though Fong rarely appears on camera himself.
His channel stands out for its unique editing, original art, and comedic tone. Fong has also branched out from video content with a personal clothing line and self-produced music under the name Rynx.
6. Markiplier — $17.5 million
Getty/Tommaso Boddi
Mark Edward Fischbach, or “Markiplier,” has been one of the most popular video-game YouTubers for more than five years, frequently collaborating with other influential content creators.
Fischbach was once studying to become a biomedical engineer, but suffered a string of life-changing events that led him to pursue a YouTube career. Fischbach told Forbes he had a tumor removed from his adrenal gland, broke up with his girlfriend, and was laid off from his job before he decided to start his channel.
Today, he has more than 23 million followers on YouTube.
5. Jeffree Star — $18 million
Once known as the most followed person on MySpace, Jeffree Star has made a wildly successful transition to YouTube since 2014.
Star launched his channel alongside his makeup brand, Jeffree Star Cosmetics, uploading a mix of beauty tips, tutorials, and personal vlogs.
Star has earned more than 13 million subscribers with about 300 videos, a departure from the daily schedule of uploads that most top YouTubers follow.
4. DanTDM — $18.5 million
Australian video-game streamer Daniel “DanTDM” Middleton was last year’s highest-paid YouTuber with $16.5 million in earnings.
Middleton’s earnings skyrocketed thanks to a world tour that included four sold-out shows at the Sydney Opera House and a thriving personal apparel brand.
Middleton built his massive audience streaming “Minecraft” and recently had a role in Disney’s “Ralph Breaks the Internet” as eBoy.
3. Dude Perfect — $20 million
YouTube/Dude Perfect
Dude Perfect is a sports-focused channel featuring hundreds of amazing trick shots and stunts. The channel is run by a five-man group: twins Cory and Coby Cotton, Garrett Hilbert, Cody Jones, and Tyler Toney, all of whom attended Texas A&M University.
The group’s tricks garnered tons of viral attention, and they’ve made appearances on “Good Morning America” and multiple ESPN shows.
As their popularity has grown, Dude Perfect has also produced videos with a number of famous professional athletes, including Odell Beckham Jr., Drew Brees, Chris Paul, and Dale Earnhardt Jr.
2. Jake Paul — $21.5 million
While Logan Paul saw his earnings stumble in the aftershock of the Aokigahara incident, his younger brother, Jake, has continued to thrive in the YouTube ecosystem, releasing daily vlogs and rap videos to more than 18 million followers each week.
Like Logan, Jake Paul’s earliest internet fame actually came from the defunct social-media network Vine, where he had more than 5 million followers and 2 billion views on his content.
Now 21 years old, Paul earned national attention in July 2017 for his ongoing feud with his neighbors over noise complaints and the unwanted attention his followers brought to his Los Angeles neighborhood.
1. Ryan ToysReview — $22 million
Ryan ToysReview is the top-earning YouTube channel, and it features a 7-year-old host, Ryan.
The boy’s parents began documenting his toy reviews in March 2015 and have now amassed more than 18 million subscribers. While Ryan’s follower base isn’t as large as some of the other top YouTube stars, his growing influence on the toy industry helped double the family’s earnings from 2017.
Ryan ToysReview was one of several YouTube brands to partner with pocket.watch and Bonkers Toys to create a new line of licensed toys and books featuring YouTube stars. The Ryan’s World toy line was the first to be released in an exclusive partnership with Walmart earlier this year.
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Home > Energy & Commodities
Nordic forestry industry at risk from deep thaw below Arctic Circle
THE forest floors below the Arctic Circle are usually frozen solid this time of year, hard enough to support the giant timber machines needed to harvest their wood.
But that is changing, according to the foresters who work the land in Finland and Sweden. Unusually mild winters are turning once icy grounds into thick layers of mud capable of swallowing up the 25 tonne vehicles used to gather the materials that go into pulp, paper and packaging.
"We will see more and more of these difficult conditions," Uno Brinnen, head of forestry at Sweden's BillerudKorsnas AB, said in an interview. "It will always shift between warm and cold winters, but the long-term trend seems clear."
Temperatures across large swathes of Sweden were as much as 3 deg C higher than normal in December and January, according to the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI). That warming forms part of a trend that is likely to persist, according to SMHI, whose scientists expect temperatures to continue rising over the next six decades because of climate change.
SEE ALSO: Massive diamond mine opens in Canada's far north
The travails increasingly experienced by Nordic foresters underscore the economic impacts of climate change.
Even as warming temperatures in and around the Arctic Circle frees waterways and reveals new paths to exploit natural resources, countries and companies in the region are being forced to adopt new ways of conducting traditional business.
For Swedish and Finnish companies such as BillerudKorsnas, Holmen AB, Stora Enso Oyj and UPM-Kymmene Oyj, the changing climate poses major challenges because if the ground does not freeze enough to support the heavy vehicles used for harvesting, companies cannot get to the raw materials that they need to do business year round.
"The high water levels after the wet and mild autumn and winter creates a tough situation for the wood supply," Sweden's largest forest-owner association, Sodra AB, said in January, when it opted to harvest closer to major public roads in order to minimise the risk of driving over mushy woodlands.
The economic stakes are high. Forest industry products have for centuries been a pillar of the Swedish and Finnish economies.
Exports of such goods accounted for 10 per cent of Sweden's total exports last year and 22 per cent of Finland's in 2016. The combined value of the forestry to the two Nordic countries is about 24 billion euros (S$38.9 billion), according to Bloomberg calculations.
"The root cause of the shortage of pulp wood is the unusually wet and mild start of the winter," said Swedish packaging giant BillerudKorsnas in January.
The company, which gets some 75 per cent of its raw material from Swedish forests, warned that mild temperatures led to shortages in late 2017 and early 2018, resulting in an estimated negative impact of as much as 100 million kronor (S$16 million) on first-quarter earnings.
BillerudKorsnas has started to scan its forests with lasers to map out more sensitive areas and to try to find stable routes through woodlands, even when they are wet.
It has also started using bigger wheels and rubber tracks on some machines to reduce the damage that they cause to the ground and forest growth, another problem stemming from the milder weather.
"Winters have started later in large parts of our world, and it's a lot of wood we want to get hold of when the grounds are frozen," Stora Enso chief executive officer Karl-Henrik Sundstrom said in an interview in Stockholm last month.
"It's something I think we have to get used to, work with and even adjust our harvest cycles." BLOOMBERG
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Home > Life & Culture
A grand opera house sings again
Palermo's Teatro Massimo symbolises the rebirth of the city and the end of the domination of the Mafia
Thu, Mar 22, 2018 - 5:50 AM
The staging of Don Quixote at the Teatro Massimo, the biggest opera house in Italy.
PHOTO: NYTIMES
HERE is a quick quiz for the opera aficionado. The biggest opera house in Italy is in Milan, Venice or Palermo?
Palermo?
Yes, Milan's La Scala may have more seats, and La Fenice in la Venezia is more venerable by a century, but Palermo's Teatro Massimo is easily the biggest in Italy, a sprawling, 83,000-square-foot, neo-romantic edifice that dominates the Sicilian capital's antique skyline. In Europe, only L'Opera in Paris and the State Opera in Vienna are bigger.
The Teatro Massimo is not nearly as well-known internationally as those other theatres, but it is an opera house with a backstory that few artistic venues can match. That in turn has contributed to bold experimentation in bringing high culture to a troubled community.
SEE ALSO: La Scala Opera chooses new leader
Superintendent Francesco Giambrone, a medical doctor by training who administers the Teatro, invites visitors to its terra-cotta and copper-clad rooftop, some 250 feet above street level (and reached by ladder from the eight-story-high backstage), for both the view and the parable it represents.
"Yes, yes, it dominates the city, it has the most amazing view," Mr Giambrone said. "Straight ahead, the sea, of course. To the right, the most beautiful old city of Palermo. To the left, the abusive new construction, ugly, the city of the Mafia." The Teatro's history was troubled from the beginning. It was envisioned as 19th-century Palermo's bid for European cultural credibility, when both Sicily and Italy were booming. But it took 33 years to plan and build, opening in 1897, closing after only two seasons and not reopening until 1901.
Teatro Massimo was closed again for renovations in 1974, when the Mafia's power in Sicily was such that mob bosses appointed the Palermo mayor - and sometimes even appointed themselves to that position. The mayor of Palermo is also the president of the city-owned Teatro's board.
Reformers blamed the corruption and Mafia domination for the city's degradation, and nothing symbolised that more than Teatro Massimo, which remained closed for the next 23 years.
"It was a negative symbol of the city," Mr Giambrone said. "Then after those attacks, the city fought back, the city rebuilt itself, and it became a positive symbol." "Those attacks" were the 1992 assassinations of anti-Mafia magistrate Giovanni Falcone, another judge who was his wife, and their three bodyguards, on the highway to the Palermo airport, by a Mafia-planted car bomb. The murders caused an anti-Mafia backlash throughout Italy, perhaps nowhere more so than in Palermo itself, an uproar that broke the Mafia's grip on the city.
Civic pride became a way to reject Mafia domination. Schoolchildren responded vigorously to a campaign in which each school chose a historical monument to care for, and as Mr Giambrone tells it, the adoption of the long-shuttered and nearly forgotten Teatro by Palermo's children brought a wave of public shame, followed by determination to see it reopened.
Leoluca Orlando was the mayor then, and he remembers famed Italian conductor Claudio Abbado on the 1997 opening night of the first concert in the Teatro, by the renowned Berlin Philharmonic.
"Reopening is important for the history of music in the world, in Europe, in Italy, in Palermo," the mayor quoted the now deceased maestro as saying. "But what I wish to remember most is that my mother was a Palermitana, and now I can be proud to say that. For the last 24 years I was ashamed to say that, because the Mafia had covered Palermo with shame." A year later, the stage that once hosted Enrico Caruso and Maria Callas again brought Giuseppe Verdi's Aida to Palermo's Piazza Verdi. Since then, the Teatro has been staging a mix of classical and innovative productions, in ballet, opera and classical music in one or another of its four performance spaces.
But the opera struggled to distinguish itself on the international stage, finding it especially hard to attract the great orchestra conductors, despite Mr Abbado's early support. So it did what few in its world were doing: become an early pioneer in livestreaming its performances, even as the city was rolling out free Wi-Fi on downtown streets - a rarity in Italian cities even today.
"The theatre is for all, not for the few," Mr Giambrone said. "That is the principal mistake Italian theatre made in the past, to close itself off and restrict to an elite." Ticket prices were set deliberately low, as little as 15 euros (S$23.60), even before youth and other discounts; the most expensive box seat typically is no more than 120 euros, undiscounted, a pittance by the standards of major opera houses.
Still, that was too high for the relatively poor Sicilian region, and nearly three decades of closure had raised generations unaccustomed to opera-going.
So during the long Sicilian summer, the theatre put up a giant screen on the piazza outside, simulcasting performances for 1 euro a seat. And if that did not reach the masses, there was the "Opera Camion" project, a truck that carried a stage into Palermo's poorest neighbourhoods, with the orchestra "pit" in the street in front, and a full production of The Barber of Seville on the portable stage, for free.
The Teatro particularly targeted the younger generation. It started a Rainbow Choir made up of children of immigrants, for many of whom Sicily is their first landing place in Europe. "In our community, migrants are an important part," Mr Giambrone said. Children are also invited in for sleepovers, complete with pajama-clad treasure hunts in the Byzantine corridors.
"Such a place, such an amazing building," said Mario Giovanni Ingrassia, a Florence-based manager of classical musicians and a Palermo native. "It's so huge, it's just immense, but the acoustics are beautiful." It also has a reputation for paying its bills on time, he said, unlike many Italian institutions.
Like all opera houses in Italy, the Teatro has struggled with steadily declining state subsidies from a financially strapped government, but it manages to fill 80 per cent of its paid seats. Non-opera fans help out, with more than 100,000 people a year paying for guided tours of the building.
While the opera house puts on classics, it also has a reputation for theatrical innovation. Currently it is staging Don Quixote, a ballet produced by the Tbilisi Opera from Georgia and choreographed by dancer Lienz Chang, from Cuba. In October, the Teatro will stage Verdi's classicRigoletto, with Sicilian-American movie actor John Turturro making his opera debut -- as the opera's director. "We are convinced that opera is not stuffy and boring," Mr Giambrone said.
"Nowhere does the opera symbolise its city like the Teatro Massimo symbolises Palermo," he said. "Covent Garden is not the symbol of London, the Opera in Paris is not the symbol of Paris, the Met doesn't represent New York. But our opera house is not only the symbol of the rebirth of the city, it's a symbol of the end of the domination of the Mafia." NYTIMES
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Are Spock & Uhura Together In ‘Star Trek Beyond’? The Problems Of The Past Still Haunt The Couple
By Johnny Brayson
It was a pretty big deal when the news came out that Sulu would be portrayed as gay in Star Trek Beyond , making him the first openly LGBT character in the Star Trek universe. And while that is certainly a milestone, Sulu's aren't the only romantic interests in the film in which the audience is invested. There's also the case of the reboot series' biggest couple: Spock and Uhura. The pair certainly have had their ups and downs in the first two movies in the rebooted Star Trek universe, and fans are wondering if Spock and Uhura are together in Star Trek Beyond .
Fans will remember that the two were revealed to be an item in 2009's Star Trek, which marked a new direction for the characters compared to previous Star Trek canon. They continued dating through that film and into its sequel, Star Trek: Into Darkness, and that's where things got messy. Their conflicts mostly arose out of Spock's ultra-logical Vulcan roots versus Uhura's more emotion-based Earthling way of viewing things. In that film, Uhura becomes upset with Spock for taking too many risks on his missions, and not caring about her feelings when putting his own life in danger. However, by the end of the movie, the pair seem to have mostly made up — though it's made clear there is still a rift between them. And that brings us to Star Trek Beyond. The pair are explicitly broken up in the movie, and they do not get back together. You can see a clip below that shows the awkward tension between them.
JoBlo Movie Trailers on YouTube
However, even though they're not together in the film, all is not lost between Spock and Uhura. Spoiler alert! At the end of Star Trek Beyond, Uhura seems to silently imply that she still has feelings for Spock by again proudly wearing the necklace he gave her — the one she tries to return to him in the clip above. It's a symbolic and intentional move on her part, and I wouldn't be surprised if Spock and Uhura once again become a legitimate couple in the just-announced fourth Star Trek movie.
Images: Paramount Pictures
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One Of Donald Trump's Worst Enemies Is High Early Voter Turnout & Georgia Could Be The First Case-In-Point
By Lani Seelinger
Scott Olson/Getty Images News/Getty Images
Early in-person voting opened up in Georgia on Monday, and people are already waiting in long lines to have their voices heard. If you think you might hear cheering in the distance, it could be the Democratic camp celebrating in advance — they consider high voter turnout in Georgia key to beating Donald Trump.
Most people consider Georgia to be solidly Republican territory. The last time Georgia voted for the Democratic candidate was in 1992 for Bill Clinton, and that was the only presidential election of the last six in which the Democrats scored a majority of the state's electoral votes. This year, however, Georgia polling reveals a tighter race than the Republicans may be comfortable with. Many of the polls have Trump winning by a percentage that falls into the margin of error, and a few even indicate that Clinton could win. In a state that Mitt Romney won by 7.3 points, this is a promising sign — and high turnout in the early voting stage in general is particularly promising for Democrats.
In the tightly fought swing states, some of which are habitually decided by margins of only tens of thousands, early voting can give one party an edge that the other can't make up even with a high turnout on election day. This helped Mitt Romney win North Carolina in 2012. This year, however, more Democrats have requested mail-in ballots than Republicans. Analysts often point to North Carolina as one of the few must-win swing states for Trump. No Democrat, on the other hand, would have expected that Georgia was even in play — but that could change this year.
High turnout generally helps the Democratic party. Many groups that are less likely to vote, like minorities and young people, are much more likely to vote Democratic, so Hillary Clinton's campaign is all about getting out the vote. In this election, in which Trump has spent so much of his time insulting one group or another, this is more important than ever. If the groups Trump has insulted — immigrants, journalists, and, of course, women — came out in full force to vote against him, Clinton would have an unbeatable coalition.
She certainly won't get all of those people, but it's at least very likely that more people will turn out to vote than usual. Georgia is a good example of that, as early voter turnout there has been extraordinarily high. Those who would like to keep Trump out of office, however, had better not get complacent. Early voting is a good sign for Clinton, but Election Day itself will also bring out masses of people.
Whether you want to try to avoid the lines and vote now or wait until the day of and experience all of the madness and chaos that it's sure to bring, the most important thing is that you let your voice be heard. It's necessary to remember that all of this campaigning and mudslinging really boils down to one thing: getting a higher number of votes.
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China dangles a potentially harmful new threat in trade war
May 29, 2019 CanadianInvestor
WASHINGTON — Facing new trade sanctions and a U.S. clampdown on its top telecommunications company, China issued a pointed reminder Wednesday that it has yet to unleash all its weapons in its trade war with the Trump administration.
Chinese state media warned that Beijing could cut America off from exotic minerals that are widely used in electric cars and mobile phones. The threat to use China’s rich supply of so-called rare earths as leverage in the conflict has contributed to sharp losses in U.S. stocks and sliding long-term bond yields.
For months, the world’s two biggest economies have been locked in a standoff over allegations that China deploys predatory tactics — including stealing trade secrets and forcing foreign companies to hand over technology — in a drive to supplant U.S. technological dominance.
The Trump administration has imposed 25% tariffs on $250 billion in Chinese imports and is planning to tax the $300 billion in imports that have so far been spared. And it escalated the stakes this month by putting the Chinese telecom giant Huawei on a blacklist that effectively bars U.S. companies from supplying it with computer chips, software and other components without government approval.
The U.S. claims Huawei is legally beholden to China’s ruling Communist Party, which could order it to spy on their behalf. Washington has offered no evidence that the Huawei has done that, however.
Huawei is trying to beat back one punitive U.S. measure in federal court. In a motion filed late Tuesday in eastern Texas, the company argued that a 2018 law that bars it from selling telecom gear to U.S. government agencies and contractors should be struck down as unconstitutional. The move for summary judgment in a case filed against the U.S. government in March says the law violates a constitutional prohibition against “trial by legislature” of individual entities. Congress thus acted unconstitutionally when it “adjudicated Huawei’s guilt and blacklisted it,” the motion argues.
An attorney representing Huawei in the U.S. case, Glen Nager of Jones Day, asserts that Congress alone cannot constitutionally impose punishment on an individual company — which the punitive law does in singling out Huawei by name.
The law “is intended to drive Huawei out of the U.S. — i.e., to banish it,” Nager argued. It “stigmatizes Huawei as a tool of the Chinese government” with no right to a fair hearing, he added.
Steven Schwinn, a professor at John Marshall Law School in Chicago, suggested that Huawei’s arguments fall short constitutionally, and “given that this relates to national security, we can expect the courts to be fairly deferential to the government.”
The nationalistic Chinese newspaper Global Times warned that China has plenty of ways to retaliate against the United States, including the threat of cutting off supplies of rare earths. China last year produced 78% of the world’s rare earths, according to researchers at Bank of America Merrill Lynch.
If the U.S. fails to exercise restraint, it will see that “China is far from running out of cards, and we have the will and determination to fight the U.S. to the end,” the paper’s editorial said. An official of China’s top economic planning agency did not rule out using rare earths as a countermeasure against “the U.S.’s unwarranted suppression.”
President Xi Jinping visited rare earth-related businesses in southeastern Jiangxi province earlier this month. He called rare earths “an important strategic resource” while stressing the importance of owning independent core technologies, the state-run China Daily reported.
China has used rare earths as a cudgel before. Five years ago, the World Trade Organization slapped down China’s attempt to restrict the export of rare earths, rejecting its claim that it just wanted to protect the environment and conserve supplies. Instead, the move appeared to be aimed at hurting Japan with which Beijing was having a diplomatic tiff.
Scott Kennedy, director of the project on the Chinese economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the Chinese might benefit even less if they try to weaponize rare earths again.
“It’s not the threat that it was … when the Chinese threatened to cut off the Japanese,” he said.
First, users of rare earths have stockpiled the minerals for a “rainy day.” Second, they also have figured out how to “use less rare earth to achieve the same results” in such products as lasers and magnets. And third, different minerals and chemicals are increasingly being used as rare earth substitutes.
Kennedy predicts that once investors have “realized the threat wasn’t as dire, markets would bounce back.”
Still, he isn’t optimistic about the U.S.-China trade negotiations, which broke off May 10 after an 11th round of talks failed to produce an agreement. U.S. officials accused the Chinese of reneging on agreements they’d made in earlier rounds.
“The Chinese first are going to have to signal they will talk,” he said. Then they will have to go back to where they stood before they backpedaled on earlier concessions. “I don’t see any body language from the Chinese that they’re about to do that,” Kennedy said.
Yanan Wang reported from Shenzhen, China, and Bajak from Boston. AP video producer Olivia Zhang in Shenzhen and writer Christopher Bodeen in Beijing contributed to this report.
Paul Wiseman, Frank Bajak And Yanan Wang, The Associated Press
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This device reads a book without opening it [WATCH]
The device, dubbed a terahertz spectrometer, is still a long way from actually scanning an entire book but researchers say the technology has great potential
by Michael Casey, The Associated Press
CAMBRIDGE, Mass.—Leave it to the great minds at MIT and Georgia Tech to figure out a way to read the pages of a book without actually opening it.
A team of researchers from the two institutions pulled it off with a system they developed that looks like a cross between a camera and a microscope.
They said it could someday be used by museums to scan the contents of old books too fragile to handle or to examine paintings to confirm their authenticity or understand the artist’s creative process.
Writing in the latest issue of the journal Nature Communications, the scientists explained how they used terahertz waves—a type of radiation situated on the electromagnetic spectrum between microwaves and infrared light—to read a stack of papers with a single letter handwritten on each page.
The device, called a terahertz spectrometer, managed to clearly read only nine pages, though it could see writing on up to 20.
“We were very excited because we didn’t think we would be able to see as deep as we did,” said Barmak Heshmat, a research scientist at the MIT Media Lab.
While the device is still a long way from actually scanning an entire book, Heshmat said the team is already talking with the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York about using it to inspect some of its artworks and antique volumes. The museum did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
He said it could also be used in industry _ for example, to see whether there are cracks or other defects beneath the paint on an aircraft part.
