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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>First of all--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>That is correct.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.
Judge: --if we are going to argue about the language?
respondent: First of all--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I do, Justice Sotomayor. Although this Court has not used the words 109, it has used the words--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.
Judge: Of course, the statute itself says "express", right? Talking about section 109.
Petitioner: That is correct.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>But, again, ever since 1908, that's a standard that this Court has not accepted. And this is based on the provision, the well-settled provision, that an earlier Congress cannot bind a later Congress.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.
Judge: --if we are going to argue about the language?
respondent: First of all--
Judge: Well, generally the word "express" incorporates "clear".
respondent: --I do, Justice Sotomayor. Although this Court has not used the words 109, it has used the words--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--There is no dispute here, I don't think, that there is a -- a lack of an express statement in the Act. But--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.
Judge: Of course, the statute itself says "express", right? Talking about section 109.
Petitioner: That is correct.
Judge: So we're pretty far removed from the language of the statute, I guess.
Petitioner: But, again, ever since 1908, that's a standard that this Court has not accepted. And this is based on the provision, the well-settled provision, that an earlier Congress cannot bind a later Congress.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>The answer is no, I don't believe that Congress felt that that was the standard. Again relying on this Court's jurisprudence that said you give us text and if we are able to find that the fair implication and the intent of Congress through that fair implication is that this new statute applies, because an earlier Congress cannot bind the newer Congress--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.
Judge: --if we are going to argue about the language?
respondent: First of all--
Judge: Well, generally the word "express" incorporates "clear".
respondent: --I do, Justice Sotomayor. Although this Court has not used the words 109, it has used the words--
Judge: So that -- why doesn't that defeat your case?
respondent: --There is no dispute here, I don't think, that there is a -- a lack of an express statement in the Act. But--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, as Justice Scalia explained in his concurring opinion in Lockhart v. United States, one Congress cannot impose standards of how another Congress is to enact legislation. The subsequent Congress is free to choose how it will express its will in the language or structure that it sees fit. And I'd like to give an example--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--This case?<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.
Judge: Say that again. I didn't understand it.
respondent: Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Okay. What I'm saying is it's an element of escape that you're avoiding custody, and escape is a continuing offense and so it doesn't end until the avoidance of custody is over.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--
Judge: But suppose it were shown -- this is hypothetical. Suppose it were shown that 90 percent of all escapes under the escape statute were breakouts involving weapons; 10 percent were failure to report. Would that affect how we decide the case?
Petitioner: --This case?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, since -- I think since this is not a prison breakout case, I don't know whether data about breakouts--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.
Judge: Say that again. I didn't understand it.
respondent: Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--
Judge: What's that got to do with increasing the risk of violence? I mean, I see -- I see your kind of elements argument, but it seems to be beside the point that--
respondent: --Okay. What I'm saying is it's an element of escape that you're avoiding custody, and escape is a continuing offense and so it doesn't end until the avoidance of custody is over.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>It shows the close connection between the two. And so when you're -- when the offender is committing the crime, it's appropriate to hold him accountable for what he can see is so highly, closely connected to the crime and which, in fact, has to happen in order to end the crime; whereas--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--
Judge: But suppose it were shown -- this is hypothetical. Suppose it were shown that 90 percent of all escapes under the escape statute were breakouts involving weapons; 10 percent were failure to report. Would that affect how we decide the case?
Petitioner: --This case?
Judge: Yes.
Petitioner: Well, since -- I think since this is not a prison breakout case, I don't know whether data about breakouts--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I think you -- I think the categorical rule does require you to look at--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.
Judge: Say that again. I didn't understand it.
respondent: Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--
Judge: What's that got to do with increasing the risk of violence? I mean, I see -- I see your kind of elements argument, but it seems to be beside the point that--
respondent: --Okay. What I'm saying is it's an element of escape that you're avoiding custody, and escape is a continuing offense and so it doesn't end until the avoidance of custody is over.
Judge: --Yes, but the crime is still -- the crime that we are concerned with here is still essentially a passive crime. He just doesn't show up.
respondent: It shows the close connection between the two. And so when you're -- when the offender is committing the crime, it's appropriate to hold him accountable for what he can see is so highly, closely connected to the crime and which, in fact, has to happen in order to end the crime; whereas--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>this mo- Do you...<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you...<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Your Honor, obviously that is not a court a a question that this Court has directly addressed in either Argersinger or Scott.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Judge: you do allow the possibility that counsel could be provided in the event the probation is revoked.
respondent: I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>The holding does not certainly.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you...
