instance_id stringlengths 11 13 | project stringclasses 2
values | bug_id stringlengths 7 9 | image_name stringlengths 27 29 | work_dir stringclasses 2
values | verification_binary stringclasses 7
values | command_options stringlengths 0 165 | target_source_files listlengths 1 10 | target_subdir listlengths 1 3 | target_vulnerability_type stringclasses 24
values | error_type stringclasses 4
values | description stringlengths 103 3.13k | vrp stringclasses 17
values | fix_patches listlengths 1 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
v8__324596281 | v8 | 324596281 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:324596281 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax --experimental-wasm-imported-strings | [
"src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc",
"src/wasm/canonical-types.cc"
] | [
"src/runtime",
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | DCHECK | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's WebAssembly tier-up mechanism within Runtime_TierUpWasmToJSWrapper (src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc). The bug was introduced by commit 08170169a305fab1dca42bc11d86d7400f25421e, which added support for the text-encoder:encodeStringToUTF8Array well-known import (WellKnownImport::... | 7000 | [
"From 2109613ad4622028778a38fb418956fab8b478b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Andreas Haas <ahaas@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 14:14:59 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm] Use correct signature index for tier-up of wasm-to-js\n wrapper\n\nThe wasm-to-js wrapper tierup used the canonicalized signature id lookup... |
v8__324747822 | v8 | 324747822 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:324747822 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc --future --fuzzing --jit-fuzzing --harmony --omit-quit --js-staging --wasm-staging --no-wasm-loop-unrolling --no-wasm-loop-peeling | [
"src/compiler/turboshaft/wasm-gc-type-reducer.cc"
] | [
"src/compiler/turboshaft"
] | Debug assertion failure | DCHECK | The vulnerability is a fatal debug assertion failure in the Turboshaft WasmGC type analyzer (WasmGCTypeAnalyzer), triggered during JIT compilation of WebAssembly modules containing GC type operations within loops. It was introduced by commit 3f2471d0abe711c92ddb3d6fe17bc22d9955f2b8, which expanded the 'uninhabited' typ... | 8000 | [
"From 8f1c8131bd1766368e9d006d0bc6b6210dd96303 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakob Kummerow <jkummerow@chromium.org>\nDate: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 16:50:53 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Merged: [wasm-imported-strings][turbofan] Use\n HeapType::kExternString\n\nand: [wasm] Introduce new heap type 'imported string'\n\n(cherry p... |
v8__325866363 | v8 | 325866363 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:325866363 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc --future --fuzzing --harmony --omit-quit --js-staging --wasm-staging | [
"src/wasm/wasm-code-manager.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Out-of-bounds write | RUNTIME_CRASH | Protected Wasm instructions did not get their own safepoint entries in `src/wasm/wasm-code-manager.cc`, so trap handling could fall back to an earlier safepoint with stale tagged spill-slot information. When an out-of-bounds Wasm memory access raised an exception, V8 used the wrong safepoint metadata during stack scann... | 7000 | [
"From 955d1972ef0a32cf44fc27cd32d055a7ddc30fcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org>\nDate: Wed, 21 Feb 2024 15:14:49 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm] Ensure empty safepoints for protected instructions\n\nProtected instructions do not emit a safepoint, except in debug code.\nHence we ... |
v8__325878101 | v8 | 325878101 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:325878101 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | --wasm-wrapper-tiering-budget=1 | [
"src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc"
] | [
"src/runtime"
] | Type confusion | DCHECK | In Runtime_TierUpWasmToJSWrapper (src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc), when tiering up a wasm-to-JS wrapper triggered by a call_indirect instruction, the code iterates over all entries in the instance's dispatch_tables array to locate the table containing the function reference. However, the dispatch_tables ProtectedFixedArra... | 12000 | [
"diff --git a/src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc b/src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc\nindex 4bfda038b9..bac78edc05 100644\n--- a/src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc\n+++ b/src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc\n@@ -612,6 +612,7 @@ RUNTIME_FUNCTION(Runtime_TierUpWasmToJSWrapper) {\n int table_count = trusted_data->dispatch_tables()->length();... |
v8__325893559 | v8 | 325893559 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:325893559 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | --wasm-wrapper-tiering-budget=1 | [
"src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc"
] | [
"src/runtime"
] | Out-of-bounds read | DCHECK | An out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in V8's WebAssembly tier-up logic inside Runtime_TierUpWasmToJSWrapper (src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc). When a Wasm module uses the generic wasm-to-js wrapper and an indirect function call triggers tier-up, the runtime iterates over all WasmDispatchTables to locate the entry mat... | 12000 | [
"From 7330f46163e8a2c10a3d40ecbf554656f0ac55e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Andreas Haas <ahaas@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 16:27:22 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm] Add bounds check in tier-up of wasm-to-js wrapper\n\nThe entry index in the WasmApiFunctionRef was used to look for the given\nWasmApiFunct... |
v8__327740539 | v8 | 327740539 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:327740539 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax --fuzzing --stress-background-compile --parallel-compile-tasks-for-lazy | [
"src/ast/scopes.cc"
] | [
"src/ast"
] | Type confusion | RUNTIME_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's background compilation path due to an unsafe cross-thread handle dereference in Scope::NewHomeObjectVariableProxy (src/ast/scopes.cc). When background compilation (via BackgroundCompileTask/LazyCompileDispatcher) lazily parses a function that contains a super property expre... | 15000 | [
"From 8f477f936c9b9e6b4c9f35a8ccc5e65bd4cb7f4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Shu-yu Guo <syg@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 14:55:28 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] [parser] Fix home object proxy to work off-thread\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n\nBecau... |
v8__329130358 | v8 | 329130358 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:329130358 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | --expose-gc --jit-fuzzing --wasm-staging | [
"src/objects/objects-body-descriptors-inl.h"
] | [
"src/objects"
] | Use-after-free | RUNTIME_CRASH | A use-after-free vulnerability exists in V8's WasmInternalFunction GC body descriptor. WasmInternalFunction::BodyDescriptor::IterateBody() in src/objects/objects-body-descriptors-inl.h does not call IterateCodePointer for the 'code' field (an IndirectPointer<Code> at kCodeOffset = kEndOfStrongFieldsOffset, outside the ... | 7000 | [
"From b93975a48c722c2e5fe9b39437738eb2e23dac74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Andreas Haas <ahaas@chromium.org>\nDate: Mon, 18 Mar 2024 15:25:15 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm][gc] Scan the code field of the WasmInternalFunction\n\nThe code field in the WasmInternalFunction is a code pointer since\nhttps://crrev.co... |
v8__332081797 | v8 | 332081797 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:332081797 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --experimental-wasm-exnref --allow-natives-syntax | [
"src/wasm/constant-expression-interface.cc",
"src/wasm/baseline/liftoff-compiler.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm",
"src/wasm/baseline"
] | Type confusion | DCHECK | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's WebAssembly exception handling due to an inconsistency in how the null value is represented for the `kWasmNullExnRef` type. In `DefaultValueForType` within `src/wasm/constant-expression-interface.cc`, when initializing default values for `kRefNull`-kinded types, the conditi... | 11500 | [
"From cf03d55db2a0b7c5ff62e08ff5ad52312f6da0b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Thibaud Michaud <thibaudm@chromium.org>\nDate: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 19:36:55 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm][exnref] Fix default value for null exnref\n\nR=manoskouk@chromium.org\n\nBug: 332081797\nChange-Id: Ied777935946c880a78e2011040a4d9ab... |
v8__334120897 | v8 | 334120897 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:334120897 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing --no-wasm-bounds-checks | [
"src/wasm/wasm-objects.tq",
"src/compiler/wasm-compiler.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm",
"src/compiler"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in V8's WebAssembly implementation due to a security boundary violation in the JS-to-Wasm call path. The root cause is that WasmFunctionData (a HeapObject living inside the V8 sandbox) holds a func_ref field that determines which call_target (JIT-compiled code) gets invoked. Becaus... | 6000 | [
"diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore\nindex b4c6ec19d5c..8140af60a0f 100644\n--- a/.gitignore\n+++ b/.gitignore\n@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@\n !/third_party/v8\n !/third_party/wasm-api\n /tools/builtins-pgo/profiles/*.profile\n+/tools/builtins-pgo/profiles/profiles_version\n /tools/clang\n /tools/gcmole/bootstrap\n /tools/g... |
v8__336009921 | v8 | 336009921 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:336009921 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/wasm/wrappers.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | The V8 JS-to-Wasm wrapper mechanism lacks a runtime signature verification between the wrapper code and the actual Wasm internal function it dispatches to. When a Wasm exported function is called from JavaScript, execution flows through three stages: JS → JS-to-Wasm wrapper → Wasm internal function. The wrapper (built ... | 5000 | [
"From e25efe6cf28b8a7dfc6de89ac16fd2a77f5e281d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakob Kummerow <jkummerow@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 11 Jun 2024 19:32:24 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm][sandbox] Verify signatures in js-to-wasm wrappers\n\nThis ports the recently introduced signature verification from\ncall_ref to comp... |
v8__340221135 | v8 | 340221135 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:340221135 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | --module | [
"src/compiler/access-info.cc",
"src/maglev/maglev-graph-builder.cc"
] | [
"src/compiler",
"src/maglev"
] | Incorrect JIT optimization | DCHECK | TurboFan's JSNativeContextSpecialization::BuildPropertyStore function (js-native-context-specialization.cc) does not handle the kModuleExport PropertyAccessInfo kind. When a JIT-compiled function attempts to store to a module namespace export (e.g., m.foo = 2), TurboFan obtains kModuleExport access info for the named p... | 7000 | [
"From b3c01ac1e60afc9addad9942f7a9a6c5e8a4a6da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Shu-yu Guo <syg@chromium.org>\nDate: Mon, 13 May 2024 11:23:20 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] [compiler] Don't build AccessInfo for storing to module\n exports\n\nBug: 340221135\nChange-Id: I5af35be6ebf6a69db1c4687107503575b23973c4\nReviewed-on... |
v8__342602616 | v8 | 342602616 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:342602616 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | --wasm-staging --no-wasm-lazy-compilation --no-liftoff --no-wasm-loop-peeling --no-wasm-loop-unrolling --turboshaft-wasm | [
"src/compiler/turboshaft/wasm-gc-type-reducer.cc"
] | [
"src/compiler/turboshaft"