Heshmat said that for now, broader uses would be limited by the cost of the device, which runs about $100,000.
The device works by directing ultrashort bursts of terahertz radiation at stacks of paper. Some of it is absorbed by the paper, and the remainder is reflected back. The signals that bounce back are then analyzed with algorithms that can discern individual letters.
In the study, the stack of paper had no cover, but Heshmat said he is confident the system could see through one.
Heshmat said the system works much better than X-rays, which are currently used to scan documents and paintings but entail harmful levels of radiation.
With X-rays, “you won’t be able to read the pages unless the ink is written by some metal like silver or gold,” he said. “But with our system, because it uses a different part of the electromagnetic spectrum, it can identify many other chemicals, so it can contrast between the blank paper and the part that has ink.”
He said the project was inspired by the work 10 years ago of a group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology that showed you could look through a closed envelope with terahertz waves. With the new system, he said, “you can actually look deeper into multiple pages.”
Researchers not involved in the project said the technology has great potential.
“I think it is almost inevitable that terahertz imaging will be an important technology in numerous future applications and that sophisticated signal processing will be an important component for extracting information from the images,” Brown University engineering professor Daniel Mittleman said in an email.
He said the researchers achieved “something the field has discussed for years but never demonstrated as nicely as in this work.”
Here is a YouTube video from MIT News describing the research process:
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Happ, Pritzel lead Wisconsin in easy win over UMass Lowell
By: Justin Thompson-Gee Facebook | Twitter
Posted: Dec 30, 2017 6:10 PM CDT
MADISON, Wis. (AP) — With nonconference play now wrapped up, Wisconsin coach Greg Gard is looking for one thing: consistency.
Saturday's win was a step in the right direction on that front as the Badgers cruised to an 82-53 win over UMass Lowell.
The win comes three days after Gard expressed frustration with a drop off on the defensive end during the second half of an 82-70 win over Chicago State.
"You're always taking it one step at a time, one day at a time and trying to retain what you've achieved and continue to inch forward and improve," Gard said.
UMass Lowell (6-7) simply didn't have the size to stop Ethan Happ, who scored 18 points in 20 minutes, and Brevin Pritzl heating up from the outside with 18 points as well, upending the River Hawks' game plan.
The River Hawks only listed one starter taller than 6 feet, 4 inches, and the 6-10 Happ had 11 points just more than halfway through the first half.
Pritzl, meanwhile, had been hitting 33 percent of his 3-point attempts coming in. But he was 4 of 6 from behind the 3-point line, showing flashes of the shooting touch his Wisconsin (8-7) teammates often say they see in practice. He also was aggressive driving to the hoop, and a late 3 helped eclipse his previous career high of 17, which he set a little more than two weeks ago.
UMass Lowell coach Pat Duqette said the plan was to double down on the Badgers' post players because of their size advantage. But the Badgers were 5 of 8 from the 3-point line in the first half, negating that approach. Duquette said the River Hawks got better at closing out on shooters in the second half, but by then they were already down more than 20 points.
Wisconsin finished 8 of 15 (53 percent) from behind the 3-point line after coming in averaging less than 35 percent on 3-point attempts.
Josh Gantz scored 16 points to lead UMass Lowell, while Matt Harris added 14.
"We were just outmatched, outsized against a good team that shot well and shared the ball on their home floor," Duqette said.
That Wisconsin was so successful on offense wasn't much of a shock. UMass Lowell came in giving up an average of 77.6 points a game, ranking the River Hawks 292nd out of 351 Division I teams.
The Badgers defense, though, has been a work in progress. But Wisconsin held the River Hawks to nearly 27 points below their season average coming in.
UMass Lowell: The River Hawks, who completed the transition to Division I from Division II this season and are eligible for postseason play for the first time, simply didn't have the firepower to hang with Wisconsin. Thing should be much easier in the America East Conference, where UMass Lowell was picked in the middle of the pack.
Wisconsin: After Wednesday's win over Chicago State, the Badgers expressed frustration with their defensive effort in giving up 70 points to a team ranked 313th in Division I scoring offense. In their final tune-up before Big Ten play begins, the Badgers looked much sharper on the defensive end.
RARE AIR
Ethan Happ became the 10th Big Ten player in the last 20 years to have at least 1,000 points, 700 rebounds and 200 assists. After Saturday, Happ's totals are 1,197 points, 733 rebounds and 200 assists. He also has 146 steals and 86 blocks. Three others on the list also played for Wisconsin: Alando Tucker, Nigel Hayes and Mike Wilkinson.
UMass Lowell: The River Hawks host Vermont on Thursday.
Wisconsin: The Badgers host Indiana on Tuesday.
Arcia delivers late, Brewers add on in win over D-backs
Pistons claim former Bucks player Christian Wood
Celtics introduce Walker and Kanter
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Contact Ava
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The World Health Organization
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Chamberlain Lockett
View as published in The Victoria Advocate
Brittany Cabrera, 25, holds her daughter Penny, 3, in front of their Goliad, Texas, home on May 2, 2019. The pair plans to permanently relocate to Colorado in June alongside Cabrera's husband and parents to seek medical marijuana treatments for Penny's seizures.
Dozens of toys litter the floor of three-year-old Penny Cabrera’s Goliad, Texas, bedroom. The toddler sits in the midst of the chaos wearing an Easter basket as a hat while her mother, Brittany Cabrera, 25, watches with a smile.
This is a typical afternoon for Cabrera, a stay at home mom, and her daughter, Penny, a preschooler with a rare genetic disorder, CDKL5. The neurodevelopmental disease affects Penny most notably in the form of uncontrollable seizures, impaired motor skills and inability to communicate verbally with the exception of three to four words.
Penny’s CDKL5 diagnosis came as a shock to her young, first-time parents back in 2016.
“The pregnancy was perfect, the delivery was fine. Two months later it was like all of a sudden our world completely turned,” Cabrera said.
Penny’s short life has been riddled with obstacles and countless medical diagnoses including West syndrome, strabismus, and Lennox-Gastaut Syndrome in addition to CDKL5.
“It’s a helpless type of thing because you can’t fix it. It’s the worst feeling because you don’t want your child to suffer or be in pain like that,” Cabrera said.
When Penny was first diagnosed with CDKL5 at two months old, the Cabreras visited hospitals across Texas seeking the best care for their daughter. They became aware of CBD oil as a treatment for seizure disorders and inquired about it to their providers at Texas Children's Hospital in Houston. Their inquiries were met with backlash from the staff who told them Child Protective Services would be called if they tried to obtain CBD oil for their daughter.
On January 28, 2019, Brittany Cabrera flips through the calendar where she has been chronicling her daughter Penny's seizures since they began in 2016.
In the early days of Penny’s diagnosis, the Cabreras entertained the idea of moving to Colorado to seek medical marijuana and more comprehensive treatment options for Penny as a last result. That last result has now become their new reality as the Cabreras, Brittany, her husband Dustin, and Penny, have recently put their Goliad house on the market and begin hunting for a place to live in the Denver area. The Cabreras hope to make the move this summer once the school year ends. Cabrera’s parents and two cousins will be moving to Colorado alongside the family to offer assistance.
“We’re all relocating for this. It’s a lot, moving to a new place not knowing anyone, so my parents are going too and we’re all just going to help each other out over there,” Cabrera said.
Cabrera plans to get her Certified Nursing Assistant’s license to become Penny’s paid home health nurse in Colorado and her mother, Tammy Campbell, a local school teacher, plans to seeks employment as a teacher’s aid for Penny at her new school. Having Campbell closeby brings Cabrera a sense of comfort about sending her daughter into unfamiliar territory.
“Here, we know the teachers because it’s Goliad, we grew up with all these people and everyone is basically related to each other… When we move to Colorado we won’t know a soul there. It really terrifies me to send her in blind,” Cabrera said.
Penny Cabrera, 3, reaches up for her mother Brittany Cabrera, 25, to pick her up in the kitchen of their Goliad, Texas, home as their dog, Shoe, walks past, on May 2, 2019.
When Penny turned three in December 2018 her seizures became increasingly worse and more frequent, leading her parents to research additional treatment options. It was then that Cabrera launched the fundraiser, Penny’s Pal, to raise money for a seizure response dog for her daughter. The dog will be custom-trained through SDWR, Service Dogs by Warren Retrievers, to meet the needs of Penny and her family, providing assistance and companionship.
Since its inception, Cabrera has raised just over $6,200 for Penny’s Pal through her monthly fundraising efforts in the form of local bake sales, raffles, t-shirt sales and garage sales. She remains hopeful the $25,000 fundraiser goal will eventually be met.
In the meantime, Cabrera tries to provide a sense of normalcy for daughter and recently enrolled her in a special needs class at Goliad Elementary School.
“It’s good for her because now she gets to socialize and she loves to be around other children,” Cabrera said.
Penny attends school for 2 hours a day alongside other special needs students.
“The first week I did not know what to do with myself because I’m used to having her home. I was like Betty Crocker, baking up a storm, because I didn’t know what to do with my time,” Cabrera joked.
Cabrera expresses immense gratitude for Penny’s teachers and school and is amazed by what her daughter has learned in just a few short months of attendance. Cabrera has noticed improvement in Penny’s motor skills along with entirely new skills like knocking and opening a zipper.
In February, the Cabreras were granted a Make A Wish trip for Penny and embarked on a cross-country roadtrip for her to meet Moana face to face at Disney World in Florida. Cabrera cites Moana as the only thing she’s ever known for sure Penny likes because of her overjoyed reaction whenever the music or movie is on.
“She can’t tell us what she likes... so it’s a big deal in our house because it’s the only thing we know she’s truly interested in,” Cabrera said.
Despite the many hardships and challenges, Cabrera views Penny’s CDKL5 as a blessing in disguise.
“I feel like this brought us way closer together as a family,” Cabrera said. “We cherish things more. The little things are ginormous to us.”
For more information on fundraising and updates on Penny’s condition, follow along at Facebook.com/PennysPal.
Click here to donate directly to the Penny’s Pal fundraiser.
email: chamberlainlockett@gmail.com
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Home / Entertainment /
Amazon Prime: New Releases Coming in June 2016
Michelle Regalado Twitter
Amazon Prime is adding a new batch of movies and television shows to its streaming collection throughout the coming month. Here are all of Amazon Prime’s new releases coming in June.
Trumbo | Source: Bleecker Street
Apocalypse Now, June 1: Starring Marlon Brando, Martin Sheen, and Robert Duvall — during the Vietnam War, Captain Willard is sent on a dangerous mission into Cambodia to assassinate a renegade colonel who has set himself up as a god among a local tribe.
The Good, The Bad And The Ugly, June 1: Starring Clint Eastwood, Eli Wallach, and Lee Van Cleef, a bounty hunting scam joins two men in an uneasy alliance against a third in a race to find a fortune in gold buried in a remote cemetery.
W, June 1: Starring Josh Brolin, Elizabeth Banks, and Ioan Gruffudd, this film is a chronicle of the life and presidency of George W. Bush.
Six Degrees Of Separation, June 1: Starring Will Smith, Stockard Channing, and Donald Sutherland, an affluent New York couple find their lives touched, intruded upon, and compelled by a mysterious young black man who is never quite who he says he is.
The Black Stallion, June 1: A young boy begins a meaningful friendship with a horse when the pair are stranded on a deserted island. Kelly Reno, Mickey Rooney, and Teri Garr star.
The Presidio, June 1: Starring Sean Connery, Mark Harmon, and Meg Ryan, a police detective is forced to team up with his former military commanding officer to solve a series of grisly murders.
Hammett, June 1: Writer/private detective Dashiell Hammett (Frederic Forrest) works a dirty case in 1920s San Francisco.
The Million Dollar Hotel, June 1: Starring Jeremy Davies, Milla Jovovich, and Mel Gibson, this is a tragi-comic, romantic whodunnit set in a rundown hotel which plays host to mentally ill people too poor to afford medical insurance.
Ulee’s Gold, June 1: Starring Peter Fonda, Patricia Richardson, and Christine Dunford, a reclusive beekeeper slowly pulls his dysfunctional family back together, but not without having to fight his son’s previous dastardly cohorts.
The Program, June 2: Starring Ben Foster, Chris O’Dowd, and Guillaume Canet, an Irish sports journalist becomes convinced that Lance Armstrong’s performances during the Tour de France victories are fueled by banned substances. With this conviction, he starts hunting for evidence that will expose Armstrong.
Love & Mercy, June 4: Starring John Cusack, Paul Dano, and Elizabeth Banks — in the 1960s, Beach Boys leader Brian Wilson struggles with emerging psychosis as he attempts to craft his avant-garde pop masterpiece. In the 1980s, he is a broken, confused man under the 24-hour watch of shady therapist Dr. Eugene Landy.
Lamb, June 6: Starring Ross Partridge, Oona Laurence, and Jess Weixler. When a man meets a young girl in a parking lot he attempts to help her avoid a bleak destiny by initiating her into the beauty of the outside world. The journey shakes them in ways neither expects.
The Cokeville Miracle, June 6: Children who were held hostage in their elementary school tell stories of miraculous things, but many adults are skeptical that the Cokeville Miracle ever truly happened.
Trumbo, June 16: Starring Bryan Cranston, Helen Mirren, and Diane Lane — in 1947, Dalton Trumbo was Hollywood’s top screenwriter, until he and other artists were jailed and blacklisted for their political beliefs.
Wayne’s World | Source: Paramount Pictures
Runaway Bride, June 1: A reporter is assigned to write a story about a woman who has left a string of fiances at the altar. Julia Roberts and Richard Gere star.
Sleepover, June 1: Four best friends, desperate to improve their social status, enter into an all-night scavenger hunt against the popular clique in school.
Wayne’s World, June 1: Two slacker friends try to promote their public-access cable show. Mike Myers, Dana Carvey, and Rob Lowe star.
In & Out, June 1: A romantic comedy starring Kevin Kline, Joan Cusack, and Tom Selleck. A midwestern teacher questions his sexuality after a former student makes a comment about him at the Academy Awards.
The Golden Child, June 1: Starring Eddie Murphy, J.L. Reate, and Charles Dance. A private detective specializing in missing children is charged with the task of finding a special child who dark forces want to eliminate.
Trading Mom, June 1: Starring Sissy Spacek, Anna Chlumsky, and Aaron Michael Metchik. Elizabeth, Jeremy, and Harry are unhappy with their single mother. An ancient magic spell allows them to select a new mother, but through their choices, they realize how much they love their own mother.
One From the Heart, June 1: As a Las Vegas couple’s relationship teeters on disaster, a fight on the 4th of July leads them both to spend a night on the Strip alone in pursuit of their romantic fantasies. As they wheel past a parade of gamblers, each must decide whether to bet it all on their own dreams — or give their marriage another roll of the dice.
Heartburn, June 1: Starring Meryl Streep, Jack Nicholson, and Jeff Daniels star in this comedy drama, based on Nora Ephron’s best-selling autobiographical novel, which explores the author’s divorce from her husband after she discovers he’s having an affair.
Rules of Attraction, June 3: Starring James Van Der Beek, Shannyn Sossamon, and Ian Somerhalder. The incredibly spoiled and overprivileged students of Camden College are a backdrop for an unusual love triangle between a drug dealer, a virgin and a bisexual classmate.
Stand Up Guys, June 22: Starring Al Pacino, Christopher Walken, and Alan Arkin. A pair of aging stickup men try to get the old gang back together for one last hurrah before one of the guys takes his last assignment — to kill his comrade.
Carrie | Source: United Artists
Carrie, June 1: Starring Sissy Spacek, Piper Laurie, and Amy Irving. Carrie White, a shy and outcast 17-year-old girl who is sheltered by her domineering, religious mother, unleashes her telekinetic powers after being humiliated by her classmates at her senior prom
The Rage: Carrie 2, June 1: Starring Emily Bergl, Jason London, and Amy Irving. A horrible massacre strikes up after an outcast teenage girl is taunted by a group of high school jocks, all of them unaware of her cutthroat telekinetic powers.
Poltergeist III, June 2: Starring Heather O’Rourke, Tom Skerritt, and Nancy Allen. Supernatural forces follow Carol Anne while she’s staying with her aunt.
Southbound, June 20: Starring Chad Villella, Hannah Marks, and Dana Gould. Five interlocking tales of terror follow the fates of a group of weary travellers who confront their worst nightmares— and darkest secrets — over one long night on a desolate stretch of desert highway.
Open Grave, June 25: Starring Sharlto Copley, Thomas Kretschmann, and Josie Ho. A man wakes up in the wilderness, in a pit full of dead bodies, with no memory and must determine if the murderer is one of the strangers who rescued him, or if he himself is the killer.
Syriana | Source: Warner Bros.
Death Wish 2, June 1: Starring Charles Bronson, Jill Ireland, and Vincent Gardenia. Architect Paul Kersey once again becomes a vigilante when he tries to find the five street punks who murdered his daughter and housekeeper, this time on the dark streets of Los Angeles.
Mulholland Falls, June 1: Starring Nick Nolte, Melanie Griffith, and Jennifer Connelly. In 1950s Los Angeles, a special crime squad of the LAPD investigates the murder of a young woman.
Switchback, June 1: Starring Danny Glover, Dennis Quaid, and Jared Leto. An FBI agent tries to catch a serial killer who kidnapped his son.
Ground Control, June 1: Starring Kiefer Sutherland, Robert Sean Leonard, and Bruce McGill. A disgraced former air traffic controller is called back into service when the airport’s traffic control system malfunctions.
Criminal Law, June 1: Starring Gary Oldman, Kevin Bacon, and Tess Harper. Not long after he successfully defends his client in a murder case, a lawyer discovers that the man is guilty.
Syriana, June 1: Starring George Clooney, Matt Damon, and Amanda Peet. A politically-charged epic about the state of the oil industry in the hands of those personally involved and affected by it.
Remember, June 8: Starring Christopher Plummer, Martin Landau, and Dean Norris. With the aid of a fellow Auschwitz survivor and a hand-written letter, an elderly man with dementia goes in search of the person responsible for the death of his family.
The Adderall Diaries, June 14: Starring James Franco, Amber Heard, and Christian Slater. A troubled writer is thrown into a passionate affair and forced to confront the secrets of his past while investigating a scandalous high-profile murder.
Mr. Robot | Source: USA
Downton Abbey Season 6, June 6: Starring Hugh Bonneville, Michelle Dockery, and Elizabeth McGovern. A chronicle of the lives of the British aristocratic Crawley family and their servants in the early 20th Century.
Mr. Robot Season 1 (Prime Exclusive), June 13: Starring Rami Malek, Christian Slater, and Portia Doubleday. Follows a young computer programmer who suffers from social anxiety disorder and forms connections through hacking. He’s recruited by a mysterious anarchist, who calls himself Mr. Robot.
BrainDead Season 1 (Prime Exclusive), June 17: Starring Jan Maxwell, Beth Malone, and Happy Anderson. A young, fresh-faced Hill staffer gets her first job in Washington, D.C. to discover two things: The government has stopped working, and alien spawn have come to earth and eaten the brains of a growing number of Congressmen and Hill staffers.
The Good Wife Season 7, June 20: Starring Julianna Marguiles, Alan Cumming, and Chris Noth. Alicia has been a good wife to her husband, a former state’s attorney. After a very humiliating sex and corruption scandal, he is behind bars. She must now provide for her family and returns to work as a litigator in a law firm.
American Gothic, season 1, June 26: A horror series that place in the fictional town of Trinity, South Carolina, and revolves around Caleb Temple (Lucas Black) and the town’s corrupt sheriff, Lucas Buck (Gary Cole).
6 Souls, June 29: Cara Harding (Julianne Moore) is a dedicated psychiatrist skeptical about the nature of certain afflictions, especially Multiple Personality Disorder. Her skepticism starts to give way when her father, Dr. Harding (Jeffrey DeMunn), introduces her to a patient named Adam (Jonathan Rhys-Meyers) who consistently assumes the personalities of murder victims.
More from Entertainment Cheat Sheet:
8 of the Worst TV Shows of the 1990s
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10 Most Hated TV Shows of All Time
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Atsushi Ogata
Atsushi Ogata, Director of Cast Me If You Can
This interview was originally published on April 19, 2011 for Winking At A Girl In The Dark.
This week we shine the Spotlight on Japanese filmmaker, and Harvard and MIT graduate, Atsushi Ogata. Ogata’s first feature film, Cast Me If You Can, premiered in June 2010, as part of the Shanghai International Film Festival’s “Asian New Talent Competition.” We were so happy to sit down with Atsushi to discuss the film and all that this process has meant to him.
CM: Cast Me If You Can is your first feature film. How does it feel to have accomplished such an impressive goal?
AO: For many years, it was my dream to make a feature film. I had been working initially as a video artist, then I had a number of script-writing grants in Germany and Holland and wrote scripts, but my films never went into production. I began acting and performing improv and became a regular on a Dutch TV quiz show for 3 years before finally I started directing short films, which I also wrote and sometimes acted in. My first feature, Cast Me If You Can, is a culmination of all those years of working and learning. I felt that the time was ripe, and it was something I HAD TO DO NOW, or it was never going to happen. I felt stressed out that it might never ever happen, so it was such a big relief when it finally did!
CM: How was the craft of filmmaking first introduced to you?
AO: In high school, I learned to shoot and print my own still photos, and also shot and edited 8mm films. At the time, it was more of a hobby, but when I went to graduate school at M.I.T., I had a chance to work much more intensively in color photography and video shooting/editing. Our school taught mainly documentary filmmaking and video art, so that was my starting point.
CM: Was there much support for the arts in your neighborhood, growing up in Japan? What were some of your first memories of film?
AO: As a child, I never thought I would become an artist. I was rather clumsy in my shop classes and art classes. When I had an assignment to make a cubic box from wood, I couldn’t make the six sides exactly the same, so it became clunky. And I had a hard time carving out sculptures, and I was terrible in my calligraphy classes too. But after I moved to America and began to work with cameras in high school, it came naturally to me – I could use the camera almost unconsciously like a painter’s brush – It was an amazing discovery.
When I was small, I used to watch films/TV shows about wildlife in Africa, and animation about cool thieves and Samurais. I think I really began to have a much stronger impression of fiction film when I moved to New York and began going to the cinemas, watching Clint Eastwood films, among others.
