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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.
Judge: --if we are going to argue about the language?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>First of all--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.
Judge: --if we are going to argue about the language?
respondent: First of all--
Judge: Well, generally the word "express" incorporates "clear".<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I do, Justice Sotomayor. Although this Court has not used the words 109, it has used the words--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.
Judge: --if we are going to argue about the language?
respondent: First of all--
Judge: Well, generally the word "express" incorporates "clear".
respondent: --I do, Justice Sotomayor. Although this Court has not used the words 109, it has used the words--
Judge: So that -- why doesn't that defeat your case?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--There is no dispute here, I don't think, that there is a -- a lack of an express statement in the Act. But--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.
Judge: --if we are going to argue about the language?
respondent: First of all--
Judge: Well, generally the word "express" incorporates "clear".
respondent: --I do, Justice Sotomayor. Although this Court has not used the words 109, it has used the words--
Judge: So that -- why doesn't that defeat your case?
respondent: --There is no dispute here, I don't think, that there is a -- a lack of an express statement in the Act. But--
Judge: Well, so then we -- we ignore The Dictionary Act?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, as Justice Scalia explained in his concurring opinion in Lockhart v. United States, one Congress cannot impose standards of how another Congress is to enact legislation. The subsequent Congress is free to choose how it will express its will in the language or structure that it sees fit. And I'd like to give an example--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: Do you think it's a clear and unmistakable implication--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fair Sentencing Act manifests the requisite fair and necessary implication that Congress intended that its new mandatory minimum thresholds apply in all sentencings after the date of the Act.
Judge: --if we are going to argue about the language?
respondent: First of all--
Judge: Well, generally the word "express" incorporates "clear".
respondent: --I do, Justice Sotomayor. Although this Court has not used the words 109, it has used the words--
Judge: So that -- why doesn't that defeat your case?
respondent: --There is no dispute here, I don't think, that there is a -- a lack of an express statement in the Act. But--
Judge: Well, so then we -- we ignore The Dictionary Act?
respondent: --Well, as Justice Scalia explained in his concurring opinion in Lockhart v. United States, one Congress cannot impose standards of how another Congress is to enact legislation. The subsequent Congress is free to choose how it will express its will in the language or structure that it sees fit. And I'd like to give an example--
Judge: And can we ignore 109?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--No, of course not, Justice Kennedy. But these--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.
Judge: Say that again. I didn't understand it.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.
Judge: Say that again. I didn't understand it.
respondent: Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--
Judge: What's that got to do with increasing the risk of violence? I mean, I see -- I see your kind of elements argument, but it seems to be beside the point that--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Okay. What I'm saying is it's an element of escape that you're avoiding custody, and escape is a continuing offense and so it doesn't end until the avoidance of custody is over.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.
Judge: Say that again. I didn't understand it.
respondent: Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--
Judge: What's that got to do with increasing the risk of violence? I mean, I see -- I see your kind of elements argument, but it seems to be beside the point that--
respondent: --Okay. What I'm saying is it's an element of escape that you're avoiding custody, and escape is a continuing offense and so it doesn't end until the avoidance of custody is over.
Judge: --Yes, but the crime is still -- the crime that we are concerned with here is still essentially a passive crime. He just doesn't show up.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>It shows the close connection between the two. And so when you're -- when the offender is committing the crime, it's appropriate to hold him accountable for what he can see is so highly, closely connected to the crime and which, in fact, has to happen in order to end the crime; whereas--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.
Judge: Say that again. I didn't understand it.
respondent: Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--
Judge: What's that got to do with increasing the risk of violence? I mean, I see -- I see your kind of elements argument, but it seems to be beside the point that--
respondent: --Okay. What I'm saying is it's an element of escape that you're avoiding custody, and escape is a continuing offense and so it doesn't end until the avoidance of custody is over.
Judge: --Yes, but the crime is still -- the crime that we are concerned with here is still essentially a passive crime. He just doesn't show up.
respondent: It shows the close connection between the two. And so when you're -- when the offender is committing the crime, it's appropriate to hold him accountable for what he can see is so highly, closely connected to the crime and which, in fact, has to happen in order to end the crime; whereas--
Judge: And given, you know, the close logical connections, I don't see that the close logical connections convert the passive crime into a higher degree of resisting arrest from any other. In fact, it suggests just the opposite.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: Mr. Roberts, wouldn't that be so of any crime? This is failure to report. Any crime, any -- an arrest for any crime has a certain risk that the arrestee is going to resist. Is there anything different, is anything greater, about this arrest for this kind of crime?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: Failure-to-report escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause because it creates a serious potential risk of physical injury that's comparable in both kind and degree to the risk that's created by the enumerated offense of burglary. Failure-to-report escape is similar in kind to burglary because it's purposeful, violent, and aggressive in the same way as burglary.
Judge: Say that again. I didn't understand it.
respondent: Yes, Your Honor. Two points on that. First, escape and failure-to-report escape, other types of escape and recapture, are linked ed in a way that arrest and the typical crime aren't, because escape inherently avoids -- inherently involves the avoidance of custody and custody is the very obligation that recapture is trying to impose. But avoiding arrest isn't an element of the typical crime, so the connection between arrest and the ordinary crime isn't close enough to justify considering the violence in arrest -- in the arrest in whether the crime is violent. Also the risk--
Judge: What's that got to do with increasing the risk of violence? I mean, I see -- I see your kind of elements argument, but it seems to be beside the point that--
respondent: --Okay. What I'm saying is it's an element of escape that you're avoiding custody, and escape is a continuing offense and so it doesn't end until the avoidance of custody is over.
Judge: --Yes, but the crime is still -- the crime that we are concerned with here is still essentially a passive crime. He just doesn't show up.
respondent: It shows the close connection between the two. And so when you're -- when the offender is committing the crime, it's appropriate to hold him accountable for what he can see is so highly, closely connected to the crime and which, in fact, has to happen in order to end the crime; whereas--
Judge: And given, you know, the close logical connections, I don't see that the close logical connections convert the passive crime into a higher degree of resisting arrest from any other. In fact, it suggests just the opposite.
respondent: --Well--
Judge: Well, you know, you may precisely be doing nothing. If I say, you know, it's Monday morning at 9 o'clock, I'm supposed to -- to report to prison, and I'm going to stay home, my purpose is to stay put in my armchair. That's purposeful conduct and it's about as passive as you can get.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--To address the -- the passive point, deliberately failing to comply with your legal duty to report to prison is not -- it is not doing nothing, as Petitioner says. It's not purely passive. It is a criminal act.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>[NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Judge: you do allow the possibility that counsel could be provided in the event the probation is revoked.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Judge: you do allow the possibility that counsel could be provided in the event the probation is revoked.
respondent: I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.
Judge: the rev- revocation hearing would not necessarily be whether he committed a crime.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>The holding does not certainly.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Judge: you do allow the possibility that counsel could be provided in the event the probation is revoked.
respondent: I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.
Judge: the rev- revocation hearing would not necessarily be whether he committed a crime.
respondent: The holding does not certainly.
Judge: counsel to defend him against that.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, that that puzzled me somewhat when the State made that concession in its reply brief that this was in e- in effect a sham sentence.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Judge: you do allow the possibility that counsel could be provided in the event the probation is revoked.
respondent: I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.
Judge: the rev- revocation hearing would not necessarily be whether he committed a crime.
respondent: The holding does not certainly.
Judge: counsel to defend him against that.
respondent: Well, that that puzzled me somewhat when the State made that concession in its reply brief that this was in e- in effect a sham sentence.
Judge: the crime itself.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Perhaps we're we're dealing with a sham sentence.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: is that a red herring? Because I y- s- I got from your brief the impression that the the there's a practical problem that that a lot of States do without giving people lawyers.
respondent: [NS] Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Judge: you do allow the possibility that counsel could be provided in the event the probation is revoked.
respondent: I- i- it would be my position that Argersinger does by the some of the pronouncements that it makes.
Judge: the rev- revocation hearing would not necessarily be whether he committed a crime.
respondent: The holding does not certainly.
Judge: counsel to defend him against that.
respondent: Well, that that puzzled me somewhat when the State made that concession in its reply brief that this was in e- in effect a sham sentence.
Judge: the crime itself.
respondent: Perhaps we're we're dealing with a sham sentence.
Judge: Well, it would als- it would also cover, I take it, whether or not the plea was voluntarieen [: voluntary] and knowingly made originally.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>That's the Attorney General's...<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.
Judge: But that is a construction of what Congress intended, and for purposes of decision we assumed that Congress intended what we held the statute meant.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.
Judge: But that is a construction of what Congress intended, and for purposes of decision we assumed that Congress intended what we held the statute meant.
respondent: Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--
Judge: It does hold that a guideline that does not conform with a congressional judgment merely expressed in a mandatory minimum is a guideline that would survive.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Justice Stevens, the only question presented in Neal was, did the Commission's weight guideline for LSD require this Court to change its interpretation of Section 841. And the Court held no. There was no question before the Court about whether the Sentencing Commission had legitimately adopted a different formula than the mixture or substance rule that this Court had held governed the statute. The LSD guideline was not in play in Neal. The government never challenged it. Its rationality was not at issue. All the Court had to hold was that whatever the Sentencing Commission did--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.
Judge: But that is a construction of what Congress intended, and for purposes of decision we assumed that Congress intended what we held the statute meant.
respondent: Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--
Judge: It does hold that a guideline that does not conform with a congressional judgment merely expressed in a mandatory minimum is a guideline that would survive.
respondent: --Justice Stevens, the only question presented in Neal was, did the Commission's weight guideline for LSD require this Court to change its interpretation of Section 841. And the Court held no. There was no question before the Court about whether the Sentencing Commission had legitimately adopted a different formula than the mixture or substance rule that this Court had held governed the statute. The LSD guideline was not in play in Neal. The government never challenged it. Its rationality was not at issue. All the Court had to hold was that whatever the Sentencing Commission did--
Judge: Yes, but there's also more data that the Commission has reflected on all this and still concludes that the 100 to 1 ratio creates an unwarranted disparity which is contrary to the statute.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, I disagree with that, Justice Stevens, because no one challenged the guideline in Neal. There was nothing at issue in the Court to decide about whether that Guideline was valid. But even if the Court thought that Neal does involve some sort of a principle that the Sentencing Commission has greater freedom to vary from the procedures laid out in a mandatory minimum sentencing statute, Neal does not control this case, because there is more data about what Congress intended the ratio between crack and powder to be, and because Congress changed the basic, organic statute that governs the Sentencing Commission's--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.
Judge: But that is a construction of what Congress intended, and for purposes of decision we assumed that Congress intended what we held the statute meant.
respondent: Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--
Judge: It does hold that a guideline that does not conform with a congressional judgment merely expressed in a mandatory minimum is a guideline that would survive.
respondent: --Justice Stevens, the only question presented in Neal was, did the Commission's weight guideline for LSD require this Court to change its interpretation of Section 841. And the Court held no. There was no question before the Court about whether the Sentencing Commission had legitimately adopted a different formula than the mixture or substance rule that this Court had held governed the statute. The LSD guideline was not in play in Neal. The government never challenged it. Its rationality was not at issue. All the Court had to hold was that whatever the Sentencing Commission did--
Judge: Yes, but there's also more data that the Commission has reflected on all this and still concludes that the 100 to 1 ratio creates an unwarranted disparity which is contrary to the statute.
respondent: --Well, I disagree with that, Justice Stevens, because no one challenged the guideline in Neal. There was nothing at issue in the Court to decide about whether that Guideline was valid. But even if the Court thought that Neal does involve some sort of a principle that the Sentencing Commission has greater freedom to vary from the procedures laid out in a mandatory minimum sentencing statute, Neal does not control this case, because there is more data about what Congress intended the ratio between crack and powder to be, and because Congress changed the basic, organic statute that governs the Sentencing Commission's--
Judge: It establishes the ratio for mandatory minimum purposes only, is what Neal held.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, the statute, itself, Section 841, establishes the ratio of a 100 to 1. When the Commission first considered creating drug guidelines--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: Mr. Dreeben, can I ask a question right at the outset that is critical for me. I think this case may well be controlled by the decision in Neal against the United States, which is not cited in the government brief and wasn't cited in the blue brief. But there the Court held that a policy judgment by Congress fixing mandatory minimums on the basis of the weight of the carrier rather than the drug did not justify guidelines based on that ratio... based on the same principle... if that would produce unwarranted disparities. And, as I understand the facts of this case, the Commission has told us actually in some of its reports that the 100 to 1 ratio does produce unwarranted disparities. Therefore, we should disregard the entire guideline as we did in Neal, and the reason the Neal case is controlling in this case.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court: The question in this case is essentially, can a district court reasonably disagree with the judgment of Congress concerning the ratio between the quantity-based sentences for crack and powder.
Judge: But that is a construction of what Congress intended, and for purposes of decision we assumed that Congress intended what we held the statute meant.
respondent: Justice Stevens, let me start with the Neal decision, because I think Neal is fundamentally unlike this case. In Neal this Court had to determine whether its prior construction of a statute, Section 841, survived the Commission's decision--
Judge: It does hold that a guideline that does not conform with a congressional judgment merely expressed in a mandatory minimum is a guideline that would survive.
respondent: --Justice Stevens, the only question presented in Neal was, did the Commission's weight guideline for LSD require this Court to change its interpretation of Section 841. And the Court held no. There was no question before the Court about whether the Sentencing Commission had legitimately adopted a different formula than the mixture or substance rule that this Court had held governed the statute. The LSD guideline was not in play in Neal. The government never challenged it. Its rationality was not at issue. All the Court had to hold was that whatever the Sentencing Commission did--
Judge: Yes, but there's also more data that the Commission has reflected on all this and still concludes that the 100 to 1 ratio creates an unwarranted disparity which is contrary to the statute.
respondent: --Well, I disagree with that, Justice Stevens, because no one challenged the guideline in Neal. There was nothing at issue in the Court to decide about whether that Guideline was valid. But even if the Court thought that Neal does involve some sort of a principle that the Sentencing Commission has greater freedom to vary from the procedures laid out in a mandatory minimum sentencing statute, Neal does not control this case, because there is more data about what Congress intended the ratio between crack and powder to be, and because Congress changed the basic, organic statute that governs the Sentencing Commission's--
Judge: It establishes the ratio for mandatory minimum purposes only, is what Neal held.
respondent: --Well, the statute, itself, Section 841, establishes the ratio of a 100 to 1. When the Commission first considered creating drug guidelines--
Judge: And if... you're talking about Public Law 104-38?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well I disagree with that, Justice Stevens, and I'm trying to explain why the legal context is different from the legal context in Neal. Let me start with a couple of points about this. First of all, when the Commission promulgated the drug Guideline initially, it conformed it to the 100 to ratio that existed under the mandatory minimum sentencing statute, because it recognized... and these were the Commission's words... that a logical and coherent sentencing scheme required that there be consistent proportionality throughout the sentencing process. When the Commission later studied the crack-powder ratio and concluded that Congress had gotten it wrong and, therefore, the Commission, itself, had gotten it wrong by conforming to what Congress did, it proposed a Guideline that would have changed the ratio for Guideline's purposes only to one to one between crack and powder. And Congress, for the first time in the history of its review of Guidelines amendments, rejected that proposal; and it did so with legislation that made clear that it believed that if the commission wanted to come back with something new, it should propose something that would change both the Guidelines and the sentencing statutes so that they would continue to work in tandem... that it would preserve a higher ratio of punishment for crack than powder because it believed that crack was more serious, and that it believed that any ratio should apply consistently across the Guidelines and the statute.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.
Judge: --of Federal burglary as defined by Justice Blackmun and the Court in this case, end of matter, QED.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I think that--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.
Judge: --of Federal burglary as defined by Justice Blackmun and the Court in this case, end of matter, QED.
respondent: I think that--
Judge: That's exactly right. So therefore, that was my question basically.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I -- I do think you've accurately described what Petitioner -- the dividing line the Petitioner would advocate is. But I would urge the Court to look at the experience of the court of appeals with trying to apply that dividing line, and that will reveal to the Court very clearly why it becomes unworkable. Because we've got several courts of appeals -- as the Court's aware there's a division of authority on this -- that have said, well, look, we want to look for statutes that are phrased in the disjunctive or that have these separately numbered subsection headings or something. Now, setting aside whether that's really principled or not to focus on the text versus the judicial decision, let's accept for the sake of argument that that's the line. The problem is that then the next case that those courts confront, that applying that rule rigidly produces really strange results.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.
Judge: --of Federal burglary as defined by Justice Blackmun and the Court in this case, end of matter, QED.
respondent: I think that--
Judge: That's exactly right. So therefore, that was my question basically.
respondent: --I -- I do think you've accurately described what Petitioner -- the dividing line the Petitioner would advocate is. But I would urge the Court to look at the experience of the court of appeals with trying to apply that dividing line, and that will reveal to the Court very clearly why it becomes unworkable. Because we've got several courts of appeals -- as the Court's aware there's a division of authority on this -- that have said, well, look, we want to look for statutes that are phrased in the disjunctive or that have these separately numbered subsection headings or something. Now, setting aside whether that's really principled or not to focus on the text versus the judicial decision, let's accept for the sake of argument that that's the line. The problem is that then the next case that those courts confront, that applying that rule rigidly produces really strange results.
Judge: And of course Congress knew that there are hundreds or thousands of State statutes with several different words and they -- you know, different ways of getting at the same thing, and therefore they wrote the next phrase of their Federal statute, which is it's burglary, arson, explosives or otherwise, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. And so if you have a slight variation on the burglary theme, it doesn't fit within generic burglary, but it's pretty hard to imagine it wouldn't otherwise present the same risks, at least if it's only a slight variation.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.
Judge: --of Federal burglary as defined by Justice Blackmun and the Court in this case, end of matter, QED.
respondent: I think that--
Judge: That's exactly right. So therefore, that was my question basically.
respondent: --I -- I do think you've accurately described what Petitioner -- the dividing line the Petitioner would advocate is. But I would urge the Court to look at the experience of the court of appeals with trying to apply that dividing line, and that will reveal to the Court very clearly why it becomes unworkable. Because we've got several courts of appeals -- as the Court's aware there's a division of authority on this -- that have said, well, look, we want to look for statutes that are phrased in the disjunctive or that have these separately numbered subsection headings or something. Now, setting aside whether that's really principled or not to focus on the text versus the judicial decision, let's accept for the sake of argument that that's the line. The problem is that then the next case that those courts confront, that applying that rule rigidly produces really strange results.
Judge: And of course Congress knew that there are hundreds or thousands of State statutes with several different words and they -- you know, different ways of getting at the same thing, and therefore they wrote the next phrase of their Federal statute, which is it's burglary, arson, explosives or otherwise, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. And so if you have a slight variation on the burglary theme, it doesn't fit within generic burglary, but it's pretty hard to imagine it wouldn't otherwise present the same risks, at least if it's only a slight variation.
respondent: Yes.
Judge: I know and that was my question. Why not?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, I -- the parties have not briefed here and I wouldn't want to speculate on what the Court would--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: But you're not -- but you're not looking at the factual basis for the purpose of deciding the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. You're looking to the factual basis or you look to these other documents in order to decide which crime it was that the offender committed. And the reason that you have to sometimes do that is because there are many State statutes which under a single section number list several different crimes, where “ crime ” here does not refer to a thing that happened at a particular day at a particular time, but refers to the kind of thing that a statute defines; i.e., a general category. Now, every case that we've written it seems to me says that or is consistent with that. And that is certainly consistent with the idea of the crimes being burglary, arson, explosives, or other dangerous crimes. So the guilty plea is beside the point. It may just say: Guilty of 828 376 Section 42-BC, end of the matter. And we don't know which of those three things: House, car, boat, which are there in that section, was the crime committed. And he's saying that's the end of that. And so he says, then, look, this is a California State statute and it isn't divided into three parts. It just has one part. And that one part is not the equivalent--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: I would like to start maybe at a point in a colloquy that my friend was having with Justice Breyer, which brought out the point that Petitioner's position here is that there's a difference between alternative elements in State crimes and alternative means; and from the point of view of a guilty plea, which is what we're dealing with here, I don't see how you're going to make that sort of distinction. It's an unworkable distinction, because, from -- from the point of view of the defendant pleading guilty, whether it's an alternative element or an alternative means, it's just an alternative way of offering the factual basis for the crime. And the sentencing court ought to look, as the Court, as this Court said in Shepard, to the factual basis that's offered for pleading guilty.
Judge: --of Federal burglary as defined by Justice Blackmun and the Court in this case, end of matter, QED.
respondent: I think that--
Judge: That's exactly right. So therefore, that was my question basically.
respondent: --I -- I do think you've accurately described what Petitioner -- the dividing line the Petitioner would advocate is. But I would urge the Court to look at the experience of the court of appeals with trying to apply that dividing line, and that will reveal to the Court very clearly why it becomes unworkable. Because we've got several courts of appeals -- as the Court's aware there's a division of authority on this -- that have said, well, look, we want to look for statutes that are phrased in the disjunctive or that have these separately numbered subsection headings or something. Now, setting aside whether that's really principled or not to focus on the text versus the judicial decision, let's accept for the sake of argument that that's the line. The problem is that then the next case that those courts confront, that applying that rule rigidly produces really strange results.
Judge: And of course Congress knew that there are hundreds or thousands of State statutes with several different words and they -- you know, different ways of getting at the same thing, and therefore they wrote the next phrase of their Federal statute, which is it's burglary, arson, explosives or otherwise, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. And so if you have a slight variation on the burglary theme, it doesn't fit within generic burglary, but it's pretty hard to imagine it wouldn't otherwise present the same risks, at least if it's only a slight variation.
respondent: Yes.
