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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.
Judge: --if we are going to argue about the language?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>First of all--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.
Judge: --if we are going to argue about the language?
respondent: First of all--
Judge: Well, generally the word "express" incorporates "clear".<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I do, Justice Sotomayor. Although this Court has not used the words 109, it has used the words--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.
Judge: --if we are going to argue about the language?
respondent: First of all--
Judge: Well, generally the word "express" incorporates "clear".
respondent: --I do, Justice Sotomayor. Although this Court has not used the words 109, it has used the words--
Judge: So that -- why doesn't that defeat your case?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--There is no dispute here, I don't think, that there is a -- a lack of an express statement in the Act. But--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.
Judge: --if we are going to argue about the language?
respondent: First of all--
Judge: Well, generally the word "express" incorporates "clear".
respondent: --I do, Justice Sotomayor. Although this Court has not used the words 109, it has used the words--
Judge: So that -- why doesn't that defeat your case?
respondent: --There is no dispute here, I don't think, that there is a -- a lack of an express statement in the Act. But--
Judge: Well, so then we -- we ignore The Dictionary Act?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, as Justice Scalia explained in his concurring opinion in Lockhart v. United States, one Congress cannot impose standards of how another Congress is to enact legislation. The subsequent Congress is free to choose how it will express its will in the language or structure that it sees fit. And I'd like to give an example--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.
Judge: --if we are going to argue about the language?
respondent: First of all--
Judge: Well, generally the word "express" incorporates "clear".
respondent: --I do, Justice Sotomayor. Although this Court has not used the words 109, it has used the words--
Judge: So that -- why doesn't that defeat your case?
respondent: --There is no dispute here, I don't think, that there is a -- a lack of an express statement in the Act. But--
Judge: Well, so then we -- we ignore The Dictionary Act?
respondent: --Well, as Justice Scalia explained in his concurring opinion in Lockhart v. United States, one Congress cannot impose standards of how another Congress is to enact legislation. The subsequent Congress is free to choose how it will express its will in the language or structure that it sees fit. And I'd like to give an example--
Judge: And can we ignore 109?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--No, of course not, Justice Kennedy. But these--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.
Judge: Say that again. I didn't understand it.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.
Judge: Say that again. I didn't understand it.
respondent: Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--
Judge: What's that got to do with increasing the risk of violence? I mean, I see -- I see your kind of elements argument, but it seems to be beside the point that--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Okay. What I'm saying is it's an element of escape that you're avoiding custody, and escape is a continuing offense and so it doesn't end until the avoidance of custody is over.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.
Judge: Say that again. I didn't understand it.
respondent: Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--
Judge: What's that got to do with increasing the risk of violence? I mean, I see -- I see your kind of elements argument, but it seems to be beside the point that--
respondent: --Okay. What I'm saying is it's an element of escape that you're avoiding custody, and escape is a continuing offense and so it doesn't end until the avoidance of custody is over.
Judge: --Yes, but the crime is still -- the crime that we are concerned with here is still essentially a passive crime. He just doesn't show up.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>It shows the close connection between the two. And so when you're -- when the offender is committing the crime, it's appropriate to hold him accountable for what he can see is so highly, closely connected to the crime and which, in fact, has to happen in order to end the crime; whereas--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.
Judge: Say that again. I didn't understand it.
respondent: Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--
Judge: What's that got to do with increasing the risk of violence? I mean, I see -- I see your kind of elements argument, but it seems to be beside the point that--
respondent: --Okay. What I'm saying is it's an element of escape that you're avoiding custody, and escape is a continuing offense and so it doesn't end until the avoidance of custody is over.
Judge: --Yes, but the crime is still -- the crime that we are concerned with here is still essentially a passive crime. He just doesn't show up.
respondent: It shows the close connection between the two. And so when you're -- when the offender is committing the crime, it's appropriate to hold him accountable for what he can see is so highly, closely connected to the crime and which, in fact, has to happen in order to end the crime; whereas--
Judge: And given, you know, the close logical connections, I don't see that the close logical connections convert the passive crime into a higher degree of resisting arrest from any other. In fact, it suggests just the opposite.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.
Judge: Say that again. I didn't understand it.
respondent: Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--
Judge: What's that got to do with increasing the risk of violence? I mean, I see -- I see your kind of elements argument, but it seems to be beside the point that--
respondent: --Okay. What I'm saying is it's an element of escape that you're avoiding custody, and escape is a continuing offense and so it doesn't end until the avoidance of custody is over.
Judge: --Yes, but the crime is still -- the crime that we are concerned with here is still essentially a passive crime. He just doesn't show up.
respondent: It shows the close connection between the two. And so when you're -- when the offender is committing the crime, it's appropriate to hold him accountable for what he can see is so highly, closely connected to the crime and which, in fact, has to happen in order to end the crime; whereas--
Judge: And given, you know, the close logical connections, I don't see that the close logical connections convert the passive crime into a higher degree of resisting arrest from any other. In fact, it suggests just the opposite.
respondent: --Well--
Judge: Well, you know, you may precisely be doing nothing. If I say, you know, it's Monday morning at 9 o'clock, I'm supposed to -- to report to prison, and I'm going to stay home, my purpose is to stay put in my armchair. That's purposeful conduct and it's about as passive as you can get.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--To address the -- the passive point, deliberately failing to comply with your legal duty to report to prison is not -- it is not doing nothing, as Petitioner says. It's not purely passive. It is a criminal act.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>[NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Judge: you do allow the possibility that counsel could be provided in the event the probation is revoked.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Judge: you do allow the possibility that counsel could be provided in the event the probation is revoked.
respondent: I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.
Judge: the rev- revocation hearing would not necessarily be whether he committed a crime.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>The holding does not certainly.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Judge: you do allow the possibility that counsel could be provided in the event the probation is revoked.
respondent: I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.
Judge: the rev- revocation hearing would not necessarily be whether he committed a crime.
respondent: The holding does not certainly.
Judge: counsel to defend him against that.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, that that puzzled me somewhat when the State made that concession in its reply brief that this was in e- in effect a sham sentence.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Judge: you do allow the possibility that counsel could be provided in the event the probation is revoked.
respondent: I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.
