HateCOT: An Explanation-Enhanced Dataset for Generalizable Offensive Speech Detection via Large Language Models
Paper
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2403.11456
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Published
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The dataset generation failed because of a cast error
Error code: DatasetGenerationCastError
Exception: DatasetGenerationCastError
Message: An error occurred while generating the dataset
All the data files must have the same columns, but at some point there are 1 new columns ({'type'})
This happened while the csv dataset builder was generating data using
hf://datasets/RuleFollower/rulefollower_parsed/misinfo/data.csv (at revision 10353e21288bc47ebfc9b7c5741b859098f85a9c)
Please either edit the data files to have matching columns, or separate them into different configurations (see docs at https://hf.co/docs/hub/datasets-manual-configuration#multiple-configurations)
Traceback: Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.12/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1831, in _prepare_split_single
writer.write_table(table)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.12/site-packages/datasets/arrow_writer.py", line 714, in write_table
pa_table = table_cast(pa_table, self._schema)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.12/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2272, in table_cast
return cast_table_to_schema(table, schema)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.12/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2218, in cast_table_to_schema
raise CastError(
datasets.table.CastError: Couldn't cast
Text: string
ground_truth: string
type: string
id: string
source: string
-- schema metadata --
pandas: '{"index_columns": [{"kind": "range", "name": null, "start": 0, "' + 818
to
{'Text': Value('string'), 'ground_truth': Value('string'), 'id': Value('string'), 'source': Value('string')}
because column names don't match
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1339, in compute_config_parquet_and_info_response
parquet_operations = convert_to_parquet(builder)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 972, in convert_to_parquet
builder.download_and_prepare(
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.12/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 894, in download_and_prepare
self._download_and_prepare(
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.12/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 970, in _download_and_prepare
self._prepare_split(split_generator, **prepare_split_kwargs)
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.12/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1702, in _prepare_split
for job_id, done, content in self._prepare_split_single(
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File "/usr/local/lib/python3.12/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1833, in _prepare_split_single
raise DatasetGenerationCastError.from_cast_error(
datasets.exceptions.DatasetGenerationCastError: An error occurred while generating the dataset
All the data files must have the same columns, but at some point there are 1 new columns ({'type'})
This happened while the csv dataset builder was generating data using
hf://datasets/RuleFollower/rulefollower_parsed/misinfo/data.csv (at revision 10353e21288bc47ebfc9b7c5741b859098f85a9c)
Please either edit the data files to have matching columns, or separate them into different configurations (see docs at https://hf.co/docs/hub/datasets-manual-configuration#multiple-configurations)Need help to make the dataset viewer work? Make sure to review how to configure the dataset viewer, and open a discussion for direct support.
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has sent you an assessment. --While precipitated by the need to defend their position there, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was motivated by wider strategic objectives in the region. :: noted in this connection that the more elite Afghan army units now guarding the cities may be released to fight the insurgents. This would provide forces with better morale which are less likely to desert and turn over their weapons to the insurgents. This, in turn, makes our aid all the more important. Mr. :: 1. It is unlikely that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan constitutes the preplanned first step in the implementation of a highly articulated grand design for the rapid establishment of hegemonic control over all of Southwest Asia. Rather than signaling the carefully timed beginning of a premeditated strategic offensive, the occupation may have been a reluctantly authorized response to what was perceived by the Kremlin as an imminent and otherwise irreversible deterioration of its already established position in a country which fell well within the Soviet Union'92s legitimate sphere of influence. However, there is no reason to doubt that the Soviets covet a larger sphere of influence in Southwest Asia or to suppose that their decision to occupy Afghanistan was made without reference to broader regional objectives. On the contrary, their willingness to incur what they almost certainly anticipated would be serious costs strongly suggests a belief that their occupation of Afghanistan would improve their access to a number of extremely lucrative targets of opportunity and might eventually lead to a highly favorable and enduring shift in the regional and perhaps even global balance of power. 2. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was probably predicated on a belief that Afghan resistance would prove relatively short lived. Among other things, their historical experience in their own Central Asian republics may have persuaded the Soviets that a strategy combining military intimidation, political conciliation, and economic enticement would quickly reduce resistance and enable their puppet regime to acquire at least a modicum of grassroots political authority and administrative control. If this turns out to be a miscalculation and Afghan resistance becomes or remains persistent and widespread, the soviets could become so bogged down in guerrilla warfare that they abandon any hopes of further near-term expansion. However, they are unlikely to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan and might well try to alleviate their problems there by intensifying pressure on or expanding the conflict to Pakistan. 3. In the face of intractable Afghan resistance, the Soviets are likely to attribute much of the blame to direct or indirect Pakistani involvement and to take what they deem to be essential deterrent and retaliatory measures. These measures could include not only cross-border raids by loyal Afghan and /or Soviet forces, but also extensive Soviet support for anti-Pakistani tribal insurgents and intimidating demarches on Islamabad by the Soviets'92 Indian allies. In extremis, moreover, the Soviets might press a not-too-reluctant India to join them in an all-out campaign of political subversion or even in a concerted invasion. Although the inevitable costs of such a drastic action might give the Soviets pause, their behavior in Afghanistan (as well as the earlier escalatory behavior of the United States in Vietnam - Laos- Cambodia) suggests that they might be undeterred by anything short of a credible threat of direct US military retaliation. 7. Although the possibility cannot be excluded, it does not seem likely that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan will turn out to have been a dress rehearsal for an impending gala performance in Iran. Unlike Afghanistan, Iran is clearly too important to the West to make the risk of a counter intervention seem negligible, and the exercised American reaction to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has probably convinced even the Kremlin'92s most unreconstructed hawks that a frontal attack on Iran could lead to a full-fledged military showdown with the United States. However, fear of such a showdown will not lead the Kremlin to forsake its ambitions or prevent it from pursuing them by more circuitous means. At the margin, apprehension that any important Soviet breakthrough in Iran would elicit a determined US military reaction may exercise a restraining influence, but the Soviets will probably still have extensive room for maneuver in a situation in which American options are severely circumscribed and Iranian vulnerabilities are very large. } :: -- Collapse of the Afghan resistance. There is little probability that the Afghan resistance will collapse soon. The Soviets would require at least double their present strength to make a serious effort to crush the insurgency altogether. A collapse of the resistance would, of course, cause serious problems for Pakistan, including a large influx of refugees and pressure from Moscow to normalize relations and downgrade ties to the U.S. (S) -- Increased insurgency in Afghanistan. Soviet pressure will probably prevent any rapid increase in insurgent activity. Although an announcement of a free Afghan government could occur at any time, the groups involved would be the essentially unrepresentative organizations in Pakistan rather than the insurgents. (S) -- Soviet military moves against or into Pakistan. Soviet aid to dissident elements in Pakistan or raids on refugee camps in Pakistan are unlikely in the near future. As Moscow becomes more involved in counterinsurgency efforts, hot pursuit of rebel troops across the Pakistani border become a more viable possibility. Strikes at Pakistani installations, however, would damage the image the Soviets probably wish to project and would run an unnecessary risk of unwanted escalation. Over the long run, Moscow, in order to gain a foothold on the Indian Ocean, might, promote an independent Baluchistan to help force the collapse of Pakistan and the dissolution of Iran. (S) }
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This isa more sophisticated piece than we usually get from our intelligence analysts. But it does not examine the possibility that the Soviets may move from forcefully with their military power against Iran, and possibly Pakistan, in the near future. The Soviets might well construct an argument for moving on Iran sooner rather than later if the tide there turns away from them. Should the hostage problem be settled, there is a reasonable chance Iran will move in an anti-Soviet direction. Moreover, the Soviets perceives clearly that US military power in the area is increasing over time and may well be tempted to move while the balance is more in their favor. We are therefore closely examining the threat of near-term Soviet military moves, and how to deter and respond to them. (S) } :: pointed out that we are now going to be assisting rebel forces; when that becomes known it could put in jeopardy our people in Kabul. Mr. :: said that a break in relations would make more sense if it were done by many countries. The situation in Afghanistan is very unstable. We do not know what may happen next, and we could prematurely cut ourselves off. Mr. SPLIT said we should strongly condemn the Soviet actions, but we should recognize that there is not much we can do about it except to build international opposition. } :: Coherence and Sense of Direction It is not Afghanistan -- Soviet domination of Middle East oil. It is not Afghanistan per se which is as strategically important but that aggressive Soviet behavior there, against the backdrop of constantly growing Soviet military power, betokens a grave and imminent threat to the entire world to which it must respond. Afghanistan Our policy of making the Soviet Union may a price for its aggression and of using the invasion to solidify our own relationships with the Islamic world requires maintaining the Afghan resistance to the Soviets. Although the Soviets are likely to be able to control the major cities and roads in the next two months and bring insurgency within tolerable levels in four to six months, the absence of a credible, loyal Afghan army will require Soviet military forces to stay on in considerable numbers indefinitely. But, politically, there is a danger that the Soviets could be seen as prevailing within a matter of months. As it becomes apparent to the Soviets that they are in for a long occupation and may not be able to create an acceptable indigenous regime, they may be more willing to look for a negotiated solution. In the interim, neutralization schemes should be considered primarily in terms of their usefulness in restoring US/European solidarity. In short, the Soviets will not play in the foreseeable future. } :: The Soviets in Afghanistan According to the NSC staff, recent developments in Soviet policy and propaganda demonstrate that Moscow -- is now actively preparing for the contingency of sending Soviet Central Asian troops to Afghanistan if nothing less will save the Khalq regime in Kabul; and -- has considered and decided to disregard the costs elsewhere of such a move to them. In the light of the above, we will review with other agencies the following possible steps to deter Soviet troop intervention: -- The Constellation could be moved somewhere between the Iranian border and Karachi. We could propose to Pakistan that we deploy one AWACS over Pakistan, thus enabling Pakistani (and US.) air reconnaissance and fighter vectoring up to the Afghan border. -- The Soviets could be told that we would consider Soviet troop entry into Afghanistan a move gravely endangering Soviet-U.S., relations, with implications for U.S. relations with its allies and other powers; that we are bound and intend, by the 1959 Treaty, to come to Pakistan'92s aid if it is threatened militarily; and that we call upon the Soviets not to intervene in Afghanistan, just as we will not. The question will be discussed at a full SCC Cabinet-level meeting. Preliminary indications from this meeting indicate that State, Defense and CIA all believe that the insurgency is in our interest and should be encouraged depending on the costs and risks involved.(S) } :: Moscow'92s Afghan Options The continuing insurgency in Afghanistan has apparently forced the Soviets to reassess their position. The :: Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan. General Pavlovskii, Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, apparently remains in Afghanistan where he arrived about a month ago. His long stay seems to indicate that the Soviets are reinforcing their advisory apparatus throughout the Afghan military and government. Pavlovskii'92s presence suggests we are unlikely to see a sudden Soviet military intervention, instead, the intervention is now in progress with a slow buildup of advisers and security forces. By the time the Pavlovskii mission is complete, a de facto Soviet military intervention may well be the case. (S) } :: argued that it was important for the message to be given wider dissemination through the papers here. Mr. :: agreed that the briefer should be cognizant of the risk of crying wolf, but the very fact of getting the story out was the best pressure available to us to prevent the Soviets from going ahead. We know they are positioning themselves so they could intervene with military force in Afghanistan. We do not yet know whether in fact they will engage. Wider recognition that Soviet activities constitute a danger to Islamic nationalism helps deflect the impression of a U.S. -- Islamic confrontation. } :: asked if there were any possibility the rebels could take over the government. Secretary SPLIT asked what our ultimate aim was in the Afghan situation. The SPLIT noted that this, however, was not likely to be successful. The :: said that the new group installed by the Soviets may be as unpopular or even more so than the former one. The Secretary of Defense noted, however, that if only isolated pockets of resistance remain, they way be successful. Dr. SPLIT suggested the Soviets were trying to hurt the President'92s reelection chances with this move. General :: said the key variables in the success of the Afghan resistance is Pakistani support and our attitude. The SPLIT said he had a different view. If we do nothing to help the rebels, then the psychological impact -- both on the Pakistanis and on the Afghans -- of isolation could be quite adverse and dry up support for their insurgency. Moreover, the Soviets are likely to try to garrison the cities and free the regular Afghan armies to pursue the rebels in the field and that might be more effective. The SPLIT noted that the Soviet Union had been reasonably successful at counter-insurgency efforts. They had had success in Latvia, Lithuania and the Ukraine, with their strategy being primarily the holding of the cities. Admiral SPLIT said it was to make it as costly as possible for the Soviets. Secretary :: The main issue is whether we are providing assistance to the insurgents. If this can become effective enough, the Soviet cost calculus could be significantly altered. The introduction of anti-helicopter weapons will be particularly important and review the status of the programs, the effectiveness of the insurgents and the possibility of sharply increased assistance and whether this could pay dividends. The limiting factors are the disorganization of the insurgents. This latter point should lead you to whether the Soviets will be able to substantially crush the insurgency by the end of the year, no matter what we do. This, in turn, raises a serious question: How will a Soviet success affect our regional and global position? How can we avoid having this look like a U.S. defeat? (S) (f) considerable success on the ground in Afghanistan itself, where the Soviets have: (1) sized the major population centers; (2) controlled the major lines of communications; (3) begun to control the major passes or block them from insurgent usage; In sum, the next nine months are going to be the most critical test we have faced with the Soviets since the Korean war. During this period Moscow will be trying to nail down what it already possesses and to open up new advantage in Europe, in Southwest Asia, in Southeast Asia, and perhaps in the Caribbean as well. By November 1980 they will hope to confront our newly elected President with a set of political configurations to which Washington will have no choice other than to accommodate. We are in real trouble. In the short term, our hope is to keep the Soviets beleaguered in Afghanistan itself and too off-balance to take advantage of the grave weakness of our present position. The key issue is how we approach the issue of neutrality for Afghanistan. We have three options: -- We can vigorously pursue the proposal with a view toward trying to engage the Soviets in a serious dialogue to resolve the issue and secure Soviet withdrawal. I think this is a fruitless approach and will only undermine our position with the rest of the world. }
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Dealing with the Soviet Leadership An important factor in deciding onus behavior in terms of planning our future military capability, and more immediately in terms of our rhetoric and actions in responding to or preempting Soviet actions elsewhere in the world, is what one believes the motivation of the Soviet leadership to be. You have now had interactions with Brezhnev and three of his Politburo colleagues, and will have drawn some conclusions of your own from those meetings. Both before and since, some of your statements suggest that you think Soviet political leaders are motivated towards ends similar to those sought by those in democratic countries. I urge caution about that conclusion. But from what I have been able to see of those who reach the top levels of the Soviet system, they are motivated by a drive, for themselves and for their country respectively, to be in a position to tell people around them and other nations what to do. They insist on a clear hierarchy, and find it very difficult to think in terms of accepting diversity. The higher up in the system one goes, the more pronounced is this attitude. '93Who'85. Whom,'94 Lenin'92s description of the world as a place of those who act to command and those who are acted upon, continues to underlie Soviet motivations. This is not to say that the Soviet leaders do not desire peace, or even that they will insist that it can exist only on precisely their terms. But it does mean that theirs is not a live and let live approach. They will not be persuaded, or much influenced, by appeals for equity or by the charms of reduction of conflict; they consider conflict, generally at some level of violence, inevitable between their system and all the rest. Whether in Cuba or Afghanistan, in Eastern Europe or Southeast Asia, they are willing to apply military strength, and are likely to be dissuaded from exercising it only by a conviction that the consequence will be very negative for them, and in the short run. The people who have risen to the top in such a system, however many similarities they have to democratic political leaders, will surely have great differences from them. In most cases they will see compromise as a sign of weakness, and conciliation as a sign of poor judgment. } :: said that we were all agreed that greater support to the Afghan rebels makes sense. His only question was whether it was enough. Mr. SPLIT said they would not have any prospect of being able to take over the government. Secretary SPLIT added that we want to use the issue as a rallying point for our policies in the area. The SPLIT said, on the other hand, the Soviets were faced with a hostile Islamic state on their border. Secretary
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noted that we could withdraw our people but not formally break relations. (S) Dr. :: pointed out that the Soviets may be there a long time. If we break relations, what excuse would we use to go back in? Mr. :: Department comments that present Soviet actions seem aimed at keeping the Afghan regime afloat and finding acceptable replacements for Taraki and Amin. Moscow would probably only consider direct intervention as a last resort and in response to a massive foreign intervention on behalf of the rebels. } :: analysis, Amin'92s position as the new ruler of Afghanistan is still very shaky. The immediate threat comes from the military who have been further alienated. With support from the Soviets, Amin might be able to head off a military revolt. But the events of last weekend may catalyze a military crisis, which the present Soviet presence would be unable to contain. The high level of current tension is indicated by press reports of Amin'92s replacement already of four provincial governors believed to be senior military officers. If the recent events precipitate a further crisis and if Soviet military personnel already in the Kabul area prove inadequate in a deteriorating situation, Moscow will be faced with the decision it probably prefers to avoid; whether or not to escalate the level of intervention } :: cautioned that we do not yet know what the Soviets are up to. :: said they can hang on and make it costly for the Soviet Union. Dr. SPLIT agreed with that view. He said that the Soviets were unwilling to face the political damage if Afghanistan went down the drain. } :: Department analysis, there are no indications that the Soviets now intend to cross into Pakistan or have yet made any decision on this question. At this stage, Moscow probably hopes that Pakistan will avoid the risks of confrontation inherent in its support of Afghan rebels and will accommodate to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The department adds, however, that there is a greater risk that eventual Soviet counterinsurgency operations along the Pakistani frontier could soon lead to border or air clashes - inadvertent or intentional. (S) } :: Growing Soviet Role in Afghanistan Soviet involvement in the war in Afghanistan military operations continues to increase. Soviet officers appear now to command, as well as advise Afghan units and operations; Soviet enlisted personnel may now be participating directly in combat operations against the insurgents, besides performing technical tasks. The Soviets, however, still do not seem to have committed units of their own into the Afghan conflict. Evidence persists of tension between Amin and Moscow. The intensified Soviet role probably reflects recommendations made by the military mission led by Soviet ground forces commander, General Pavlovskiy. The prolonged stay of his mission from mid-August until late October attests to the importance the Soviets attach to Afghanistan'92s acute security problems. Increased Soviet involvement, however, has not as yet resulted in a decline of insurgent activity. } :: 1. Afghanistan. The security situation in Kabul is deteriorating. Following the general strike yesterday, the Soviets this morning moved additional forces into the city and there was firing throughout the day. Soviet helicopter gunships and MIGs buzzed the city continuously, in an apparent effort to intimidate the population. We are recommending evacuation to the private American community, preferably on commercial flights when available. If none are, we are prepared to charter an aircraft if necessary. About 60 private and 20 official Americans remain in Afghanistan. Warren reported to me your comment at breakfast today about the possible desirability of closing or further cutting back on our embassy, and we are urgently reviewing this question. }
