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78. The applicant raised numerous complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention about the criminal proceedings against him. He complained that there had been a violation of his defence rights regarding the examination of the undercover witness, that the judges had been biased, had not given reasons for their decisions and had rejected his requests for the admission of evidence. He further alleged that his conviction had been based on inadmissible evidence obtained by using special investigative techniques and that the witness whose statement had served as the main evidence against him had been involved in the operation as an agent provocateur. He complained also that the documents in the case file had not been translated into a language that he understood. The Court considers that these complaints should be analysed under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, the latter concerning particular aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1, which, in so far, as relevant, read as follows: | 9 |
48. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the Commissioner of Public Interest had refused to call advocates of the Koszalin Regional Bar as witnesses for him. Furthermore, the lustration courts had refused to hear a number of the applicant’s witnesses who were to testify that he had not been a secret and conscious collaborator of the security service. He also complained that he had been deprived of the right to practise as an advocate for ten years and accordingly sustained significant moral and pecuniary damage. Lastly, the applicant alleged that judges of the Lustration Chamber of the Warsaw Court of Appeal had not been permanently assigned to either the first or the second-instance lustration court but had heard cases sometimes sitting on the first-instance court and sometimes sitting on the second-instance court. | 9 |
24. The Government were of the view that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention did not apply to the proceedings concerning the imposition of solitary confinement on the applicant. This provision did not apply to incidental proceedings conducted in the course of criminal proceedings concerning the determination of a criminal charge, even when important procedural issues were determined in them. Such proceedings did not relate to the merits of the criminal case against the applicant. As a consequence, they did not concern the determination of a criminal charge against him. The procedural safeguards laid down by Article <mask> of the Convention did not, as a rule, apply to various preliminary measures which could be taken as a part of a criminal investigation before bringing a criminal charge, such as the arrest or interviewing of a suspect (Escoubet v. Belgium [GC], no. 26780/95, § 34, ECHR 1999‑VII). | 9 |
41. The applicants submitted that in the absence of a prosecuting party the trial judges had taken on the role of the prosecution. The court therefore was not “independent and impartial” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The first applicant also alleged that the domestic courts had dismissed the testimonies of the defence witnesses and video recording favourable to him while giving weight to the written statements of the police officers. | 9 |
38. The applicant complained that the domestic courts had not taken into consideration the evidence proving the unlawfulness of the Ministry's refusal to register the association and had failed to properly examine the complaint concerning the Ministry's breach of statutory time-limits for an official response to the state registration request. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows: | 9 |
30. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the length of the proceedings had been excessive. He further argued that the Supreme Court had re-established the facts of the case although it had not been vested with such a jurisdiction; that it had not been impartial and independent, as it had decided under the Government's influence. He further maintained that it had not decided in public. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
57. The applicant submitted that the disciplinary proceedings against him had been a drastic step. By their very nature and consequences a “right” in the sense of Article <mask> of the Convention had been created. Any public‑law features of a disciplinary nature in the case did not exclude the proceedings from the scope of Article 6 since their outcome had been severe and far-reaching: the applicant had been dismissed from his post, affecting his career and professional activities. The fact that Articles 12 § 5 and 30 of the Constitution, which contained equivalent guarantees to Article 6 of the Convention, had been applicable to the disciplinary proceedings were indicative of the civil nature of the right at stake. | 9 |
19. The applicant complained that the manner in which the domestic courts had dismissed his claim had not been in compliance with Article <mask> of the Convention. In this connection, he also relied on Article 13 of the Convention. The Court considers that these complaints should be examined as an “access to a court” complaint under Article 6 (see Akdeniz v. Turkey, no. 25165/94, § 88, 31 May 2005). The applicant also complained that the judges had been biased and the principle of equality of arms had been violated. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
135. The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that various irregularities in the criminal proceedings against him had rendered them unfair. In his view, his conviction had been based on insufficient and inadmissible evidence. In particular, the courts had taken into account the expert report of 13 April 2004, and had rejected an alternative expert report submitted by the defence. Also, the courts had incorrectly assessed statements by a number of prosecution witnesses and referred, in convicting the applicant, to a statement by a witness who had lodged an anonymous complaint, and to a statement by another witness who had been biased against the applicant. At the same time, in the applicant’s view, the courts had failed to give appropriate weight to the statements of the defence witnesses. The applicant also disputed the establishment of facts by the trial court, stating that its relevant findings had not been substantiated with sufficient evidence. | 9 |
26. The applicants also complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of non-enforcement of the judgments of 11 December 2001 delivered by the Ryazan Garnison Military Court. Invoking the same provisions the applicant S. Panchenko also complained of delayed enforcement of the two other judgments delivered by the same court on 13 and 20 December 2001 and of insufficient compensation subsequently awarded by the same court on account of this delayed enforcement. The relevant parts of the Convention’s provisions are cited above. | 9 |
45. The applicant complained that the prolonged failure to enforce the judgments of 12 May 1999, as clarified on 7 September 1999, 21 July 1999, as upheld on 5 October 1999, 10 May 2000, as upheld on 22 June 2000, and 16 May 2000 violated Article <mask> of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of Article 6 provide as follows: | 9 |
26. The applicant argued that the dismissal of her “Pinto” compensation claim as being out of time had disregarded the Court’s case-law to the effect that the execution phase is an integral part of the “trial” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Thus, according to the applicant, based on the principles set out in the Cocchiarella judgment (cited above, §§ 87‑90), the “final domestic decision”, to be taken as a starting point for the six-month period within which to bring a claim for just satisfaction under section 4 of Law no. 89 of 2001, should be the garnishee order of 25 January 2005 issued by the enforcements judge. | 9 |
27. The Government submitted that the proceedings regarding the trial of the preliminary issue of jurisdiction of the Larnaca District Court and the appeal lodged against the decision of that court in this respect should be excluded from the period concerned in determining the overall period of the proceedings. They relied on the case of Buchholz v. Germany (judgment of 6 May 1981, Series A no. 42) which in their view was applicable in the present case, since the courts were not called on to determine the dispute between the parties; their ruling did not relate to the right claimed by the applicant against the defendant. Therefore, they argued that these proceedings did not fall within the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 9 |