CM: Who are some of your influences when it comes to filmmaking and directing?
AO: I don’t know if I can say they are my “influences,” but I’m inspired by films by Woody Allen, Neil Jordan, Charlie Kauffman, among others. I also watched a lot of Antonioni and Tarkovsky when I was in graduate school.
CM: You are in Boston this week, screening your film as part of the Boston International Film Festival. This is your second time at the BIFF. What first brought you to the Festival?
AO: Since I went to college and grad school in Boston, I’m happy to have a chance to return to Boston to show my films to my friends, former teachers and colleagues. The Boston International Film Festival has been supportive of my films, so it seemed like a perfect opportunity. Last time I was here in 2008, they showed my comedy short Eternally Yours, a battle of wits between an elderly lady and a conman. The Festival coincided with my college reunion at Harvard, so I was able to attend both events at the same time, which was a lot of fun.
CM: So you come off the win in Boston that year for Best Storyline and head back to Japan. At what point did you first think about making Cast Me If You Can? How did that process begin for you?
AO: I began working on the script for Cast Me If You Can in November 2007, so I was probably on my fifth draft or so, when I participated in BIFF in 2008. After winning the Prize for the Best Storyline for my short, I returned to Japan and continued to develop my script further. The original inspiration was (1) an image I had in my mind of the lead actor (who also acted in my previous film) running around Tokyo wearing a police uniform, and (2) “Frasier,” the American TV sit-com, whose humorous father-son relationship reflects also the relationship I have with my own father.
CM: I really enjoyed the movie. I saw the film as being, in part, a story of longing, and of the search for love and a true purpose in life. Can you tell us a bit more about the film, as you see it?
AO: The story is about Hiroshi, a perpetual supporting actor, living in the shadow of his famous playwright father, who is marginalized both at work and at home and is always mistaken for someone else, such as a store clerk or even a kidnapper. One day, luck changes: Hiroshi has a chance to play the lead in a Woody Allen remake, and he also meets his muse Aya, an aspiring actress, who is the only person who doesn’t mistake Hiroshi for someone else. Hiroshi falls for Aya head-over-heels. Through a series of misadventures, Hiroshi tries to court Aya, struggles to play the lead in his own life, and grows as a human being.
CM: As the writer, how much of yourself was injected into the main character?
AO: Cast Me If You Can is a semi-autobiographical comedy. Like Hiroshi in Cast Me If You Can and Zelig in Woody Allen’s film Zelig, I often get mistaken for someone else. Even after landing in Boston this trip, I was at Fedex/Kinko’s on a Saturday morning, sending emails, and a customer came up to me asking me about lamination, totally convinced that I worked there! It happens to me all over the world. A lot of the lines by Kenta, the father character in the film, are taken directly from what my own father says to me, and I’ve also worked as a very minor supporting actor in Holland.
CM: Can you relay a funny story from on set?
AO: Even during the film shoot, a number of times, passersby mistook me for an actor or a production assistant and kept asking me whose film it was. When we were getting ready for a shoot in an actual store, at one point I happened to stand behind the cash register; at that point, a real customer wandered into the store and tried to buy a bunch of sake cans from me! The list goes on and on…
CM: What was something you encountered working on this project that was new for you?
AO: Having to set up our own company, so that we wouldn’t be held personally liable. Securing and working with a number producers and associate producers who helped raise funding. Holding screening events of my previous work to raise funding. Preparing legal investment contracts. Having a talented composer score original scores for the whole film and having professional top performers play the music for the music recording. Securing a distributor who theatrically released our film in more than 16 cities in Japan. Publicizing our film through newspaper, TV, and radio interviews with experienced publicists in countless media. Personally selling 500 advanced tickets for the theatrical screenings and organizing 20 others to sell more than 1500 tickets, in addition to the normal sales at the box-office. Getting a “novelized” version of my film published and sold nation-wide. Getting praise and criticism from thousands of people. Making an audio commentary for the DVD release. Contracting with various sales agents for the ancillary markets. Feeling like Jack Bauer in “24”, sleepless and running an obstacle-race continuously for more than two years straight.
CM: How has the experience of working on your first feature changed you as a director?
AO: Having shot so many kinds of scenes in so many types of locations with experienced cast and crew, I feel much more confident that I can direct more different scenes and stories moving forward.
CM: The film has been very well received on the film festival circuit. Tell us about that success.
AO: Cast Me If You Can had its world premiere at the Shanghai International Film Festival’s Asian New Talent Competition section and has been screened and awarded in festivals in California, New York, Indiana and India, in addition to being theatrically released in more than 16 cities in Japan and in San Francisco. It was inspiring to see the audience truly laughing and crying during the film screening and getting feedback from hundreds of people and being complimented by the jury.
CM: Where did you shoot the film?
AO: The film was shot in Tokyo and all over the neighboring prefectures.
CM: I know you are screening the film at Harvard University on Wednesday, April 20, as a way to help raise awareness and funds for the relief efforts taking part in your homeland of Japan. What is your goal with the screening?
AO: To show uplifting, heart-warming, humorous images from Japan to counter the overdose of disaster TV images from the past month, and also as a way to humanize the country.
CM: Your work is often comedic in nature. Can you speak to the importance of humor, laughter, and levity in life and in art, particularly in times of tragedy?
AO: Humor is what allows us to overcome difficulties in life and to appreciate it further. No matter what a bad day I had, when I describe it, people start laughing. No matter what script I write, it’s never devoid of humor. I think it’s critical that everyone nurtures and develops his/her sense of humor. Humor also provides insights into our daily lives and we learn to think “out of the box.” Even before this recent natural disaster, in Japan for the past 10 years or longer, on average 100 people were committing suicides daily, which seems unthinkable in a materialistically rich nation. With humor, hopefully, people won’t get so stuck in their own misery and can learn to overcome difficulties by laughing them off.
CM: It has been a long journey for you, getting to this high point in your career. A lot of hard work, a lot of challenges along the way. What advice would you give to a young filmmaker who shares your dream? One who is at the beginning of his long and winding journey?
AO: Watch as many films as you can, and see which ones appeal to you and why. Try to work on as many different aspects of filmmaking writing, acting, directing, both on personal projects and on industry/commercial projects to gain knowledge and experience and to build your network. Try out different things and learn from your mistakes. Find the right people to work with, while avoiding the wrong people – easier said than done, but you have to try. And make a film you feel passionately about. It’s so much work and you end up sacrificing so much, so you have to LOVE doing it.
CM: Where does the film screen next?
AO: The Newport Beach Film Festival in California.
CM: Any new projects in the works?
AO: Yes, a caper and an action film, both in development.
CM: Where can people see the film? How can they acquire a copy?
AO: If they are in the New England area, then they can come out to see it at the Boston International Film Festival this Tuesday, April 19th. Cast Me If You Can will be screening at 3:00 p.m. at the AMC/Loews Theater at Boston Common, located at 175 Tremont Street in Boston. For more information on that screening people can visit http://www.bifilmfestival.com/0000011session18.html.
They are also invited to attend the free screening at Harvard University at 7:30 p.m., Wednesday, April 20, at Harvard Hall 104 (located next to Johnson Gate).
The DVD (region 2, NTSC) with English subtitles and my audio commentary in English, with a bi-lingual menu, can be ordered on Amazon inside Japan. For outside of Japan, availability is yet to be determined.
CM: What happens to the main characters in your film? Do they live happily ever after?
AO: What happens to the main characters after the ending of the film is up to your imagination.
Since its debut, Cast Me If You Can has been screened at festivals in California, New York, Indiana and India, winning prizes for Best Actress, Best Original Score and Best Title Sequence. The film has been released nation-wide in 16 cities in Japan, as well as in San Francisco, and was recently adapted into a novel.
Born in Japan and raised partly in the U.S., Harvard and MIT graduate, Atsushi Ogata has worked in Holland, Germany, Japan, and the U.S. as a film director, script-writer, video artist and actor.
Ogata’s short film, Eternally Yours, was selected for the prestigious New Directors/New Films Festival 2007 in New York at the MoMA & the Lincoln Center and won awards at the Bangkok, Moondance, and Boston International Film Festivals.
For more information on Cast Me If You Can, please visit the film’s bilingual website at http://www.wakiyakuthemovie.com.
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Archaeologists In Israel Find Evidence That Proves Literal Truth Of Bible
Ruth Gledhill Wed 28 Sep 2016 14:47 BST
The Tel Lachish National Park and the gate structure.Guy Fitoussi/Israel Antiquities Authority
Archaeologists have proved that passages of the Bible about the triumph of Judaism over the pagan Ba'al worship are literally true.
Referring to the fight against paganism in the biblical city of Lachish, 2 Kings 10 says: "Then they demolished the pillar of Ba'al, and destroyed the temple of Ba'al, and made it a latrine to this day."
Excavations in Israel have for the first time discovered an actual physical toilet of the kind referred to in this passage.
The stone latrine was deliberately inserted into a Ba'al shrine to render it unclean, and therefore unusable as a shrine any more.
The Biblical toilet at the time of its discoveryIgor Kramerman.
This and other artifacts that back Biblical accounts in Kings were found in archaeological excavations in Tel Lachish National Park.
Archaeologist were investigating the gate-shrine from the First Temple period, dating from the eighth century BC.
According to the Bible, city gates were where "everything took place".
Elders, judges, governors, kings and officials would sit on benches at the city gate to rule the city and keep an eye on comings and goings.
These very benches were found in the excavation at Tel Lachish, once the second most important city in the Holy Land after Jerusalem.
Israel Antiquities Authority (IAA) investigated the southern three chambers of the gate. The northern chambers had been excavated decades earlier by a British expedition.
One of the three southern chambers turned out to be a shrine to the pagan deity Ba'al.
Sa'ar Ganor, excavation director for the IAA, told Christian Today: "What is so important about the gate is that it is the place where everything took place – administrative and cultic activities."
The discoveries at the gate matched perfectly with an account of activites at the gate described in Kings during the reign of King Hezekiah.
"It means we have the evidence. The Bible and the archaeology are matching," Ganor said.
Evidence of the removal of the altar's horns.Yoli Shwartz/Israel Antiquities Authority.
The archaeologists found the remains of the stone altar to Ba'al, and the holes left in the altar when the horns of the deity were removed and the altar smashed – exactly as described in the Bible.
Ze'ev Elkin, minister of Jerusalem and Heritage, said: "The fascinating new discovery at Tel Lachish is a typical example whereby excavations and further research of heritage sites show us time and time again how Biblical tales that are known to us become historical and archaeological stories."
He said the discovery is physical evidence of events that took place during the 29-year reign of King Hezekiah: "He removed the high places, smashed the sacred stones and cut down the Asherah poles..." (II Kings 18:4).
Elkin added: "Before our very eyes these new finds become the biblical verses themselves and speak in their voice."
He said it was an "enthralling experience of ancient stones that speak to us of the Bible in their own unique voice."
Miri Regev of Israel's culture ministry said: "The uncovering of these finds joins a long list of discoveries that enlighten us about our historic past, a past that is manifested in our country's soil and in the writings of the Book of Books.
"The Bible – the founding book of the Jewish people, draws the country's boundaries and the heritage of the Jewish people that was exiled from its country and returned to its homeland. It boldly commemorates the way of our forefathers, the prophets, the kings, and the judges, and the Israel Antiquities Authority deserves praise for this important discovery, a discovery that deepens our connection to our ancestors who walked this land."
After the toilet was placed in the shrine, it was sealed and finally the gate was destroyed by Sennacherib, king of Assyria, in 701 BCE as described in II Kings 18 and II Chronicles 32.
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Dr Rashmi Patel (m. 2002) awarded Fulbright Scholarship
Congratulations to our alumnus Dr Rashmi Patel (m. 2002), who has been awarded an All Disciplines Fulbright Award to enable him to conduct research at the Digital Psychiatry Division of Harvard University.
Rashmi has been selected to work on a research project to develop a relapse prediction tool using electronic health record (EHR) and smartphone data from people who have experienced their first episode of psychosis.
Commenting on receiving the Award, Dr Patel said, “I am absolutely thrilled to have been awarded a Fulbright Scholarship to visit Harvard. Psychotic disorders cause enormous suffering for affected individuals and a key challenge is preventing relapse. As a Fulbright scholar I will conduct research to predict relapse using smartphone and electronic health record data. Psychosis is a serious mental disorder which affects up to 3% of people worldwide. I hope that my work will contribute towards more effective relapse prediction and better treatment outcomes as well as foster increased collaboration between the US and UK in mental health research.”
Biography: Dr Rashmi Patel studied Medical Sciences at the University of Cambridge before completing his medical degree at the University of Oxford. He moved to London to train as an academic foundation doctor at North Middlesex Hospital and The Whittington Hospital. He is now an MRC UKRI Health Data Research UK Fellow in the Department of Psychosis Studies at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King's College London (UK). He has a particular interest in the neurobiology of psychotic disorders and the role of health data research techniques such as extracting data from free text electronic health records (EHRs) using natural language processing to predict clinical outcomes and develop more effective treatment strategies. In addition to research, he is an honorary consultant psychiatrist in the Psychosis Clinical Academic Group of King's Health Partners, a pioneering Academic Health Science Centre which combines world-class clinical research and mental healthcare for people with psychotic disorders.
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Big names in music coming to Cincy in 2016
For more concert listings, go to cincinnati.com/calendar, keyword: concerts
Big names in music coming to Cincy in 2016 For more concert listings, go to cincinnati.com/calendar, keyword: concerts Check out this story on cincinnati.com: http://cin.ci/1ORaJ5W
Rasputin Todd, rtodd@cincinnati.com Published 10:54 a.m. ET Jan. 7, 2016 | Updated 2:05 p.m. ET Jan. 11, 2016
Chris Young.(Photo: Enquirer file)Buy Photo
Let us know what acts you're going to see this year at the bottom of this page.
How many other people have a New Year’s resolution to simply get out of the house more? There’s no better way to have a night on the town than with some music, drinks and time spent swaying/singing/moshing with a few good friends.
We’re barely into the new year, so lots of concerts are still yet to be planned or announced. But we already have a strong lineup slated, and things are looking good for a musical ’16. Pick a few, highlight them, stick this on your fridge or plug them in your phone... Just make sure you don’t miss that show you’ll never forgive yourself for missing.
Jan. 20: Steve Forbert, 7:30 p.m., The Southgate House Revival, 111 E. Sixth St., Newport. $25, $20 advance. 859-431-2201; www.southgatehouse.com.
Jan. 27: Queensryche, 7 p.m., Bogart’s, 2621 Vine St., Corryville. With Halcyon Way. $23. 513-281-8400; www.bogarts.com.
Jan. 29: Chris Young, 7:30 p.m., Aronoff Center, Procter & Gamble Hall, 650 Walnut St., Downtown. I’m Comin’ Over Tour. With Cassadee Pope. $58.25, $48.25, $38.25; $152.75 VIP. 513-621-2787; www.cincinnatiarts.org.
Jan. 30: Blue Highway, 7:30 p.m., St. Xavier High School, 600 W. North Bend Road, Finneytown. Performance Center. One of the leaders in bluegrass music. $40, $35 advance. 513-484-0157; www.gcparts.org.
Jan. 30: Tanya Tagaq: Nanook of the North, 8 p.m., Woodward Theater, 1404 Main St., Over-the-Rhine. $23, $18 CAC members. 513-246-4157; www.contemporaryartscenter.org.
CINCINNATI.COM
Concert announcements, tickets on sale now
Feb. 5-6: Cincy Blues Society’s Winter Blues Fest, 6 p.m. (Nick Moss Band headlining.) Friday, 6 p.m. (Carolyn Wonderland headlining.) Saturday, The Phoenix, 812 Race St., Downtown. $33 weekend pass, $20 per night. Plus fees. 513-739-2583; www.cincyblues.org.
Feb. 6: Aaron Lewis, 8 p.m., Horseshoe Casino, 1000 Broadway St., Downtown. Pavilion. Lead singer of Staind. Ages 21 and up. $28-$38, plus fees. 800-745-3000; www.ticketmaster.com.
Feb. 11: Barry Manilow, 8 p.m., BB&T Arena, 500 Nunn Drive, Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights. Singer-songwriter and producer. $17.75-$147.75 plus fees. 800-745-3000; www.thebbtarena.com.
Blake Shelton. (Photo: Trae Patton/NBC)
Feb. 18: Blake Shelton, 8 p.m. (With Chris Janson.), U.S. Bank Arena, 100 Broadway, Downtown. $69.75, $29.75 plus fees. 800-745-3000; www.ticketmaster.com.
Feb. 19: Winter Jam 2016, 6:45 p.m., U.S. Bank Arena, 100 Broadway, Downtown. Christian music tour featuring King & Country, Matthew West, Crowder, RED, Sidewalk Prophets, NewSong, KB/Tedashii/Trip Lee, Lauren Daigle and evangelist Tony Nolan. $10 at door, no ticket required. 800-745-3000; www.usbankarena.com.
Feb. 27: Antsy McClain and the Trailer Park Troubadours, 7:30-10 p.m., St. Xavier High School, 600 W. North Bend Road, Finneytown. Dubbed “Jimmy Buffett of the Trailer Parks,” artist sings of fictional Pineview Heights trailer park and interesting residents within. $35. 513-570-0652; www.gcparts.org.
Feb. 27: Wussy Album Release, 9 p.m., Woodward Theater, 1404 Main St., Over-the-Rhine. Album release for “Forever Sounds. Scrawl opens. Ages 21 and up. $20, $15 advance. 513-246-4157; www.woodwardtheater.com.
Feb. 29: Josh Ritter and the Royal City Band, 7:30 p.m., Taft Theatre, 317 E. Fifth St., Downtown. $38.50, $28.50; plus fees. 800-745-3000; www.tafttheatre.org.
March 5: Delbert McClinton, 8 p.m., Madison Theater, 730 Madison Ave., Covington. $30, $25 advance. 859-491-2444; www.madisontheateronline.com.
March 6: Dropkick Murphys, 8 p.m., Bogart’s, 2621 Vine St., Corryville. $32.50. 800-745-3000; www.bogarts.com.
March 10: Chris Smither, 8 p.m., 20th Century Theater, 3021 Madison Road, Oakley. Folk/blues singer, guitarist and songwriter. $30 orchestra, $25 main floor. 513-731-8000; www.the20thcenturytheatre.com.
March 12: Travis Tritt, 7 p.m., Belterra Casino Resort & Spa, 777 Belterra Drive, Florence, Ind.. $40. 800-745-3000; www.ticketmaster.com.
March 13: Experience Hendrix, 7:30 p.m., Taft Theatre, 317 E. Fifth St., Downtown. Features guitarists Buddy Guy, Zakk Wylde, Jonny Lang, Kenny Wayne Shepherd, Eric Johnson, Dweezil Zappa and more. $77.50, $62.50 & $42.50, plus fees. 513-232-6220; www.tafttheatre.org.
March 17: An Evening with Greg Dulli, 8 p.m., Woodward Theater, 1404 Main St., Over-the-Rhine. With Derrick Brown. Ages 21 and up. $30, $25 advance. 513-246-4157; www.woodwardtheater.com.
Carly Rae Jepsen. (Photo: Cindy Ord, Getty Images)
March 17: Carly Rae Jepsen, 8 p.m., Madison Theater, 730 Madison Ave., Covington. $28, $25 advance. 859-491-2444; www.madisontheateronline.com.
March 18: Patty Griffin, Sara Watkins, and Anais Mitchell, 7:30-9:30 p.m., Miami University Middletown, 4200 N. University Blvd., Middletown. Dave Finkelman Auditorium. $35. Reservations required. 513-529-3200; www.miamioh.edu/boxoffice.
March 18: They Might Be Giants, 9 p.m., Madison Theater, 730 Madison Ave., Covington. $30, $25 advance. 859-491-2444; www.madisontheateronline.com.
Rihanna. (Photo: Provided)
March 19: Rihanna, 7:30 p.m. (With Travis Scott.), U.S. Bank Arena, 100 Broadway, Downtown. Anti World Tour 2016. $30.50-$126 plus fees. 800-745-3000; www.usbankarena.com.
March 24: Celtic Woman: The Destiny Tour, 7 p.m., Aronoff Center, Procter & Gamble Hall, 650 Walnut St., Downtown. Multi-platinum Irish music sensation. $48.25 and up. 513-621-8727; www.cincinnatiarts.org.
March 25: Fetty Wap, 7 p.m. (Monster Energy Outbreak Tour. With Post Malone.), Bogart’s, 2621 Vine St., Corryville. $40.50. 800-745-3000; www.bogarts.com.
March 26: One Night of Queen, 8 p.m., Lawrenceburg Event Center, 91 Walnut St., Lawrenceburg. Gary Mullen & The Works hailed as world’s premier Queen tribute band. $35, $25. 800-745-3000; www.ticketmaster.com.
April 2: Robben Ford, 7:30-9:30 p.m., Harrison High School, 9860 West Road, Harrison. Martin Marietta Theater. Guitar virtuoso nominated for five Grammy awards. $40, $35 advance. 513-570-0652; www.gcparts.org.
April 5: Ani DiFranco, 7 p.m., Bogart’s, 2621 Vine St., Corryville. $25. 800-745-3000.
Billy Joel. (Photo: Enquirer file)
April 5: Billy Joel, 8 p.m., U.S. Bank Arena, 100 Broadway, Downtown. $52.50-$127.50. 513-562-4949; www.usbankarena.com.
April 5: Son Lux and Dawn of Midi, 8-10:30 p.m., Contemporary Arts Center, 44 E. Sixth St., Downtown. Indiana-bred composer and producer Ryan Lott performs as Son Lux. With Dawn of Mindi, Brooklyn-based acoustic ensemble. $15, $12 members. 513-345-8400; www.contemporaryartscenter.org.
April 12: Jethro Tull, 8 p.m., Aronoff Center, Procter & Gamble Hall, 650 Walnut St., Downtown. $70, $58.50, $48.50. 513-621-2787; www.cincinnatiarts.org.
April 15: Lee Brice, 7:30 p.m. (With Tyler Farr.), BB&T Arena, 500 Nunn Drive, Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights. $31.75-$41.75 plus fees. 800-745-3000; www.thebbtarena.com.