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said that Afghanistan itself is a loss and of no particular help to the Soviets strategically. In this judgment, they were obviously looking beyond it and to cause perceptions of their willingness to use power and are seeking a stepping stone. Secretary :: a presentation at this point in which he pointed out that Soviet military deployments into Afghanistan will fundamentally change the military threat to our allies on the Persian Gulf -- Soviet fighter aircraft based in Afghanistan will be able to reach the Gulf of Hormuz, a wholly new development. -- Soviet armored ground forces could reach the waters of the Arabian Sea through Baluchistan in 10 to 12 days if unopposed. -- Preferred Soviet land routes to Tehran probably still remain those from the Caucasus. Soviet heavy military ground forces on this route could reach the oil field regions in the vicinity of Kuwait in 10 to 12 days. -- Using sealift from the Black Sea, the Soviets could project forces through the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf in about 21 days. -- One Soviet airborne division, about 8,000 troops, with organic armor vehicles, could land anywhere in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf in two to three days if all Soviet airlift is employed. General Jones outlined our options for rapid short-term measures to meet this changed Soviet threat by early spring this year; 1. Our naval presence in the Arabian Sea will eventually have to be reduced to one aircraft carrier battle group. We do not have sustaining power for the two there at present. }
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Mr. President, until the coup, the Portuguese had no intention of leaving their territories in Africa and didn'92t organize them for independence. Secretary SPLIT Mr. President, I will be reasonably brief. This is an area where no one can be sure of the judgments. I do question the judgment that control of the capital is not of importance. The history of Africa has shown that a nation'92s only focal point is the capital, and whoever has the capital has a claim on international support. In the Congo civil war, the reason we came out on top is because we never lost Leopoldville. If Neto can get Luanda, and drive the others out, he will have a power base, and gradually gain support of other Africans. Mr. SPLIT Soviet arms shipments have reversed the situation. Sheldon Vance has just come back from talking with Mobutu, 2 who has stressed the change in the balance of power. Portugal is tilting toward Neto, and the Soviets are putting important equipment, such as armed personnel carriers, into Neto'92s hands. Our understanding from Vance is that this is one reason Mobutu is moving away from Roberto and wants a coalition. An interagency effort has developed options, 3 none of which I am in wild agreement with. The first is neutrality'97stay out and let nature take its course. This would enable us to avoid a costly involvement in a situation that may be beyond our control; protect us from some international criticism; avoid tying us to any group; and avoid further antagonizing the MPLA. The probable outcome would be that Neto would establish a dominant position. Mobutu might try to go with Savimbi, or adjust to reality; Angola would go in a leftward direction; and Zaire would conclude we have disinterested ourselves in that part of the world and move towards anti-Americanism. As for the second course, my Department agrees, but I don'92t. It is recommended that we launch a diplomatic offensive to get the Soviets, the Yugoslavs, and others, to lessen arms shipments to the MPLA, get Portugal to exert its authority, and encourage cooperation among the groups. We could have direct dealings with the Soviets or get African states to do it. If we appeal to the Soviets not to be active, it will be a sign of weakness; for us to police it is next to impossible, and we would be bound to do nothing. If we try to affect events, we could support Roberto and Savimbi with arms and money. If we move to arms supplies, it would be best to do so through Mobutu, but we could give some money directly to Roberto and Savimbi. Mr. SPLIT There is need for money to increase the discipline of his organizations. The agency has weapons that it could get [ less than 1 line not declassified ] into Zaire to control the situation with Mobutu as the front man. I am not against diplomacy, but you can do that only if you know where you go if you fail. To launch a campaign against arms supply and not know where you'92re going afterward is an impotent policy. We would be the first victims of failure. The SPLIT The Forty Committee has met twice to discuss the situation. The first meeting involved only money, 4 but the second included some arms package. 5 I recommend a working group make a more systematic study of this option and return to you. Mr. SPLIT [ 1'bd lines not declassified ] The SPLIT [ less than 1 line not declassified ] The SPLIT Kaunda was giving the President a lesson in political science. [Laughter.] Mr. SPLIT But the reverse of that is that if we don'92t do something they would be suppressed. The SPLIT In the first instance we could activate Mobutu and inform Kaunda. The SPLIT With Savimbi and Mobutu. The :: On Angola. I favor action. If the U.S. does nothing when the Soviet-supported group gains dominance, I think all the movements will draw the conclusions that they must accommodate to the Soviet Union and China. I think reluctantly we must do something. But you must know that we have massive problems within the State Department. They are passionately opposed and it will leak. SPLIT He will resign and take some with him. SPLIT I also have a problem with the Ambassador to Tanzania. 2 He participated in giving the ransom for the students. I would like to recall and retire him. But you have to know there would be a major blow-up'97mostly blamed on me. Has Colby gone to Kaunda? SPLIT That is a disgrace. [Describes the State paper of objections.] 3 There isn'92t one African leader who doesn'92t govern by physical domination, except maybe Nigeria. SPLIT We should send Vance with [ dollar amount not declassified ] Then we should have Mobutu and Kaunda get together and work it out. Without us, Neto will win. And the argument is, it doesn'92t matter. SPLIT We will know better when we see the Mobutu plan. I will send you the Nat Davis paper. 4 You have a Zaire economic aid package from Lynn. We would like to give a $20 million economic package for Zaire. Lynn objects because there is no economic justification. He is right, but the political considerations override. This won'92t hurt us, but the covert action will. SPLIT But those who rant against the Soviets won'92t follow through on it. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.] 1 'a0 :: You will have to certify it. SPLIT We'92ll send Vance to Mobutu [ 1 line not declassified ] and more if needed, and ask him to come up with a program. It may be too late because Luanda is lost. Unless we can seize it back, it is pretty hopeless. We'92ll have a resignation from Davis, then I'92ll clean out the AF bureau. SPLIT In six years I have been on the tough side. But I push d'e9tente in order to be able to be tough. If we were publicly tough, the Soviet Union would have no incentive. Now, so long as they think we are pushing d'e9tente, they will keep their heads down. Call the Agencies and give them the decision. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.] 1 'a0
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Yes, sir. [Briefed'97as attached.] The SPLIT Yes, sir. The SPLIT These are essentially tribal, not military areas. These are additional tribes and I just chose [pointing on the chart] to mention those three. They have different languages and are different socially. The SPLIT The Portuguese were not forceful in this area. The literacy rate is between 10'9615 percent. Secretary SPLIT Three to four hundred thousand. The SPLIT About 5.7 million. The SPLIT Yes. The SPLIT I agree, except to note the importance of the (Benguella) railway and Zaire and Zambia'92s need for it. The SPLIT Lobito. There is, of course, always the possibility for fragmentation. Secretary SPLIT We have had a relationship with Roberto [ 1'bd lines not declassified ] The SPLIT For him and his activities. Savimbi has had a [ less than 1 line not declassified ] and we could up that. The SPLIT Some. Mobutu knows about our relationship. Secretary SPLIT [ 1 line not declassified ] give Mobutu money for the purchase of arms; [ less than 1 line not declassified ] Mr. SPLIT [ less than 1 line not declassified ] The SPLIT [ 1 line not declassified ] The SPLIT [ 2 lines not declassified ] Secretary SPLIT [ 2 lines not declassified ] Secretary SPLIT There is great value to aiding Roberto through Mobutu. The first is the effect on Angola, and the effect on Mobutu himself. Assistance to Savimbi could come in cooperation with Kaunda. The SPLIT While it would be useful to give assistance, it would be matched by the Soviets and there could be increased fighting and there would be no happy ending. I don'92t think we can put up a large enough sum to wrap it up quickly, and, with CIA'92s own present exposure, to get away without a great deal of criticism. The SPLIT What I'92m worried about is leakage and scandal in the present situation. The SPLIT In answer, I doubt we could have an immediate strategic effect. Secretary SPLIT We could have that next week. South Africa would like us to join with them in an effort, but we can avoid the problems that would create and deal with the blacks. Some would be encouraged for the US to take a role, and that would activate them. Mr. SPLIT By mid-week. Secretary SPLIT 8 June 27, 1975. ANGOLA I. The current situation in Angola is highly unstable. Rivalry between contending nationalist groups has featured increasing violence, with each group trying to stake out territory and gain military superiority before independence on November 11 and final Portuguese withdrawal by next February. A. The fighting over the past few months has been between the two largest groups, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, led by Agostinho Neto, and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola led by Holden Roberto. A third group in the picture is the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, led by Jonas Savimbi. 1. In action early this month Neto'92s Popular Movement pushed the National Front out of some areas north and east of Luanda, thus blocking the Front'92s supply lines into the capital. 2. Although there were some clashes in Luanda this month, the two remain essentially in a standoff there. a. Military control of Luanda by either group would necessarily not determine control of or influence over the rest of Angola, particularly in the rich agricultural areas or along all the main transportation routes. 3. Roberto'92s National Front still remains strongly entrenched in large areas of northern Angola where it has substantial tribal support. B. New fighting can erupt at any time: '97There is a continuing buildup of the military forces of all three nationalist groups; '97Heavier weapons'97mortars and bazookas'97are being introduced into Angola by the USSR and Zaire; '97Armed and undisciplined civilians are in Luanda on behalf of the Popular Movement; '97Neither major group is able or willing to exercise effective control over its own forces; '97All three groups are initiating military operations in parts of Angola yet untouched by the fighting where no single group has an edge; and '97Politicking for the October elections for a constituent assembly will increase tensions. C. The oil-rich enclave of Cabinda remains a tinderbox. The Popular Movement has a slight military edge there, but both other groups also have forces active. 1. All three want the enclave to remain a part of an independent Angola. 2. The picture is complicated by the presence of a factionalized separatist movement supported by both Zaire and Congo. 3. Both countries have endorsed Cabindan independence , and any intensification of the fighting there could bring outside intervention either directly or in support of the separatists. II. The transitional government installed last January has proved unworkable. A. It is constructed on a system of checks and balances, but in the current climate members of the three liberation groups, as government officials, concentrate on the competition between them. 1. Portuguese officials are not effective'97they are caught in the middle. 2. The liberation groups have not honored their commitment to establish an integrated national army as called for in the independence accord. B. The 24,000 Portuguese troops are mostly kept in Luanda. They will intervene in the fighting only to protect the whites. 1. The Portuguese have in effect abandoned most of the countryside to the nationalists, and are already crating some of their heavy equipment for shipment to Lisbon. 2. Portuguese forces are scheduled to begin withdrawal in October and are to be totally removed by next February. 3. There is nothing in the independence accord to prevent the Portuguese from withdrawing as fast as possible after October. C. Lisbon'92s policy insofar as it has one, is neutrality among the factions. 1. Portugal wants to protect its important agricultural and mining interests. 2. The Portuguese also want to be on good terms with whoever ends up in charge after independence, but their ability to affect events is diminishing. 3. At this point, the Portuguese leaders'92 major concern is to prevent civil war, which could have serious political repercussions in Lisbon. They hope to avoid, for example, an increase in the number of white refugees returning to Portugal who would add to the turbulence there. 4. Thus, Lisbon can be expected to expend considerable diplomatic effort to reduce tension in Angola, and would certainly welcome similar efforts by interested third countries. III. The role of outside powers in supplying military assistance to the nationalist groups remains a key factor. A. The Soviet Union has been a long time supporter of Neto'92s Popular Movement, providing both arms and cash during the years of the insurgency against the Portuguese. 1. We are unable to determine how much Soviet military aid is now reaching the Movement, but it helped the Movement score some of its recent gains. 2. Most of the aid is being channeled through Congo. 3. Soviet long-range goals in Angola are unclear, but in the short run Moscow supports the Popular Movement in a situation where all three nationalist groups are viable contenders for power. B. Peking has had some association with all of the liberation movements in the past, but the Chinese are most closely associated with Roberto'92s National Front. 1. They have supplied military equipment as well as some training. Some 100 Chinese advisers may now be in Zaire working with the Front. 2. Chinese assistance has helped the Front to establish its forces firmly in northern Angola. C. Roberto has had little success in finding assistance elsewhere. 1. Zaire'92s President Mobutu has loose family ties with Roberto and has long supported him and the Front with funds, arms, and training. He has also allowed Roberto to maintain his headquarters in Zaire. a. Recently, however, Mobutu has cut back his assistance to the Front, in part because of his government'92s serious financial problems and because he is cooling toward Roberto. b. Mobutu is alarmed over the Front'92s recent setbacks and feels Roberto'92s position has been damaged because he refuses to leave Zaire and go to Luanda. c. Mobutu now believes Jonas Savimbi of the National Union should be the primary figure in an independent Angolan government. 2. Mobutu, of course, has some serious concerns of his own. a. Zaire is experiencing a severe foreign exchange shortage because of the low price of copper on the international market. b. He has now privately acknowledged that the US was not involved in a recent coup plot, as he alleged, but may remain suspicious for some time. IV. The prospects for Angola between now and November are poor. Further violence could take place and edge the territory closer to civil war. At best, Angola will lurch along and become independent without a strong leader. A. The constituent assembly scheduled to be elected in October is supposed to select a head of government of an independent Angola, but new violence could force a postponement. B. At a meeting in Kenya last week Savimbi, Roberto, and Neto reached what amounts to an uncertain truce that merely postpones a confrontation. 1. They '93agreed'94 to a number of measures, such as disarming civilians, designed to prevent new fighting. Similar agreements in the past have failed, however. 2. All three contenders seem to recognize the inconclusiveness of the pact. They state that they will meet again to try another form for the transfer of power if the elections are not held. V. After independence, it now appears that no single liberation group in Angola will have the power to impose its own ideology as national policy. A. If civil war is averted and the three liberation groups establish some kind of coalition, the government'92s policies probably will be a delicate mix of the philosophies of the two major groups. B. Both major groups want a non-aligned foreign policy and will seek to maintain some balance between East and West. 1. The Popular Movement, if dominant, would establish a highly-centralized and authoritarian one-party regime with a pronounced socialist orientation and close ties to the communist world, with US ties kept to a minimum. 2. The National Front would probably seek to establish a highly nationalistic and personalized regime. Because of the Front'92s rather narrow political base, an FNLA state might be highly coercive. The Front would likely accept development and/or military aid from the West as well as the East. C. Both groups can be expected to nationalize Angola'92s major productive enterprises, but the Front probably would be more hospitable toward selective Western investment than the Popular Movement. D. As long as an independent Angola does not restrict access to its transportation facilities, good relations with its neighbors Zaire and Zambia probably can be maintained. 1. An independent Angola will give moral and political support to black nationalists in Rhodesia and South Africa. It would probably not become immediately involved in supporting insurgencies there, however, because of distance and the dominant role now being played by Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique in seeking a settlement with the Smith regime. VI. If, on the other hand, protracted civil war develops, Congo and Zaire could be brought into the conflict. A. Civil war could also convince either one, or both to move into Cabinda in an attempt to annex or neutralize the enclave. B. Continued fighting in Angola would exacerbate the confrontation between black and white Africa. It would intensify the fears of Rhodesia and South Africa concerning black majority rule. 1. South Africa is particularly concerned that a communist or unfriendly regime in Angola might support guerrilla activity in Namibia. 2. A hostile or unstable Angola would increase South African pressure on us to support its domestic and international policies. This would complicate our efforts to promote peaceful solutions to Southern Africa'92s racial problems. 3. South Africa does not seem to be planning any action to counter this threat. 1 'a0
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Mr. President, I was just checking ours and just talking to the Israelis to find out what was going on. The Israelis are still advancing into Syria, although they are now getting heavy counter-attacks and the Iraqi armor division is beginning to fight them. SPLIT That'92s right. But they claim to be advancing and they claim to be reaching their objective. Of course it is obvious that all the fighting is tougher for the Israelis than it has ever been before. SPLIT We had a call from Heath yesterday, 2 transferring a request from Jordan which we received already directly that if he is forced to move an armored unit into Syria, whether he could get an assurance from the Israelis that they wouldn'92t attack him. SPLIT That was a hell of a question to ask. SPLIT Well, I asked, I put it to the Israelis and they said they are not trying to add to the divisions facing them from Syria, but they'92re not looking for an excuse to attack Jordan. 3 SPLIT Oh, yeah, we'92ve had an appeal from Sadat to prevent Israeli attacks on civilian targets and we'92re sending a reply back saying we'92ve made that appeal to the Israelis. 4 Then we'92ve had an appeal from King Hussein. Today diplomacy is going to begin moving. I'92m seeing the press at noon, to see whether they can put up a simple cease-fire. 5 SPLIT That'92s right. That would still pass it. SPLIT Well, they just, because right now there'92s a sort of a balance in the sense that the Israelis gained in Syria and lost in Egypt. SPLIT I can'92t get a clear report of that. SPLIT Well, last night we finally told Schlesinger just to charter some of these civilian air lines, airplanes from civilian air lines for the Defense Department and then turn them over to the Israelis. SPLIT We'92ve tried everything else and these civilian airlines just wouldn'92t charter to the Israelis directly. SPLIT So that'92s going to start moving later today. SPLIT No. And of course the most important assurance you gave them was that you'92d replace the equipment. SPLIT Right. So that they can expend what they'92ve got, knowing they'92ll get more. SPLIT I'92m giving a press conference today. SPLIT No, we'92ve always said that we . . . SPLIT I'92m giving a press conference today. I'92ve got to navigate that one. SPLIT There'92s nothing else to be done, Mr. President. After all . . . SPLIT Impossible. SPLIT And it wouldn'92t change the situation in the next two or three days, which is what we'92re talking about. SPLIT In two or three weeks the international pressures will become unmanageable. SPLIT That'92s right. 1 'a0