Judge: I know and that was my question. Why not?
respondent: Well, I -- the parties have not briefed here and I wouldn't want to speculate on what the Court would--
Judge: Maybe -- maybe they haven't argued it because there's some serious constitutional doubt about whether the statute which makes it a crime to engage in conduct which creates a serious risk of physical injury is constitutional. That's such a vague standard, you go to prison for 30 years if you engage in conduct, quote, "that creates a serious risk of physical injury. " I'm not about to buy into that one.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, this case has been argued as -- because this is a conviction under California burglary, it's been argued under the -- the premise that it should be classified as generic burglary. But let me offer--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.
Judge: The value of what?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.
Judge: The value of what?
respondent: Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.
Judge: What does that mean?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Personal autonomy.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.
Judge: The value of what?
respondent: Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.
Judge: What does that mean?
respondent: Personal autonomy.
Judge: No, not exaggerate -- lie.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, that we get to -- we get to exaggerate and create--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.
Judge: The value of what?
respondent: Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.
Judge: What does that mean?
respondent: Personal autonomy.
Judge: No, not exaggerate -- lie.
respondent: Well, that we get to -- we get to exaggerate and create--
Judge: Well, but that was for literary purposes. No one is suggesting you can't write a book or tell a story about somebody who earned a Medal of Honor and it's a fictional character, so he obviously didn't. It just seems to me very different.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, when we create our own persona, we're often making up things about ourselves that we want people to think about us, and that can be valuable. Samuel Clemens creating Mark Twain. That was creating a persona, and he made things up about himself--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: What is -- what is the First Amendment value in a lie, pure lie?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes pure speech in the form of bare falsity, a mere telling of a lie. It doesn't matter whether the lie was told in a public meeting or in a private conversation with a friend or family member. And the law punishes false claims to a military award regardless of whether harm results or even is likely to result in an individual case.
Judge: The value of what?
respondent: Just a pure lie? There can be a number of values. There is the value of personal autonomy.
Judge: What does that mean?
respondent: Personal autonomy.
Judge: No, not exaggerate -- lie.
respondent: Well, that we get to -- we get to exaggerate and create--
Judge: Well, but that was for literary purposes. No one is suggesting you can't write a book or tell a story about somebody who earned a Medal of Honor and it's a fictional character, so he obviously didn't. It just seems to me very different.
respondent: --Well, when we create our own persona, we're often making up things about ourselves that we want people to think about us, and that can be valuable. Samuel Clemens creating Mark Twain. That was creating a persona, and he made things up about himself--
Judge: Do you really think that there is -- that the First Amendment -- that there is First Amendment value in a bald-faced lie about a purely factual statement that a person makes about himself, because that person would like to create a particular persona? Gee, I won the Medal of Honor. I was a Rhodes scholar, I won the Nobel Prize. There's a personal -- the First Amendment protects that?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Perhaps. But there are other things. In addition to the fact that people tell lies allows us to appreciate truth better.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.
Judge: There are cases in the pipeline that don't think it's as clear as day.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, that's true, but my point is just that on the face of the domestic violence statute, and what it says is that the restoration of rights exception is limited to circumstances where the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights. So on the face of that provision... the provision says restoration occurs only if civil rights have been lost. So it's clear as day that what Congress was saying there was it was mandating the allegedly absurd result here in situations where rights were not lost. And what that means is that you can't say that it's impossible that Congress--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.
Judge: There are cases in the pipeline that don't think it's as clear as day.
respondent: Well, that's true, but my point is just that on the face of the domestic violence statute, and what it says is that the restoration of rights exception is limited to circumstances where the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights. So on the face of that provision... the provision says restoration occurs only if civil rights have been lost. So it's clear as day that what Congress was saying there was it was mandating the allegedly absurd result here in situations where rights were not lost. And what that means is that you can't say that it's impossible that Congress--
Judge: Yes.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--There is... in the context of subsection (33)... in the context of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.
Judge: There are cases in the pipeline that don't think it's as clear as day.
respondent: Well, that's true, but my point is just that on the face of the domestic violence statute, and what it says is that the restoration of rights exception is limited to circumstances where the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights. So on the face of that provision... the provision says restoration occurs only if civil rights have been lost. So it's clear as day that what Congress was saying there was it was mandating the allegedly absurd result here in situations where rights were not lost. And what that means is that you can't say that it's impossible that Congress--
Judge: Yes.
respondent: --There is... in the context of subsection (33)... in the context of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision--
Judge: What court--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--there is one circuit that has applied... that has basically overlooked the plain language there, not even attempted to deal with the plain language there. And it's true, and it's found that that exemption was somehow satisfied in a situation where civil rights were never taken away or restored. But the fact that, you know, a court of appeals reached that conclusion without even attempting to take a look at the statutory language doesn't diminish the very plain meaning--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.
Judge: There are cases in the pipeline that don't think it's as clear as day.
respondent: Well, that's true, but my point is just that on the face of the domestic violence statute, and what it says is that the restoration of rights exception is limited to circumstances where the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights. So on the face of that provision... the provision says restoration occurs only if civil rights have been lost. So it's clear as day that what Congress was saying there was it was mandating the allegedly absurd result here in situations where rights were not lost. And what that means is that you can't say that it's impossible that Congress--
Judge: Yes.
respondent: --There is... in the context of subsection (33)... in the context of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision--
Judge: What court--
respondent: --there is one circuit that has applied... that has basically overlooked the plain language there, not even attempted to deal with the plain language there. And it's true, and it's found that that exemption was somehow satisfied in a situation where civil rights were never taken away or restored. But the fact that, you know, a court of appeals reached that conclusion without even attempting to take a look at the statutory language doesn't diminish the very plain meaning--
Judge: --What court of appeals was that? I didn't get that.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--of the statutory language.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: Everyone in this case. The point might be arguable in a case that involved that domestic violence statute. This case doesn't involve that other provision.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: We just have a two points. The first is that restoring a right does not mean leaving it alone, and the second is that the statute is not absurd. And for those reasons, Petitioner's prior offenses are violent felonies under the meaning of the act. The statute is clear on point. It says "restored", and restoring a right means giving back a right that has been taken away. It does not mean leaving a right alone. And though words can sometimes have different meanings in contexts, we are aware of no context in which "restore" was "leave alone". And this is certainly not such a context because the statute refers to a pardon, a set-aside, an expungement, or a restoration of rights. And the one thing that those four items all have in common is that there are ways which a State essentially undoes its conviction by relieving a defendant of some or all of the consequences of that conviction. Giving back rights that have been taken away as part of the conviction has that effect. Simply leaving the rights alone does not. And for that reason, because the statute is so clear, the only question in this case is whether the scope of the statutory exemption is so absurd that this Court should take the liberty to amend it in order to add an additional exemption for defendants who never lost their civil rights in the first place. And the Court should not do so for numerous reasons. The first is that the absurd results canon applies only if it is clear that Congress could not possibly have intended the result of the plain statutory text. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, and Justice Souter did as well, we know from the subsequent enactment of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision that this result is not something that's beyond Congress's comprehension. Everyone agrees that Congress did in fact mandate the supposedly alleged absurd results in a closely analogous statute. And that's just fatal to the absurdity argument.
Judge: There are cases in the pipeline that don't think it's as clear as day.
respondent: Well, that's true, but my point is just that on the face of the domestic violence statute, and what it says is that the restoration of rights exception is limited to circumstances where the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights. So on the face of that provision... the provision says restoration occurs only if civil rights have been lost. So it's clear as day that what Congress was saying there was it was mandating the allegedly absurd result here in situations where rights were not lost. And what that means is that you can't say that it's impossible that Congress--
Judge: Yes.
respondent: --There is... in the context of subsection (33)... in the context of the domestic violence misdemeanor provision--
Judge: What court--
respondent: --there is one circuit that has applied... that has basically overlooked the plain language there, not even attempted to deal with the plain language there. And it's true, and it's found that that exemption was somehow satisfied in a situation where civil rights were never taken away or restored. But the fact that, you know, a court of appeals reached that conclusion without even attempting to take a look at the statutory language doesn't diminish the very plain meaning--
Judge: --What court of appeals was that? I didn't get that.
respondent: --of the statutory language.
Judge: If Congress thought about the problem, what reason could they have for saying that the firearms ban should apply to someone who never lost his or her civil rights, but not... but would not apply to someone who had civil rights restored? Automatically, let's say. Automatically and within a short period of time. What rationale reason could there be for doing that?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>It was the Sixth Circuit in the Burgin case, I believe it's called. And the Sixth Circuit there, similar to the First Circuit in construing this statute, was very clear that it was just skipping the language and doing what it thought Congress would have wanted to do if it had thought about it. But the plain language in the domestic violence provision is unmistakable because it expressly refers to civil rights--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: Ms. Harrington--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:: The Due Process Clause does not require the government to disprove withdrawal outside the limitations period, because lack of withdrawal is not an element of the crime of conspiracy. This Court has been clear that the Winship burden attaches to only things that are elements in the constitutional sense. And when something is an element in the constitutional sense, then at least four consequences follow. As the Court has suggested, first, the government has to allege in the indictment in every case. Second, the government has to prove it in every case. Third, the jury has to be instructed on it in every case. And fourth, a defendant can't waive the requirement that it be proved in his case by failing to raise it. But none of those things apply as to a statute of limitations.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: Ms. Harrington--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:: The Due Process Clause does not require the government to disprove withdrawal outside the limitations period, because lack of withdrawal is not an element of the crime of conspiracy. This Court has been clear that the Winship burden attaches to only things that are elements in the constitutional sense. And when something is an element in the constitutional sense, then at least four consequences follow. As the Court has suggested, first, the government has to allege in the indictment in every case. Second, the government has to prove it in every case. Third, the jury has to be instructed on it in every case. And fourth, a defendant can't waive the requirement that it be proved in his case by failing to raise it. But none of those things apply as to a statute of limitations.
Judge: This is true, but his point, basic point, and he has responded to the points I've made, is that, of course if there is a five-year statute on robbery, it doesn't help the government that he create -- he committed a robbery before.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Correct.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: Ms. Harrington--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:: The Due Process Clause does not require the government to disprove withdrawal outside the limitations period, because lack of withdrawal is not an element of the crime of conspiracy. This Court has been clear that the Winship burden attaches to only things that are elements in the constitutional sense. And when something is an element in the constitutional sense, then at least four consequences follow. As the Court has suggested, first, the government has to allege in the indictment in every case. Second, the government has to prove it in every case. Third, the jury has to be instructed on it in every case. And fourth, a defendant can't waive the requirement that it be proved in his case by failing to raise it. But none of those things apply as to a statute of limitations.
Judge: This is true, but his point, basic point, and he has responded to the points I've made, is that, of course if there is a five-year statute on robbery, it doesn't help the government that he create -- he committed a robbery before.
respondent: Correct.
Judge: So he's saying what you charged in the indictment is that he was a member of a conspiracy that existed between 1995 and 2005. That's the crime that concerns us, roughly. And he is saying to prove your case, you have to show as an element that he was a member. Now, you did present some evidence that he was a member. And he wants to present some evidence and has that he wasn't a member. And he wasn't a member if he withdrew. And therefore, once he presents enough to get -- make that an issue, you have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member. So you have to show he didn't withdraw. Now, this has nothing to do with the statute of limitations. By coincidence it does, but a statute of limitations issue would be that you all agreed that he withdrew, but the question is did it happen in 1993 or 1997. That's a statute of limitations issue, but this isn't. This is a question of whether he was a member of the conspiracy during the time period that you charged in the indictment. That's his point. So what is the response?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>So I guess I have two responses. The first is that it is a statute of limitations question in the sense that the government proved, and there is no dispute about this, that the conspiracy that was charged did exist within the limitations period. And so, the question is just, did this particular member of the conspiracy--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: Ms. Harrington--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:: The Due Process Clause does not require the government to disprove withdrawal outside the limitations period, because lack of withdrawal is not an element of the crime of conspiracy. This Court has been clear that the Winship burden attaches to only things that are elements in the constitutional sense. And when something is an element in the constitutional sense, then at least four consequences follow. As the Court has suggested, first, the government has to allege in the indictment in every case. Second, the government has to prove it in every case. Third, the jury has to be instructed on it in every case. And fourth, a defendant can't waive the requirement that it be proved in his case by failing to raise it. But none of those things apply as to a statute of limitations.
Judge: This is true, but his point, basic point, and he has responded to the points I've made, is that, of course if there is a five-year statute on robbery, it doesn't help the government that he create -- he committed a robbery before.
respondent: Correct.
Judge: So he's saying what you charged in the indictment is that he was a member of a conspiracy that existed between 1995 and 2005. That's the crime that concerns us, roughly. And he is saying to prove your case, you have to show as an element that he was a member. Now, you did present some evidence that he was a member. And he wants to present some evidence and has that he wasn't a member. And he wasn't a member if he withdrew. And therefore, once he presents enough to get -- make that an issue, you have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member. So you have to show he didn't withdraw. Now, this has nothing to do with the statute of limitations. By coincidence it does, but a statute of limitations issue would be that you all agreed that he withdrew, but the question is did it happen in 1993 or 1997. That's a statute of limitations issue, but this isn't. This is a question of whether he was a member of the conspiracy during the time period that you charged in the indictment. That's his point. So what is the response?
respondent: So I guess I have two responses. The first is that it is a statute of limitations question in the sense that the government proved, and there is no dispute about this, that the conspiracy that was charged did exist within the limitations period. And so, the question is just, did this particular member of the conspiracy--
Judge: In other words, you can charge me or anybody in the audience or anybody here with what? Not charging them? You are saying there was a conspiracy, doesn't he have to be shown to be a member of the conspiracy in order for you to get a conviction?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--He does, and there's no--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: Ms. Harrington--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:: The Due Process Clause does not require the government to disprove withdrawal outside the limitations period, because lack of withdrawal is not an element of the crime of conspiracy. This Court has been clear that the Winship burden attaches to only things that are elements in the constitutional sense. And when something is an element in the constitutional sense, then at least four consequences follow. As the Court has suggested, first, the government has to allege in the indictment in every case. Second, the government has to prove it in every case. Third, the jury has to be instructed on it in every case. And fourth, a defendant can't waive the requirement that it be proved in his case by failing to raise it. But none of those things apply as to a statute of limitations.
Judge: This is true, but his point, basic point, and he has responded to the points I've made, is that, of course if there is a five-year statute on robbery, it doesn't help the government that he create -- he committed a robbery before.
respondent: Correct.
Judge: So he's saying what you charged in the indictment is that he was a member of a conspiracy that existed between 1995 and 2005. That's the crime that concerns us, roughly. And he is saying to prove your case, you have to show as an element that he was a member. Now, you did present some evidence that he was a member. And he wants to present some evidence and has that he wasn't a member. And he wasn't a member if he withdrew. And therefore, once he presents enough to get -- make that an issue, you have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member. So you have to show he didn't withdraw. Now, this has nothing to do with the statute of limitations. By coincidence it does, but a statute of limitations issue would be that you all agreed that he withdrew, but the question is did it happen in 1993 or 1997. That's a statute of limitations issue, but this isn't. This is a question of whether he was a member of the conspiracy during the time period that you charged in the indictment. That's his point. So what is the response?
respondent: So I guess I have two responses. The first is that it is a statute of limitations question in the sense that the government proved, and there is no dispute about this, that the conspiracy that was charged did exist within the limitations period. And so, the question is just, did this particular member of the conspiracy--
Judge: In other words, you can charge me or anybody in the audience or anybody here with what? Not charging them? You are saying there was a conspiracy, doesn't he have to be shown to be a member of the conspiracy in order for you to get a conviction?
respondent: --He does, and there's no--
Judge: And that's an element of the crime?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--And an -- but when Petitioner talks about the membership or participation element, what he is really talking about is the agreement element. The government has to prove that each defendant who is charged with a conspiracy intentionally agreed to join the conspiracy. And there is no dispute that the government proved that with respect to Petitioner--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: Ms. Harrington--
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:: The Due Process Clause does not require the government to disprove withdrawal outside the limitations period, because lack of withdrawal is not an element of the crime of conspiracy. This Court has been clear that the Winship burden attaches to only things that are elements in the constitutional sense. And when something is an element in the constitutional sense, then at least four consequences follow. As the Court has suggested, first, the government has to allege in the indictment in every case. Second, the government has to prove it in every case. Third, the jury has to be instructed on it in every case. And fourth, a defendant can't waive the requirement that it be proved in his case by failing to raise it. But none of those things apply as to a statute of limitations.
Judge: This is true, but his point, basic point, and he has responded to the points I've made, is that, of course if there is a five-year statute on robbery, it doesn't help the government that he create -- he committed a robbery before.
respondent: Correct.
Judge: So he's saying what you charged in the indictment is that he was a member of a conspiracy that existed between 1995 and 2005. That's the crime that concerns us, roughly. And he is saying to prove your case, you have to show as an element that he was a member. Now, you did present some evidence that he was a member. And he wants to present some evidence and has that he wasn't a member. And he wasn't a member if he withdrew. And therefore, once he presents enough to get -- make that an issue, you have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member. So you have to show he didn't withdraw. Now, this has nothing to do with the statute of limitations. By coincidence it does, but a statute of limitations issue would be that you all agreed that he withdrew, but the question is did it happen in 1993 or 1997. That's a statute of limitations issue, but this isn't. This is a question of whether he was a member of the conspiracy during the time period that you charged in the indictment. That's his point. So what is the response?
respondent: So I guess I have two responses. The first is that it is a statute of limitations question in the sense that the government proved, and there is no dispute about this, that the conspiracy that was charged did exist within the limitations period. And so, the question is just, did this particular member of the conspiracy--
Judge: In other words, you can charge me or anybody in the audience or anybody here with what? Not charging them? You are saying there was a conspiracy, doesn't he have to be shown to be a member of the conspiracy in order for you to get a conviction?
respondent: --He does, and there's no--
Judge: And that's an element of the crime?
respondent: --And an -- but when Petitioner talks about the membership or participation element, what he is really talking about is the agreement element. The government has to prove that each defendant who is charged with a conspiracy intentionally agreed to join the conspiracy. And there is no dispute that the government proved that with respect to Petitioner--
Judge: There is no more relevance, is there, to the fact that there happened to be a pre-1995 conspiracy, except as a matter of proof, I shouldn't say relevance, that he happened to rob a bank before 1995? I mean, in each instance there was criminal activity before 1995. Now, you can use that in order to prove that he was a member during '95 to 2000. That I see. But he similar can use the matter of withdrawal to prove he wasn't a member during 1995 to 2000. And, therefore, it goes to show whether you or the government have proved an element of the offense, namely, that he was a member between '95 and 2000.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--But again, the element is agreement. Right? So we prove that he agreed to join the conspiracy, and we proved that each defendant agreed to join the conspiracy. We don't have to prove that that agreement happened in the limitations period, as long as we prove that the conspiracy continues to--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: That's true. But it may save a little time. I worry we're in an arcane area of the law. It was created by Robert Jackson, Attorney General and by Thorn burg, Attorney General. And if we are starting with that, what that says is we have a list over here of excludable things and we have a list of deportable things. And if you are deported for a reason that shows up on that first list, than the AG could waive. That's basically the outline I have. And also I have, which isn't quite right, that in that first list there is something called -- in big letters, CIMT or something, crime of moral turpitude. And all of the things on the second list, the big issue is, is it a crime of moral turpitude. As I looked through the opinions, this is what I got out of it. This is tentative. I got out, just as you say, there are two things in the second list which are not crimes of moral turpitude. They consist of illegal entry crimes and gun crimes. And there are special reasons for the first and the second is debatable, but they have been consistent with that. Then there are things that are on both lists, they are crimes of moral turpitude. I counted at least eight cases. Say, for example, rape, burglary, manslaughter, second degree robbery, indecency with a child and probably some others are all crimes of moral turpitude, so it cuts here, okay. Then I find Blake, and Blake says sexual abuse of a minor is not a crime of moral turpitude. That's a little surprising. But it gives us a reason because, and this was the problem here, it talks about, there has to be substantial -- there has to be similar language in the two lists. I don't know where that one came from. It certainly had not been in the earlier cases. And now we have this case, which is voluntary manslaughter. I would have thought that voluntary manslaughter is right at the heart of the lists that they said the things are crimes of moral turpitude, and not like visa crimes or gun crimes, if I read the cases. So where do I end up? Well, what I end up with is this. And this is what I would like you to reply to. Justice Brandies once said something like we have to know before we can say whether an agency opinion is right or wrong, what they are talking about. I felt perplexity after I had read through these decisions. In other words, I don't understand it. So I would like you to explain to me why this all fits together and how, if you can do that, I couldn't get that clear explanation from the brief, and I suspect it is not your fault.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: The Petitioner does not dispute that some comparability analysis must be applied to prevent relief under former section 212 c from being extended to certain grounds of de portability. But his methodology of asking whether his offense could have made him excludable is inconsistent with established cases from the board that long predated the ones at issue here involving firearms offenses and visa fraud. Justice Scalia brought up the case in Wadud. That was a visa fraud case. It was a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1546. That's a provision that penalizes fraudulent and other misuse of visas and other immigration documents. It's a very broad criminal provision. It's long been a ground of de portability. And at the time the alien argued that this is fraud. It's a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore I would be subject to exclusion. In Wadud the board rejected that analysis.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: That's true. But it may save a little time. I worry we're in an arcane area of the law. It was created by Robert Jackson, Attorney General and by Thorn burg, Attorney General. And if we are starting with that, what that says is we have a list over here of excludable things and we have a list of deportable things. And if you are deported for a reason that shows up on that first list, than the AG could waive. That's basically the outline I have. And also I have, which isn't quite right, that in that first list there is something called -- in big letters, CIMT or something, crime of moral turpitude. And all of the things on the second list, the big issue is, is it a crime of moral turpitude. As I looked through the opinions, this is what I got out of it. This is tentative. I got out, just as you say, there are two things in the second list which are not crimes of moral turpitude. They consist of illegal entry crimes and gun crimes. And there are special reasons for the first and the second is debatable, but they have been consistent with that. Then there are things that are on both lists, they are crimes of moral turpitude. I counted at least eight cases. Say, for example, rape, burglary, manslaughter, second degree robbery, indecency with a child and probably some others are all crimes of moral turpitude, so it cuts here, okay. Then I find Blake, and Blake says sexual abuse of a minor is not a crime of moral turpitude. That's a little surprising. But it gives us a reason because, and this was the problem here, it talks about, there has to be substantial -- there has to be similar language in the two lists. I don't know where that one came from. It certainly had not been in the earlier cases. And now we have this case, which is voluntary manslaughter. I would have thought that voluntary manslaughter is right at the heart of the lists that they said the things are crimes of moral turpitude, and not like visa crimes or gun crimes, if I read the cases. So where do I end up? Well, what I end up with is this. And this is what I would like you to reply to. Justice Brandies once said something like we have to know before we can say whether an agency opinion is right or wrong, what they are talking about. I felt perplexity after I had read through these decisions. In other words, I don't understand it. So I would like you to explain to me why this all fits together and how, if you can do that, I couldn't get that clear explanation from the brief, and I suspect it is not your fault.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: The Petitioner does not dispute that some comparability analysis must be applied to prevent relief under former section 212 c from being extended to certain grounds of de portability. But his methodology of asking whether his offense could have made him excludable is inconsistent with established cases from the board that long predated the ones at issue here involving firearms offenses and visa fraud. Justice Scalia brought up the case in Wadud. That was a visa fraud case. It was a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1546. That's a provision that penalizes fraudulent and other misuse of visas and other immigration documents. It's a very broad criminal provision. It's long been a ground of de portability. And at the time the alien argued that this is fraud. It's a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore I would be subject to exclusion. In Wadud the board rejected that analysis.