April 28: Saul Williams and Mivos Quartet, 8 p.m., Contemporary Arts Center, 44 E. Sixth St., Downtown. Hailed as 'one of America's most daring and ferocious new-music ensembles.' $20, $15 members. 513-345-8400; www.contemporaryartscenter.org.
May 14: The Orchestra Featuring Former Members of ELO and ELO II, 7:30-10 p.m., Mount St. Joseph University, 5701 Delhi Road, Delhi Township. $55, $45 advance. 513-570-0652; www.gcparts.org.
May 19: Paula Cole, 8:15 p.m., Live at The Ludlow Garage, 342 Ludlow Ave., Clifton. 513-221-4111; www.liveattheludlowgarage.com.
May 21: Blue October, 8 p.m., Bogart’s, 2621 Vine St., Corryville. $28. 513-281-8400; www.bogarts.com.
Twenty One Pilots. (Photo: Enquirer file)
May 31: Twenty One Pilots, 8 p.m., U.S. Bank Arena, 100 Broadway, Downtown. $45, $25. 800-745-3000; www.ticketmaster.com.
June 1: Dixie Chicks, 7 p.m., Riverbend Music Center, 6295 Kellogg Ave., Anderson Township. DCX World Tour MMXVI. $73.50-$133.50 pavilion, $39.50 lawn; plus fees. 800-745-3000; www.riverbend.org.
June 3-5: Bunbury Music Festival, 1 p.m. Friday-Sunday, Sawyer Point, Pete Rose Way, Downtown. Three-day, four-stage alternative music festival. $349 three-day VIP, $154 three-day, $69 one-day. 513-352-4000; www.bunburyfestival.com.
Selena Gomez. (Photo: Charles Sykes/Invision/AP)
June 5: Selena Gomez, 7:30 p.m., U.S. Bank Arena, 100 Broadway, Downtown. $70.50, $50.50, $40.50, $30.50. 800-745-3000; www.ticketmaster.com.
Justin Bieber. (Photo: EPA)
June 24: Justin Bieber, 7 p.m. (Purpose World Tour.), U.S. Bank Arena, 100 Broadway, Downtown. Platinum-selling pop singing sensation. $116, $70.50, $50.50. 800-745-3000; www.ticketmaster.com.
July 22: Cincinnati Music Festival presented by P&G, 7:30 p.m. Friday-Saturday, Paul Brown Stadium, One Paul Brown Stadium, Downtown. $45-$85, plus fees. 800-452-3132; www.cincymusicfestival.com.
July 26: 5 Seconds of Summer, 7:30 p.m., Riverbend Music Center, 6295 Kellogg Ave., Anderson Township. $79.95, $59.95, $39.95, $29.95, $25 lawn, plus fees. 800-745-3000; www.ticketmaster.com.
July 29: Journey and The Doobie Brothers, 7 p.m. (With Dave Mason.), Riverbend Music Center, 6295 Kellogg Ave., Anderson Township. San Francisco Fest 2016. $34.50-$141.50 plus fees. 800-745-3000; www.riverbend.org.
Aug. 12-13: Cincy Blues Fest, 5 p.m.-midnight (Teeny Tucker Band, Albert Castiglia, Sugar Ray and the Bluetones.) Friday, 5 p.m.-midnight (Tinsley Ellis, Rod Piazza and the Mighty Flyers, Walter Trout.) Saturday, Sawyer Point, Pete Rose Way, Downtown. $35 two-day pass; $20 Saturday, $20 Friday; $5 per day ages 13-18, free ages 12 and under. 513-739-2583; www.cincybluesfest.org.
Aug. 12: Josh Groban, 7:30 p.m., Riverbend Music Center, 6295 Kellogg Ave., Anderson Township. With Sarah McLachlan. $44.50-$134.50 pavilion, $29 lawn; plus fees. 800-745-3000; www.riverbend.org.
Maroon 5. (Photo: AP)
Sept. 29: Maroon 5, 7:30 p.m., U.S. Bank Arena, 100 Broadway, Downtown. $30.50-$126, plus fees. 800-745-3000; www.usbankarena.com.
On mobile? Tap here to tell us what acts you'll see in 2016.
Read or Share this story: http://cin.ci/1ORaJ5W
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Tomahawk Missiles Would Send A Crystal Clear Message To Syria
Featuring Ben FitzGerald
Journalist Geoffrey Ingersoll
The U.S. will probably send several Tomahawk missiles at Syria sometime this week, defense analysts tell Bloomberg.
The choice of the 30 year-old Tomahawk when the U.S. could deploy newer, equally effective weapons — drones, cyber attacks, special operators that make ninjas look amateur, etc. — is likely one of messaging.
Stephanie Gaskell of Defense One talked to a few experts about the choice:
“Using newer technology in this situation leaves opportunity for misinterpretation. If we executed a cyber-strike would the Syrians and the international community understand what we meant?” Ben FitzGerald, an adjunct fellow with the Center for a New American Security and expert on the impact of technology on conflict, told Defense One. “The messaging associated with more traditional weapons, like Tomahawks, is less ambiguous,” he said. “They’ve been used before and precedents have been set. Clarity and certainty is more important than sophistication.”
The Tomahawk missile packs a 1,000-lb warhead, smart guidance systems that have an 85% percent hit rate on targets the size of a common window, and can circle their targets for hours before making a final approach.
The fallout of launching at Syrian targets will of course result in Syrian casualties, possibly even the deaths of Russian advisers, but they allow the U.S. to send a clear, kinetic message and obliterate physical objectives, all without putting American lives at risk.
"They allow us to penetrate what we would call a medium to high threat without putting air crew at risk [and] create the conditions for manned aircraft," then Vice Adm. William Gortney, director of the Joint Staff, told press in 2011.
It's not as if the U.S. (and Israel for that matter) are without other, just as effective, options.
"The United States' ability to employ offensive cyber effects is unmatched. As far as defensive, all signs point to USCYBERCOM and other national-level elements having moved aggressively to make a lot of progress in that arena," Robert Caruso, a former assistant command security manager in the Navy and consultant, told Business Insider.
The purpose is obviously to send a message as much as it is to destroy targets, since the stated aim of the administration is not to remove Assad, but rather, to "provide a response."
From The Hill:
White House press secretary Jay Carney on Tuesday said that there was “no military solution to the conflict in Syria,” suggesting a U.S. strike would be limited. But he added that “there must be a response” to the latest attack.
The response from Syria, on the other hand, has taken on all the characteristics of panic. They've not only threatened to bomb Israel for America's actions (an idea they didn't even float when Israel itself launched attacks against Syrian targets), they've also blamed American agents for perpetrating the chemical attacks as a part of a false flag.
Certainly the desperation is thick, and despite Washington voicing clear intent not to remove Assad, desperation may lead to desperate measures.
"There is a legitimate concern Iran will counter any attempt to unseat Assad with cyber effects and attacks of an asymmetric nature, against the US and her allies," one official with the U.S. Navy told Business Insider. "I am most concerned with their electronic warfare capabilities, which we don't have as much visibility on as I'd like."
Iran has already proven itself capable of hacking attacks, and so has Syria — so it could just be that the two embattled countries have a message of their own to return.
Adjunct Senior Fellow, Defense Program
Ben FitzGerald is a partner at Lupa, a private investment firm, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). At Lupa he leads the firm’s inve...
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We will 'write bigger checks' in the US, says Middle East investor
Published Mon, Oct 29 2018 12:01 AM EDT Updated Mon, Oct 29 2018 9:22 AM EDT
David Reid@cnbcdavy
Investcorp has said it is ready to ramp up investment in the United States.
The firm's chairman told CNBC that it already spends about $1 billion each year buying up U.S. Real Estate.
The Middle Eastern alternative investotrfirm is also making its first forays into China and India.
Investcorp chairman: All of our US businesses are doing well
Investcorp has said it is ready to ramp up investment in the United States, citing the country's booming economy.
At the end of June, Investcorp had about $22.6 billion in assets under management. The firm has previously stated that it wants to take that to $50 billion within 5 to 7 years.
Speaking at the Investcorp Strategic Partners Conference in Paris, company chairman Mohammed Bin Mahfoodh Alardhi said U.S. economic fundamentals were currently "good for us" and he anticipated big purchases.
"Our private equity is growing there, and we are looking to see how to write bigger checks and buy bigger companies," he told CNBC's Hadley Gamble on Friday.
Alardhi added that Investcorp's growing real estate spend in the U.S. remained at about one billion dollars a year and was continuing to perform well. The chairman also lauded the credit business, which focuses on senior secured corporate debt, describing it as a "huge opportunity to grow."
On any potential for the upcoming U.S. mid-term elections to disrupt the country's red-hot economy, Alardhi was dismissive, noting that the firm had thrived through different political "seasons" in the U.S., as far back as 1982.
Since the firm's launch in the early 1980s, the majority of Investcorp's investments have been in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.
But in August this year, the firm made a stated aim to broaden its portfolio into Asian markets, especially India and China.
"We are really taking baby steps, but we are making progress out there," Alardhi said before adding that the firm had completed its first investment the Chinese tech sector and was on the verge of buying its first business in India.
Asia Economy
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Renew Understanding
From ‘Hilltop’ to ‘America is Beautiful’: Coke’s Enduring Legacy of Inclusive Advertising
By: Journey Staff | Sep 6, 2017
You could teach the history of America in the 20th Century using only Coca-Cola advertising.
That’s because, in general, advertising is like holding up a mirror to society. Commercials and other creative from a certain year or era typically reflect what’s going on in culture at any given point in time.
But what if society is in turmoil? Coca-Cola has a history of advertising in tough times, as well. During World War II, the company pledged that every soldier in the field would be able to buy a Coke for a nickel, regardless of what it cost the company. We built 64 bottling plants around the world and strove with all our might to make Coke available both to soldiers serving our country and the people back home working in the war-time economy.
Our advertising reflected that effort as the company asked people to work together to help promote the war effort. One of our early Christmas ads featuring the famous Coca-Cola Santa Claus even had a war bond poking out of Santa’s bag. Santa and the company were supporting the war effort.
Fast forward a few decades, and the company premiered the “Real Thing” campaign with photographs depicting Coca-Cola in real life. As part of this series, we produced the “Boys on the Bench” print ad in 1969, featuring a fully integrated scene of African-American and white kids sitting on a park bench in New York drinking Coca-Cola and laughing.
It was a seminal ad, and if you look at what was going on in society back then, it was timely and topical. In 1968, Dr. King was assassinated. The Civil Rights Movement was still in full force as schools were being integrated throughout the country, yet Coca-Cola felt strong enough in its convictions to be able to depict a scene as a natural one.
Two years later, Coca-Cola premiered the famous “Hilltop” commercial featuring the “I’d Like to Buy the World a Coke” jingle. In 1971, the company gathered a group of young people on a mountaintop in Italy as they sang a simple refrain about teaching the world to sing and coming together in peace and harmony.
Whenever I discuss this ad, I point out that only a brand like Coca-Cola could pull off a spot like “Hilltop”. Coca-Cola represented optimism, refreshment and that little moment of time that brings people together. Bill Backer, the McCann Erickson creative director behind "Hilltop", once described Coke as “the catalyst that brings people together.” That scene of those kids on the hill, holding the bottles and singing a simple melody was counterbalanced by what was going on in the world. The Vietnam War was in full force, there was intergenerational strife, riots on campuses, and around the world, there was a general discontent. Yet the company called for people to come together in a moment of optimism and try to celebrate a little bit of peace.
By the end of the decade, Coca-Cola produced the famous Mean Joe Greene commercial, which premiered in 1979. “Mean” Joe Greene was one of the most ferocious football players at the time. He was tall and intimidating, and he happened to be an African-American male. In the crux of the ad, a small boy follows Greene down the tunnel off the field and offers him his Coke. Greene gruffly brushes it aside at first, but eventually accepts the Coke, drains it, cracks a huge smile, and as the kid walks dejectedly up the tunnel back to the playing field, tosses him this jersey with the famous slogan, “Hey kid, catch.” It captured the imagination of the football-watching public and has been voted one of the top 10 Big Game ads of all time.
When you get to the core of the ad, though, it’s about the resolution of conflict. It’s about the notion of an African-American man and a small, white boy interacting and it turns out for the positive. The crux of the narrative, once again, is that we can all just get along.
If you move forward a few decades, in 1990 the company introduced an ad called "General Assembly", in which the people of the world gather and sing in unity and harmony about trying to come together in advance of the summit between the Russian and U.S. over eliminating nuclear weapons. It was one small way that the company could call out something that was going on in the world. And once again, they did it as they had done with "Hilltop", via a song that still is popular with fans today.
A more humorous example that demonstrates the power of messaging is a 2007 ad called "Video Game". In this ad, an animated character, just as would be seen in the game Grand Theft Auto, walks down the street causing mayhem. Only this time, it’s mayhem for good instead of for ill. Instead of robbing people and causing harm, he walks down the street giving a woman back her purse that had just been stolen and handing flowers to a new mom. In a small way, it goes to show that if you have that optimism, if you look forward, that your message will resonate. "Video Game" has been one of the more popular ads we’ve done in the last decade.
Originally released in 2008, Coca-Cola's "Ceremony" commercial champions the company's longstanding support of the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games and Special Olympics. Several iterations of the spot have aired during Olympic Games telecasts, highlighting medal moments throughout history and honoring some of the world's best athletes.
In 2013, Coca-Cola brand invited the people of India and Pakistan to share a simple moment of connection and joy with the help of technology. High-tech vending machines installed in two popular shopping malls in Lahore and New Delhi – two cities separated by only 325 miles, but seemingly worlds apart due to decades of political tension – invited people to put their differences aside and share a simple moment over a Coke. The “Small World Machines” provided a live communications portal linking strangers in two nations divided by more than just borders, with the hope of provoking a small moment of happiness and promoting cultural understanding around the world. Coke used first-of-its-kind 3D touchscreen technology to project a streaming video feed onto the vending machine screen while simultaneously filming through the unit to capture a live emotional exchange. People from both countries and various walks of life were encouraged to complete a friendly task together – wave, touch hands, draw a peace sign or dance – before sharing a Coca-Cola.
In 2014, Coca-Cola celebrated America’s diversity and ideals of optimism, unity and inclusion with a buzzworthy spot that debuted during the Big Game. “America is Beautiful” featured snapshots of American families representing diverse ethnicities, religions, races and families, set to “America the Beautiful” sung by bilingual Americans in seven languages: English, Spanish, Keres, Tagalog, Hindi, Senegalese French and Hebrew.
Coca-Cola joined a coalition of brands partnering with The Ad Council and R/GA to launch a series of PSAs explaining that to love America is to love all Americans. WWE Superstar John Cena is featured in “We Are America”, released on July 4, 2016. The online video and TV spot were part of the Love Has No Labels campaign, which promotes acceptance of all communities regardless of race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, age or ability.
And just earlier this year, a lighthearted Coca-Cola spot from the “Taste the Feeling” campaign titled “Pool Boy”. On a hot summer day, a brother and sister scramble to win the affection of the family “pool boy” by grabbing an ice-cold Coca-Cola from the fridge and racing outside. But, to their surprise, mom gets there first. The spot positions an ice-cold Coca-Cola as the ultimate object of desire, while telling an emotional, human story with a subtle “wink” that touches on our point of view on diversity and inclusion.
Our newest work harkens back to the past, to the DNA of what Coca-Cola has done before. If you look at what we did during World War II, with "Hilltop", with our consistent message of optimism, community, diversity, and standing up for something, everything we produce today is a continuation of what Coca-Cola has been doing for the past 131 years.
More #CocaColaRenew Stories
Coca-Cola USA: A Total Beverage Company With Local Roots
Investing In America: Coca-Cola And Its U.S. Bottler Partners
Coke’s Enduring Legacy of Inclusive Advertising
Gallery: The Faces of Coca-Cola USA
Learn more about #CocaColaRenew
Jay Moye and Hannah Nemer
He Helped Teach the World to Sing: Meet One of the Songwriters Behind the Iconic Coke Jingle-Turned-Pop Hit
Commercial Appeal: ‘Mean’ Joe Greene Reflects on Iconic Coca-Cola Ad That Changed His Life
Ted Ryan
The Making of 'I'd Like to Buy the World a Coke'
Renew JobsRenew Jobs
Renew Our ProductsRenew Our Products
Renew CommunityRenew Community
Renew WaterRenew Water
Renew OpportunityRenew Opportunity
Renew UnderstandingRenew Understanding
Renew EmpowermentRenew Empowerment
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Missing Air Asia flight ‘requested deviation,’ say officials
Posted on December 28, 2014 Author Agency Reporter Comment(0)
Pilots of an AirAsia plane gone missing on a flight from Indonesia to Singapore requested to change altitude to avoid bad weather, Indonesian aviation officials say. The Airbus 320-300 was carrying 162 people.
An AirAsia flight that lost contact with ground control on Sunday while flying over the Java Sea had requested permission to ascend to avoid bad weather shortly before it disappeared from radar, Indonesian aviation officials say.
"The aircraft was on the submitted flight plan route and was requesting deviation due to enroute weather before communication with the aircraft was lost while it was still under the control of the Indonesian air traffic control," the airline said in a statement.
No distress signal had been sent by Flight QZ8501 before it disappeared between the port of Tanjung Pandan and the town of Pontianak, in West Kalimantan on Borneo island, said Djoko Murjatmodjo, air transportation director at the Indonesian Transport Ministry.
Good safety record
Contact with the plane was lost about 42 minutes after the jetliner took off from Indonesia's Surabaya airport, another transportation ministry official told Indonesia's MetroTV. This was about an hour before the plane was due to land in Singapore at 0030 UTC, according to a statement from the Singapore Civil Aviation Authority.
The flight time from Surabaya to Singapore is normally just over two hours.
The plane was carrying two pilots, five cabin crew and 155 passengers, including 16 children and a baby, AirAsia Indonesia said in a statement. It said there were six foreigners on board – three South Koreans and one each from Singapore, Malaysia and France – with the rest being Indonesian nationals.
It said both the captain and the first officer were experienced flyers.
The airline said a search and rescue operation had been launched, with Singapore saying it had activated its air force and navy to help.
AirAsia is a regional low-cost carrier operating across several Southeast Asian countries and has an excellent safety record.
Year of aviation disasters
Sunday's incident comes in the wake of two disasters that have struck Malaysia's national flag carrier, Malaysia Airlines, which has lost two aircraft this year.
Flight MH370 went missing on March 8 while flying from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing with 239 people on board. It has still not been found despite a massive search operation by several countries.
Another Malaysia Airlines flight, MH17, was allegedly shot down over territory held by pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine in mid-July. All 298 passengers and crew lost their lives.
Naomi Claret
Putin: Gas may have been used by rebels, not Syrian Army
Posted on September 12, 2013 Author William M. Welch , USA TODAY
Russian President Vladimir Putin, writing in the New York Times, said Wednesday that "there is every reason to believe'' poison gas was used in Syria by opposition rebels rather than that nation's military. Putin, whose offer to help ensure Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles are contained has presented President Obama with a diplomatic opening for […]
Indian man nabbed for raping injured cow using coconut oil as lubricant
Posted on March 10, 2015 Author Isaac Dachen
An insane man in India whose name is given as Muthu, has been arrested for committing an unnatural act of bestiality by raping an injured cow that was laying beside train tracks, the police in that country say. According to Emirate247, the 55-year-old homeless man used coconut oil as a lubricant to rape the injured […]
3800 couples tie the knot at Unification Church in South Korea [PHOTOS]
Posted on March 4, 2015 Author Oke Efagene
Thousands of couples tied the knot on Tuesday, March 3, 2015, in a mass wedding held at the headquarters of the Unification Church in South Korea. This would be the third of such event since the death of the church founder and self-proclaimed messiah, Sun Myung Moon. About 3,800 couples, some of whom met barely […]
AirAsia flight QZ8501 carrying 162 people goes missing.
Snow strands motorists in Savoy
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Conference on World Affairs
Donate to the CWA
Ross Chapin
Architect, Author: Pocket Neighborhoods
2019 Speaker
Whidbey Island, Washington
Ross Chapin is an architect, neighborhood planner and author based near Seattle, Washington. He is a passionate advocate for sensibly sized homes and sociably scaled neighborhoods that nourish the individual, support healthy household relationships and foster a meaningful sense of community.
Since 1997 Chapin has partnered in building seven “pocket neighborhoods” and designed dozens of socially oriented communities for developers across North America, many of which have received international media coverage, professional peer review and national design awards.
Chapin’s work and ideas have been featured in more than 40 books and in publications including the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, USA Today, AARP Bulletin, Forbes, Planning magazine, Architectural Record and Builder magazine. His own book, Pocket Neighborhoods: Creating Small Scale Community in a Large Scale World, has been widely read, shifting the thinking of developers, policymakers, architects, homebuyers and community advocates.
In his home community, Chapin helped formulate the cottage housing development zoning ordinance, the first of its kind to be implemented in the U.S. This ordinance has become a model for innovative housing codes, opening the way for small-scale communities within existing neighborhoods and new developments. Projects by Chapin’s firm are often used to illustrate city zoning ordinances and state and federal housing policy papers.
In his personal life, Chapin regularly takes part in contact improvisation, qigong, Sufi whirling, seasonal ceremony and ritual, hiking, and open-water swimming in Puget Sound.
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cwa@colorado.edu
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Privacy • Legal & Trademarks • Campus Map
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Sapiens - Yuval Noah Harari | Animal Farm - George Orwell | 1984 - George Orwell | A Scanner Darkly - Philip K. Dick | We - Yevgeny Zamyatin | The Elementary Particles - Michel Houellebecq | The Trial - Franz Kafka | Midnight in Peking - Paul French | Brave New World - Aldous Huxley
Fatherland - Robert Harris | The Chrysalids - John Wyndham | Empire of Dragons - Valerio Massimo Manfredi | South of the Border, West of the Sun - Haruki Murakami | Dune - Frank Herbert | The Outsider - Albert Camus | Norwegian Wood - Haruki Murakami | Dune Messiah - Frank Herbert | One Day In The Life Of Ivan Denisovich - Alexander Solzhenitsyn | The Gilt Kid - James Curtis | The Sound Of Waves - Yukio Mishima | Money: A Suicide Note - Martin Amis | Slaughterhouse-Five - Kurt Vonnegut | Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep? - Philip K. Dick
The Sound of Waves by Yukio Mishima
May 10, 2019 / Degen Hill
“Japanese love on a fishing island never seemed so interesting”
Let me start by saying that reading so many stories about Japanese teenagers in love wasn’t planned, it just sort of happened. Also, this was the book I picked up after I had to put down “The Coup” by Updike after 80 pages.