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briefly outlined to the Council the type of military contingency plans that had been prepared. One group of plans provides for military support of an effort to re-establish a Cuban Government friendly to the U.S. A second group provides for protection of U.S. lives and interests, including evacuation if necessary. A final group of plans was designed to re-establish peace in the event of armed attack on Guantanamo. These last-named plans covered a wide range of possibilities. He recognized that the nature of our response could not be decided in advance. Marion W. Boggs} :: offered a personal opinion that in view of the strong forces Castro now had that the Cubans would have very little chance of success. As opposed to this, SPLIT also pointed out that whereas they might be able to take a small beach head that after a relatively short time Castro would be able to mount heavy forces against them. The problem would then be one of who would come to their assistance.'94 (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) 1 }
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explained why he had placed U.S. Policy toward Cuba on the Council agenda. He asked whether, in what now appeared to be the unlikely event of a military move by Castro against Guantanamo, the U.S. was wholly prepared with respect to policy and with respect to the coordination of political and military planning. He cited two extremes of possible U.S. reactions in the event of an attack on Guantanamo'93(a) use of only such military forces as might be necessary to protect the Guantanamo Base itself, and (b) a decision that such an attack was an act of war by the Castro Government against the U.S. and that military power should be applied accordingly.'94 In the latter case the obligations of the military would be different from what they would be in the former case. He assumed that in the latter case, we would pursue hostilities to a successful conclusion. He went on to say it was not clear whether military contingency planning was being done in close coordination with political planning and took full account of the actions that we might take in the UN or in the OAS. He concluded by stating that his reason for raising the issue was to make sure that the responsible departments had the benefit of the President'92s views so that, in the event an attack did occur, at least their planning would be complete. Secretary SPLIT asked what our reaction would be in a situation in which an overt move against the Base was accompanied by harassment of American citizens. This would be more than an attack on the Base. The :: From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy Source Washington, February 11, 1961. As you know, there is great pressure within the government in favor of a drastic decision with regard to Cuba. There is, it seems to me, a plausible argument for this decision if one excludes everything but Cuba itself and looks only at the pace of military consolidation within Cuba and the mounting impatience of the armed exiles. However, as soon as one begins to broaden the focus beyond Cuba to include the hemisphere and the rest of the world, the arguments against this decision begin to gain force. However well disguised any action might be, it will be ascribed to the United States. The result would be a wave of massive protest, agitation and sabotage throughout Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa (not to speak of Canada and of certain quarters in the United States). Worst of all, this would be your first dramatic foreign policy initiative. At one stroke, it would dissipate all the extraordinary good will which has been rising toward the new Administration through the world. It would fix a malevolent image of the new Administration in the minds of millions. It may be that on balance the drastic decision may have to be made. If so, every care must be taken to protect ourselves against the inevitable political and diplomatic fall-out. 1. Would it not be possible to induce Castro to take offensive action first? He has already launched expeditions against Panama and against the Dominican Republic. One can conceive a black operation in, say, Haiti which might in time lure Castro into sending a few boatloads of men on to a Haitian beach in what could be portrayed as an effort to overthrow the Haitian regime. If only Castro could be induced to commit an offensive act, then the moral issue would be clouded, and the anti-US campaign would be hobbled from the start. 2. Should you not consider at some point addressing a speech to the whole hemisphere setting forth in eloquent terms your own conception of inter-American progress toward individual freedom and social justice? Such a speech would identify our Latin American policy with the aspirations of the plain people of the hemisphere. As part of this speech, you could point out the threats raised against the inter-American system by dictatorial states, and especially by dictatorial states under the control of non-hemisphere governments or ideologies. If this were done properly, action against Castro could be seen as in the interests of the hemisphere and not just of American corporations. 3. Could we not bring down Castro and Trujillo at the same time? If the fall of the Castro regime could be accompanied or preceded by the fall of the Trujillo regime, it would show that we have a principled concern for human freedom and do not object only to left-wing dictators. If the drastic decision proves necessary in the end, I hope that steps of this sort can do something to mitigate the effects. And, if we do take the drastic decision, it must be made clear that we have done so, not lightly, but only after we had exhausted every conceivable alternative. Arthur Schlesinger, jr. 1} :: I think the gloomier parts of both papers are right. Diplomatic and public opinion are surely not ready for an invasion, but Castro's internal strength continues to grow. The battalion's dispersal would be a blow to U.S. prestige, but we should today have a hard time at the U.N. if it goes in. The one hope I see is in an early'97even if thin'97recognition of a rival regime. I think if a Government-in-Exile can be surfaced promptly we could and should follow Mann's suggestion of working toward its recognition fairly soon. (We could also put in a full trade embargo against Castro, and you could sorrowfully read him out of the liberal family in a strong and factual speech about his outrages.) Then, conceivably, we could hold back Bissell's battalion for about three months and even build it up somewhat. And when it did go in, the color of civil war would be quite a lot stronger. McG. B.} :: Meeting on Cuba, 4:00 PM, March 15, 1961 CIA will present a revised plan for the Cuban operation. 1 They have done a remarkable job of reframing the landing plan so as to make it unspectacular and quiet, and plausibly Cuban in its essentials. The one major problem which remains is the air battle. I think there is unanimous agreement that at some stage the Castro Air Force must be removed. It is a very sketchy force, in very poor shape at the present, and Colonel Hawkins (Bissell's military brain) thinks it can be removed by six to eight simultaneous sorties of B-26s. These will be undertaken by Cuban pilots in planes with Cuban Air Force markings. This is the only really noisy enterprise that remains. My own belief is that this air battle has to come sooner or later, and that the longer we put it off, the harder it will be. Castro's Air Force is currently his Achilles' heel, but he is making drastic efforts to strengthen it with Russian planes and Russian-trained pilots. Even the revised landing plan depends strongly upon prompt action against Castro's air. The question in my mind is whether we cannot solve this problem by having the air strike come some little time before the invasion. A group of patriotic airplanes flying from Nicaraguan bases might knock out Castro's Air Force in a single day without anyone knowing (for some time) where they came from, and with nothing to prove that it was not an interior rebellion by the Cuban Air Force, which has been of very doubtful loyalty in the past; the pilots will in fact be members of the Cuban Air Force who went into the opposition some time ago. Then the invasion could come as a separate enterprise, and neither the air strike nor the quiet landing of patriots would in itself give Castro anything to take to the United Nations. I have been a skeptic about Bissell's operation, but now I think we are on the edge of a good answer. I also think that Bissell and Hawkins have done an honorable job of meeting the proper criticisms and cautions of the Department of State. McGeorge Bundy 2} :: Cuba 2. My brief answer is that I am in favor of a continuation and expansion of the present approach to Cuba'97i.e., quiet infiltration of anti-Castro exiles into Cuba and subsequent support through air drops. The beachhead operation, with the landing and recognition of the provisional government, would represent, however, a change of phase in our Cuban policy. If entirely successful, it would have the highly beneficial result of getting rid of the Castro regime. If we could achieve this by a swift, surgical stroke, I would be for it. But in present circumstances the operation seems to me to involve many hazards; and on balance'97and despite the intelligence and responsibility with which the case for the action has been presented'97I am against it. 3. The following considerations concerning the beachhead operation seem to me vital: a) No matter how '93Cuban'94 the equipment and personnel, the US will be held accountable for the operation, and our prestige will be committed to its success. b) Since the Castro regime is presumably too strong to be toppled by a single landing, the operation will turn into a protracted civil conflict. 4. If these assumptions are true, it seems to me that the operation involves the following hazards: a) The protraction of the struggle and the commitment of American prestige (especially if we proceed to recognize and supply a provisional government) will create increasing pressure on us to guarantee the success of the operation through ever more intense and overt involvement. It will seem increasingly intolerable to subject ourselves to the humiliation of a defeat in Cuba. If the landing fails to trigger uprisings behind the lines and defections in the Militia (and the evidence that it would do so is inconclusive), the logic of the situation could well lead us, step by step, to the point where the last step would be to dispatch the Marines. b) The protraction of the struggle will give the Soviet Union a magnificent opportunity to wage political warfare. Cuba will become our Hungary; and, since our pretensions to international good behavior have been greater than those of the Russians, we would be more damaged by Hungary than they were (and they were considerably damaged). The situation is made to order for the Communist agitprop apparatus. Jose Marti Brigades and no doubt Abraham Lincoln Brigades will be recruited to support Castro, not just from beyond the Iron Curtain, but in Western Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. There will be demonstrations and riots around the world on the model of the movement for Loyalist Spain in the late Thirties. There will be resolutions in the United Nations, with testimony by prisoners or Castro agents about the US preparation of and responsibility for the action. (I must say, however, that I question the view that this operation would have serious substantive effect on Soviet policy, in Laos or elsewhere. My guess is that the Soviet Union regards Cuba as in our domain and is rather surprised that we have not taken action before this to rid ourselves of Castro. (I also think that the operation would be more easily accepted in Latin America, where there is spreading knowledge about the nature of the Castro regime, than in Western Europe, Africa or Asia, where it will seem gross, unprovoked and bullying imperialism.) c) As the struggle protracts itself and as the political campaign mounts against the US, our government'97and you'97will have to meet penetrating questions about our role in the affair. We will have either to evade the questions and thereby tacitly plead guilty; or deny involvement; or declare ignorance. Each course presents obvious difficulties. If we admit involvement, we admit action taken in violation of the basic characters of the hemisphere and of the United Nations. If we justify such violation by pleading a higher law, we place ourselves thereafter on the same moral plane as the Soviet Union. If we deny involvement, few will believe us; and we invite a repetition of the U-2 episode, which made us look absurd before the world. Whatever we do, the effect will be to spoil the new US image'97the image of intelligence, reasonableness and honest firmness which has already had such an extraordinary effect in changing world opinion about the US and increasing world confidence in US methods and purposes. d) And there is the Fulbright point: our responsibility for the post-Castro regime. The eyes of the world will be upon us, and we cannot afford a post-Castro mess. On the basis of the documents 2 they have submitted to us containing their ideas for the future, I rather share his doubts as to the competence of the exile leaders. 5. These hazards would be outweighed, in my judgment, by the advantage of getting rid of Castro a) if the operation could be swift and surgical b) if support were forthcoming from our allies, both in Latin America and in Europe c) if the danger to the US were visible and overwhelming. Conditions (a) and (b) seem doubtful. Of (c), it can only be said that it is not self-evident to many people (including the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee). The counter argument would be: why not wait? Every month Castro is making himself more unpopular both through the hemisphere and in his own country. Every month more people through the world are coming to understand the nature of his regime. Opinion has changed tremendously in the last six months; it will change even more in the next six months, if Castro is not made a martyr. The combination of internal discontent and external isolation will doom his regime. The counter argument to this, of course, is that time will permit a military build-up and a perfection of internal control which will make Castro invulnerable to anything but a major invasion. In the meantime, he will prosecute his campaign against the hemisphere. The counter argument to that is that the measures which increase his invulnerability will also increase his unpopularity; that the more he tries to totalitarianize and terrorize Cuba, the more he makes Communism an object of hatred through the hemisphere; and, if he uses his military strength against any other state, he gives us the excuse we need for collective intervention. I am not sure that this debate permits a categorical judgment on the question whether time would run for or against us in Cuba. 6. The consequences of abandonment remain to be considered. Abandonment would conceivably suggest a US failure of nerve. It might seem to place a premium on the defiance of Castro; it would certainly dishearten those in Latin America who have exposed themselves by demanding action against Castro; it would certainly disillusion the brave men we have gathered in Guatemala; it would confront us with the problem of demobilizing and resettling these men. The fact that the expedition was conceived, prepared and then called off at the last moment would increase Castro's prestige and power. These are all powerful points. They weigh very heavily in my mind on the side of going ahead. However, I hesitate to say that we should do something simply because we have seemed to commit ourselves to doing it which, if we were starting fresh, we would not do. On balance, I think that the risks of the operation slightly outweigh the risks of abandonment. These latter risks would be mitigated somewhat if we could manage a partial rather than a total abandonment (i.e., if we could put the men into Cuba quietly). We might also be able to make some diplomatic capital out of the abandonment. We might have Thompson say to Khrushchev, for example, that we have discouraged an invasion of Cuba; that this shows our genuine desire to compose differences; but that K. should tell his friend to behave, because our patience is not inexhaustible and we cannot hope to restrain the Cuban patriots indefinitely. Conceivably we might be able to turn abandonment to some diplomatic advantage within the hemisphere too. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.}
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. The judgment expressed without dissent was that Cuba is now for practical purposes a Communist-controlled state. The two basic elements in the present situation are a rapid and continuing build-up of Castro's military power, and a great increase also in popular opposition to his regime. The United States has undertaken a number of covert measures against Castro, including propaganda, sabotage, political action, and direct assistance to anti-Castro Cubans in military training. A particularly urgent question is the use to be made of a group of such Cubans now in training in Guatemala, who cannot remain indefinitely where they are. The present estimate of the SPLIT took a very optimistic view of the force's ability to land and hold a beach head. The :: of the current plan for launching the troops from Guatemala. He reported that the JCS, after careful study, believed that this plan had a fair chance of success'97'93success'94 meaning ability to survive, hold ground, and attract growing support from Cubans. At the worst, the invaders should be able to fight their way to the Escambray and go into guerrilla action. If the troops are to land in top form, the operation should not be delayed, at the longest, beyond March 31, and the decision to land for it must be made before D minus 21. Secretary
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agreed. General :: remarked that we are risking the same thing with an unsuccessful small convoy. At this point General :: , at the president'92s request, then pointed out some of the military actions which are being taken. He emphasized that much planning is being conducted, both in the Pentagon and in General Norstad'92s headquarters, on a contingency basis. He pointed out that any effort to bull our way into Berlin with ground forces alone requires more strength than we have available; therefore, no substantial reinforcement of our land forces in Europe is contemplated. For psychological reasons, however, some small reinforcements are being sent primarily to round out units and bring them up to strength. Secretary SPLIT emphasized the improbability of moving into Germany without entailing hostilities directly with Russia. Therefore, since we cannot fight this battle on the ground, we are studying the matter of airlift as a fallback action. We are preparing our crews by way of familiarizing them with Tempelhof airfield and we are making electronic jamming studies. The Secretary emphasized that what we are making are normal preparations. He feels that the Congressmen present should know about them, but he requests that talk be avoided to enable us to bring our allies along with us. We are playing on the basis of '93not much noise but carry a big stick.'94 We must realize that the Russians will carry their threats '93up to the line.'94 We are therefore planning as if we will be required to carry out our contingency plans. We think, however, the country will be better served if we avoid saber rattling. Secretary :: Berlin Contingency Planning 1. You asked recently to be brought up to date on Berlin contingency planning. 2. Berlin contingency planning has proceeded on the basis of guidance which you approved at a meeting on January 29, 1959, 1 with Secretary Dulles, Secretary McElroy and General Twining (Tab A). 2 3. In order to obtain full understanding of the access control question, a joint State'96Defense team of officials acquainted with current contingency planning will proceed promptly to Germany to make first-hand observations of current Soviet practice concerning access. 4. The following steps are now recommended for your approval: -720 (a) At an appropriate time before May 27, test flights should be made in and out of Berlin above 10,000 feet. The Soviets have denied that we have a right to fly above that ceiling. We have maintained that we do have such a right, but have never in fact exercised it. (b) Present contingency planning provides that after the attempted or announced substitution of GDR for USSR, the first unit to go through would be a truck or trucks accompanied by a scout car or some other vehicle with a capability for shooting. We recommend that this concept be changed, and that the first unit to attempt passage in such circumstances should be a routine convoy to emphasize our intention to continue past practices. If this unit is blocked, we recommend that the next unit should be accompanied by a scout car or similar vehicle. Its purpose would be to establish the existence of forcible blockage. 3 (c) We recommend that you ask the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA to prepare for you on an urgent basis an analysis of the political and military implications of the four alternative courses of action with respect to the use of force, discussed in paragraph 7 below. We suggest a deadline of April 7. You may recall that a similar study proved useful in connection with the Korean War (NSC 147 of April 2, 1953). 4 [ 1 paragraph ( 2'961/2 lines of source text ) not declassified ] Open Questions 5. Concessions for the sake of unity. At the meeting in your office on March 5 5 after the NSC meeting, it was agreed that continued Allied unity on Berlin was essential That leaves open the question whether and, if so, to what extent we should modify our basic position if that turns out to be necessary in order to get Allied agreement. 6. Substitution. The doctrine that we will allow '93no substitution'94 of GDR for Soviet personnel (at least unless there is an acknowledged agency relation between the two) is being questioned in various quarters'97both foreign and domestic. Attention is focusing on the '93no stamping'94 application of the '93no substitution'94 doctrine, i.e., the proposition that we will refuse to allow paper stamping as a means of identifying allied military traffic to GDR personnel since this would imply acceptance of control. [ 4 paragraphs (17 lines of source text) not declassified ] 7. Alternative uses of force. -720 (a) Recent discussions between State and Defense officials confirmed agreement that we should be prepared to resort to force if necessary to maintain access to Berlin'97even at the risk of general war. (b) Four alternative uses of force, in the event of failure of political negotiations, have been discussed: -1440 (i) A substantial effort to reopen ground access by local action. (ii) A substantial effort to reopen air access, if blocked. (iii) Reprisals against the communists in other areas, e.g., Western naval controls on bloc shipping. (iv) General war measures. -720 (c) In paragraph 4 (c) above, we recommended that you direct preparation of an analysis of the implications of these alternative courses of action on an urgent basis. 8. Timing of force. It may be difficult to maintain a state of high military readiness over a long period. On the other hand, there would be political difficulties in breaking off negotiations, or a debate in the United Nations, and resorting to force, especially if civilian traffic to Berlin was still moving freely. If political negotiations prove prolonged, at what point should we be prepared to resort to one of the four alternative uses of forces described above? The answer to this question will, of course, hinge in considerable measure on your decision after the completion of the study recommended in paragraph 4 (c). Neil McElroy Christian A. Herter [ Tab B (2 pages of source text) not declassified ]} :: added that while there is a chance of a protest, there is a good chance that this flight might go unnoticed. Polish transports come in at 25,000 feet. The use of a jet or turboprop aircraft would give us a legitimate reason for this reversal of procedures. He added the operating factor that the Soviets are not particularly alert in their four-power airway control center. As a matter of fact, the Soviet member is normally either intoxicated or violently hung over. This factor might well permit the filing of a flight plan about [ above ] 10,000 feet without Soviet protest. The :: expressed agreement with this view of Secretary Herter. Mr. SPLIT inquired whether we should omit Alternative Three in any material which we transmit to our Allies. The :: suggested that the key to the '93token force'94 idea is to avoid letting the situation slip to the point that the force must become a major invasion. Our position must be to meet the first indications resolutely. The