Judge: Rape, burglary, manslaughter, second-degree robbery -- all of those cases -- about seven or eight of them.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, I agree that the history and the law here is relatively complicated and it has had a lot of moving pieces over the years. But I think that the board has been very consistent, especially beginning in the 1984 Wadud decision that was picked up in the Jimenez-Santillano decision and also in firearms offenses. Justice Breyer, you talked about the fact that the board had been consistent in firearms offenses. And the Petitioner does not dispute that firearms offenses are ones that do not have a comparable ground--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: That's true. But it may save a little time. I worry we're in an arcane area of the law. It was created by Robert Jackson, Attorney General and by Thorn burg, Attorney General. And if we are starting with that, what that says is we have a list over here of excludable things and we have a list of deportable things. And if you are deported for a reason that shows up on that first list, than the AG could waive. That's basically the outline I have. And also I have, which isn't quite right, that in that first list there is something called -- in big letters, CIMT or something, crime of moral turpitude. And all of the things on the second list, the big issue is, is it a crime of moral turpitude. As I looked through the opinions, this is what I got out of it. This is tentative. I got out, just as you say, there are two things in the second list which are not crimes of moral turpitude. They consist of illegal entry crimes and gun crimes. And there are special reasons for the first and the second is debatable, but they have been consistent with that. Then there are things that are on both lists, they are crimes of moral turpitude. I counted at least eight cases. Say, for example, rape, burglary, manslaughter, second degree robbery, indecency with a child and probably some others are all crimes of moral turpitude, so it cuts here, okay. Then I find Blake, and Blake says sexual abuse of a minor is not a crime of moral turpitude. That's a little surprising. But it gives us a reason because, and this was the problem here, it talks about, there has to be substantial -- there has to be similar language in the two lists. I don't know where that one came from. It certainly had not been in the earlier cases. And now we have this case, which is voluntary manslaughter. I would have thought that voluntary manslaughter is right at the heart of the lists that they said the things are crimes of moral turpitude, and not like visa crimes or gun crimes, if I read the cases. So where do I end up? Well, what I end up with is this. And this is what I would like you to reply to. Justice Brandies once said something like we have to know before we can say whether an agency opinion is right or wrong, what they are talking about. I felt perplexity after I had read through these decisions. In other words, I don't understand it. So I would like you to explain to me why this all fits together and how, if you can do that, I couldn't get that clear explanation from the brief, and I suspect it is not your fault.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: The Petitioner does not dispute that some comparability analysis must be applied to prevent relief under former section 212 c from being extended to certain grounds of de portability. But his methodology of asking whether his offense could have made him excludable is inconsistent with established cases from the board that long predated the ones at issue here involving firearms offenses and visa fraud. Justice Scalia brought up the case in Wadud. That was a visa fraud case. It was a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1546. That's a provision that penalizes fraudulent and other misuse of visas and other immigration documents. It's a very broad criminal provision. It's long been a ground of de portability. And at the time the alien argued that this is fraud. It's a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore I would be subject to exclusion. In Wadud the board rejected that analysis.
Judge: Rape, burglary, manslaughter, second-degree robbery -- all of those cases -- about seven or eight of them.
respondent: Well, I agree that the history and the law here is relatively complicated and it has had a lot of moving pieces over the years. But I think that the board has been very consistent, especially beginning in the 1984 Wadud decision that was picked up in the Jimenez-Santillano decision and also in firearms offenses. Justice Breyer, you talked about the fact that the board had been consistent in firearms offenses. And the Petitioner does not dispute that firearms offenses are ones that do not have a comparable ground--
Judge: Is there any aggravated felony crime of violence that is not a crime involving moral turpitude?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--If I could go back for a second to firearms offenses. The board there has continued to say that there is no comparable ground for firearms offenses, even if your firearms offense would be something that could have been considered a crime involving moral turpitude. If you look at the board's 1992 decision in Montenegro, that was a case that was assault with a firearm, and so it wasn't merely possession of a handgun or an automatic weapon or a sawed-off shotgun--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: That's true. But it may save a little time. I worry we're in an arcane area of the law. It was created by Robert Jackson, Attorney General and by Thorn burg, Attorney General. And if we are starting with that, what that says is we have a list over here of excludable things and we have a list of deportable things. And if you are deported for a reason that shows up on that first list, than the AG could waive. That's basically the outline I have. And also I have, which isn't quite right, that in that first list there is something called -- in big letters, CIMT or something, crime of moral turpitude. And all of the things on the second list, the big issue is, is it a crime of moral turpitude. As I looked through the opinions, this is what I got out of it. This is tentative. I got out, just as you say, there are two things in the second list which are not crimes of moral turpitude. They consist of illegal entry crimes and gun crimes. And there are special reasons for the first and the second is debatable, but they have been consistent with that. Then there are things that are on both lists, they are crimes of moral turpitude. I counted at least eight cases. Say, for example, rape, burglary, manslaughter, second degree robbery, indecency with a child and probably some others are all crimes of moral turpitude, so it cuts here, okay. Then I find Blake, and Blake says sexual abuse of a minor is not a crime of moral turpitude. That's a little surprising. But it gives us a reason because, and this was the problem here, it talks about, there has to be substantial -- there has to be similar language in the two lists. I don't know where that one came from. It certainly had not been in the earlier cases. And now we have this case, which is voluntary manslaughter. I would have thought that voluntary manslaughter is right at the heart of the lists that they said the things are crimes of moral turpitude, and not like visa crimes or gun crimes, if I read the cases. So where do I end up? Well, what I end up with is this. And this is what I would like you to reply to. Justice Brandies once said something like we have to know before we can say whether an agency opinion is right or wrong, what they are talking about. I felt perplexity after I had read through these decisions. In other words, I don't understand it. So I would like you to explain to me why this all fits together and how, if you can do that, I couldn't get that clear explanation from the brief, and I suspect it is not your fault.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: The Petitioner does not dispute that some comparability analysis must be applied to prevent relief under former section 212 c from being extended to certain grounds of de portability. But his methodology of asking whether his offense could have made him excludable is inconsistent with established cases from the board that long predated the ones at issue here involving firearms offenses and visa fraud. Justice Scalia brought up the case in Wadud. That was a visa fraud case. It was a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1546. That's a provision that penalizes fraudulent and other misuse of visas and other immigration documents. It's a very broad criminal provision. It's long been a ground of de portability. And at the time the alien argued that this is fraud. It's a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore I would be subject to exclusion. In Wadud the board rejected that analysis.
Judge: Rape, burglary, manslaughter, second-degree robbery -- all of those cases -- about seven or eight of them.
respondent: Well, I agree that the history and the law here is relatively complicated and it has had a lot of moving pieces over the years. But I think that the board has been very consistent, especially beginning in the 1984 Wadud decision that was picked up in the Jimenez-Santillano decision and also in firearms offenses. Justice Breyer, you talked about the fact that the board had been consistent in firearms offenses. And the Petitioner does not dispute that firearms offenses are ones that do not have a comparable ground--
Judge: Is there any aggravated felony crime of violence that is not a crime involving moral turpitude?
respondent: --If I could go back for a second to firearms offenses. The board there has continued to say that there is no comparable ground for firearms offenses, even if your firearms offense would be something that could have been considered a crime involving moral turpitude. If you look at the board's 1992 decision in Montenegro, that was a case that was assault with a firearm, and so it wasn't merely possession of a handgun or an automatic weapon or a sawed-off shotgun--
Judge: Was Judulang's crime a crime involving violence?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Yes, Justice Ginsburg. The board pointed out in the Brieva-Perez decision that minor but relatively common crimes of violence, including simple assaults and burglary, generally are not considered to be crimes involving moral turpitude. In the reply brief, Petitioner points to a board petition in Louissaint saying that -- that the record is muddled on burglary, but that opinion only showed that residential burglary isn't a crime involving moral turpitude, and a crime of violence, in the definition, is one that involves the use of physical force against personal property of another. And so it doesn't need to be aggravated in any other sense. It doesn't need to be--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: That's true. But it may save a little time. I worry we're in an arcane area of the law. It was created by Robert Jackson, Attorney General and by Thorn burg, Attorney General. And if we are starting with that, what that says is we have a list over here of excludable things and we have a list of deportable things. And if you are deported for a reason that shows up on that first list, than the AG could waive. That's basically the outline I have. And also I have, which isn't quite right, that in that first list there is something called -- in big letters, CIMT or something, crime of moral turpitude. And all of the things on the second list, the big issue is, is it a crime of moral turpitude. As I looked through the opinions, this is what I got out of it. This is tentative. I got out, just as you say, there are two things in the second list which are not crimes of moral turpitude. They consist of illegal entry crimes and gun crimes. And there are special reasons for the first and the second is debatable, but they have been consistent with that. Then there are things that are on both lists, they are crimes of moral turpitude. I counted at least eight cases. Say, for example, rape, burglary, manslaughter, second degree robbery, indecency with a child and probably some others are all crimes of moral turpitude, so it cuts here, okay. Then I find Blake, and Blake says sexual abuse of a minor is not a crime of moral turpitude. That's a little surprising. But it gives us a reason because, and this was the problem here, it talks about, there has to be substantial -- there has to be similar language in the two lists. I don't know where that one came from. It certainly had not been in the earlier cases. And now we have this case, which is voluntary manslaughter. I would have thought that voluntary manslaughter is right at the heart of the lists that they said the things are crimes of moral turpitude, and not like visa crimes or gun crimes, if I read the cases. So where do I end up? Well, what I end up with is this. And this is what I would like you to reply to. Justice Brandies once said something like we have to know before we can say whether an agency opinion is right or wrong, what they are talking about. I felt perplexity after I had read through these decisions. In other words, I don't understand it. So I would like you to explain to me why this all fits together and how, if you can do that, I couldn't get that clear explanation from the brief, and I suspect it is not your fault.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: The Petitioner does not dispute that some comparability analysis must be applied to prevent relief under former section 212 c from being extended to certain grounds of de portability. But his methodology of asking whether his offense could have made him excludable is inconsistent with established cases from the board that long predated the ones at issue here involving firearms offenses and visa fraud. Justice Scalia brought up the case in Wadud. That was a visa fraud case. It was a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1546. That's a provision that penalizes fraudulent and other misuse of visas and other immigration documents. It's a very broad criminal provision. It's long been a ground of de portability. And at the time the alien argued that this is fraud. It's a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore I would be subject to exclusion. In Wadud the board rejected that analysis.
Judge: Rape, burglary, manslaughter, second-degree robbery -- all of those cases -- about seven or eight of them.
respondent: Well, I agree that the history and the law here is relatively complicated and it has had a lot of moving pieces over the years. But I think that the board has been very consistent, especially beginning in the 1984 Wadud decision that was picked up in the Jimenez-Santillano decision and also in firearms offenses. Justice Breyer, you talked about the fact that the board had been consistent in firearms offenses. And the Petitioner does not dispute that firearms offenses are ones that do not have a comparable ground--
Judge: Is there any aggravated felony crime of violence that is not a crime involving moral turpitude?
respondent: --If I could go back for a second to firearms offenses. The board there has continued to say that there is no comparable ground for firearms offenses, even if your firearms offense would be something that could have been considered a crime involving moral turpitude. If you look at the board's 1992 decision in Montenegro, that was a case that was assault with a firearm, and so it wasn't merely possession of a handgun or an automatic weapon or a sawed-off shotgun--
Judge: Was Judulang's crime a crime involving violence?
respondent: --Yes, Justice Ginsburg. The board pointed out in the Brieva-Perez decision that minor but relatively common crimes of violence, including simple assaults and burglary, generally are not considered to be crimes involving moral turpitude. In the reply brief, Petitioner points to a board petition in Louissaint saying that -- that the record is muddled on burglary, but that opinion only showed that residential burglary isn't a crime involving moral turpitude, and a crime of violence, in the definition, is one that involves the use of physical force against personal property of another. And so it doesn't need to be aggravated in any other sense. It doesn't need to be--
Judge: I mean a crime of moral turpitude.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Yes, it was a crime--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: That's true. But it may save a little time. I worry we're in an arcane area of the law. It was created by Robert Jackson, Attorney General and by Thorn burg, Attorney General. And if we are starting with that, what that says is we have a list over here of excludable things and we have a list of deportable things. And if you are deported for a reason that shows up on that first list, than the AG could waive. That's basically the outline I have. And also I have, which isn't quite right, that in that first list there is something called -- in big letters, CIMT or something, crime of moral turpitude. And all of the things on the second list, the big issue is, is it a crime of moral turpitude. As I looked through the opinions, this is what I got out of it. This is tentative. I got out, just as you say, there are two things in the second list which are not crimes of moral turpitude. They consist of illegal entry crimes and gun crimes. And there are special reasons for the first and the second is debatable, but they have been consistent with that. Then there are things that are on both lists, they are crimes of moral turpitude. I counted at least eight cases. Say, for example, rape, burglary, manslaughter, second degree robbery, indecency with a child and probably some others are all crimes of moral turpitude, so it cuts here, okay. Then I find Blake, and Blake says sexual abuse of a minor is not a crime of moral turpitude. That's a little surprising. But it gives us a reason because, and this was the problem here, it talks about, there has to be substantial -- there has to be similar language in the two lists. I don't know where that one came from. It certainly had not been in the earlier cases. And now we have this case, which is voluntary manslaughter. I would have thought that voluntary manslaughter is right at the heart of the lists that they said the things are crimes of moral turpitude, and not like visa crimes or gun crimes, if I read the cases. So where do I end up? Well, what I end up with is this. And this is what I would like you to reply to. Justice Brandies once said something like we have to know before we can say whether an agency opinion is right or wrong, what they are talking about. I felt perplexity after I had read through these decisions. In other words, I don't understand it. So I would like you to explain to me why this all fits together and how, if you can do that, I couldn't get that clear explanation from the brief, and I suspect it is not your fault.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: The Petitioner does not dispute that some comparability analysis must be applied to prevent relief under former section 212 c from being extended to certain grounds of de portability. But his methodology of asking whether his offense could have made him excludable is inconsistent with established cases from the board that long predated the ones at issue here involving firearms offenses and visa fraud. Justice Scalia brought up the case in Wadud. That was a visa fraud case. It was a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1546. That's a provision that penalizes fraudulent and other misuse of visas and other immigration documents. It's a very broad criminal provision. It's long been a ground of de portability. And at the time the alien argued that this is fraud. It's a crime involving moral turpitude and therefore I would be subject to exclusion. In Wadud the board rejected that analysis.
Judge: Rape, burglary, manslaughter, second-degree robbery -- all of those cases -- about seven or eight of them.
respondent: Well, I agree that the history and the law here is relatively complicated and it has had a lot of moving pieces over the years. But I think that the board has been very consistent, especially beginning in the 1984 Wadud decision that was picked up in the Jimenez-Santillano decision and also in firearms offenses. Justice Breyer, you talked about the fact that the board had been consistent in firearms offenses. And the Petitioner does not dispute that firearms offenses are ones that do not have a comparable ground--
Judge: Is there any aggravated felony crime of violence that is not a crime involving moral turpitude?
respondent: --If I could go back for a second to firearms offenses. The board there has continued to say that there is no comparable ground for firearms offenses, even if your firearms offense would be something that could have been considered a crime involving moral turpitude. If you look at the board's 1992 decision in Montenegro, that was a case that was assault with a firearm, and so it wasn't merely possession of a handgun or an automatic weapon or a sawed-off shotgun--
Judge: Was Judulang's crime a crime involving violence?
respondent: --Yes, Justice Ginsburg. The board pointed out in the Brieva-Perez decision that minor but relatively common crimes of violence, including simple assaults and burglary, generally are not considered to be crimes involving moral turpitude. In the reply brief, Petitioner points to a board petition in Louissaint saying that -- that the record is muddled on burglary, but that opinion only showed that residential burglary isn't a crime involving moral turpitude, and a crime of violence, in the definition, is one that involves the use of physical force against personal property of another. And so it doesn't need to be aggravated in any other sense. It doesn't need to be--
Judge: I mean a crime of moral turpitude.
respondent: --Yes, it was a crime--
Judge: Don't -- that may be his approach. My approach is look to the category.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Yes, it was. But what I'm trying to say, Justice Ginsburg, is that Petitioner's approach of looking to the conviction is inconsistent with the board's repeated--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: Has factor (k) been supplemented with a CALJIC instruction since Payton?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Thank you, Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: I'd like to start off, if I may, by addressing some of the points that were brought up just earlier, and I'd like to indicate to this Court that the California Supreme Court has held that factors (a) through (k) are the exclusive considerations that the jury must encompass in deciding whether or not to impose death or life.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: Has factor (k) been supplemented with a CALJIC instruction since Payton?
respondent: Thank you, Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: I'd like to start off, if I may, by addressing some of the points that were brought up just earlier, and I'd like to indicate to this Court that the California Supreme Court has held that factors (a) through (k) are the exclusive considerations that the jury must encompass in deciding whether or not to impose death or life.
Judge: Excuse me. Do they still call it factor (k) or do they just have a supplemental instruction that follows factor (k)?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>It has. In 1983, 2 years after Payton's trial, it was supplemented to include all of the mitigating evidence that this Court has indicated the jury is entitled to consider. But what is important--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: Has factor (k) been supplemented with a CALJIC instruction since Payton?
respondent: Thank you, Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: I'd like to start off, if I may, by addressing some of the points that were brought up just earlier, and I'd like to indicate to this Court that the California Supreme Court has held that factors (a) through (k) are the exclusive considerations that the jury must encompass in deciding whether or not to impose death or life.
Judge: Excuse me. Do they still call it factor (k) or do they just have a supplemental instruction that follows factor (k)?
respondent: It has. In 1983, 2 years after Payton's trial, it was supplemented to include all of the mitigating evidence that this Court has indicated the jury is entitled to consider. But what is important--
Judge: And what was the question?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--It's been a couple of years since I've done a death penalty trial, but I think it's still called factor (k). It's just supplemented and changed that way. The second thing is that this Court has indicated some concern over the jury question that was raised first in... in the State's reply argument. And I need to put the Court, I think, in... in proper context as to what occurred in... in that jury question. The case was given to the jury at 11:55 on the date of... of the determination, and the jury was told to select a foreman. 5 minutes... they went into the deliberations room. 5 minutes later they came out and went to lunch. They didn't commence their deliberations thereafter until 1 o'clock. At 1:10, they came out with a... the question that is now before the Court. And I want to suggest to this Court that it is not reasonable to believe that during that 10-minute span of time the jury considered the... whether or not factor (k) was applied.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: Has factor (k) been supplemented with a CALJIC instruction since Payton?
respondent: Thank you, Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: I'd like to start off, if I may, by addressing some of the points that were brought up just earlier, and I'd like to indicate to this Court that the California Supreme Court has held that factors (a) through (k) are the exclusive considerations that the jury must encompass in deciding whether or not to impose death or life.
Judge: Excuse me. Do they still call it factor (k) or do they just have a supplemental instruction that follows factor (k)?
respondent: It has. In 1983, 2 years after Payton's trial, it was supplemented to include all of the mitigating evidence that this Court has indicated the jury is entitled to consider. But what is important--
Judge: And what was the question?
respondent: --It's been a couple of years since I've done a death penalty trial, but I think it's still called factor (k). It's just supplemented and changed that way. The second thing is that this Court has indicated some concern over the jury question that was raised first in... in the State's reply argument. And I need to put the Court, I think, in... in proper context as to what occurred in... in that jury question. The case was given to the jury at 11:55 on the date of... of the determination, and the jury was told to select a foreman. 5 minutes... they went into the deliberations room. 5 minutes later they came out and went to lunch. They didn't commence their deliberations thereafter until 1 o'clock. At 1:10, they came out with a... the question that is now before the Court. And I want to suggest to this Court that it is not reasonable to believe that during that 10-minute span of time the jury considered the... whether or not factor (k) was applied.