Judge: the rev- revocation hearing would not necessarily be whether he committed a crime.
respondent: The holding does not certainly.
Judge: counsel to defend him against that.
respondent: Well, that that puzzled me somewhat when the State made that concession in its reply brief that this was in e- in effect a sham sentence.
Judge: the crime itself.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Perhaps we're we're dealing with a sham sentence.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Judge: you do allow the possibility that counsel could be provided in the event the probation is revoked.
respondent: I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.
Judge: the rev- revocation hearing would not necessarily be whether he committed a crime.
respondent: The holding does not certainly.
Judge: counsel to defend him against that.
respondent: Well, that that puzzled me somewhat when the State made that concession in its reply brief that this was in e- in effect a sham sentence.
Judge: the crime itself.
respondent: Perhaps we're we're dealing with a sham sentence.
Judge: Well, it would als- it would also cover, I take it, whether or not the plea was voluntarieen [: voluntary] and knowingly made originally.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>That's the Attorney General's...<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.
Judge: But that is a construction of what Congress intended, and for purposes of decision we assumed that Congress intended what we held the statute meant.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.
Judge: But that is a construction of what Congress intended, and for purposes of decision we assumed that Congress intended what we held the statute meant.
respondent: Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--
Judge: It does hold that a guideline that does not conform with a congressional judgment merely expressed in a mandatory minimum is a guideline that would survive.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Justice Stevens, the only question presented in Neal was, did the Commission's weight guideline for LSD require this Court to change its interpretation of Section 841. And the Court held no. There was no question before the Court about whether the Sentencing Commission had legitimately adopted a different formula than the mixture or substance rule that this Court had held governed the statute. The LSD guideline was not in play in Neal. The government never challenged it. Its rationality was not at issue. All the Court had to hold was that whatever the Sentencing Commission did--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.
Judge: But that is a construction of what Congress intended, and for purposes of decision we assumed that Congress intended what we held the statute meant.
respondent: Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--
Judge: It does hold that a guideline that does not conform with a congressional judgment merely expressed in a mandatory minimum is a guideline that would survive.
respondent: --Justice Stevens, the only question presented in Neal was, did the Commission's weight guideline for LSD require this Court to change its interpretation of Section 841. And the Court held no. There was no question before the Court about whether the Sentencing Commission had legitimately adopted a different formula than the mixture or substance rule that this Court had held governed the statute. The LSD guideline was not in play in Neal. The government never challenged it. Its rationality was not at issue. All the Court had to hold was that whatever the Sentencing Commission did--
Judge: Yes, but there's also more data that the Commission has reflected on all this and still concludes that the 100 to 1 ratio creates an unwarranted disparity which is contrary to the statute.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, I disagree with that, Justice Stevens, because no one challenged the guideline in Neal. There was nothing at issue in the Court to decide about whether that Guideline was valid. But even if the Court thought that Neal does involve some sort of a principle that the Sentencing Commission has greater freedom to vary from the procedures laid out in a mandatory minimum sentencing statute, Neal does not control this case, because there is more data about what Congress intended the ratio between crack and powder to be, and because Congress changed the basic, organic statute that governs the Sentencing Commission's--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.
Judge: But that is a construction of what Congress intended, and for purposes of decision we assumed that Congress intended what we held the statute meant.
respondent: Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--
Judge: It does hold that a guideline that does not conform with a congressional judgment merely expressed in a mandatory minimum is a guideline that would survive.
respondent: --Justice Stevens, the only question presented in Neal was, did the Commission's weight guideline for LSD require this Court to change its interpretation of Section 841. And the Court held no. There was no question before the Court about whether the Sentencing Commission had legitimately adopted a different formula than the mixture or substance rule that this Court had held governed the statute. The LSD guideline was not in play in Neal. The government never challenged it. Its rationality was not at issue. All the Court had to hold was that whatever the Sentencing Commission did--
Judge: Yes, but there's also more data that the Commission has reflected on all this and still concludes that the 100 to 1 ratio creates an unwarranted disparity which is contrary to the statute.
respondent: --Well, I disagree with that, Justice Stevens, because no one challenged the guideline in Neal. There was nothing at issue in the Court to decide about whether that Guideline was valid. But even if the Court thought that Neal does involve some sort of a principle that the Sentencing Commission has greater freedom to vary from the procedures laid out in a mandatory minimum sentencing statute, Neal does not control this case, because there is more data about what Congress intended the ratio between crack and powder to be, and because Congress changed the basic, organic statute that governs the Sentencing Commission's--
Judge: It establishes the ratio for mandatory minimum purposes only, is what Neal held.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, the statute, itself, Section 841, establishes the ratio of a 100 to 1. When the Commission first considered creating drug guidelines--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.
Judge: But that is a construction of what Congress intended, and for purposes of decision we assumed that Congress intended what we held the statute meant.
respondent: Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--
Judge: It does hold that a guideline that does not conform with a congressional judgment merely expressed in a mandatory minimum is a guideline that would survive.
respondent: --Justice Stevens, the only question presented in Neal was, did the Commission's weight guideline for LSD require this Court to change its interpretation of Section 841. And the Court held no. There was no question before the Court about whether the Sentencing Commission had legitimately adopted a different formula than the mixture or substance rule that this Court had held governed the statute. The LSD guideline was not in play in Neal. The government never challenged it. Its rationality was not at issue. All the Court had to hold was that whatever the Sentencing Commission did--
Judge: Yes, but there's also more data that the Commission has reflected on all this and still concludes that the 100 to 1 ratio creates an unwarranted disparity which is contrary to the statute.
respondent: --Well, I disagree with that, Justice Stevens, because no one challenged the guideline in Neal. There was nothing at issue in the Court to decide about whether that Guideline was valid. But even if the Court thought that Neal does involve some sort of a principle that the Sentencing Commission has greater freedom to vary from the procedures laid out in a mandatory minimum sentencing statute, Neal does not control this case, because there is more data about what Congress intended the ratio between crack and powder to be, and because Congress changed the basic, organic statute that governs the Sentencing Commission's--
Judge: It establishes the ratio for mandatory minimum purposes only, is what Neal held.
