| # Contributing to CAIO | |
| Thanks for your interest. CAIO is a reference prototype synthesizing ideas | |
| validated separately across several sibling projects (see the README's | |
| "Relationship to other projects" section) — contributions that strengthen | |
| the actual security properties (lineage integrity, capability conservation, | |
| divergence detection, audit tamper-evidence) are especially valuable. | |
| ## Getting set up | |
| ```bash | |
| git clone https://github.com/kaymyg/caio.git | |
| cd caio | |
| pip install -r requirements-dev.txt | |
| pip install -e . | |
| python -m caio.demo # see it work end to end | |
| pytest -q --cov=caio --cov-report=term-missing # 10 tests, 100% on core.py | |
| ``` | |
| ## Before opening a PR | |
| CI runs the test suite with coverage and the demo script, across Python | |
| 3.10–3.12, on every push and PR. Please run that locally first. | |
| If you add a new branch or status code to `Gateway.transact()`, add a test | |
| that exercises it through `gw.transact()` itself, not just the underlying | |
| helper it calls — `test_transact_level_status_mapping` exists specifically | |
| because the original test suite covered `EvidenceGraph.evaluate()` directly | |
| but never asserted what `transact()` actually mapped that result to. | |
| ## What especially matters here | |
| - **This is a reference prototype, not a deployable network protocol.** The | |
| agent key-binding check in `Gateway.transact()` is a local | |
| sign/verify-with-a-fresh-nonce consistency check, not a real challenge | |
| issued over an untrusted wire — be precise about this distinction in any | |
| docs or code you touch, don't let it get oversold. | |
| - **`Lease.expires_at` is checked; `Lease.issued_at` is not.** A lease | |
| "valid" from a future timestamp still passes `Gateway.valid()`. This is a | |
| known, documented gap (see README "Known Limitations"), not an oversight | |
| to silently patch — if you fix it, make sure you understand why it was | |
| left out (clock-skew tolerance) before tightening it. | |
| - **The host-divergence detector checks two specific action strings** | |
| (`CRITICAL_TAMPER`, `UNSANCTIONED_EXEC`), not general anomaly detection. | |
| A generic claim/host mismatch only reaches `CAPABILITY_REDUCTION`, not | |
| `QUARANTINE` — that's intentional graduated response, not a bug, but | |
| don't describe it as catching "any divergence" in docs. | |
| - **Nonce replay protection burns the nonce only after key-binding | |
| succeeds** — preserve that ordering if you touch `transact()`; marking a | |
| nonce used before authentication would let an attacker burn a legitimate | |
| agent's nonce with a failed forged request. | |
| ## Good places to start | |
| - A real network-level challenge-response protocol to replace the local | |
| key-binding consistency check | |
| - `issued_at` validation (with configurable clock-skew tolerance) | |
| - Persisting `Ledger`/`Audit`/`EvidenceGraph` state instead of in-memory only | |
| - Expanding the host-action taxonomy beyond the current two hardcoded | |
| "bad" actions, ideally via a configurable policy rather than more | |
| hardcoded strings | |
| - A real transport binding (HTTP middleware, gRPC interceptor) around | |
| `Gateway.transact()` | |
| For anything larger, please open an issue first to discuss the approach. | |
| ## Commit style | |
| Small, focused commits with a clear one-line summary. No strict format | |
| enforced beyond that. | |