Judge: Those don't sound as if they thought his conversion to Christianity made a difference.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>The question... there were really two questions. One... and I'm paraphrasing... is there any possibility Mr. Payton could be released on parole if we give him life, and the second one is if the law is amended, could that be construed to be retroactively applicable to Mr. Payton. Those were the two questions.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: Has factor (k) been supplemented with a CALJIC instruction since Payton?
respondent: Thank you, Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: I'd like to start off, if I may, by addressing some of the points that were brought up just earlier, and I'd like to indicate to this Court that the California Supreme Court has held that factors (a) through (k) are the exclusive considerations that the jury must encompass in deciding whether or not to impose death or life.
Judge: Excuse me. Do they still call it factor (k) or do they just have a supplemental instruction that follows factor (k)?
respondent: It has. In 1983, 2 years after Payton's trial, it was supplemented to include all of the mitigating evidence that this Court has indicated the jury is entitled to consider. But what is important--
Judge: And what was the question?
respondent: --It's been a couple of years since I've done a death penalty trial, but I think it's still called factor (k). It's just supplemented and changed that way. The second thing is that this Court has indicated some concern over the jury question that was raised first in... in the State's reply argument. And I need to put the Court, I think, in... in proper context as to what occurred in... in that jury question. The case was given to the jury at 11:55 on the date of... of the determination, and the jury was told to select a foreman. 5 minutes... they went into the deliberations room. 5 minutes later they came out and went to lunch. They didn't commence their deliberations thereafter until 1 o'clock. At 1:10, they came out with a... the question that is now before the Court. And I want to suggest to this Court that it is not reasonable to believe that during that 10-minute span of time the jury considered the... whether or not factor (k) was applied.
Judge: Those don't sound as if they thought his conversion to Christianity made a difference.
respondent: The question... there were really two questions. One... and I'm paraphrasing... is there any possibility Mr. Payton could be released on parole if we give him life, and the second one is if the law is amended, could that be construed to be retroactively applicable to Mr. Payton. Those were the two questions.
Judge: Yes.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I think, Your Honor, what the jury articulated is what this Court has seen on many occasions, the jury's concern about does life without possibility mean life without.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
Judge: Has factor (k) been supplemented with a CALJIC instruction since Payton?
respondent: Thank you, Justice Stevens, and may it please the Court: I'd like to start off, if I may, by addressing some of the points that were brought up just earlier, and I'd like to indicate to this Court that the California Supreme Court has held that factors (a) through (k) are the exclusive considerations that the jury must encompass in deciding whether or not to impose death or life.
Judge: Excuse me. Do they still call it factor (k) or do they just have a supplemental instruction that follows factor (k)?
respondent: It has. In 1983, 2 years after Payton's trial, it was supplemented to include all of the mitigating evidence that this Court has indicated the jury is entitled to consider. But what is important--
Judge: And what was the question?
respondent: --It's been a couple of years since I've done a death penalty trial, but I think it's still called factor (k). It's just supplemented and changed that way. The second thing is that this Court has indicated some concern over the jury question that was raised first in... in the State's reply argument. And I need to put the Court, I think, in... in proper context as to what occurred in... in that jury question. The case was given to the jury at 11:55 on the date of... of the determination, and the jury was told to select a foreman. 5 minutes... they went into the deliberations room. 5 minutes later they came out and went to lunch. They didn't commence their deliberations thereafter until 1 o'clock. At 1:10, they came out with a... the question that is now before the Court. And I want to suggest to this Court that it is not reasonable to believe that during that 10-minute span of time the jury considered the... whether or not factor (k) was applied.
Judge: Those don't sound as if they thought his conversion to Christianity made a difference.
respondent: The question... there were really two questions. One... and I'm paraphrasing... is there any possibility Mr. Payton could be released on parole if we give him life, and the second one is if the law is amended, could that be construed to be retroactively applicable to Mr. Payton. Those were the two questions.
Judge: Yes.
respondent: I think, Your Honor, what the jury articulated is what this Court has seen on many occasions, the jury's concern about does life without possibility mean life without.
Judge: Well, an equal inference is they just felt that it was entitled to no weight at all given the horrific nature of this... of this crime.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>They never went beyond that at this point in time. So what I'm suggesting to this Court is that the short span that they had to write that question, which I agree, given enough time, might permit an inference that they did consider factor (k), isn't applicable in this case.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: Thank you, counsel. I'd -- I'd like to return to Justice Alito's question. Congress passed legislation at the turn of the prior century saying that the United States laws and the laws of Arkansas, which would be applied in Oklahoma, would apply to all persons therein, irrespective of race. Now, if you prevail, the laws in the eastern half of Oklahoma will be different. The applicable law will be different, dependent upon race. So how is that consistent with Congress's legislation?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Oklahoma has jurisdiction over the eastern half of the state because it never was reservation land and is certainly not reservation land today. To start, the land was not public land preserved from sale, where title remains with the United States, but instead patented in fee to the Creek Nation. That is why this Court in U.S. v. Creek Nation called it a former dependent Indian community. And under Venetie, it clearly lost that status when the fee patent was dismantled. Now, assuming the land was a reservation, Congress stripped away all semblance of reservation status. Solem asks us whether Congress's purpose was to divest the tribe of all its interest in the land, and, here, statute after statute did precisely that. The Curtis Act ended tribal governance of the land, the allotment agreement divested the tribe of all its rights, title, and interest, and even allotments were quickly stripped of federal superintendents. Everyone at the time read these statutes to mean the state had jurisdiction and the land was not a reservation.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: Thank you, counsel. I'd -- I'd like to return to Justice Alito's question. Congress passed legislation at the turn of the prior century saying that the United States laws and the laws of Arkansas, which would be applied in Oklahoma, would apply to all persons therein, irrespective of race. Now, if you prevail, the laws in the eastern half of Oklahoma will be different. The applicable law will be different, dependent upon race. So how is that consistent with Congress's legislation?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Oklahoma has jurisdiction over the eastern half of the state because it never was reservation land and is certainly not reservation land today. To start, the land was not public land preserved from sale, where title remains with the United States, but instead patented in fee to the Creek Nation. That is why this Court in U.S. v. Creek Nation called it a former dependent Indian community. And under Venetie, it clearly lost that status when the fee patent was dismantled. Now, assuming the land was a reservation, Congress stripped away all semblance of reservation status. Solem asks us whether Congress's purpose was to divest the tribe of all its interest in the land, and, here, statute after statute did precisely that. The Curtis Act ended tribal governance of the land, the allotment agreement divested the tribe of all its rights, title, and interest, and even allotments were quickly stripped of federal superintendents. Everyone at the time read these statutes to mean the state had jurisdiction and the land was not a reservation.
Judge: But I -- I would like an answer to the precise question, which is the law would be different in eastern Oklahoma depending upon race, right?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>See, I think that definition would completely make 1151(b) surplusage. It would read it right out of the statute. What this Court said in Venetie is that tribes with land in fee are "unalike Indians living on reservations," citing Sandoval, which compares the -- the -- the Pueblos, who had a dependent Indian community, as essentially the same as the Five Tribes. And in Creek Nation, this Court said that the Five Tribes had a fee simple, not the usual Indian right of occupancy, which is what is typical of reservations, and it was a dependent Indian community. And then Congress went out and codified Sandoval as a -- as a type of land status separate and apart from reservations, which is what this Court held in Venetie.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: Thank you, counsel. I'd -- I'd like to return to Justice Alito's question. Congress passed legislation at the turn of the prior century saying that the United States laws and the laws of Arkansas, which would be applied in Oklahoma, would apply to all persons therein, irrespective of race. Now, if you prevail, the laws in the eastern half of Oklahoma will be different. The applicable law will be different, dependent upon race. So how is that consistent with Congress's legislation?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Oklahoma has jurisdiction over the eastern half of the state because it never was reservation land and is certainly not reservation land today. To start, the land was not public land preserved from sale, where title remains with the United States, but instead patented in fee to the Creek Nation. That is why this Court in U.S. v. Creek Nation called it a former dependent Indian community. And under Venetie, it clearly lost that status when the fee patent was dismantled. Now, assuming the land was a reservation, Congress stripped away all semblance of reservation status. Solem asks us whether Congress's purpose was to divest the tribe of all its interest in the land, and, here, statute after statute did precisely that. The Curtis Act ended tribal governance of the land, the allotment agreement divested the tribe of all its rights, title, and interest, and even allotments were quickly stripped of federal superintendents. Everyone at the time read these statutes to mean the state had jurisdiction and the land was not a reservation.
Judge: But I -- I would like an answer to the precise question, which is the law would be different in eastern Oklahoma depending upon race, right?
respondent: See, I think that definition would completely make 1151(b) surplusage. It would read it right out of the statute. What this Court said in Venetie is that tribes with land in fee are "unalike Indians living on reservations," citing Sandoval, which compares the -- the -- the Pueblos, who had a dependent Indian community, as essentially the same as the Five Tribes. And in Creek Nation, this Court said that the Five Tribes had a fee simple, not the usual Indian right of occupancy, which is what is typical of reservations, and it was a dependent Indian community. And then Congress went out and codified Sandoval as a -- as a type of land status separate and apart from reservations, which is what this Court held in Venetie.
Judge: Thank you, counsel. Justice Thomas?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>So why is it a dependent Indian community. First, as I said, the -- Venetie said that tribes holding their land under restricted fee are unlike Indians living on reservations. Sandoval and Creek Nation confirmed that. And as far as -- it doesn't meet the definition of a reservation. I'll take the definition from Hagen v. Utah, land belonging to United States that is reserved from sale and set apart for public uses. And in Pine River, this Court said "reserved from sale" means the fee remains in the United States. Well, issuing a fee patent is not reserving it from sale. It's selling it. Why? It makes sense. Making land alienable to non-Indians in a dependent Indian community ends the dependent Indian community status. That's what this Court said in Venetie and that's what then Judge -- Judge Gorsuch at the Tenth Circuit said in Hydro Resources on page 1163 in Footnotes 11 and 30 of his opinion. And that makes textual and logical sense because there's a textual difference between 1151(a), which says that a reservation remains one notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and 1151(b), which doesn't contain that language and defines dependent Indian communities. Again, Judge Gorsuch pointed that out in Hydro Resources. It also makes logical sense because, if what created the land was the fee patent, the opposite of that, the conveyance of the fee patent disestablishes. That's in accordance with this Court's decision in Hagen v. Utah, where it said reservation is reserving land from the public domain, so restoring land to the public domain ends the reservation.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: Thank you, counsel. I'd -- I'd like to return to Justice Alito's question. Congress passed legislation at the turn of the prior century saying that the United States laws and the laws of Arkansas, which would be applied in Oklahoma, would apply to all persons therein, irrespective of race. Now, if you prevail, the laws in the eastern half of Oklahoma will be different. The applicable law will be different, dependent upon race. So how is that consistent with Congress's legislation?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Oklahoma has jurisdiction over the eastern half of the state because it never was reservation land and is certainly not reservation land today. To start, the land was not public land preserved from sale, where title remains with the United States, but instead patented in fee to the Creek Nation. That is why this Court in U.S. v. Creek Nation called it a former dependent Indian community. And under Venetie, it clearly lost that status when the fee patent was dismantled. Now, assuming the land was a reservation, Congress stripped away all semblance of reservation status. Solem asks us whether Congress's purpose was to divest the tribe of all its interest in the land, and, here, statute after statute did precisely that. The Curtis Act ended tribal governance of the land, the allotment agreement divested the tribe of all its rights, title, and interest, and even allotments were quickly stripped of federal superintendents. Everyone at the time read these statutes to mean the state had jurisdiction and the land was not a reservation.
Judge: But I -- I would like an answer to the precise question, which is the law would be different in eastern Oklahoma depending upon race, right?
respondent: See, I think that definition would completely make 1151(b) surplusage. It would read it right out of the statute. What this Court said in Venetie is that tribes with land in fee are "unalike Indians living on reservations," citing Sandoval, which compares the -- the -- the Pueblos, who had a dependent Indian community, as essentially the same as the Five Tribes. And in Creek Nation, this Court said that the Five Tribes had a fee simple, not the usual Indian right of occupancy, which is what is typical of reservations, and it was a dependent Indian community. And then Congress went out and codified Sandoval as a -- as a type of land status separate and apart from reservations, which is what this Court held in Venetie.
Judge: Thank you, counsel. Justice Thomas?
respondent: So why is it a dependent Indian community. First, as I said, the -- Venetie said that tribes holding their land under restricted fee are unlike Indians living on reservations. Sandoval and Creek Nation confirmed that. And as far as -- it doesn't meet the definition of a reservation. I'll take the definition from Hagen v. Utah, land belonging to United States that is reserved from sale and set apart for public uses. And in Pine River, this Court said "reserved from sale" means the fee remains in the United States. Well, issuing a fee patent is not reserving it from sale. It's selling it. Why? It makes sense. Making land alienable to non-Indians in a dependent Indian community ends the dependent Indian community status. That's what this Court said in Venetie and that's what then Judge -- Judge Gorsuch at the Tenth Circuit said in Hydro Resources on page 1163 in Footnotes 11 and 30 of his opinion. And that makes textual and logical sense because there's a textual difference between 1151(a), which says that a reservation remains one notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and 1151(b), which doesn't contain that language and defines dependent Indian communities. Again, Judge Gorsuch pointed that out in Hydro Resources. It also makes logical sense because, if what created the land was the fee patent, the opposite of that, the conveyance of the fee patent disestablishes. That's in accordance with this Court's decision in Hagen v. Utah, where it said reservation is reserving land from the public domain, so restoring land to the public domain ends the reservation.
Judge: Yes, Mr. Kanji, a brief question, and this is just -- it's not necessarily dispositive of this case, but I'm interested in your answer. Do you think a tribe can be effectively divested of title to land, to its land and its sovereignty, and still retain the status of reservation?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>So the tribe would have their governments in -- in that they would have control over their own internal affairs and managing their property interests, which, if you look to the tribal understanding at the time, as we -- as we quote in our Respondent's appendix, is exactly what the tribe understood their own authority to be. As far as would they have any authority over land, there is some land that is under their original fee patent, so the River Spirit Casino in Tulsa is built on the riverbed of the Arkansas River because that land was never allotted. So they have governing authority over that land, over trust land, and over restricted allotments, but we think the state, nonetheless, has jurisdiction over all of the state pursuant to the transfer of state -- to -- to state jurisdiction in the Enabling Act, which, you know, the -- the -- what Congress had done in the Indian territory is say the Indian territory is an area where Indians and non-Indians are treated alike. Then the Enabling Act in Section 21 extended federal law except where not local -- where locally inapplicable. And it was locally -- the Major Crimes Act was locally inapplicable in the Indian territory because the 1897 Act is the act that conferred jurisdiction, not the Major Crimes Act, which is why Petitioner can't cite a single Major Crimes Act case during this period, before statehood or after.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: Thank you, counsel. I'd -- I'd like to return to Justice Alito's question. Congress passed legislation at the turn of the prior century saying that the United States laws and the laws of Arkansas, which would be applied in Oklahoma, would apply to all persons therein, irrespective of race. Now, if you prevail, the laws in the eastern half of Oklahoma will be different. The applicable law will be different, dependent upon race. So how is that consistent with Congress's legislation?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Oklahoma has jurisdiction over the eastern half of the state because it never was reservation land and is certainly not reservation land today. To start, the land was not public land preserved from sale, where title remains with the United States, but instead patented in fee to the Creek Nation. That is why this Court in U.S. v. Creek Nation called it a former dependent Indian community. And under Venetie, it clearly lost that status when the fee patent was dismantled. Now, assuming the land was a reservation, Congress stripped away all semblance of reservation status. Solem asks us whether Congress's purpose was to divest the tribe of all its interest in the land, and, here, statute after statute did precisely that. The Curtis Act ended tribal governance of the land, the allotment agreement divested the tribe of all its rights, title, and interest, and even allotments were quickly stripped of federal superintendents. Everyone at the time read these statutes to mean the state had jurisdiction and the land was not a reservation.
Judge: But I -- I would like an answer to the precise question, which is the law would be different in eastern Oklahoma depending upon race, right?
respondent: See, I think that definition would completely make 1151(b) surplusage. It would read it right out of the statute. What this Court said in Venetie is that tribes with land in fee are "unalike Indians living on reservations," citing Sandoval, which compares the -- the -- the Pueblos, who had a dependent Indian community, as essentially the same as the Five Tribes. And in Creek Nation, this Court said that the Five Tribes had a fee simple, not the usual Indian right of occupancy, which is what is typical of reservations, and it was a dependent Indian community. And then Congress went out and codified Sandoval as a -- as a type of land status separate and apart from reservations, which is what this Court held in Venetie.
Judge: Thank you, counsel. Justice Thomas?
respondent: So why is it a dependent Indian community. First, as I said, the -- Venetie said that tribes holding their land under restricted fee are unlike Indians living on reservations. Sandoval and Creek Nation confirmed that. And as far as -- it doesn't meet the definition of a reservation. I'll take the definition from Hagen v. Utah, land belonging to United States that is reserved from sale and set apart for public uses. And in Pine River, this Court said "reserved from sale" means the fee remains in the United States. Well, issuing a fee patent is not reserving it from sale. It's selling it. Why? It makes sense. Making land alienable to non-Indians in a dependent Indian community ends the dependent Indian community status. That's what this Court said in Venetie and that's what then Judge -- Judge Gorsuch at the Tenth Circuit said in Hydro Resources on page 1163 in Footnotes 11 and 30 of his opinion. And that makes textual and logical sense because there's a textual difference between 1151(a), which says that a reservation remains one notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and 1151(b), which doesn't contain that language and defines dependent Indian communities. Again, Judge Gorsuch pointed that out in Hydro Resources. It also makes logical sense because, if what created the land was the fee patent, the opposite of that, the conveyance of the fee patent disestablishes. That's in accordance with this Court's decision in Hagen v. Utah, where it said reservation is reserving land from the public domain, so restoring land to the public domain ends the reservation.
Judge: Yes, Mr. Kanji, a brief question, and this is just -- it's not necessarily dispositive of this case, but I'm interested in your answer. Do you think a tribe can be effectively divested of title to land, to its land and its sovereignty, and still retain the status of reservation?
respondent: So the tribe would have their governments in -- in that they would have control over their own internal affairs and managing their property interests, which, if you look to the tribal understanding at the time, as we -- as we quote in our Respondent's appendix, is exactly what the tribe understood their own authority to be. As far as would they have any authority over land, there is some land that is under their original fee patent, so the River Spirit Casino in Tulsa is built on the riverbed of the Arkansas River because that land was never allotted. So they have governing authority over that land, over trust land, and over restricted allotments, but we think the state, nonetheless, has jurisdiction over all of the state pursuant to the transfer of state -- to -- to state jurisdiction in the Enabling Act, which, you know, the -- the -- what Congress had done in the Indian territory is say the Indian territory is an area where Indians and non-Indians are treated alike. Then the Enabling Act in Section 21 extended federal law except where not local -- where locally inapplicable. And it was locally -- the Major Crimes Act was locally inapplicable in the Indian territory because the 1897 Act is the act that conferred jurisdiction, not the Major Crimes Act, which is why Petitioner can't cite a single Major Crimes Act case during this period, before statehood or after.
Judge: Thank you.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I think that lays the framework of what Congress was trying to do in make -- in -- in creating the State of Oklahoma, which was to transform the governance of the state and the land ownership of the state, which was exclusively tribal, to a place where both Indians and non-Indians could both own land and be governed by the same state government. If you look at pages 23 -- 22 to 25 of our brief, we lay out that history and -- and lay out that that is what Congress said explicitly in legislative reports, that's what the Dallas Commission report said, and that's what the tribes recognize in their own tribal understanding.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
Judge: Thank you, counsel. I'd -- I'd like to return to Justice Alito's question. Congress passed legislation at the turn of the prior century saying that the United States laws and the laws of Arkansas, which would be applied in Oklahoma, would apply to all persons therein, irrespective of race. Now, if you prevail, the laws in the eastern half of Oklahoma will be different. The applicable law will be different, dependent upon race. So how is that consistent with Congress's legislation?
respondent: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Oklahoma has jurisdiction over the eastern half of the state because it never was reservation land and is certainly not reservation land today. To start, the land was not public land preserved from sale, where title remains with the United States, but instead patented in fee to the Creek Nation. That is why this Court in U.S. v. Creek Nation called it a former dependent Indian community. And under Venetie, it clearly lost that status when the fee patent was dismantled. Now, assuming the land was a reservation, Congress stripped away all semblance of reservation status. Solem asks us whether Congress's purpose was to divest the tribe of all its interest in the land, and, here, statute after statute did precisely that. The Curtis Act ended tribal governance of the land, the allotment agreement divested the tribe of all its rights, title, and interest, and even allotments were quickly stripped of federal superintendents. Everyone at the time read these statutes to mean the state had jurisdiction and the land was not a reservation.
Judge: But I -- I would like an answer to the precise question, which is the law would be different in eastern Oklahoma depending upon race, right?
respondent: See, I think that definition would completely make 1151(b) surplusage. It would read it right out of the statute. What this Court said in Venetie is that tribes with land in fee are "unalike Indians living on reservations," citing Sandoval, which compares the -- the -- the Pueblos, who had a dependent Indian community, as essentially the same as the Five Tribes. And in Creek Nation, this Court said that the Five Tribes had a fee simple, not the usual Indian right of occupancy, which is what is typical of reservations, and it was a dependent Indian community. And then Congress went out and codified Sandoval as a -- as a type of land status separate and apart from reservations, which is what this Court held in Venetie.