respondent: --Well, the statute, itself, Section 841, establishes the ratio of a 100 to 1. When the Commission first considered creating drug guidelines--
Judge: And if... you're talking about Public Law 104-38?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well I disagree with that, Justice Stevens, and I'm trying to explain why the legal context is different from the legal context in Neal. Let me start with a couple of points about this. First of all, when the Commission promulgated the drug Guideline initially, it conformed it to the 100 to ratio that existed under the mandatory minimum sentencing statute, because it recognized... and these were the Commission's words... that a logical and coherent sentencing scheme required that there be consistent proportionality throughout the sentencing process. When the Commission later studied the crack-powder ratio and concluded that Congress had gotten it wrong and, therefore, the Commission, itself, had gotten it wrong by conforming to what Congress did, it proposed a Guideline that would have changed the ratio for Guideline's purposes only to one to one between crack and powder. And Congress, for the first time in the history of its review of Guidelines amendments, rejected that proposal; and it did so with legislation that made clear that it believed that if the commission wanted to come back with something new, it should propose something that would change both the Guidelines and the sentencing statutes so that they would continue to work in tandem... that it would preserve a higher ratio of punishment for crack than powder because it believed that crack was more serious, and that it believed that any ratio should apply consistently across the Guidelines and the statute.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.
Judge: --of Federal burglary as defined by Justice Blackmun and the Court in this case, end of matter, QED.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I think that--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.
Judge: --of Federal burglary as defined by Justice Blackmun and the Court in this case, end of matter, QED.
respondent: I think that--
Judge: That's exactly right. So therefore, that was my question basically.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I -- I do think you've accurately described what Petitioner -- the dividing line the Petitioner would advocate is. But I would urge the Court to look at the experience of the court of appeals with trying to apply that dividing line, and that will reveal to the Court very clearly why it becomes unworkable. Because we've got several courts of appeals -- as the Court's aware there's a division of authority on this -- that have said, well, look, we want to look for statutes that are phrased in the disjunctive or that have these separately numbered subsection headings or something. Now, setting aside whether that's really principled or not to focus on the text versus the judicial decision, let's accept for the sake of argument that that's the line. The problem is that then the next case that those courts confront, that applying that rule rigidly produces really strange results.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.
Judge: --of Federal burglary as defined by Justice Blackmun and the Court in this case, end of matter, QED.
respondent: I think that--
Judge: That's exactly right. So therefore, that was my question basically.
respondent: --I -- I do think you've accurately described what Petitioner -- the dividing line the Petitioner would advocate is. But I would urge the Court to look at the experience of the court of appeals with trying to apply that dividing line, and that will reveal to the Court very clearly why it becomes unworkable. Because we've got several courts of appeals -- as the Court's aware there's a division of authority on this -- that have said, well, look, we want to look for statutes that are phrased in the disjunctive or that have these separately numbered subsection headings or something. Now, setting aside whether that's really principled or not to focus on the text versus the judicial decision, let's accept for the sake of argument that that's the line. The problem is that then the next case that those courts confront, that applying that rule rigidly produces really strange results.
Judge: And of course Congress knew that there are hundreds or thousands of State statutes with several different words and they -- you know, different ways of getting at the same thing, and therefore they wrote the next phrase of their Federal statute, which is it's burglary, arson, explosives or otherwise, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. And so if you have a slight variation on the burglary theme, it doesn't fit within generic burglary, but it's pretty hard to imagine it wouldn't otherwise present the same risks, at least if it's only a slight variation.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.
Judge: --of Federal burglary as defined by Justice Blackmun and the Court in this case, end of matter, QED.
respondent: I think that--
Judge: That's exactly right. So therefore, that was my question basically.
respondent: --I -- I do think you've accurately described what Petitioner -- the dividing line the Petitioner would advocate is. But I would urge the Court to look at the experience of the court of appeals with trying to apply that dividing line, and that will reveal to the Court very clearly why it becomes unworkable. Because we've got several courts of appeals -- as the Court's aware there's a division of authority on this -- that have said, well, look, we want to look for statutes that are phrased in the disjunctive or that have these separately numbered subsection headings or something. Now, setting aside whether that's really principled or not to focus on the text versus the judicial decision, let's accept for the sake of argument that that's the line. The problem is that then the next case that those courts confront, that applying that rule rigidly produces really strange results.
Judge: And of course Congress knew that there are hundreds or thousands of State statutes with several different words and they -- you know, different ways of getting at the same thing, and therefore they wrote the next phrase of their Federal statute, which is it's burglary, arson, explosives or otherwise, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. And so if you have a slight variation on the burglary theme, it doesn't fit within generic burglary, but it's pretty hard to imagine it wouldn't otherwise present the same risks, at least if it's only a slight variation.
respondent: Yes.
Judge: I know and that was my question. Why not?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, I -- the parties have not briefed here and I wouldn't want to speculate on what the Court would--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.
Judge: --of Federal burglary as defined by Justice Blackmun and the Court in this case, end of matter, QED.
respondent: I think that--
Judge: That's exactly right. So therefore, that was my question basically.
respondent: --I -- I do think you've accurately described what Petitioner -- the dividing line the Petitioner would advocate is. But I would urge the Court to look at the experience of the court of appeals with trying to apply that dividing line, and that will reveal to the Court very clearly why it becomes unworkable. Because we've got several courts of appeals -- as the Court's aware there's a division of authority on this -- that have said, well, look, we want to look for statutes that are phrased in the disjunctive or that have these separately numbered subsection headings or something. Now, setting aside whether that's really principled or not to focus on the text versus the judicial decision, let's accept for the sake of argument that that's the line. The problem is that then the next case that those courts confront, that applying that rule rigidly produces really strange results.
Judge: And of course Congress knew that there are hundreds or thousands of State statutes with several different words and they -- you know, different ways of getting at the same thing, and therefore they wrote the next phrase of their Federal statute, which is it's burglary, arson, explosives or otherwise, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. And so if you have a slight variation on the burglary theme, it doesn't fit within generic burglary, but it's pretty hard to imagine it wouldn't otherwise present the same risks, at least if it's only a slight variation.
respondent: Yes.