] | Type confusion | DCHECK | In WasmGCTypeAnalyzer::Run() (wasm-gc-type-reducer.cc), the loop-header revisit logic calls CreateMergeSnapshot with a hardcoded reachable = {true, true} for the pair of (old_snapshot, new_snapshot). However, after ProcessBlock(loop_header) re-processes the loop header using backedge type information, certain phi opera... | 7000 | [
"diff --git a/src/compiler/turboshaft/wasm-gc-type-reducer.cc b/src/compiler/turboshaft/wasm-gc-type-reducer.cc\nindex 789d628f83..8918cfb102 100644\n--- a/src/compiler/turboshaft/wasm-gc-type-reducer.cc\n+++ b/src/compiler/turboshaft/wasm-gc-type-reducer.cc\n@@ -206,8 +206,9 @@ void WasmGCTypeAnalyzer::ProcessStru... |
v8__342866373 | v8 | 342866373 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:342866373 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/codegen/interface-descriptors.h"
] | [
"src/codegen"
] | Type confusion | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | The WasmJSToWasmWrapperDescriptor and WasmToJSWrapperDescriptor in src/codegen/interface-descriptors.h were incorrectly marked with SANDBOX_EXPOSED_DESCRIPTOR(kJSEntrypointTag) and SANDBOX_EXPOSED_DESCRIPTOR(kWasmEntrypointTag), respectively. This registered the JSToWasmWrapperAsm and WasmToJsWrapperAsm builtins in the... | 5000 | [
"diff --git a/src/codegen/interface-descriptors.h b/src/codegen/interface-descriptors.h\nindex f5a9ab95092..f7751c4e14a 100644\n--- a/src/codegen/interface-descriptors.h\n+++ b/src/codegen/interface-descriptors.h\n@@ -2421,7 +2421,7 @@ class WasmFloat64ToTaggedDescriptor final\n class WasmJSToWasmWrapperDescriptor ... |
v8__343407073 | v8 | 343407073 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:343407073 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/wasm/wasm-objects.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A V8 sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in the WebAssembly dispatch table mechanism that allows control-flow hijacking within the WASM RWX memory region. The root cause is that WasmTrustedInstanceData::module_object() (wasm-objects-inl.h:279) reads through the untrusted WasmInstanceObject::module_object field, which r... | 5000 | [
"diff --git a/src/builtins/js-to-js.tq b/src/builtins/js-to-js.tq\nindex b605d84..e9bea45 100644\n--- a/src/builtins/js-to-js.tq\n+++ b/src/builtins/js-to-js.tq\n@@ -72,9 +72,8 @@ transitioning javascript builtin JSToJSWrapper(\n js-implicit context: NativeContext, receiver: JSAny, target: JSFunction)(\n ..... |
v8__343748812 | v8 | 343748812 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:343748812 | /src/v8 | out/arm64.debug.asan/d8 | --wasm-staging | [
"src/wasm/baseline/liftoff-assembler.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm/baseline"
] | Incorrect code generation | DCHECK | The root cause is a bug in `LiftoffAssembler::DropValue()` in `src/wasm/baseline/liftoff-assembler.cc`. When a WebAssembly exception value is dropped from the Liftoff baseline compiler's virtual stack state during `try/catch` handling, the old implementation simply used `std::copy` to shift the remaining `VarState` slo... | 7000 | [
"diff --git a/src/wasm/baseline/liftoff-assembler.cc b/src/wasm/baseline/liftoff-assembler.cc\nindex 3069026dd7..0e80907082 100644\n--- a/src/wasm/baseline/liftoff-assembler.cc\n+++ b/src/wasm/baseline/liftoff-assembler.cc\n@@ -435,12 +435,13 @@ void LiftoffAssembler::DropExceptionValueAtOffset(int offset) {\n ... |
v8__344343031 | v8 | 344343031 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:344343031 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/objects/shared-function-info.h",
"src/objects/shared-function-info.cc"
] | [
"src/objects"
] | Type confusion | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A sandbox escape vulnerability exists because V8 trusts `SharedFunctionInfo::formal_parameter_count` even though the value resides in attacker-corruptible sandbox memory. By combining a function's code with a mismatched `SharedFunctionInfo` parameter count, V8 can push and pop the wrong number of arguments, creating st... | 5000 | [
"From 4065564213f5c18c15c6bfa72d735e9050004be8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Samuel=20Gro=C3=9F?= <saelo@chromium.org>\nDate: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 14:23:31 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [sandbox] Validate parameter count in\n InterpreterEntryTrampoline\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n... |
v8__344963941 | v8 | 344963941 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:344963941 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/regexp/regexp-interpreter.cc"
] | [
"src/regexp"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | The BacktrackStack::peek() method in src/regexp/regexp-interpreter.cc guards against underflow with only a DCHECK(!data_.empty()), which is elided in release builds. BacktrackStack uses a base::SmallVector with stack-allocated (OS stack) backing storage inside RawMatch(). Since Irregexp bytecode resides on the V8 heap ... | 5250 | [
"From 8859e5e21f4b5e587d9b75839c27befbdf1b9ddd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: pthier <pthier@chromium.org>\nDate: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 11:06:57 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [regexp] Harden backtrack strack access in interpreter\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n\nP... |
v8__348084786 | v8 | 348084786 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:348084786 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --expose-gc --allow-natives-syntax --sandbox-testing --experimental-wasm-memory64 | [
"src/builtins/js-to-wasm.tq"
] | [
"src/builtins"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A V8 sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in the JSToWasmWrapperHelper builtin (src/builtins/js-to-wasm.tq). When a JavaScript-to-WebAssembly call wrapper returns, it must pop all arguments from the stack. To calculate the pop count, it reads `target.shared_function_info.length` (an int16 field on the SharedFunctionInfo... | 5000 | [
"diff --git a/src/builtins/js-to-wasm.tq b/src/builtins/js-to-wasm.tq\nindex 33c4790aa9..080714fe6a 100644\n--- a/src/builtins/js-to-wasm.tq\n+++ b/src/builtins/js-to-wasm.tq\n@@ -757,7 +757,6 @@ macro JSToWasmWrapperHelper(\n // `SharedFunctionInfo::length`.\n let popCount = arguments.length;\n- const declare... |
v8__348598133 | v8 | 348598133 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:348598133 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax | [
"src/compiler/wasm-compiler.cc",
"src/wasm/wasm-js.cc"
] | [
"src/compiler",
"src/wasm"
] | Out-of-bounds write | DCHECK | In WasmWrapperGraphBuilder::BuildWasmToJSWrapper (src/compiler/wasm-compiler.cc), the kJSFunctionArityMismatch branch allocates the args SmallVector with size pushed_count + 7, where pushed_count = max(expected_arity, wasm_count - suspend). However, the padding loop 'for (int i = wasm_count - suspend; i < expected_arit... | 11000 | [
"diff --git a/src/wasm/wasm-js.cc b/src/wasm/wasm-js.cc\nindex 86b0c1d6e18..2d4af99a1d2 100644\n--- a/src/wasm/wasm-js.cc\n+++ b/src/wasm/wasm-js.cc\n@@ -2076,13 +2076,15 @@ bool HasJSPromiseIntegrationFlag(Isolate* isolate, Local<Object> usage_obj,\n // {outer_sig} must be: [externref ti*] -> [to*]\n bool IsSuspen... |
v8__348793144 | v8 | 348793144 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:348793144 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | --wasm-staging | [
"src/builtins/js-to-wasm.tq"
] | [
"src/builtins"
] | Type confusion | DCHECK | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's WebAssembly JavaScript Promise Integration (JSPI) JS-to-Wasm wrapper. It was introduced by commit 125189fa267 ('[wasm][jspi] Remove explicit suspender param in export wrapper'), which added the new WasmPromising builtin that processes all wasm function parameters starting f... | 8000 | [
"From 96ce32ea56b320a738f82c6ab0bbc75234688aab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Thibaud Michaud <thibaudm@chromium.org>\nDate: Fri, 28 Jun 2024 16:28:14 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm][jspi] Check JS-compatibility of promising export\n signatures\n\nR=ahaas@chromium.org\n\nFixed: 348793144\nChange-Id: I20cd088fc11b94... |
v8__350292240 | v8 | 350292240 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:350292240 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/wasm/module-instantiate.cc",
"src/wasm/baseline/liftoff-compiler.cc",
"src/wasm/turboshaft-graph-interface.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A V8 sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in the JIT-compiled WebAssembly call_indirect instruction's runtime RTT subtype check. When a call_indirect targets a function table with a non-final typed function reference (including generic function tables), V8 cannot statically verify the function signature and instead gene... | 20000 | [
"From 58f407806ad0ea83d8174dd701ba4b84c3cca14f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Stephen Roettger <sroettger@google.com>\nDate: Tue, 10 Dec 2024 18:02:39 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [sandbox][wasm] add signature checks to the code pointer\n table\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transf... |
v8__351327767 | v8 | 351327767 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:351327767 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --experimental-wasm-memory64 --no-wasm-trap-handler --sandbox-testing | [
"src/compiler/wasm-compiler.cc"
] | [
"src/compiler"
] | Out-of-bounds memory access | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | An out-of-bounds memory access vulnerability exists in V8's WebAssembly multi-memory instance cache mechanism. The root cause is an erroneous `static_cast<uint8_t>(cached_memory_index_)` in `WasmGraphBuilder::MemStart` and `WasmGraphBuilder::MemSize` (src/compiler/wasm-compiler.cc), which truncates the cached memory in... | 20000 | [
"From bc545b15a0ee5dd3bea9f2bfb991b380f5f3659c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakob Kummerow <jkummerow@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 16:34:00 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm][multi-memory] Fix cast of memory index\n\n\"uint8_t\" must have been a typo.\n\nFixed: 351327767\nBug: 42203854\nChange-Id: I196c961e... |
v8__355256380 | v8 | 355256380 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:355256380 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | [
"src/maglev/maglev-graph-builder.cc"
] | [
"src/maglev"
] | Type confusion | DCHECK | In V8's Maglev JIT compiler, MaglevGraphBuilder::InferHasInPrototypeChain calls prototype.AsJSObject() when all receiver maps have the given prototype in their chain (all == true), without first verifying that prototype is actually a JSObject. This function is invoked during optimization of the instanceof operator via ... | 7000 | [
"From 313905c4f2c153be4bf4b09b2b06ffad7106869c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Victor Gomes <victorgomes@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 25 Jul 2024 11:36:01 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [maglev] Consider WasmStruct in InferHasInPrototypeChain\n\nFixed: 355256380\nChange-Id: I0d82c1a723685cf4c1a093ed9e8eb8190502fce8\nReviewed... | |
v8__359949835 | v8 | 359949835 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:359949835 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --expose-gc --omit-quit --allow-natives-syntax --fuzzing --jit-fuzzing | [
"src/builtins/js-to-wasm.tq"
] | [
"src/builtins"
] | Type confusion | RUNTIME_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's generic WebAssembly-to-JavaScript wrapper. The `WasmToJSObject` Torque macro in `src/builtins/js-to-wasm.tq` is responsible for converting wasm reference values into JavaScript objects when wasm calls an imported JS function. For the `anyref` (kAny) heap type, both in the n... | 8000 | [
"From aa2cbd9e4ed70238694e07f1c525941aa1e04429 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Andreas Haas <ahaas@chromium.org>\nDate: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 16:55:04 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm][wrapper] Don't store converted references in arguments\n\nWhen the generic js-to-wasm wrapper converts tagged parameters, it has\nto store ... |
v8__365376497 | v8 | 365376497 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:365376497 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --wasm-staging --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/deoptimizer/deoptimizer.cc"
] | [
"src/deoptimizer"