Judge: I'm asking whether the State of Alabama concedes that it can't ever impose that original sentence.
Petitioner: Your Honor, obviously that is not a court a a question that this Court has directly addressed in either Argersinger or Scott.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Our reading of of Scott is that th- that we cannot activate the suspended sentence.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Judge: you do allow the possibility that counsel could be provided in the event the probation is revoked.
respondent: I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.
Judge: the rev- revocation hearing would not necessarily be whether he committed a crime.
respondent: The holding does not certainly.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, that that puzzled me somewhat when the State made that concession in its reply brief that this was in e- in effect a sham sentence.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you...
Judge: I'm asking whether the State of Alabama concedes that it can't ever impose that original sentence.
Petitioner: Your Honor, obviously that is not a court a a question that this Court has directly addressed in either Argersinger or Scott.
Judge: what happens in Alabama if if a a criminal defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor and placed on probation and then violates probation? Does that enable the State to impose the original sentence for violation of the probation?
Petitioner: Our reading of of Scott is that th- that we cannot activate the suspended sentence.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, ordinarily it would.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Judge: you do allow the possibility that counsel could be provided in the event the probation is revoked.
respondent: I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.
Judge: the rev- revocation hearing would not necessarily be whether he committed a crime.
respondent: The holding does not certainly.
Judge: counsel to defend him against that.
respondent: Well, that that puzzled me somewhat when the State made that concession in its reply brief that this was in e- in effect a sham sentence.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Perhaps we're we're dealing with a sham sentence.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Justice Alito, Congress certainly can cabin the discretion of judges. But once they set a floor and a ceiling, pursuant to this Court's remedial holding in Booker, judges must be free to consider the entire range of punishment. And Booker relies on the notion that the Guidelines are now fully advisory and, therefore, judges without having to identify specific facts have to have the discretion to disagree with policies or identify things unique to the case in order to fashion an appropriate punishment.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.
Judge: But that is a construction of what Congress intended, and for purposes of decision we assumed that Congress intended what we held the statute meant.
respondent: Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Justice Stevens, the only question presented in Neal was, did the Commission's weight guideline for LSD require this Court to change its interpretation of Section 841. And the Court held no. There was no question before the Court about whether the Sentencing Commission had legitimately adopted a different formula than the mixture or substance rule that this Court had held governed the statute. The LSD guideline was not in play in Neal. The government never challenged it. Its rationality was not at issue. All the Court had to hold was that whatever the Sentencing Commission did--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.
Judge: If Congress made a finding that crack and cocaine are equally dangerous and passed a statute that said, for sentencing purposes, every district judge shall treat cases involving these two substances exactly the same, would there be a Sixth Amendment problem with that? Or do you think every district judge gets the right to make that policy decision individually?
Petitioner: Justice Alito, Congress certainly can cabin the discretion of judges. But once they set a floor and a ceiling, pursuant to this Court's remedial holding in Booker, judges must be free to consider the entire range of punishment. And Booker relies on the notion that the Guidelines are now fully advisory and, therefore, judges without having to identify specific facts have to have the discretion to disagree with policies or identify things unique to the case in order to fashion an appropriate punishment.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Your Honor.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.
Judge: But that is a construction of what Congress intended, and for purposes of decision we assumed that Congress intended what we held the statute meant.
respondent: Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--
Judge: It does hold that a guideline that does not conform with a congressional judgment merely expressed in a mandatory minimum is a guideline that would survive.
respondent: --Justice Stevens, the only question presented in Neal was, did the Commission's weight guideline for LSD require this Court to change its interpretation of Section 841. And the Court held no. There was no question before the Court about whether the Sentencing Commission had legitimately adopted a different formula than the mixture or substance rule that this Court had held governed the statute. The LSD guideline was not in play in Neal. The government never challenged it. Its rationality was not at issue. All the Court had to hold was that whatever the Sentencing Commission did--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, I disagree with that, Justice Stevens, because no one challenged the guideline in Neal. There was nothing at issue in the Court to decide about whether that Guideline was valid. But even if the Court thought that Neal does involve some sort of a principle that the Sentencing Commission has greater freedom to vary from the procedures laid out in a mandatory minimum sentencing statute, Neal does not control this case, because there is more data about what Congress intended the ratio between crack and powder to be, and because Congress changed the basic, organic statute that governs the Sentencing Commission's--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.