Judge: I know and that was my question. Why not?
respondent: Well, I -- the parties have not briefed here and I wouldn't want to speculate on what the Court would--
Judge: Maybe -- maybe they haven't argued it because there's some serious constitutional doubt about whether the statute which makes it a crime to engage in conduct which creates a serious risk of physical injury is constitutional. That's such a vague standard, you go to prison for 30 years if you engage in conduct, quote, "that creates a serious risk of physical injury. " I'm not about to buy into that one.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, this case has been argued as -- because this is a conviction under California burglary, it's been argued under the -- the premise that it should be classified as generic burglary. But let me offer--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.
Judge: The value of what?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.
Judge: The value of what?
respondent: Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.
Judge: What does that mean?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Personal autonomy.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.
Judge: The value of what?
respondent: Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.
Judge: What does that mean?
respondent: Personal autonomy.
Judge: No, not exaggerate -- lie.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, that we get to -- we get to exaggerate and create--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.
Judge: The value of what?
respondent: Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.
Judge: What does that mean?
respondent: Personal autonomy.
Judge: No, not exaggerate -- lie.
respondent: Well, that we get to -- we get to exaggerate and create--
Judge: Well, but that was for literary purposes. No one is suggesting you can't write a book or tell a story about somebody who earned a Medal of Honor and it's a fictional character, so he obviously didn't. It just seems to me very different.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, when we create our own persona, we're often making up things about ourselves that we want people to think about us, and that can be valuable. Samuel Clemens creating Mark Twain. That was creating a persona, and he made things up about himself--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.
Judge: The value of what?
respondent: Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.
Judge: What does that mean?
respondent: Personal autonomy.
Judge: No, not exaggerate -- lie.
respondent: Well, that we get to -- we get to exaggerate and create--
Judge: Well, but that was for literary purposes. No one is suggesting you can't write a book or tell a story about somebody who earned a Medal of Honor and it's a fictional character, so he obviously didn't. It just seems to me very different.
respondent: --Well, when we create our own persona, we're often making up things about ourselves that we want people to think about us, and that can be valuable. Samuel Clemens creating Mark Twain. That was creating a persona, and he made things up about himself--
Judge: Do you really think that there is -- that the First Amendment -- that there is First Amendment value in a bald-faced lie about a purely factual statement that a person makes about himself, because that person would like to create a particular persona? Gee, I won the Medal of Honor. I was a Rhodes scholar, I won the Nobel Prize. There's a personal -- the First Amendment protects that?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Perhaps. But there are other things. In addition to the fact that people tell lies allows us to appreciate truth better.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.
Judge: There are cases in the pipeline that don't think it's as clear as day.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, that's true, but my point is just that on the face of the domestic violence statute, and what it says is that the restoration of rights exception is limited to circumstances where the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights. So on the face of that provision... the provision says restoration occurs only if civil rights have been lost. So it's clear as day that what Congress was saying there was it was mandating the allegedly absurd result here in situations where rights were not lost. And what that means is that you can't say that it's impossible that Congress--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.
Judge: There are cases in the pipeline that don't think it's as clear as day.
respondent: Well, that's true, but my point is just that on the face of the domestic violence statute, and what it says is that the restoration of rights exception is limited to circumstances where the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights. So on the face of that provision... the provision says restoration occurs only if civil rights have been lost. So it's clear as day that what Congress was saying there was it was mandating the allegedly absurd result here in situations where rights were not lost. And what that means is that you can't say that it's impossible that Congress--
Judge: Yes.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--There is... in the context of subsection (33)... in the context of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.
Judge: There are cases in the pipeline that don't think it's as clear as day.
respondent: Well, that's true, but my point is just that on the face of the domestic violence statute, and what it says is that the restoration of rights exception is limited to circumstances where the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights. So on the face of that provision... the provision says restoration occurs only if civil rights have been lost. So it's clear as day that what Congress was saying there was it was mandating the allegedly absurd result here in situations where rights were not lost. And what that means is that you can't say that it's impossible that Congress--
Judge: Yes.
respondent: --There is... in the context of subsection (33)... in the context of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision--
Judge: What court--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--there is one circuit that has applied... that has basically overlooked the plain language there, not even attempted to deal with the plain language there. And it's true, and it's found that that exemption was somehow satisfied in a situation where civil rights were never taken away or restored. But the fact that, you know, a court of appeals reached that conclusion without even attempting to take a look at the statutory language doesn't diminish the very plain meaning--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.
Judge: There are cases in the pipeline that don't think it's as clear as day.
respondent: Well, that's true, but my point is just that on the face of the domestic violence statute, and what it says is that the restoration of rights exception is limited to circumstances where the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights. So on the face of that provision... the provision says restoration occurs only if civil rights have been lost. So it's clear as day that what Congress was saying there was it was mandating the allegedly absurd result here in situations where rights were not lost. And what that means is that you can't say that it's impossible that Congress--
Judge: Yes.
respondent: --There is... in the context of subsection (33)... in the context of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision--
Judge: What court--
respondent: --there is one circuit that has applied... that has basically overlooked the plain language there, not even attempted to deal with the plain language there. And it's true, and it's found that that exemption was somehow satisfied in a situation where civil rights were never taken away or restored. But the fact that, you know, a court of appeals reached that conclusion without even attempting to take a look at the statutory language doesn't diminish the very plain meaning--
Judge: --What court of appeals was that? I didn't get that.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--of the statutory language.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.
Judge: There are cases in the pipeline that don't think it's as clear as day.
respondent: Well, that's true, but my point is just that on the face of the domestic violence statute, and what it says is that the restoration of rights exception is limited to circumstances where the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights. So on the face of that provision... the provision says restoration occurs only if civil rights have been lost. So it's clear as day that what Congress was saying there was it was mandating the allegedly absurd result here in situations where rights were not lost. And what that means is that you can't say that it's impossible that Congress--
Judge: Yes.
respondent: --There is... in the context of subsection (33)... in the context of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision--
Judge: What court--
respondent: --there is one circuit that has applied... that has basically overlooked the plain language there, not even attempted to deal with the plain language there. And it's true, and it's found that that exemption was somehow satisfied in a situation where civil rights were never taken away or restored. But the fact that, you know, a court of appeals reached that conclusion without even attempting to take a look at the statutory language doesn't diminish the very plain meaning--
Judge: --What court of appeals was that? I didn't get that.
respondent: --of the statutory language.