80. The applicant further complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in that the courts had refused to obtain an opinion from an expert in photographic analysis in order to show that the impression created by one of the published photographs, namely that he was exchanging a French kiss with the seminarian K., was an optical illusion. | 9 |
64. The Government, referring to the complexity of the case, number of participants and conduct of the parties to the proceedings, pleaded that the proceedings had been held within the reasonable time. In particular, they submitted that the authorities had carried out twenty-three forensic examinations and interrogated more than six hundred witnesses. The criminal limb of the proceedings had been also complicated by civil actions brought by the victims, numbering in total up to twelve persons. The civil limb of the proceedings had been complicated by the claimants, including the applicant, who had enjoyed their procedural rights (for example, modified their claims, inter alia, indicating new defendants to the case whose number on different stages of the proceedings ranged from four to eight, appealed against court decisions, lodged various requests, etc.). On several occasions the parties had requested the hearings be adjourned and had failed to appear before the courts, which according to the Government had delayed the progress of the proceedings for eleven months. The domestic authorities, on the other hand, had caused no delays and a fortiori had taken measures to speed up the proceedings. Accordingly, the Government concluded that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in the present case. | 9 |
32. The Government submitted that the judgments in Phillips v. the United Kingdom (cited above) and in R. v. Benjafield (see paragraph 26 above) had recognised that the 1994 Act was designed to combat the serious problem of drug trafficking, by punishing convicted offenders, deterring other offences and reducing the profits available to fund future drug-trafficking ventures. The objectives of the legislation reflected not only national but also international policy, as was made clear by the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs (see paragraph 27 above). Moreover, as also found in those judgments, the operation of the legislation was compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention and provided a number of safeguards for the defendant. | 9 |
70. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been denied access to court twice (in November 2005 and June 2006) in connection with several charges related to a cover-up, racist behaviour towards him and a breach of his personal rights because of violation of data protection. He also complained that the Patras Court of Appeal's judgment lacked sufficient reasoning. Under Article 6 § 2 the applicant complained of a claim made by the Patras prosecutor that the applicant had signed a forged document in order to incriminate the police officers. Finally, the applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that his private and family life had been violated because one of the defendant police officers had submitted information on past criminal activity of the applicant's relatives in order to discredit the applicant's statements. | 9 |
60. The applicant also alleged a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the fact that under Moldovan law it was impossible for him to adduce evidence in support of his claim to have his ethnic origin changed from Moldovan to Romanian. Since this complaint relates to the same matters as those considered under Article 8, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine it separately (see, mutatis mutandis, Megadat.com S.R.L. v. Moldova, no. 21151/04, § 80, 8 April 2008). | 9 |
16. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that their right of access to court was violated by the refusal to hold a hearing at which they could challenge the order made by the High Court of Justiciary on 15 February 2005. They further complained under Article 10 of the Convention that this was an unjustified interference with their right to impart information as guaranteed by that Article. Finally, under Article 13 of the Convention, they complained that there was no effective remedy to challenge the making of an order under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1983. | 9 |
24. The applicant submitted that the Administrative Court had unlawfully dismissed his request to hold an oral hearing, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to discuss the expert opinions in the context of a public hearing. Since an oral hearing could have elucidated the facts of the case, the Court's refusal to hold one was in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 9 |
25. The applicant submits that the right to a fair trial in which a lawyer can defend the accused in his or her absence – and therefore without fear of arrest – is an integral part of the right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. Referring to the Court’s findings in Lala and Pelladoah v. the Netherlands (judgments of 22 September 1994, Series A nos. 297-A and 297-B), the applicant argues that, in weighing the State’s interest in securing the appearance of accused at their trial against that of defendants in exercising their right to be defended by counsel, the latter interest should prevail. | 9 |
103. The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account. It reiterates that when an applicant has been convicted despite an infringement of his rights as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, he should, as far as possible, be put in the position that he would have been in had the requirements of that provision not been disregarded, and that the most appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be trial de novo or the reopening of the proceedings, if requested (see Öcalan v. Turkey, cited above, § 210 in fine). | 9 |
11. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the non-enforcement of the judgments of 4 February 2004 and 27 May 2005, as well as, in substance, about the quashing of the judgment of 27 May 2005 and the unfairness of the supervisory-review proceedings. Insofar as relevant, these Articles read as follows: | 9 |
37. The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the length of other proceedings. Relying on Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention, the applicant complained about the outcome of the first set of the proceedings and the proceedings instituted by the company, G., against the Inspectorate, and that both sets of proceedings were unfair. He complained under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 that pecuniary damage had been caused to him and his company. | 9 |
61. The Government submitted that, considering the limited and technical nature of the issues arising in costs proceedings, Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable. In any event the applicants had not raised the question of costs before the court or addressed the Supreme Court on this matter, although they had had the right to do so at any stage of the hearing of their appeal or in their written addresses. The applicants had known that the Supreme Court would decide on the issue of costs at the end of its judgment. The Government referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kypros Economides and Christos A. Theodoulou v. the Republic of Cyprus through the Council of Ministers, the Minister of the Interior and Director of Town Planning (appeal no. 3196, 4 July 2007) in which the appellants had raised the issue of costs before the Court in their written pleadings and the Supreme Court had addressed the matter in its judgment and applied the general rule that costs follow the outcome of the case. | 9 |
72. The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention did not necessarily require a hearing in all proceedings. They argued in that connection that where no controversy existed over the facts of a case and the legal question was not particularly complex, proceedings could be dealt with on the basis of written submissions. They submitted that in proceedings before enforcement courts the examination of a case was done on the basis of the case file. The only exception to this rule concerned objections against disciplinary penalties, where a hearing would be held. In the present case, the fact that no hearing had taken place had not prevented the applicant from submitting his arguments against the decision of the Edirne Enforcement Court before the Assize Court. They also argued that in certain proceedings, such as the present one, the demands of efficiency and economy could justify dispensing with a hearing. They maintained in that connection that if each application submitted to an enforcement court were to be examined by holding a hearing, thousands of detainees and convicts would be required frequently to go outside of the prison institutions which would, economic hardships aside, jeopardise the security and the discipline of the institution. | 9 |