So, let’s jump right into it. Mishima was crazy. He formed an unarmed civilian militia for the avowed purpose of defending the Japanese emperor in the event of a revolution by Japanese communists. On November 25, 1970, Mishima and four members of his militia entered a military base in central Tokyo, took the commandant hostage, and tried to persuade the soldiers at the base to join them in supporting the emperor and overturning Japan's pacifist Constitution. When this was unsuccessful, Mishima committed suicide by seppuku at the age of 45.
Overview: Set in a remote fishing village in Japan, The Sound of Waves is a timeless story of first love. A young fisherman is entranced at the sight of the beautiful daughter of the wealthiest man in the village. They fall in love, but must then endure the calumny and gossip of the villagers.
The Sound of Waves was published in 1954 and is a coming-of-age story about Shinji and his romance with Hatsue, the beautiful daughter of the wealthy ship owner Terukichi. The story has been adapted for film five times.
I really enjoyed the story, probably because the writing was characterized by its luxurious vocabulary and decadent metaphors, its fusion of traditional Japanese and modern Western literary styles, and its obsessive assertions of the unity of beauty, eroticism and death. The ending was strong, and for lack of a better word, fulfilling, much like the way Mishima described the setting of the beautiful island on which the majority of the story takes place.
May 10, 2019 / Degen Hill/
The Sound of Waves by Yukio Mishima, Mishima, The Sound of Waves, Novel, Book Review, A book review about the novel The Sound of Waves by Yukio Mishima, Japanese author, Japanese literature, Books, readingw, reading, writing, Life, Japanese Island
Money: A Suicide Note by Martin Amis
The Gilt Kid by James Curtis
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Today's Top News Story
DUBAI/WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Iran said it had seized a British oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz on Friday but denied Washington's assertion that the U.S. Navy had downed an Iranian drone nearby this week, as tensions in the Gulf region grew again. Read More
RIYADH (Reuters) - Saudi Arabia's King Salman approved hosting U.S. forces in the country to boost regional security and stability, the state news agency (SPA) reported on Friday. More »
McALLEN, Texas (Reuters) - U.S. Democratic lawmakers on Friday called President Donald Trump's latest anti-immigration initiatives "unacceptable" and warned his administration against misappropriating funding authorized only for humanitarian use. More »
(Reuters) - An attorney for former White House Communications Director Hope Hicks denied on Friday that she was involved in discussions during the 2016 presidential campaign about a hush-money payment to a porn star who claimed to have had a sexual encounter with President Donald Trump. More »
Exclusive: Ex-Russian arms tycoon quietly wields influence in British PM race
LONDON (Reuters) - A former Russian arms tycoon who had connections at the highest levels of the Kremlin is a major donor to Britain's ruling Conservative Party and counts himself a friend of the man expected to be the country's next prime minister. More »
(Reuters) - Two people have died following a multi-state outbreak of salmonella infections linked to backyard poultry, U.S. health officials said on Friday. More »
PALM HARBOR, Fla. (Reuters) - An immigrant to the United States, Suzanne Vale took no offense at Republican President Donald Trump's tweet this week telling Democratic congresswomen they are free to "go back" to their ancestral homes if America is not to their liking. More »
NEW YORK (Reuters) - Wall Street's main indexes fell on Friday following a report that the Federal Reserve plans to cut interest rates by only a quarter-percentage point at the end of the month. More »
STOCKHOLM (Reuters) - Swedish prosecutors on Friday extended American rapper A$AP Rocky's detention by six days amid their ongoing investigation into a street fight in Stockholm as U.S. President Donald Trump said he planned to call Sweden's prime minister about the case. More »
(Reuters) - Thousands of Puerto Ricans, led by protesters on horseback and with some banging drums and singing, marched on the governor's residence on Friday demanding that he resign over hundreds of vulgar and offensive leaked chat messages. More »
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U.N. to probe Philippines drug war deaths
By Stephanie Nebehay and Marina Depetris
GENEVA (Reuters) - The U.N. Human Rights Council voted on Thursday to set up an investigation into mass killings during Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte's so-called 'war on drugs', a step that activists said was long overdue.
Duterte's government says police have killed about 6,600 people in shootouts with suspected drug dealers since he was elected in 2016 on a platform of crushing crime. Activists say the toll is at least 27,000.
The first-ever resolution on the Philippines, led by Iceland, was adopted by a vote of 18 countries in favor and 14 against, including China, with 15 abstentions, including Japan.
"This is not just a step toward paying justice for the thousands of families of victims of extrajudicial killings in the Philippines, but it is also a message that we collectively send out to those who have praised President Duterte," said Ellecer "Budit" Carlos of the Manila-based rights group iDefend.
"This war on drugs, as we have repeatedly said, it's a sham war," he told a news briefing in Geneva.
Philippine activists say tens of thousands are being killed as police terrorize poor communities, using cursory drug "watch lists" to identify suspected users or dealers, and executing many in the guise of sting operations.
Police deny that, saying all their killings were in self-defense.
Myca Ulpina, a 3-year-old killed on June 29 near Manila, was among the latest and youngest known victims. Police say her father, Renato, had used his daughter as a human shield.
'MALICIOUSLY PARTISAN'
Duterte's spokesman, Salvador Panelo, questioned the validity of a resolution not backed by the majority of council members, saying Filipinos overwhelmingly backed the president's unique leadership and approach.
"The resolution is grotesquely one-sided, outrageously narrow, and maliciously partisan," Panelo said in a lengthy statement issued overnight.
"It reeks of nauseating politics completely devoid of respect for the sovereignty of our country, even as it is bereft of the gruesome realities of the drug menace."
The delegation from the Philippines, which is among the council's 47 members, had lobbied hard against the resolution, which asks national authorities to prevent extrajudicial killings and cooperate with U.N. human rights boss Michelle Bachelet, who is to report her findings in June 2020.
Philippines Ambassador Evan Garcia said the Duterte administration was committed to upholding justice, adding, "We will not tolerate any form of disrespect or acts of bad faith. There will be consequences, far-reaching consequences."
Laila Matar of New York-based Human Rights Watch criticized his comments.
"It was quite clear that they threatened consequences for those who had supported the resolution, which in turn makes us concerned for the many human rights defenders, civil society activists and journalists on the ground," she told the briefing.
Duterte, asked by reporters in Manila whether he would allow U.N. rights officials access to investigate, said, "Let them state their purpose and I will review it."
If Duterte permitted the investigation and it proceeded impartially, Panelo said, "We are certain its result will only lead to the humiliation of the investigators, as well as of Iceland and the 17 other nations."
(Additional reporting by Jerome Morales and Karen Lema and Martin Petty in MANILA; writing by Stephanie Nebehay; editing by Tom Miles and Kevin Liffey)
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Brazil's Bolsonaro says nominating son as ambassador to U.S. is not nepotism
BRASILIA (Reuters) - Brazil's President Jair Bolsonaro said on Friday that the nomination of his son Eduardo to be ambassador to the United States was not an act of nepotism and that he would not make the appointment if it were.
"Some people say that it is nepotism, but that's for the Supreme Court to decide. It is not nepotism, I would never do that," Bolsonaro said on a live social media broadcast on Friday.
The initial findings of an internal legal study carried out by the president's office showed that top-ranking appointments, like those of ambassador, do not constitute nepotism.
On Thursday, Bolsonaro confirmed that he was considering nominating his son, a federal congressman representing Rio de Janeiro, for the post. Eduardo, 35, said he would accept it if offered.
The Supreme Court barred nepotism in 2008. However, a Supreme Court panel ruled last year that this rule did not apply to political appointments.
"It's not up to me, it's up to my son to accept and then he will be subject to Senate approval. Who do you want me to put in? Celso Amorim?" Bolsonaro said, referring to the veteran politician who served under former presidents Itamar Franco, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff.
Eduardo Bolsonaro is the third of the president's four sons and a daughter from three marriages and has counseled his father on foreign affairs. His appointment would need to be approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before passing to the full upper house for confirmation.
(Reporting by Lisandra Paraguassu, Writing by Jamie McGeever; Editing by Dan Grebler)
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§ 1010.12 Intrastate exemption.
(a) Eligibility requirements. The sale of a lot is exempt from the registration requirements of the Act if the following requirements are met:
(1) The sale of lots in the subdivision after December 20, 1979, is restricted solely to residents of the state in which the subdivision is located unless the sale is exempt under § 1010.5, § 1010.11, or § 1010.13.
(2) The purchaser or purchaser's spouse makes a personal on-the-lot inspection of the lot to be purchased before signing a contract.
(3) Each contract:
(i) Specifies the developer's and purchaser's responsibilities for providing and maintaining roads, water and sewer facilities and any existing or promised amenities;
(ii) Contains a good faith estimate of the year in which the roads, water and sewer facilities and promised amenities will be completed; and
(iii) Contains a non-waivable provision giving the purchaser the opportunity to revoke the contract until at least midnight of the seventh calendar day following the date the purchaser signed the contract. If the purchaser is entitled to a longer revocation period by operation of state law, that period becomes the Federal revocation period and the contract must reflect the requirements of the longer period.
(4) The lot being sold is free and clear of all liens, encumbrances and adverse claims except the following:
(i) Mortgages or deeds of trust which contain release provisions for the individual lot purchased if:
(A) The contract of sale obligates the developer to deliver, within 180 days, a warranty deed (or its equivalent under local law), which at the time of delivery is free from any monetary liens or encumbrances; and
(B) The purchaser's payments are deposited in an escrow account independent of the developer until a deed is delivered.
(ii) Liens which are subordinate to the leasehold interest and do not affect the lessee's right to use or enjoy the lot.
(iii) Property reservations which are for the purpose of bringing public services to the land being developed, such as easements for water and sewer lines.
(iv) Taxes or assessments which constitute liens before they are due and payable if imposed by a state or other public body having authority to assess and tax property or by a property owners' association.
(v) Beneficial property restrictions that are mutually enforceable by the lot owners in the subdivision. Restrictions, whether separately recorded or incorporated into individual deeds, must be applied uniformly to every lot or group of lots. To be considered beneficial and enforceable, any restriction or covenant that imposes an assessment on lot owners must apply to the developer on the same basis as other lot owners. Developers who maintain control of a subdivision through a Property Owners' Association, Architectural Control Committee, restrictive covenant or otherwise, shall transfer such control to the lot owners no later than when the developer ceases to own a majority of total lots in, or planned for, the subdivision. Relinquishment of developer control shall require affirmative action, usually in the form of an election based upon one vote per lot.
(vi) Reservations contained in United States land patents and similar Federal grants or reservations.
(5) Prior to the sale the developer discloses in a written statement to the purchaser all qualifying liens, reservations, taxes, assessments and restrictions applicable to the lot purchased. The developer must obtain a written receipt from the purchaser acknowledging that the statement required by this subparagraph was delivered to the purchaser.
(6) Prior to the sale the developer provides in a written statement good faith estimates of the cost to the purchaser of providing electric, water, sewer, gas and telephone service to the lot. The estimates for unsold lots must be updated every two years or more frequently if the developer has reason to believe that significant cost increases have occurred. The dates on which the estimates were made must be included in the statement. The developer must obtain a written receipt from the purchaser acknowledging that the statement required by this subparagraph was delivered to the purchaser.
(b) Intrastate Exemption Statement. To satisfy the requirements of paragraphs (a)(5) and (6) of this section, an Intrastate Exemption Statement containing the information prescribed in each such paragraph shall be given to each purchaser. A State-approved disclosure document may be used to satisfy this requirement if all the information required by paragraphs (a)(5) and (6) of this section is included in this disclosure. In such a case, the developer must obtain a written receipt from the purchaser and comply with all other requirements of the exemption. To be acceptable for purposes of the exemption, the statement(s) given to purchasers must contain neither advertising nor promotion on behalf of the developer or subdivision nor references to the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection or the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. A sample Intrastate Exemption Statement is included in the exemption guidelines.
(c) The sale must also comply with the anti-fraud provisions of § 1010.4(b) and (c) of this part.
Previous section - § 1010.11 § 1010.11 Manufactured home exemption.
Next section - § 1010.13 § 1010.13 Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) exemption.
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Recreation Parks & Culture»Parks & Trails»Park Finder
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Mariner Park
2985 Mariner Way
Mariner Park offers a forested area, trails, a playground and two tennis courts. In addition to standard tennis, the Mariner courts have been lined for pickleball, a paddle sport for two or four players that combines elements of badminton, tennis and table tennis.
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3000 Guildford Way,
Coquitlam, BC Canada V3B 7N2
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Where Will Your Retirement Money Come From?
Tip: Retiring Older.
One survey found 22% of baby boomers have found it difficult to pay mortgages or rent and have postponed plans to retire.
Source: Insured Retirement Institute, 2018
For many people, retirement income may come from a variety of sources. Here’s a quick review of the six main sources:
Social Security is the government-administered retirement income program. Workers become eligible after paying Social Security taxes for 10 years. Benefits are based on each worker’s 35 highest earning years. If there are fewer than 35 years of earnings, non-earning years are averaged in as zero. In 2017, the average monthly benefit was estimated at $1,360.¹
Personal Savings and Investments
Personal savings and investments outside of retirement plans can provide income during retirement. Retirees tend to go for investments that offer monthly guaranteed income over potential returns.²
Traditional IRAs have been around since 1974. Contributions you make to a traditional IRA may be fully or partially deductible, depending on your individual circumstances. Distributions from a traditional IRA are taxed as ordinary income and, if taken before age 59½, may be subject to a 10% federal income tax penalty. Generally, once you reach age 70½, you must begin taking required minimum distributions.
Roth IRAs were created in 1997. Roth IRA contributions cannot be made by taxpayers with high incomes. To qualify for the tax-free and penalty-free withdrawal of earnings, Roth IRA distributions must meet a five-year holding requirement and occur after age 59½. Tax-free and penalty-free withdrawal also can be taken under certain other circumstances, such as a result of the owner’s death. The original Roth IRA owner is not required to take minimum annual withdrawals.
Many workers are eligible to participate in a defined–contribution plan such as a 401(k), 403(b), or 457 plan. Eligible workers can set aside a portion of their pre-tax income into an account, which then accumulates tax deferred.
Distributions from defined contribution plans are taxed as ordinary income and, if taken before age 59½, may be subject to a 10% federal income tax penalty. Generally, once you reach age 70½, you must begin taking required minimum distributions.
Defined benefit plans are “traditional” pensions—employer–sponsored plans under which benefits, rather than contributions, are defined. Benefits are normally based on factors such as salary history and duration of employment. The number of traditional pension plans has dropped dramatically during the past 30 years.
Continued Employment
In a recent survey, 68% of workers stated that they planned to keep working in retirement. In contrast, only 26% of retirees reported that continued employment was a major or minor source of retirement income.³
Expected Vs. Actual Sources of Income in Retirement
What workers anticipate in terms of retirement income sources may differ considerably from what retirees actually experience.
Employee Benefit Research Institute, 2018 Retirement Confidence Survey
1. Social Security Administration, 2017
2. Insured Retirement Institute, April 2018
3. Employee Benefits Research Institute, 2018
Choices for Your 401(k) at a Former Employer
Individuals have three basic choices with the 401(k) account they accrued at a previous employer.
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Nicole Duclos Joins Covingtons International Arbitration and Latin America Practices
NEW YORK, September 9, 2013 — Covington & Burling is expanding its international commercial arbitration capabilities and reach into Latin America with the addition of Nicole Duclos.
Ms. Duclos joins the firm’s New York City office as of counsel along with associates Erin Thomas and Thomas Odell. The team’s arrival enhances the firm’s international arbitration offering in New York, where they will focus on international commercial and investment arbitration, as well as international litigation, with an emphasis on Latin America.
“The addition of Nicole and her team is an important building block in expanding our commercial arbitration practice around the globe and assisting our clients in Latin America that are expanding their businesses in the U.S., Europe, China, India, and other regions where we’re active,” said Timothy Hester, chair of Covington’s management committee.
Ms. Duclos has represented clients in international commercial and investment arbitrations around the globe, including in more than ten Latin American jurisdictions. Her experience spans energy, construction, infrastructure, finance and mining, among other industries. In recent editions of Legal 500, Ms. Duclos is described by peers as a “first class lawyer” whose “handling of the cases is brilliant,” and “one of the best prepared international arbitration lawyers one is likely to meet.” Chambers International Arbitration: Latin America-wide 2012 notes that Ms. Duclos is “a star of the future with the world at her feet.”
“Nicole is a talented arbitration practitioner with deep expertise in the Latin America region,” commented Gaëtan Verhoosel, the London based co-chair of the firm's international arbitration practice. “Her addition will enhance both our commercial arbitration capability in New York and our Iberian and Latin American arbitration practices currently centered in Washington, D.C. and London.”
Ms. Duclos will also work closely with Rubén Kraiem, the firm’s leading corporate partner for business interests in Latin America, Miguel López Forastier, a partner whose practice focuses on international arbitration and litigation, and Dr. Arturo Valenzuela, a senior advisor at Covington and former State Department official, who is leading the firm’s effort to advise Latin American and U.S.-based corporations on expanding their global presence.
Ms. Duclos earned her law degree at Universidad de Valparaíso in Chile and a master of laws from Harvard Law School. She is a native Spanish speaker, fluent in English and has a working knowledge of Portuguese. She is admitted to practice in both Chile and New York.
Covington is widely recognized as a leading international arbitration law firm with rankings in GAR100, GAR30, Chambers Global, Chambers UK, Chambers USA, Chambers Latin America, Legal 500 UK and Legal 500 USA.
Nicole Duclos +1 212 841 1135 nduclos@cov.com
Erin Thomas +1 212 841 1137 ethomas@cov.com
Timothy C. Hester +1 202 662 5324 thester@cov.com
Rubén Kraiem +1 212 841 1002 rkraiem@cov.com
Miguel López Forastier +1 202 662 5185 mlopezforastier@cov.com
Arturo A. Valenzuela +1 202 662 5378 avalenzuela@cov.com
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Dallas once had 19 drive-in theaters. Now it has zero. Curious Texas explains why they're gone
Filed under Curious Texas at Apr 18
Elvia Limón, Engagement Reporter
Connect with Elvia Limón
North Texans looking to enjoy a movie on the big screen alfresco will have to look outside of Dallas’ city limits. Big D is home to many movie theaters, but the city has been without a single drive-in theater for 21 years.
The Astro Drive-In, the city’s last outdoor theater, closed in 1998 after a devastating fire. But the golden era of drive-ins had vanished long before then.
Russell Woodall wanted to know why the number of drive-ins had declined, so he asked Curious Texas: "What happened to the drive in theaters in the D-FW area, such as the Astro and the one at 75 and 635 on the east side? I remember $5 car nights."
Curious Texas is a special project from The Dallas Morning News. You ask questions, our journalists find answers.
His question is part of Curious Texas, an ongoing project from The Dallas Morning News that invites readers to join in our reporting process. The idea is simple: You have questions, and our journalists are trained to track down answers.
You can send us your Curious Texas questions by texting "DMN" to 214-817-3868. Follow the prompts and introduce yourself to us, share your story or questions, and we'll text you with information as we report the story.
Texas was home to 475 drive-in theaters in the 1950s. The Dallas-Fort Worth area had 43, but only Fort Worth’s Coyote Drive-In and Ennis’ Galaxy Drive In Theater operate in North Texas today.
As stars light the sky, Ken Bartlette and his wife, Tammie Bartlette, from Dallas, watched the movie Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen from the back of their truck at the Galaxy Drive-In in Ennis, Texas on June 26, 2009.
(Staff/The Dallas Morning News)
Statewide, 15 drive-in theaters survive, which makes Texas one of top states for drive-ins, said D. Edward Vogel, the administrative secretary for the United Drive-In Theater Owners Association.
Woodall isn’t the only one wondering. Readers cast ballots for his question to be investigated during a voting round earlier this year. You can tell us what we should answer next by voting on this week’s voting round.
In addition to his role with the United Drive-In Theater Owners Association, Vogel runs his own drive-in theater, Bengies Drive-In, near Baltimore, Md. He said there are a number of reasons drive-in theaters across the country have closed in recent years.
The movie Inferno starring Tom Hanks was shown at the Coyote Drive-In in Lewisville on Oct. 29, 2016. The Lewisville location closed last fall "until further notice."
(File Photo /Staff Photographer)
Some say the options introduced by VHS, DVDs and streaming services are to blame for the decline in drive-in theaters, but Vogel said that’s not it. Others say corporate buyouts of drive-in theater land is the culprit, but, again, he said that’s not necessarily the case.
“The real reason they disappeared is mom and pop would buy land outside the city and build a drive-in, but then the cities grew,” Vogel said. “Suddenly, they were in the city. The land prices increased, and other problems escalated like the amount of lights around and the owners got older.
“The children — even though they were brought up in the business — didn’t want to take on the drive-in.”
Danny Kinnard sleeps as his wife, Katy Kinnard, and daughter Gracie Kinnard, 3, from Waxahachie, waited for the sun to go down to watch a double feature at the Galaxy Drive-In in Ennis in 2009.
Drive-in theaters always had to cope with inclement weather, but increased competition from multiplex indoor theaters with dozens of screens largely left single-screen, independently owned drive-in theaters in the dust.
Some drive-in theater owners in the late 1960s and early 1970s saw opportunity in this challenge and transformed their venue into “adult drive-in theaters” to bolster attendance and revenue. Indoor theaters tended to have first pick of new releases, which left drive-in theater owners to show less popular films.
“It wasn’t like that for very many years, but in order to survive, that’s what some of them had to do,” Vogel said. “But it didn’t make money. Nobody sold any concessions because people wouldn’t get out of their car. What does that tell you? That they weren’t really watching the movie.”
Tina and Art Lira of Lewisville settle in to watch the "Coming Attractions" reel at the Coyote Drive-In in Lewisville in 2016.
(Louis DeLuca/Staff Photographer)
In Dallas, the Lone Star Drive In followed this model in the 1960s. However, in 1987, the City of Dallas filed a lawsuit to close the drive-in theater after its sexually oriented business license expired. The theater did not reopen after the lawsuit.