Judge: If Congress made a finding that crack and cocaine are equally dangerous and passed a statute that said, for sentencing purposes, every district judge shall treat cases involving these two substances exactly the same, would there be a Sixth Amendment problem with that? Or do you think every district judge gets the right to make that policy decision individually?
Petitioner: Justice Alito, Congress certainly can cabin the discretion of judges. But once they set a floor and a ceiling, pursuant to this Court's remedial holding in Booker, judges must be free to consider the entire range of punishment. And Booker relies on the notion that the Guidelines are now fully advisory and, therefore, judges without having to identify specific facts have to have the discretion to disagree with policies or identify things unique to the case in order to fashion an appropriate punishment.
Judge: What's your answer simply to the very simple argument that because the floor was set on the assumption of a 100 to 1 ratio, set by Congress, that any other sentencing assumption, regardless of the particular justifications in a given case, is simply incoherent with the statutory scheme and for that reason should be regarded as unreasonable?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes. There are several answers to that question, Justice Souter. The first is that this Court has recognized with the same statute which has the same structure that the government argues can only logically be understood one way, that with regard to the weight for LSD in the case of Neal versus United States, it is perfectly appropriate for there to be two different methods of calculating weight for purposes of punishment. The Guidelines calculate weight based on a presumed weight of the combination of the LSD and the blotter paper or the carrier medium. And the statute defines the method for calculating the mandatory minimum by the combined weight of the LSD and the blotter paper, regardless of whether it is heavy or whether it is light.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.
Judge: But that is a construction of what Congress intended, and for purposes of decision we assumed that Congress intended what we held the statute meant.
respondent: Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--
Judge: It does hold that a guideline that does not conform with a congressional judgment merely expressed in a mandatory minimum is a guideline that would survive.
respondent: --Justice Stevens, the only question presented in Neal was, did the Commission's weight guideline for LSD require this Court to change its interpretation of Section 841. And the Court held no. There was no question before the Court about whether the Sentencing Commission had legitimately adopted a different formula than the mixture or substance rule that this Court had held governed the statute. The LSD guideline was not in play in Neal. The government never challenged it. Its rationality was not at issue. All the Court had to hold was that whatever the Sentencing Commission did--
Judge: Yes, but there's also more data that the Commission has reflected on all this and still concludes that the 100 to 1 ratio creates an unwarranted disparity which is contrary to the statute.
respondent: --Well, I disagree with that, Justice Stevens, because no one challenged the guideline in Neal. There was nothing at issue in the Court to decide about whether that Guideline was valid. But even if the Court thought that Neal does involve some sort of a principle that the Sentencing Commission has greater freedom to vary from the procedures laid out in a mandatory minimum sentencing statute, Neal does not control this case, because there is more data about what Congress intended the ratio between crack and powder to be, and because Congress changed the basic, organic statute that governs the Sentencing Commission's--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, the statute, itself, Section 841, establishes the ratio of a 100 to 1. When the Commission first considered creating drug guidelines--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I think that--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Okay.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.
Judge: --of Federal burglary as defined by Justice Blackmun and the Court in this case, end of matter, QED.
respondent: I think that--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I -- I do think you've accurately described what Petitioner -- the dividing line the Petitioner would advocate is. But I would urge the Court to look at the experience of the court of appeals with trying to apply that dividing line, and that will reveal to the Court very clearly why it becomes unworkable. Because we've got several courts of appeals -- as the Court's aware there's a division of authority on this -- that have said, well, look, we want to look for statutes that are phrased in the disjunctive or that have these separately numbered subsection headings or something. Now, setting aside whether that's really principled or not to focus on the text versus the judicial decision, let's accept for the sake of argument that that's the line. The problem is that then the next case that those courts confront, that applying that rule rigidly produces really strange results.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.
Judge: Well, the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessory interest. Now, I know there is some disagreement between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element, one way for the California court to express that is to say simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of the possessory interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term “ enters ” under the California burglary statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.