Judge: Thank you, counsel. Justice Thomas?
respondent: So why is it a dependent Indian community. First, as I said, the -- Venetie said that tribes holding their land under restricted fee are unlike Indians living on reservations. Sandoval and Creek Nation confirmed that. And as far as -- it doesn't meet the definition of a reservation. I'll take the definition from Hagen v. Utah, land belonging to United States that is reserved from sale and set apart for public uses. And in Pine River, this Court said "reserved from sale" means the fee remains in the United States. Well, issuing a fee patent is not reserving it from sale. It's selling it. Why? It makes sense. Making land alienable to non-Indians in a dependent Indian community ends the dependent Indian community status. That's what this Court said in Venetie and that's what then Judge -- Judge Gorsuch at the Tenth Circuit said in Hydro Resources on page 1163 in Footnotes 11 and 30 of his opinion. And that makes textual and logical sense because there's a textual difference between 1151(a), which says that a reservation remains one notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and 1151(b), which doesn't contain that language and defines dependent Indian communities. Again, Judge Gorsuch pointed that out in Hydro Resources. It also makes logical sense because, if what created the land was the fee patent, the opposite of that, the conveyance of the fee patent disestablishes. That's in accordance with this Court's decision in Hagen v. Utah, where it said reservation is reserving land from the public domain, so restoring land to the public domain ends the reservation.
Judge: Yes, Mr. Kanji, a brief question, and this is just -- it's not necessarily dispositive of this case, but I'm interested in your answer. Do you think a tribe can be effectively divested of title to land, to its land and its sovereignty, and still retain the status of reservation?
respondent: So the tribe would have their governments in -- in that they would have control over their own internal affairs and managing their property interests, which, if you look to the tribal understanding at the time, as we -- as we quote in our Respondent's appendix, is exactly what the tribe understood their own authority to be. As far as would they have any authority over land, there is some land that is under their original fee patent, so the River Spirit Casino in Tulsa is built on the riverbed of the Arkansas River because that land was never allotted. So they have governing authority over that land, over trust land, and over restricted allotments, but we think the state, nonetheless, has jurisdiction over all of the state pursuant to the transfer of state -- to -- to state jurisdiction in the Enabling Act, which, you know, the -- the -- what Congress had done in the Indian territory is say the Indian territory is an area where Indians and non-Indians are treated alike. Then the Enabling Act in Section 21 extended federal law except where not local -- where locally inapplicable. And it was locally -- the Major Crimes Act was locally inapplicable in the Indian territory because the 1897 Act is the act that conferred jurisdiction, not the Major Crimes Act, which is why Petitioner can't cite a single Major Crimes Act case during this period, before statehood or after.
Judge: Thank you.
respondent: I think that lays the framework of what Congress was trying to do in make -- in -- in creating the State of Oklahoma, which was to transform the governance of the state and the land ownership of the state, which was exclusively tribal, to a place where both Indians and non-Indians could both own land and be governed by the same state government. If you look at pages 23 -- 22 to 25 of our brief, we lay out that history and -- and lay out that that is what Congress said explicitly in legislative reports, that's what the Dallas Commission report said, and that's what the tribes recognize in their own tribal understanding.
Judge: Justice Ginsburg?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>No, Justice Alito. So let me -- let me put some -- some solid numbers on this. We have currently over 1700 inmates whose crimes were committed in the former Indian territory who identify as Native American. So the state presumptively would not have jurisdiction over those people and have to release them. And that is probably half the actual number because it doesn't include crimes committed against Indians, which the state would not have jurisdiction over, so we're talking here about potentially around 30 -- over 3,000 inmates we may have to turn over. As far as future cases go, there were 32,000 felonies committed in the former Indian territory, an area that is about 12 percent Native American. So only including crimes committed by Native Americans, that would be 4,000 new felonies a year that the federal government would have to prosecute. Including crimes that -- where the Native American is the victim, you can take that to about 8,000. On the civil side, what -- on the civil side, what happens is it creates precisely the differential legal treatment between non-Indians and Indians that Congress tried to abolish when it -- when it created the State of Oklahoma. So non-Indians would not be subject to -- presumptively to state zoning law, to dog law, as Justice Breyer mentioned, and that creates a disparity between Indians and non-Indians. So now Indian -- non-Indian businesses are competing on an unequal playing field with Indian businesses. That's just one example. The Tulsa brief points out examples of, on restricted allotments, how Indians are erecting billboards in residential neighborhoods, are selling fireworks in them, but -- but that's in the few areas, the 2 percent of land that remains restricted allotment. If the entire area is a reservation, then you're -- you're creating the two separate societies that Congress had sought to abolish when it passed the dozen statutes it did in creating Oklahoma.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: So Mr.--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The situation here is very much what Congress had in mind when it sought to hold drug traffickers responsible for the results of the use of the dangerous substances in which they deal. It's perfectly ordinary to speak of a drug as contributing to an overdose. And in the context of the Controlled Substances Act, there is no room to argue that a heroin user's overdose death comes as a surprise.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: So Mr.--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The situation here is very much what Congress had in mind when it sought to hold drug traffickers responsible for the results of the use of the dangerous substances in which they deal. It's perfectly ordinary to speak of a drug as contributing to an overdose. And in the context of the Controlled Substances Act, there is no room to argue that a heroin user's overdose death comes as a surprise.
Judge: So one little -- one little grain of heroin that you discover is in the body, and that person's going away for whatever it is, 20 years?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>No, I don't think so, Mr. Chief Justice. And let me explain, because I think the concern that arises with your hypothetical, which doesn't arise on these facts, presents a different issue than what's in dispute before the Court right now. The dispute between the parties is what kinds of -- on the causation in fact side of the case, the dispute is between what kinds of causes can qualify at all. Do they have to be but-for causes or can a contributing cause count? Now, there is a separate principle which is reflected in jury instructions and reflected in the substantial factor concept and so forth that causes that are causes in fact but are too insignificant or not important enough or too insubstantial are not properly the basis for criminal responsibility. Now, that's -- that's not the dispute before this Court.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: So Mr.--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The situation here is very much what Congress had in mind when it sought to hold drug traffickers responsible for the results of the use of the dangerous substances in which they deal. It's perfectly ordinary to speak of a drug as contributing to an overdose. And in the context of the Controlled Substances Act, there is no room to argue that a heroin user's overdose death comes as a surprise.
Judge: So one little -- one little grain of heroin that you discover is in the body, and that person's going away for whatever it is, 20 years?
respondent: No, I don't think so, Mr. Chief Justice. And let me explain, because I think the concern that arises with your hypothetical, which doesn't arise on these facts, presents a different issue than what's in dispute before the Court right now. The dispute between the parties is what kinds of -- on the causation in fact side of the case, the dispute is between what kinds of causes can qualify at all. Do they have to be but-for causes or can a contributing cause count? Now, there is a separate principle which is reflected in jury instructions and reflected in the substantial factor concept and so forth that causes that are causes in fact but are too insignificant or not important enough or too insubstantial are not properly the basis for criminal responsibility. Now, that's -- that's not the dispute before this Court.
Judge: --Well, Mr. Horwich, I mean, it seems to me that the dispute before this Court is this: You have somebody who's taken five drugs. One of them is heroin. And the -- the experts get on the stand, and they say: Did the heroin cause the death? And the experts say: Really can't say whether the heroin caused the death in the sense that if the -- if he hadn't taken the heroin, he wouldn't have died. So they say: Well, what can you say? He said: Well, what I can say is that if he hadn't -- is that the heroin made it more likely that he died. Well, how much more likely did the heroin make it? Well, the heroin made it 50 percent more likely that death resulted. Would that be sufficient?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I -- I think probably yes, although let me -- let me explain that we -- why we see the nature of the expert testimony as actually different than what you're describing there. Because--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: So Mr.--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The situation here is very much what Congress had in mind when it sought to hold drug traffickers responsible for the results of the use of the dangerous substances in which they deal. It's perfectly ordinary to speak of a drug as contributing to an overdose. And in the context of the Controlled Substances Act, there is no room to argue that a heroin user's overdose death comes as a surprise.
Judge: So one little -- one little grain of heroin that you discover is in the body, and that person's going away for whatever it is, 20 years?
respondent: No, I don't think so, Mr. Chief Justice. And let me explain, because I think the concern that arises with your hypothetical, which doesn't arise on these facts, presents a different issue than what's in dispute before the Court right now. The dispute between the parties is what kinds of -- on the causation in fact side of the case, the dispute is between what kinds of causes can qualify at all. Do they have to be but-for causes or can a contributing cause count? Now, there is a separate principle which is reflected in jury instructions and reflected in the substantial factor concept and so forth that causes that are causes in fact but are too insignificant or not important enough or too insubstantial are not properly the basis for criminal responsibility. Now, that's -- that's not the dispute before this Court.
Judge: --Well, Mr. Horwich, I mean, it seems to me that the dispute before this Court is this: You have somebody who's taken five drugs. One of them is heroin. And the -- the experts get on the stand, and they say: Did the heroin cause the death? And the experts say: Really can't say whether the heroin caused the death in the sense that if the -- if he hadn't taken the heroin, he wouldn't have died. So they say: Well, what can you say? He said: Well, what I can say is that if he hadn't -- is that the heroin made it more likely that he died. Well, how much more likely did the heroin make it? Well, the heroin made it 50 percent more likely that death resulted. Would that be sufficient?
respondent: I -- I think probably yes, although let me -- let me explain that we -- why we see the nature of the expert testimony as actually different than what you're describing there. Because--
Judge: Well, take mine.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Yes.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: So Mr.--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The situation here is very much what Congress had in mind when it sought to hold drug traffickers responsible for the results of the use of the dangerous substances in which they deal. It's perfectly ordinary to speak of a drug as contributing to an overdose. And in the context of the Controlled Substances Act, there is no room to argue that a heroin user's overdose death comes as a surprise.
Judge: So one little -- one little grain of heroin that you discover is in the body, and that person's going away for whatever it is, 20 years?
respondent: No, I don't think so, Mr. Chief Justice. And let me explain, because I think the concern that arises with your hypothetical, which doesn't arise on these facts, presents a different issue than what's in dispute before the Court right now. The dispute between the parties is what kinds of -- on the causation in fact side of the case, the dispute is between what kinds of causes can qualify at all. Do they have to be but-for causes or can a contributing cause count? Now, there is a separate principle which is reflected in jury instructions and reflected in the substantial factor concept and so forth that causes that are causes in fact but are too insignificant or not important enough or too insubstantial are not properly the basis for criminal responsibility. Now, that's -- that's not the dispute before this Court.
Judge: --Well, Mr. Horwich, I mean, it seems to me that the dispute before this Court is this: You have somebody who's taken five drugs. One of them is heroin. And the -- the experts get on the stand, and they say: Did the heroin cause the death? And the experts say: Really can't say whether the heroin caused the death in the sense that if the -- if he hadn't taken the heroin, he wouldn't have died. So they say: Well, what can you say? He said: Well, what I can say is that if he hadn't -- is that the heroin made it more likely that he died. Well, how much more likely did the heroin make it? Well, the heroin made it 50 percent more likely that death resulted. Would that be sufficient?
respondent: I -- I think probably yes, although let me -- let me explain that we -- why we see the nature of the expert testimony as actually different than what you're describing there. Because--
Judge: Well, take mine.
respondent: --Yes.
Judge: Because I think that that's actually--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Oh, I'm sorry. I didn't mean the expert testimony in this case, but in general what experts are testifying to when they're testifying to that. They are not testifying to some uncertainty about whether the defendant's drugs played any role at all. This isn't the question of say, yeah, he bought heroin from two different dealers. He took one of them, and he died, but we don't know which dealer it was. In that case we totally agree that that sort of uncertainty means no liability. What the experts testified to in these cases is that the primary cause of death, which is essentially central nervous system depression that leads to asphyxiating on stomach contents or saliva or something like that, was a process to which a number of substances contributed.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
Judge: So Mr.--
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The situation here is very much what Congress had in mind when it sought to hold drug traffickers responsible for the results of the use of the dangerous substances in which they deal. It's perfectly ordinary to speak of a drug as contributing to an overdose. And in the context of the Controlled Substances Act, there is no room to argue that a heroin user's overdose death comes as a surprise.
Judge: So one little -- one little grain of heroin that you discover is in the body, and that person's going away for whatever it is, 20 years?
respondent: No, I don't think so, Mr. Chief Justice. And let me explain, because I think the concern that arises with your hypothetical, which doesn't arise on these facts, presents a different issue than what's in dispute before the Court right now. The dispute between the parties is what kinds of -- on the causation in fact side of the case, the dispute is between what kinds of causes can qualify at all. Do they have to be but-for causes or can a contributing cause count? Now, there is a separate principle which is reflected in jury instructions and reflected in the substantial factor concept and so forth that causes that are causes in fact but are too insignificant or not important enough or too insubstantial are not properly the basis for criminal responsibility. Now, that's -- that's not the dispute before this Court.
Judge: --Well, Mr. Horwich, I mean, it seems to me that the dispute before this Court is this: You have somebody who's taken five drugs. One of them is heroin. And the -- the experts get on the stand, and they say: Did the heroin cause the death? And the experts say: Really can't say whether the heroin caused the death in the sense that if the -- if he hadn't taken the heroin, he wouldn't have died. So they say: Well, what can you say? He said: Well, what I can say is that if he hadn't -- is that the heroin made it more likely that he died. Well, how much more likely did the heroin make it? Well, the heroin made it 50 percent more likely that death resulted. Would that be sufficient?
respondent: I -- I think probably yes, although let me -- let me explain that we -- why we see the nature of the expert testimony as actually different than what you're describing there. Because--
Judge: Well, take mine.
respondent: --Yes.
Judge: Because I think that that's actually--
respondent: Oh, I'm sorry. I didn't mean the expert testimony in this case, but in general what experts are testifying to when they're testifying to that. They are not testifying to some uncertainty about whether the defendant's drugs played any role at all. This isn't the question of say, yeah, he bought heroin from two different dealers. He took one of them, and he died, but we don't know which dealer it was. In that case we totally agree that that sort of uncertainty means no liability. What the experts testified to in these cases is that the primary cause of death, which is essentially central nervous system depression that leads to asphyxiating on stomach contents or saliva or something like that, was a process to which a number of substances contributed.
Judge: --Yes, and he might have died even without the heroin, because all the other substances might have been perfectly adequate to cause death. So I really can't tell you that the heroin played -- even -- you know, even to use your language, I can't tell you whether the heroin contributed. All I can tell you is a likelihood, a probability that the heroin led to death.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, the experts here of course did testify specifically that the heroin did contribute to the death. So--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: When did the defense counsel say that this evidence did not fit within factor (k)?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Here is Respondent's 60-second nutshell summary of our core position. This case does not turn on the constitutional factor (k) standing alone. Rather, it turns on a straightforward application of the Boyde test, to the unusual, unique circumstances that occurred during the arguments, instructions to deliberations at the penalty trial of this case. Here are the two key components of our claim. During arguments to the jury, both counsel conveyed to the jury that Belmontes' evidence of Youth Authority religious experience was not covered by factor (k). However, both counsel suggested to the jury that it should be considered anyway. Now, this is unusual, because, of all... of all the things that the district attorney and the defense counsel disagreed on, this was one that they did agree on, and it's likely that the jury would have taken note of that. The case then proceeded to instructions and deliberations. The jury came back to court, announced that they were deeply divided, perhaps with a majority favoring life. The turning point occurred when one juror, Juror Hern, requested judicial confirmation that the specific list of factors previously given was the only base... was the only framework within which the penalty decision could be made. At that point, the trial court had a constitutional obligation to disabuse Juror Hern and the rest of the assembled jurors of that misapprehension and, at the very least, to reinstruct the jurors that the enumerated factors were merely illustrative and not exhaustive, and instruct the jurors that the jury had to consider all of the mitigating evidence. The trial court did neither, with the result that the jury all too likely returned to its deliberations with the belief that the only factors... the only matters they considered... could consider were those encompassed within the enumerated factors, and believing... based on counsel's prior arguments... that factor (k) did not include the Youth Authority religious-experience evidence.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: When did the defense counsel say that this evidence did not fit within factor (k)?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Here is Respondent's 60-second nutshell summary of our core position. This case does not turn on the constitutional factor (k) standing alone. Rather, it turns on a straightforward application of the Boyde test, to the unusual, unique circumstances that occurred during the arguments, instructions to deliberations at the penalty trial of this case. Here are the two key components of our claim. During arguments to the jury, both counsel conveyed to the jury that Belmontes' evidence of Youth Authority religious experience was not covered by factor (k). However, both counsel suggested to the jury that it should be considered anyway. Now, this is unusual, because, of all... of all the things that the district attorney and the defense counsel disagreed on, this was one that they did agree on, and it's likely that the jury would have taken note of that. The case then proceeded to instructions and deliberations. The jury came back to court, announced that they were deeply divided, perhaps with a majority favoring life. The turning point occurred when one juror, Juror Hern, requested judicial confirmation that the specific list of factors previously given was the only base... was the only framework within which the penalty decision could be made. At that point, the trial court had a constitutional obligation to disabuse Juror Hern and the rest of the assembled jurors of that misapprehension and, at the very least, to reinstruct the jurors that the enumerated factors were merely illustrative and not exhaustive, and instruct the jurors that the jury had to consider all of the mitigating evidence. The trial court did neither, with the result that the jury all too likely returned to its deliberations with the belief that the only factors... the only matters they considered... could consider were those encompassed within the enumerated factors, and believing... based on counsel's prior arguments... that factor (k) did not include the Youth Authority religious-experience evidence.
Judge: Why does that--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Your Honor, it occurred in argument. And my counsel... esteemed co-counsel will give me the exact page... but it occurred in the context... the context... during the prosecutor's argument, the prosecutor said to the jury that, "I suspect"... and then he, for emphasis, said, "I can't imagine that you won't be told that the religious-conversion evidence doesn't fit within factor (k). " And, at that point, he expressed reservations, doubts, as to whether it did fit in factor (k) or--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: When did the defense counsel say that this evidence did not fit within factor (k)?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Here is Respondent's 60-second nutshell summary of our core position. This case does not turn on the constitutional factor (k) standing alone. Rather, it turns on a straightforward application of the Boyde test, to the unusual, unique circumstances that occurred during the arguments, instructions to deliberations at the penalty trial of this case. Here are the two key components of our claim. During arguments to the jury, both counsel conveyed to the jury that Belmontes' evidence of Youth Authority religious experience was not covered by factor (k). However, both counsel suggested to the jury that it should be considered anyway. Now, this is unusual, because, of all... of all the things that the district attorney and the defense counsel disagreed on, this was one that they did agree on, and it's likely that the jury would have taken note of that. The case then proceeded to instructions and deliberations. The jury came back to court, announced that they were deeply divided, perhaps with a majority favoring life. The turning point occurred when one juror, Juror Hern, requested judicial confirmation that the specific list of factors previously given was the only base... was the only framework within which the penalty decision could be made. At that point, the trial court had a constitutional obligation to disabuse Juror Hern and the rest of the assembled jurors of that misapprehension and, at the very least, to reinstruct the jurors that the enumerated factors were merely illustrative and not exhaustive, and instruct the jurors that the jury had to consider all of the mitigating evidence. The trial court did neither, with the result that the jury all too likely returned to its deliberations with the belief that the only factors... the only matters they considered... could consider were those encompassed within the enumerated factors, and believing... based on counsel's prior arguments... that factor (k) did not include the Youth Authority religious-experience evidence.
Judge: Why does that--
respondent: Your Honor, it occurred in argument. And my counsel... esteemed co-counsel will give me the exact page... but it occurred in the context... the context... during the prosecutor's argument, the prosecutor said to the jury that, "I suspect"... and then he, for emphasis, said, "I can't imagine that you won't be told that the religious-conversion evidence doesn't fit within factor (k). " And, at that point, he expressed reservations, doubts, as to whether it did fit in factor (k) or--
Judge: --Why does that matter? Because the jury was told that the factors were merely-- examples of the mitigating evidence they could consider.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--any other factor.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: When did the defense counsel say that this evidence did not fit within factor (k)?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Here is Respondent's 60-second nutshell summary of our core position. This case does not turn on the constitutional factor (k) standing alone. Rather, it turns on a straightforward application of the Boyde test, to the unusual, unique circumstances that occurred during the arguments, instructions to deliberations at the penalty trial of this case. Here are the two key components of our claim. During arguments to the jury, both counsel conveyed to the jury that Belmontes' evidence of Youth Authority religious experience was not covered by factor (k). However, both counsel suggested to the jury that it should be considered anyway. Now, this is unusual, because, of all... of all the things that the district attorney and the defense counsel disagreed on, this was one that they did agree on, and it's likely that the jury would have taken note of that. The case then proceeded to instructions and deliberations. The jury came back to court, announced that they were deeply divided, perhaps with a majority favoring life. The turning point occurred when one juror, Juror Hern, requested judicial confirmation that the specific list of factors previously given was the only base... was the only framework within which the penalty decision could be made. At that point, the trial court had a constitutional obligation to disabuse Juror Hern and the rest of the assembled jurors of that misapprehension and, at the very least, to reinstruct the jurors that the enumerated factors were merely illustrative and not exhaustive, and instruct the jurors that the jury had to consider all of the mitigating evidence. The trial court did neither, with the result that the jury all too likely returned to its deliberations with the belief that the only factors... the only matters they considered... could consider were those encompassed within the enumerated factors, and believing... based on counsel's prior arguments... that factor (k) did not include the Youth Authority religious-experience evidence.