Other X-rated drive-in businesses didn’t last long, and most eventually transformed into family-friendly venues.
In the 1980s, many drive-in theaters were forced to close as the cost of maintaining the aging equipment became too expensive, Vogel said.
“Drive-in theaters are risky,” he said. “Everything is a threat to theaters. People have often said, ‘This is going to kill us,’ or, ‘That is going to kill us.’ But theaters are still around.”
Rachel Leigh Marek and Andrew Shepherd wait for their movie to start at the Galaxy Drive-In in Ennis on Aug. 6, 2014.
(Brad Loper/Staff Photographer)
The modern Texas drive-in theater experience
Dallas-native Ryan Smith also believes drive-ins have a fighting chance in the future. Smith is the owner of Stars & Stripes Drive-In theaters in Lubbock and New Braunfels. In 2002, while he was a law student at Southern Methodist University, Smith was inspired to open his own outdoor theater. He’d enjoyed a viewing of M. Night Shyamalan’s Signs at a drive-in near Lubbock and knew it was an experience he wanted to share with more Texans.
A year later, he opened his first drive-in theater in Lubbock; Smith added a location in New Braunfels in 2015.
Stars & Stripes Drive-In Theater in New Braunfels, Texas. This is the theater's second location. The first Stars & Stripes Drive-In opened in Lubbock in 2003.
(Ryan Smith/Courtesy)
Smith’s drive-in theaters feature three screens and offer double features every night they are open. He recently invested in new digital projectors for both locations to improve the quality. Now, his employees play the movies from a computer rather than reels of film.
“Three screens are important because we can play big hits,” he said. “We play the popular movies and we can pair those with other popular movies.”
Smith said his theaters also have playgrounds and concession stands that sells burgers and hot dogs. They will offer free face painting to children before the movie in the summer. Smith’s theaters also permit movie-goers to bring in food and drink to eat in their cars.
“It's a slice of Americana that you can't get anywhere else,” Smith said. “If you get an opportunity to go to a drive-in, load up the car and go. You never know how long it will be around."
Did you visit any of the drive-in theaters listed below? Share your memories with us via our texting group.
Dallas’ long-gone drive-in theaters
Northwest Highway Drive-In, 6729 W. Northwest Hwy.
FILE-- Northwest Highway Drive-In Theater, undated.
W.G. Underwood and Claude Ezell, owners of drive-in theaters in Houston and San Antonio, opened Dallas’ first drive-in theater on June 20, 1941. The Northwest Highway Drive-In had a capacity for more than 450 vehicles, The News reported at the time.
There were 204 loudspeakers on the property, one between every two cars.
The drive-in theater received a facelift seven years after its grand opening, which included new pavement and a playground with swings, seesaws and sandboxes for children to play in while their parents watched the movie, The News reported at the time.
The outdoor theater closed in 1963. The location is now a shopping center and apartments.
Chalk Hill Drive-In, 4501 W. Davis St.
Northwest Highway and Chalk Hill Drive-In Theaters' newspaper advertisement.
(The Dallas Morning News)
Dallas’ second drive-in theater, Chalk Hill Drive-In, was also owned by Underwood and Ezell. Chalk Hill opened two weeks after the Northwest location on July 4, 1941. The theater could accommodate up to 408 vehicles and also had 204 loudspeakers. Chalk Hill’s opening night attraction was The Invisible Woman with Virginia Bruce, John Barrymore — Drew Barrymore’s grandfather — and John Howard, The News reported at the time.
The outdoor theater unveiled a new 80-foot fiberglass curved screen in 1954 that featured King of the Khyber Rifles.
The Chalk Hill Drive-In closed in 1973 and was demolished a year later. Several warehouses currently sit in the outdoor theater’s former location.
Buckner Boulevard Drive-In, 3333 N. Buckner Blvd.
Buckner Boulevard Drive-In Theater's newspaper ad.
The Buckner Boulevard Drive-In, formerly located between Samuell Boulevard and East Grand Avenue, first opened on June 4, 1948, with the screening of the film Tycoon with John Wayne and Laraine Day. The theater could accommodate up to 664 vehicles, and had a loud speaker for each of them, The News reported at the time.
The theater claimed to have the “World’s Largest Fiberglass Screen” when it first opened.
Buckner Boulevard Drive-In's outdoor speaker system.
Buckner Boulevard had a play area with two elephant slides, sand boxes and other playground equipment. The outdoor theater also provided bottle warmers for infant feeding, and a concession stand for adults.
The theater was demolished in the late 1970s, and is now a storage facility.
Jefferson Drive-In, 4506 W. Jefferson Blvd.
The Jefferson Drive-In Theatre at dusk in 1989.
(DAVID WOO/The Dallas Morning News)
This Oak Cliff drive-in theater first opened its doors in 1949. The outdoor theater could accommodate up to 600 vehicles.
The Jefferson drew steady crowds for decades, despite not always screening the hottest films, but Dallas’ growth eventually caught up to the theater. The city lights dimmed the shows on the screen and the re-introduction of daylight saving time in the early 1970s were two contributing factors to its first closure in 1987, The News reported at the time. The theater reopened in 1981, but closed for good in 1990. It was demolished in 2004 to make room for Celestino Mauricio Soto Jr. Elementary School.
Kaufman Pike Drive-In, 7041 Hawn Freeway
The Kaufman Pike Drive-In opened at the intersection of Highway 175 and Jim Miller Road on July 1, 1949. The theater was owned and operated by Charles Weisenberg, who also owned the Paloduro Drive-In in Amarillo and the Buena Vista Drive-In in Borger, Texas.
The theater had space for 600 cars, and was equipped with RCA individual in-car speakers with adjustable volume control. The outdoor theater had a playground and a concession stand, The News reported at the time.
Kaufman Pike featured Montana Mike with Robert Cumming and Brian Donlevy on its opening day. The drive-in theater closed in the summer of 1983 and was demolished soon after. The officers of the Southeast Division of the Dallas Police Department now sit on the property.
Hi-Vue Drive-In, 5525 South Beckley Ave., Dallas
The Hi-Vue Drive-in, owned and operated by W.P. Moran, M.J Konemann, opened the same day as the Kaufman Pike Drive-In on July 1, 1949. The drive-in theater was demolished around 1978. The drive-in’s former address leads to a dead end, which is currently sandwiched between an apartment complex and Interstate 35.
Big D Drive-In, 6327 Harry Hines Blvd.
The Big D Drive-In opened around 1950 as the Hines Boulevard Drive-In. It changed its name the following year. The theater eventually added a heated indoor auditorium for moviegoers who did not want to sit in their cars.
The outdoor theater made the news two years later after two armed suspects who had robbed a man of $8 at a nearby gas station hid at the drive-in for hours.
“As 722 patrons in parked cars still sat in the darkened open-air Big D Drive-In Theater, six policemen with shotguns suddenly swooped down on the suspects’ car at 10:30 p.m,” The News reported at the time. “Not a shot was fired. Three officers descended on each side of the car and two frightened young men were taken in a flash of steel and handcuffs.”
The drive in closed in 1970, and UT Southwestern Medical Center now sits on the property.
Samuell Boulevard Drive-In, 4617 Samuell Blvd.
Samuel Boulevard Drive-In opened Dec. 12, 1950, with the film Copper Canyon, which featured Hedy Lamarr and Ray Milland. The venue was decorated with wrought iron and included a snack bar with a patio and a playground for children, The News reported at the time.
The drive-in theater added a pool to its amenities in 1954. It closed in March 1959.
South Loop Drive-In, 3142 E. Ledbetter Drive
The South Loop Drive-in, located along East Ledbetter Drive close to Interstate 45, opened in 1950. The original screen, destroyed by a windstorm in 1956, featured a mural of Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs. The theater was lost by 1968.
L. "Bub" Thompson Photography
/Courtesy)
South Loop Drive-In opened on March 30, 1950, with the film On the Town, starring Gene Kelly and Frank Sinatra. The theater’s construction cost $150,000 and included indirectly lighted walkways, a patio with a lounge and chairs and a playground for children. Children under 12 could also get into the drive-ins for free, The News reported at the time.
South Loop closed in 1975, and has since been demolished. Part of the land remains empty, and is surrounded by small commercial shopping centers.
Hampton Road Drive-In, 2833 S. Hampton Road
Hampton Road Drive-In opened on May 12, 1950. The drive-in theater screened Colorado Territory, starring Robert Taylor and John Hodiak, during its grand opening. The theater had a children’s playground, a snack bar, restrooms and infant’s bottle warmers, The News reported at the time.
The theater was demolished around 1979. It is now an optometrist's office.
Denton Road Drive-In, 11325 Harry Hines Blvd.
The Denton Road Drive-In had its grand opening on June 23, 1950 with Montana, starring Errol Flynn and Alexis Smith. Commercial businesses now sit on the property.
King Drive-In, 4601 S. Lamar St.
The King Drive-In was originally named the Cinderella Drive-In when it opened on Dec. 16, 1950. It screened Return of the Frontiersman, starring Gordon McRae. The opening also included a fireworks show and free coffee and donuts for all moviegoers. The outdoor theater changed its name to King Drive-In in the early 1970s and later became an adult drive-in theater.
Lone Star Drive-In, 4600 Lawnview Ave.
Lone Star Drive-In first opened on Feb. 3, 1951, with the screening of Broken Arrow, starring James Stewart. The grand opening also included fireworks and free souvenirs. The outdoor theater had a concession stand, and outdoor patio and a children's playground. Lone Star turned into an adult theater in the mid-1960s, and began showing X-rated content. In 1987, the city of Dallas filed a lawsuit to close the drive-in theater after its sexually oriented business license expired. The theater did not open after the lawsuit.
Starlite Drive-In, 5101 S. Lamar St.
Not much was documented on the Starlite Drive-In, which was sometimes referred as Starlight. The theater opened around 1953, and had a capacity for approximately 500 cars. The drive-in was frequented by Dallas’ African American community, The News reported in the '90s. The date of its closure was not found.
Kiest Boulevard Drive-In, 3100 E. Kiest Blvd.
The Kiest Boulevard Drive-In opened on May 23, 1953, with the film Navy Wife, starring Joan Bennett. The theater claimed to have the biggest screen in Dallas at the time. The theater could accommodate up to 1,000 vehicles and had electronic speakers for each car, The News reported at the time.
Like other drive-in, Kiest had a playground with swings and rides for children. It also had a picnic area, a nursery and a swimming pool with beach equipment and bath houses.
The theater closed in 1982. The property remains empty.
Casa View Drive-In, 5299 Gus Thomasson Road
The Casa View Drive-In opened was first named the White Rock Drive-In when it opened its doors in 1954. The venue shut down two years later and reopened in 1958 as the Casa View Drive-In. The outdoor theater was demolished in the early 1970s, and Larry G. Smith Elementary School now occupies the site.
Linda Kay Drive-In, 11949 U.S. Frontage Road
Owner Frank Gillepsie opened the Linda Kay Drive-In in June 29, 1956. The drive-in opened in the town of Kleberg, which had been newly incorporated. The town is now part of southeast Dallas, near Pleasant Grove. The theater had a full cafeteria, The News reported at the time. Linda Kay eventually became an adult theater.
Gemini Drive-In, 11990 N. Central Expressway
Westmount Realty Capital LLC purchased these 27 acres formerly the site of the Gemini Drive-in Theater in 2006.
(Westmount Realty Capital)
The Gemini Drive-In became Dallas’ first multiscreen drive-in theater when it opened in 1965. The $1.5 million outdoor theater opened with a cocktail party and celebrity appearances. Frankie Avalon and Deborah Waley hosted an autograph party at Gemini before the screening of their film Beach Blanket Bingo during the theater’s grand opening. The drive-in could accommodate 2,000 cars. It later added a third screen. The owners tried unsuccessfully to sell the land in the late-’80s, but it the land was not sold until the mid-2000s.
Astro Drive-In, 3141 S. Walton Walker Blvd.
The Astro Drive-In sign towers over rubble after the old drive-in movie theater was torn down in 1999.
When the Asto Drive-In opened on Aug. 2, 1969, it became known as the first fully automated drive-in with the largest screen — 140 feet tall — in the world.
An electrical fire in late-1998 destroyed the theater’s roof and nearly all of the uninsured equipment inside its concrete building, The News reported at the time. The Astro Drive-In had been the last remaining drive-in theater in Dallas. The outdoor venue was demolished in 1999.
Staff researcher Meredyth Grange contributed to this report.
Dallas' last drive-in, the Astro, shown here in 1994, boasted it had the nation's largest movie screen.
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Dark Reading Staff
Telecom Hacker Sentenced for Laundering Millions
Pakistani man sentenced to prison for hacking into PBX systems and generating millions of dollars via bogus premium phone calls and laundering the money.
A federal court sentenced a Pakistani telecom hacker to four years in prison, after he and his cohorts illegally infiltrated PBX systems run by companies and organizations to set up a fake premium phone service and laundered money, according to an FBI report.
Muhammad Sohail Qasmani was sent to prison for running the bogus premium phone service between November 2008 to December 2012 and generating more than $19.6 million. The money was laundered using 650 transferees in 10 different countries, according to the FBI.
As part of the scheme, the international group hacked into PBX telephone networks operated by companies and organizations. Once inside a company's PBX system, the group reprogrammed unused extensions to operate as a pay-per-minute premium service line. But instead, the group had dialers call the pay-per-minute numbers to rack up large phone bills, which the unsuspecting companies paid. Qasmani and his cohorts then collected those proceeds and laundered the money.
A major telecom provider discovered the fraud and reported it to the FBI. One of Qasmani's cohorts, Noor Aziz Uddin, is still at large.
Read more about the FBI sentencing here.
Dark Reading's Quick Hits delivers a brief synopsis and summary of the significance of breaking news events. For more information from the original source of the news item, please follow the link provided in this article. View Full Bio
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Home Business Features Detroit 2.0
Detroit 2.0
R.J. King
Detroit has plenty of opportunities to further redevelopment and growth, according to business and community leaders.
Van Conway// CEO // Conway MacKenzie
“One of Detroit’s strengths is a skilled work force in manufacturing, which is arguably the best in the world. At the same time, you have a lot of real estate that’s available at very reasonable prices. If you build a new factory in Alabama, you have to start from scratch. But in Detroit, you have infrastructure already in place; you just have to plug it in. I would really look at the military industry and see what more we can be doing in terms of building components, parts, and whole systems for bomber jets, tanks, or submarines. Our labor force may be a bit more expensive than other parts of the country, but remember, you don’t have to start from scratch here. I also think we could add a lot more housing along the riverfront. That’s one reason Chicago does so well. They have people living and working downtown, so the stores and restaurants benefit twice.”
Irvin D. Reid // President Emeritus // Wayne State University
“You have to get a handle on the huge problem of poor health in the city. It starts in the schools, but you also have to reach into the community and make sure seniors are being taken care of. If people take their medications, eat right, and stay active, everyone wins. If you let things go as they are now, it will just lead to higher costs and more problems down the road. We all know the high costs of emergency room visits, and one way to reduce those visits is to place more medical clinics in the neighborhoods. If you can take care of health care at the grass roots level and really drive home the need for good nutrition and regular exercise, it would improve the quality of life immensely.”
Sue Mosey // President // Midtown Detroit Inc.
“There are a lot of projects that are transferrable around the city. Right now, we’re working with Vanguard CDC (a nonprofit community development corporation affiliated with Second Ebenezer Church, located at I-75 and McNichols) to develop a model for housing rehabilitation and a housing repair grant program. The goal is to help stabilize the neighborhoods and create a viable model for redevelopment going forward. At Midtown, we offer a technical assistance program for small businesses and entrepreneurs that provides grants for security, exterior signage, façade improvements, and mentorship programs. We also have employee housing incentives from Henry Ford Health System, Detroit Medical Center, Wayne State University, and others. There are other health care agencies and institutions around the city that could offer housing assistance in a given area.”
Frank Venegas Jr. // Chairman and CEO // Ideal Group
“When we moved our business to Michigan and Clark (in southwest Detroit) in 1996, one of the first things we supported was Detroit Hispanic Development Corp., a nonprofit here that offers after-school programs for students, social services, and a host of other offerings. But we just didn’t throw money at it. We looked at the operation and, over time, worked with the organization to establish an annual budget that was appropriate to the services offered. Otherwise, you’re scrambling every year to plug the holes. Let’s face it, money is at the root of most positive changes in the community, but you also have to encourage the next generation. The one thing I don’t see is a way to share best practices with other parts of Detroit in terms of community support. That’s something we need to work on.”
John Hantz // CEO // Hantz Farms
“The vision from 40,000 feet is that Detroit is experiencing the best of times and the worst of times. Downtown and some of the neighborhoods are doing well, but outside of that core, there are some incredible challenges. Most people see urban farming as a panacea, since the city has so much vacant land. But you don’t go from blight to farming overnight. You really need to clean an area, figure out a maintenance plan, and then farm. Blight just leads to more blight. What’s more, you can’t go into an area and just bulldoze all the structures and then begin farming. You have to save every building that can be economically viable; otherwise, you’re just destroying your future tax base. You also can get two growing seasons in Detroit (per year, due to weather patterns).”
George Jackson // President and CEO // Detroit Economic Growth Corp.
“We have to do a better job of overseeing job retraining programs that are supported and operated by federal, state, and local governments. At times, the only people benefiting from the training programs are the people doing the training. We should do a better job of bringing training programs into the high schools so when a student graduates, they have a diploma and a certificate to land a job in a high-demand field such as health care. For example, our hospitals need nurses, surgical assistants, and lab technicians. It’s the same for technology, robotics, or engineering. Not everyone has to go to a four-year college. We also need to get employers more involved. They can either support current retraining programs or offer them at their own facilities.”
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Nirvana - Unplugged in New York Vinyl
Vinyl LP pressing of this live release from the Grunge heroes. Recorded in November 1993, less than six months before singer Kurt Cobain killed himself, Nirvana's MTV Unplugged is a watershed document that presents a band at the peak of its powers. Unlike any other unplugged affair, the diverse album is not a simple stripped-down regurgitation of greatest hits or a cash-it-in set of nostalgic favourites. Rather, the live effort is among the most emotionally naked spectacles ever released an album so starkly intense and profoundly personal, it's impossible not to get chills down the spine. The set list is as surprising as the stylistic makeover. Save for renditions of 'All Apologies' and 'Come As You Are', the adventurous material includes brooding covers of the Meat Puppets' 'Lake of Fire', 'Plateau', and 'Oh Me' as well as harrowing versions of David Bowie's 'The Man Who Sold the World', and the Vaselines' 'Jesus Don't Want Me for a Sunbeam'.
Includes FREE MP3 version of this album.
1. About a Girl
2. Come As You Are
3. Jesus Doesn't Want Me for a Sunbeam
4. The Man Who Sold the World
5. Pennyroyal Tea
6. Dumb
7. Polly
8. On A Plain
9. Something in the Way
10. Plateau
11. Oh Me
12. Lake of Fire
13. All Apologies
14. Where Did You Sleep Last Night
Format: Vinyl / 12" Album
Producer: Scott Litt, Nirvana
Label: Geffen
No of Discs: 1
Running Time: 53:50 minutes
Dimensions: 300 x 300 x 5 (mm)
Catalogue No: GEF24727
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Exposure Therapies for Specific Phobias
Status: Strong Research Support
Exposure-based therapies reflect a variety of behavioral approaches that are all based on exposing the phobic individuals to the stimuli that frighten them. From a behavioral perspective, specific phobias are maintained because of avoidance of the phobic stimuli so that the individual does not have the opportunity to learn that they can tolerate the fear, that the fear will come down on its own without avoiding or escaping, and that their feared outcomes often do not come true or are not as terrible as they imagine. Avoidance can occur either by not entering a situation at all or by entering the situation but not experiencing it fully (e.g., because of consuming alcohol before taking a flight for a person with flying phobia). Exposure therapies are thus designed to encourage the individual to enter feared situations (either in reality or through imaginal exercises) and to try to remain in those situations. The selection of situations to try typically follows an individually-tailored fear hierarchy that starts with situations that are only mildly anxiety-provoking and builds up to the most feared encounters, though in some forms of exposure therapy (e.g., implosion therapy), the individual starts out being exposed to a very anxiety-provoking stimulus rather than building up to that point more gradually.
There are a number of variations of exposure therapy that work effectively in the treatment of specific phobias, so to some extent the specific approach selected may depend on the nature of the phobia and therapist and client preferences. Notwithstanding, the research evidence does provide more substantial support for some exposure therapies (i.e., in vivo exposure) over others (e.g., systematic desensitization).
In vivo exposure involves actually confronting the feared stimuli, usually in a graduated fashion (e.g., in spider phobia, a person might first look at a picture of a spider and eventually work up to touching a large tarantula; in flying phobia, a person might first read a story about a plane crash and then work up to taking an actual flight). The treatment usually last a number of hours, and can be administered in one very long session (e.g., one 3-hour session for spider phobia) or across multiple sessions (e.g., three to eight 1-1.5-hour-long sessions). A range of specific phobias respond well to in vivo treatment, although treatment acceptance and dropout can be a problem. Further, treatment gains tend to be well maintained up to a year following the end of treatment, particularly for animal phobias (though follow-up data is less impressive for blood-injection-injury phobia). When the therapist is actively modeling each step of the exposure and teaching the phobic individual how to interact with the feared stimulus, this type of exposure therapy can also be called Participant modeling or Guided mastery.
Applied muscle tension is a special variant of in vivo exposure for the treatment of blood-injection-injury phobia. This treatment uses standard exposure techniques but also incorporates muscle tension exercises to respond to decreases in blood pressure that can lead to fainting.
Virtual reality exposure uses a computer program to generate the phobic situation (e.g., being on a plane that is taking off, encountering a large tarantula, looking over a tall balcony ledge), and integrates real-time computer graphics with various body tracking devices so that the individual can interact in the environment. This therapy appears to be useful for phobias that may be difficult to treat in vivo; namely, flying phobias (where repeated plane flights are impractical) and height phobias, but more studies are needed to demonstrate its efficacy for a broader range of phobia subtypes.