Petitioner: Okay.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, I don't believe it would, because I don't believe possessory interest equates to Taylor definition.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.
Judge: --of Federal burglary as defined by Justice Blackmun and the Court in this case, end of matter, QED.
respondent: I think that--
Judge: That's exactly right. So therefore, that was my question basically.
respondent: --I -- I do think you've accurately described what Petitioner -- the dividing line the Petitioner would advocate is. But I would urge the Court to look at the experience of the court of appeals with trying to apply that dividing line, and that will reveal to the Court very clearly why it becomes unworkable. Because we've got several courts of appeals -- as the Court's aware there's a division of authority on this -- that have said, well, look, we want to look for statutes that are phrased in the disjunctive or that have these separately numbered subsection headings or something. Now, setting aside whether that's really principled or not to focus on the text versus the judicial decision, let's accept for the sake of argument that that's the line. The problem is that then the next case that those courts confront, that applying that rule rigidly produces really strange results.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.
Judge: Well, the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessory interest. Now, I know there is some disagreement between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element, one way for the California court to express that is to say simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of the possessory interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term “ enters ” under the California burglary statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.
Petitioner: Okay.
Judge: Those are exactly equivalent. Now, if they were to say the latter, would a conviction under this statute potentially qualify under the Armed Career Criminal Act?
Petitioner: Well, I don't believe it would, because I don't believe possessory interest equates to Taylor definition.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, if -- if the elements are shown, and if that's the definition, then yes. But I don't think California possessory interest is the same thing.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.
Judge: --of Federal burglary as defined by Justice Blackmun and the Court in this case, end of matter, QED.
respondent: I think that--
Judge: That's exactly right. So therefore, that was my question basically.
respondent: --I -- I do think you've accurately described what Petitioner -- the dividing line the Petitioner would advocate is. But I would urge the Court to look at the experience of the court of appeals with trying to apply that dividing line, and that will reveal to the Court very clearly why it becomes unworkable. Because we've got several courts of appeals -- as the Court's aware there's a division of authority on this -- that have said, well, look, we want to look for statutes that are phrased in the disjunctive or that have these separately numbered subsection headings or something. Now, setting aside whether that's really principled or not to focus on the text versus the judicial decision, let's accept for the sake of argument that that's the line. The problem is that then the next case that those courts confront, that applying that rule rigidly produces really strange results.
Judge: And of course Congress knew that there are hundreds or thousands of State statutes with several different words and they -- you know, different ways of getting at the same thing, and therefore they wrote the next phrase of their Federal statute, which is it's burglary, arson, explosives or otherwise, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. And so if you have a slight variation on the burglary theme, it doesn't fit within generic burglary, but it's pretty hard to imagine it wouldn't otherwise present the same risks, at least if it's only a slight variation.
respondent: Yes.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, I -- the parties have not briefed here and I wouldn't want to speculate on what the Court would--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, what -- what I would say with respect to that, Your Honor, is that this Court has said in numerous contexts, numerous contexts, that the calculated factual falsehood has no First Amendment value for its own sake.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.
Judge: The value of what?
respondent: Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Personal autonomy.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.
Judge: Somewhat dangerous, isn't it, to subject speech to the absolute rule of no protection? Which is what you're advocating, I understand, that there are no circumstances in which this speech has value. I believe that's your bottom line.
Petitioner: Well, what -- what I would say with respect to that, Your Honor, is that this Court has said in numerous contexts, numerous contexts, that the calculated factual falsehood has no First Amendment value for its own sake.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I want to be--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.
Judge: The value of what?
respondent: Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.
Judge: What does that mean?
respondent: Personal autonomy.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, that we get to -- we get to exaggerate and create--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.
Judge: Somewhat dangerous, isn't it, to subject speech to the absolute rule of no protection? Which is what you're advocating, I understand, that there are no circumstances in which this speech has value. I believe that's your bottom line.
Petitioner: Well, what -- what I would say with respect to that, Your Honor, is that this Court has said in numerous contexts, numerous contexts, that the calculated factual falsehood has no First Amendment value for its own sake.