] | Type confusion | ASAN_CRASH | The V8 deoptimizer's lazy deoptimization mechanism (DeoptimizeMarkedCode) fails to account for suspended JSPI (JavaScript Promise Integration) Wasm stacks. When a JavaScript function is marked for deoptimization (e.g., due to an invalidated stable map dependency), the deoptimizer patches return addresses on the current... | 55000 | [
"From 906e41b88fa5b79d2afc699f8c4da87c4eb9c7e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Thibaud Michaud <thibaudm@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 10 Sep 2024 10:52:38 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm][jspi] Fix JSPI + lazy deopt\n\nWith JSPI, the stack frame iterator stops at the end of the current\nstack segment. Follow the chain o... |
v8__368241697 | v8 | 368241697 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:368241697 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --wasm-test-streaming --wasm_max_module_size=1500000000 --module --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/wasm/streaming-decoder.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | ASAN_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's WebAssembly streaming decoder. The root cause is that AsyncStreamingDecoder::DecodeSectionLength (streaming-decoder.cc) validates each section's size against kV8MaxWasmModuleSize individually, but never checks the cumulative total module size. In contrast, the synchronous m... | 55000 | [
"From 9542895cdd3dbd97da3d9032ddb36fd4feb612e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakob Kummerow <jkummerow@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 24 Sep 2024 17:34:49 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm][streaming] Properly check max module size\n\nand allow d8-based tests for it.\n\nFixed: 368241697\nChange-Id: Iddc9f7e669de7a1d79dccb... |
v8__371565065 | v8 | 371565065 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:371565065 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc",
"src/wasm/module-instantiate.cc"
] | [
"src/runtime",
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | ASAN_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's WebAssembly wasm-to-JS wrapper tier-up logic in Runtime_TierUpWasmToJSWrapper() (src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc). The bug is triggered when a cross-module function table import is used: Module A imports a JS function, creates a function table with it as an element, and exports... | 11000 | [
"diff --git a/src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc b/src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc\nindex 0e608b9a7d4..2a45dbccdf7 100644\n--- a/src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc\n+++ b/src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc\n@@ -678,9 +678,23 @@ RUNTIME_FUNCTION(Runtime_TierUpWasmToJSWrapper) {\n isolate);\n ... |
v8__372269618 | v8 | 372269618 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:372269618 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --turboshaft-wasm --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/wasm/wasm-js.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | ASAN_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's WebAssembly JavaScript API implementation in DefaultReferenceValue() (src/wasm/wasm-js.cc). The function incorrectly returns JavaScript undefined as the default value for externref (kExtern) and nullexternref (kNoExtern) reference types, instead of returning null. According... | 55000 | [
"From e7ccf0af1bdddd20dc58e1790a94739dba0209a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Thibaud Michaud <thibaudm@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 18:54:04 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm] Fix default externref/exnref reference\n\n- The default nullexternref should be null instead of undefined\n- The default exnref/nulle... |
v8__374790906 | v8 | 374790906 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:374790906 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --turboshaft-wasm --experimental-wasm-exnref --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/wasm/function-body-decoder-impl.h"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | ASAN_CRASH | A type nullability confusion vulnerability exists in V8's WebAssembly exception handling implementation. The root cause is in commit 7cb6188, which changed the type pushed onto the value stack for catch_ref/catch_all_ref operations from the nullable kWasmExnRef (ref null exn) to the non-nullable ValueType::Ref(HeapType... | 55000 | [
"From 9997fc01395257cffd7231f14bb4d9fa7eaa9665 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Thibaud Michaud <thibaudm@chromium.org>\nDate: Wed, 23 Oct 2024 15:27:44 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm][exnref] Use wasm_null for exnref\n\nA JS null caught in wasm as an exnref with catch_(all_)ref should be\nobservably different from a... |
v8__377620832 | v8 | 377620832 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:377620832 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --turboshaft-wasm --experimental-wasm-exnref --allow-natives-syntax --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/wasm/wasm-js.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | ASAN_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's WebAssembly JS API caused by `DefaultReferenceValue()` in `src/wasm/wasm-js.cc` returning a JS `null` value instead of `wasm_null` for the `kExn` and `kNoExn` heap types. Commit 9997fc0 internalized the exn type hierarchy to use `wasm_null` as the canonical null sentinel fo... | 55000 | [
"From 47fb21842c13e750da83db884589b207a44bca70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakob Kummerow <jkummerow@chromium.org>\nDate: Fri, 8 Nov 2024 14:34:39 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm] Use ValueType::use_wasm_null() helper consistently\n\nThis is a follow-up to crrev.com/c/5953226: exnref now uses Wasm null,\nand the ... |
v8__379009132 | v8 | 379009132 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:379009132 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --jit-fuzzing | [
"src/wasm/canonical-types.cc",
"src/wasm/canonical-types.h"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | DCHECK | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's compiled JS-to-Wasm wrapper when handling wasm functions with self-referential return types. When a wasm function's signature includes a return type that references its own type index (e.g., `ref type_N` within type `N`), V8's type canonicalization encodes that return type ... | 8000 | [
"From 20d9a7f760c018183c836283017a321638b66810 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 19 Nov 2024 18:17:33 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm] Remove relative type indexes from canonical types\n\nThose relative types were leaking from the type canonicalizer, which\nleads to ty... |
v8__379140430 | v8 | 379140430 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:379140430 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc"
] | [
"src/runtime"
] | Type confusion | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A V8 sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in Runtime_TierUpWasmToJSWrapper (src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc). When a JS function is exported from one Wasm module and imported into another module's indirect function table, WasmImportData::call_origin is set to an in-sandbox (untrusted) Tuple2 object containing (WasmInstanceO... | none | [
"diff --git a/src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc b/src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc\nindex 2348624..aadefa1 100644\n--- a/src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc\n+++ b/src/runtime/runtime-wasm.cc\n@@ -712,41 +712,30 @@ RUNTIME_FUNCTION(Runtime_TierUpWasmToJSWrapper) {\n CHECK(IsSmi(*origin));\n Tagged<Smi> call_origin_index = Cast<Sm... |
v8__379591504 | v8 | 379591504 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:379591504 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --expose-gc --allow-natives-syntax --sandbox-testing | [
"src/heap/base/basic-slot-set.h"
] | [
"src/heap/base"
] | Heap buffer overflow | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A heap buffer overflow vulnerability exists in V8's write barrier mechanism that allows an attacker to bypass the V8 sandbox. The root cause is a missing bounds check in `BasicSlotSet::Insert()` (`src/heap/base/basic-slot-set.h:117`): the function computes `bucket_index = slot_offset / (kBitsPerBucket * SlotGranularity... | none | [
"From 47c50e8013d9061ca113e66514568debc4dfb133 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>\nDate: Mon, 18 Nov 2024 18:50:46 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [heap, builtins] Check bucket bounds for remembered set\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Enco... |
v8__380397544 | v8 | 380397544 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:380397544 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --turboshaft-wasm --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/wasm/canonical-types.h"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | ASAN_CRASH | A WASM type confusion vulnerability in V8's isorecursive type canonicalization. The bug was introduced by commit 20d9a7f (attempting to fix b/379009132) which added the RecursionGroupRange struct in canonical-types.h to handle recursive group comparisons. The flaw is in RecursionGroupRange::RelativeIndex(): when two re... | 55000 | [
"diff --git a/src/wasm/canonical-types.h b/src/wasm/canonical-types.h\nindex 1f80b994d18..5f7f7e2f38a 100644\n--- a/src/wasm/canonical-types.h\n+++ b/src/wasm/canonical-types.h\n@@ -181,20 +181,6 @@ class TypeCanonicalizer {\n bool Contains(CanonicalTypeIndex index) const {\n return base::IsInRange(index.... |
v8__381999810 | v8 | 381999810 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:381999810 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --fuzzing --sandbox-fuzzing | [
"src/objects/backing-store.h",
"src/wasm/wasm-js.cc"
] | [
"src/objects",
"src/wasm"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | The `BackingStore::buffer_start()` accessor in `src/objects/backing-store.h` returns the raw `buffer_start_` field, which is `nullptr` for empty (zero-byte) ArrayBuffers. When `WebAssembly.validate()` is called with a TypedArray backed by such an empty ArrayBuffer, `GetFirstArgumentAsBytes` in `src/wasm/wasm-js.cc` com... | 5000 | [
"diff --git a/src/objects/backing-store.h b/src/objects/backing-store.h\nindex 33eb0b0d2aa..39cbaac3aa3 100644\n--- a/src/objects/backing-store.h\n+++ b/src/objects/backing-store.h\n@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@\n #include \"include/v8-array-buffer.h\"\n #include \"include/v8-internal.h\"\n #include \"src/handles/handles.h\"\n... |
v8__383356864 | v8 | 383356864 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:383356864 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --turboshaft-wasm --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/compiler/turboshaft/wasm-gc-typed-optimization-reducer.cc"
] | [
"src/compiler/turboshaft"
] | Type confusion | ASAN_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's WasmGCTypeAnalyzer, the Turboshaft analyzer responsible for inferring type information for WasmGC operations to allow WasmGCTypedOptimizationReducer to eliminate redundant type checks at compile time. In WasmGCTypeAnalyzer::Run(), when a loop backedge is encountered and the... | 55000 | [
"From f231d83cb3c08754413b3ee1aa249cebd4d5445f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Matthias Liedtke <mliedtke@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 12 Dec 2024 14:11:00 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [turboshaft][wasm] WasmGCTypeAnalyzer: Fix phi input for\n single-block loops\n\nFixed: 383356864\nChange-Id: Idc644923c2e09e16b0c4c1cb1cda... |
v8__384186547 | v8 | 384186547 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:384186547 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing --expose-gc --single-threaded | [
"src/objects/js-array-buffer.cc"
] | [
"src/objects"
] | Use-after-free | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A use-after-free vulnerability exists in V8's ArrayBuffer management due to a race condition between JSArrayBuffer::Setup and JSArrayBuffer::Attach in src/objects/js-array-buffer.cc. Setup calls init_extension() to initialize (nullify) the extension field, and later Attach calls EnsureExtension() which either returns t... | 20000 | [