13. The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Izmir State Security Court which tried and convicted them. They further complain that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter‑arguments. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows: | 9 |
59. The applicants complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, under various heads. Firstly, they complained that the 2004 Act had introduced a legislative amendment that interfered with their rights in pending proceedings. Secondly, they complained that the proceedings regarding the compensation due to them have not been concluded within a reasonable time. They relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
85. The Government put forward an admissibility objection as regards one specific complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. They contended that the applicants had not contested the decision to disjoin the case against X from the criminal proceedings against them. They claimed, in particular, that the first applicant had not challenged the rulings of 17 October 2012 and 10 December 2012 under the procedure set out in Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the second applicant had not lodged any complaints at all. The Government therefore argued that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies as regards this complaint. If they had considered this remedy ineffective, the Government claimed in the alternative that they had missed the six-month time-limit for lodging their complaint with the Court. | 9 |
22. The Government submitted that the applicant’s claim was of a public-law nature and fell outside the material scope of the application of Article <mask> of the Convention, therefore it was incompatible ratione materiae with its provisions, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a). They stressed that although access to a court was not excluded expressly in respect of the right claimed by the applicant, this could not create a substantive right under Hungarian law, to be recognised as a civil right for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention. | 9 |
161. The applicant submitted that the civil limb of Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable to each set of domestic proceedings (see paragraphs 31-33 above) aimed at declaring his administrative arrest in breach of domestic law and arbitrary, and at obtaining compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of such arrest. The civil courts had wrongly declined jurisdiction by referring to the competence of courts in a CAO case to assess the legality of administrative arrest and related actions on the part of the police. In both sets of proceedings, the civil courts had wrongly reasoned that the courts in the applicant’s CAO case had assessed the legality of the arrest, by emphasising that the related court decisions had become final. The CAO contained no provision requiring courts in CAO cases to assess related issues of legality. The courts in the second set of proceedings had omitted to assess the relevant factual and legal elements arising from his claim. | 9 |
27. The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair trial on account of his trial by the Istanbul Security Court whose composition included a military judge, the denial of access to a lawyer during the preliminary investigation, the use of statements taken under duress to convict him, the non-communication of the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court Cassation and the failure of the trial court to hear important witnesses. He further complained that the length of the criminal proceedings had been excessive. Article <mask> of the Convention provides, in so far as relevant, as follows: | 9 |
30. The Government maintained that the Respondent State’s liability may only be engaged in so far as it relates to the enforcement proceedings against the debtor while the subsequent insolvency proceedings against the debtor should not be assessed in the context of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. They further argued, taking into account that the debtor was at one point a privately owned company, that the Respondent State cannot be held responsible for the failure to fulfil its obligations. They finally argued that the State cannot be held responsible for the debtor’s lack of assets. | 9 |
85. The applicant also complained that at the material time the courts were not functioning in the Chechen Republic, and therefore the company had to bring court proceedings in a neighbouring region. It was thus placed at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the other party, as the company had difficulty in securing the attendance of witnesses and obtaining necessary materials, and because its representative incurred additional travel expenses. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention which, in its relevant part, reads as follows: | 9 |
62. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had not had the opportunity to question witnesses. He further complained, without invoking any Convention provision, that his health had deteriorated in detention and that the medical assistance provided had been inadequate. Finally, the applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention that the judicial authorities had failed to take into account his detention before 16 January 2005 when calculating his prison sentence and under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that he had had no opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of his pre-conviction detention. | 9 |
27. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been denied access to a court since their claim had remained undecided on the merits due to the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the national courts to decide the case. They also complained about the excessive length of the proceedings. Article 6 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
46. The applicant contended that the reports on his background check had been based on unverified and incorrect insinuations made by the police. Although he had asked for disclosure of the information on which the reports had been based, it had never been provided to him. Instead, the Administrative Court had reviewed it ex parte and thus prevented him from effectively arguing his case. In the applicant’s view, this had run counter to the requirements of equality of arms and adversarial trial under Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant also considered that he had sufficiently demonstrated that he had no problem of alcohol abuse and there had therefore been no reason not to renew his firearms licence. | 9 |
34. The Government stated that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in the applicant's case. In particular, they submitted that the applicant had been duly informed of the hearing on appeal on 17 August 2005 and had been able to request the adjournment of that hearing, that her lawyer had also been aware of that hearing, which was confirmed by his request of 7 September 2005, and that after the hearing of 17 August 2005 the decision of the Court of Appeal together with other materials of the case had been available at that court. On these grounds, the Government contended that the applicant and her lawyer had had a real opportunity to submit an appeal in cassation within the time-limit set by the law. | 9 |
23. The applicant further complained under Article 6 that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair and that the prosecutor’s office had refused to initiate criminal proceedings against third parties. The Court considers that there is nothing in the material submitted by the applicant to suggest that the criminal proceedings against him were unfair in any way. This part of the complaint is thus manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. As to the second part of the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, the Court reiterates that the Convention does not guarantee the right to pursue criminal proceedings against third persons and that Article 6 does not apply to proceedings aimed at instituting criminal proceedings against third persons. It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4. | 9 |