Judge: Well, I'm -- I'm not sure that that's quite correct. It has said it often, but always in context where it is well understood that speech can injure. Defamation, Gertz. At page 12 of your brief, you make this point, and it's what Justice Sotomayor is indicating. You think there's no value to falsity. But I -- I simply can't find that in our cases, and I -- I think it's a sweeping proposition to say that there's no value to falsity. Falsity is a way in which we contrast what is false and what is true.
Petitioner: I want to be--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I want to respond with precision, Justice Kennedy, that the -- I think what this Court -- and Gertz is a good example -- has done is to draw a line, and that line -- and I think it is Gertz itself that contains this Court's statement that false statements of fact have no First Amendment value. That doesn't automatically mean that a false statement of fact lacks First Amendment protection.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.
Judge: The value of what?
respondent: Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.
Judge: What does that mean?
respondent: Personal autonomy.
Judge: No, not exaggerate -- lie.
respondent: Well, that we get to -- we get to exaggerate and create--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, when we create our own persona, we're often making up things about ourselves that we want people to think about us, and that can be valuable. Samuel Clemens creating Mark Twain. That was creating a persona, and he made things up about himself--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, that's true, but my point is just that on the face of the domestic violence statute, and what it says is that the restoration of rights exception is limited to circumstances where the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights. So on the face of that provision... the provision says restoration occurs only if civil rights have been lost. So it's clear as day that what Congress was saying there was it was mandating the allegedly absurd result here in situations where rights were not lost. And what that means is that you can't say that it's impossible that Congress--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Correct. We have to read the... both clauses, the exemption clause and the unless cause. And--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.
Judge: There are cases in the pipeline that don't think it's as clear as day.
respondent: Well, that's true, but my point is just that on the face of the domestic violence statute, and what it says is that the restoration of rights exception is limited to circumstances where the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights. So on the face of that provision... the provision says restoration occurs only if civil rights have been lost. So it's clear as day that what Congress was saying there was it was mandating the allegedly absurd result here in situations where rights were not lost. And what that means is that you can't say that it's impossible that Congress--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--There is... in the context of subsection (33)... in the context of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--
Judge: They're not anomalies because the gun prohibition would cover them, even though they never had their civil rights taken away? Is that... is that what you're saying?
Petitioner: --Correct. We have to read the... both clauses, the exemption clause and the unless cause. And--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--It depends on the State. In the NACDL lodging that the Court has... I believe 29 States were identified as having some type of restoration procedures. The majority of those, it is by automatic operation of law. So there's no subsequent conditions met by the offender.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the respondent. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the respondent.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.
Judge: There are cases in the pipeline that don't think it's as clear as day.
respondent: Well, that's true, but my point is just that on the face of the domestic violence statute, and what it says is that the restoration of rights exception is limited to circumstances where the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights. So on the face of that provision... the provision says restoration occurs only if civil rights have been lost. So it's clear as day that what Congress was saying there was it was mandating the allegedly absurd result here in situations where rights were not lost. And what that means is that you can't say that it's impossible that Congress--
Judge: Yes.
respondent: --There is... in the context of subsection (33)... in the context of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--there is one circuit that has applied... that has basically overlooked the plain language there, not even attempted to deal with the plain language there. And it's true, and it's found that that exemption was somehow satisfied in a situation where civil rights were never taken away or restored. But the fact that, you know, a court of appeals reached that conclusion without even attempting to take a look at the statutory language doesn't diminish the very plain meaning--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Analyze the conversation between the judge and the petitioner. Based on the dialogue and the key aspects of the case, determine the next most appropriate response from the petitioner.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--
Judge: They're not anomalies because the gun prohibition would cover them, even though they never had their civil rights taken away? Is that... is that what you're saying?
Petitioner: --Correct. We have to read the... both clauses, the exemption clause and the unless cause. And--
Judge: Mr. Coad, how are... how are civil rights which have been taken away typically restored? What is... what is the process for restoring them? Just if you don't commit another offense within a certain number of years?
Petitioner: --It depends on the State. In the NACDL lodging that the Court has... I believe 29 States were identified as having some type of restoration procedures. The majority of those, it is by automatic operation of law. So there's no subsequent conditions met by the offender.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, I think that there really isn't a difference between... by operation of law, a State taking away someone's rights and giving it back or allowing a offender to retain civil rights--<|eot_id|>
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