"diff --git a/src/builtins/builtins-arraybuffer.cc b/src/builtins/builtins-arraybuffer.cc\nindex 07181645698..b747035ae38 100644\n--- a/src/builtins/builtins-arraybuffer.cc\n+++ b/src/builtins/builtins-arraybuffer.cc\n@@ -39,74 +39,94 @@ namespace internal {\n \n namespace {\n \n+// Tries to allocate a BackingStore... |
v8__385775375 | v8 | 385775375 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:385775375 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --single-threaded --sandbox-fuzzing --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc | [
"src/runtime/runtime-typedarray.cc"
] | [
"src/runtime"
] | Out-of-bounds write | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A heap buffer overflow (out-of-bounds write) vulnerability exists in V8's Runtime_TypedArraySortFast function in src/runtime/runtime-typedarray.cc. The root cause is a TOCTOU (Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use) race condition — a double-fetch bug — arising from multiple reads of the TypedArray's element type (elements_kind)... | 5000 | [
"diff --git a/src/runtime/runtime-typedarray.cc b/src/runtime/runtime-typedarray.cc\nindex 40a3e7a5e92..efd89acb6b3 100644\n--- a/src/runtime/runtime-typedarray.cc\n+++ b/src/runtime/runtime-typedarray.cc\n@@ -129,8 +129,11 @@ RUNTIME_FUNCTION(Runtime_TypedArraySortFast) {\n }\n #endif\n \n- size_t length = arra... |
v8__386565139 | v8 | 386565139 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:386565139 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --sandbox-testing --allow-natives-syntax | [
"src/runtime/runtime-typedarray.cc",
"src/objects/elements.cc"
] | [
"src/runtime",
"src/objects"
] | Integer overflow | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | An integer overflow vulnerability in V8's TypedArray bounds checking allows bypassing the V8 sandbox. In CopyElementsHandleImpl (src/objects/elements.cc), the bounds check `CHECK_LE(offset + length, destination_ta->GetLengthOrOutOfBounds(...))` does not guard against integer overflow of the `size_t` addition `offset + ... | 5000 | [
"From ec48078aaeaef623314ed1dddc3a4b3967e8eb82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Stephen Roettger <sroettger@google.com>\nDate: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 12:04:58 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [sandbox] limit TryNumberToSize to\n kMaxSafeBufferSizeForSandbox\n\nBug: 391169061, 397187119\nChange-Id: I399e34589f726b7949045c3efba7695b... |
v8__388437270 | v8 | 388437270 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:388437270 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --single-threaded --sandbox-fuzzing --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc | [
"src/json/json-stringifier.cc"
] | [
"src/json"
] | Out-of-bounds write | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A heap-buffer-overflow (out-of-bounds write) vulnerability exists in V8's JSON serializer (JsonStringifier::SerializeString_). When JSON.stringify serializes an array containing strings, the serializer allocates an output buffer (two_byte_ptr_) via ChangeEncoding() upon encountering a two-byte string. Subsequently, whe... | 5000 | [
"diff --git a/src/json/json-stringifier.cc b/src/json/json-stringifier.cc\nindex 383147abbc3..c98feec8eee 100644\n--- a/src/json/json-stringifier.cc\n+++ b/src/json/json-stringifier.cc\n@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ class JsonStringifier {\n }\n }\n \n- V8_INLINE bool CurrentPartCanFit(uint32_t length) {\n+ V8_INLINE... |
v8__390201806 | v8 | 390201806 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:390201806 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/objects/js-array-buffer.cc"
] | [
"src/objects"
] | Race condition | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A TOCTOU (Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use) race condition in JSTypedArray::GetVariableLengthOrOutOfBounds() (src/objects/js-array-buffer.cc:451) causes integer underflow, enabling arbitrary address read/write and V8 sandbox bypass. For length-tracking TypedArrays backed by a shared resizable ArrayBuffer (GSAB), the backing s... | 20000 | [
"From de42e588f4f7bafc773e630f937407924528cb36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Marja=20H=C3=B6ltt=C3=A4?= <marja@chromium.org>\nDate: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 10:33:22 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [typed arrays] Implement GetVariableLengthOrOutOfBounds in\n terms of GetVariableByteLengthOrOutOfBounds\nMIME-Version: 1.... |
v8__390205877 | v8 | 390205877 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:390205877 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --fuzzing --sandbox-fuzzing --single-threaded --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc | [
"src/execution/tiering-manager.cc"
] | [
"src/execution"
] | Undefined Behavior (invalid enum variant) | ASAN_CRASH | A sandbox bypass vulnerability caused by undefined behavior in ShouldResetInterruptBudgetByICChange (tiering-manager.cc) when processing an out-of-range CachedTieringDecision enum value. The CachedTieringDecision enum has 6 valid variants (kPending=0 through kNormal=5), but the field is stored as a 3-bit value in the f... | [
"From 3517e6ced4eddbe54c1d468c91622494190984cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Stephen Roettger <sroettger@google.com>\nDate: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 17:34:45 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [sandbox] fix UB after switch on CachedTieringDecision enum\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-En... | |
v8__390639820 | v8 | 390639820 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:390639820 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"third_party/v8/builtins/array-sort.tq",
"src/torque/csa-generator.cc"
] | [
"third_party/v8/builtins",
"src/torque"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | The SortState class defined in array-sort.tq stores five function pointer fields (sortComparePtr, loadFn, storeFn, deleteFn, canUseSameAccessorFn) as BuiltinPtr values, which are Smi integers representing raw indices into V8's internal builtin entry table (IsolateData::builtin_entry_table). Because SortState is a HeapO... | 20000 | [
"From 02d0fc9fbda0c8a06f2e71ab2bacaa85560510a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 23 Jan 2025 12:33:31 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [torque] Remove indirect calls in array-sort.tq\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8b... |
v8__390743124 | v8 | 390743124 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:390743124 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax | [
"src/compiler/escape-analysis.cc"
] | [
"src/compiler"
] | Type confusion | RUNTIME_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists in TurboFan's escape analysis because `TrustedHeapConstant` values could flow through phi nodes together with regular heap constants. That confused later decompression optimization and deoptimization materialization, allowing a value reconstructed through `TranslatedState` to lose ... | 7000 | [
"From b75e527fb521dca5e7621928846c0c7c6becc8dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Darius Mercadier <dmercadier@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 09:32:04 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [turbofan] Disable escape analysis for TrustedHeapConstant\n\nMore precisely: prevent eliding objects that contain\nTrustedHeapConstant, ... |
v8__390993097 | v8 | 390993097 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:390993097 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/interpreter/bytecode-generator.cc"
] | [
"src/interpreter"
] | Out-of-bounds memory access | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A V8 sandbox bypass vulnerability caused by an asyncness inconsistency in BytecodeGenerator. The root cause is in BytecodeGenerator::BuildAsyncReturn(), which unconditionally calls generator_object() (returning the incoming_new_target_or_generator_ register) without verifying that the function is actually a resumable/a... | 5000 | [
"diff --git a/src/interpreter/bytecode-generator.cc b/src/interpreter/bytecode-generator.cc\nindex 5460d935380..f43124e3d2a 100644\n--- a/src/interpreter/bytecode-generator.cc\n+++ b/src/interpreter/bytecode-generator.cc\n@@ -1311,13 +1311,13 @@ class V8_NODISCARD BytecodeGenerator::DisposablesStackScope final {\n ... |
v8__391169061 | v8 | 391169061 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:391169061 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/builtins/typed-array-set.tq",
"src/builtins/base.tq"
] | [
"src/builtins"
] | Integer overflow | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | An integer overflow in the bounds check of `TypedArrayPrototypeSetArray` (in `src/builtins/typed-array-set.tq`) allows a V8 sandbox bypass via arbitrary address write. The vulnerability arises because `GetLengthProperty` on a corrupted JSArray can return a `Number` (HeapNumber) whose value exceeds `kMaxSafeInteger`. On... | 20000 | [
"From ec48078aaeaef623314ed1dddc3a4b3967e8eb82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Stephen Roettger <sroettger@google.com>\nDate: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 12:04:58 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [sandbox] limit TryNumberToSize to\n kMaxSafeBufferSizeForSandbox\n\nBug: 391169061, 397187119\nChange-Id: I399e34589f726b7949045c3efba7695b... |
v8__392541992 | v8 | 392541992 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:392541992 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --single-threaded --sandbox-fuzzing --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc | [
"src/objects/value-serializer.cc"
] | [
"src/objects"
] | Use-after-free | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A heap-use-after-free vulnerability exists in V8's ValueSerializer::ExpandBuffer (src/objects/value-serializer.cc). The PoC manipulates a string's length field (via the memory corruption API) to a large negative value (`0xffffffd5` = -43 as int32_t). When `WriteTwoByteString` computes the byte length as `chars.length()... | 5000 | [
"From 4d8f79a7f783a61ec5327c8af7fbd42572b55ca2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>\nDate: Fri, 31 Jan 2025 10:57:04 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [base] Disallow base::Realloc() with zero size\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n\nT... |
v8__393989622 | v8 | 393989622 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:393989622 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --single-threaded --sandbox-fuzzing --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc | [
"src/objects/intl-objects.cc"
] | [
"src/objects"
] | Heap buffer overflow | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | The vulnerability is in Intl::ToICUUnicodeString (src/objects/intl-objects.cc). The function reads the string length from V8 heap memory via string->length() as a uint32_t, which is attacker-controlled in the V8 sandbox model. Although the code includes a comment noting this concern for the kShortStringSize comparison,... | 5000 | [
"diff --git a/third_party/icu/source/common/unistr.cpp b/third_party/icu/source/common/unistr.cpp\nindex 04f01cf..626f888 100644\n--- a/third_party/icu/source/common/unistr.cpp\n+++ b/third_party/icu/source/common/unistr.cpp\n@@ -1865,6 +1865,13 @@ UnicodeString::cloneArrayIfNeeded(int32_t newCapacity,\n grow... |
v8__394350433 | v8 | 394350433 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:394350433 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | [
"src/wasm/wrappers.cc",
"src/compiler/turboshaft/operations.h",
"src/compiler/backend/instruction-selector.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm",
"src/compiler/turboshaft",
"src/compiler/backend"
] | Heap buffer overflow | ASAN_CRASH | A heap buffer overflow vulnerability exists in V8's Wasm-to-JS wrapper tier-up compilation. In `BuildWasmToJSWrapper()` (src/wasm/wrappers.cc), when a Wasm module imports a JavaScript function with an `expected_arity` of 0xfffa or more, the function constructs an `args` SmallVector of size `pushed_count + 4 + (has_disp... | 11000 | [
"From 84a0e230dabc2c874a129c2280d6be4f45636225 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Thibaud Michaud <thibaudm@chromium.org>\nDate: Mon, 10 Feb 2025 14:31:16 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Reland \"Lower the maximum JS parameter count\"\n\nThis is a reland of commit 1827ed8345369ca50a55a10ab3e45bcc581c6339\n\nBefore the change,... | |