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defined the difference between his approach and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The SPLIT would prefer to execute this operation in two stages, allowing a lapse of time between the first probe and the use of appreciable force. To this Secretary SPLIT expressed his agreement that we are risking defeat and humiliation by the use of one division. Mr. SPLIT reaffirmed his own history of willingness to risk war when necessary. He stressed, however, that in a situation of this type it is essential to give peace forces a chance to work. The first obstruction, in his view, is insufficient reason to precipitate a war. For this reason he regards extensive military preparations as the '93second barrel.'94 There is plenty of time in his view to send a division after due contemplation. A discussion then followed regarding our ground capabilities vis-'e0-vis those of the Soviets in Europe. General :: Berlin Contingency Planning When Secretary Dulles and others discussed Berlin contingency planning with you on January 29, 1 the application of additional military force was reserved for governmental decision in the event that an initial probe followed by other measures proved unsuccessful. Though decision is reserved, the need for advance planning is evident, and the Department of State has been examining alternative possibilities. Short of general war, these appear to be two. One is the use of substantial force to attempt to reopen passage to Berlin. The other, a pacific counter-blockade, supplemented perhaps by other forms of naval reprisal, seems on preliminary examination to merit careful study also. There is attached a memorandum on this subject prepared in the State Department. Pacific blockade is considered an act of reprisal rather than an act of war. By applying this concept to Berlin situation, we might frame a strategy which would counter interference with Western access not by invading East Germany, where we would be at a disadvantage, but by action at sea where the USSR would be at a disadvantage. We might, for example, control Soviet and East German shipping at the entrances to the Baltic and the Black Sea. The control could assume various degrees of stringency, in case the USSR should use gradual tactics over Berlin. It could be extended to other principal ports in the North and Far East if desired, and it could be supplemented by seizing ships on the high seas. While such a course of action, like its alternative, raises serious problems, it has such apparent advantages that I believe it worth very careful study. I therefore suggest that you direct that the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff report urgently on United States capabilities for naval reprisals, including counter-blockade, in connection with Berlin contingency planning. Christian A. Herter [Attachment] 2 Paper Prepared by George A. Morganof the Policy Planning Staff :: Washington, March 3, 1959. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING: PACIFIC COUNTER-BLOCKADE Introduction 1. There are two basic issues which confront us in contingency planning for Berlin (a) at what stage and over what issue to threaten and, if necessary, use force; (b) what type of force to use. 2. This memorandum addresses the second of these issues. It proposes in particular the study of a type of force which could be used as an alternative to substantial ground action in East Germany or immediate initiation of general war. It does not address the question of defining the point at which the proposed type of force should be used, but it does suggest that the threat to use it would decrease the likelihood of such a point being reached. 3. In challenging the West on Berlin, the USSR is relying on two circumstances in particular: first, the only way the West can maintain access is by crossing territory under effective communist control and, second, it is far easier to deny than to maintain such access by localized military action. It is thus clear that local use of force by Western powers cannot of itself be an effective counter to the proposed Soviet line of action, hence that its significance would consist wholly in the implied threat of imminent general war. Yet it is precisely the immense psychological gap between pinpoint Berlin situation and global reaction that has made it difficult to win Allied commitment to this step, makes Allied unanimity uncertain when faced with the ultimate decision, and therefore encourages Soviet intransigeance. 4. We need accordingly to look beyond Berlin to see if there is not some other way in which we can more effectively deter or counter Soviet interference with Western access. One way might be the application of seapower which served us so well over Lebanon and Quemoy. In seapower the balance of general military advantage is with us, not with the USSR, and by its use we should be able to pick situations where the balance of local advantage would also be in our favor. The Concept of Graduated Pacific Counter-Blockade 5. Some form of counter-blockade would seem to be the most logical use of seapower in relation to Berlin, since what is threatened against us in Berlin amounts to a blockade. It should be considered a pacific counter-blockade since it would be intended as a reprisal rather than an act of war. As Soviet or East German interference with our access might begin gradually, it would be desirable to plan wide flexibility in both degree and scope. Suitable points at which to control shipping might be at the entrances to the Baltic and the Black Sea, and the degree of control might vary with the degree of interference with our access to Berlin. The blockade could be extended to the principal ports in the north and far east if desired. It might be applied to all Soviet and East German shipping, or to vessels to and from one or more specific ports. It could also be supplemented by seizing ships on the high seas by way of reprisal, or by other measures such as a trade embargo. 6. If in the end any new agreements or implicit understandings were reached concerning Berlin, the continuing possibility and perhaps explicit threat of pacific counter-blockade might provide useful insurance against further Soviet bad faith or East German nibbling at our position. Advantages as a Deterrent 7. The USSR would know counter-blockade to be a course of action well within our capabilities, on terms relatively advantageous to us and therefore not suspect of bluffing. The recent incident when we boarded a Soviet trawler believed to have cut cables 3 illustrates for their benefit the decisiveness of US action in this sphere. 8. A strategy of counter-blockade would be a rational and symmetrical response to wrongful use of force against us, thereby appealing to the poplar sense of justice, and it would tend to place on the USSR the chief onus for extending the conflict into open hostilities if that occurred. It should therefore be more acceptable to NATO and to Western public opinion than using substantial force to try to open a passage to Berlin. It would be a course of action in which the French and British could fully participate, and their efforts could be supplemented by some or all other NATO powers as a token of solidarity. Moreover it would be capable of adoption at an early date, at least for purposes of planning and preparation. To enhance its deterrent value we should probably wish to let the USSR know our intentions, privately if not publicly, well in advance. It should thus confront the USSR with the prospect of full and continuing Allied unanimity on a vital aspect of the question of using force over Berlin. 9. Counter-blockade would help to bridge the psychological gap between Berlin and our global deterrent. It would involve operations on an extensive scale, from which the transition to a global strike would be credible alike to friend and foe if it appeared to be in the US interest. Advantages if Implemented 10. In addition to several advantages already mentioned, counterblockade if implemented would inflict serious psychological and political damage on the USSR, and it could not be broken without grave risk of general war, for which the USSR would bear the main onus. It would therefore give the USSR substantial inducement to come to terms. The psychological and political inducement would be supplemented by significant economic losses, the probable amount of which should be the subject of further study. 11. Counter-blockade would afford time and a sound basis for further negotiations, rather than precipitating a rapid showdown. We would be under no compulsion to make concessions without counter-concessions. We would be in a relatively favorable position with world opinion, which would be drawn away from confusing details about Berlin traffic control and focussed on the big picture. 12. Counter-blockade would wear well in case of UN intervention. The UN could hardly ask one side to back down more than the other, and any foot-dragging by the USSR could be matched by us. Possible Objections 13. While the present memorandum is only an initial not a definitive study, some objections which readily arise may be considered briefly. 14. Counter-blockade might be considered unduly provocative, especially since blockade is traditionally considered an act of war and the concept of pacific blockade is not familiar to the general public. But our actual interference with communist shipping would be proportionate to the interference with Western access to Berlin, hence a just response rather than a provocation. In any case in the light of Khrushchev'92s flat statements it would probably seem less provocative than invasion of East Germany'97the only alternative resort to force so far proposed. 15. The communists might extend the Berlin blockade to civilian traffic, or even seize West Berlin. But we would have at our disposal appropriate counter-measures, including seizing all communist shipping and extending our counter-blockade, or deciding this meant general war. If Western troops were captured and held as hostages, we could likewise imprison all personnel of ships we seized. 16. West Berlin could not hold out indefinitely, and the USSR might simply sit tight until Berlin collapsed. It is true that the USSR could physically stand our counter-blockade indefinitely. But whatever the economic losses involved, the USSR would doubtless find the situation very humiliating to its prestige. Meanwhile the pressure of world opinion, both direct and through the UN, would mount strongly in favor of a settlement. As for Berlin, the stockpiles should enable the city to hold out physically for some months, which should be adequate. The key question would be morale, but that also should respond on the whole favorably to a vigorous stand by the West like counter-blockade. Something might also be done about morale on the other side, as the tense situation could easily bring anti-communist feelings in East Germany to the boiling point. 17. The USSR might well react with mine sweeping if our blockade used mines, with submarine attacks on our shipping, or plane and submarine attacks on our blockading vessels, conduct mine warfare against them, or try to force the blockade by naval escort of merchant ships. But in that event they would bear the responsibility of taking additional military measures, and we would retain the option of fighting back in a type of hostilities which would be more advantageous to us than local ground fighting and less dangerous than immediate resort to general war. Conclusion The possibility of naval reprisals, particularly in the form of pacific counter-blockade, has enough apparent promise to justify careful study.} :: said we planned to keep moving until the other side shoots at us. The SPLIT remarked that this is the determination we have to make. The SPLIT said it might be necessary to postpone the decision until after the NATO meeting. The :: agreed in the light of coordination difficulties that we must not talk unilaterally. Senator :: then outlined the one problem in contingency planning which concerns the group, namely, provision for flying over 10,000 feet in the corridors. If we would deliberately fly above this altitude, a measure to which we have previously claimed the right but not exercised, the fact of maintaining a fighter alert for protection of the aircraft might well result in an undesired opening of hostilities. General SPLIT stated that he just wanted the president to know of the potential difficulty.} :: was quite sure that the Soviets would deduce the meaning of such an action. Secretary :: stressed the very great importance of the Intelligence Estimates in the paper. He added that it was his personal view that if we carried out the First Alternative now under discussion, the Soviets were likely to fight unless they were really prepared to let our military forces, either of battalion or division size, move down the Autobahn into Berlin. General SPLIT called attention to the footnote on Page 26 reading as follows: '93There is a serious question as to whether one or more of such actions would constitute retaliation, which is regarded as belligerent action'94. Secretary SPLIT said that he himself believed that some of the suggested actions under this Alternative might be called aggressive and belligerent. Secretary SPLIT commented that of course the military courses of action must be dove-tailed with the political courses of action. He felt reasonably sure, he said, that our Allies would go along with our proposed military actions if they are convinced that we had exhausted all the other possibilities. Mr. SPLIT thought this was a useful idea but of reprisals in general, under Alternative Three, he pointed out that the three Allied Governments had definite legal rights with respect to access to Berlin. On the other hand, if we held up Soviet shipping on the high seas, we could not do so on the basis of any clear legal right. The :: , still referring to the question of Khrushchev'92s motives, stated the view that Khrushchev had felt a need to bolster East Germany. Many people were making their escape from East Germany through Berlin. A high percentage of these people comprised intellectuals. :: '92s answer to this was that the key issue is a willingness to use limited force to maintain our rights. The attitude of the Germans if we let the GDR officials stamp our papers would be bad. If we accept any signs of jurisdiction by the GDR in the first instance, we have no firm line on which to stand if later provocations follow. He repeated that we must use limited force at the first instance, and that will be the greatest deterrent. General
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have recommended preparation for a large-scale use of force on May 27, to include meeting resistance with a large force, rebuilding of bridges, obstructions, etc. This force can comprise strength up to a division. Secretary SPLIT then spoke up in defense of the Joint Chiefs of Staff point of view. They recommend that we make up our minds now as to our sequence of action rather than attempt to address the problem only after we are stopped. (The SPLIT forcefully injected the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fear that the United States will go half way and then quit. They feel that if we do not carry through with our resolution to risk general war we might as well get out of Europe. To this viewpoint the SPLIT pointed out that our policies forbid a limited war in Europe, that we cannot fight the USSR on the ground conventionally, and that if we make up our minds to go through we must be prepared to fight a general nuclear war. To this the :: then gave a report on the small military actions being taken which Soviet intelligence might pick up. 8 General SPLIT also reported that a Communications Plan in support of Berlin was being prepared. He also said that the Joint Chiefs felt that we can handle a garrison airlift to Berlin with only a small augmentation, even in the face of, efforts to jam our communications. The SPLIT said that as regards Air Force and Navy plans, no decisions were needed now. However, if Norstad had to move large forces from southern to northern Europe, it might be necessary to supply up to 1 additional division from the United States. The :: added further explanation that our normal procedure is to fly at 6,000 and 8,000 feet. We always have fighters ready for scrambling to protect our air traffic. Therefore, should difficulties result from this venture, we could possibly have an incident. He further stated that action on the part of the Communists of a minor nature, such as buzzing or flying alongside our aircraft, happens continually and it creates no problem for us. We do not regard any Communist action short of firing across the bow as a hostile act. Mr. :: wondered whether it would not be possible to express the Majority view and the Dissent in rather generalized terms. Mr. SPLIT said that of course CINCEUR was well aware of the points that the SPLIT observed that the main thing was to stir up the Tripartite Group in Norstad'92s Headquarters in Paris to get down to work. Secretary SPLIT pointed out that the paper under consideration required us to confine our military action to the Corridor if possible. Mr. :: proceeded to outline the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to wit, that it is difficult to tell how far we will go ultimately in our use of force. The important thing, in the view of the JCS, is to verify that we have been stopped, not by our own backing down, but by actual use of force on the part of the Soviets. From there we may have to proceed to an airlift as the next step; but this is the least desirable course of action and is regarded as a form of defeat. In short, an attempt on the part of an armed convoy may be regarded as a '93reconnaissance in force.'94 Its failure would leave us facing two choices: the use of more force, or the use of an airlift. The
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then briefed the Members of Congress by use of a map of East Germany. This indicated Soviet and GDR armed forces. (See summary of Mr. Dulles'92 briefing, attached.) 1 At the end of this presentation there were brief questions. To Mr. Halleck'92s question regarding the reliability of GDR troops, SPLIT gave the opinion that these troops are not overly reliable, but the Soviets would not depend on them in any serious action. From this Mr. :: thought that General Twining'92s suggestion was a good one but advised against identifying the source of Dissents in the Intelligence Estimates. He suggested that the paper just provide the Minority view as one which differed from the Majority Intelligence Estimate. If the paper were to be given to the French, Mr. SPLIT urged that it be '93sanitized'94 first. There being no further discussion of Alternative One, Mr. SPLIT commented that this time the Dissent came from the State Department rather than from the Military Intelligence Agencies. At this point the SPLIT again came back to the problem of reprisals. He pointed out that there was one type of naval reprisal which we might well consider and which might not seem too belligerent. If the Soviets held up one of our Berlin convoys we could retaliate by holding one Soviet merchant vessel, on one pretext or another, in an Allied port. Mr. :: ventured that Khrushchev is probably looking for a way out at this time. His first motive had been to point up Europe since things in the world had been going rather well for the U.S. (Lebanon and Quemoy). Mr. SPLIT agreed with Mr. Herter, stating that if a free election were held in East Germany, only 10% would vote Communist.}
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opened by explaining to the president that the State and Defense Departments were coordinating on a couple of subjects, such as reunification of Germany, European security, and contingency planning. The purpose of requesting this meeting is to obtain additional guidance in preparation for the foreign ministers talks to begin on March 31st. Secretary :: '93General War Measures'94. Here again he pointed out that there was a difference of opinion as to the Intelligence Estimate on the reaction to be expected from the NATO Governments if the Fourth Alternative were undertaken (Page 34). Mr. :: pointed out that the discussion had now reached the First of the Four Alternative Courses of Action; namely, '93A Substantial Effort to Re-Open Ground Access by Local Action.'94 Mr. SPLIT pointed out on Page 15 a difference in the Intelligence Estimate of the response which we might expect from the Soviets if we undertook this First Alternative. Air Force Intelligence (A'962) believed that this course of action would convince the Soviets that the Western Allies were prepared if necessary to proceed to General War, and that the Soviets would therefore find ways to ease the crisis. Mr. SPLIT pointed out that this difference of view was one factor to be considered if this paper were to be transmitted to other Allied Governments. In such a case, he asked, should these splits in Intelligence Estimates be reflected at all? If they were to be reflected, should the identity of those who held the differing views be made clear or alternatively should just the Majority Estimate be provided to the other Governments? Secretary SPLIT directed the Council'92s attention to the Second Alternative; namely, '93A Substantial Effort to Re-Open Air Access, if Blocked.'94 As in the case of the First Alternative, he noted that this Alternative also involved a difference in the Intelligence Estimate of the reaction which we might expect from the Soviets if this Alternative were attempted (Page 21). He suggested that the same considerations should apply in the case of this split as applied in the case of the split Estimate as to the First Alternative. Mr. SPLIT then referred to the Third Alternative, that is, '93Reprisals Against the Communists in Other Areas, e.g., Western Naval Controls on Bloc Shipping.'94 Initially Mr. SPLIT pointed out that the same problem of timing existed with respect to this Alternative as with the first two Alternatives. Secretary SPLIT proceeded to the Fourth SPLIT next inquired whether the same considerations would not apply to Alternative Two as applied to Alternative One with respect to General Norstad'92s planning. In reply the SPLIT then invited the Council'92s attention to the final section of the paper: '93Reactions within Germany to the Four Courses of Action.'94 There being no comment or discussion on this section, Mr. SPLIT turned to the :: then posed the question of what Khrushchev is after. Mr. SPLIT considers it improbable that Khrushchev is seeking a fight but believes that Khrushchev may be seeking a conference. On this, SPLIT pointed out the parallel between this situation and the Quemoy situation in that the Soviets had stirred up trouble as a device to lure us into a conference. He then asked if the U.S. is willing at this time to have a conference. Mr.