Judge: If Congress thought about the problem, what reason could they have for saying that the firearms ban should apply to someone who never lost his or her civil rights, but not... but would not apply to someone who had civil rights restored? Automatically, let's say. Automatically and within a short period of time. What rationale reason could there be for doing that?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>It was the Sixth Circuit in the Burgin case, I believe it's called. And the Sixth Circuit there, similar to the First Circuit in construing this statute, was very clear that it was just skipping the language and doing what it thought Congress would have wanted to do if it had thought about it. But the plain language in the domestic violence provision is unmistakable because it expressly refers to civil rights--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: Ms. Harrington--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:: The Due Process Clause does not require the government to disprove withdrawal outside the limitations period, because lack of withdrawal is not an element of the crime of conspiracy. This Court has been clear that the Winship burden attaches to only things that are elements in the constitutional sense. And when something is an element in the constitutional sense, then at least four consequences follow. As the Court has suggested, first, the government has to allege in the indictment in every case. Second, the government has to prove it in every case. Third, the jury has to be instructed on it in every case. And fourth, a defendant can't waive the requirement that it be proved in his case by failing to raise it. But none of those things apply as to a statute of limitations.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: Ms. Harrington--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:: The Due Process Clause does not require the government to disprove withdrawal outside the limitations period, because lack of withdrawal is not an element of the crime of conspiracy. This Court has been clear that the Winship burden attaches to only things that are elements in the constitutional sense. And when something is an element in the constitutional sense, then at least four consequences follow. As the Court has suggested, first, the government has to allege in the indictment in every case. Second, the government has to prove it in every case. Third, the jury has to be instructed on it in every case. And fourth, a defendant can't waive the requirement that it be proved in his case by failing to raise it. But none of those things apply as to a statute of limitations.
Judge: This is true, but his point, basic point, and he has responded to the points I've made, is that, of course if there is a five-year statute on robbery, it doesn't help the government that he create -- he committed a robbery before.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Correct.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: Ms. Harrington--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:: The Due Process Clause does not require the government to disprove withdrawal outside the limitations period, because lack of withdrawal is not an element of the crime of conspiracy. This Court has been clear that the Winship burden attaches to only things that are elements in the constitutional sense. And when something is an element in the constitutional sense, then at least four consequences follow. As the Court has suggested, first, the government has to allege in the indictment in every case. Second, the government has to prove it in every case. Third, the jury has to be instructed on it in every case. And fourth, a defendant can't waive the requirement that it be proved in his case by failing to raise it. But none of those things apply as to a statute of limitations.
Judge: This is true, but his point, basic point, and he has responded to the points I've made, is that, of course if there is a five-year statute on robbery, it doesn't help the government that he create -- he committed a robbery before.
respondent: Correct.
Judge: So he's saying what you charged in the indictment is that he was a member of a conspiracy that existed between 1995 and 2005. That's the crime that concerns us, roughly. And he is saying to prove your case, you have to show as an element that he was a member. Now, you did present some evidence that he was a member. And he wants to present some evidence and has that he wasn't a member. And he wasn't a member if he withdrew. And therefore, once he presents enough to get -- make that an issue, you have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member. So you have to show he didn't withdraw. Now, this has nothing to do with the statute of limitations. By coincidence it does, but a statute of limitations issue would be that you all agreed that he withdrew, but the question is did it happen in 1993 or 1997. That's a statute of limitations issue, but this isn't. This is a question of whether he was a member of the conspiracy during the time period that you charged in the indictment. That's his point. So what is the response?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>So I guess I have two responses. The first is that it is a statute of limitations question in the sense that the government proved, and there is no dispute about this, that the conspiracy that was charged did exist within the limitations period. And so, the question is just, did this particular member of the conspiracy--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: Ms. Harrington--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:: The Due Process Clause does not require the government to disprove withdrawal outside the limitations period, because lack of withdrawal is not an element of the crime of conspiracy. This Court has been clear that the Winship burden attaches to only things that are elements in the constitutional sense. And when something is an element in the constitutional sense, then at least four consequences follow. As the Court has suggested, first, the government has to allege in the indictment in every case. Second, the government has to prove it in every case. Third, the jury has to be instructed on it in every case. And fourth, a defendant can't waive the requirement that it be proved in his case by failing to raise it. But none of those things apply as to a statute of limitations.
Judge: This is true, but his point, basic point, and he has responded to the points I've made, is that, of course if there is a five-year statute on robbery, it doesn't help the government that he create -- he committed a robbery before.
respondent: Correct.
Judge: So he's saying what you charged in the indictment is that he was a member of a conspiracy that existed between 1995 and 2005. That's the crime that concerns us, roughly. And he is saying to prove your case, you have to show as an element that he was a member. Now, you did present some evidence that he was a member. And he wants to present some evidence and has that he wasn't a member. And he wasn't a member if he withdrew. And therefore, once he presents enough to get -- make that an issue, you have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member. So you have to show he didn't withdraw. Now, this has nothing to do with the statute of limitations. By coincidence it does, but a statute of limitations issue would be that you all agreed that he withdrew, but the question is did it happen in 1993 or 1997. That's a statute of limitations issue, but this isn't. This is a question of whether he was a member of the conspiracy during the time period that you charged in the indictment. That's his point. So what is the response?
respondent: So I guess I have two responses. The first is that it is a statute of limitations question in the sense that the government proved, and there is no dispute about this, that the conspiracy that was charged did exist within the limitations period. And so, the question is just, did this particular member of the conspiracy--
Judge: In other words, you can charge me or anybody in the audience or anybody here with what? Not charging them? You are saying there was a conspiracy, doesn't he have to be shown to be a member of the conspiracy in order for you to get a conviction?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--He does, and there's no--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: Ms. Harrington--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:: The Due Process Clause does not require the government to disprove withdrawal outside the limitations period, because lack of withdrawal is not an element of the crime of conspiracy. This Court has been clear that the Winship burden attaches to only things that are elements in the constitutional sense. And when something is an element in the constitutional sense, then at least four consequences follow. As the Court has suggested, first, the government has to allege in the indictment in every case. Second, the government has to prove it in every case. Third, the jury has to be instructed on it in every case. And fourth, a defendant can't waive the requirement that it be proved in his case by failing to raise it. But none of those things apply as to a statute of limitations.
