| # Security Policy |
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|
| ## Supported Versions |
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| Security fixes target the current `main` branch and the latest published |
| `claude-ctx` release. Older releases are not actively maintained; reporters |
| should verify an issue against the latest release or `main` when practical. |
| ctx requires Python 3.11 or newer. |
|
|
| ## Reporting a Vulnerability |
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|
| Do not open a public issue, discussion, or pull request for a suspected |
| vulnerability. |
|
|
| Report vulnerabilities only through |
| [GitHub private vulnerability reporting](https://github.com/stevesolun/ctx/security/advisories/new). |
| Keep reproduction details, proof-of-concept material, and disclosure |
| coordination inside that private advisory. |
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| Include: |
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| - the affected version or commit; |
| - the affected component and environment; |
| - security impact and realistic attack conditions; |
| - minimal reproduction steps or a proof of concept; |
| - any known mitigations; and |
| - whether the issue is already public. |
|
|
| Do not submit real credentials, tokens, private datasets, or other sensitive |
| third-party data. Use redacted or synthetic examples. |
|
|
| The maintainer will use the private advisory to validate the report, |
| coordinate a fix and release, and agree on disclosure. This project does not |
| currently operate a vulnerability bounty program or promise a fixed response |
| time. |
|
|
| ## In Scope |
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|
| Reports are welcome for security issues in the shipped Python package and |
| command-line tools, MCP boundary, recommendation and graph/wiki surfaces, |
| generic harness runtime, telemetry and exporters, dashboard, installation and |
| sync paths, and release artifacts. Dependency reports should explain how the |
| dependency issue is reachable through ctx. |
|
|
| ## Current Monitor Trust Boundary |
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| `ctx-monitor` is a local operator tool, not a production multi-tenant service. |
|
|
| - The default `127.0.0.1` bind is full local mode. Dashboard reads are |
| available to loopback clients. Mutation endpoints are enabled only in this |
| mode and require the generated per-process monitor token. Browser requests |
| that supply an `Origin` header must match the exact normalized HTTP |
| authority, including the effective port; originless clients are accepted |
| only when they provide the valid token. |
| - A non-loopback bind requires the explicit `--allow-non-loopback` flag and is |
| read-only. HTML, JSON API, and server-sent event routes require the generated |
| per-process read token (or the HttpOnly, same-site cookie established from |
| the token URL). Load, unload, and other POST mutations are disabled. |
| - Treat the printed token URL as a secret. The built-in server does not turn a |
| non-loopback bind into an enterprise authentication or authorization |
| service, and it should not be exposed directly to the public internet. |
|
|
| See the [threat model](docs/threat-model.md) for the complete boundary, |
| implemented controls, and residual risks. |
|
|
| ## Governance Status |
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| Private vulnerability reporting is enabled. The active GitHub |
| [ruleset 15907020](https://github.com/stevesolun/ctx/rules/15907020) |
| CI-protects `main`: it strictly requires the `CI required` status and has no |
| bypass actors. The ruleset does not require pull-request review or CODEOWNER |
| approval, and `.github/CODEOWNERS` currently names only one human. Mandatory |
| independent review therefore remains a human/operator blocker. |
|
|
| Dependabot, CodeQL, and other GitHub-hosted controls are managed separately. |
| They do not replace private vulnerability reporting or independent review. |
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|