Judge: Why does that--
respondent: Your Honor, it occurred in argument. And my counsel... esteemed co-counsel will give me the exact page... but it occurred in the context... the context... during the prosecutor's argument, the prosecutor said to the jury that, "I suspect"... and then he, for emphasis, said, "I can't imagine that you won't be told that the religious-conversion evidence doesn't fit within factor (k). " And, at that point, he expressed reservations, doubts, as to whether it did fit in factor (k) or--
Judge: --Why does that matter? Because the jury was told that the factors were merely-- examples of the mitigating evidence they could consider.
respondent: --any other factor.
Judge: It probably didn't fit into factor (h), either, but it doesn't matter.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I'm more than--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: When did the defense counsel say that this evidence did not fit within factor (k)?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Here is Respondent's 60-second nutshell summary of our core position. This case does not turn on the constitutional factor (k) standing alone. Rather, it turns on a straightforward application of the Boyde test, to the unusual, unique circumstances that occurred during the arguments, instructions to deliberations at the penalty trial of this case. Here are the two key components of our claim. During arguments to the jury, both counsel conveyed to the jury that Belmontes' evidence of Youth Authority religious experience was not covered by factor (k). However, both counsel suggested to the jury that it should be considered anyway. Now, this is unusual, because, of all... of all the things that the district attorney and the defense counsel disagreed on, this was one that they did agree on, and it's likely that the jury would have taken note of that. The case then proceeded to instructions and deliberations. The jury came back to court, announced that they were deeply divided, perhaps with a majority favoring life. The turning point occurred when one juror, Juror Hern, requested judicial confirmation that the specific list of factors previously given was the only base... was the only framework within which the penalty decision could be made. At that point, the trial court had a constitutional obligation to disabuse Juror Hern and the rest of the assembled jurors of that misapprehension and, at the very least, to reinstruct the jurors that the enumerated factors were merely illustrative and not exhaustive, and instruct the jurors that the jury had to consider all of the mitigating evidence. The trial court did neither, with the result that the jury all too likely returned to its deliberations with the belief that the only factors... the only matters they considered... could consider were those encompassed within the enumerated factors, and believing... based on counsel's prior arguments... that factor (k) did not include the Youth Authority religious-experience evidence.
Judge: Why does that--
respondent: Your Honor, it occurred in argument. And my counsel... esteemed co-counsel will give me the exact page... but it occurred in the context... the context... during the prosecutor's argument, the prosecutor said to the jury that, "I suspect"... and then he, for emphasis, said, "I can't imagine that you won't be told that the religious-conversion evidence doesn't fit within factor (k). " And, at that point, he expressed reservations, doubts, as to whether it did fit in factor (k) or--
Judge: --Why does that matter? Because the jury was told that the factors were merely-- examples of the mitigating evidence they could consider.
respondent: --any other factor.
Judge: It probably didn't fit into factor (h), either, but it doesn't matter.
respondent: I'm more than--
Judge: You said this case is different because both counsel told the jury that the evidence that you're relying on did not fit within factor (k). And I'm not sure what you're referring to.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, it has... if it... oh, Your Honor, the... calling your... or you've called my attention to the instruction that said that the set... in the prior set of... or in the general set of instructions, that the enumerated factors were merely illustrative. Now, that instruction had a cloud of confusion surrounding it, because the way it was phrased was, the Court said, "The mitigating factors that I have expressed to you are illustrative. " There was no list of mitigating factors. There was only a single list, unitary list, of factors that could be either aggravating or mitigating, depending on a jury's decision. The instruction that you're referring to, Your Honor, was a... was the result of the trial court denying some, and granting some, parts of the special instructions requested by the defense. And so, when the trial court said to the jury, "The list of mitigating factors is illustrative only. " I... we, who know the background of this, understand what... the point he was trying to make, but the jury, hearing it, they would think, very reasonably, "There's no list of mitigating factors. "<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
Judge: When did the defense counsel say that this evidence did not fit within factor (k)?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Here is Respondent's 60-second nutshell summary of our core position. This case does not turn on the constitutional factor (k) standing alone. Rather, it turns on a straightforward application of the Boyde test, to the unusual, unique circumstances that occurred during the arguments, instructions to deliberations at the penalty trial of this case. Here are the two key components of our claim. During arguments to the jury, both counsel conveyed to the jury that Belmontes' evidence of Youth Authority religious experience was not covered by factor (k). However, both counsel suggested to the jury that it should be considered anyway. Now, this is unusual, because, of all... of all the things that the district attorney and the defense counsel disagreed on, this was one that they did agree on, and it's likely that the jury would have taken note of that. The case then proceeded to instructions and deliberations. The jury came back to court, announced that they were deeply divided, perhaps with a majority favoring life. The turning point occurred when one juror, Juror Hern, requested judicial confirmation that the specific list of factors previously given was the only base... was the only framework within which the penalty decision could be made. At that point, the trial court had a constitutional obligation to disabuse Juror Hern and the rest of the assembled jurors of that misapprehension and, at the very least, to reinstruct the jurors that the enumerated factors were merely illustrative and not exhaustive, and instruct the jurors that the jury had to consider all of the mitigating evidence. The trial court did neither, with the result that the jury all too likely returned to its deliberations with the belief that the only factors... the only matters they considered... could consider were those encompassed within the enumerated factors, and believing... based on counsel's prior arguments... that factor (k) did not include the Youth Authority religious-experience evidence.
Judge: Why does that--
respondent: Your Honor, it occurred in argument. And my counsel... esteemed co-counsel will give me the exact page... but it occurred in the context... the context... during the prosecutor's argument, the prosecutor said to the jury that, "I suspect"... and then he, for emphasis, said, "I can't imagine that you won't be told that the religious-conversion evidence doesn't fit within factor (k). " And, at that point, he expressed reservations, doubts, as to whether it did fit in factor (k) or--
Judge: --Why does that matter? Because the jury was told that the factors were merely-- examples of the mitigating evidence they could consider.
respondent: --any other factor.
Judge: It probably didn't fit into factor (h), either, but it doesn't matter.
respondent: I'm more than--
Judge: You said this case is different because both counsel told the jury that the evidence that you're relying on did not fit within factor (k). And I'm not sure what you're referring to.
respondent: --Well, it has... if it... oh, Your Honor, the... calling your... or you've called my attention to the instruction that said that the set... in the prior set of... or in the general set of instructions, that the enumerated factors were merely illustrative. Now, that instruction had a cloud of confusion surrounding it, because the way it was phrased was, the Court said, "The mitigating factors that I have expressed to you are illustrative. " There was no list of mitigating factors. There was only a single list, unitary list, of factors that could be either aggravating or mitigating, depending on a jury's decision. The instruction that you're referring to, Your Honor, was a... was the result of the trial court denying some, and granting some, parts of the special instructions requested by the defense. And so, when the trial court said to the jury, "The list of mitigating factors is illustrative only. " I... we, who know the background of this, understand what... the point he was trying to make, but the jury, hearing it, they would think, very reasonably, "There's no list of mitigating factors. "
Judge: Now, as to defense counsel, are you referring to what you quoted on page 9 of your brief, where he says, "I'm not going to insult you. " --what you highlighted on page 9... "I'm not going to insult you by telling you I think it excuses, in any way, what happened here? " That's what you... is that what you're referring to?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Okay.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: Your brief reads to me... at about page 15... to suggest that you're proposing a broad rule that probable cause exists to arrest all occupants of a car anytime commercial quantities of narcotics are found in the passenger portion of the car.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This is a unique case with highly unusual facts, and the reason it is unique is because of the facts... not because of the facts that exist so much in this case, but because of those that do not exist here. There was no testimony whatsoever in this case that Mr. Pringle had control over or knowledge of the drugs hidden in the back seat of the car--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: Your brief reads to me... at about page 15... to suggest that you're proposing a broad rule that probable cause exists to arrest all occupants of a car anytime commercial quantities of narcotics are found in the passenger portion of the car.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This is a unique case with highly unusual facts, and the reason it is unique is because of the facts... not because of the facts that exist so much in this case, but because of those that do not exist here. There was no testimony whatsoever in this case that Mr. Pringle had control over or knowledge of the drugs hidden in the back seat of the car--
Judge: Is that your position?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, Your Honor, what the court in Maryland reviews on appeal is the motion to suppress hearing, and at that hearing there was no evidence presented whatsoever that the officer in this case noticed any furtive movements by Mr. Pringle, any furtive gestures, that he said anything suspicious at the scene, or that he acted in any unusually nervous manner. All we have here--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: Your brief reads to me... at about page 15... to suggest that you're proposing a broad rule that probable cause exists to arrest all occupants of a car anytime commercial quantities of narcotics are found in the passenger portion of the car.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This is a unique case with highly unusual facts, and the reason it is unique is because of the facts... not because of the facts that exist so much in this case, but because of those that do not exist here. There was no testimony whatsoever in this case that Mr. Pringle had control over or knowledge of the drugs hidden in the back seat of the car--
Judge: Is that your position?
respondent: --Well, Your Honor, what the court in Maryland reviews on appeal is the motion to suppress hearing, and at that hearing there was no evidence presented whatsoever that the officer in this case noticed any furtive movements by Mr. Pringle, any furtive gestures, that he said anything suspicious at the scene, or that he acted in any unusually nervous manner. All we have here--
Judge: Do you agree that it is a totality of the circumstances test?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--A few corrections, if I may, Justice O'Connor--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: Your brief reads to me... at about page 15... to suggest that you're proposing a broad rule that probable cause exists to arrest all occupants of a car anytime commercial quantities of narcotics are found in the passenger portion of the car.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This is a unique case with highly unusual facts, and the reason it is unique is because of the facts... not because of the facts that exist so much in this case, but because of those that do not exist here. There was no testimony whatsoever in this case that Mr. Pringle had control over or knowledge of the drugs hidden in the back seat of the car--
Judge: Is that your position?
respondent: --Well, Your Honor, what the court in Maryland reviews on appeal is the motion to suppress hearing, and at that hearing there was no evidence presented whatsoever that the officer in this case noticed any furtive movements by Mr. Pringle, any furtive gestures, that he said anything suspicious at the scene, or that he acted in any unusually nervous manner. All we have here--
Judge: Do you agree that it is a totality of the circumstances test?
respondent: --A few corrections, if I may, Justice O'Connor--
Judge: Well, you do say at page 15, beginning of the first full paragraph, for these reasons, the discovery of an amount of narcotics suitable for distribution in the passenger compartment supports an inference that all of the car's occupants were aware of, and hence, involved with the drugs. That's a sweeping statement.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--This is... 3:00 a.m. is accurate, 3:16 a.m. It is in a residential area. This was not in fact a high crime area. And I think that under the totality of circumstances we have to put that in context, and the context is this, that it's 3:00 a.m. on a Saturday night with a car of three young men in their twenties in a residential area, and I think that anyone who has children of that age knows that often their Saturday night does not even begin until 10:00 or 11:00 p.m.--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: Your brief reads to me... at about page 15... to suggest that you're proposing a broad rule that probable cause exists to arrest all occupants of a car anytime commercial quantities of narcotics are found in the passenger portion of the car.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This is a unique case with highly unusual facts, and the reason it is unique is because of the facts... not because of the facts that exist so much in this case, but because of those that do not exist here. There was no testimony whatsoever in this case that Mr. Pringle had control over or knowledge of the drugs hidden in the back seat of the car--
Judge: Is that your position?
respondent: --Well, Your Honor, what the court in Maryland reviews on appeal is the motion to suppress hearing, and at that hearing there was no evidence presented whatsoever that the officer in this case noticed any furtive movements by Mr. Pringle, any furtive gestures, that he said anything suspicious at the scene, or that he acted in any unusually nervous manner. All we have here--
Judge: Do you agree that it is a totality of the circumstances test?
respondent: --A few corrections, if I may, Justice O'Connor--
Judge: Well, you do say at page 15, beginning of the first full paragraph, for these reasons, the discovery of an amount of narcotics suitable for distribution in the passenger compartment supports an inference that all of the car's occupants were aware of, and hence, involved with the drugs. That's a sweeping statement.
respondent: --This is... 3:00 a.m. is accurate, 3:16 a.m. It is in a residential area. This was not in fact a high crime area. And I think that under the totality of circumstances we have to put that in context, and the context is this, that it's 3:00 a.m. on a Saturday night with a car of three young men in their twenties in a residential area, and I think that anyone who has children of that age knows that often their Saturday night does not even begin until 10:00 or 11:00 p.m.--
Judge: But it... it might... wouldn't different factors enter into it? Suppose it's a young child--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Young adult children, Your Honor.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
Judge: Your brief reads to me... at about page 15... to suggest that you're proposing a broad rule that probable cause exists to arrest all occupants of a car anytime commercial quantities of narcotics are found in the passenger portion of the car.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This is a unique case with highly unusual facts, and the reason it is unique is because of the facts... not because of the facts that exist so much in this case, but because of those that do not exist here. There was no testimony whatsoever in this case that Mr. Pringle had control over or knowledge of the drugs hidden in the back seat of the car--
Judge: Is that your position?
respondent: --Well, Your Honor, what the court in Maryland reviews on appeal is the motion to suppress hearing, and at that hearing there was no evidence presented whatsoever that the officer in this case noticed any furtive movements by Mr. Pringle, any furtive gestures, that he said anything suspicious at the scene, or that he acted in any unusually nervous manner. All we have here--
Judge: Do you agree that it is a totality of the circumstances test?
respondent: --A few corrections, if I may, Justice O'Connor--
Judge: Well, you do say at page 15, beginning of the first full paragraph, for these reasons, the discovery of an amount of narcotics suitable for distribution in the passenger compartment supports an inference that all of the car's occupants were aware of, and hence, involved with the drugs. That's a sweeping statement.
respondent: --This is... 3:00 a.m. is accurate, 3:16 a.m. It is in a residential area. This was not in fact a high crime area. And I think that under the totality of circumstances we have to put that in context, and the context is this, that it's 3:00 a.m. on a Saturday night with a car of three young men in their twenties in a residential area, and I think that anyone who has children of that age knows that often their Saturday night does not even begin until 10:00 or 11:00 p.m.--
Judge: But it... it might... wouldn't different factors enter into it? Suppose it's a young child--
respondent: --Young adult children, Your Honor.
Judge: --in the vehicle, and it's in the middle of the day and they're dropping the child off at school or something. Are you suggesting there would nonetheless be this inference and the child could be hauled up and sent to the juvenile court?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>But what we have here with respect to Mr. Pringle is simply presence and nothing more. We have no further--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: As closely as it can, and the "as it can" depends upon violation of the Sixth Amendment by entitling defendants to sentences determined by facts found by a judge instead of a jury. Suppose in this case the court of appeals instead of disallowing the lower sentence, approved it? And then in the next case that comes up involving what was the small amount of equivalent, 5.26 grams of cocaine powder rather than crack, okay? Suppose in the next case it would have been 30 grams of powder. And the district court judge once again departs just the way the departure was here, and the court of appeals says no, that departure is unreasonable. You now have circuit law which says 30 grams, you get the guidelines sentence; 5.26 grams, you're entitled to a lesser sentence. Okay? Why isn't... why haven't we fallen back into the same problem that produced Booker/Fanfan? You have fact findings being made by the judge. It's a judge who decides whether it's 30 grams or 5.26 grams. What difference does it make whether that factual difference produces an entitlement to a sentence on the basis of the guidelines or on the basis of an opinion by or a series of opinion by a court of appeals? Isn't the Sixth Amendment equally violated?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court in Booker concluded that the remedial severing of the statute's provision for mandatory application of the guidelines and a provision governing the standards of review on appeal rendered the statute constitutional. It further implied a standard of review of reasonableness of guideline sentences on appeal, and it did not elaborate what that reasonableness requirement means. The Government submits that the best interpretation of a reasonableness form of review would be one that conforms as closely as it can to Congress's original intent of minimizing and eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly situated defendants.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: As closely as it can, and the "as it can" depends upon violation of the Sixth Amendment by entitling defendants to sentences determined by facts found by a judge instead of a jury. Suppose in this case the court of appeals instead of disallowing the lower sentence, approved it? And then in the next case that comes up involving what was the small amount of equivalent, 5.26 grams of cocaine powder rather than crack, okay? Suppose in the next case it would have been 30 grams of powder. And the district court judge once again departs just the way the departure was here, and the court of appeals says no, that departure is unreasonable. You now have circuit law which says 30 grams, you get the guidelines sentence; 5.26 grams, you're entitled to a lesser sentence. Okay? Why isn't... why haven't we fallen back into the same problem that produced Booker/Fanfan? You have fact findings being made by the judge. It's a judge who decides whether it's 30 grams or 5.26 grams. What difference does it make whether that factual difference produces an entitlement to a sentence on the basis of the guidelines or on the basis of an opinion by or a series of opinion by a court of appeals? Isn't the Sixth Amendment equally violated?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court in Booker concluded that the remedial severing of the statute's provision for mandatory application of the guidelines and a provision governing the standards of review on appeal rendered the statute constitutional. It further implied a standard of review of reasonableness of guideline sentences on appeal, and it did not elaborate what that reasonableness requirement means. The Government submits that the best interpretation of a reasonableness form of review would be one that conforms as closely as it can to Congress's original intent of minimizing and eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly situated defendants.
Judge: But if you have two cases that are in other respects similar, and the court of appeals has held 5.26 is too little to apply the guidelines, it's okay to depart downward the way this judge did, it seems to me that the next case that comes up, the defendant has an entitlement to that lower sentence.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Justice Scalia, as I think we talked about in the last argument, in theory it could be if this Court concludes that judicial determinations on appeal are equivalent to guidelines promulgated by a commission or statute, and if what the court of appeals does is essentially function as a sentencing commission, literally prescribing particular levels of punishment for recurring sets of facts. The Government's submission here is not that the court of appeals has to do that in order to apply a proportionality principle. A proportionality principle will look to all of the facts of the case and will try to get a handle on, is this a reasonable sentence in response to all of the facts and circumstances that the judge articulated within--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: As closely as it can, and the "as it can" depends upon violation of the Sixth Amendment by entitling defendants to sentences determined by facts found by a judge instead of a jury. Suppose in this case the court of appeals instead of disallowing the lower sentence, approved it? And then in the next case that comes up involving what was the small amount of equivalent, 5.26 grams of cocaine powder rather than crack, okay? Suppose in the next case it would have been 30 grams of powder. And the district court judge once again departs just the way the departure was here, and the court of appeals says no, that departure is unreasonable. You now have circuit law which says 30 grams, you get the guidelines sentence; 5.26 grams, you're entitled to a lesser sentence. Okay? Why isn't... why haven't we fallen back into the same problem that produced Booker/Fanfan? You have fact findings being made by the judge. It's a judge who decides whether it's 30 grams or 5.26 grams. What difference does it make whether that factual difference produces an entitlement to a sentence on the basis of the guidelines or on the basis of an opinion by or a series of opinion by a court of appeals? Isn't the Sixth Amendment equally violated?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court in Booker concluded that the remedial severing of the statute's provision for mandatory application of the guidelines and a provision governing the standards of review on appeal rendered the statute constitutional. It further implied a standard of review of reasonableness of guideline sentences on appeal, and it did not elaborate what that reasonableness requirement means. The Government submits that the best interpretation of a reasonableness form of review would be one that conforms as closely as it can to Congress's original intent of minimizing and eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly situated defendants.
Judge: But if you have two cases that are in other respects similar, and the court of appeals has held 5.26 is too little to apply the guidelines, it's okay to depart downward the way this judge did, it seems to me that the next case that comes up, the defendant has an entitlement to that lower sentence.
respondent: Justice Scalia, as I think we talked about in the last argument, in theory it could be if this Court concludes that judicial determinations on appeal are equivalent to guidelines promulgated by a commission or statute, and if what the court of appeals does is essentially function as a sentencing commission, literally prescribing particular levels of punishment for recurring sets of facts. The Government's submission here is not that the court of appeals has to do that in order to apply a proportionality principle. A proportionality principle will look to all of the facts of the case and will try to get a handle on, is this a reasonable sentence in response to all of the facts and circumstances that the judge articulated within--
Judge: May I ask this question: It seems to me that in sentencing there are two different broad categories of decision that the judge has to make, one involving the severity of the crime, and the other the characteristics of the particular offender. And might it not be the case that you give a greater presumption of following the guidelines when you're talking about the severity of the offense, and a greater deference to the trial judge when you're evaluating the factors of the individual that might affect the sentence? There might be a difference in the--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, he doesn't, Justice Scalia, because the second defendant may not encounter a judge who concludes that that quantity warrants the same level of leniency or any leniency at all. That judge will retain the judge's classic discretion to look at the totality of the facts and conclude whether a sentence that would be below the range is a reasonable sentence. And unlike a situation that some of us might prefer in which the court of appeals would ensure that like cases are treated with reasonable consistency, the system of reasonableness review on top of advisory guidelines will not produce perfect levels of consistency. And what the defendant is entitled to under the Sixth Amendment rulings of this Court is knowing that if the law says if I commit this crime and these are the facts that support it, my level of sentence is this and no higher, that any higher sentence that's produced by a fact finding gives him a jury trial entitlement. That's what the Sixth Amendment entitles you. But no defendant who commits a crack offense can say that even after a series of court of appeals rulings that mark out various points of reasonableness. That defendant will not know whether the judge that he or she appears in front of will give the same kind of weight to those facts as some other judge did who was affirmed or reversed. Nor will that judge be able to say what is the constellation of policy and factual reasons that this particular judge will find in announcing the judge's sentence. So I don't think that a proportionality principle runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment. And I don't think that it runs afoul of anything in 3553(a) or any other part of the statute. What the Court is left with is the task of interpreting reasonableness, and I submit it should ask the same question that it asked in Booker itself: Which alternative, the Petitioner's alternative in this case or the Government's, conforms more closely to Congress's original claim in the Sentencing Reform Act? The Petitioner's version of appellate review as I understand it is very light review, if at all, of the substance of what the district judge does. It may reach a truly extreme case such as if a judge said a second degree murderer, I think probation is the appropriate sentence. Perhaps the Petitioner would concede that that would be arbitrary and irrational; but beyond such an extreme case that it is so unlikely to arise that Petitioner can feel free to give it away, Petitioner gives the Court nothing, and gives the courts of appeals nothing to apply standards to determine whether a particular sentence is reasonable. And that is what the court of appeals have been reaching for when eight of them have adopted this proportionality principle.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: As closely as it can, and the "as it can" depends upon violation of the Sixth Amendment by entitling defendants to sentences determined by facts found by a judge instead of a jury. Suppose in this case the court of appeals instead of disallowing the lower sentence, approved it? And then in the next case that comes up involving what was the small amount of equivalent, 5.26 grams of cocaine powder rather than crack, okay? Suppose in the next case it would have been 30 grams of powder. And the district court judge once again departs just the way the departure was here, and the court of appeals says no, that departure is unreasonable. You now have circuit law which says 30 grams, you get the guidelines sentence; 5.26 grams, you're entitled to a lesser sentence. Okay? Why isn't... why haven't we fallen back into the same problem that produced Booker/Fanfan? You have fact findings being made by the judge. It's a judge who decides whether it's 30 grams or 5.26 grams. What difference does it make whether that factual difference produces an entitlement to a sentence on the basis of the guidelines or on the basis of an opinion by or a series of opinion by a court of appeals? Isn't the Sixth Amendment equally violated?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court in Booker concluded that the remedial severing of the statute's provision for mandatory application of the guidelines and a provision governing the standards of review on appeal rendered the statute constitutional. It further implied a standard of review of reasonableness of guideline sentences on appeal, and it did not elaborate what that reasonableness requirement means. The Government submits that the best interpretation of a reasonableness form of review would be one that conforms as closely as it can to Congress's original intent of minimizing and eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly situated defendants.