Judge: This is true, but his point, basic point, and he has responded to the points I've made, is that, of course if there is a five-year statute on robbery, it doesn't help the government that he create -- he committed a robbery before.
respondent: Correct.
Judge: So he's saying what you charged in the indictment is that he was a member of a conspiracy that existed between 1995 and 2005. That's the crime that concerns us, roughly. And he is saying to prove your case, you have to show as an element that he was a member. Now, you did present some evidence that he was a member. And he wants to present some evidence and has that he wasn't a member. And he wasn't a member if he withdrew. And therefore, once he presents enough to get -- make that an issue, you have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member. So you have to show he didn't withdraw. Now, this has nothing to do with the statute of limitations. By coincidence it does, but a statute of limitations issue would be that you all agreed that he withdrew, but the question is did it happen in 1993 or 1997. That's a statute of limitations issue, but this isn't. This is a question of whether he was a member of the conspiracy during the time period that you charged in the indictment. That's his point. So what is the response?
respondent: So I guess I have two responses. The first is that it is a statute of limitations question in the sense that the government proved, and there is no dispute about this, that the conspiracy that was charged did exist within the limitations period. And so, the question is just, did this particular member of the conspiracy--
Judge: In other words, you can charge me or anybody in the audience or anybody here with what? Not charging them? You are saying there was a conspiracy, doesn't he have to be shown to be a member of the conspiracy in order for you to get a conviction?
respondent: --He does, and there's no--
Judge: And that's an element of the crime?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--And an -- but when Petitioner talks about the membership or participation element, what he is really talking about is the agreement element. The government has to prove that each defendant who is charged with a conspiracy intentionally agreed to join the conspiracy. And there is no dispute that the government proved that with respect to Petitioner--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: Ms. Harrington--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:: The Due Process Clause does not require the government to disprove withdrawal outside the limitations period, because lack of withdrawal is not an element of the crime of conspiracy. This Court has been clear that the Winship burden attaches to only things that are elements in the constitutional sense. And when something is an element in the constitutional sense, then at least four consequences follow. As the Court has suggested, first, the government has to allege in the indictment in every case. Second, the government has to prove it in every case. Third, the jury has to be instructed on it in every case. And fourth, a defendant can't waive the requirement that it be proved in his case by failing to raise it. But none of those things apply as to a statute of limitations.
Judge: This is true, but his point, basic point, and he has responded to the points I've made, is that, of course if there is a five-year statute on robbery, it doesn't help the government that he create -- he committed a robbery before.
respondent: Correct.
Judge: So he's saying what you charged in the indictment is that he was a member of a conspiracy that existed between 1995 and 2005. That's the crime that concerns us, roughly. And he is saying to prove your case, you have to show as an element that he was a member. Now, you did present some evidence that he was a member. And he wants to present some evidence and has that he wasn't a member. And he wasn't a member if he withdrew. And therefore, once he presents enough to get -- make that an issue, you have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member. So you have to show he didn't withdraw. Now, this has nothing to do with the statute of limitations. By coincidence it does, but a statute of limitations issue would be that you all agreed that he withdrew, but the question is did it happen in 1993 or 1997. That's a statute of limitations issue, but this isn't. This is a question of whether he was a member of the conspiracy during the time period that you charged in the indictment. That's his point. So what is the response?
respondent: So I guess I have two responses. The first is that it is a statute of limitations question in the sense that the government proved, and there is no dispute about this, that the conspiracy that was charged did exist within the limitations period. And so, the question is just, did this particular member of the conspiracy--
Judge: In other words, you can charge me or anybody in the audience or anybody here with what? Not charging them? You are saying there was a conspiracy, doesn't he have to be shown to be a member of the conspiracy in order for you to get a conviction?
respondent: --He does, and there's no--
Judge: And that's an element of the crime?
respondent: --And an -- but when Petitioner talks about the membership or participation element, what he is really talking about is the agreement element. The government has to prove that each defendant who is charged with a conspiracy intentionally agreed to join the conspiracy. And there is no dispute that the government proved that with respect to Petitioner--
Judge: There is no more relevance, is there, to the fact that there happened to be a pre-1995 conspiracy, except as a matter of proof, I shouldn't say relevance, that he happened to rob a bank before 1995? I mean, in each instance there was criminal activity before 1995. Now, you can use that in order to prove that he was a member during '95 to 2000. That I see. But he similar can use the matter of withdrawal to prove he wasn't a member during 1995 to 2000. And, therefore, it goes to show whether you or the government have proved an element of the offense, namely, that he was a member between '95 and 2000.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--But again, the element is agreement. Right? So we prove that he agreed to join the conspiracy, and we proved that each defendant agreed to join the conspiracy. We don't have to prove that that agreement happened in the limitations period, as long as we prove that the conspiracy continues to--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: That's true. But it may save a little time. I worry we're in an arcane area of the law. It was created by Robert Jackson, Attorney General and by Thorn burg, Attorney General. And if we are starting with that, what that says is we have a list over here of excludable things and we have a list of deportable things. And if you are deported for a reason that shows up on that first list, than the AG could waive. That's basically the outline I have. And also I have, which isn't quite right, that in that first list there is something called -- in big letters, CIMT or something, crime of moral turpitude. And all of the things on the second list, the big issue is, is it a crime of moral turpitude. As I looked through the opinions, this is what I got out of it. This is tentative. I got out, just as you say, there are two things in the second list which are not crimes of moral turpitude. They consist of illegal entry crimes and gun crimes. And there are special reasons for the first and the second is debatable, but they have been consistent with that. Then there are things that are on both lists, they are crimes of moral turpitude. I counted at least eight cases. Say, for example, rape, burglary, manslaughter, second degree robbery, indecency with a child and probably some others are all crimes of moral turpitude, so it cuts here, okay. Then I find Blake, and Blake says sexual abuse of a minor is not a crime of moral turpitude. That's a little surprising. But it gives us a reason because, and this was the problem here, it talks about, there has to be substantial -- there has to be similar language in the two lists. I don't know where that one came from. It certainly had not been in the earlier cases. And now we have this case, which is voluntary manslaughter. I would have thought that voluntary manslaughter is right at the heart of the lists that they said the things are crimes of moral turpitude, and not like visa crimes or gun crimes, if I read the cases. So where do I end up? Well, what I end up with is this. And this is what I would like you to reply to. Justice Brandies once said something like we have to know before we can say whether an agency opinion is right or wrong, what they are talking about. I felt perplexity after I had read through these decisions. In other words, I don't understand it. So I would like you to explain to me why this all fits together and how, if you can do that, I couldn't get that clear explanation from the brief, and I suspect it is not your fault.