v8__394635429 | v8 | 394635429 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:394635429 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/regexp/regexp-parser.cc"
] | [
"src/regexp"
] | Race condition | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A TOCTOU (Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use) race condition in the V8 RegExp parser allows a sandbox escape via out-of-bounds access on the RegExpCapture list. When parsing a regex containing backreferences or named captures, RegExpParserImpl::ScanForCaptures() eagerly scans the full pattern to determine the total capture coun... | 20000 | [
"From 6c5f6bdc3652c1bed3b5f3e4a42090cd684e4d75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: pthier <pthier@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 6 Feb 2025 13:34:30 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [regexp] Harden access of captures during RegExp parsing\n\nCapture indices are calculated while parsing a RegExp pattern and\nused to retrieve capture ... |
v8__395659804 | v8 | 395659804 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:395659804 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/builtins/x64/builtins-x64.cc"
] | [
"src/builtins/x64"
] | Type confusion | RUNTIME_CRASH | A V8 sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in the On-Stack Replacement (OSR) path. In the `OnStackReplacement` function in `src/builtins/x64/builtins-x64.cc`, after loading a cached OSR target Code object from the FeedbackVector (via a CodeWrapper), the code unconditionally reads `Code::kDeoptimizationDataOrInterpreterDa... | 20000 | [
"diff --git a/src/builtins/arm64/builtins-arm64.cc b/src/builtins/arm64/builtins-arm64.cc\nindex 762182175e6..5465255ab98 100644\n--- a/src/builtins/arm64/builtins-arm64.cc\n+++ b/src/builtins/arm64/builtins-arm64.cc\n@@ -2313,6 +2313,13 @@ void OnStackReplacement(MacroAssembler* masm, OsrSourceTier source,\n _... |
v8__395895382 | v8 | 395895382 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:395895382 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --expose-memory-corruption-api --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/compiler/js-call-reducer.cc"
] | [
"src/compiler"
] | Out-of-bounds write | ASAN_CRASH | In Turbofan's inlining phase, JSCallReducer::ReduceCallOrConstructWithArrayLikeOrSpread() reads the array length from an AllocationSite boilerplate cached in the FeedbackVector for spread-call nodes (e.g., fn(...arr)). If the boilerplate JSArray length has been corrupted to a negative value via sandbox memory corruptio... | 20000 | [
"From da14a949b0dc122c848f556b9e89ab1064a73306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Nico Hartmann <nicohartmann@chromium.org>\nDate: Fri, 25 Apr 2025 10:59:10 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [turbofan] Fix Call argument count mismatch for array\n literals\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Tran... |
v8__398065918 | v8 | 398065918 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:398065918 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax --no-js-atomics-pause --no-script-context-mutable-heap-number --predictable --wasm-staging --isolate | [
"src/maglev/maglev-graph-builder.cc"
] | [
"src/maglev"
] | Type confusion | RUNTIME_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability in V8's Maglev JIT compiler caused by improper handling of folded allocations during garbage collection. In `BuildInlinedAllocation` (maglev-graph-builder.cc), when processing a `VirtualObject::kDefault` object whose fields contain nested `VirtualObject` instances (e.g., a rest-parameter ... | 7000 | [
"From eb9b25970b0ad4a3f8ce23d8de3583c62e5d6b87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Olivier=20Fl=C3=BCckiger?= <olivf@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 13:14:53 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [maglev] Add missing ClearAllocationBlock\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-En... |
v8__398999390 | v8 | 398999390 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:398999390 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax | [
"src/json/json-stringifier.cc"
] | [
"src/json"
] | Out-of-bounds read | DCHECK | When an ExternalTwoByteString that serves as the parent of a SlicedString is internalized via String::MakeThin(), it can be converted into a ThinString pointing to a SeqOneByteString (when the equivalent internalized string has one-byte encoding). However, the SlicedString's own instance type (kTwoByteStringTag | kSlic... | 2000 | [
"From 8db16e651ff456e0eea6e576045623d2039a1d34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: pthier <pthier@chromium.org>\nDate: Wed, 26 Feb 2025 14:11:04 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Revert \"[string] Remove\n String::IsOneByteRepresentationUnderneath\"\n\nThis reverts commit e3f33e99674eab3881d2d65b82dfe436829bb831.\n\nReason for r... |
v8__400086889 | v8 | 400086889 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:400086889 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax | [
"src/wasm/canonical-types.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | RUNTIME_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's WebAssembly type canonicalization due to a transient canonical index overflow. In `TypeCanonicalizer::CanonicalizeTypeDef()` (canonical-types.cc), the `CanonicalizeTypeIndex` lambda computes a provisional absolute canonical index for types within a new recursion group by ad... | 62000 | [
"From 700e9d09e4c916e7ea510b85f53e95e1f5ea2f93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakob Kummerow <jkummerow@chromium.org>\nDate: Mon, 3 Mar 2025 21:05:35 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm] Restore lost CHECK for max canonical type index\n\nFollow-up to crrev.com/c/6288535\n\nFixed: 400086889\nChange-Id: I6dd74e532419e6b31... |
v8__401732698 | v8 | 401732698 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:401732698 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --sandbox-fuzzing | [
"src/common/ptr-compr-inl.h",
"src/common/ptr-compr.h",
"src/objects/tagged-field-inl.h"
] | [
"src/common",
"src/objects"
] | Type confusion | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's pointer-compression helpers because they used `V8_ASSUME` on tag conditions for values loaded from sandbox memory. If an attacker corrupts a field that is assumed to contain a Smi-tagged compressed value, helpers in `src/common/ptr-compr*.h` and `src/objects/tagged-field-in... | 5000 | [
"diff --git a/src/common/ptr-compr-inl.h b/src/common/ptr-compr-inl.h\nindex 742d1daf31b..f27ae78dfc1 100644\n--- a/src/common/ptr-compr-inl.h\n+++ b/src/common/ptr-compr-inl.h\n@@ -85,7 +85,8 @@ Tagged_t V8HeapCompressionSchemeImpl<Cage>::CompressObject(Address tagged) {\n // This is used to help clang produce b... |
v8__403600260 | v8 | 403600260 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:403600260 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing --single-threaded | [
"src/maglev/maglev-graph-builder.cc"
] | [
"src/maglev"
] | Uninitialized memory read | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | In MaglevGraphBuilder::TryBuildAndAllocateJSGeneratorObject(), a VirtualObject is created via CreateJSGeneratorObject() with slot_count derived from the generator function's initial_map instance_size. The zone allocator (zone()->AllocateArray<ValueNode*>(slot_count)) does not initialize the allocated slots. CreateJSGen... | 25000 | [
"diff --git a/src/maglev/maglev-graph-builder.cc b/src/maglev/maglev-graph-builder.cc\nindex c423fc22702..e0a249265e8 100644\n--- a/src/maglev/maglev-graph-builder.cc\n+++ b/src/maglev/maglev-graph-builder.cc\n@@ -11650,6 +11650,9 @@ ReduceResult MaglevGraphBuilder::BuildAndAllocateJSArray(\n array->set(map.Get... |
v8__404285918 | v8 | 404285918 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:404285918 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --experimental-wasm-jspi --sandbox-testing | [
"src/execution/isolate.cc"
] | [
"src/execution"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A V8 sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in the Wasm JSPI (JavaScript Promise Integration) central stack management. The root cause is in `Isolate::UpdateCentralStackInfo()` (src/execution/isolate.cc), which is called on every stack switch via `Isolate::SwitchStacks()`. This function traverses the active WasmContinuati... | 20000 | [
"diff --git a/src/execution/isolate.cc b/src/execution/isolate.cc\nindex a6ebcf9..01f3c70 100644\n--- a/src/execution/isolate.cc\n+++ b/src/execution/isolate.cc\n@@ -3897,7 +3897,10 @@ void Isolate::UpdateCentralStackInfo() {\n Cast<WasmContinuationObject>(current)->stack());\n current = Cast<WasmContinuati... |
v8__411598604 | v8 | 411598604 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:411598604 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --single-threaded --sandbox-fuzzing --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc | [
"src/heap/large-spaces.cc",
"src/heap/page-pool.cc"
] | [
"src/heap"
] | Use-after-free | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A use-after-free vulnerability exists in V8's heap teardown process that can be triggered via sandbox memory corruption. The attacker uses Sandbox.MemoryView to write 0x1415 to sandbox offset 0x40000, setting the LARGE_PAGE flag (bit 10) in the MemoryChunk flags of a normal OLD_SPACE page. This causes the page to be tr... | 5000 | [
"From 41614e86a3e9f3b94f7bb36d83cd9f0fb1c52a17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Dominik=20Inf=C3=BChr?= <dinfuehr@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 6 May 2025 18:43:56 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [heap] Avoid page flag check for large page detection\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-... |
v8__41494611 | v8 | 41494611 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:41494611 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax --optimize-on-next-call-optimizes-to-maglev --maglev-cse | [
"src/maglev/maglev-ir.h"
] | [
"src/maglev"
] | Debug assertion failure | DCHECK | Maglev CSE leaves ValueNode allocation state invalid and trips the is_loadable() DCHECK in maglev-ir.h. | 8000 | [
"From 2414b1c31a87d40de79acfcd2a3b0c068f27442e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Olivier=20Fl=C3=BCckiger?= <olivf@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 10:51:02 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [maglev] CSE: clear available expressions for exception\n handlers\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=U... |
v8__417636716 | v8 | 417636716 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:417636716 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing --expose-gc | [
"src/builtins/builtins-lazy-gen.cc",
"src/codegen/x64/macro-assembler-x64.cc"
] | [
"src/builtins",
"src/codegen/x64"
] | Stack corruption | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A sandbox escape vulnerability exists in the tail-call path used after code updates. After installing baseline code, V8 could tail-call the returned code object directly instead of reloading code through the function's dispatch-handle or closure path that carries the validated parameter count. If the dispatch handle is... | 20000 | [
"diff --git a/src/builtins/builtins-lazy-gen.cc b/src/builtins/builtins-lazy-gen.cc\nindex 75baa8c57f8..c95ce99e7ae 100644\n--- a/src/builtins/builtins-lazy-gen.cc\n+++ b/src/builtins/builtins-lazy-gen.cc\n@@ -16,6 +16,28 @@ namespace internal {\n \n #include \"src/codegen/define-code-stub-assembler-macros.inc\"\n ... |
v8__420697404 | v8 | 420697404 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:420697404 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | [
"src/objects/js-regexp.cc"
] | [
"src/objects"
] | Integer overflow | DCHECK | An integer overflow vulnerability exists in the CountAdditionalEscapeChars function in src/objects/js-regexp.cc. The function uses a 32-bit signed int variable 'escapes' to count the additional characters required when escaping a RegExp source string. For each U+2028 (LINE SEPARATOR) or U+2029 (PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR) cha... | 7000 | [
"From 62ee3244f3b212b92e22b8e2651afbed35de9768 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: pthier <pthier@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 3 Jun 2025 09:16:02 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [regexp] Use uint32_t over int in EscapeRegExpSource\n\nWhile escaping the regexp source, a regular signed int might overflow,\nwhile an uint32_t can al... | |