Systematic desensitization involves exposing phobic individuals to fear-evoking images and thoughts (i.e., imaginal exposure) or to actual phobic stimuli, while pairing the exposure with relaxation (or another response that is incompatible with fear) to decrease the normal fear response. Treatment using systematic desensitization tends to take longer than in vivo exposure, and appears to be more effective at changing subjective anxiety than at reducing avoidance. Thus, it is not recommended as the first line of treatment if a client is willing to try in vivo or an alternate form of exposure therapy.
Note that many exposure therapies also include a cognitive component that involves cognitive restructuring to challenge distorted or irrational thoughts related to the phobic object or response (e.g., I am going to fall, The dog is going to attack me, I can’t tolerate this fear, etc.). Further, there is some evidence that either adding cognitive therapy to in vivo exposure or administering cognitive therapy alone can be helpful for claustrophobia, and it may also be useful for dental phobia. Evidence regarding the utility of cognitive therapy for flying phobia is mixed, and it is not clear that adding cognitive therapy to exposure therapy for other phobia types improves outcomes.
Key References (in reverse chronological order)
In vivo Exposure Therapy (typically therapist-directed, also termed guided mastery or participant modeling)
Animal phobias
Gotestam, K. G., & Hokstad, A. (2002). One session treatment of spider phobia in a group setting with rotating active exposure. European Journal of Psychiatry, 16, 129?134.
Gilroy, L., Kirkby, K. C., Daniels, B. A., Menzies, R. G., & Montgomery, I. M. (2000). Controlled comparison of computer-aided vicarious exposure versus live exposure in the treatment of spider phobia. Behavior Therapy, 31, 733?744.
Öst, L. G., Ferebee, I., & Furmark, T. (1997). One-session group therapy of spider phobia: direct versus indirect treatments. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 721?732.
Hellstrom, K., & Öst, L. (1995). One-session therapist directed exposure versus two forms of manual directed self-exposure in the treatment of spider phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 959-965.
Öst, L. G., Salkovskis, P. M., & Hellstrom, K. (1991). One-session therapist directed exposure vs. self-exposure in the treatment of spider phobia. Behavior Therapy, 22, 407-422.
Bandura, A., Blahard, E. B., & Ritter, B. (1969). Relative efficacy of desensitization and modeling approaches for inducing behavioral, affective, and attitudinal changes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13, 173-199.
Flying phobia
Walder, C., McCracken, J., Herbert, M., James, P., & Brewitt, N. (1987). Psychological intervention in civilian flying phobia; evaluation and a three year follow-up. British Journal of Psychiatry, 151, 494-498.
Water phobia
Egan, S. (1981). Reduction of anxiety in aquaphobics. Canadian Journal of Applied Sport Sciences-Journal Canadien des Sciences Appliquees au Sport, 6, 68-71.
Height phobia and driving phobia
Williams, S. L., Turner, S. M., & Peer, D. F. (1985). Guided mastery and performance desensitization treatments for severe acrophobia. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 53, 237-247.
Williams, S. L., Dooseman, G., & Kleinfield, E. (1984). Comparative effectiveness of guided mastery and exposure treatments for intractable phobias. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 52, 505-518.
Öst, L. G., Alm, T., Brandberg, M., & Breitholtz, E. (2001). One vs five sessions of exposure and five sessions of cognitive therapy in the treatment of claustrophobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39(2), 167-183.
Booth, R., & Rachman, S. (1992). The reduction of claustrophobia-I. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 30, 207-221.
Muhlberger, A., Wiedemann, G. C., & Pauli, P. (2003). Efficacy of a one-session virtual reality exposure treatment for fear of flying. Psychotherapy Research, 13, 323-336.
Wiederhold, B. K., Jang, D. P., Gevirtz, R. G., Kim, S. I., Kim, I. Y., & Wiederhold, M. D. (2002). The treatment of fear of flying: A controlled study of imaginal and virtual reality graded exposure therapy. IEEE Transactions on Information Technology in Biomedicine, 6, 218-223.
Rothbaum, B. O., Hodges, L., Smith, S., Lee, J. H., & Price, L. (2000). A controlled study of virtual reality exposure therapy for the fear of flying. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 68, 1020-1026.
Height phobia
Krijn, M., Emmelkamp, P. M., Biemond, R., deWilde de Ligny, C., Schuemie, M. J., & van der Mast, C. A. (2004). Treatment of acrophobia in virtual reality: The role of immersion and presence. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 229-239.
Emmelkamp, P., Krijn, M., Hulsbosch, A. M., de Vries, S., Schuemie,M. J., & van der Mast, C. A. (2002). Virtual reality treatment versus exposure in vivo: a comparative evaluation in acrophobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 509-516.
Animal phobia
Garcia-Palacios, A., Hoffman, H., Carlin, A., Furness, III, T. A., & Botella, C. (2002). Virtual reality in the treatment of spider phobia: a controlled study. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 983-993.
Applied Muscle Tension for Blood-Injury-Injection Phobia
Öst, L. G., Fellenius, J., & Sterner, U. (1991). Applied tension, exposure in vivo, and tension-only in the treatment of blood phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 29, 561-574.
Öst, L. G., Sterner, U., & Fellenius, J. (1989). Applied tension, applied relaxation, and the combination in the treatment of blood phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 27, 109-121.
Barrett, C. L. (1969). Systematic desensitization versus implosive therapy. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 74, 587-592.
Height phobia and claustrophobia
Lazarus, A. A. (1961). Group therapy of phobic disorders by systematic desensitization. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 504-510.
Öst, L. G., Alm, T., Brandberg, M., & Breitholtz, E. (2001). One vs five sessions of exposure and five sessions of cognitive therapy in the treatment of claustrophobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39, 167-183.
Craske, M. G., Mohlman, J., Yi, J., Glover, D., & Valeri, S. (1995). Treatment of claustrophobias and snake/spider phobias: Fear of arousal and fear of context. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 197-203.
Willumsen, T., Vassend, O., & Hoffart, A. (2001). A comparison of cognitive therapy, applied relaxation, and nitrous oxide sedation in the treatment of dental fear. Acta Odontologica Scandinavica, 59, 290-296.
de Jongh, A., Muris, P., ter Horst, G., van Zuuren, F., Schoenmakers, N., & Makkes, P. (1995). One-session cognitive treatment of dental phobia: Preparing dental phobics for treatment by restructuring negative cognitions. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 947-954.
Capafons, J. I., Sosa, C. D., & Vina, C. M. (1999). A reattributional training program as a therapeutic strategy for fear of flying. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 30, 259-272.
Treatment reviews of exposure therapy for specific phobias
Choy, Y., Fyer, A. J., & Lipsitz, J. D. (2007). Treatment of specific phobia in adults. Clinical Psychology Review, 27, 266-286.
Antony, M. M., & Grös, D. F. (2006). The assessment and treatment of specific phobias: A review. Current Psychiatry Reports, 8, 298-303.
Pull, C. B. (2005). Current status of virtual reality exposure therapy in anxiety disorders. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 18, 7-14.
Future directions in therapies for specific phobias
Advances in therapies for specific phobias are promising, including the use of computer-assisted therapy, and the use of interoceptive exposure therapy (exposure to anxiety-relevant bodily sensations, such as dizziness and shortness of breath) for claustrophobia. Key references for each of these treatment approaches are noted below, though there is not yet sufficient research evidence to list these approaches as well-established.
Bornas, X., Tortella-Feliu, M., Llabrés, J. & Fullana, M.A. (2001). Computer-Assisted Exposure Treatment for Flight Phobia: A Controlled Study. Psychotherapy Research, 11, 259-273.
See description of exposure techniques in the following clinical resource/manual:
McLean, P.D., & Woody, S.R. (2001). Specific fears and phobias, pp. 48-83. In P.D. McLean and S.R. Woody, Anxiety disorders in adults: An evidence-based approach to psychological treatment. New York: Oxford University Press.
Craske, M., Antony, M., & Barlow, D. (1997). Mastery of your specific phobia: Therapist guide. Academic Press.
Williams, S. L. (1990). Guided mastery treatment of agoraphobia: Beyond stimulus exposure. Progress in Behavior Modification, 26, 89-121.
Marks, I. (1978). Living with fear. New York: McGraw-Hill.
See description of applied muscle tension in the following clinical resource/manual:
Öst, L. G., & Sterner, U. (1987). Applied tension. A specific behavioral method for treatment of blood phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 25, 25-29.
See description of cognitive therapy techniques in the following clinical resource/manual
Wells, A. (1997). Cognitive therapy of anxiety disorders: A practice manual and conceptual guide. Chichester, England: Wiley.
Beck, A. T., & Emery, G., with Greenberg, R. L. (1985). Anxiety disorders and phobias: A cognitive perspective. New York: Basic Books.
Center for Cognitive Therapy
Cory Newman, PhD, Director
Mary Anne Layden, Ph.D., Director of Education
University of Pennsylvania Medical School
psycct@mail.med.upenn.edu
Beck Institute for Cognitive Therapy and Research
Judy S. Beck, PhD, Director
One Belmont Avenue, Suite 700
Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004-1610
San Francisco Bay Area Center for Cognitive Therapy
Oakland, CA (Rockridge)
Anxiety Disorders Center
Saint Louis Behavioral Medicine Institute
1129 Macklind Avenue
Director, C. Alec Pollard
314-534-0200, fax 314-534-7996
pollarda@sluvca.slu.edu
UCLA Anxiety Disorders Behavioral Program
405 Hilgard Ave
craske@psych.sscnet.ucla.edu
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David L. Buck
David Buck was appointed Principal Flute of the Dallas Symphony Orchestra in 2017. Praised for his "supple tone, rhythmic dynamism and technical agility” (The Oregonian), he was previously Principal Flute of the Detroit Symphony Orchestra, and has also held positions with the Los Angeles Philharmonic and the Oregon Symphony. Guest principal appearances include the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra and the Baltimore Symphony.
As a soloist, Mr. Buck has performed with the Dallas Symphony Orchestra, Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Detroit Chamber Winds & Strings and the Oregon Symphony, collaborating with conductors including Jaap van Zweden, Leonard Slatkin, John Storgårds, Paul Watkins and H. Robert Reynolds. In 2014, he recorded John Williams' rarely heard Concerto for Flute and Orchestra with Leonard Slatkin and the Detroit Symphony for Naxos Records.
During the summer months, Mr. Buck has appeared at the Great Lakes Chamber Music Festival, Oregon Bach Festival, Colorado Music Festival, Tanglewood, Kent/Blossom, Spoleto Festival del Due Monde and the Pacific Music Festival. An avid chamber musician, he has collaborated with members of the Guarneri and Emerson String Quartets, the LA Phil New Music Group and the Detroit Chamber Winds & Strings.
A native of Philadelphia, David Buck began playing the flute at the age of nine. After initial studies with David Cramer, he went on to graduate from The Juilliard School, where he earned his Bachelor of Music and Graduate Diploma as a student of Robert Langevin and Jeffrey Khaner.
Mr. Buck is adjunct associate professor of flute at Southern Methodist University and a Powell Artist. He lives in Dallas, Texas with his wife, flutist Jung-Wan Kang.
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Trintech's Teresa Mackintosh. Jill Broussard
Dallas EY Entrepreneur of the Year 2018
This year’s finalists are proficient at coping with rapid change—and so much more.
By D CEO Published in D CEO July 2018 Photography by Jill Broussard | Headshots courtesy of companies
Reeling in venture capital. Figuring out online solutions to bring down costs. Incentivizing employees and renegotiating contracts. Prioritizing future growth.
Those are things the entrepreneurs on the following pages do very well. But what they may do best is cope with rapid change. For the 11th straight year, D CEO is honored to profile all of the finalists in the EY Entrepreneur Of The Year program for the Southwest region.
EY assembled a stellar panel of independent judges to select the 2018 finalists. They were: Rick Allen, Paragon Healthcare Inc.; Mark Dubrow, Onyx CenterSource; Randy Gier, NRG Restaurant Group; Amber Venz Box, rewardStyle; Kevin Lavelle, Mizzen+Main; Anurag Jain, Access Healthcare; Clane LaCrosse, Bosque Systems; Lee Bird, At Home; Wendy Lopez, AECOM; and Chris MacFarland, Masergy Communications.
The regional finalists in this year’s EOY program were honored at a gala in June at Dallas’ Hilton Anatole hotel. The winners will go on to vie for national recognition in November at EY’s Strategic Growth Forum in Palm Springs, California.
Chris Munday
2020 COMPANIES
In recent years, the retail industry has traveled down a rocky road, and Chris Munday has felt some of the bumps.
Munday’s Fort Worth-based 2020 Companies could have stayed—and survived—on the same route it had been on. For a decade, the business’s bread and butter had been providing outsourced brand advocates, sales representatives, and merchandisers at more than 50,000 retail locations.
But as online shopping has soared and bricks-and-mortar retail has teetered, Munday leaned on this corporate mantra: “We stay focused on finding a way, and change when change is not necessary.”
One of the biggest “unnecessary” changes at 2020 Companies? Creation of an events business, launched in 2012 and ramped up in 2014, that lets 2020 bypass traditional retail settings and take brand sales and marketing efforts straight to the consumer at sporting events, exhibitions, fairs, festivals, and the like. —John Egan
Lucas Lu
5miles has not only managed to outlive several of its competitors but also to expand.
The company, founded in 2014 to create a localized mobile marketplace, gained speed after picking up a sponsorship with the Dallas Mavericks earlier this year. It also has made headway in the auto category, helping auto dealers automatically upload inventory into the 5miles marketplace, as well as in the housing and job-listing categories.
In 2016, it landed $30 million in venture capital and, last year, launched CyberMiles, a blockchain network for ecommerce. To date, the company has more than 13 million downloads. It ended 2017 with $10 million in revenue and 100 employees.
“We’ve been really lucky the last four years,” Lucas Lu says. “We are reaching the break-even point. So … it’s a very good time for us.” —Danielle Abril
Stephen Bohanon
ALKAMI TECHNOLOGY
Founder and Chief Strategy and Sales Officer
Stephen Bohanon wanted to help regional and community banks strengthen their digital presence. So in 2009 he created Alkami Technology, a fintech company that provides a mobile digital banking solution.
“Digital banking is becoming more important to financial institutions,” Bohanon says.
Alkami currently employs about 330 people, has more than 4 million active users from 63 clients, and is expecting to generate about $50 million in revenue this year. Last year, Alkami posted $24 million in revenue. The company also recently raised $70 million in investment.
This year, Alkami has focused on applying data intelligence and artificial intelligence to data it collects, providing insights behind the numbers. It’s also investing in developing capabilities to allow connected devices and home assistants to access its data. —Danielle Abril
Jere Thompson, John Burke, Laurie Rodriguez and Chris Chambless
CEO, Chief Information Officer, CFO and Chief Marketing Officer
Jere Thompson knows it might sound cliché, but he credits Ambit Energy’s workforce for the company’s global success. “We talk a lot about needing better systems, better products, and the ability to respond rapidly to market changes in our business, but all of those capabilities come from having the right personnel,” Thompson says.
Dallas-based Ambit Energy, which has about 600 employees, provides electric and natural gas services in deregulated markets in the United States, Canada, and Japan. The company expanded to Canada and Japan in 2017. More than 400,000 independent consultants market Ambit Energy’s utility services.
“As an increasingly international company, we have to find a way to navigate various cultural and regulatory environments,” Thompson says. “That’s why having good people who share common values of commitment to excellence, integrity, and hard work is so important.” —John Egan
Blake Walker
ARCIS GOLF
Founder, Chairman, and CEO
In just a few years, SMU grad Blake Walker has turned Dallas-based Arcis Golf into the second-largest owner and operator of fee-simple private and public golf courses in the country. But truth to tell, the former ClubCorp investment officer says, Arcis is actually a “vertically integrated lifestyle company” that is “reinventing” the American golf-club experience.
Essentially, Arcis clubs are “adult playgrounds.”
Blake Walker, Arcis Golf
Beyond the golf itself, Arcis facilities are centers for concerts, wine-barrel tastings, curated food and retail offerings, corporate events of all stripes, Jumbotron screens, and health and wellness options, including organized triathlons. Essentially, says Walker, Arcis clubs are “adult playgrounds.”
The latest to be added to the Arcis portfolio of roughly 60 clubs was TPC Valencia in Valencia, California, giving the company two private clubs in the city just northwest of Los Angeles. —Glenn Hunter
Don Dykstra
BLOOMFIELD HOMES
What started as a business run out of the garage of a model home in Mansfield has grown into one of the region’s largest homebuilders putting up houses exclusively in Dallas-Fort Worth.
Don Dykstra founded Bloomfield Homes in 2004. While the company built 62 homes that first year, it will top 1,500 homes and $500 million in sales in 2018. Also this year, Southlake-based Bloomfield delivered the first phase of homes at Timberbrook in Justin, the company’s first large-scale master-planned community.
Now the firm is actively growing, with new communities from Melissa to Waxahachie with average home prices hovering around $325,000. In 2013, as part of succession planning, Japan-based Sumitomo Forestry bought half of Bloomfield, though the day-to-day business has been relatively undisturbed by the sale. —Julia Bunch
Merrilee Kick
BUZZBALLZ/SOUTHERN CHAMPION
Merrilee Kick’s BuzzBallz/Southern Champion, which mainly makes ready-to-drink alcoholic beverages, has had a busy year. Most notably, the company Kick founded in Carrollton eight years ago has begun attracting top-shelf talent from the beverage-distribution industry. One case in point: Blair Casey, her new sales and marketing VP, who came from Southern Glazer’s Wine & Spirits.
Kick’s also started providing energy drinks for a Colorado company that sells to GNC, adding a special enzyme that makes her plastic bottles more eco-friendly, and selling BuzzBallz aboard Spirit Airlines flights.
With close to 80 employees, the company now is offering its products domestically as well as in seven countries or territories. It’s projecting 2018 revenue of $25 million to $30 million, up 30 to 40 percent over last year. —Glenn Hunter
David Ricker
BROADJUMP
Some companies really do get started at the kitchen table. That’s what happened with Dallas-based BroadJump, which helps healthcare providers manage their supply chain costs via web-based data and analytics.
David Ricker thought if he could figure out a way to assemble healthcare purchasing data in an easy-to-use web interface, then healthcare companies could see what others were paying for medical equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals and be in a position to negotiate.
Ricker gathered a team around the table and together they launched BroadJump in 2013. Its technology delivers market share, volume, and exact price points.
“It’s bringing down costs,” Ricker says. “Our technology is directly aimed at fixing the complete lack of transparency between suppliers and hospitals.” More than 760 hospitals use BroadJump. —Kerry Curry
Kyle Noonan and Joshua Sepkowitz
FREERANGE CONCEPTS
Co-founders and Co-CEOs
When they met at SMU, Kyle Noonan was an art major and Joshua Sepkowitz was in finance. Despite having little in common, they became fast friends. In 2012, they combined their complementary skill sets, and Dallas-based hospitality company FreeRange Concepts was born.
Noticing that retail and dining were becoming increasingly internet- and app-based, the two set out to create restaurants that offer memorable experiences. “You don’t come to us for a matter of convenience, you come to us for sheer entertainment,” Noonan says. “That entertainment component, mixed with great food and beverage service, is somewhat internet-proof.”
FreeRange’s brands include bowling alley Bowl & Barrel and dog-friendly restaurant Mutts Canine Cantina. In five years, FreeRange has grown into a near-$50 million company—and Noonan says “big growth plans” are in the works. —Tara Nieuwesteeg
Sheffield Clark and Bobby Sharp
Co-founder/CEO and Co-founder
“The number of machines has increased by over 400 percent.”
Sheffield Clark, Coinsource
ATMs aren’t just for greenbacks anymore. Entrepreneurs Sheffield Clark and Bobby Sharp are marrying the immediacy of ATMs with the untapped potential of the cryptocurrency bitcoin, allowing people to buy and sell bitcoins at automatic teller machines.
Clark, Sharp, and another co-founder established Fort Worth-based Coinsource in 2015, when bitcoin was still a relatively unknown digital currency.
The company, which installed its first ATM in Las Vegas, now has more than 200 machines in 21 states—the largest bitcoin ATM network in the world. It expects to have 300 ATMs by year’s end.
Says Clark: “The number of Coinsource machines has increased by over 400 percent year over year since our inception, in line with increasing transaction volumes at our Bitcoin ATMs around the country.” —Kerry Curry
Sam Darwish
SKINNY IT
After attending EY’s 2017 Entrepreneur Of The Year Awards for the Southwest region, Skinny IT’s Sam Darwish felt inspired. “You look at all the great things people accomplished, and you say … ‘How do I do better?’” he says.
With that, Skinny IT made a “multimillion-dollar investment” to pivot from hardware and hardware-related services, which it was focusing on for the last seven years, to start offering software and support services. It also scooped up Kansas City-based Installation & Service Technologies Inc. to bolster its ability to provide on-site deployments.
Now companies can automate tech installation and service support with help from Skinny IT. The company employs about 300, including those at a call center in Mexico City for Spanish-speaking customers, and generates more than $100 million in revenue annually. —Danielle Abril
Joe Armes
CSW INDUSTRIALS INC.
Chairman, CEO, and President
At CSW Industrials, every employee shares in the company’s success. The Dallas-based industrial manufacturer is a combination of six legacy businesses with six different strategies that now operate with a shared purpose, according to Joe Armes.
“Shape a corporate culture that everyone can be proud of.”
Joe Armes, CSW Industrials Inc.
“We made it a priority to ensure everyone’s interests were aligned and that we’re incentivizing the right behaviors at every level of the organization,” he says. “This is best demonstrated through our employee stock ownership plan: Every employee is a shareholder. So, when we succeed, we all succeed together.”
What’s Armes’s prescription for achieving such success? “Shape a corporate culture that everyone can be proud of,” he says. “Start by recruiting people that you respect and admire. Then, make sure you align your interests with those of every member of your organization.”— John Egan
Cade Griffis
D-BAT SPORTS
Cade Griffis has baseball in his blood. He started playing at age 5, and was drafted after college by the Kansas City Royals. In 1998, he and his brother took an entrepreneurial approach to the game and opened the first D-BAT Sports. At the time, baseball academies were hot, low-lit, and “smelled like a locker room.”
“We took it from being a sweatbox workout facility for softball and baseball players to more of a ‘mother-friendly’ atmosphere—and more of a business,” Griffis says.