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proposed two actions: a. Reinforcement of the West Berlin garrison. 2. The :: trouble will break out in other areas. SPLIT asked if the supplies will permit approx 30 days. :: if our air access stopped, we would stop Soviet civil air traffic; 80% goes in Eur. Most to Germany. They want to break link of civilian traffic between WG and West Berlin. :: pointed out that the first side to use nuclear weapons will carry a very grave responsibility and endure heavy consequences before the rest of the world. McGeorge Bundy 4 1 'a0 :: see considerable merit in General Clay's proposed course. 1. It would demonstrate that we consider our right of access to and circulation in East Berlin still valid. 2. It would probably make the Soviets pause before taking further encroaching action as well as affect the nature of their subsequent actions. 3. Moreover, unlike other proposals for a military response to a Soviet/GDR closing action, General Clay's proposal does not involve a serious problem of disengaging our forces for General SPLIT view, however, the absence of any response on our part to a Soviet/GDR move at Friedrichstrasse would be unnecessarily supine. To take no action against Soviet personnel, for example, would hardly be understood. To take the obvious retaliatory measures might not regain much of our lost prestige, but not to take them would cost us further prestige. Recommendations The alternatives posed therefore are: (a) The
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suggested that (i) this Bloc action might portend a speed-up of Khrushchev's schedule; (ii) our own military preparations should be hastened accordingly. There was some disagreement with his diagnosis, but none with his prescription. 1 'a0 :: yes. SPLIT Yes'97as long as they can fight with. SPLIT our purpose is to insure that K knows we will use nuc. :: air access may be first blocked total. Described possible action'97Schonfeld. Discussed escalation. Discussed ground target attacks. SPLIT explained part I naval blockade table; part II acts of war. SPLIT with 30 divs you can man the whole line. :: presented opposite views on this point. The SPLIT believed that with such a strike, we could in some real sense be victorious in the series of nuclear exchanges, while we might well lose if we allowed the Soviets to strike first in the strategic battle. Mr. :: and Mr. SPLIT argued that the consequences of IV. C. were so very grave that IV A. and B. should be undertaken first even though they might indeed lead very quickly to IV C. Mr. Nitze, on the other hand, believed that since IV A. and B. would greatly increase the temptation to the Soviets to initiate a strategic strike of their own, it would be best for us, in moving toward the use of nuclear weapons, to consider most seriously the option of an initial strategic strike of our own. Mr. SPLIT felt that neither side could be sure of winning by striking first and that the consequences to both sides of a strategic exchange would be so devastating that both sides had a very high interest in avoiding such a result. On the whole of Paragraph IV, the
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UPON GDR RESTRICTIONS ON ALLIED CIRCULATION BETWEEN THE WEST AND EAST SECTORS OF BERLIN 1. It appears to me that the new measures of restraint imposed by the GDR on Allied circulation between the sectors in Berlin are more serious than seem to be generally regarded. For the first time the East Germans have aimed restrictions specifically and publicly at the occupying powers. This new measure has nothing to do with the restraint of refugees, the primary excuse for the sealing off of the East Sector. Its target is the Western Allies who are to be humiliated publicly before all of Germany. It is a measure aimed at further depressing the morale of West Berlin, at destroying the confidence of West Berlin in the Western Powers, and at offsetting the effects of the Johnson-Clay visit. 2. If we allow this provocation to pass unchallenged, it is difficult to see how we can resist restrictions by the GDR on Allied movements on the autobahn, the railway and perhaps in the air. 3. A minimum action to take is for the Western Powers to announce that they will disregard these restrictions and cross into the East Sector wherever and whenever they see fit. What they would do subsequently in living up to this bold language would depend upon circumstances. 4. A second course which recommends itself to me (if supported by our representatives in Berlin) would be for the Western Commandants (or at least the U.S. Commandant) to call up the Soviet Commandant, in Karlshorst, informing him that they are calling on him in a body, crossing at X (a place other than Friedrichstrasse). They would further inform him that they will hold the USSR responsible for any incidents in transiting this Sector border. After waiting a reasonable time to permit the word to get about, they would then proceed to X prepared to cross by force if resisted. 5. While such a course of action is fraught with some hazard and the outcome cannot be clearly predicted, I have the feeling that it would break the rhythm of mounting Communist provocation and prevent later and more hazardous incidents. M.D.T. 2 1 'a0 :: Recent events provide pretty clear evidence that Khrushchev intends using military force, or the threat thereof, to gain his ends in Berlin. He has raised his ante by progressively isolating West Berlin, by retaining in service several hundred thousand men due for discharge, and by reverting to atomic testing. Thus far our own defense efforts have been deliberately kept in a low key and at a comparatively normal tempo. I have a strong feeling that the moment has come to shift into a higher gear. On August 31 you sent a memorandum to Secretary McNamara 2 asking him for recommendations on expansion of our military forces in the light of the events noted above. The decision which you take will be an extremely important one, and it seems to me that you will, therefore, want to touch all the bases and establish a clear record. You might consider some such scenario as follows: Maxwell D. :: could be the reverse. 1 'a0 :: would support program's rec. Looks like Sov accel. schedule probably as result of refugee prob. We must accelerate. Other purposes'97restore morale of European allies to stand up to prospective military action. Be prepared for action. Not have onus of failure. Picking up pieces if we have a war. Rec to date does not add divs. SPLIT we must respond with force. SPLIT if we had no troops in E & if we would not use nuc he would do as he pleases. We must establish credibility of our det to use nuc. There are not enough div in Eur to retake B. We must show K & others we are not going to sacrifice 5 or more divs without use of nuc. We will be more ready to use nuc with more divs. If we don't, we go from meg [ reg? ] to nuc war. SPLIT this is only chance of making nuc war unnecessary. :: summary of the discussion, he stressed the need for the Departments of State and Defense to submit a paper to the president stating what the best courses of action would be '93in response to broad contingencies of harassment within Berlin, interference with ground access, interference with air access, and any other broad contingencies which could arise'94 from the derogation of vital U.S. interests in Berlin. (Talking Paper, October 4; ibid., :: suggests that if the Friedrichstrasse crossing point is closed, we should force the barrier even in the face of desultory fire, with a small number of tanks. These tanks would then take a defensive position in East Berlin immediately inside the entry point. If, however, our tanks were attacked by East German forces or confronted by substantial Soviet forces, our tanks would withdraw to defensive positions in West Berlin. General SPLIT believes such action would probably result in the entry point being kept open and he sees as additional advantages the fact that the Soviets would again be forced to participate in a Berlin problem; we, in turn, would have demonstrated our insistence upon our right of access to and circulation in East Berlin; Soviet intentions and determination might be more clearly revealed; and Berlin opinion would be less disillusioned than if a weaker course of action had been taken. SPLIT apparently accepts the fact that the operation might be limited to running tanks a few yards into East Berlin without attempting to use the access thus gained. On the other hand we question General Clay's assertion that such action on our part is likely to keep the access point open. In our view it is unlikely that such a gesture would cause the Soviets to leave the entrance open if they had once decided to close it. As for Soviet participation in Berlin problems, this would not seem to be any longer of major significance once the Communists decided finally to split the city. Soviet responsibility within the city would be of little practical importance once the boundary was closed. And the appearance of their forces to drive out our tanks, if they in fact appeared, would be the last gasp of Soviet responsibility. Whether this action would be less damaging to Berlin morale than present plans is also moot. The sight of our tanks plunging through the barrier to remain in the East Sector might raise hopes that the wall at last was coming down or at the very least, indicate that we intended to keep the access point open. And then if our tanks simply stopped, and subsequently had to withdraw, the let-down following in the wake of our demonstrated inability to follow through might be greater than if we had implied no bold determination. A final and major difficulty for us is this proposed course of action, even though it might reduce the problem of follow-up and disengaging forces, still is essentially open-ended, and does not clearly forestall an uncontrollable and unpredictable situation. However, in considering General Clay's proposals, it seems to us that the purposes of his recommendations might probably be achieved, and at the same time some of its apparent disadvantages avoided, through the following course of action: If the Friedrichstrasse crossing point is closed either by unacceptable demands for documentation by the GDR or by the erection of a barrier, we might run two or three tanks up to the checkpoint to demolish whatever was barring our entry (even if only a customs-type gate), and then have them withdraw and stationed nearby inside the Western Sector. The Commandant in the Kommandatura chair for the month, or alternatively the US Commandant (Friedrichstrasse is in the US Sector), would then immediately call Karlshorst to protest the situation and demand an urgent meeting with the Soviet Commandant as well as assurances of safe conduct through the sector boundary for purposes of such meeting. He would immediately release a statement, explaining that the Allied forces had destroyed a barrier which the East Germans illegally erected to bar Allied passage, and that the matter was being protested to the Soviet Commandant. He also would make it clear that, following our initial action, this was a problem to be resolved with the Soviets, who continue to bear full responsibility for the situation. If, as is likely, access continued to be denied us, we would take the further position that the Soviets had violated existing agreements and that we would take appropriate countering measures. It is to be noted that neither this proposal nor that of General clay is really a plan for reopening access. Both must be considered on their merits as gestures demonstrating Western readiness to react in a forceful manner, and bring home to the Soviets the point that they must expect increasingly vigorous countermeasures to moves against us. The advantage of this alternative to General Clay's proposal is that it would present no problem of disengaging our forces. It would be sufficiently abrupt so that it would not unduly raise the hopes of the Berliners. It also would be so limited so that the danger of escalation and the possibility of setting off uncontrolled popular demonstrations would be reduced to an absolute minimum. In essence it would have the desirable effects of General Clay's proposed course without leaving us in a vulnerable position, open to unpredictable and uncontrolled developments. In his message on the Friedrichstrasse problem, General SPLIT says he believes no response is preferable to a weak response. Presumably the General means we should not even take the measures now proposed (attempt to drive through the crossing point, remove any barrier that can be removed by hand, protest, take retaliatory action against Soviet personnel in Berlin, take countermeasures outside Berlin, move additional forces to the sector boundary, expel Czech and Polish Mission personnel from West Berlin). It might perhaps be argued that since we could not take measures adequate to restore access, lesser measures would simply demonstrate weakness. In SPLIT proposals, (b) The State Department's variant of those proposals, (c) Adherence to the September 14, 1961 decision, (d) A decision to take no action at all. General :: Enclosure 3 Washington, October20, 1961. U.S. POLICY ON MILITARY ACTIONS IN A BERLIN CONFLICT In the event military force is applied in the Berlin situation, it is United States policy that the nature and sequence of such use should preferably be: I If Soviet/GDR administrative or other action interferes with Berlin access by ground or air but is short of definitive blockage, then the tripartite powers should execute Berlin contingency plans, to include tripartitely agreed probes of Soviet intentions by a platoon or smaller force on the ground and by fighter escort in the air; they should continue to use fully any unblocked mode of access. ( Comment Through this point, risks of major war, unless Soviets wish to start one, are not materially raised by any tripartite action, and therefore, decision on execution is tripartite rather than NATO responsibility.) II If, despite the above tripartite actions, Soviet/GDR action indicates a determination to maintain significant blockage of our access to Berlin, then the NATO Allies should undertake such non-combatant activity as economic embargo, maritime harassment, and UN action. Simultaneously, they should mobilize and reinforce rapidly to improve capability for taking actions listed below. Meanwhile, they should use fully any unblocked access to Berlin. (If, however, the situation has so developed that NATO forces have been substantially reinforced, after appropriate non-combatant measures undertake without delay one or more of the courses of military action shown below.) (Without a build-up by the Allies, the range of options for early military action by us is limited. Undue delay could weaken nuclear credibility, threaten the viability of West Berlin, and erode Alliance resolve, but these potential disadvantages may be out-weighed by the higher risk of nuclear escalation if early non-nuclear action were taken with no more than the currently available forces. To the extent that Alliance forces in Europe are raised above present levels, the delays in initiating military action can be reduced or the military action can be tailored to the existing force levels.) III If, despite the above Allied actions, our Berlin access is not restored, the Allies should take appropriate further action to clarify whether the Soviets/GDR intend to maintain blockage of air or ground access, or both, while making clear our intention to obtain re-opened access. Then embark on one or more of the following expanded military courses of action: A. European Theatre 1. Expanding non-nuclear air action, against a background of expanded ground defensive strength, to gain local air superiority. Extend size and scope as necessary. ( comment: This is a politically oriented military operation aiming to display to the Soviets the approaching danger of possibly irreversible escalation. Military overpowering of determined Soviet resistance is not feasible. The risks rise, as do the military pressures on the Soviets.) B. World Wide Maritime control, naval blockade, or other world-wide measures, both for reprisal and to add to general pressure on the Soviets. ( Comment This action, by itself, is not apt to be effective and might lead to Soviet initiation of action on the European central front in any case. It lacks direct relation to Berlin and may entail political liabilities. It exploits pronounced Allied naval superiority. It would have a delayed impact on nuclear risks. It is the view of the JCS and the principal unified commanders that a naval blockade should be accompanied by other military action in Central Europe. IV If, despite Allied use of substantial non-nuclear forces, the Soviets continue to encroach upon our vital interests, then the Allies should use nuclear weapons, starting with one of the following courses of action but continuing through C below if necessary: A. Selective nuclear attacks for the primary purpose of demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons. B. Limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons to achieve in addition significant tactical advantage such as preservation of the integrity of Allied forces committed, or to extend pressure toward the objective. C. General Nuclear war. ( Comment The Allies only partially control the timing and scale of nuclear weapons use. Such use might be initiated by the Soviets, at any time after the opening of small-scale hostilities. Allied initiation of limited nuclear action may elicit a reply in kind; it may also prompt unrestrained pre-emptive attack.) 1 'a0
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Mr. President. SPLIT I just wanted to bring you up to date. All the passengers were off the plane when they blew it up. SPLIT They are holding 40 hostages. 23 with dual citizenship, 6 Swiss, 6 German and 5 British. SPLIT They are demanding that the Swiss release 3 fedayeen, the British the woman, the Germans 3 fedayeen. SPLIT The 23. The 23 in return for an unspecified number of fedayeen. I doubt that the Israelis will agree. Pressure is not so bad on us. SPLIT Some claim that they have dual citizenship. If they have an American fighting in the Israeli army we would have a tough case. Nationalized '85 We are now trying to determine [citizenship questions]. SPLIT Ideal would be '85 not releasing prisoners '85 Germans have caved in. Swiss are willing to hold out. SPLIT Probably will cave. Germans are '85 Brandt sent someone independently to Amman. He is very weak '85 SPLIT Definitely I do. In terms of time. The Sixth Fleet began to move'97 first they were hysterical and then they started releasing prisoners. SPLIT There are quite a few people who do not think it is a good idea. Only for evacuation purposes would be best for us to go in. Sisco feels that the King would not stand after we left if we went in and then pulled out. SPLIT Yes. Israelis go in. If there is a war'85 SPLIT If it comes out this way. SPLIT We should get a plan started to start boycotting countries where planes are taken. SPLIT '85 encourage King to move against Fedayeen. Helms '85 SPLIT It would strap us militarily. Use all our available military reserve. The JCS is not anxious to do this. SPLIT This is not the problem anyway. SPLIT We can urge Hussain to move against Fedayeen and we would militarily support it'97with air support. SPLIT Ideal would be if the King could clean up the Fedayeen with our air support. SPLIT We have a brigade in Europe that we have put on maneuvers. The 82nd from the US to follow behind it. SPLIT Most of the Americans out. Otherwise it is between '85 problem for Fedayeen because Israelis may move. Ideal for them would have been . .. SPLIT General Haig reached the exact same conclusion I did quite independently'97that the Sixth Fleet had a tremendous impact on the releasing of prisoners. 1 'a0 :: Options in Jordan As you continue to think about the decisions we may face in Jordan, you may wish to consider some of the broader issues raised. The Broader Situation and U.S. Interests Two issues are now being contested in Jordan (1) Who is to control the Palestinian movement? (2) What balance of political forces is to control Jordan? The Three Principal Contingencies A situation now exists in Jordan which may cause King Hussein to seek U.S. or other assistance in an all-out showdown with the fedayeen. These seem to be the main contingencies that will be faced: 1. The King and army vs. the fedayeen alone . It seems generally agreed in the intelligence community and in the U.S. Embassy in Amman that the Jordanian army can manage the situation as long as only the fedayeen'97and not outside troops'97are ranged against the regime. It is possible in this situation that Jordanian forces might need some materiel support. It has been our assumption that there would be no strong argument against supplying any reasonable support. Such assistance could be airlifted both as a demonstration and for prompt delivery. The main issue to be considered in connection with this contingency is: If the regime unexpectedly turns out to be too weak to win this battle with its own forces, should there be intervention to support it? A key judgment to be made is how much difference outside intervention might make in such a situation. The principal arguments for such intervention are: It would prevent'97at least as long as U.S. troops are present'97dominance by a group that would offer almost no hope of a Palestine settlement. It might still be possible that stability could be rescued with the help of the army. It is also important for the U.S. to demonstrate its support for responsible regimes. In short, a risky intervention would be preferable to the certainty of radical control over the situation. The argument against such intervention is that if Hussein is too weak to stand up against domestic opposition, outside intervention can only save his regime for a limited period of time. Attempting to bolster it in the absence of sufficient internal strength could put whoever intervenes into a position of supporting a minority cause against effective majority guerrilla opposition in a country without access to the Mediterranean where the U.S. would have a difficult time supporting sustained military operations. Intervention could cause a fedayeen reaction against U.S. installations elsewhere in the Mid-East. In any case, there may not be much of a real choice since if the King appears about to fall, the Israelis may very well intervene on their own or at least seize the heights from which the fedayeen have been shelling Israeli settlements. 2. The second contingency: King Hussein and the army vs. the fedayeen and Iraqi troops . Even if one judged that Hussein should not be supported if he cannot control the fedayeen alone, one might judge intervention quite justified if the 17,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan stepped in. Before considering the question of armed intervention, it would be prudent to look at the possibilities for non-military action that might precede armed intervention or perhaps even make it unnecessary. A request from Hussein for Soviet restraint on Iraq might help. Intelligence indicates that Nasser is prepared to give diplomatic and possibly military support in the event of Iraqi intervention. The Shah might mount a show of force on Iraq'92s border. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait might threaten to cut off financial support for the fedayeen. Finally, the greatest political assist to Hussein might well be the capacity to demonstrate hope for progress in peace negotiations. If political actions fail, then a judgment must be made whether armed intervention seems in the U.S. interest . The argument for is that'97in addition to the basic objective of trying to save a regime that offers some hope of the stability necessary for peace'97the U.S. would be supporting a responsible government against a threat from foreign forces. Such a stand is a necessary part of the U.S. posture. It would be possible to justify this as an in-and-out operation. The main arguments against are the operational difficulty of sustaining such an operation and the possibility of a general Arab reaction. This operation would have to be sustained entirely by air (unless we used an overland route across Israel). It would require dipping into the reserve of strategic forces in the U.S.'97leaving us little for other contingencies. Sustaining such an operation by air would be extremely difficult without a staging base in the eastern Mediterranean, and there is good reason to doubt their availability under these circumstances. If political actions fail and if armed intervention of some sort in support of Hussein seems desirable, then there are two related questions : a. Would air attacks against Iraqi forces be sufficient ? Pro . Iraqi forces are 60 miles northeast of Amman and, to be militarily effective would have to travel on an open road and would be vulnerable to air attacks which could presumably prevent their arrival in Amman. Also, air strikes are not likely to produce the same reactions either by other Arabs or by the Soviets as a major ground action would. Even Israeli air strikes would avoid the connotation of invasion and takeover. Con . Air strikes are not operationally useful against the fedayeen. They are dispersed among the population and their concentrations and the fighting around them will be in such small areas as to make air targeting very difficult. If intervention had to reach beyond the Iraqis, air strikes would probably be inadequate. 3. The third contingency: armed intervention for evacuation. If there is complete chaos in Amman and Jordanian forces lose control, it is probable that armed intervention could not with assurance save either the American community or the hijacking hostages. If, however, the army remains in control of parts of the city and Americans can collect there, armed intervention could save them. Even in this situation, it seems unlikely that the hijacking hostages could be saved. There is one other important aspect of this option: It is possible that an intervention primarily for evacuation could temporarily bolster Hussein'92s regime. It could, if well timed, amount to a U.S. show of force without the political onus of sustained intervention. It seems most likely that if intervention comes it would come this way. 1 'a0 :: Mr. President, I wanted to bring you up to date on the number of things that have developed since I last spoke to you. 2 First of all, Bill decided to put out the statement in his own name which was very good'97it made it tougher. 3 SPLIT The second thing is I don'92t know whether I have said this to you but they have come back in. They withdrew and now they are back in with tanks. The King has appealed to us again for immediate help but it is night there now. He has also asked us for reconnaissance. [ 4 lines not declassified ] SPLIT We have put that unit in Germany on alert. It was on near alert anyway, and I just wanted to warn you that if this thing keeps up within the next 24 hours I would guess by tomorrow morning we may reach the decision point as between U.S. and Israeli action'97that is if the King loses the tank battle. And there is nothing we can do now, except the things we are doing which are all pretty strong. SPLIT We are prepared for our air action, Mr. President. We can run two hundred sorties a day from the carriers. The land-based planes'97 we have had a full study made that looks pretty grim. The only fields we could use are in Turkey and the Turks almost certainly won'92t give us permission. The only other fields would be in Greece or Crete and for that we would have to use air refueling and it would take us 8 days to get them ready. SPLIT But the third carrier is on the way and within 8 days that can add to it and that would increase it by '85 SPLIT That is in SHAPE. SPLIT Well, they could do a good job on them. Their handicap is that if that fails they can'92t follow it up with very much unless we want to get ground forces fighting the Syrians which is a rough decision to make. SPLIT The Syrians would fear it. Of course, there'92s a third problem that we may not have any choice about'97I don'92t think the Israelis would hold still for very long if the Syrians seem to be winning. They seem already to have mobilized a bit, which is a good deterrent. SPLIT Incidentally, we picked up an intelligence report this morning'97 not very reliable'97but interesting that the Russians gave the Syrians a carte blanche which proves when you told me Friday night they may be playing us, your instinct about the Russians is usually remarkable. 6 SPLIT Just to keep us quiet. SPLIT No, it was absolutely right that we don'92t get anywhere near the situation where we seem to be egging on the Israelis, because they don'92t need any encouragement, and it should be at the '85 SPLIT Yeah, but that'92s tough to work against the Syrians. SPLIT But that'92s another that can work both ways, if we go in and then they get killed. And then I don'92t know what the Congressional reaction would be if we got involved. If we did it in a two or three-day operation, I think we'92ll be all right'97or even a week. SPLIT To save Jordan and to prevent a general Mid-East war. But it'92s tougher if we do it. SPLIT And curiously enough, we might get more support if the Israelis do it. My major worry is if it doesn'92t work and another little country '85 It will work if we are determined enough, but these Syrians are the craziest of the lot. SPLIT Nobody has any question about that. SPLIT Well, and they'92ve beat them to a pulp once before and they haven'92t improved that much. Of course, it may still be that the Jordanian armor can defeat the Syrians. The original estimate of CIA was that the King could handle the Syrians and the Fedayeen simultaneously. 8 The situation in Amman from the health point of view is very bad; many people killed and there seems to be a cholera epidemic. SPLIT So, it'92s a miserable situation. It is night now, so nothing is going to be happening now for another 12 hours anyway. There isn'92t any decision needed. I only took the liberty of calling you to alert you that this may be coming up. SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT Right, but the '85 SPLIT I didn'92t ask Rogers to make that statement. What we had recommended to them was just to send the note. But I have to say in their defense that the acts we undertook last week pretty much put us in that posture where it would have been hard not to do something. SPLIT Oh, I don'92t think they will give you any trouble. SPLIT I agree with you. SPLIT Well, our action would have to be overwhelming. SPLIT We can'92t have another even three-months'92 war'97trouble against these God-damned Syrians. SPLIT Right, Mr. President. :: to review the situation as it had developed over the past 24 hours with the reported entry of Syrian forces into Jordan and the decisions made during the night. Dr. SPLIT stated that at 5:15 that morning Ambassador Rabin had called and reported that Irbid had fallen to the Syrian forces, that the Israeli Government did not believe their intervention should be limited to air action alone, and that they had posed a series of questions and conditions on which they would like a response within three hours. Later, at about 6:45 a.m. Ambassador Rabin had called again and stated that Israeli reconnaissance had observed Syrian units south of Irbid but they were not sure whether the units represented security forces or were the vanguard for a move south. The Israelis stated that the King could maintain his position for at least another day or more. The Israelis had no territorial ambitions vis-'e0-vis Jordan, however, they did believe that an attack in support of the King must have some '93political cause'94 and that some adjustment of a technical nature would have to be made as a result of their attack to preclude future technical difficulties. Among Israeli conditions were assurances that the U.S. would protect Israel against Soviet counteraction. 2 Following this call, Dr. SPLIT then called the SPLIT pointed out, that they have no territorial designs in Jordan, although this certainly remains to be seen. Secretary SPLIT agreed but noted it might not be sufficient to do the job. The SPLIT stated that those conditions established yesterday by Israel occurred before the exchange with the Israelis the previous night. Assistant Secretary SPLIT stated that the only thing the British know at this point is that we have conveyed the message they received from the King requesting intervention. 8 The SPLIT how he thought the situation should be played. Dr. SPLIT stated that it would be most difficult to specifically inform the Congress that we were working in collaboration with the Israelis. On the other hand, we might keep our consultation in the most general terms with some emphasis on the fact that it might be necessary to use U.S. military forces short of intervention and that before using these forces we would consult. The SPLIT commented that the Israelis will not want us to inform the Soviets for purely military reasons and they certainly would not want us to go to the Soviets in the role of negotiating Israeli military action. The SPLIT then commented that he believed the first thing that must be done is to provide them with a military briefing, as Mr. SPLIT was correct and that he saw this point. He added that Ziegler should say nothing beyond the fact that we have stated our position, that the Secretary of State'92s statement of yesterday 11 stands on its own, and that we are watching the situation most carefully. It is important that we do consult with the Congress before the Israelis move so that we achieve their cooperation. Dr. SPLIT confirmed that he favored the action as outlined by Secretary SPLIT replied that there would be a meeting of the WSAG at noon. 12 Secretary SPLIT added that it was very important that no one suspect that we have been moving jointly with the Israelis on this issue. The SPLIT suggested late in the afternoon. The
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confirmed that military intelligence suggested that the spearhead was on a route which led to Amman. SPLIT stated: '93At this point, my main concern before any intervention by Israel or the United States is the Congressional attitude and the lack of public understanding of this problem. Whatever we do we should make it clear that Jordan has been attacked and that the survival of the King is crucial from the U.S. interest, especially the long-term perspective. Finally, if there is to be intervention, it must be done quickly with intervening forces moving in rapidly and pulling out rapidly.'94 The SPLIT stated that we should not give the Israelis a go-ahead at this time, but that we should tell them to be prepared to move. The SPLIT added that they might strike Syrian air fields. Secretary SPLIT stated that they have personnel also in Jordan and should certainly feel an obligation. Assistant Secretary SPLIT commented that we should make our contacts now in the event of a possible need to intervene by U.S. forces for the evacuation of U.S. citizens. The SPLIT suggested that we also consider giving to the Congressional leadership the military facts of life right now, perhaps through a military briefing. We could tell them that we have prepared evacuation contingency plans but that nothing has been decided. The SPLIT commented that he did not think that the Congressmen would press us that hard. The SPLIT '92s idea of a briefing was preferable. Secretary SPLIT has suggested. Secondly, we can tell the leaders that we will not intervene without consultation but we must be careful not to deflate the balloon. One of the operative pressures on the other side is their fear of a unilateral U.S. move. The SPLIT and elaborated further in the conversation. The SPLIT asked about Senator Mansfield. The
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stated that it appeared the Israelis had determined that air action alone would not be adequate in view of the deteriorating military situation. SPLIT added that we could not assess the time of possible Israeli intervention, that we would not know the hour and that we would probably not have advance notice, although he did not believe that the Israelis could launch attacks prior to Tuesday morning. 4 The question at hand was at what point our coordinating with the Israelis would make their action irreversible. This morning, he stated, it would be necessary to arrive at a new decision on the issue posed by Israel to combine both ground and air action in any intervention which they might undertake. Secretary SPLIT then stated that before the Israelis move one of the conditions listed by them early that morning was the requirement that the King know what they were doing and be in full agreement with it. For this reason, State had sent a message to Embassy Amman to confirm that the King in fact does wish to have Israeli air and ground support. 5 A second issue which must be resolved rapidly is the fact that the Israeli Government apparently insists on establishing liaison with the Jordanian Government before taking any military action. Finally, they have made it clear, as Dr. SPLIT suggested we might again consider the United Nations. SPLIT cautioned that another twenty-four hour delay might be too much for the King'92s morale. Perhaps it would be better, he suggested, to inform the King and the Israelis that we agreed in principle to air and ground intervention, subject to final review sometime later that day. It was obvious that the King would agree with Israeli air strikes and perhaps we might urge them to initiate at least the air strikes that day. Secretary SPLIT then stated that while there would be no further diplomatic move toward the Soviets, he hoped that the SPLIT stated that he would suggest air action today and if that proved to be defective, we would have bought at least some time before having to decide on full intervention. At the same time, we could tell the Israelis that we agree to both actions in principle. The SPLIT commented that in any event, the Israeli communication of early Monday morning would be a good vehicle for inquiring again as to the King'92s view. 6 The SPLIT whether or not we had coordinated possible action with the British and what the British plans were. SPLIT replied that they have no forces that could assist and that Mr. Hume had suggested that they would do nothing. Secretary SPLIT stated that we have not really put it to the British in these terms. Secretary SPLIT said that if we say '93yes, we have consulted with the Israelis'94, this is tantamount to collusion. Maybe we would be much better off just suggesting benevolent acquiescence. The :: then stated that the important issue was whether or not the Syrians were actually moving south with the view toward taking Amman or whether they intended merely to carve out an enclave in northern Jordan. Admiral SPLIT stated that he agreed with the overall assessment of the situation and was relieved to learn, as the Israeli Ambassador pointed out, that we have some additional time. Secretary SPLIT added that although the King thought that the Syrians were moving on Amman, this was not the case in his view. Therefore, it was necessary to find out again what the King'92s feelings were with respect to Israeli intervention. In light of the possibility that the Syrians were not moving on Amman, obviously, SPLIT stated, Israel was playing it cool. They wanted liaison with the Jordanians, perhaps even a common staff for the conduct of their operations in Jordan. On balance, SPLIT insisted, it would be far better if the King could do the job himself. If he had to call on Israel, it was likely that he would be doomed in any event. Secretary SPLIT also raised the question of U.S. motivations for encouraging Israeli intervention and asked whether this was not really benefitting the Israelis more than anyone else. He judged that Israel had probably not made up its own mind yet with respect to intervention. Finally, he cautioned, it was most important that we know exactly what course of action the U.S. should pursue with respect to the Soviets. He stated: '93I am relaxed about the situation, but for God'92s sake, let'92s know what we are going to do. I am relieved to learn that we have a little more time.'94 Secretary SPLIT interjected that he was not asking for a delay but rather extreme caution before moving so that we do not get into an inflexible position. The SPLIT again made the point that previous requests for assistance from the King were based on his assumption that Syrian tanks were moving on Amman. The SPLIT commented that in his view militarily Syria was the best target, but politically Jordan was preferable. Assistant Secretary SPLIT then said that he had some severe reservations about telling Israel how to conduct their operation. It would be difficult for the United States to dictate to the Israelis in this regard. Perhaps all we should do was tell them to go ahead in principle, get an answer from the King with respect to his desires, and then suggest to Israel that they do it in such a way as to achieve maximum results and a quick solution. In any event, it would be a terrible diplomatic mess. The SPLIT asked if Israeli action against Syria was the only alternative. The SPLIT then recalled that Allon had stated Sunday that action against Egypt was not necessary. The SPLIT asked if it might not be possible to start close air reconnaissance that day. Assistant Secretary SPLIT then asked, if the King falls, what will the Israelis have achieved? Admiral SPLIT referred to the message received on Sunday from the Israelis in which they expressed a desire to establish liaison with the Jordanians. Dr. SPLIT stated that this would be difficult to judge since we would have some difficulty on the ground in Amman communicating with the King and that we had used a combination of radio and telephone. The SPLIT asked whether or not we should tell the United Kingdom about our plans if we decide to support Israeli intervention. Dr. SPLIT asked how we should play Israeli intervention. Should we suggest that the Israelis initiated this action on their own with U.S. knowledge or in fact with U.S. encouragement? The SPLIT stated that what we are really talking about, however, is Israeli intervention. This could lead to a new Middle East war. If we are to give the Israelis a go-ahead, the results could be most serious. Congress, Secretary SPLIT stated, must know the consequences of these actions. The Soviets also must know. The Soviets have to be aware of what is being done and why, if we are to avoid another confrontation with the Soviet Union. We also have the problem, Secretary SPLIT stated, that everyone will suspect that we plotted with the Israelis for the action. Thus, we will need very careful and detailed Congressional coordination if we are to acquiesce in Israeli intervention. The SPLIT stated that this was well and good but that with respect to Israeli intervention, we cannot lie to the Hill. Would it not be possible to just inform the leaders that we have discussed this with the Israeli Government but have made no decision? Secretary SPLIT then asked what we would tell Congress if we decided to go ahead with Israeli intervention. Certainly it would become public quite soon and if it comes out in the newspapers that we have worked in collaboration with the Israelis, then what. For all these reasons, Secretary SPLIT strongly suggested that we should consult with the Congress specifically about Israeli intervention. The SPLIT then stated that certainly the Soviets should know where we stand on this issue. Dr. SPLIT stated that we will need Congressional support if the going gets rough, and certainly it is necessary that we consider notifying key members of the Congress. The SPLIT said that he was talking about the situation that would come next after the Israelis move in. It was likely, he stated, that Senator Russell 10 would insist that the U.S. not intervene if and when the Israelis decide to move. Then we could say that we would move only if the super powers get involved. The SPLIT again stated that he believed we should tell the Congressmen what we know about Israeli actions and that we have been in consultation with them. We should tell them that while we will not intervene, we won'92t discourage Israel from doing so, and that if they move, it is with the King'92s blessing. Dr. SPLIT then commented that on the question of the use of U.S. forces, we need merely tell the leaders that we are making preparations in the event it is necessary to evacuate U.S. personnel. The SPLIT suggested that the group meet again before the day ended. The
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. I have been informed by Henry Kissinger and his staff that you have approved the course of action associated with enemy positions in the vicinity of the Fish-hook in the III Corps Tactical Zone. 2 Planning for B'9652 strikes is proceeding. I have discussed the matter in detail with General Wheeler, and, following those discussions, I have some observations to make. Military Execution . There is no doubt in my mind, nor in General Wheeler's mind, that the proposed strikes can be executed effectively. In accordance with the instructions provided to me by Henry Kissinger, I have asked General Wheeler to put the operational machinery in motion that is necessary if the mission is to be carried out on the currently outlined schedule. This operational planning carries minimal security risks. The order can be countermanded at any time up to 1200 GMT, Thursday, 27 February. Political Considerations . There are some facets of the matter which continue to bother me, however. This is that a number of people in other departments and agencies are aware of the possibility of this mission, simply by virtue of Ambassador Bunker's February 12 message (Saigon 2830). 3 It is reasonable to assume some of the people who saw the Bunker message would not look with favor upon this mission. It is also reasonable to believe they would then create, or attempt to create, difficulty for you and for all of us through contacts in the Congress and in the press who would likewise look with disfavor on this proposed action. By virtue of the presumed widespread knowledge of this possible mission, it would be difficult to claim, and make credible, an operational error. Equally difficult, in view of the moderate scale thus far and the currently diminishing level of enemy activity, would be the forthright approach of admitting an attack against an alleged enemy headquarters in a neutral nation. Alternative . As you can see, I have reservations about conducting the mission under current circumstances. General Wheeler shares my concern. I believe it would be better to hold this attack for a period in which the scope, intensity, and duration of enemy-initiated activity are at more pronounced levels. 4 If the enemy were to commit his main force units in major ground attacks in III Corps, that might present the backdrop behind which we could execute the mission and not be confronted with such marked risks vis-'e0-vis Congress and the press. While I submit this alternative for your consideration, I want to assure you we are proceeding as instructed previously and will continue to do so through execution unless informed otherwise. All best wishes. Melvin R. Laird 1 'a0