70. The applicants complained under Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (d) of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against them had been arbitrary and unfair, in particular on account of the failure to comply with the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms when the evidence and witnesses had been admitted and examined. They complained about their conviction for acts which had not fallen under the legal classification assigned to them. They also alleged that they had been deprived of having the judgment against them delivered in public because the date of delivery had been moved to prevent attendance by the public and press and because only the operative part of the judgment had been delivered at the hearing. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
93. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him. In particular, he complained that his inability to take part in the supervisory-review proceedings before the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Russia had rendered those proceedings unfair. The Court is of the view that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides: | 9 |
72. The Government, agreeing that the delays in the criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s rape had been excessive, argued that the situation had been appropriately redressed by the competent domestic authorities, which had awarded the applicant EUR 5,000 as compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time. Taking the view that in the specific circumstances of the present case the remedy in question had constituted appropriate and sufficient redress with regard to both the alleged violations of the “reasonable time” requirement under Article <mask> of the Convention and of the applicant’s procedural rights under Article 3 of the Convention, the Government argued that she had lost her victim status. They pointed out that in the proceedings for compensation under the 2006 Act, the domestic courts had taken account of the particular circumstances of the criminal proceedings, emphasising that the applicant’s case had not been handled in a careful, resolute and rapid manner, as required by the serious nature of the criminal acts involved, and that during the lengthy proceedings the applicant had had to relive the abuse she had suffered, which had caused her severe mental distress. Consequently, the applicant had been awarded a considerably higher amount than would normally have been granted under the 2006 Act. In the Government’s opinion, the domestic courts had therefore appropriately examined the substantial deficiencies in the criminal proceedings on which the applicant had based her allegations concerning a violation of the State’s positive obligations under Article 3. | 9 |
38. The Government contested these claims stating, firstly, that there was no causal link between the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and any pecuniary damage claimed by the applicant. As to non-pecuniary damage, the Government considered the applicant’s claim exorbitant as to quantum. In the event that the Court were to find a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, compensation for non-pecuniary damage should not exceed EUR 3,000. | 9 |
42. The applicant further claimed that both Article 70 § 3 of the CCP and Article 22 of the Law on State Fees contradicted the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention. These provisions created inequality between physical and legal persons, the former being able to obtain an exemption from payment of the court fee in case of insufficient financial means, while the latter was deprived of this possibility. Even if a legal person which was experiencing financial difficulties was granted a deferral of payment of the court fee, it would still find itself in a difficult financial situation in the future. In sum, the applicant company claimed that the non-examination of its cassation appeal violated its right of access to court guaranteed by Article 6. | 9 |
33. The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable in the circumstances of the present case concerning the proceedings relating to the applicant’s family disability benefit request. Those proceedings had not involved any contentious issue between two parties. They had been principally conducted by the administrative authorities and only later by the Administrative Court. In the Government’s view, Article 6 of the Convention could be applicable to proceedings before the administrative authorities in cases where there was a dispute between an applicant and the competent administrative body, but only with regard to complaints concerning the length of proceedings. In other situations, such as the instant case, which concerned a complaint about the lack of fairness in the proceedings, Article 6 of the Convention would not be applicable. | 9 |
19. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the fairness of the domestic proceedings, the assessment of the evidence by the domestic courts and their alleged failure to examine all his arguments. In particular, he complained, inter alia, that the domestic courts had committed errors of fact and law and the decisions had not been well reasoned. He further complained about the absence of a hearing prior to the imposition of the fine in question. | 9 |
15. The applicant complained that judge N.H. had been a member of both Supreme Court panels that had examined his two successive appeals on points of law. He noted that the participation of the judge in the examination of the same case for the second time had been in breach of the requirements of the domestic procedural law and therefore that the Supreme Court panel composed in this manner could not have been impartial. Article <mask> of the Convention provides as follows, in the relevant part: | 9 |
38. The Government argued that it could not be inferred from this Court’s case-law that Article <mask> of the Convention requires domestic courts to refer a case to the CJEU or to provide specific reasons for refusing such a referral, irrespective of the content or grounds of that request. According to the Government, the duty to provide reasons when refusing to refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling is “a specific element of the general duty of courts to give reasoned decisions” and, referring to Hansen (cited above, § 80), an appellate court was not required to provide more detailed reasoning when it applied a specific legal provision to dismiss an appeal in cassation as having no prospects of success, without further explanation. Therefore, in the Government’s view, the Supreme Court’s judgment containing a summary reasoning based on section 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act was compliant with Article 6 of the Convention and it should be read as that court’s conclusion that the applicant’s request for the referral of a question to the CJEU did not relate to a point of law that required answering. | 9 |
37. The Government submitted that the application did not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, in particular having regard to the time elapsed after the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Croatia. They submitted further that the subject matter of the applicant's case did not call for particular urgency in deciding it. They referred to the Court's case-law, arguing that the cases that did call for special urgency were those that related to family-law matters or to payment of damages to the victims of road accidents, those that involved the interests of a great number of persons and cases concerning dismissal from work. | 9 |