v8__421403261 | v8 | 421403261 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:421403261 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/wasm/baseline/liftoff-compiler.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm/baseline"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | Liftoff, V8's baseline WebAssembly compiler, maintains an invariant that registers holding i32 values have their upper 32 bits zeroed on x86-64. BoundsCheckArray() enforces the array index bound using a 32-bit comparison (kI32), which is correct under normal operation. However, in array element access operations (e.g.,... | 20000 | [
"From df3874776c396ba7ddc6ca7894a1e09937bc3d04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org>\nDate: Mon, 2 Jun 2025 17:42:22 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [liftoff] Ensure zero-extension of returned i32 values\n\nThe signature hash allows for i64/i32 collisions. To compensate for that\nwe already... |
v8__427918760 | v8 | 427918760 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:427918760 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --fuzzing --sandbox-fuzzing --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc | [
"src/asmjs/asm-parser.cc",
"src/wasm/function-body-decoder-impl.h"
] | [
"src/asmjs",
"src/wasm"
] | Out-of-bounds write | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A race condition (TOCTOU) in AsmJsParser::SwitchStatement() in src/asmjs/asm-parser.cc leads to a heap out-of-bounds write in WasmFullDecoder::EndControl(). The switch statement parser works in two passes over the source buffer: first, GatherCases() scans forward to count 'case' labels and then rewinds the scanner to t... | 5000 | [
"From c250ecfd8b26dee1370d89524946288cbfbf0635 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Clemens Backes <clemensb@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 3 Jul 2025 12:11:25 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [asmjs] Copy input before parsing\n\nThe asm parser often rewinds the scanner to re-parse the input. This is\ndone in particular for switches ... |
v8__429703123 | v8 | 429703123 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:429703123 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/builtins/x64/builtins-x64.cc"
] | [
"src/builtins/x64"
] | Type confusion | RUNTIME_CRASH | A V8 sandbox bypass via type confusion in the interpreter-to-baseline OSR (On-Stack Replacement) transition. In `Builtins::Generate_InterpreterOnStackReplacement_ToBaseline`, the Code object is re-fetched from `SharedFunctionInfo::kTrustedFunctionDataOffset` using `kUnknownIndirectPointerTag` (line ~5199 of builtins-x6... | 20000 | [
"From ebf22f9a925a45549a6124158ad935d624e7bf8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Olivier=20Fl=C3=BCckiger?= <olivf@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 8 Jul 2025 17:41:37 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [builtins] Use correct pointer tag in OSR after we checked\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nCon... |
v8__430344952 | v8 | 430344952 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:430344952 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | [
"src/parsing/preparser.cc",
"src/ast/scopes.cc"
] | [
"src/parsing",
"src/ast"
] | Out-of-bounds read | DCHECK | A discrepancy between the preparser and the full parser in handling unicode-escaped identifiers causes a function literal ID mismatch, leading to an out-of-bounds read in WeakFixedArray::get inside DeclarationScope::AllocateScopeInfos. The root cause is in GetIdentifierHelper (src/parsing/preparser.cc): when an identif... | 8000 | [
"From 9a884b1b9a53cd23531c5428001c3f85389cb8f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 16:38:52 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [preparser] Support escapes in eval\n\nBug: 430344952\nChange-Id: I81ca2d30da871d9d1ec4c7850a94f2a3e90658ac\nReviewed-on: https://chromium-rev... | |
v8__430572435 | v8 | 430572435 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:430572435 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | [
"src/maglev/maglev-graph-builder.cc"
] | [
"src/maglev"
] | Type confusion | DCHECK | A JIT type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's Maglev compiler due to missing bytecode size accounting for small eagerly-inlined functions. In MaglevGraphBuilder::TryBuildInlineCall, when ShouldEagerInlineCall() returns true (for tiny functions like noop()), execution takes an early-exit path directly to BuildEagerI... | 7000 | [
"From f22ca7b61a92d3cd2b856485a55a1519cb11b627 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>\nDate: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 17:01:40 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [maglev] Cap inlining at MaxInliningId\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n\nBug: 43... | |
v8__430960844 | v8 | 430960844 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:430960844 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/builtins/builtins-internal-gen.cc",
"src/codegen/code-stub-assembler.cc"
] | [
"src/builtins",
"src/codegen"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A V8 sandbox escape exists in the InstantiateAsmJs Turbofan builtin (src/builtins/builtins-internal-gen.cc:1644-1686) due to a TOCTOU (time-of-check-time-of-use) mismatch between the dispatch handle and code object used during a tail call. At the start of the builtin, the dispatch handle is captured from the JSFunction... | 20000 | [
"diff --git a/src/builtins/builtins-internal-gen.cc b/src/builtins/builtins-internal-gen.cc\nindex a404cbb41eb..ff00c1f65fe 100644\n--- a/src/builtins/builtins-internal-gen.cc\n+++ b/src/builtins/builtins-internal-gen.cc\n@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@\n #include \"src/api/api.h\"\n #include \"src/baseline/baseline.h\"\n #include... |
v8__432289371 | v8 | 432289371 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:432289371 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --expose-memory-corruption-api --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/wasm/module-instantiate.cc",
"src/wasm/wasm-objects.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | ASAN_CRASH | A type confusion (signature confusion) vulnerability in V8's WebAssembly module instantiation allows bypassing the V8 sandbox. The root cause is in `ProcessImportedFunction` and `ResolvedWasmImport::ComputeKind` in `src/wasm/module-instantiate.cc`. When a `WasmSuspendingObject` whose inner `.callable` is a wasm functio... | 5000 | [
"diff --git a/src/wasm/module-instantiate.cc b/src/wasm/module-instantiate.cc\nindex 2d2aaa03a7d..9eecd678ad3 100644\n--- a/src/wasm/module-instantiate.cc\n+++ b/src/wasm/module-instantiate.cc\n@@ -715,7 +715,10 @@ ImportCallKind ResolvedWasmImport::ComputeKind(\n Isolate* isolate = Isolate::Current();\n if (Is... |
v8__433407763 | v8 | 433407763 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:433407763 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --expose-memory-corruption-api --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/wasm/module-instantiate.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | ASAN_CRASH | A type confusion / TOCTOU vulnerability in V8's WebAssembly instance builder allows bypassing the V8 sandbox. In InstanceBuilder::Build(), SanitizeImports() is called before Build_Phase1(), and SanitizeImports() can invoke user-controlled JavaScript accessors on imported objects. An attacker exploits this by defining a... | 20000 | [
"From bb8724fd6cc27651ce44165d0b97daefb42bee0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakob Kummerow <jkummerow@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 24 Jul 2025 16:30:25 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [sandbox][wasm] Harden instantiation some more\n\ncrrev.com/c/6691457 missed one case where we still read the\nNativeModule pointer from the... |
v8__435630464 | v8 | 435630464 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:435630464 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/objects/js-atomics-synchronization.cc"
] | [
"src/objects"
] | Stack use-after-return | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A V8 sandbox bypass vulnerability caused by a stack use-after-return (UAR) in JSAtomicsCondition::WaitFor(). A SyncWaiterQueueNode (this_waiter) is allocated on the stack and enqueued into the condition variable's doubly-linked waiter queue (stored as an ExternalPointer waiter_queue_head in JSSynchronizationPrimitive).... | 20000 | [
"From 792c326e896020f74533e0d7b629b9a1b35e555a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>\nDate: Mon, 6 Oct 2025 12:27:29 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [sandbox] Don't allow to use disabled builtins, pt.2\n\n... i.e. the ones that belong to features that are not currently enabled.\n\nThis CL:\n -... |
v8__435630467 | v8 | 435630467 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:435630467 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/builtins/builtins-internal-gen.cc"
] | [
"src/builtins"
] | Control-flow integrity violation | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | The DebugBreakTrampoline builtin in src/builtins/builtins-internal-gen.cc performs an unsafe tail call without validating the parameter count of the target code. When installed as a function's code entry (e.g., when a debugger breakpoint is set), the trampoline reads the SharedFunctionInfo from the JSFunction object (w... | 20000 | [
"From 269d7c0f238a38e272f19f98a217989524c9f799 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 19:14:08 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [sandbox] Make DebugBreakTrampoline check the arguments count\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Enco... |
v8__438786702 | v8 | 438786702 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:438786702 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --sandbox-fuzzing --expose-externalize-string | [
"src/objects/string-inl.h"
] | [
"src/objects"
] | Out-of-bounds read | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A heap-buffer-overflow (out-of-bounds read) vulnerability exists in V8's String::Utf8Length function in src/objects/string-inl.h. The root cause is a type confusion triggered by corrupting the Map of an ExternalOneByteString to make V8 treat it as an ExternalTwoByteString. When a one-byte string is externalized via ext... | none | [
"From 8c815e898fe13f9ed436825a77399561597cd708 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Maksim Ivanov <emaxx@google.com>\nDate: Thu, 18 Dec 2025 15:46:48 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Reland-2 \"[sandbox] Cage for ExternalStrings when memory\n corruption API\"\n\nFix the original CL's mjsunit test slowness by using std::unique_pt... |
v8__439521654 | v8 | 439521654 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:439521654 | /src/v8 | out/ia32.asan/d8 | [
"src/runtime/runtime-typedarray.cc"
] | [
"src/runtime"
] | Race condition | ASAN_CRASH | A race condition (TOCTOU) vulnerability exists in Runtime_TypedArraySortFast (src/runtime/runtime-typedarray.cc) when sorting a TypedArray backed by a Growable SharedArrayBuffer (GSAB). The function first reads byte_length from the typed array and allocates a temporary copy buffer of that size, then copies the array co... | none | [
"From 3bbb4dcb340460be8ff9afe51290cfe94d7188ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Marja=20H=C3=B6ltt=C3=A4?= <marja@chromium.org>\nDate: Fri, 5 Sep 2025 12:46:03 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [rab/gsab] Handle GSABs growing during sorting gracefully\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nCont... | |
v8__439771269 | v8 | 439771269 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:439771269 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --expose-gc | [
"src/wasm/wasm-js.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Use-after-free | RUNTIME_CRASH | A use-after-free vulnerability exists in `WebAssemblyValidateImpl` (src/wasm/wasm-js.cc). The function first calls `GetFirstArgumentAsBytes` to extract a raw pointer into the ArrayBuffer's backing store, storing it in a `base::Vector<const uint8_t>`. It then calls `ArgumentToCompileOptions(info[1], ...)` to process the... | none | [