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. -720 SUBJECT Breakfast Plan I. Major Political/Psychological Reasons for Action A. Failure to take action in response to Saigon/Hue shellings'97especially after repeated Presidential warnings'97would appear to Hanoi as a demonstration of weakness. B. Failure to act would encourage Hanoi to use shellings and other military pressures in an effort to force major concessions at the Paris negotiations. C. The GVN will be more willing to agree to private talks, and less suspicious about our statements on the conditions for a bombing halt. Indeed, the Thieu/Bunker conversation is likely to be sticky if we respond to the latest shelling of Saigon with a request to initiate private talks. D. Retaliatory action, if combined with a proposal for private talks, will serve as a signal to the Soviets of the Administration's determination to end the war. It would be a signal that things may get out of hand. II. Arguments Against A. Domestic critics of the Vietnam war could seize on this to renew attacks on war and pressure for quick U.S. withdrawal. B. Hanoi could try to buttress domestic critics with attacks aimed at gaining large U.S. casualties. C. Could start escalatory cycle. III. Some Possible Consequences of Breakfast Plan A. Minimum Possible Consequences 1. Pro-forma Cambodian protest. B. Larger Possible Consequences 1. If attack on COSVN is formally announced as '93appropriate response'94 major protest by Cambodia is probable, cutting off prospect of resuming diplomatic relations for the present. (NVN will probably try to pressure Sihanouk on this point.) 2. Soviets could feel compelled, probably under Hanoi pressure, to register strong protest which might affect our other talks with them. 3. Hanoi will feel compelled to retaliate, should our public statements indicate action is retaliatory. IV. Scenario A. Basic Plan of Action 1. NVN military concentrations in the DMZ will be attacked 12 hours prior to Breakfast Plan. This attack, in response to currently well publicized NVN buildup in the DMZ, will be acknowledged as the '93appropriate response'94 to the shelling of Saigon and Hue. This would have the following advantages: (a) it would indicate a response; (b) it would divert public attention; (c) it would therefore enable Cambodia to play down the Breakfast Plan and; (d) it would still show restraint. 2. Breakfast Plan will be treated as a routine military operation within the framework of our current military actions in Cambodian territory and not publicly or in any messages identified as a retaliatory action against the shelling of Saigon and Hue. Hanoi is likely to recognize the action as our response, without a public statement. Any public statement identifying it as a retaliatory action, on the other hand, would be more likely to induce retaliatory actions by Hanoi, a major protest by Cambodia, a Soviet protest, and major domestic criticism in the press. 3. The military action will be combined with an effort in Paris to initiate private talks. B. Press Scenario 1. The attacks on the DMZ will be publicly announced with no additional comment. If the press asks whether these attacks are the '93appropriate response'94 mentioned by the President, the spokesman will state that the press can draw its own conclusions. 2. Breakfast Plan would be announced routinely by Saigon as a normal B'9652 operation against targets along the Cambodian border. The targets would not be specifically identified. 3. Press briefing and backgrounders would in no way directly identify the action as the '93appropriate response'94 to the Saigon/Hue shellings. 4. All press queries should be referred to the Saigon spokesman who will neither affirm nor deny reports of attacks on Cambodia but state that this is under investigation. With respect to any attacks against Cambodia, we will take the same public position of '93no comment'94 as in the case of bombing attacks on Laos, with the additional statement that reports of such attacks are under investigation. 5. If the Cambodians protest publicly, we will state publicly that we are investigating the Cambodian protest. 6. At no point will attacks against Cambodia be officially denied. When we reply to a Cambodian protest, we will state that we have apologized and have offered compensation. C. Diplomatic Scenario 1. On March 18, Ambassador Bunker will inform President Thieu privately about DMZ strike and Breakfast Plan and seek Thieu's immediate agreement to the initiation of private talks on this basis. 2. On March 18, following Thieu's agreement, Ambassador Lodge will be authorized to initiate a request immediately for private talks with the North Vietnamese. 3. If Cambodia makes it normal routine protest, we will agree to investigate and subsequently confirm that the raid took place in Cambodian territory, apologize, and offer compensation. 4. If Cambodia makes a major protest, we will acknowledge responsibility, offer compensation, explain that incidents along the Cambodian border occur due to the extensive VC use of military exploitation of Cambodian territory in this area, and request an ICC investigation of the area. 5. If the Soviet Union privately makes a major protest against our action, we will point out the military reasons for the action, the fact that both Saigon and Hue were shelled after full warning, that more provocative options were available but not undertaken, and that we would now like to get down to serious negotiations and have initiated a request for private talks as suggested by them. 1 'a0
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. -720 SUBJECT Possible CIA Courses of Action in Cambodia You asked that I explore in the 303 Committee two possible CIA courses of action with respect to Cambodia (a) CIA potential for creating covert paramilitary harassing operations directed against North Vietnamese Regular Forces in the sanctuary areas just over the Cambodian border (b) CIA capability for eliminating or reducing the arms traffic through Cambodia to communist forces in South Vietnam. CIA can develop the operations described in (a) above at some sacrifice to high priority operations now directed against the Viet Cong infrastructure in South Vietnam. CIA recommends against initiating such operations on the grounds of high cost versus expected low effectiveness against the large concentrations of regular NVN forces there. 2 The Committee members endorsed the CIA recommendation. With respect to (b) above, CIA has identified a number of Cambodian army officers who are actively involved in supporting the movement of arms and ammunition through Cambodia to communist forces in South Vietnam. CIA does not now have direct, secure and controlled access to any of these officers but is continuing to explore vigorously opportunities in this direction. CIA is skeptical that any of the officers involved in the arms traffic would be now susceptible to bribery both because of the profits accruing to them from such operations as well as the personal political risks entailed in a relationship involving the United States. 3 CIA has pointed out that if recent U.S. diplomatic approaches to Cambodia result in the formal resumption of full diplomatic relations, CIA will gain an operating base for improved intelligence collection and covert action in support of U.S. diplomatic measures aimed at attempting to convince Prince Sihanouk that it is in his best interest to make an honest effort to reduce or halt the arms traffic. 4 I recommend that: 5 (a) you approve the 303 Committee's judgment that the probable effectiveness of mounting a CIA paramilitary effort against the NVN regulars in Cambodia would not be worth the expense, and (b) that as diplomatic relationships develop with Cambodia, I monitor those diplomatic and CIA steps which can be taken in an effort to eliminate or reduce the arms traffic from Cambodia to the communist forces in South Vietnam. 1 'a0
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Cambodia Options The Situation Cambodia's President Lon Nol has written asking immediate U.S. aid in arming Cambodian forces to a total of 410,000 (Tab A). 2 North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces are nearing Phnom Penh. They have moved with surprising ease against the poorly organized, ill-equipped and ill-trained Cambodian forces. It is not certain that they intend to take over the country but they may soon be in a position to do so. The Cambodian forces of 35,000 Army and 40,000 Paramilitary is being expanded rapidly'97addition of 30,000 is now underway, but it will take time for them to become effective. Fuller background was covered in my memorandum of April 22. 3 Our Charg'e9 in Phnom Penh, though perhaps excessively alarmist, reflects the concern of other foreign embassies in recommending we be prepared to evacuate American personnel from the city. 4 The Consequences of Cambodia's Fall to the Communists Cambodia's fall to the Communists would have the following seriously adverse consequences: '97In the immediate aftermath of a Communist takeover in Cambodia there would be a profound psychological shock in South Vietnam. '97Over the longer run, South Vietnam would be completely surrounded by hostile territory. '97The heretofore limited covert operations of Communist forces from Cambodia into Vietnam will become overt and much larger. '97The Communists could send in North Vietnamese units and units formed of Vietnamese residents of Cambodia. They could also form a Guerrilla movement of Cambodian ethnics in South Vietnam. The new situation might not have immediate military consequences, but would certainly begin to tell in six months or a year. '97Communist forces in South Vietnam, particularly in the Delta area, could count on obtaining all the food and military supplies they need, whereas now they suffer some shortages. '97Vietnamization would be impossible to carry out. The South Vietnamese government and army could not preserve itself against pressure from all sides without a very large continuing presence of U.S. forces. 5 '97Our negotiating position would be complicated. '97In the rest of Asia, there would be a feeling that Communism was on the march and we were powerless to stop it. Thailand in particular would be subject to greater pressure. What We Are Doing The following measures have been undertaken or are planned: '97The ARVN has undertaken several ground operations against Communist forces in Cambodia since the change of Government. Those have been fairly extensive, and have included South Vietnamese air support. One such operation which was just completed involved 2,500 men and lasted for two days. Penetration was 3 or 4 kilometers. '97An operation on a larger scale is pending, however. This will involve a multi-division effort in Svay Rieng with full air and artillery support. The initial thrust will be 7'968 kilometers, but will be joined by other forces moving to cut off the entire Parrot's Beak. It is hoped that this particular operation will cause the Communists to draw off the combat units which they are now employing against Phnom Penh in order to defend their base camps. The operation has received general approval from both the ARVN and MACV drafters, but still needs final approval from the ARVN joint general staff. '97U.S. operations have been essentially B'9652 strikes. (Tactical air operations on a small scale have been permitted for some time in the extraction of special forces teams from missions in Cambodia.) Strikes have been conducted at a rate of one or more per week against Communist base camps just opposite the Vietnamese border, mainly in III and IV Corps. '97This week strikes are planned for targets opposite the Central Highlands in II Corps, the Angel's Wing area of III Corps, and in the zone between III Corps and IV Corps southwest of the Parrot's Beak. '97These raids have been effective in destroying supplies and dislocating troop concentrations, but have not seriously interfered with Communist military plans. If continued during the major ARVN operation mentioned above, or during similar operations of this scale, the disruptive effectives could be much greater. '97One U.S. tactical air operation is now planned: Operation Patio, which will cover an area 20 miles deep into Cambodia from the Vietnamese border, about 60 miles south of the tri-border area. It will consist of tactical aircraft and forward air controllers for artillery fire, and will be backed up with teams on the ground. '97U.S. arms shipments to Cambodia have consisted of 1,500 AK'9647s, which were airlifted into Phnom Penh as of 12 noon Washington time April 22. 1,300 more will be sent in the same way tomorrow. A 1,000-man pack of U.S. arms and equipment will also go into Cambodia shortly. '97Several thousand more AK'9647s will be readied and shipped over the next week. Our Immediate Options The Lon Nol government is better than any alternative at this point. Given the likely consequences of its fall, it is in our interest to give it the moral support it needs by evidencing willingness to help and to help its struggle by giving what material assistance we can. '97 Military Assistance The Cambodians have asked for quantities of equipment far in excess of what they could use effectively or what could be delivered in time to be of help in the present situation. They now primarily need light weapons, ammunition and radios. '97Delivery of even small quantities quickly will have an important psychological effect and bolster Cambodian morale though they will not necessarily change the unfavorable military balance. '97There are two ways we can help: '97Open delivery'97this would enable us to move large quantities in quickly. But the risks are not worth it. '97Use CIA 1000-man packs'97These are available now and each fully equips a unit. They could be moved rapidly to equip three new regiments the Cambodians are forming and be delivered without directly showing our hand. If it is disclosed we would have the excuse that we had wanted to limit our commitment. I recommend that for now we stick to the CIA packs. 6 It will not meet all of the Cambodian's requests but will do enough to have some military impact in the Phnom Penh area and give a morale boost. Approve CIA Packs Prefer Open Delivery Military Operations in the Border Region Attacks against North Vietnamese/VC sanctuaries near the South Vietnam border will tie down enemy forces needed for their protection, disrupt his logistics support and take some pressure off the Cambodians. Attacks can be made by cross-border operations, tactical air, or B'9652s or a combination of these. Cross-border operations '97There are three levels. '97Shallow'972'963 miles in depth of the type now conducted by ARVN forces of brigade size supported by their own artillery and tactical area. These attacks harass the enemy and tie down some of his forces but have been insufficient to limit his offensive operations in Cambodia. '97Deeper Penetrations'97These would extend up to ten miles into Cambodia and would require forces numbering up to a division supported by tactical air and artillery. They would attack bases and headquarters now beyond reach disrupting enemy logistical support and sowing confusion which would take some pressure off Cambodia. Such attacks limited in depth or duration would be responsive to Lon Nol's desire that they go no deeper. '97Massive operations'97of multi-divisional size supported by artillery, tactical air and B'9652s seeking to permanently deny the sanctuaries to the enemy. This would seriously disrupt enemy logistical support and capability to operate either in Cambodia or against South Vietnam. Lon Nol would at least publicly criticize such attacks, however, and international repercussions could be serious. It would involve greater U.S. involvement and could provoke North Vietnamese reaction against Phnom Penh. '97 Air Attacks '97either by tactical air or B'9652's could damage enemy bases and concentrations which could not otherwise be reached. They could be independent of or in support of cross-border operations. They would have disruptive effects on enemy operations in Cambodia and Vietnam but would have their maximum effort in conjunction with ground operations. They risk disclosure, however, with potential adverse international and domestic reaction. I recommend, in the present situation, deeper penetrations of division size but not permanent investiture of the sanctuaries. The penetrations would be conducted by ARVN divisions supported by their own artillery and tactical air and by U.S. cross-border artillery, tactical and B'9652 strikes on specific targets. To further assist the ARVN forces, I recommend U.S. forces be deployed in the border area to relieve ARVN forces needed for these attacks. I recommend you approve deeper ARVN penetrations with U.S. cross-border artillery support, tactical air and B'9652 strikes. Khmer Krom and Khmer Serai Deployment '97There are 3,500 Cambodian ethnics forces now in South Vietnam equipped and trained. They are part of the Special Forces. Lon Nol asked for them and Ambassador Bunker recommends that four battalions of them be airlifted to Phnom Penh with their equipment. They would strengthen Cambodian forces at Phnom Penh and have an important desirable psychological effect in Cambodia. They lack logistical support, however, and we will have to arrange to provide it. This can be done through the South Vietnamese. I recommend we approve airlift of the Cambodian Forces to Phnom Penh as soon as possible. I have enclosed summaries of the recommendations of Ambassador Bunker (Tab B) 7 and the JCS (Tab C). 8 1 'a0 :: Meeting on Cambodia, Sunday, April 26, 1970 at 4:30 p.m. in the President's EOB Office 2 -720 PARTICIPANTS Secretary Rogers Secretary Laird The Attorney General Director Helms General Earle Wheeler Henry A. Kissinger Purpose of Meeting The purpose of today's meeting should be to consider the ramifications of authorizing the combined U.S.'96 ARVN operation into Base Area 352/353 (Fish Hook area of Cambodia containing COSVN Headquarters). Conceptually, this operation would constitute a second punch when combined with the already approved ARVN operation into the Parrot's Beak scheduled for the early morning hours of April 28th Saigon time. The combined U.S.'96 ARVN operation into Base Area 352/353 has been under preparation by MACV for several weeks but up until now, Secretary Laird has not been aware of the likelihood of its being approved and opposition can be anticipated from him as well as from the Secretary of State. The Joint Staff and MACV, however, have been proceeding with the view towards early implementation of the plan in the event you decided in favor of it. Care should be exercised at today's meeting not to surface the fact that General Wheeler has been conducting intensified planning to implement the attacks on Base Area 352/353 without the full knowledge of the Secretary of Defense. General Outlines of Plan for Attack on Base Area 352/353 '97The immediate military objective of the plan would be to destroy a main enemy headquarters area (COSVN) and troop and logistics facilities. '97The area contains the headquarters, as well as a large complex of troop logistics facilities, ammunition storage areas, hospitals, POW camps and Command and Control Headquarters for one division and six regiments. It is a primary staging area for enemy units operating in South Vietnam. The estimated enemy strength is approximately 4,000 men, with a reserve of up to 8,000 others who could be sent to the area in the event of attack. Intelligence indicates that enemy forces have been directed to defend this base area in the event of attack. '97General Wheeler will be prepared to brief the broad outlines of the plans which would involve elements of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and a brigade of the ARVN Airborne Division, together with elements of the U.S. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Total forces would consist of approximately 16,000 U.S. and 2,000 to 3,000 ARVN. It is estimated that the operation will require three to four weeks to complete and can be executed within 72 hours of receipt of orders to do so. '97 Timing . It would appear important to execute this operation in coordination with the ARVN operation in the Parrot's Beak. Assuming the ARVN operation kicks off as scheduled on the morning of the 28th, we can anticipate that knowledge of the operation will surface within two days or as early as Wednesday or Thursday Washington time. In order to obtain maximum psychological impact on the enemy and minimize the period of domestic turbulence, it would appear desirable to kick off the combined U.S.'96 ARVN operation as early as Wednesday or Thursday of this week. Furthermore, the rainy season normally commences in this part of Southeast Asia by approximately mid-May. Therefore, if you decide to approve this operation, a decision should be made to do so not later than Monday afternoon Washington time. This would enable us to get maximum benefit of the one-two punch, reduce the heat through conducting both operations simultaneously and achieve the maximum span of favorable weather. '97 Ancillary Operation . All factors considered'97troop reductions, approaching rainy season, the critical situation in Cambodia, continuing intransigence in Hanoi'97this one-two punch may constitute a major watershed in the outcome of events in Southeast Asia. For this reason, you may also wish to consider extending blanket authorization to General Abrams to conduct ground operations into the entire complex of identified enemy base areas along the Cambodian border. This authority would constitute prima facie evidence of your determination to take whatever steps are necessary to protect U.S. forces in South Vietnam as Vietnamization proceeds. It would also constitute a major threat to the continuation of enemy offensive operations against Phnom Penh. In addition to this broad authority, you may also wish to authorize additional military strikes against selected targets in North Vietnam which are directly linked to the current enemy offensive in Cambodia. These might include tactical air strikes against supplies and logistics installations adjacent to the Laotian border in North Vietnam (Ban Karai, Mu Gia and Nape Pass complexes). These actions, and those you have previously approved, when combined with a strong public announcement by you, would constitute positive evidence of your determination to take whatever steps are necessary to achieve a prompt settlement of events in Southeast Asia or at least serve to seriously disrupt the enemy's campaign against Phnom Penh. 1 'a0 :: Ground Attacks on Base Camps in Cambodia Attached at Tab A 2 is a brief summary of the two options for ground attacks on enemy base camps in Cambodia submitted by General Abrams on March 30. In developing plans for potential operations against enemy base areas, General Abrams was asked to consider two possibilities: '97An attack against targets of high military priority which could involve the use of US forces if necessary. '97Any other operation which would reduce the necessity of the involvement of US forces. With respect to military priority, MACV considered an attack on Base Area 352/353 (COSVN Hq) to be the most lucrative. He made the following significant points about this base
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cited the security surrounding Chinese Communist military movements in the Korean War and asked if we didn't think that the Chinese were being more '93open'94 in this case. :: asked if there was anybody in this Intelligence [community?] and USIB who was taking the line that it was possible for it to be a surprise attack; was it potential Pearl Harbor and Mr. :: am not at all sure that this kind of deliberately phased attack is the most likely or the most dangerous to the defense of the Offshore Islands. Because of the shallow depth of the water around Chinmen, it will be impossible to get heavy weapons ashore during the assault phase. The attack will inevitably depend on masses of lightly armed infantrymen, supported by air and artillery from the mainland. The pattern of the assault is likely to resemble that of the ChiComs in 1949 rather than any American amphibious landings of World War II. The amphibious shipping will probably consist largely of rafts, sampans and junks employed in large numbers and with little order. It seems likely that the ChiComs would make every effort to exploit surprise in making their attack. Under the cover of the very bad weather which is common during this season of the year, and utilizing small craft always in the area, it is entirely possible for the ChiComs to make a quick jump across the narrow water passage separating Chinmen from the mainland and establish a substantial beachhead in the course of a single night. SPLIT This or any other major attack will be extremely costly to the ChiComs and, if they have sensible leadership, the adventure should not prove attractive. However, we probably do not think like Chinese and their eventual decision may run counter to what seems sensible to us. The prize to them would be the elimination of a large part of Chiang's best troops, a serious blow to ChiNat and U.S. prestige worldwide, and a great lift to the ChiCom home front. On the other hand, a reverse for the ChiComs would greatly increase the already serious internal situation and would exact a heavy price in military assets. Maxwell D.