Judge: But if you have two cases that are in other respects similar, and the court of appeals has held 5.26 is too little to apply the guidelines, it's okay to depart downward the way this judge did, it seems to me that the next case that comes up, the defendant has an entitlement to that lower sentence.
respondent: Justice Scalia, as I think we talked about in the last argument, in theory it could be if this Court concludes that judicial determinations on appeal are equivalent to guidelines promulgated by a commission or statute, and if what the court of appeals does is essentially function as a sentencing commission, literally prescribing particular levels of punishment for recurring sets of facts. The Government's submission here is not that the court of appeals has to do that in order to apply a proportionality principle. A proportionality principle will look to all of the facts of the case and will try to get a handle on, is this a reasonable sentence in response to all of the facts and circumstances that the judge articulated within--
Judge: May I ask this question: It seems to me that in sentencing there are two different broad categories of decision that the judge has to make, one involving the severity of the crime, and the other the characteristics of the particular offender. And might it not be the case that you give a greater presumption of following the guidelines when you're talking about the severity of the offense, and a greater deference to the trial judge when you're evaluating the factors of the individual that might affect the sentence? There might be a difference in the--
respondent: --Well, he doesn't, Justice Scalia, because the second defendant may not encounter a judge who concludes that that quantity warrants the same level of leniency or any leniency at all. That judge will retain the judge's classic discretion to look at the totality of the facts and conclude whether a sentence that would be below the range is a reasonable sentence. And unlike a situation that some of us might prefer in which the court of appeals would ensure that like cases are treated with reasonable consistency, the system of reasonableness review on top of advisory guidelines will not produce perfect levels of consistency. And what the defendant is entitled to under the Sixth Amendment rulings of this Court is knowing that if the law says if I commit this crime and these are the facts that support it, my level of sentence is this and no higher, that any higher sentence that's produced by a fact finding gives him a jury trial entitlement. That's what the Sixth Amendment entitles you. But no defendant who commits a crack offense can say that even after a series of court of appeals rulings that mark out various points of reasonableness. That defendant will not know whether the judge that he or she appears in front of will give the same kind of weight to those facts as some other judge did who was affirmed or reversed. Nor will that judge be able to say what is the constellation of policy and factual reasons that this particular judge will find in announcing the judge's sentence. So I don't think that a proportionality principle runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment. And I don't think that it runs afoul of anything in 3553(a) or any other part of the statute. What the Court is left with is the task of interpreting reasonableness, and I submit it should ask the same question that it asked in Booker itself: Which alternative, the Petitioner's alternative in this case or the Government's, conforms more closely to Congress's original claim in the Sentencing Reform Act? The Petitioner's version of appellate review as I understand it is very light review, if at all, of the substance of what the district judge does. It may reach a truly extreme case such as if a judge said a second degree murderer, I think probation is the appropriate sentence. Perhaps the Petitioner would concede that that would be arbitrary and irrational; but beyond such an extreme case that it is so unlikely to arise that Petitioner can feel free to give it away, Petitioner gives the Court nothing, and gives the courts of appeals nothing to apply standards to determine whether a particular sentence is reasonable. And that is what the court of appeals have been reaching for when eight of them have adopted this proportionality principle.
Judge: What do you think about taking some of the Rivera ideas... I'm slightly hypothesizing this... and following up with what Justice Stevens said. You'd say look, one thing a district judge can't say, he can't say that I believe the guideline is right for a typical case. And I think this is a typical case. And I won't follow the guideline. You couldn't think those three things?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I think at a high level of generality, that is true. Because what the sentencing commission is good at is taking paradigmatic circumstances and assigning them a numerical weight that will translate into a sentence. And what the strength of the district judge is is looking at the defendant in front of that particular judge and seeing how that person's characteristics may map onto the policies of sentencing. But I don't agree that that distinction would support a two-track form of appellate review that would give the district judge greater deference to take personal characteristics into account and to impose widely varying sentences. That is exactly the situation that we had in the pre Sentencing Reform Act era when any district judge could choose whatever policies of sentencing appeal to that judge, find the facts, and impose a widely disparate sentence. And as the Court well knows, there was no appellate review of that exercise of discretion unless it could be shown that the judge didn't exercise discretion at all. Now it is not an exercise of discretion if a judge simply says for this crime, I always give the same sentence. That would not take into account the full range of facts and factors that are present in the sentencing court and as a result, that wouldn't be an exercise of discretion. But in the pre Sentencing Reform Act era, the judge had pretty much plenary reign to decide what facts mattered. If we continue with that same sort of deference on appeal in the Booker remedial opinion, then it's hard for me to see how appellate review can serve any valid purpose of channeling and ensuring some consistency and uniformity in the way district judges impose sentencing.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: As closely as it can, and the "as it can" depends upon violation of the Sixth Amendment by entitling defendants to sentences determined by facts found by a judge instead of a jury. Suppose in this case the court of appeals instead of disallowing the lower sentence, approved it? And then in the next case that comes up involving what was the small amount of equivalent, 5.26 grams of cocaine powder rather than crack, okay? Suppose in the next case it would have been 30 grams of powder. And the district court judge once again departs just the way the departure was here, and the court of appeals says no, that departure is unreasonable. You now have circuit law which says 30 grams, you get the guidelines sentence; 5.26 grams, you're entitled to a lesser sentence. Okay? Why isn't... why haven't we fallen back into the same problem that produced Booker/Fanfan? You have fact findings being made by the judge. It's a judge who decides whether it's 30 grams or 5.26 grams. What difference does it make whether that factual difference produces an entitlement to a sentence on the basis of the guidelines or on the basis of an opinion by or a series of opinion by a court of appeals? Isn't the Sixth Amendment equally violated?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court in Booker concluded that the remedial severing of the statute's provision for mandatory application of the guidelines and a provision governing the standards of review on appeal rendered the statute constitutional. It further implied a standard of review of reasonableness of guideline sentences on appeal, and it did not elaborate what that reasonableness requirement means. The Government submits that the best interpretation of a reasonableness form of review would be one that conforms as closely as it can to Congress's original intent of minimizing and eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly situated defendants.
Judge: But if you have two cases that are in other respects similar, and the court of appeals has held 5.26 is too little to apply the guidelines, it's okay to depart downward the way this judge did, it seems to me that the next case that comes up, the defendant has an entitlement to that lower sentence.
respondent: Justice Scalia, as I think we talked about in the last argument, in theory it could be if this Court concludes that judicial determinations on appeal are equivalent to guidelines promulgated by a commission or statute, and if what the court of appeals does is essentially function as a sentencing commission, literally prescribing particular levels of punishment for recurring sets of facts. The Government's submission here is not that the court of appeals has to do that in order to apply a proportionality principle. A proportionality principle will look to all of the facts of the case and will try to get a handle on, is this a reasonable sentence in response to all of the facts and circumstances that the judge articulated within--
Judge: May I ask this question: It seems to me that in sentencing there are two different broad categories of decision that the judge has to make, one involving the severity of the crime, and the other the characteristics of the particular offender. And might it not be the case that you give a greater presumption of following the guidelines when you're talking about the severity of the offense, and a greater deference to the trial judge when you're evaluating the factors of the individual that might affect the sentence? There might be a difference in the--
respondent: --Well, he doesn't, Justice Scalia, because the second defendant may not encounter a judge who concludes that that quantity warrants the same level of leniency or any leniency at all. That judge will retain the judge's classic discretion to look at the totality of the facts and conclude whether a sentence that would be below the range is a reasonable sentence. And unlike a situation that some of us might prefer in which the court of appeals would ensure that like cases are treated with reasonable consistency, the system of reasonableness review on top of advisory guidelines will not produce perfect levels of consistency. And what the defendant is entitled to under the Sixth Amendment rulings of this Court is knowing that if the law says if I commit this crime and these are the facts that support it, my level of sentence is this and no higher, that any higher sentence that's produced by a fact finding gives him a jury trial entitlement. That's what the Sixth Amendment entitles you. But no defendant who commits a crack offense can say that even after a series of court of appeals rulings that mark out various points of reasonableness. That defendant will not know whether the judge that he or she appears in front of will give the same kind of weight to those facts as some other judge did who was affirmed or reversed. Nor will that judge be able to say what is the constellation of policy and factual reasons that this particular judge will find in announcing the judge's sentence. So I don't think that a proportionality principle runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment. And I don't think that it runs afoul of anything in 3553(a) or any other part of the statute. What the Court is left with is the task of interpreting reasonableness, and I submit it should ask the same question that it asked in Booker itself: Which alternative, the Petitioner's alternative in this case or the Government's, conforms more closely to Congress's original claim in the Sentencing Reform Act? The Petitioner's version of appellate review as I understand it is very light review, if at all, of the substance of what the district judge does. It may reach a truly extreme case such as if a judge said a second degree murderer, I think probation is the appropriate sentence. Perhaps the Petitioner would concede that that would be arbitrary and irrational; but beyond such an extreme case that it is so unlikely to arise that Petitioner can feel free to give it away, Petitioner gives the Court nothing, and gives the courts of appeals nothing to apply standards to determine whether a particular sentence is reasonable. And that is what the court of appeals have been reaching for when eight of them have adopted this proportionality principle.
Judge: What do you think about taking some of the Rivera ideas... I'm slightly hypothesizing this... and following up with what Justice Stevens said. You'd say look, one thing a district judge can't say, he can't say that I believe the guideline is right for a typical case. And I think this is a typical case. And I won't follow the guideline. You couldn't think those three things?
respondent: I think at a high level of generality, that is true. Because what the sentencing commission is good at is taking paradigmatic circumstances and assigning them a numerical weight that will translate into a sentence. And what the strength of the district judge is is looking at the defendant in front of that particular judge and seeing how that person's characteristics may map onto the policies of sentencing. But I don't agree that that distinction would support a two-track form of appellate review that would give the district judge greater deference to take personal characteristics into account and to impose widely varying sentences. That is exactly the situation that we had in the pre Sentencing Reform Act era when any district judge could choose whatever policies of sentencing appeal to that judge, find the facts, and impose a widely disparate sentence. And as the Court well knows, there was no appellate review of that exercise of discretion unless it could be shown that the judge didn't exercise discretion at all. Now it is not an exercise of discretion if a judge simply says for this crime, I always give the same sentence. That would not take into account the full range of facts and factors that are present in the sentencing court and as a result, that wouldn't be an exercise of discretion. But in the pre Sentencing Reform Act era, the judge had pretty much plenary reign to decide what facts mattered. If we continue with that same sort of deference on appeal in the Booker remedial opinion, then it's hard for me to see how appellate review can serve any valid purpose of channeling and ensuring some consistency and uniformity in the way district judges impose sentencing.
Judge: So one big power a judge has that they didn't have before, after Booker, is to say the guideline itself is unreasonable. So we're... let's just say... and there if they say that, the district judge could decide whether or not, the court of appeals could decide is the guideline reasonable or not reasonable. But leave those cases aside. I imagine they'll be few and far between. Now we take one they assume is reasonable. And now unlike the past, the judge has to do three things. One, to give the kind of thing that... the reason he's not following the guideline, which he admits is reasonable for a typical case. So what's the kind of thing that leads you to think yours is not typical? And he says it. And then he has the evidence as to the related facts. And then he has the degree of departure. As to the first thing, the court of appeals could review it and decide whether it is or is not the kind of thing. As to the second and third, they also could review it but only after giving considerable weight to what the district judge thinks about the case in front of him. Now maybe that's... I mean, you might not have a reaction to that. I'd have to sort of think about it.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I agree.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.
Judge: As closely as it can, and the "as it can" depends upon violation of the Sixth Amendment by entitling defendants to sentences determined by facts found by a judge instead of a jury. Suppose in this case the court of appeals instead of disallowing the lower sentence, approved it? And then in the next case that comes up involving what was the small amount of equivalent, 5.26 grams of cocaine powder rather than crack, okay? Suppose in the next case it would have been 30 grams of powder. And the district court judge once again departs just the way the departure was here, and the court of appeals says no, that departure is unreasonable. You now have circuit law which says 30 grams, you get the guidelines sentence; 5.26 grams, you're entitled to a lesser sentence. Okay? Why isn't... why haven't we fallen back into the same problem that produced Booker/Fanfan? You have fact findings being made by the judge. It's a judge who decides whether it's 30 grams or 5.26 grams. What difference does it make whether that factual difference produces an entitlement to a sentence on the basis of the guidelines or on the basis of an opinion by or a series of opinion by a court of appeals? Isn't the Sixth Amendment equally violated?
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court in Booker concluded that the remedial severing of the statute's provision for mandatory application of the guidelines and a provision governing the standards of review on appeal rendered the statute constitutional. It further implied a standard of review of reasonableness of guideline sentences on appeal, and it did not elaborate what that reasonableness requirement means. The Government submits that the best interpretation of a reasonableness form of review would be one that conforms as closely as it can to Congress's original intent of minimizing and eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly situated defendants.
Judge: But if you have two cases that are in other respects similar, and the court of appeals has held 5.26 is too little to apply the guidelines, it's okay to depart downward the way this judge did, it seems to me that the next case that comes up, the defendant has an entitlement to that lower sentence.
respondent: Justice Scalia, as I think we talked about in the last argument, in theory it could be if this Court concludes that judicial determinations on appeal are equivalent to guidelines promulgated by a commission or statute, and if what the court of appeals does is essentially function as a sentencing commission, literally prescribing particular levels of punishment for recurring sets of facts. The Government's submission here is not that the court of appeals has to do that in order to apply a proportionality principle. A proportionality principle will look to all of the facts of the case and will try to get a handle on, is this a reasonable sentence in response to all of the facts and circumstances that the judge articulated within--
Judge: May I ask this question: It seems to me that in sentencing there are two different broad categories of decision that the judge has to make, one involving the severity of the crime, and the other the characteristics of the particular offender. And might it not be the case that you give a greater presumption of following the guidelines when you're talking about the severity of the offense, and a greater deference to the trial judge when you're evaluating the factors of the individual that might affect the sentence? There might be a difference in the--
respondent: --Well, he doesn't, Justice Scalia, because the second defendant may not encounter a judge who concludes that that quantity warrants the same level of leniency or any leniency at all. That judge will retain the judge's classic discretion to look at the totality of the facts and conclude whether a sentence that would be below the range is a reasonable sentence. And unlike a situation that some of us might prefer in which the court of appeals would ensure that like cases are treated with reasonable consistency, the system of reasonableness review on top of advisory guidelines will not produce perfect levels of consistency. And what the defendant is entitled to under the Sixth Amendment rulings of this Court is knowing that if the law says if I commit this crime and these are the facts that support it, my level of sentence is this and no higher, that any higher sentence that's produced by a fact finding gives him a jury trial entitlement. That's what the Sixth Amendment entitles you. But no defendant who commits a crack offense can say that even after a series of court of appeals rulings that mark out various points of reasonableness. That defendant will not know whether the judge that he or she appears in front of will give the same kind of weight to those facts as some other judge did who was affirmed or reversed. Nor will that judge be able to say what is the constellation of policy and factual reasons that this particular judge will find in announcing the judge's sentence. So I don't think that a proportionality principle runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment. And I don't think that it runs afoul of anything in 3553(a) or any other part of the statute. What the Court is left with is the task of interpreting reasonableness, and I submit it should ask the same question that it asked in Booker itself: Which alternative, the Petitioner's alternative in this case or the Government's, conforms more closely to Congress's original claim in the Sentencing Reform Act? The Petitioner's version of appellate review as I understand it is very light review, if at all, of the substance of what the district judge does. It may reach a truly extreme case such as if a judge said a second degree murderer, I think probation is the appropriate sentence. Perhaps the Petitioner would concede that that would be arbitrary and irrational; but beyond such an extreme case that it is so unlikely to arise that Petitioner can feel free to give it away, Petitioner gives the Court nothing, and gives the courts of appeals nothing to apply standards to determine whether a particular sentence is reasonable. And that is what the court of appeals have been reaching for when eight of them have adopted this proportionality principle.
Judge: What do you think about taking some of the Rivera ideas... I'm slightly hypothesizing this... and following up with what Justice Stevens said. You'd say look, one thing a district judge can't say, he can't say that I believe the guideline is right for a typical case. And I think this is a typical case. And I won't follow the guideline. You couldn't think those three things?
respondent: I think at a high level of generality, that is true. Because what the sentencing commission is good at is taking paradigmatic circumstances and assigning them a numerical weight that will translate into a sentence. And what the strength of the district judge is is looking at the defendant in front of that particular judge and seeing how that person's characteristics may map onto the policies of sentencing. But I don't agree that that distinction would support a two-track form of appellate review that would give the district judge greater deference to take personal characteristics into account and to impose widely varying sentences. That is exactly the situation that we had in the pre Sentencing Reform Act era when any district judge could choose whatever policies of sentencing appeal to that judge, find the facts, and impose a widely disparate sentence. And as the Court well knows, there was no appellate review of that exercise of discretion unless it could be shown that the judge didn't exercise discretion at all. Now it is not an exercise of discretion if a judge simply says for this crime, I always give the same sentence. That would not take into account the full range of facts and factors that are present in the sentencing court and as a result, that wouldn't be an exercise of discretion. But in the pre Sentencing Reform Act era, the judge had pretty much plenary reign to decide what facts mattered. If we continue with that same sort of deference on appeal in the Booker remedial opinion, then it's hard for me to see how appellate review can serve any valid purpose of channeling and ensuring some consistency and uniformity in the way district judges impose sentencing.
Judge: So one big power a judge has that they didn't have before, after Booker, is to say the guideline itself is unreasonable. So we're... let's just say... and there if they say that, the district judge could decide whether or not, the court of appeals could decide is the guideline reasonable or not reasonable. But leave those cases aside. I imagine they'll be few and far between. Now we take one they assume is reasonable. And now unlike the past, the judge has to do three things. One, to give the kind of thing that... the reason he's not following the guideline, which he admits is reasonable for a typical case. So what's the kind of thing that leads you to think yours is not typical? And he says it. And then he has the evidence as to the related facts. And then he has the degree of departure. As to the first thing, the court of appeals could review it and decide whether it is or is not the kind of thing. As to the second and third, they also could review it but only after giving considerable weight to what the district judge thinks about the case in front of him. Now maybe that's... I mean, you might not have a reaction to that. I'd have to sort of think about it.
respondent: I agree.
Judge: Not quite--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, Justice Breyer, if the system that you're describing is a replica of the system that existed under Koon versus United States--<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Well... well, given the precedent of Apprendi, suppose the judge says, now, you know, the jury finds an enhancement because of harassment, and the judge says, well, under... let me begin again. Under your theory of the case, the jury doesn't... the judge said, you know, I would ordinarily give you 6 months, but I... I find there's a harassment here... or pardon me... brandishing here, and so I'm going to give you 5 to 7 years. True, it's a mandatory minimum. True, that's different than Apprendi. But it certainly seems to me that the concerns Apprendi... of Apprendi are fully applicable here.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court's decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania forms the backdrop for both the statutory and the constitutional questions in this case. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the amended section 924(c) creates one crime with a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of life in prison and then gives the sentencing court additional guidance as to where the penalty shall be set within that 5-year-to-life range. The increase in the mandatory minimums does not run afoul of the Apprendi rule and is, in fact, specifically endorsed by this Court's decision in McMillan. And on the constitutional question, this Court's decision in McMillan 16 years ago established that it does not violate the Constitution for a legislature to choose one fact that has historically borne on the appropriate penalty to be assessed at sentencing and give the judge guidance as to what that sentence shall be.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Well... well, given the precedent of Apprendi, suppose the judge says, now, you know, the jury finds an enhancement because of harassment, and the judge says, well, under... let me begin again. Under your theory of the case, the jury doesn't... the judge said, you know, I would ordinarily give you 6 months, but I... I find there's a harassment here... or pardon me... brandishing here, and so I'm going to give you 5 to 7 years. True, it's a mandatory minimum. True, that's different than Apprendi. But it certainly seems to me that the concerns Apprendi... of Apprendi are fully applicable here.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court's decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania forms the backdrop for both the statutory and the constitutional questions in this case. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the amended section 924(c) creates one crime with a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of life in prison and then gives the sentencing court additional guidance as to where the penalty shall be set within that 5-year-to-life range. The increase in the mandatory minimums does not run afoul of the Apprendi rule and is, in fact, specifically endorsed by this Court's decision in McMillan. And on the constitutional question, this Court's decision in McMillan 16 years ago established that it does not violate the Constitution for a legislature to choose one fact that has historically borne on the appropriate penalty to be assessed at sentencing and give the judge guidance as to what that sentence shall be.