"diff --git a/src/wasm/wasm-js.cc b/src/wasm/wasm-js.cc\nindex 00dd6977199..9959516383f 100644\n--- a/src/wasm/wasm-js.cc\n+++ b/src/wasm/wasm-js.cc\n@@ -195,9 +195,9 @@ GET_FIRST_ARGUMENT_AS(Tag)\n \n #undef GET_FIRST_ARGUMENT_AS\n \n-base::Vector<const uint8_t> GetFirstArgumentAsBytes(\n+base::OwnedVector<const u... |
v8__441949792 | v8 | 441949792 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:441949792 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --expose-memory-corruption-api --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/builtins/x64/builtins-x64.cc"
] | [
"src/builtins/x64"
] | Race condition | ASAN_CRASH | A double-fetch (TOCTOU) vulnerability in Generate_PushBoundArguments() in src/builtins/x64/builtins-x64.cc. The JSBoundFunction's bound arguments array and its length are fetched twice: once before the stack overflow check (to skip if empty) and again inside the push loop. Between the two fetches, an attacker can race ... | 5000 | [
"diff --git a/src/builtins/x64/builtins-x64.cc b/src/builtins/x64/builtins-x64.cc\nindex 747dec26315..dd0a2b1c6ac 100644\n--- a/src/builtins/x64/builtins-x64.cc\n+++ b/src/builtins/x64/builtins-x64.cc\n@@ -2775,19 +2775,14 @@ void Generate_PushBoundArguments(MacroAssembler* masm) {\n // -- rbx : the number of ... |
v8__442412895 | v8 | 442412895 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:442412895 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --omit-quit --fuzzing --jit-fuzzing --sandbox-fuzzing --js-staging | [
"src/json/json-stringifier.cc"
] | [
"src/json"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in FastJsonStringifier::SerializeString in V8's JSON stringifier. The root cause is that FastJsonStringifier::SerializeString reads string->length() without any SBXCHECK sandbox bounds validation. An attacker with in-sandbox write access (e.g., via Sandbox.MemoryView) can corrupt a... | none | [
"From 753d3760c6e477a7615bed2ddb26c3e8388ed1fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: pthier <pthier@chromium.org>\nDate: Mon, 19 May 2025 17:08:09 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [json] Stringify: Ensure we are not reading OOB the\n JsonEscapeTable\n\nIn the SIMD version, we load the character that requires escaping from\nmemory... |
v8__442981541 | v8 | 442981541 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:442981541 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --sandbox-fuzzing | [
"src/d8/d8.cc"
] | [
"src/d8"
] | Use-after-free | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A heap use-after-free vulnerability in V8's d8 shell dynamic module import handling. When a dynamic import is performed (e.g., `import('...')`), `Shell::HostImportModuleWithPhaseDynamically` allocates a `DynamicImportData` object on the native heap and enqueues a `CallbackTask` microtask via `isolate->EnqueueMicrotask(... | none | [
"From 2388032b518d067b8d5bbc4313c3c7d595f10e90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Nikolaos Papaspyrou <nikolaos@chromium.org>\nDate: Fri, 5 Sep 2025 18:19:18 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [d8] Guard against DynamicImportData abuses\n\nThis CL fixes a UAF in d8 that can occur with --sandbox-fuzzing, by\nsetting the same Dyna... |
v8__443182220 | v8 | 443182220 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:443182220 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --sandbox-fuzzing --harmony-struct | [
"src/objects/js-atomics-synchronization.cc"
] | [
"src/objects"
] | Use-after-free | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A heap use-after-free vulnerability exists in V8's Atomics.Mutex async unlock path. When `Atomics.Mutex.lockAsync` is called, a `LockAsyncWaiterQueueNode` (a C++ object managed by a `unique_ptr` in the isolate's `async_waiter_queue_nodes` list) is created and its raw pointer is wrapped in a `Foreign` object stored in a... | 5000 | [
"From df48074d0e652501f234ab26ff919fe8b05b84a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Nikolaos Papaspyrou <nikolaos@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 9 Sep 2025 14:48:34 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [shared-struct] Guard against Atomics.Mutex.lockAsync abuses\n\nThis CL fixes a UAF that can occur with --sandbox-fuzzing, by setting\nth... |
v8__443475183 | v8 | 443475183 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:443475183 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --fuzzing --sandbox-fuzzing --single-threaded | [
"third_party/partition_alloc/src/partition_alloc/partition_page.h",
"src/init/isolate-group.cc"
] | [
"third_party/partition_alloc/src/partition_alloc",
"src/init"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A sandbox escape vulnerability exists in the interaction between PartitionAlloc freelist metadata and V8's ArrayBuffer backing-store allocator. `SlotSpanMetadata::freelist_head` in `third_party/partition_alloc/src/partition_alloc/partition_page.h` is consumed as a raw pointer, and `PABackedSandboxedArrayBufferAllocator... | 5000 | [
"diff --git a/src/init/isolate-group.cc b/src/init/isolate-group.cc\nindex d0843d71bfb..9af2277d514 100644\n--- a/src/init/isolate-group.cc\n+++ b/src/init/isolate-group.cc\n@@ -589,6 +589,10 @@ class PABackedSandboxedArrayBufferAllocator::Impl final {\n }\n // The V8 sandbox is guaranteed to be large enoug... |
v8__443772809 | v8 | 443772809 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:443772809 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc --sandbox-testing | [
"src/objects/objects-body-descriptors-inl.h"
] | [
"src/objects"
] | Use-after-free | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A use-after-free vulnerability exists in V8's JSDispatchEntry lifecycle management when the LeapTiering feature is enabled. The root cause is that `InstructionStream::BodyDescriptor::kRelocModeMask` in `src/objects/objects-body-descriptors-inl.h` does not include `RelocInfo::ModeMask(RelocInfo::JS_DISPATCH_HANDLE)`. As... | 20000 | [
"From 51b324c6d189eeca06b84200d1acbdfba85f5c9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>\nDate: Mon, 15 Sep 2025 11:45:03 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [heap] Fix processing of JSDispatch handle through RelocInfo\n\nBefore this patch any dispatch handles contained in RelocInfo were assumed... |
v8__443875388 | v8 | 443875388 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:443875388 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | [
"src/codegen/handler-table.h",
"src/codegen/handler-table.cc"
] | [
"src/codegen"
] | Integer truncation | DCHECK | An integer truncation vulnerability exists in V8's bytecode exception handler table. `HandlerTable::SetRangeHandler` in `src/codegen/handler-table.cc` encodes each catch handler's bytecode offset into the 28-bit `HandlerOffsetField` without enforcing that the offset fits in 28 bits in release builds. A sufficiently lar... | none | [
"From a5f18bb86c3b97b9bfc8f95a0926812a1282ad7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Leszek Swirski <leszeks@chromium.org>\nDate: Fri, 12 Sep 2025 16:48:24 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [ignition] CHECK that handler offsets fit in the bitfield\n\nFixed: 443765373\nChange-Id: I2be7258463c7787311105b7075f3007197cfccfe\nReviewed-... | |
v8__444048032 | v8 | 444048032 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:444048032 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --fuzzing --sandbox-fuzzing --single-threaded | [
"src/bigint/mul-toom.cc"
] | [
"src/bigint"
] | Out-of-bounds write | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A race condition in V8's BigInt Toom-Cook multiplication leads to an out-of-bounds write that enables a V8 sandbox escape. The root cause is that `ShiftedDigits` (in `div-helpers.h`) does not allocate new storage when the divisor's top bit is already set (shift == 0), instead keeping a direct pointer into the BigInt's ... | 5000 | [
"From 28c02e0c7bb14704cc328b00a84782214d22f48a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakob Kummerow <jkummerow@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 11 Sep 2025 14:06:07 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [bigint][sandbox] Harden more against concurrent modification\n\nSome additional BigInt algorithms get confused when malicious worker\nthrea... |
v8__444141029 | v8 | 444141029 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:444141029 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax | [
"src/maglev/maglev-ir.h"
] | [
"src/maglev"
] | Integer truncation | ASAN_CRASH | An integer truncation vulnerability exists in the Maglev JIT compiler's node representation. The `NodeBase` class in `maglev-ir.h` stores the number of inputs for each IR node in a 16-bit bitfield (`InputCountField`). When allocating a node via `NodeBase::Allocate`, the provided `input_count` is encoded into this 16-bi... | none | [
"From 84c0b167d973cdeba2f57004fd4d500e70a8b992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Victor Gomes <victorgomes@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 11 Sep 2025 10:19:34 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [maglev] SBXCHECK input count is less than max allowed\n\nChange-Id: I37dc612929243de4aac90d73c4e5e8724abf648e\nReviewed-on: https://chromiu... |
v8__444189152 | v8 | 444189152 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:444189152 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --no-liftoff --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/compiler/backend/x64/instruction-selector-x64.cc"
] | [
"src/compiler/backend/x64"
] | Integer overflow | ASAN_CRASH | An integer overflow vulnerability exists in the `TryEmitLoadForLoadWord64AndShiftRight` function in V8's x64 instruction selector (`src/compiler/backend/x64/instruction-selector-x64.cc`). This function optimizes the pattern of loading a 64-bit value from memory and right-shifting it by 32 bits, by instead directly load... | none | [
"diff --git a/src/compiler/backend/x64/instruction-selector-x64.cc b/src/compiler/backend/x64/instruction-selector-x64.cc\nindex e95c716450e..353d032b655 100644\n--- a/src/compiler/backend/x64/instruction-selector-x64.cc\n+++ b/src/compiler/backend/x64/instruction-selector-x64.cc\n@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@\n #include <limits... |
v8__445209324 | v8 | 445209324 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:445209324 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --sandbox-testing --allow-natives-syntax | [
"src/sandbox/code-entrypoint-tag.h",
"src/sandbox/js-dispatch-table-inl.h"
] | [
"src/sandbox"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A V8 sandbox bypass vulnerability exists due to incorrect code entrypoint tag handling in the JS dispatch table. The root cause is that `kJSEntrypointTag` is aliased to `kDefaultCodeEntrypointTag` (both equal 0) in `src/sandbox/code-entrypoint-tag.h`. As a result, `JSDispatchTable::IsCompatibleCode` in `src/sandbox/js-... | 5000 | [
"From 581bca24327d088eaa5d6689a1428aa4cf28fbb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Krishna Ravishankar <krishna.ravi732@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 16 Sep 2025 11:38:54 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] [sandbox] Ensure only JS linkage builtins are added to\n dispatch tables\n\nFixed: 445209324\nChange-Id: Ide965ed03736799ec820ad0ba6... |
v8__445966259 | v8 | 445966259 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:445966259 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax --sandbox-testing | [
"src/builtins/builtins-internal-gen.cc"
] | [
"src/builtins"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | The DebugBreakTrampoline builtin (in src/builtins/builtins-internal-gen.cc) retrieves the code object from a JSFunction's SharedFunctionInfo via GetSharedFunctionInfoCode() and immediately tail-calls into it using TailCallJSCode() without validating that the retrieved code has JS linkage. An attacker who can corrupt th... | 20000 | [
"From a622c3686d9b0eeb6fbf38c949252479460b967a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>\nDate: Fri, 19 Sep 2025 18:25:05 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [sandbox] Introduce kCEntryEntrypointTag for CEntry builtins\n\n... which are not compatible with JS calling convention.\n\nBug: 435630464\nChan... |
v8__446113730 | v8 | 446113730 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:446113730 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/wasm/wasm-objects.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Use-after-free | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A use-after-free vulnerability in V8's WebAssembly dispatch table growth logic allows sandbox bypass via WasmCPT (Code Pointer Table) handle UAF. In WasmDispatchTable::Grow(), when a dispatch table is grown, the offheap wrapper refcount holders (wrappers_ in WasmDispatchTableData) are moved via std::move() to the newly... | 20000 | [