94. The applicant further complained about the outcome and conduct of the custody proceedings (5 F 283/98 and 5 F 18/99); he alleged in particular that the District Court had been obliged to take one single definitive decision on the attribution of custody when the spouses separated, that the attribution of sole custody to the mother had been contrary to the children's best interest and that the acting judge had been biased. He further complained that his children had not been heard in either set of proceedings, and that he and his former wife had also not been heard. The applicant further complained about the court's failure to determine his contact rights within the scope of the joint judgment granting the divorce and determining the custody rights. With respect to the proceedings 5 F 283/98 and 5 F 18/99 the applicant finally complained under Articles 8 and 17 of the Convention about the possibility of one parent to apply for sole custody according to Article 1671 of the German Civil Code. As regards the proceedings for the regulation of his contact rights (5 F 272/98, 5 F 271/04 and 5 F 33/08) the applicant, relying on Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention further complained about the content of the court settlement of 5 September 2002 and that he had allegedly not been involved in its conclusion. He also complained that his children had not been heard prior to the settlement, that the acting judge had been biased and that the domestic courts had failed to protect his relationship with his children, who had now been alienated from him. Finally, he also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the length of the proceedings instituted under file no. 5 F 33/08. As regards the proceedings for the regulation of the children's contact rights with their father (5 F 134/01) the applicant complained under Articles 8, 17 and 18 of the Convention that he had been prevented from representing his children in these proceedings. As regards the proceedings for the regulation of the grandparents' contact rights the applicant, relying on Article 8 of the Convention, again complained that he had also been prevented from representing his children and that the domestic courts had given priority to the grandparents' contact rights. | 9 |
92. The Government noted that, in Morris, the Court had rejected the applicant's general argument (as had the House of Lords) that service tribunals could not try service personnel on criminal charges consistently with Article <mask> of the Convention. The core question in Morris and the present case was not whether military tribunals were acceptable under Article 6 in times of peace or war but rather whether the applicant had obtained a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and the Government maintained that he had. | 9 |
111. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the investigator’s decisions to recommence the investigation of his case and the allegedly unsafe sentence that was based on contradictory witness statements and misrepresentations in the trial court records. In his application form of 25 April 2003 he also claimed that the late service of formal charges against him breached his rights provided by the Convention. The relevant parts of Article 6 provide: | 9 |
123. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the administrative offence proceedings against him had been unfair and unreasonably long. He also complained, relying on Article 7, that he had been forced to undergo a psychiatric examination applicable only to criminal proceedings. The applicant next complained, under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, of the unauthorised entry into his flat and theft of his property while he was in hospital. He complained under Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention that by ordering his psychiatric confinement, the domestic courts had been punishing him for expressing his disagreement with “the political, moral, legal, religious and cultural values held by a certain sector of society”. Lastly, the applicant complained that although he had never been married, the authorities had mistakenly decided to seek a character reference from his non-existent ex-wife, which he considered to be a violation of Article 12 of the Convention. | 9 |
37. The Government considered that the applicant’s statement had not been the sole basis for his conviction and that the applicant had been represented by a lawyer throughout the domestic proceedings and had enjoyed the rights guaranteed under domestic law. For the Government, a single shortcoming had not violated the rights provided in Article <mask> of the Convention in so far as it could be concluded that the trial had been fair taken as a whole. They submitted that the domestic court decision had been in conformity with the Court’s case-law. | 9 |
60. The applicant asserted that the thirty-two hours (four days) allocated to him for familiarising himself with the case file had been insufficient to allow the preparation of his cassation appeal, regard particularly being had to the fact that the case file had contained twenty-eight volumes (some 7,000 pages). His situation had been further prejudiced by the fact that he had remained handcuffed on the occasions that he was allowed to familiarise himself with the materials, which had impeded his ability to take notes and had caused him severe physical suffering. In addition, there had been a six-month interval between the dates on which the applicant had studied the case file and the date on which he had participated in the cassation hearing, at which he had eventually found himself without legal representation. In the light of these factors, the Supreme Court’s refusal to provide him with additional time to study the case-file materials had breached the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 9 |
38. The Government first submitted that the proceedings in question did not concern the applicants’ civil rights and obligations within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. This was so because the applicants had not shown that their legal predecessor W.U. had been the owner of the property concerned in 1948. The Government argued that he had never acquired ownership of this property, which had been bequeathed to him under the 1918 will drawn up by his father, K.U., on certain conditions. As those conditions had never been fulfilled, W.U. had not become owner of the property and his name had not been listed in the relevant land register. | 9 |
25. The applicants complained that the appeal and supervisory review proceedings had fallen short of the requirements of fairness. In particular, they alleged that the legal assistance provided by State-appointed counsel had not been effective and that the video links provided had been of poor quality. The first applicant also complained that the appeal court had ordered his removal from the hearing and had proceeded in his absence. The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
100. The applicant submitted that the Constitutional Court changed its interpretation of the Salduz judgment in 2012 and 2013 (see relevant domestic law) and different conclusions were then arrived at. He noted that these conflicting judgments ran counter to the principle of legal certainty. It was the Constitutional Court’s role to create certainty; however, concerning the subject matter it had done just the opposite. The applicant relied on the case of Beian, cited above. He noted that in The Police vs Alvin Privitera of 11 April 2011, The Police vs Esron Pullicino of 12 April 2011, and The Police v Mark Lombardi, also of 12 April 2011, the Constitutional Court held that the claimants had suffered a breach of their right to a fair trial under Article <mask> of the Convention in so far as they had not been legally assisted. This interpretation was reversed in the judgment in the names of Joseph Bugeja vs The Attorney General, 14 January 2013; The Police vs Tyron Fenech, 22 February 2013; and The Police vs Amanda Agius, also of 22 February 2013, as well as in his own case. The interpretation was again reversed in The Republic of Malta vs Alfred Camilleri of 12 November 2012, albeit that decision was once again overturned. | 9 |
39. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of unfairness of the proceedings in her case. She also complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention of lack of access to a court on account of the outcome of the second, third and fourth sets of proceedings. The applicant finally alleged that the State authorities had violated her right guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. | 9 |
62. The applicant companies relied on the Court’s principles regarding access to court and legislative intervention under Article <mask> of the Convention, and referred in particular to the Court’s judgment in Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) ([GC], no. 36813/97, ECHR 2006‑V). They considered that there existed no legitimate reasons or compelling general interest reasons which could allow the Italian legislator to legitimately intervene in pending proceedings by enacting a law with retroactive effect concerning facts which had already come to be and proceedings which had already been initiated, thus usurping the function of the judiciary and violating the applicants’ right to a fair trial as well as impairing the very essence of the their right to a court. Indeed, the only reason behind the intervention had been financial, namely to avoid payments in a number of judgments, at first‑instance and on appeal, which had found in favour of the applicant companies and other companies in the same position. This was clear even from the name of the law – Urgent dispositions to favour development and to adjust the trend in public finances (Disposizioni urgenti per favorire lo sviluppo e la correzione dell’andamaneto dei conti pubblici). Without the intervention, and in accordance with the established case-law arising from a multitude of cases including judgments of the Court of Cassation, the applicant companies’ claims would have succeeded. However, the intervention ensured that, contrary to what had already been established, the INPS would be successful. | 9 |