Judge: But if that's so, do you... do you accept what... what your... what the petitioner said in respect to my second statute, if you remember it? The second statute is, Congress passes a law and it says the maximum for robbery is 15 years, but if there is no injury, then it's 7 or 5. Now, does Apprendi apply to that?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Justice Kennedy, there are several significant differences between the issue in a case like this and the issue in a case like Apprendi. In Apprendi, the judge could not go above the jury's verdict based on the Court's constitutional analysis. In other words, the jury sets the outermost limit that the judge can do, and in the sense of protecting the jury trial right, the Apprendi rule tracks onto what the jury must find. Here, regardless of what the jury finds, the judge has the discretion and the authority to sentence the defendant between 5 years and life in prison. What the mandatory minimum takes away is not a jury trial right, but a right to judicial discretion to give a lower sentence than the mandatory minimum calls for. But Apprendi was not about protecting judicial discretion. Apprendi, in fact, limited judicial discretion and said that the judge cannot go above the maximum that the jury's facts have determined. Here the judge is not doing anything that he could not do based on the jury's verdict anyway. All that is happening is that he is losing the discretionary power to give less, and that judicial discretion interest is not the interest that was at stake in Apprendi. That's reinforced by the fact that the history that this Court relied on, as one of its key determinants in the Apprendi decision, is not present in this case. The history in Apprendi, the Court concluded, showed that it has been the rule down centuries into the common law that the judge cannot give a higher sentence than based on the facts that the jury has determined. But there is no comparable historical rule that would support a preclusion of judicial discretion within the otherwise applicable range. The history of sentencing in this country shows that within the maximum sentence established by the jury verdict, judges have been often given tremendous amounts of discretion on what sentence they should impose. But the history of sentencing also reveals that legislatures have frequently intervened in order to establish more precise rules to govern that discretion. And the... therefore, there is no broad historical rule that is contradicted by a statute like the one in this case and the one that was at issue in McMillan.<|eot_id|>
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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Well... well, given the precedent of Apprendi, suppose the judge says, now, you know, the jury finds an enhancement because of harassment, and the judge says, well, under... let me begin again. Under your theory of the case, the jury doesn't... the judge said, you know, I would ordinarily give you 6 months, but I... I find there's a harassment here... or pardon me... brandishing here, and so I'm going to give you 5 to 7 years. True, it's a mandatory minimum. True, that's different than Apprendi. But it certainly seems to me that the concerns Apprendi... of Apprendi are fully applicable here.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court's decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania forms the backdrop for both the statutory and the constitutional questions in this case. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the amended section 924(c) creates one crime with a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of life in prison and then gives the sentencing court additional guidance as to where the penalty shall be set within that 5-year-to-life range. The increase in the mandatory minimums does not run afoul of the Apprendi rule and is, in fact, specifically endorsed by this Court's decision in McMillan. And on the constitutional question, this Court's decision in McMillan 16 years ago established that it does not violate the Constitution for a legislature to choose one fact that has historically borne on the appropriate penalty to be assessed at sentencing and give the judge guidance as to what that sentence shall be.
Judge: But if that's so, do you... do you accept what... what your... what the petitioner said in respect to my second statute, if you remember it? The second statute is, Congress passes a law and it says the maximum for robbery is 15 years, but if there is no injury, then it's 7 or 5. Now, does Apprendi apply to that?
respondent: Justice Kennedy, there are several significant differences between the issue in a case like this and the issue in a case like Apprendi. In Apprendi, the judge could not go above the jury's verdict based on the Court's constitutional analysis. In other words, the jury sets the outermost limit that the judge can do, and in the sense of protecting the jury trial right, the Apprendi rule tracks onto what the jury must find. Here, regardless of what the jury finds, the judge has the discretion and the authority to sentence the defendant between 5 years and life in prison. What the mandatory minimum takes away is not a jury trial right, but a right to judicial discretion to give a lower sentence than the mandatory minimum calls for. But Apprendi was not about protecting judicial discretion. Apprendi, in fact, limited judicial discretion and said that the judge cannot go above the maximum that the jury's facts have determined. Here the judge is not doing anything that he could not do based on the jury's verdict anyway. All that is happening is that he is losing the discretionary power to give less, and that judicial discretion interest is not the interest that was at stake in Apprendi. That's reinforced by the fact that the history that this Court relied on, as one of its key determinants in the Apprendi decision, is not present in this case. The history in Apprendi, the Court concluded, showed that it has been the rule down centuries into the common law that the judge cannot give a higher sentence than based on the facts that the jury has determined. But there is no comparable historical rule that would support a preclusion of judicial discretion within the otherwise applicable range. The history of sentencing in this country shows that within the maximum sentence established by the jury verdict, judges have been often given tremendous amounts of discretion on what sentence they should impose. But the history of sentencing also reveals that legislatures have frequently intervened in order to establish more precise rules to govern that discretion. And the... therefore, there is no broad historical rule that is contradicted by a statute like the one in this case and the one that was at issue in McMillan.
Judge: Or if there is... if the gun isn't discharged. Does Apprendi apply to that?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>It--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Well... well, given the precedent of Apprendi, suppose the judge says, now, you know, the jury finds an enhancement because of harassment, and the judge says, well, under... let me begin again. Under your theory of the case, the jury doesn't... the judge said, you know, I would ordinarily give you 6 months, but I... I find there's a harassment here... or pardon me... brandishing here, and so I'm going to give you 5 to 7 years. True, it's a mandatory minimum. True, that's different than Apprendi. But it certainly seems to me that the concerns Apprendi... of Apprendi are fully applicable here.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court's decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania forms the backdrop for both the statutory and the constitutional questions in this case. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the amended section 924(c) creates one crime with a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of life in prison and then gives the sentencing court additional guidance as to where the penalty shall be set within that 5-year-to-life range. The increase in the mandatory minimums does not run afoul of the Apprendi rule and is, in fact, specifically endorsed by this Court's decision in McMillan. And on the constitutional question, this Court's decision in McMillan 16 years ago established that it does not violate the Constitution for a legislature to choose one fact that has historically borne on the appropriate penalty to be assessed at sentencing and give the judge guidance as to what that sentence shall be.
Judge: But if that's so, do you... do you accept what... what your... what the petitioner said in respect to my second statute, if you remember it? The second statute is, Congress passes a law and it says the maximum for robbery is 15 years, but if there is no injury, then it's 7 or 5. Now, does Apprendi apply to that?
respondent: Justice Kennedy, there are several significant differences between the issue in a case like this and the issue in a case like Apprendi. In Apprendi, the judge could not go above the jury's verdict based on the Court's constitutional analysis. In other words, the jury sets the outermost limit that the judge can do, and in the sense of protecting the jury trial right, the Apprendi rule tracks onto what the jury must find. Here, regardless of what the jury finds, the judge has the discretion and the authority to sentence the defendant between 5 years and life in prison. What the mandatory minimum takes away is not a jury trial right, but a right to judicial discretion to give a lower sentence than the mandatory minimum calls for. But Apprendi was not about protecting judicial discretion. Apprendi, in fact, limited judicial discretion and said that the judge cannot go above the maximum that the jury's facts have determined. Here the judge is not doing anything that he could not do based on the jury's verdict anyway. All that is happening is that he is losing the discretionary power to give less, and that judicial discretion interest is not the interest that was at stake in Apprendi. That's reinforced by the fact that the history that this Court relied on, as one of its key determinants in the Apprendi decision, is not present in this case. The history in Apprendi, the Court concluded, showed that it has been the rule down centuries into the common law that the judge cannot give a higher sentence than based on the facts that the jury has determined. But there is no comparable historical rule that would support a preclusion of judicial discretion within the otherwise applicable range. The history of sentencing in this country shows that within the maximum sentence established by the jury verdict, judges have been often given tremendous amounts of discretion on what sentence they should impose. But the history of sentencing also reveals that legislatures have frequently intervened in order to establish more precise rules to govern that discretion. And the... therefore, there is no broad historical rule that is contradicted by a statute like the one in this case and the one that was at issue in McMillan.
Judge: Or if there is... if the gun isn't discharged. Does Apprendi apply to that?
respondent: It--
Judge: No, no, no. There is no doubt that the statute I'm talking about intends the fact of discharge to be a sentencing factor. There is no doubt. I mean, I can write it in such a way that that's clear.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--It might, Justice Breyer. The crucial question is whether that statute has created an affirmative defense.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Well... well, given the precedent of Apprendi, suppose the judge says, now, you know, the jury finds an enhancement because of harassment, and the judge says, well, under... let me begin again. Under your theory of the case, the jury doesn't... the judge said, you know, I would ordinarily give you 6 months, but I... I find there's a harassment here... or pardon me... brandishing here, and so I'm going to give you 5 to 7 years. True, it's a mandatory minimum. True, that's different than Apprendi. But it certainly seems to me that the concerns Apprendi... of Apprendi are fully applicable here.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court's decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania forms the backdrop for both the statutory and the constitutional questions in this case. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the amended section 924(c) creates one crime with a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of life in prison and then gives the sentencing court additional guidance as to where the penalty shall be set within that 5-year-to-life range. The increase in the mandatory minimums does not run afoul of the Apprendi rule and is, in fact, specifically endorsed by this Court's decision in McMillan. And on the constitutional question, this Court's decision in McMillan 16 years ago established that it does not violate the Constitution for a legislature to choose one fact that has historically borne on the appropriate penalty to be assessed at sentencing and give the judge guidance as to what that sentence shall be.
Judge: But if that's so, do you... do you accept what... what your... what the petitioner said in respect to my second statute, if you remember it? The second statute is, Congress passes a law and it says the maximum for robbery is 15 years, but if there is no injury, then it's 7 or 5. Now, does Apprendi apply to that?
respondent: Justice Kennedy, there are several significant differences between the issue in a case like this and the issue in a case like Apprendi. In Apprendi, the judge could not go above the jury's verdict based on the Court's constitutional analysis. In other words, the jury sets the outermost limit that the judge can do, and in the sense of protecting the jury trial right, the Apprendi rule tracks onto what the jury must find. Here, regardless of what the jury finds, the judge has the discretion and the authority to sentence the defendant between 5 years and life in prison. What the mandatory minimum takes away is not a jury trial right, but a right to judicial discretion to give a lower sentence than the mandatory minimum calls for. But Apprendi was not about protecting judicial discretion. Apprendi, in fact, limited judicial discretion and said that the judge cannot go above the maximum that the jury's facts have determined. Here the judge is not doing anything that he could not do based on the jury's verdict anyway. All that is happening is that he is losing the discretionary power to give less, and that judicial discretion interest is not the interest that was at stake in Apprendi. That's reinforced by the fact that the history that this Court relied on, as one of its key determinants in the Apprendi decision, is not present in this case. The history in Apprendi, the Court concluded, showed that it has been the rule down centuries into the common law that the judge cannot give a higher sentence than based on the facts that the jury has determined. But there is no comparable historical rule that would support a preclusion of judicial discretion within the otherwise applicable range. The history of sentencing in this country shows that within the maximum sentence established by the jury verdict, judges have been often given tremendous amounts of discretion on what sentence they should impose. But the history of sentencing also reveals that legislatures have frequently intervened in order to establish more precise rules to govern that discretion. And the... therefore, there is no broad historical rule that is contradicted by a statute like the one in this case and the one that was at issue in McMillan.
Judge: Or if there is... if the gun isn't discharged. Does Apprendi apply to that?
respondent: It--
Judge: No, no, no. There is no doubt that the statute I'm talking about intends the fact of discharge to be a sentencing factor. There is no doubt. I mean, I can write it in such a way that that's clear.
respondent: --It might, Justice Breyer. The crucial question is whether that statute has created an affirmative defense.
Judge: Now, at that point, Apprendi is a constitutional rule, and therefore does the discharger not have to be presented to the jury?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>If it's--<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
Judge: Well... well, given the precedent of Apprendi, suppose the judge says, now, you know, the jury finds an enhancement because of harassment, and the judge says, well, under... let me begin again. Under your theory of the case, the jury doesn't... the judge said, you know, I would ordinarily give you 6 months, but I... I find there's a harassment here... or pardon me... brandishing here, and so I'm going to give you 5 to 7 years. True, it's a mandatory minimum. True, that's different than Apprendi. But it certainly seems to me that the concerns Apprendi... of Apprendi are fully applicable here.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court's decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania forms the backdrop for both the statutory and the constitutional questions in this case. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the amended section 924(c) creates one crime with a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of life in prison and then gives the sentencing court additional guidance as to where the penalty shall be set within that 5-year-to-life range. The increase in the mandatory minimums does not run afoul of the Apprendi rule and is, in fact, specifically endorsed by this Court's decision in McMillan. And on the constitutional question, this Court's decision in McMillan 16 years ago established that it does not violate the Constitution for a legislature to choose one fact that has historically borne on the appropriate penalty to be assessed at sentencing and give the judge guidance as to what that sentence shall be.
Judge: But if that's so, do you... do you accept what... what your... what the petitioner said in respect to my second statute, if you remember it? The second statute is, Congress passes a law and it says the maximum for robbery is 15 years, but if there is no injury, then it's 7 or 5. Now, does Apprendi apply to that?
respondent: Justice Kennedy, there are several significant differences between the issue in a case like this and the issue in a case like Apprendi. In Apprendi, the judge could not go above the jury's verdict based on the Court's constitutional analysis. In other words, the jury sets the outermost limit that the judge can do, and in the sense of protecting the jury trial right, the Apprendi rule tracks onto what the jury must find. Here, regardless of what the jury finds, the judge has the discretion and the authority to sentence the defendant between 5 years and life in prison. What the mandatory minimum takes away is not a jury trial right, but a right to judicial discretion to give a lower sentence than the mandatory minimum calls for. But Apprendi was not about protecting judicial discretion. Apprendi, in fact, limited judicial discretion and said that the judge cannot go above the maximum that the jury's facts have determined. Here the judge is not doing anything that he could not do based on the jury's verdict anyway. All that is happening is that he is losing the discretionary power to give less, and that judicial discretion interest is not the interest that was at stake in Apprendi. That's reinforced by the fact that the history that this Court relied on, as one of its key determinants in the Apprendi decision, is not present in this case. The history in Apprendi, the Court concluded, showed that it has been the rule down centuries into the common law that the judge cannot give a higher sentence than based on the facts that the jury has determined. But there is no comparable historical rule that would support a preclusion of judicial discretion within the otherwise applicable range. The history of sentencing in this country shows that within the maximum sentence established by the jury verdict, judges have been often given tremendous amounts of discretion on what sentence they should impose. But the history of sentencing also reveals that legislatures have frequently intervened in order to establish more precise rules to govern that discretion. And the... therefore, there is no broad historical rule that is contradicted by a statute like the one in this case and the one that was at issue in McMillan.
Judge: Or if there is... if the gun isn't discharged. Does Apprendi apply to that?
respondent: It--
Judge: No, no, no. There is no doubt that the statute I'm talking about intends the fact of discharge to be a sentencing factor. There is no doubt. I mean, I can write it in such a way that that's clear.
respondent: --It might, Justice Breyer. The crucial question is whether that statute has created an affirmative defense.
Judge: Now, at that point, Apprendi is a constitutional rule, and therefore does the discharger not have to be presented to the jury?
respondent: If it's--
Judge: All right. If that's so, then what did you say in your first answer? You've had two parts. You had a... a purposive part and you had a historical part. Now, did you say anything, other than saying eloquently and in several different ways, that Apprendi concerned a maximum and this case concerns a minimum, which I am sure that the petitioners would concede?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--As I understand Apprendi, it would.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.
Judge: What do you think the trigger to be? Because in your brief you kept on talking about the trigger being the trip. And I would have thought that you would have talked more about the activity being the attempt to enter the country.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As the discussion so far this morning reveals, the Court's retroactivity analysis takes account of a number of different factors, but the one that is most significant and indeed in this case virtually dispositive is that the application of Section 1101(a)(13) to Petitioner was triggered only because he engaged in voluntary conduct that postdated the enactment of the statute.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.
Judge: What do you think the trigger to be? Because in your brief you kept on talking about the trigger being the trip. And I would have thought that you would have talked more about the activity being the attempt to enter the country.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As the discussion so far this morning reveals, the Court's retroactivity analysis takes account of a number of different factors, but the one that is most significant and indeed in this case virtually dispositive is that the application of Section 1101(a)(13) to Petitioner was triggered only because he engaged in voluntary conduct that postdated the enactment of the statute.
Judge: Counsel, I have to -- I just don't understand this statute. This is somebody we would not allow into the country. And yet the only thing we say is: You can't leave. I just don't understand how that -- how that works.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>That's -- I mean they are closely connected together in time and they both -- but they both postdate the enactment of the statute. But -- well, the thing that is being regulated by section 1101(a)(13) is the entry of aliens into the United States. The statute sets out a comprehensive scheme for determining when an alien arriving at the border seeking to come into the United States should be regarded as seeking an admission. So that's conduct that takes place in the future. Part A of 1101(a)(13) sets out the general definition of admission and then (c) sets out a number of exceptions. And so taken together they are part of a comprehensive effort to codify Fleuti in some respects and in particular Romanette (ii), the 180-day provision is actually a fairly generous codification of Fleuti probably extending beyond what would have been regarded as a brief trip under Fleuti.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.
Judge: What do you think the trigger to be? Because in your brief you kept on talking about the trigger being the trip. And I would have thought that you would have talked more about the activity being the attempt to enter the country.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As the discussion so far this morning reveals, the Court's retroactivity analysis takes account of a number of different factors, but the one that is most significant and indeed in this case virtually dispositive is that the application of Section 1101(a)(13) to Petitioner was triggered only because he engaged in voluntary conduct that postdated the enactment of the statute.
Judge: Counsel, I have to -- I just don't understand this statute. This is somebody we would not allow into the country. And yet the only thing we say is: You can't leave. I just don't understand how that -- how that works.
respondent: That's -- I mean they are closely connected together in time and they both -- but they both postdate the enactment of the statute. But -- well, the thing that is being regulated by section 1101(a)(13) is the entry of aliens into the United States. The statute sets out a comprehensive scheme for determining when an alien arriving at the border seeking to come into the United States should be regarded as seeking an admission. So that's conduct that takes place in the future. Part A of 1101(a)(13) sets out the general definition of admission and then (c) sets out a number of exceptions. And so taken together they are part of a comprehensive effort to codify Fleuti in some respects and in particular Romanette (ii), the 180-day provision is actually a fairly generous codification of Fleuti probably extending beyond what would have been regarded as a brief trip under Fleuti.
Judge: Right.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I think there are two points to be made about that. And the first is that that is a feature of the statute at large. That exists even with respect to post enactment criminal convictions.<|eot_id|>
|
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided facts and the context of the preceding dialogue between the judge and the respondent, craft the respondent’s next reponse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.
Judge: What do you think the trigger to be? Because in your brief you kept on talking about the trigger being the trip. And I would have thought that you would have talked more about the activity being the attempt to enter the country.
respondent: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: As the discussion so far this morning reveals, the Court's retroactivity analysis takes account of a number of different factors, but the one that is most significant and indeed in this case virtually dispositive is that the application of Section 1101(a)(13) to Petitioner was triggered only because he engaged in voluntary conduct that postdated the enactment of the statute.
Judge: Counsel, I have to -- I just don't understand this statute. This is somebody we would not allow into the country. And yet the only thing we say is: You can't leave. I just don't understand how that -- how that works.
respondent: That's -- I mean they are closely connected together in time and they both -- but they both postdate the enactment of the statute. But -- well, the thing that is being regulated by section 1101(a)(13) is the entry of aliens into the United States. The statute sets out a comprehensive scheme for determining when an alien arriving at the border seeking to come into the United States should be regarded as seeking an admission. So that's conduct that takes place in the future. Part A of 1101(a)(13) sets out the general definition of admission and then (c) sets out a number of exceptions. And so taken together they are part of a comprehensive effort to codify Fleuti in some respects and in particular Romanette (ii), the 180-day provision is actually a fairly generous codification of Fleuti probably extending beyond what would have been regarded as a brief trip under Fleuti.
Judge: Right.
respondent: I think there are two points to be made about that. And the first is that that is a feature of the statute at large. That exists even with respect to post enactment criminal convictions.
Judge: Well, I know, and I understand that there is a limitation on actually deporting the person. But here I think the one thing you want the person to do is leave. Maybe for a particular event, but maybe he will decide to stay in Greece if once he's there for the -- but it seems very odd to say: We are going to show you how much we don't want you here; we are not going to let you leave.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>And the second, I think to understand it, it's helpful to look at the history. The distinction between grounds of inadmissibility and grounds of deportability goes back all the way back to the 1917 Act. In that statute, a single crime of moral turpitude was the basis for inadmissibility but was generally not a basis for deportability unless it had a-one-year sentence and was committed within five years--<|eot_id|>
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