D-BAT is a Carrollton-based training facility chain that offers lessons, camps, and clinics. The company began franchising in 2009, and Griffis expects to close this year with more than 70 locations and $46 million in gross sales. Future plans involve expanding to other countries. —Tara Nieuwesteeg
David Iliff, Jamie Gibbs and Vince Sullivan
DURASERV
CEO, Chairman and President
DuraServ has opened the door to growth in a couple of ways.
The Farmers Branch-based company, a service provider in the loading dock, door, and equipment industry, has expanded organically by establishing new geographic territories, such as Miami and Charlotte, North Carolina. It also has grown via acquisition, snapping up Cookson Door Sales of Arizona earlier this year, for example.
David Iliff, who was promoted from CFO to CEO in 2017, says DuraServ aims to make two acquisitions per year. The company then beefs up trucks, facilities, and training at the newly acquired businesses, he says.
“We love to bring our culture … to these new acquisitions, and they really do thrive under our ownership,” he says, adding, “It’s about hiring and retaining great people.” —John Egan
Carly Nance and Rachel Bentley
THE CITIZENRY
The Citizenry was born out of co-founders Carly Nance and Rachel Bentley’s frustration with the home décor market. The duo wanted to create an antithesis to “dime-a-dozen, mass-produced” goods. The result, founded in August 2014, is an online marketplace of about 300 fair-trade products created by makers all over the globe, such as patterned rugs handmade in Oaxaca, Mexico, and wood cheeseboards handmade in Wicklow, Ireland.
With initial backing of about $1 million from venture capitalists and angel investors, The Citizenry has taken off. Year-over-year sales are up 140 percent, and the brand’s impact (defined by its number of artisans employed worldwide) is up 180 percent year-over-year. As for future growth, Nance says she and Bentley are determining how The Citizenry translates into brick-and-mortar retail. —Julia Bunch
Alex Doubet
After witnessing his mother’s unpleasant experience selling her home, Alex Doubet decided to found a company that would make buying and selling easier, more transparent, and less expensive. So, in 2015, he launched Door.
The startup, which now serves Dallas, San Antonio, Austin, and Houston, charges homeowners a flat rate of $5,000 for brokerage services. It also offers title and mortgage services. “Homeowners are tired of how much money they have to spend,” Doubet says. “It doesn’t have to be the same as it’s always been.”
In 2016, Door did $38 million in sales volume, generating $400,000 in revenue. It more than quadrupled the following year, with more than $2 million in revenue. Doubet expects to end 2018 having generated nearly $10 million in revenue. —Danielle Abril
GREEN BRICK PARTNERS INC.
When others were thinking about retirement, Jim Brickman was starting a brand-new venture. Brickman and David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital formed Plano-based Green Brick Partners’ predecessor in 2008, when Brickman was 56.
Since then, their initial investment of $10 million has grown into a publicly traded homebuilder with a market cap of $550 million. Still, few outside the industry know the brand, because Green Brick Partners acquires builders who maintain their brand identity through retention of a minority stake.
The model allows Green Brick to provide diverse residential offerings while maintaining homebuilder reputations built over a lifetime. “We seek out builders who want the financial structure and security of a big company,” Brickman says, “but also the entrepreneurial environment that made them successful to start with.” —Kerry Curry
Mike Stacy
ID90 TRAVEL INC.
When Mike Stacy came to ID90 Travel in 2011, the company was in trouble. “We were burning through a lot of cash,” Stacy says. “It was primarily because of the contracts we had with airlines. We were upside down on every transaction.”
“More and more airlines are working with us.”
Mike Stacy, ID90 Travel Inc.
He got to work. Stacy renegotiated the contracts, diversified the company’s revenue stream, and set the business on the path to profit.
ID90 Travel, based in Southlake, offers technology-driven solutions that streamline airline employees’ travel bookings. Today, 25 airlines have partnered with ID90 Travel and, since 2016, the company has enjoyed a compound annual EBITDA growth rate of 150 percent.
“We’ve become a one-stop solution,” Stacy says. “More and more airlines are working with us, and more and more airline employees are using our system.” —Tara Nieuwesteeg
Lance Crosby
After selling SoftLayer to IBM for $2 billion in 2013, Lance Crosby set out to explore another industry: cybersecurity. Three years later he launched StackPath, which offers a suite of cybersecurity services, with a $150 million investment and the acquisition of four companies.
Since then he’s made another acquisition and merged with London-based Server Density. In between the M&A activity, he’s grown StackPath organically by 40 percent, ending 2017 with a run rate of $250 million. “It’s like changing the tires on a car during the NASCAR race and not pulling over in the pit stop,” Crosby says.
StackPath—which employs 450 people (including 100 in Dallas), serves more than a million customers, and offers four services—is expected to offer 12 services by year’s end. —Danielle Abril
Curtis Hite
IMPROVING
Curtis Hite and his partners started technology services firm Blue Ocean Group in 2006. The next year the young company acquired Improving Enterprises, and the name stuck. Today, Improving is an IT services and software development company offering training, consulting, and recruiting.
“With good intent, you usually have a lot to work with.”
Curtis Hite, Improving
Part of Improving’s core mission is to foster transparency and trust with its stakeholders and within its community. So far, that’s gone a long way: the Plano-based company has been on the Inc. 500 or Inc. 5000 list nine times since 2009, and its annual revenue is approaching $70 million.
“Unfortunately, our field suffers from having a bad perception among CEOs,” Hite says. “What I know for certain is that our intent is good. With good intent, you usually have a lot to work with.” —Tara Nieuwesteeg
Rich Howe
INUVO INC.
In 2009, Rich Howe received an offer to join a company that was $13 million in debt. The company, later named Inuvo, had problems—but it had potential, too.
“I saw some assets in the ashes,” Howe says. “There were a few gems that a real successful business could be built on the back of.”
Howe restructured, rebuilt, divested, and eventually paid back every penny of the debt. With the cleanup out of the way, he set about building the business.
Today, Inuvo utilizes artificial intelligence in targeted advertising, using technology to effectively connect advertisers with their intended consumers. The company is based in Little Rock, Arkansas, with a satellite office in California. With Howe at the helm, Inuvo is now an $80 million-a-year business. —Tara Nieuwesteeg
Eric Waller
MD AMERICA ENERGY LLC
For MD America Energy LLC, oil and gas equipment is vital to unearthing energy resources. But Eric Waller places even greater value on the Fort Worth company’s human resources—its more than 40 employees.
“The secret to our success lies in the details of how one person’s work connects to another person’s work in respectful ways,” says Waller.
At MD America Energy, every person’s work relates to the company’s core purpose: drilling and operating oil and natural gas wells in the Texas counties of Brazos, Grimes, Leon, and Madison. After wiping out $525 million in debt in 2015 and 2016, the company today is focused on making even more “remarkable things” happen by growing the company’s share of the Texas and U.S. energy markets. —John Egan
Teresa Mackintosh
TRINTECH
When Teresa Mackintosh became CEO of Trintech two years ago, she was challenged to get a 29-year-old company up to speed. “I took a sleepy finance company that happened to do software and evolved it into a hip, cool software company that solves problems in finance,” she says.
Trintech’s software helps chief financial officers consolidate and streamline financials. Leveraging automatic system processes and analytics, the software aims to eliminate manual processes, allowing CFOs to focus on anomalies or greater issues that require human attention.
Since taking over, Mackintosh, a certified public accountant, brought in software developers to drive innovation and has doubled the company to generate more than $100 million in revenue and employ 500 people. She also tripled customers and now serves more than 275,000 clients. —Danielle Abril
Carl Wehmeyer
NIAGRA CONSERVATION CORP.
In 2000, then-18-year-old Carl Wehmeyer joined Niagara Conservation as a sales assistant, fielding calls and entering data. He moved into sales, then sales management. By his 21st birthday, he’d helped start wholesale and international sales departments.
“From a culture standpoint, we’ve always been very entrepreneurial.”
Carl Wehmeyer, Niagara Conservation Corp.
“I don’t think that, in a regular company, someone coming in that young would be given an opportunity,” Wehmeyer says. “From a culture standpoint, we’ve always been very entrepreneurial.”
Based in Flower Mound, Niagara is a conservation technology company that specializes in toilets, showerheads, and faucet aerators that reduce water usage without sacrificing performance. The company expects to log close to $182 million in sales this year.
“When it comes to stretching new limits and trying new things, we’re constantly open,” Wehmeyer says. “Everyone here is always on their toes.” —Tara Nieuwesteeg
Stuart Archer
OCEANS HEALTHCARE
While much of the U.S. mental healthcare system is focused on the needs of adolescents and adults in their prime, Oceans Healthcare focuses on older adults and seniors by helping them with Alzheimer’s, depression, and other mental health issues.
Founded in 2004, the Plano company has 17 hospitals and 15 outpatient programs and is the largest provider of inpatient geriatric behavioral health treatment in Louisiana, and one of the largest in Texas. Expansion into more states is on tap.
Aging baby boomers, a reduced stigma surrounding mental health, and more citizens actively engaged in their health has translated into strong demand, Archer says: “There are very few communities that have adequate behavioral health systems. We are prioritizing our growth in areas where we feel we can make the biggest difference.” —Kerry Curry
Kent McKeaigg
ORDERMYGEAR
After watching the pains his father experienced selling uniforms and gear to local teams and schools, Kent McKeaigg began working on a side project. It was 2008, and he had one thought in mind: streamline orders and payments.
McKeaigg initially bootstrapped the company, starting with just 15 customers willing to give his system a try. Today OrderMyGear serves more than 100,000 group stores and 2,000 team dealers, decorators, and athletic organizations. It employs 80 and generates annual revenue of $14 million. The company, which graduated from the VentureSpur accelerator program in 2013, recently raised $35 million from Susquehanna Growth Equity to add new products and services to its e-commerce platform.
McKeaigg’s approach to business is, if customers don’t win, the company can’t grow. —Danielle Abril
Tony Ramji
VICTORY GROUP
Tony Ramji takes a high-touch approach to running Dallas-based Victory Group, a real estate company that has developed
1 million square feet of property in Dallas-Fort Worth. “We get into all aspects of our projects,” he says. “We meet and greet all of our tenants. We know our subcontractors. We are hands-on.”
Victory operates in seven verticals: retail, build-to-suit, urban, medical office, construction, entertainment, and restaurants, and brings its own equity to its deals. The company holds properties long-term, forming long-lasting tenant relationships. It’s also vertically integrated with its own construction company.
“We take our time to hire people of really great character,” says Ramji, who mentors aspiring entrepreneurs. “I think we owe it to people to give that time back and to share what we’ve learned.” —Kerry Curry
Adam Teague and Tim Paslay
PLANK AND MILL LLC
Co-Founder/CEO and Co-Founder/Creative Director
After a few years making wooden bow ties, The Two Guys Bow Tie co-founders Adam Teague and Tim Paslay sought a new challenge. Paslay noticed the popularity of wood accent walls and began doing custom jobs. But he found that a business built around installations might be difficult.
“They were always a hassle and required a lot of time,” he says.
Teague suggested minimizing the hassle: By adding adhesives to the backs of pieces of reclaimed wood, they could create a unique do-it-yourself experience that resulted in beautiful walls. In fall 2016, Tulsa-based Plank and Mill was born.
Turning a tough job into one that homeowners could complete themselves proved popular. In 2017, Plank and Mill generated $2.9 million in revenue. This year, Paslay expects the figure to hit $6.5 million. —Tara Nieuwesteeg
Richard Margolin
ROBOKIND
When RoboKind began in 2011, it aimed to use its facially expressive robots to equip autistic children with social skills. Since then, it has expanded into hundreds of schools across 28 states and several countries and launched new educational curriculum related to science, technology, engineering, and math.
“It’s pretty early in terms of getting it out there,” Margolin says. But “in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, we’re expecting to surpass our autism programming sales within the 2018-2019 school year.”
The Dallas-based company, which employs 25 people and generates more than $2 million in revenue, expects the new STEM programming to aid with the nationwide shortage in software developers. RoboKind is also venturing into curriculum to aid students’ transitions from high school to college or the workforce, Margolin says. —Danielle Abril
Joey LaRocque
ROCKSOLID LLC
Former NFL player Joey LaRocque was helping a high school football team when two players were injured in a collision. California bans the use of contact equipment outside the regular season, so they weren’t wearing protection.
“In football, you learn work ethic, attention to detail, how to become a team player.”
Joey Larocque, Rocksolid LLC
In response, LaRocque created Rocksolid, a soft-shell helmet company. But he soon found another problem: Interest in football was declining. Kids played flag but often quit before progressing to tackle. LaRocque invented Flex Football as a bridge between the two. Now a platform experience company based in Frisco, Rocksolid helps kids grow their skills in limited-contact play.
“In football, you learn work ethic, attention to detail, how to become a team player,” LaRocque says. “If we don’t do something, that’s going to go away.”
Rocksolid isn’t going away anytime soon. LaRocque projects his business will double this year. —Tara Nieuwesteeg
Scott Everett
S2 CAPITAL LLC
Founder and Managing Partner
Scott Everett doesn’t think he has a “secret sauce” for his multifamily acquisition firm. But the fact that the 29-year-old has grown S2 Capital into a $1.7 billion portfolio that has renovated more than 18,000 apartment units across Texas and Florida since 2012 might say otherwise.
S2 looks for large, underperforming apartment complexes in metro areas, then buys and renovates the assets using about 70 percent debt and 30 percent equity, mostly in the form of private equity funds or wealth advisors. After spending its first few years focused exclusively on North Texas, S2 has expanded to Houston, Orlando, Jacksonville, and, soon, to Phoenix. Everett says he’d like to grow to 20,000 units in the next 12 months, but he’s careful not to over-lever the company this late in the real estate cycle. —Julia Bunch
Alex Danza
VONLANE
Say this for Alex Danza, the savvy great-grandson of Ellis Island immigrants: He knows how to get things done. In 2017, for example, the founder of Dallas-based Vonlane—a first-class luxury bus service connecting five Texas cities—persuaded the state Legislature to allow alcohol to be sold aboard Vonlane’s custom-designed buses. “That put us on an even footing with the airlines and the rail” companies, Danza says.
The company’s fleet of 22-seat, 48-foot-long coaches should grow by 33 percent in 2018, he predicts, as routes increase to six and daily departures to 66 by year’s end. With existing amenities aboard its buses like on-board attendants and meals, the 80-plus-employee company is in the midst of rolling out a new service for its business and leisure passengers: on-demand personal entertainment including games, movies, and TV shows. —Glenn Hunter
John Schmitz
SELECT ENERGY SERVICES INC.
You might say that 2017 was a gusher for Select Energy Services Inc. In April 2017, Gainesville-based Select, a provider of water-related services for oilfield operators, carried out a $122 million IPO. Seven months later, the company merged with Houston-based rival Rockwater Energy Solutions to form a company boasting combined annual revenue of $1.2 billion to $1.3 billion.
“Wake up excited, and go to bed satisfied with your company and your efforts.”
John Schmitz, Select Energy Services Inc.
The corporate headquarters of the reconstituted company is now in Houston, but its operational headquarters remains in Gainesville. Schmitz, who founded the original Select in 2007, attributes the company’s success to pinpointing and solving challenges faced by customers while also delivering “good returns for our equity owners.”
It also helps that Schmitz embraces this approach: “Wake up excited, and go to bed satisfied with your company and your efforts.” —John Egan
Frost Prioleau
SIMPLI.FI
Co-founder and CEO
Frost Prioleau recognized programmatic advertising—using software to purchase ads in real time—as a growing trend with potential, and launched Simpli.fi in 2010. At the time, the technology was mostly applied to national advertisers with large budgets. “Our focus was to see what solutions we can bring to the market that fit with smaller or localized advertisers,” Prioleau says.
Simpli.fi, based in Fort Worth, utilizes its brand of programmatic advertising in two ways: One is with local businesses, like doctors or auto dealers. The second is with multilocation brands, like chain restaurants, that want to customize their ads to fit local needs.
Simpli.fi now has 80,000 live campaigns serving about 25,000 advertisers. The company expects to maintain a yearly growth rate of 50 percent. —Tara Nieuwesteeg
SOLOVIS INC.
Founded four years ago, Solovis Inc. has tapped into what Josh Smith calls a “market within a market.” Irving-based Solovis provides a cloud-based platform that helps the likes of pension funds, endowments, foundations, and family offices better manage their portfolios.
“If you are willing to step out of your comfort zone… magic can happen.”
Josh Smith, Solovis Inc.
Smith says the offering was developed so that large-scale investors could rely on a technology platform tailored to their needs, rather than one that was merely a retrofitted “hand-me-down” from software vendors.
But it’s not just Solovis’s tailor-made product that his customers appreciate, Smith says:
“People don’t want to be sold features or products. They buy understanding, partnership, relationship, and passion. If you have knowledge about your space, genuinely care, have made an effort, and are willing to step out of your comfort zone … magic can happen.” —John Egan
Lance Taylor
STEWARD ENERGY II LLC
Founder, President, and CEO
In the topsy-turvy world of oil and gas, Lance Taylor puts a lot of stock in the ability to adapt.
In 2012 he founded Steward Energy LLC, which enjoyed success in exploring for oil and natural gas in West Texas’s Delaware Basin. He sold the company two years later, before oil prices plunged.
Anticipating a longer-term drag on oil prices, Taylor bulked up his team and established Frisco-based Steward Energy II LLC. The company’s second iteration employs modern techniques to drill beneath and beyond the boundaries of older oilfields in West Texas. “Most of our more well-known peers were racing to the deeper basins in West Texas,” Taylor recalls. “Steward zigged when they zagged.”
That pivot has generated “incredible economic results,” he says, supercharging production to more than 15,000 barrels a day in just three years. —John Egan
Gene Scott
TRAVEL NURSE ACROSS AMERICA LLC
When GENE Scott took over as CEO in 2008, Travel Nurse Across America had 42 employees, 156 nurses on assignment, and revenue of $22 million. Then the recession hit. The bank called its note and line of credit despite no late payments, and the company had to lay off most of its employees. Revenue dipped below $8 million, and investors considered shutting it down.
Ultimately, though, a core group of investors infused capital into the agency. Today, TNAA has revenue of $200 million and a workforce of 225, two-thirds of whom work remotely. That’s a strategy born of the recession that enabled TNAA to scoop up talent without requiring employees to move to its Little Rock headquarters. “It’s been great in terms of diversity and life-changing for the people we hired,” Scott says. —Kerry Curry
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New Zoning Proposal Seeks to Split Amsterdam Houses Among 3 Schools
By Emily Frost | February 5, 2016 11:59am
@efrost1
CEC members are proposing that the Amsterdam Houses' student population get distributed between P.S. 342 (top), P.S. 199 (right) and P.S. 191 (left).
Dattner Architects; DNAinfo/Emily Frost
UPPER WEST SIDE — Redistributing low-income students from a local public housing complex among three schools — rather than concentrating them all at one — would alleviate issues at the southern end of the school district, education leaders said.
Currently, students living in the Amsterdam Houses — a NYCHA development that sits between West 61st and 65th streets on Amsterdam Avenue — are zoned for P.S. 191 at 210 W. 61st St.
But parents and education leaders have said this unfairly burdens the K-8 school because students from the Amsterdam Houses tend to have greater needs than others because of their socioeconomic backgrounds, but the school hasn't had the resources to meet them.
"I think the tragedy of [P.S.] 191 has been they were completely bereft of any student services... it’s criminal," said Community Education Council 3 member Nan Mead at a meeting Wednesday. "You have to be able to support the population."
Under a new plan leaders are floating as a possible solution, the Amsterdam Houses' zoning lines would be redrawn so that a third of its students would continue to go to P.S. 191, a third would go to the funding-rich and higher-achieving P.S. 199, and the final third would attend the brand new P.S. 342 when it opens in 2018.
This redistribution would also serve to increase the racial and economic diversity at nearby P.S. 199, where the vast majority of students are white or Asian and do not receive free lunch, CEC members said.
The DOE has held a series of "stakeholder meetings" in December and January at P.S. 191 and P.S. 199 with each school's PTA and principal, as well as elected officials and CEC members.
The meetings were intended to figure out what each school would want from a rezoning of that part of the district, after the DOE tabled an original rezoning plan this fall.
At one of its meetings, "[P.S.] 191 had specifically asked that Amsterdam Houses be not exclusively zoned to their school," said CEC member Noah Gotbaum, who attended the meetings.
"If you look at all the stats on performance, schools that have up to 25 percent high needs do phenomenally better than schools that have 75 percent [high needs]," noted board member Dan Katz.
"It’s got to be a third, a third and a third," he said in support of the proposal.
The school's principal, Lauren Keville, said she had not officially weighed in on the idea, however.
"This is not an idea that I've recommended or endorsed. While members of the P.S. 191 community may have views as to how they want the new zone lines to be drawn, my focus as principal is on the school's academics and serving our students," she said in an email.
Parents of prospective students who would have been rezoned from P.S. 199 to P.S. 191 raised concerns about 191's lower test scores during the zoning process that played out this past fall. Though it's a major sticking point, P.S. 191 can't magically boost those scores overnight, CEC members have said.
However, changing the P.S. 191 population influences test scores, Gotbaum said.
"Test scores are a function of economic status. When the major low-income projects are all zoned to one school, you’re going to get associated low test scores," he explained. "If those projects are then redistributed, your test scores are going to change."
At P.S. 199's stakeholder meetings, school leadership was open to the idea of having the Amsterdam Houses buildings rezoned to their school, so long as other buildings were removed, Mead said.
"It’s not that they don’t want [students from the Amsterdam Houses] part of their community; it’s that they don’t have the space," DOE Superintendent Ilene Altschul said.
P.S. 199 parents and leaders pushed for a rezoning that would shrink their zone because they said the school is dangerously over capacity.
In order to bring in students from the Amsterdam Houses, students from other buildings would have to be removed from the P.S. 199 zone, school leaders said, according to the CEC.
P.S. 199's PTA would not officially comment on this plan.
"As a PTA we do not have a position on specific re-zoning scenarios," the PTA's co-presidents said in an email.
CEC 3 has until November 2016 to hammer out and vote on a new zoning plan if it's to be put in action for the 2017-18 school year.
P.S. 191 is not alone in serving a higher proportion of public housing students than neighboring schools.
The Independent Budget Office recently released a report finding that students living in public housing are disproportionately distributed among New York City schools.
At 123 schools — or 9 percent of city schools — more than 35 percent of the school population lives in public housing.
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