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: The Petitioner does not dispute that some comparability analysis must be applied to prevent relief under former section 212 c from being extended to certain grounds of de portability. But his methodology of asking whether his offense could have made him excludable is inconsistent with established cases from the board that long predated the ones at issue here involving firearms offenses and visa fraud. Justice Scalia brought up the case in Wadud. That was a visa fraud case. It was a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1546. That's a provision that penalizes fraudulent and other misuse of visas and other immigration documents. It's a very broad criminal provision. It's long been a ground of de portability. And at the time the alien argued that this is fraud. It's a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore I would be subject to exclusion. In Wadud the board rejected that analysis.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: That's true. But it may save a little time. I worry we're in an arcane area of the law. It was created by Robert Jackson, Attorney General and by Thorn burg, Attorney General. And if we are starting with that, what that says is we have a list over here of excludable things and we have a list of deportable things. And if you are deported for a reason that shows up on that first list, than the AG could waive. That's basically the outline I have. And also I have, which isn't quite right, that in that first list there is something called -- in big letters, CIMT or something, crime of moral turpitude. And all of the things on the second list, the big issue is, is it a crime of moral turpitude. As I looked through the opinions, this is what I got out of it. This is tentative. I got out, just as you say, there are two things in the second list which are not crimes of moral turpitude. They consist of illegal entry crimes and gun crimes. And there are special reasons for the first and the second is debatable, but they have been consistent with that. Then there are things that are on both lists, they are crimes of moral turpitude. I counted at least eight cases. Say, for example, rape, burglary, manslaughter, second degree robbery, indecency with a child and probably some others are all crimes of moral turpitude, so it cuts here, okay. Then I find Blake, and Blake says sexual abuse of a minor is not a crime of moral turpitude. That's a little surprising. But it gives us a reason because, and this was the problem here, it talks about, there has to be substantial -- there has to be similar language in the two lists. I don't know where that one came from. It certainly had not been in the earlier cases. And now we have this case, which is voluntary manslaughter. I would have thought that voluntary manslaughter is right at the heart of the lists that they said the things are crimes of moral turpitude, and not like visa crimes or gun crimes, if I read the cases. So where do I end up? Well, what I end up with is this. And this is what I would like you to reply to. Justice Brandies once said something like we have to know before we can say whether an agency opinion is right or wrong, what they are talking about. I felt perplexity after I had read through these decisions. In other words, I don't understand it. So I would like you to explain to me why this all fits together and how, if you can do that, I couldn't get that clear explanation from the brief, and I suspect it is not your fault.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: The Petitioner does not dispute that some comparability analysis must be applied to prevent relief under former section 212 c from being extended to certain grounds of de portability. But his methodology of asking whether his offense could have made him excludable is inconsistent with established cases from the board that long predated the ones at issue here involving firearms offenses and visa fraud. Justice Scalia brought up the case in Wadud. That was a visa fraud case. It was a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1546. That's a provision that penalizes fraudulent and other misuse of visas and other immigration documents. It's a very broad criminal provision. It's long been a ground of de portability. And at the time the alien argued that this is fraud. It's a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore I would be subject to exclusion. In Wadud the board rejected that analysis.
Judge: Rape, burglary, manslaughter, second-degree robbery -- all of those cases -- about seven or eight of them.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, I agree that the history and the law here is relatively complicated and it has had a lot of moving pieces over the years. But I think that the board has been very consistent, especially beginning in the 1984 Wadud decision that was picked up in the Jimenez-Santillano decision and also in firearms offenses. Justice Breyer, you talked about the fact that the board had been consistent in firearms offenses. And the Petitioner does not dispute that firearms offenses are ones that do not have a comparable ground--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: That's true. But it may save a little time. I worry we're in an arcane area of the law. It was created by Robert Jackson, Attorney General and by Thorn burg, Attorney General. And if we are starting with that, what that says is we have a list over here of excludable things and we have a list of deportable things. And if you are deported for a reason that shows up on that first list, than the AG could waive. That's basically the outline I have. And also I have, which isn't quite right, that in that first list there is something called -- in big letters, CIMT or something, crime of moral turpitude. And all of the things on the second list, the big issue is, is it a crime of moral turpitude. As I looked through the opinions, this is what I got out of it. This is tentative. I got out, just as you say, there are two things in the second list which are not crimes of moral turpitude. They consist of illegal entry crimes and gun crimes. And there are special reasons for the first and the second is debatable, but they have been consistent with that. Then there are things that are on both lists, they are crimes of moral turpitude. I counted at least eight cases. Say, for example, rape, burglary, manslaughter, second degree robbery, indecency with a child and probably some others are all crimes of moral turpitude, so it cuts here, okay. Then I find Blake, and Blake says sexual abuse of a minor is not a crime of moral turpitude. That's a little surprising. But it gives us a reason because, and this was the problem here, it talks about, there has to be substantial -- there has to be similar language in the two lists. I don't know where that one came from. It certainly had not been in the earlier cases. And now we have this case, which is voluntary manslaughter. I would have thought that voluntary manslaughter is right at the heart of the lists that they said the things are crimes of moral turpitude, and not like visa crimes or gun crimes, if I read the cases. So where do I end up? Well, what I end up with is this. And this is what I would like you to reply to. Justice Brandies once said something like we have to know before we can say whether an agency opinion is right or wrong, what they are talking about. I felt perplexity after I had read through these decisions. In other words, I don't understand it. So I would like you to explain to me why this all fits together and how, if you can do that, I couldn't get that clear explanation from the brief, and I suspect it is not your fault.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: The Petitioner does not dispute that some comparability analysis must be applied to prevent relief under former section 212 c from being extended to certain grounds of de portability. But his methodology of asking whether his offense could have made him excludable is inconsistent with established cases from the board that long predated the ones at issue here involving firearms offenses and visa fraud. Justice Scalia brought up the case in Wadud. That was a visa fraud case. It was a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1546. That's a provision that penalizes fraudulent and other misuse of visas and other immigration documents. It's a very broad criminal provision. It's long been a ground of de portability. And at the time the alien argued that this is fraud. It's a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore I would be subject to exclusion. In Wadud the board rejected that analysis.