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charged in with all guns blazing, and charged in hard and with contempt in his voice for the intelligence community and he said this was pretty silly, and of course SPLIT understands the facts and figures business, this is his business; so he said there were 300 motorized junks, and 1300 sailing vessels, take 50 men each; this means that the most you can do is 100,000; you'd have to go back, and couldn't move heavy equipment; with LST's and he thinks this is for the birds; SPLIT said he had several recommendations to make; he wanted to bring two more SAC U-2s into Formosa; we gotta have intelligence; have no intelligence; implications that CIA has been doing a lousy job, make judgments on the wrong facts; SPLIT recommended keeping the 4th Carrier in the Pacific which it was due to come back apparently moving a couple of carriers into the Straits, bringing two more U-2s to Formosa; :: '93What would be the likely pattern of the attack and what the outcome?'94 We will continue to explore this subject. General SPLIT , too, share their views, with one exception. I believe that with full U.S. support the Islands can be effectively defended without tactical nuclear weapons; in any event, I am not ready to recommend their use for that purpose. RMcN * 'a0 :: considers that the landing craft required for an attack on the Chinmens or Matsu could be marshalled within 24 or 48 hours, and that the ChiComs could launch an attack on the Offshore Islands with little or no warning.
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plan which was developed followed your guidance with only some minor shift in the scheduling of certain targets between categories 1 and 2 which had the purpose of concentrating on areas such as Hanoi, Haiphong rather than just specific types of targets. The entire plan would be completed in seven days, weather permitting, and then continuing action would be repetitive strikes on those targets and shifts to other possible targets. Mining would be accomplished in all the deep water ports. The plan includes new targets not previously attacked and is designed to accomplish the maximum psychological shock. B'9652s are scheduled on a continuing basis, principally against targets in the Hanoi area. The docks were selected for a visual attack using guidance bombs. The SPLIT confirmed that they could be. He said that the commercial field could be done in a way which would avoid damaging the commercial aircraft that might be there. Admiral SPLIT pointed out the unfortunate truth that this is a very bad weather period ahead in which only one-third of the time could we expect a six hour window in a given day. So a heavy concentration of targets has been selected for all weather attack by B'9652s, F'96111s and A'966s. The plan would call for a minimum of 825 strike sorties for the initial attack phase. These would be drawn from four attack carriers, land based tactical air and B'9652 resources. The SPLIT pointed out that a significant number of the targets had never previously been attacked. I added that we also had a number of other operations for which we had plans. Admiral SPLIT confirmed this. The SPLIT said he would continue to refine the plans and the SPLIT on possible courses of action emerging out of the talks. Both believe that we should try to get an agreement even if it appears Thieu won'92t go along. If we do not, they believe we would have serious difficulty and likely fund cut-off for both assistance and military activity by June 30. Both believe that because of what we have done for South Vietnam up to now, especially May 8, our national honor will be preserved and that the October agreement with improvements meets all of the President'92s May 8 requirements. 3 Warm regards. 1 'a0
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Ceasefire Agreement I have had long and detailed discussions with Ken Rush and Tom Moorer on what must appear to you as a critical dilemma in the current negotiations being conducted by Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. On one hand, the North Vietnamese appear to be stiffening by re-opening issues once considered settled and prompting their forces in South Vietnam to prepare for action that would violate the terms of the proposed agreement. If the test proves that the North Vietnamese have deceived us, then is the time to take action to help the GVN in the South, if such help proves necessary. I am of the strong belief that little US help would be required to permit the South Vietnamese to handle any attempts of the North Vietnamese and/or Viet Cong to challenge the security of South Vietnam. Vietnamization has been successful. It was designed to give the South Vietnamese the capability to defend themselves against a North Vietnamese threat twice the size of the present NVA force in South Vietnam. We should not be surprised nor alarmed to read intelligence reports indicating that the NVA/VC goals in South Vietnam have not changed. We should expect that they will try to gain their objectives in new ways following a ceasefire. But that should not dissuade us from signing the agreement because South Vietnam is capable now of satisfactorily defending themselves against whatever attempts are made by North Vietnam. President Thieu may take exception to this reasoning. But I am convinced that he will always find reasons for demanding the continued direct military involvement of the US until you finally say no. Therefore, Ken Rush, Tom Moorer and I strongly recommend: a. Avoiding any increased US military action at this time. b. Signing the agreement now. c. Pressing for the immediate return of our POW'92s and the accounting for our MIA'92s. d. Putting the onus on the North Vietnamese to honor a ceasefire agreement. e. Reacting strongly to any North Vietnamese violations after our POW'92s are returned'97thereby gaining support from Congress and the rest of the world. 3 Melvin R. Laird}
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There is, I think, these are basically wanting to settle. We had an intelligence report today in which a very senior Chinese official said that they were pressing Hanoi to settle, that they thought the decision was already made. But these guys are just a bloody bunch of bastards. Dobrynin told me yesterday that they told the Russians that you would have to settle just before Inauguration so you can see their strategy. SPLIT They were going to meet me again early in January'97 SPLIT Well, make us go back to the October 26 draft. SPLIT We could have easily lived with it in October, but if we accept now after all this arguing for changes would make us look impotent. With this blow they are going to get, they'92re going to scream for a few weeks, but with blow they'92re going to'97 SPLIT It'92s going to make the agreement enforceable, Mr. President, they are going to be very careful. SPLIT That'92s right. SPLIT I doubt it. SPLIT It'92s been known to happen but if they thought they had that option they would have done it already. They don'92t react to our moves that way they react to their analysis of the situation. If they felt confident in being able to face us down they would have broken off the talks. SPLIT If the whole bloody country is again covered with clouds, so they have to do it with B'9652s. SPLIT No question. SPLIT You can'92t take out the power plant in the center of Hanoi, and you know if we had had 72 hours of good weather, we could have done the whole bloody thing in one blow. SPLIT The thing is going to last until the 20th now. We have had to cancel 65% of our strikes'97 SPLIT Exactly. SPLIT He'92s right on both counts. We have, Mr. President, to cancel over 50% of our targets during the dry season, and now they only have three or four days of what they consider flying weather in months. Now that just means they'92ve got the wrong airplane. SPLIT Yes. They are double loaded. That'92s like a 4,000 plane raid in World War II. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT 30 planes are like a thousand and they are flying 127 double loaded, that'92s like 250, so it'92s really between 4 and 8 thousand planes, if they got them all over there. It'92s going to break every window in Hanoi. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT Oh, yeah. SPLIT I don'92t know whether you'92ve been in Saigon when they hit 30 or 40 miles away, how the ground shakes. SPLIT Well, this one is going to be two miles outside, and there are going to be about 50 of them. I don'92t think there are going to be too many windows in Hanoi tomorrow. But it would have been good if we could have taken all power plants simultaneously. SPLIT Well we are going to get the ship yards in Haiphong, we are going to get the marshalling yards, the rail yards, Radio Hanoi, we'92ll get the transmitters at the outskirts of town. SPLIT It'92s in the center of town. SPLIT Absolutely. SPLIT But it is a lousy set of airplanes. I think they are going give them quite a shock tomorrow, we'92re going to have a little screaming here. SPLIT Absolutely. SPLIT That'92s right. They are building up. SPLIT Oh, no question about it. SPLIT Yeah. SPLIT Well, Le Duc Tho asked that we send him a message as soon as he returns. He'92s returning tomorrow. SPLIT Yeah. He'92ll be back within 6 hours'976 hours after he returns he'92ll get it. SPLIT That'92s what I mean. SPLIT Well, we are sending him another one too which he'92ll get about four hours before it hits. 3 SPLIT It'92s just going to say your talks were conducted in bad faith and the only way to settle is to go back to November 23rd. That'92s taking out the word '93administrative structure'94 which they had agreed to last week, and'97 SPLIT We are ready to do that immediately. SPLIT Well, when you really come down to it, even the Vice President caved in on us because the sum total of his recommendation was to do nothing. 4 If Congress'97when you'92ve got to go wailing to Thieu and you can'92t do anything because Congress will cut you off, you are paralyzed. SPLIT For all your reasons, I'92ve been very hesitant about it, but'97well, I myself think that, either the North Vietnamese are going to dig in, which I don'92t really believe, or they are going to cave quickly. And I think that'92s more likely. SPLIT Yeah, but they'92ve seen that'97 SPLIT That'92s right. They just cannot be sure enough of getting you. They'92ve tried it for four years and I just don'92t think they have enough self-confidence in order to do it and I think that the Chinese, actually I think the Chinese are pushing them harder than the Russians. SPLIT Oh yeah. We sent this note to the Chinese on Friday, midnight, saying the allies are a bunch of liars and they are tricking you, if you'92d like to hear our story we'92ll be glad to tell you. 6 Within 8 hours we get a phone call saying come on up and tell us why our allies are liars. And it fits in with all the intelligence reporting. SPLIT No, the bastards on their Radio today put out another insane statement about my press conference in which they said in effect this means the talks have collapsed completely, that we will never resume them unless the other side changes its approach completely, and '85 (end of tape) 1 'a0
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End of preview.
YAML Metadata
Warning:
empty or missing yaml metadata in repo card
(https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/datasets-cards)
RuleFollower – Parsed Datasets
This repository contains parsed datasets used in the RuleFollower project.
Datasets
- GWSD
- Misinfo
- Misinfo Cancer
- Bureaucracies
- Tweets23
- Tweets Congress
- Tweets News
- Tweets
- Rumoureval2019
- Hatecot
- Implicit Hate
Each folder contains a data.csv file with the parsed annotations. Each dataset is capped at 5k samples (full dataset used if <5k).
Each data file includes standardized columns:
Text: The text input for annotationid: Unique identifier for the rowsource: Name of the original dataset or paperground_truth: (Optional) Gold label, if available in the original dataset
RumorEval
- Text content: Replies to source tweets about rumored events
- Source: Gorrell et al (2019)
- Dataset: Huggingface
- Annotation goal: Classify reply stance as
support,deny,query, orcomment - Ground truth: Provided (stance label)
- Note: Only reply texts are retained for classification.
HateCoT
- Text content: Social media posts from 8 hate/offensive speech datasets
- Source: Nghiem and Daumé III (2024)
- Dataset: Github
- Annotation goal: Classify post as
benign,offensive, orhateful - Ground truth: Provided
- Note: The original HateCoT dataset combines samples from 8 hate speech datasets with diverse annotation schemes. We standardized its many fine-grained labels into 3 unified classes:
0 = Benign(e.g., "Not Hate", "Normal", "Neutral"),1 = Offensive(e.g., "Toxic", "Offensive"),2 = Hateful(e.g., "Hate", "Dehumanization", "Directed Abuse").
Tweets(2023) / Tweets News(2017) / Tweets(2020-2021)
- Text content: Tweets from different public Twitter samples spanning 2017 to 2023, focused on content moderation and related debates. Sample sizes vary across years and sources.
- Source: Gilardi et al (2023)
- Dataset: Harvard Dataverse
- Ground truth: Not provided
- Supported tasks (from annotation codebook, excluding political content tasks):
| Task ID | Task Name | Task Description Summary | Labels |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | Content Moderation Relevance | Is the tweet about content moderation? | relevant (1), irrelevant (0) |
| T3 | Problem/Solution Frame | Does the tweet portray content moderation as a problem, a solution, or neither? | problem, solution, neutral |
| T4 | Policy Frame (Moderation) | What policy dimension frames the content moderation issue? | e.g., morality, fairness, security, equality, health, ... |
| T6 | Stance on Section 230 | Does the tweet support, oppose, or remain neutral about Section 230 of U.S. law? | positive, negative, neutral |
| T7 | Topic Classification | What is the topic in relation to content moderation? | section 230, trump ban, complaints, platform policies, ... |
- Note:
- Each of these tasks has a dedicated
.txttask description underprompt/task_descriptions/. - The same dataset can be reused across tasks; task choice is controlled by the selected prompt.
- Tweets by U.S. Congress members (used for political content) are handled separately (see below).
- Each of these tasks has a dedicated
Tweets Congressional
- Text content: Tweets by U.S. Congress members (2017–2022)
- Source: Gilardi et al (2023)
- Dataset: Harvard Dataverse
- Annotation goal: Binary classification: whether tweet is political
- Ground truth: Not provided
Misinfo / Misinfo Cancer
- Text content:News headlines (The Misinfo Reaction Frames corpus is an dataset of 25k news headlines to articles that have been factchecked. The articles can be about Covid-19, Cancer or Climate Change)
- Source: Gabriel et al. (2022)
- Dataset: Github
- Annotation goal: Classify headline as misinformation or not
- Ground truth: Provided
Implicit Hate
- Text content:A dataset of English-language tweets annotated to capture both explicit and implicit hate speech. Implicit hate includes stereotypical, sarcastic, or coded language that may not be overtly hateful. The data was originally collected from Twitter and the Social Bias Inference Corpus.
- Source: Elsafoury et al. (2021)
- Dataset: Github
- Annotation goal: Classify post as
explicit_hate,implicit_hate, ornot_hate - Ground truth: Provided
- We use Stage 1 annotations for parsing:
explicit_hate: overt hate speechimplicit_hate: indirect hate speech (e.g., stereotypes, sarcasm)not_hate: no hateful content
- Note:
- The dataset originally included multiple annotation stages (e.g., fine-grained subtypes, implied statements).
- Additional parsing for Stage 2 (fine-grained) or Stage 3 (target/implied meaning) will be added later.
GWSD (Global Warming Stance Dataset)
- Text content: News spans (Opinion spans extracted from global warming news articles, published from Jan. 1, 2000 to April 12, 2020 by various U.S. news sources.)
- Source: Luo et al. (2020)
- Dataset: Github
- Annotation goal: Classify stance toward the statement: “Climate change is a serious concern”
Labels:agree,neutral, ordisagree - Ground truth: Provided
Bureaucracies
- Text content: Crisis communication texts (bureaucratic cables and memos from international crises)
- Source: Schub (2022)
- Dataset: Data
- Annotation goal:
- Info Type Task: Classify whether the text conveys
politicalormilitaryinformation relevant to Cold War crisis decision-making. - Certainty Task: Determine whether the adviser expresses the information with certainty or uncertainty.
- Info Type Task: Classify whether the text conveys
- Ground truth: Available only by "Info Type Task"
Using the Parsing Script
To convert raw datasets into the standardized format used in this folder, use the helper script:
Script: script/script_parse_dataset.py
This script loads a dataset in CSV, TSV, JSONL, or Excel format and outputs a standardized parsed file under parsed_data/.
What the Script Automatically Handles
- Detects common text columns (e.g., text, tweet, post, content)
- Detects common label columns (e.g., label, class, ground_truth, stance)
- Standardizes output columns to:
Text,id,source, andground_truth(only included if the dataset has labels).
Example
python script/script_parse_dataset.py \
--input_file example.csv \
--dataset_name example_data \
--text_col text
(Optional) Manually specifying ununsual column names:
python script/script_parse_dataset.py \
--input_file example.tsv \
--dataset_name example_data \
--text_col text \
--label_col category
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