Mirror GitHub commit ee85750d6e24637976519a5c34924a5c44d47886 (committed 2026-09-15T16:44:49+03:00), pushed 2026-09-15T13:45:07Z
84fcd8d verified | # WebSecure | |
| Passive, B2B website-security scanning for local Eilat businesses — a | |
| separate brand from SIPA OS, run by the same team. | |
| **Live site:** https://web-secure.sipa-os.org | |
| ## What this is | |
| WebSecure gives small local businesses (the kind that had a website built | |
| by a freelancer or a page builder years ago and never touched it again) a | |
| plain-language, non-intrusive check of how exposed their site actually is, | |
| plus a paid path to a deeper human-reviewed audit and — as a cross-sell — | |
| website/AI-agent build services from the same team under the `web.sipa-os.org` | |
| brand. | |
| It is intentionally **passive**. Every request the scanner makes is one a | |
| normal browser, visitor, or search-engine crawler would also make. It does | |
| **not**: | |
| - attempt logins or credential guessing | |
| - send injection payloads (SQLi, XSS, etc.) | |
| - brute-force anything | |
| - port-scan beyond the default web ports a browser would hit | |
| This is a read-only, GET-only reconnaissance tool, not a penetration tester. | |
| ## Services (as shown on the landing page) | |
| | Service | Price | What you get | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | Free scan | free | Instant automated pass/fail report from the passive scanner below | | |
| | Full audit | from ₪2,000 | A human goes through what the free scan found, plus what it can't see (outdated CMS versions, weak passwords, exposed admin panels) — clear report in Hebrew within 48 hours | | |
| | Website build (cross-sell, `web.sipa-os.org`) | from ₪1,200 | A real landing page, live within 24 hours — WhatsApp button, Google Maps, HTTPS, three rounds of edits included | | |
| | AI WhatsApp agent (cross-sell, `web.sipa-os.org`) | from ₪4,000 | AI WhatsApp agent for the business | | |
| ## What the passive scanner actually checks | |
| Implemented in `functions/api/scan.js` (a Cloudflare Pages Function backing | |
| `POST /api/scan`). Given a URL, it checks: | |
| 1. **HTTPS reachability** — can the site be reached over HTTPS at all | |
| 2. **HTTP → HTTPS redirect** — does plain `http://` force an upgrade to | |
| `https://`, or can traffic still go over cleartext | |
| 3. **Six security response headers** — presence/absence of: | |
| - `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) | |
| - `Content-Security-Policy` | |
| - `X-Frame-Options` | |
| - `X-Content-Type-Options` | |
| - `Referrer-Policy` | |
| - `Permissions-Policy` | |
| 4. **Cookie flags** — whether `Set-Cookie` headers carry `Secure` and | |
| `HttpOnly` | |
| 5. **Technology/version disclosure** — `Server` and `X-Powered-By` headers | |
| leaking stack/version info | |
| 6. **Mixed content** — `http://` resources referenced from an `https://` page | |
| 7. **Exposed sensitive paths** — a fixed list of conventionally-public-if- | |
| present paths is probed with plain GETs: `/.env`, `/.git/config`, | |
| `/.git/HEAD`, `/wp-config.php.bak`, `/config.json`, `/.DS_Store`, | |
| `/backup.zip`, `/phpinfo.php` | |
| 8. **TLS** — reachability/handshake over HTTPS (certificate expiry is checked | |
| separately in `scan_own_domains.py`, see below) | |
| The scan returns a JSON payload: `{ target, scannedAt, grade, findings[] }`, | |
| where `grade` starts at 100 and is docked per finding by severity. | |
| ### What it does NOT do | |
| No logins, no injection testing, no brute-force, no port scanning. If a | |
| prospective customer needs that, it is out of scope for this tool and would | |
| require an explicit, authorized penetration test — not something a passive | |
| web scanner should ever attempt without a signed engagement. | |
| ## `scan_own_domains.py` | |
| A separate, **not customer-facing** script. It runs the same category of | |
| passive checks (headers, cookie flags, sensitive paths, forced HTTPS | |
| redirect, plus TLS certificate expiry) against a fixed list of the | |
| architect's own 14 SIPA OS domains, for self-monitoring rather than as part | |
| of the WebSecure product. It is currently run **manually** — it is not yet | |
| wired into a cron schedule or CI job. | |
| ## Deploying | |
| The site is a Cloudflare Pages project (`eilatsecure`) already deployed and | |
| attached to its custom domain — no new infrastructure should be created for | |
| routine deploys. To ship a change: | |
| ```bash | |
| export CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN="$CLOUDFLARE_WORKERS_TOKEN" | |
| npx wrangler pages deploy . --project-name=eilatsecure --branch=main | |
| ``` | |
| ## Domains — read this before linking anywhere | |
| - **`web-secure.sipa-os.org`** is the current, working, canonical domain — | |
| a Cloudflare Pages custom domain on the `sipa-os.org` zone. This is the | |
| only URL that should ever be presented as "the live site." | |
| - **`eilatsecure.com`** is a separate domain, registered via IONOS, that is | |
| currently **non-functional** — it is stuck mid-transfer between IONOS and | |
| Cloudflare and WHOIS currently returns "no match." It is **not** live and | |
| should not be linked to or treated as reachable anywhere until the | |
| transfer completes. | |
| ## Repository layout | |
| ``` | |
| index.html landing page (free-scan form + pricing) | |
| functions/api/scan.js Cloudflare Pages Function — the scan API | |
| scan_own_domains.py self-monitoring script (not customer-facing) | |
| REMEDIATION/G15_REMEDIATION_LOG__2026-08-16.md historical one-time remediation log | |
| *.sha256 / *.TAG integrity seals (see below) | |
| ``` | |
| ## Integrity seals | |
| Every content file in this repo is sealed with a `<file>.sha256` and | |
| `<file>.TAG` sidecar pair, produced by the shared `reseal.py` tool used | |
| across SIPA OS projects. A `.TAG` records `FILE`, `SHA256`, `SIZE`, `DEVICE`, | |
| and `TS` (plus any extra fields already present, which reseal preserves | |
| rather than dropping). Reseal any content file you change: | |
| ```bash | |
| python3 /path/to/sipa-os-governance/scripts/reseal.py <path> [DEVICE] | |
| ``` | |
| This README is sealed too — check `README.md.sha256` / `README.md.TAG` | |
| alongside it. | |