Judge: Rape, burglary, manslaughter, second-degree robbery -- all of those cases -- about seven or eight of them.
respondent: Well, I agree that the history and the law here is relatively complicated and it has had a lot of moving pieces over the years. But I think that the board has been very consistent, especially beginning in the 1984 Wadud decision that was picked up in the Jimenez-Santillano decision and also in firearms offenses. Justice Breyer, you talked about the fact that the board had been consistent in firearms offenses. And the Petitioner does not dispute that firearms offenses are ones that do not have a comparable ground--
Judge: Is there any aggravated felony crime of violence that is not a crime involving moral turpitude?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--If I could go back for a second to firearms offenses. The board there has continued to say that there is no comparable ground for firearms offenses, even if your firearms offense would be something that could have been considered a crime involving moral turpitude. If you look at the board's 1992 decision in Montenegro, that was a case that was assault with a firearm, and so it wasn't merely possession of a handgun or an automatic weapon or a sawed-off shotgun--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: That's true. But it may save a little time. I worry we're in an arcane area of the law. It was created by Robert Jackson, Attorney General and by Thorn burg, Attorney General. And if we are starting with that, what that says is we have a list over here of excludable things and we have a list of deportable things. And if you are deported for a reason that shows up on that first list, than the AG could waive. That's basically the outline I have. And also I have, which isn't quite right, that in that first list there is something called -- in big letters, CIMT or something, crime of moral turpitude. And all of the things on the second list, the big issue is, is it a crime of moral turpitude. As I looked through the opinions, this is what I got out of it. This is tentative. I got out, just as you say, there are two things in the second list which are not crimes of moral turpitude. They consist of illegal entry crimes and gun crimes. And there are special reasons for the first and the second is debatable, but they have been consistent with that. Then there are things that are on both lists, they are crimes of moral turpitude. I counted at least eight cases. Say, for example, rape, burglary, manslaughter, second degree robbery, indecency with a child and probably some others are all crimes of moral turpitude, so it cuts here, okay. Then I find Blake, and Blake says sexual abuse of a minor is not a crime of moral turpitude. That's a little surprising. But it gives us a reason because, and this was the problem here, it talks about, there has to be substantial -- there has to be similar language in the two lists. I don't know where that one came from. It certainly had not been in the earlier cases. And now we have this case, which is voluntary manslaughter. I would have thought that voluntary manslaughter is right at the heart of the lists that they said the things are crimes of moral turpitude, and not like visa crimes or gun crimes, if I read the cases. So where do I end up? Well, what I end up with is this. And this is what I would like you to reply to. Justice Brandies once said something like we have to know before we can say whether an agency opinion is right or wrong, what they are talking about. I felt perplexity after I had read through these decisions. In other words, I don't understand it. So I would like you to explain to me why this all fits together and how, if you can do that, I couldn't get that clear explanation from the brief, and I suspect it is not your fault.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: The Petitioner does not dispute that some comparability analysis must be applied to prevent relief under former section 212 c from being extended to certain grounds of de portability. But his methodology of asking whether his offense could have made him excludable is inconsistent with established cases from the board that long predated the ones at issue here involving firearms offenses and visa fraud. Justice Scalia brought up the case in Wadud. That was a visa fraud case. It was a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1546. That's a provision that penalizes fraudulent and other misuse of visas and other immigration documents. It's a very broad criminal provision. It's long been a ground of de portability. And at the time the alien argued that this is fraud. It's a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore I would be subject to exclusion. In Wadud the board rejected that analysis.
Judge: Rape, burglary, manslaughter, second-degree robbery -- all of those cases -- about seven or eight of them.
respondent: Well, I agree that the history and the law here is relatively complicated and it has had a lot of moving pieces over the years. But I think that the board has been very consistent, especially beginning in the 1984 Wadud decision that was picked up in the Jimenez-Santillano decision and also in firearms offenses. Justice Breyer, you talked about the fact that the board had been consistent in firearms offenses. And the Petitioner does not dispute that firearms offenses are ones that do not have a comparable ground--
Judge: Is there any aggravated felony crime of violence that is not a crime involving moral turpitude?
respondent: --If I could go back for a second to firearms offenses. The board there has continued to say that there is no comparable ground for firearms offenses, even if your firearms offense would be something that could have been considered a crime involving moral turpitude. If you look at the board's 1992 decision in Montenegro, that was a case that was assault with a firearm, and so it wasn't merely possession of a handgun or an automatic weapon or a sawed-off shotgun--
Judge: Was Judulang's crime a crime involving violence?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Yes, Justice Ginsburg. The board pointed out in the Brieva-Perez decision that minor but relatively common crimes of violence, including simple assaults and burglary, generally are not considered to be crimes involving moral turpitude. In the reply brief, Petitioner points to a board petition in Louissaint saying that -- that the record is muddled on burglary, but that opinion only showed that residential burglary isn't a crime involving moral turpitude, and a crime of violence, in the definition, is one that involves the use of physical force against personal property of another. And so it doesn't need to be aggravated in any other sense. It doesn't need to be--<|eot_id|>
|
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