"diff --git a/src/codegen/arm64/macro-assembler-arm64.cc b/src/codegen/arm64/macro-assembler-arm64.cc\nindex 2981a56e1c6..11d902daa5b 100644\n--- a/src/codegen/arm64/macro-assembler-arm64.cc\n+++ b/src/codegen/arm64/macro-assembler-arm64.cc\n@@ -2676,8 +2676,20 @@ void MacroAssembler::ResolveWasmCodePointer(Registe... |
v8__446113731 | v8 | 446113731 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:446113731 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --experimental-wasm-custom-descriptors | [
"src/wasm/module-instantiate.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | RUNTIME_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's WebAssembly custom descriptors support because `ref.func` is typed as an exact reference to the declared function type even though imported functions may legally be subtypes of that type. Module instantiation preserves the original imported function reference for `ref.func`... | 55000 | [
"From 48c3551179299151b044b2c161566465497c0407 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakob Kummerow <jkummerow@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 23 Sep 2025 15:39:41 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm-custom-desc] Fix subtyping\n\nThis updates the restrictions on subtyping of descriptors, in\nanticipation of upcoming spec changes:\n-... |
v8__446113732 | v8 | 446113732 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:446113732 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --experimental-wasm-custom-descriptors | [
"src/wasm/function-body-decoder-impl.h"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | RUNTIME_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's implementation of WebAssembly custom descriptors because `ref.cast_desc` and `br_on_cast_desc*` allow subtype relationships between descriptors to justify casts between unrelated described struct types. Descriptor subtyping does not imply subtyping between the underlying de... | 55000 | [
"diff --git a/src/compiler/turboshaft/wasm-gc-typed-optimization-reducer.cc b/src/compiler/turboshaft/wasm-gc-typed-optimization-reducer.cc\nindex c8d6693a442..f6905e68dbe 100644\n--- a/src/compiler/turboshaft/wasm-gc-typed-optimization-reducer.cc\n+++ b/src/compiler/turboshaft/wasm-gc-typed-optimization-reducer.cc... |
v8__446122633 | v8 | 446122633 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:446122633 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --experimental-wasm-custom-descriptors | [
"src/compiler/turboshaft/wasm-gc-typed-optimization-reducer.cc"
] | [
"src/compiler/turboshaft"
] | Type confusion | RUNTIME_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's Turboshaft compiler due to incorrect reachability analysis in `WasmGCTypeAnalyzer::ProcessBranchOnTarget()`. When processing a `WasmTypeCheck` operation, the analyzer marks the false branch (the branch taken when the cast fails) as statically unreachable if the checked obje... | 55000 | [
"From 48c3551179299151b044b2c161566465497c0407 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakob Kummerow <jkummerow@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 23 Sep 2025 15:39:41 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm-custom-desc] Fix subtyping\n\nThis updates the restrictions on subtyping of descriptors, in\nanticipation of upcoming spec changes:\n-... |
v8__446124892 | v8 | 446124892 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:446124892 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --experimental-wasm-custom-descriptors | [
"src/wasm/wasm-objects.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | RUNTIME_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists on V8's JS-to-Wasm boundary because `JSToWasmObject` in `src/wasm/wasm-objects.cc` checks only canonical subtyping and ignores exactness for custom descriptors. That allows a descriptor object to cross the boundary as an exact supertype even when it is only a subtype, which in turn... | 55000 | [
"From 48c3551179299151b044b2c161566465497c0407 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakob Kummerow <jkummerow@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 23 Sep 2025 15:39:41 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm-custom-desc] Fix subtyping\n\nThis updates the restrictions on subtyping of descriptors, in\nanticipation of upcoming spec changes:\n-... |
v8__446124893 | v8 | 446124893 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:446124893 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --experimental-wasm-custom-descriptors | [
"src/wasm/function-body-decoder-impl.h"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Type confusion | RUNTIME_CRASH | A type confusion vulnerability exists in V8's implementation of `ref.get_desc` because it propagates the exactness of the input reference while deriving the result type from the encoded immediate type's descriptor. This unsound rule can type a descriptor of subtype `y'` as exact supertype `y`, letting attackers instant... | 55000 | [
"From 48c3551179299151b044b2c161566465497c0407 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakob Kummerow <jkummerow@chromium.org>\nDate: Tue, 23 Sep 2025 15:39:41 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [wasm-custom-desc] Fix subtyping\n\nThis updates the restrictions on subtyping of descriptors, in\nanticipation of upcoming spec changes:\n-... |
v8__446714227 | v8 | 446714227 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:446714227 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --fuzzing --sandbox-fuzzing --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc --jit-fuzzing --single-threaded | [
"src/compiler/heap-refs.cc"
] | [
"src/compiler"
] | Out-of-bounds write | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A race condition in MapData::MapData (src/compiler/heap-refs.cc) causes inconsistent caching of Map fields, leading to an out-of-bounds write during Maglev IR graph construction. The MapData constructor reads instance_size_ and in_object_properties_ from the live Map object in two separate non-atomic operations (lines ... | none | [
"diff --git a/src/maglev/maglev-ir.h b/src/maglev/maglev-ir.h\nindex 0b03695..c1e7e09 100644\n--- a/src/maglev/maglev-ir.h\n+++ b/src/maglev/maglev-ir.h\n@@ -6435,7 +6435,9 @@ class VirtualObject : public FixedInputValueNodeT<0, VirtualObject> {\n ValueNode* get(uint32_t offset) const {\n DCHECK_EQ(type_, kDe... |
v8__447307165 | v8 | 447307165 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:447307165 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --sandbox-fuzzing --harmony-struct | [
"src/objects/js-atomics-synchronization.cc"
] | [
"src/objects"
] | Use-after-free | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | A use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability exists in V8's async mutex implementation, specifically in the `UnlockAsyncLockedMutex` function in `js-atomics-synchronization.cc`. This is a bypass of the fix for issue 443182220.
When `Atomics.Mutex.lockAsync()` is called, a `LockAsyncWaiterQueueNode` is created (owned by the is... | 5000 | [
"diff --git a/src/objects/waiter-queue-node.cc b/src/objects/waiter-queue-node.cc\nindex fcd2ba4b5b2..1e0306d4828 100644\n--- a/src/objects/waiter-queue-node.cc\n+++ b/src/objects/waiter-queue-node.cc\n@@ -18,14 +18,14 @@ WaiterQueueNode::~WaiterQueueNode() {\n // Since waiter queue nodes are allocated on the sta... |
v8__449296526 | v8 | 449296526 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:449296526 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/objects/string.cc",
"src/objects/script.cc"
] | [
"src/objects"
] | Sandbox bypass | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | An out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in V8's script line-end computation for externalized strings. If an attacker corrupts the length field of an externalized string, `Script::GetPositionInfo` and `Script::InitLineEndsInternal` in `src/objects/script.cc` eventually call `String::CalculateLineEnds` in `src/objects... | none | [
"From 64d557999055da1faa080b97864b7fbb5e225953 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Maksim Ivanov <emaxx@google.com>\nDate: Tue, 27 Jan 2026 11:52:58 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [testing][sandbox] Singleton external strings cage\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n\n... |
v8__449910706 | v8 | 449910706 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:449910706 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | [
"src/interpreter/bytecode-generator.cc"
] | [
"src/interpreter"
] | Hole leak | DCHECK | A hole leak vulnerability exists in V8's Ignition bytecode compiler due to an incorrect hole-check elimination in `VisitDoWhileStatement` (src/interpreter/bytecode-generator.cc). The compiler uses a bitmap-based `HoleCheckElisionScope` mechanism to track which `let`/`const` variables have already been hole-checked, eli... | none | [
"From b371b4f8ba073fb5c054273e8909bee5de574b35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Toon Verwaest <verwaest@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 9 Oct 2025 15:06:36 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [interpreter] Merge hole elision info on break\n\nThis e.g. allows us to optimize the access of `x` even though there's\na conditional labeled ... | |
v8__451355210 | v8 | 451355210 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:451355210 | /src/v8 | out/x64.asan/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax --sandbox-testing --disable-in-process-stack-traces | [
"src/codegen/code-stub-assembler.cc",
"src/objects/shared-function-info.cc",
"src/builtins/builtins-internal-gen.cc"
] | [
"src/codegen",
"src/objects",
"src/builtins"
] | Out-of-bounds read/write | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | CodeStubAssembler::LoadBuiltin in src/codegen/code-stub-assembler.cc validates the builtin ID index with only a CSA_DCHECK (a debug-only assertion stripped in release builds) rather than a CSA_SBXCHECK (a sandbox-enforced check). This is inconsistent with the C++ counterpart SharedFunctionInfo::builtin_id() in src/obje... | 20000 | [
"From 95b9fa928629d3aa86a20b5a6c29a9ccbe322385 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Igor Sheludko <ishell@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 16 Oct 2025 14:23:10 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [sandbox] SBXCHECK that CSA::LoadBuiltin() gets valid builtin\n id\n\nDrive-by: add IFTTT linter pragmas for CSA::GetSharedFunctionInfoCode()\na... |
v8__452319320 | v8 | 452319320 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:452319320 | /src/v8 | out/x64.debug/d8 | --allow-natives-syntax | [
"src/json/json-parser.cc"
] | [
"src/json"
] | Out-of-bounds read | DCHECK | An out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in V8's JSON parser (`ParseJsonObjectProperties` in `src/json/json-parser.cc`). When `JSON.parse` processes an array of objects, it uses a previously-parsed object as a 'feedback' template, caching a reference to that object's `DescriptorArray` to accelerate subsequent propert... | none | [
"From 50eba5e6c269c71d6e0e758b84fafe8d5c37d210 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: pthier <pthier@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 16 Oct 2025 15:16:31 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [json] Parser: Early return if Expect() fails\n\nExpect()/ExpectNext() used to simply set the cursor to the end of the\ninput if the expectation failed... |
v8__452605803 | v8 | 452605803 | hwiwonlee/v8.x86_64:452605803 | /src/v8 | out/x64.release/d8 | --sandbox-testing | [
"src/wasm/wasm-objects.cc",
"src/wasm/wasm-js.cc"
] | [
"src/wasm"
] | Use-after-free | SANDBOX_VIOLATION | Corrupting the import dispatch table frees a WasmCPT wrapper handle and leads to a use-after-free outside the sandbox. | 20000 | [
"From 58bdae122c0f44e427ee2ec7dda636620e7aade2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakob Kummerow <jkummerow@chromium.org>\nDate: Thu, 30 Oct 2025 14:06:17 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Reland \"[sandbox][wasm] Un-expose dispatch_table_for_imports\"\n\nThis is a reland of commit 7a322570d2973af0abf7f3122eb0674334d3af0a\nReve... |
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