131. The Government submitted that the lustration proceedings in the applicant’s case had been in line with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant had been represented during the proceedings, had the right to appeal, and the Commission and the courts had given reasons for their decisions. He had had full access to all the documents available in the file, which had been examined at the hearing before the Administrative Court in his presence. Given the small size of the applicant’s personal record of around forty to fifty pages and its relatively simple content, the imposed time-limits had been sufficient for him to prepare his arguments in the case. | 9 |
83. The Government reiterated their submission (see paragraphs 40 to 46 above) to the effect that there was no obligation under Article 3 or any other Article of the Convention to reopen domestic proceedings in every instance where a violation of the Convention had been established. The individual facts of each case alone would determine whether the need to ensure restitutio in integrum required the reopening of the proceedings and whether this need prevailed over the principle of legal certainty. The Government also stressed that the applicant had manifestly failed to disclose the nature of the “very serious consequences” he allegedly continued to suffer as a result of the ineffective investigation into his ill-treatment. While the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against the police officers might have led to some disappointment for the applicant, it had not entailed serious consequences for him. In that connection the Government submitted that in the present case, unlike that of Cēsnieks, cited above, no issue arose as to the impact of the applicant’s ill-treatment on the fairness of the proceedings determining the charges brought against him, since the Court had declared the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention inadmissible. | 9 |
19. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the reasons given by the Indictment Division of the Samos Criminal Court presented him as the perpetrator of a crime with which he had not been charged and for which he was not standing trial. The Court will examine this complaint under Article 6 § 2 to the Convention, which reads as follows: | 9 |
45. The Government, referring to the relationship between Article 5 § 4 and Article <mask> of the Convention and, in particular, to the case of Reinprecht v. Austria (no. 67175/01, ECHR 2005‑XII), submitted that Article 6 of the Convention was not applicable to the present case. However, even if Article 6 of the Convention were applicable, the proceedings had not lasted too long. | 9 |
38. The applicant replied that she had in fact exhausted domestic remedies. She submitted that at the outset she could choose between appealing against the CDEC's decision or directly filing an action for damages against her employer. However, in 1996, when she had to make that choice, neither alternative seemed more promising than the other. Had she chosen to appeal, she would have had to rely on Article 120 of the Constitution or Article <mask> of the Convention to persuade the domestic courts to change their then established case‑law. Had she chosen to directly file an action for damages, as she had in fact done, she could try to adduce evidence to directly prove the occupational character of her disease. The advantage of this approach was that it saved her one set of proceedings, while in the same time presenting the same chances for success: the courts examining the action for damages could have relied on the principles underlying Article 120 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Convention and could have examined all factual issues relevant to her claim. Having chosen one set of judicial proceedings over another, the applicant was not required to embark on a second attempt. | 9 |
63. The Government did not contest the applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention. They noted, however, that, although criminal sanctions could follow a finding of contempt, it was essential when considering the requirements of Article 6 to recognise that contempt proceedings were not akin to ordinary criminal proceedings, but were a sui generis form of proceedings which aimed at securing the unimpeded functioning of a court, the safeguarding of its authority and standing and the protection, in the public interest, of the integrity of the judicial process. | 9 |
54. The Government submitted that the fact that the applicant had had no possibility to participate in ex post factum review proceedings legalising his personal search had had no bearing on his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Referring to the relevant procedure as provided for in Article 290 of the CCP (cited in paragraph 37 above), the Government stressed that the competent judge had taken the relevant decision on the basis of supporting documents, in particular the decision to conduct the search and the police report on the search, submitted by the prosecution. Thus, the alleged negative impact of the above-mentioned judicial procedure remained unsubstantiated. In this connection, the Government again reiterated their inadmissibility argument, claiming that the applicant could have challenged the decision to conduct his personal search in urgent circumstances on the basis of Article 234 of the CCP, before the relevant court had legalised its results on 5 July 2004. Furthermore, according to the Government, the fact that the applicant had not been served with a copy of that decision prior to the personal search was irrelevant. Indeed, he had never voiced any grievances in this respect during the pre-trial investigation or before the first-instance court. | 9 |
27. The applicants complained that no prosecuting party had been present at the court hearings in the administrative proceedings against them, and that the trial judges had acted in breach of the impartiality requirement. The applicants also alleged that they had not been afforded adequate time and facilities to prepare their defence. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows: | 9 |
15. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him had not been fair and that his defence rights had been breached. In particular, he complained that he had not been afforded access to a lawyer during the police questioning, that he had not been allowed time to prepare his defence but had been questioned immediately upon his arrest, and that he had undergone an expert forensic examination, as he and his family had requested. | 9 |
40. The applicant disagreed and maintained that the domestic remedies had been exhausted. When she had requested an oral hearing before the Administrative Court of Appeal, the court’s obligation had been to examine her request according to Article <mask> of the Convention. However, the court for some reason had failed to do so. Therefore, the applicant had expressly alleged before the Supreme Administrative Court that there had been a breach of Article 6, due to the fact that she had been denied an oral hearing by the lower court. By doing so, the applicant had given the Supreme Administrative Court an opportunity to correct the violation and to refer the case back to the lower court for an oral hearing. Therefore, the applicant had already, during the administrative court proceedings, exhausted the domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant pointed out that she was only required to try one possible remedy, which she had done by invoking the matter before the Supreme Administrative Court. | 9 |
