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himself. He must of course have food and shelter. But he makes temples
and statues and poems. He makes myths and theories of the world. He
carries on great enterprises in commerce or government, not so much to
gratify desires for bodily wants as to experience the growth of power.
He creates a family life which is raised to a higher level by art and
religion. He does not live by bread only, but builds up gradually a
life of reason. Psychologically this means that whereas at the beginning
we want what our body calls for, we soon come to want things which the
mind takes an interest in. As we form by memory, imagination, and reason
a more continuous, permanent, highly-organized self, we require a far
more permanent and ideal kind of good to satisfy us. This gives rise to
the contrast between the material and ideal selves, or in another form,
between "the world" and "the spirit."
=The Socializing Process.=--The "socializing" side of the process of
development stands for an increased capacity to enter into relations
with other human beings. Like the growth of reason it is both a means
and an end. It has its roots in certain instincts--sex, gregariousness,
parental instincts--and in the necessities of mutual support and
protection. But the associations thus formed imply a great variety of
activities which call out new powers and set up new ends. Language is
one of the first of these activities and a first step toward more
complete socialization. Coöperation, in all kinds of enterprises,
interchange of services and goods, participation in social arts,
associations for various purposes, institutions of blood, family,
government, and religion, all add enormously to the individual's power.
On the other hand, as he enters into these relations and becomes a
"member" of all these bodies he inevitably undergoes a transformation in
his interests. Psychologically the process is one of building up a
"social" self. Imitation and suggestion, sympathy and affection, common
purpose and common interest, are the aids in building such a self. As
the various instincts, emotions, and purposes are more definitely
organized into such a unit, it becomes possible to set off the interests
of others against those interests that center in my more individual
good. Conscious egoism and altruism become possible. And in a way that
will be explained, the interests of self and others are raised to the
plane of rights and justice.
=What is Needed to Make Conduct Moral.=--All this is not yet moral
progress in the fullest sense. The progress to more rational and more
social conduct is the indispensable condition of the moral, but not the
whole story. What is needed is that the more rational and social conduct
should itself be valued as good, and so be chosen and sought; or in
terms of control, that the law which society or reason prescribes should
be consciously thought of as right, used as a standard, and respected as
binding. This gives the contrast between the higher and lower, as a
conscious aim, not merely as a matter of taste. It raises the collision
between self and others to the basis of personal rights and justice, of
deliberate selfishness or benevolence. Finally it gives the basis for
such organization of the social and rational choices that the progress
already gained may be permanently secured, while the attention, the
struggle between duty and inclination, the conscious choice, move
forward to a new issue. Aristotle made these points clear:
"But the virtues are not in this point analogous to the arts. The
products of art have their excellence in themselves, and so it is
enough if when produced they are of a certain quality; but in the
case of the virtues, a man is not said to act justly or
temperately (or like a just or temperate man) if what he does
merely be of a certain sort--he must also be in a certain state of
mind when he does it: i.e., first of all, he must know what he is
doing; secondly, he must choose it, and choose it for itself; and,
thirdly, his act must be the expression of a formed and stable
character."
=Summary of the Characteristics of the Moral as Growth.=--The full cycle
has three stages:
(a) Instinctive or habitual action.
(b) Action under the stress of attention, with conscious intervention
and reconstruction.
(c) Organization of consciously directed conduct into habits and a self
of a higher order: Character.
The advance from (a) to and through (b) has three aspects.
(a) It is a rationalizing and idealizing process. Reason is both a means
to secure other ends, and an element in determining what shall be
sought.
(b) It is a socializing process. Society both strengthens and transforms
the individual.
(c) It is a process in which finally conduct itself is made the
conscious object of reflection, valuation, and criticism. In this the
definitely moral conceptions of right and duty, good and virtue appear.
§ 3. DIVISIONS OF THE TREATMENT
PART I., after a preliminary presentation of certain important aspects
of group life, will first trace the process of moral development in its
general outlines, and then give specific illustrations of the process
taken from the life of Israel, of Greece, and of modern civilization.
PART II. will analyze conduct or the moral life on its inner, personal
side. After distinguishing more carefully what is meant by moral action,
and noting some typical ways in which the moral life has been viewed by