43. The Government took issue with the Chamber’s judgment. They considered, in the first place, that the matter should be determined by reference to Article <mask> of the Convention and not Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Unlike in previous cases, the Government in this case had not appropriated property to its own use, and had not introduced legislation for the involuntary transfer of private property from one person to another in pursuit of a social-policy objective. The only interference with the applicant companies’ land came about through the actions of private individuals, the squatters, who obtained adverse possession in 1983-84. The outcome of the proceedings was dictated by the applicant companies’ own inaction. They contended that the application to the present facts of the conventional case-law as to the necessity, in principle, for compensation to be paid in respect of deprivations of property confirmed the logic of analysing the case by reference to Article 6: the purpose of a limitation period is to deprive a claimant, at the end of the relevant time period, of any opportunity of enforcing his rights through the courts. That objective would be frustrated if a limitation provision could only be compatible with the Convention if the claimant was provided with compensation against the very person against whom his claim was barred. | 9 |
13. The Government contended that the complaint is inadmissible on three grounds. They claimed, first, that the applicant is not a “victim” of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention because, in consequence of his reliance on the provision before the Court of Appeal, he obtained a substantial reduction in his sentence. Secondly, they contended that even if he is a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34, he has failed to exhaust domestic remedies because it was open to him to bring a civil action under Section 7 (1) (a) of the Human Rights Act in respect of the delay of the hearing of his appeal, but he did not do so. The applicant does not comment on these pleas. Finally, as noted above, they contended that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded. | 9 |
40. The Government considered that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable in the instant case, as neither the interim proceedings nor the main proceedings concerned a civil right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. Relying on the Court's judgment in the Pellegrin case (Pellegrin v. France [GC], no. 28541/95, § 59; § 64 et s., ECHR 1999‑VIII), they submitted that disputes on recruitment to civil service fell outside the scope of Article 6 § 1, as neither the Convention nor the protocols thereto guaranteed such right. This principle remained unchanged by the Court's judgment in the Vilho Eskelinen case (Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, ECHR 2007‑IV, 8 August 2006). The office of a notary had to be regarded as part of the civil service, as he performed functions which were manifestations of public authority. It followed that the right to equal access to the notary profession derived from Article 12 in conjunction with Article 33 § 2 of the Basic Law did not qualify as a “civil” right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. | 9 |
118. The applicant submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable under both its civil and its criminal head. With particular reference to the latter, she reiterated the arguments she had submitted before the Chamber, arguing that the penalties liable to be imposed on her were of a criminal nature on account of their severity and the fact that they cast doubt on the honour, integrity and trustworthiness of the person concerned. | 9 |
36. The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the final judgment of 24 March 2000 had been annulled by way of the supervisory review on 5 February 2001. In this respect the Court notes that the applicant lodged his complaint in this regard on 25 March 2005, which was more than six months after the judgment was annulled. Therefore, this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. | 9 |
102. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the defamation proceedings against her had been unfair. Having regard to all the material in its possession and in so far as the complaint falls within the Court’s competence, it finds that it does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the applications must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. | 9 |
55. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had not been allowed to see a lawyer during their initial detention at the police stations in Chişinău and Ialoveni, and that this had prevented them from challenging the court order for their detention pending trial. However, the Court notes that the applicants did not show that their case had been prejudiced as a result of the above alleged breaches. Accordingly, the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. | 9 |
13. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the judgment of 16 July 2003, as upheld on 14 October 2003, and the judgments of 5 January, 16 February, 15 April, 6 and 30 September 2004 were not enforced in good time. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows: | 9 |
138. The applicant complained that the proceedings concerning the recognition and enforcement of the Florence District Court’s judgment of 18 September 2012 had been unfair, in that he had not been informed of the date of the appeal hearing on 12 March 2013, and had therefore been absent from that hearing. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads: | 9 |
17. The applicant company complained of a violation of its right to a fair trial, contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, it complained that the courts had failed to apply the statute of limitations and that it had not been summoned to the hearing before the Supreme Court of Justice. The relevant part of Article 6 reads as follows: | 9 |
105. The applicant complained that he had not had a fair trial, in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. He further complained of a violation of Article 13, arguing that the rules on the basis of which he had been convicted had been ambiguous. Lastly, he considered that the alleged violations also amounted to a violation of Article 17. | 9 |
4. The applicants were found guilty of the administrative offence of market manipulation, provided for by Article 187 ter of the TUF and punished under a procedure set out in Article 187 septis of the TUF in conjunction with section 23 of Law no. 689 of 24 November 1981. The procedure before the CONSOB is not fair in the light of the standards laid down by Article <mask> of the Convention[3]. | 9 |
36. The Government argued that the mere fact that the Supreme Court had dismissed the applicants’ appeal on points of law as inadmissible did not constitute a denial of access to court, in particular given that it had been the applicants’ omission and lack of care which had led the Supreme Court to reach such a decision. The Government pointed out that the applicants neither had submitted their appeal on points of law as lawyers nor had they submitted a Bar exam certificate. In the Government’s view, it was not the responsibility of the Virovitica Municipal Court to request the first applicant to submit additional documents in support of his appeal on points of law. The Government also argued that the first applicant had failed to inform any of the courts that he had qualified as a lawyer in the course of the proceedings. Finally, the Government pointed out that the domestic courts had conducted separate proceedings to ascertain the validity of the applicants’ allegations, and had found them to be untrue. In the Government’s view, by doing so the Republic of Croatia had fulfilled its positive obligations under the access-to-court limb of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 9 |
18. The applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which tried them. They further submitted that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation had never been served on them, thus depriving them of the opportunity to put forward their counter-arguments. Moreover, the applicants also claimed that they had been denied the assistance of a lawyer during the initial stages of the criminal proceedings. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides: | 9 |
111. The applicant alleged a violation of her right to an independent and impartial tribunal with full jurisdiction and of her right to a public hearing. She further alleged that, following the reclassification of the facts by the CSM, she had not been informed in detail of the accusation against her and had therefore not had adequate time and facilities for the preparation of her defence. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in its relevant parts provides: | 9 |
44. The applicant maintained that any waiver by him of a trial by court-martial could not be considered to be valid. The Government observed that the applicant declined to elect trial by court-martial and submitted that there were no important public interest considerations which might suggest that the matter should have been dealt with otherwise than summarily. In such circumstances, they argued that he made a voluntary, informed and unequivocal election to waive his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Contrary to the position in the case of Thompson v. the United Kingdom (no. 36256/97, 15 June 2004), the present applicant could have chosen a court-martial convened under the 1996 Act which would have fully complied with the requirements of the Convention (Cooper v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48843/99, ECHR 2003‑XII). He could have taken legal advice and, even if he could not be legally represented at the summary hearing, he had access to the Accused’s Adviser. | 9 |
79. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been denied a fair hearing because (i) the trial judge had been manifestly biased against them and had overtly favoured the defendants; (ii) they had not benefited from the equality-of-arms principle; and (iii) the court had refused to admit their evidence and made findings that had been perverse and unsustainable in the light of the facts. Article 6, in its relevant part, provides as follows: | 9 |
25. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him. Furthermore, he complained that the decision of the Supreme Court of 19 November 2002 had prevented him from exercising his defence rights properly and thus rendered the supervisory review proceedings unfair. The Court is of the view that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides: | 9 |
23. The applicant averred that compliance of the domestic court with the reasonable-time requirement in examining her case against the company could only have been established by the proceedings against the Ministry of Finance which she had sought to initiate. However, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, the Russian courts had refused to examine her claim, relying on the fact that the domestic law had not determined territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction over such claims. | 9 |
22. The applicants complained that their right to a fair trial under Article <mask> of the Convention had been violated as the Appeal Court had convicted the first applicant and ordered the forfeiture of the profit gained by the applicant company without holding an oral hearing and the Supreme Court had upheld this judgment. Due to the lack of an oral hearing, the applicants had not been able to present all evidence in the case. | 9 |
161. The applicant Mr Rakov complained that his claim for compensation had been adjudicated in his absence and the absence of his chosen representative by both the first-instance and appellate courts. The Court reiterates that the Russian Code of Civil Procedure, as worded at the material time, provided for oral hearings before courts of appeal, and that the scope of review by appellate courts was not limited to matters of law but also extended to factual issues. The appellate courts were empowered to carry out a full review of the case and to consider additional evidence and arguments which had not been examined in the first-instance proceedings. Given the broad scope of review of the appellate court, the fair trial guarantees enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention, including in particular the right to make oral submissions to the court, were as important in the appellate proceedings as they were in the first-instance courts (see Gankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 2430/06 and 3 others, § 40, 31 May 2016, and Barkov and Others v. Russia, no. 38054/05 and 8 others, 19 July 2016). | 9 |
20. The applicant complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the quashing by way of supervisory review of the binding and enforceable judgment in her favour. She further complained of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in relation to the same facts. Both provisions, insofar as relevant, read as follows: | 9 |
51. The Government conceded that the courts had not examined the video cassette recording of the applicant's interviews on 4 and 5 June 1997. However, that did not raise an issue under Article <mask> of the Convention, since there was sufficient evidence that the applicant had not been ill-treated. The courts found that all the pieces of evidence in the case were consistent with each other and with the applicant's statements. They adopted judgments based on the facts of the case and having followed exactly the procedural requirements of the criminal proceedings. | 9 |
23. The applicant complained of an unjustified delay in the execution of the judgment of 23 December 2003 and a violation of his property rights as a result of non-enforcement of this judgment. Although the applicant did not specifically rely on any Convention provisions, the Court considers that the substance of this complaint must be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Article 6 reads as follows: | 9 |
51. The Government noted that the Court had repeatedly found that the Contracting States enjoyed wide discretion as regards the choice of the means to ensure that their legal systems are in compliance with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. In the Government’s view the flaws in the District Court’s procedure did not by themselves constitute a violation if these defects were remedied on appeal. The requirement of fairness in Article 6 of the Convention had been interpreted to mean that it covered the proceedings as a whole, and as a result flaws at one level might be put right at a later stage. Article 6 of the Convention did not require an appeal court to order a retrial at first instance if new evidence were submitted on appeal and the right to retrial was not, as such, included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. In this respect the Government referred to the Commission decision in the case of Callaghan and others v. the United Kingdom (no. 14739/89, Commission decision of 9 May 1989, Decisions and Reports 60, p. 296). | 9 |
44. The applicants also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic courts had been partial, that they had incorrectly assessed the facts and applied the domestic law. However, in the light of all the materials in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in these provisions in that respect. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) of the Convention. | 9 |
42. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the outcome of the criminal proceedings and alleged violations of the presumption of innocence and of his right to adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence. Also, he complained under Article 13 of a lack of effective domestic remedies and, with reference to Article 14, of discrimination on the ground of his political opinions. | 9 |
23. The Government concluded that they enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in respect of the rules they introduced for the exercise of the right of access to a court and in this case, the rule that the reasons for appeal should have been included in the report by which the legal remedy was lodged did not violate Article <mask> of the Convention. The dismissal of the applicant’s appeal as inadmissible was entirely the applicant’s fault as he had omitted to include the reasons for his appeal in the relevant report, even though he could have consulted his lawyer. | 9 |
18. The applicant complained about the lengthy non-enforcement of the judgment of the Neryungri Town Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) of 16 March 2001, as upheld on 11 July 2001. She relied on Articles 1, 3 and 6 of the Convention. The Court will examine the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Article 6, in so far as relevant, provides as follows: | 9 |
137. The applicant complained that the domestic criminal investigation had been ineffective and that the civil proceedings instituted by her had been unfair. She submitted that the courts had not been objective in their assessment of the facts and had failed to redress the grievance which she bore as a result of the beating by the police. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and, in substance, on Article 13 of the Convention. | 9 |
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