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94. The applicant also complained that his right to have his family life respected had been breached on account of delays in the proceedings concerning child custody and contact arrangements as well as in the criminal proceedings. He also complained that as a result of the ineffectiveness of the proceedings he could not have had regular contact with A., which had impeded A.’s psychological development and their relationship as father and daughter. In this connection, he further complained that the national authorities had failed to make sufficient efforts to expedite the criminal proceedings in order to determine the applicant’s innocence and, as a result, to ensure unsupervised contact. According to the applicant, the national authorities had also failed to order the interim measures sought in civil proceedings. To this end, the applicant invoked Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 7 of the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights. | 9 |
49. The Government considered that the applicant had suffered no “significant disadvantage” (see, among others, Giuran v. Romania, no. 24360/04, §§ 21-23, ECHR 2011 (extracts), and Van Velden v. the Netherlands, no. 30666/08, §§ 37-39, 19 July 2011). The Court accepts that the fines imposed on the applicant were small. The Court observes that the present case raises issues concerning applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to the procedure prescribed by the Russian Code of Administrative Offences and the absence of any provision for a right to free legal assistance under the CAO. Both issues arise in a number of similar pending applications before the Court in respect of Russia. Noting the nature of the issues raised in the present case, which also arguably concerns an important matter of principle, as well as the scope of the limitations, the Court does not find it appropriate to dismiss the present application with reference to Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention (see Berladir and Others v. Russia, no. 34202/06, § 34, 10 July 2012, and also paragraph 40 above). | 9 |
38. The Government submitted that the sums in question were excessive. They argued that the applicants could seek compensation only in respect of a possible violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. Thus any claim in respect of pecuniary damage was unfounded since it was not for the Court to speculate as to whether the applicants would succeed with their claim before the domestic courts. | 9 |
16. The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Malatya State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He claimed that in refusing his request for the examination of the signature on the deposition, and in relying on the statements of witnesses whom he did not confront, the court violated his right to a fair hearing. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows: | 9 |
98. The Government maintained that the applicants had not exhausted available domestic remedies as regards this part of their application. The Government argued that in their submissions to the Supreme Court the applicants had not requested that the District Court judgment be quashed and the case be referred back for a new trial. Furthermore, they had not claimed that it was necessary to have a new trial before the District Court, even though they had maintained that the procedure before the first instance court had been flawed and in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 70 of the Constitution. Moreover, nowhere in their submissions to the Supreme Court had they argued that the court could not remedy the defects in the lower court’s proceedings. | 9 |
64. The applicant further complained of the fact that the civil proceedings in which he had challenged his conditions of detention in the IVS had been conducted in his absence on the ground that the domestic law did not provide for the participation of convicted detainees in civil proceedings. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows: | 9 |
40. The applicant complained that he had not been allowed to be defended by counsel of his own choosing, with whom he could have spoken Finnish and whose pleadings he would have been able to fully understand. Describing his level of Swedish as “street Swedish”, he maintained that he had been able to communicate with H., the counsel appointed for him, only via an interpreter and that H., as a consequence, had not been able to carry out his duties properly. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, provides the following: | 9 |
19. The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint did not fall within the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention. The court hearing held on 18 March 2005 concerned the execution of two sentences imposed earlier on the applicant. Under Russian law, a hearing of this type was not considered to be part of the proceedings concerning determination of the criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. A hearing of this type was of a formal character. The court was not competent to decide the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused, or to establish the circumstances of the case, or to assess evidence, or to verify the lawfulness or well-foundedness of the verdict. It was incumbent on the domestic court to determine only the way in which the applicant was to serve the two criminal sentences imposed on him consecutively in accordance with the “arithmetical” rules set out in the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. | 9 |
29. The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court which tried him. The applicant further complained that the length of the criminal proceedings brought against him, which are still pending, was in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads: | 9 |
17. The applicants complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. They further complained under the same Article that the Court of Cassation, in its decision of 13 November 1984, had made a procedural mistake. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
21. The Government further referred to an earlier case, against Russia (see Nurmagomedov v. Russia, no. 30138/02, §§ 40-51, 7 June 2007). In Nurmagomedov the Court had held that the proceedings concerning the bringing of an offender’s sentence in line with the amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation fell outside the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government considered that the present case bore a close resemblance to Nurmagomedov and it should, accordingly, be dismissed as being incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention provisions. | 9 |
75. The applicants complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, because neither the Constitutional Court nor the Administrative Court dealt with the first applicant’s complaints on the merits. They further complained under the same provision that the Independent Administrative Panel in its decision of 6 April 2009 did not take all factors into account when making its legal assessment. They also relied on Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention, without further substantiating their complaint. | 9 |
60. The applicant contested the Government's submissions. He stated that the President of the Regional Court lacked impartiality when lodging his protest against the ruling of 13 March 2001 and subsequently chairing its examination by the Presidium. The applicant also considered that the Presidium's decision of 27 June 2001 was incompatible with the principles of equality of arms and rule of law guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. | 9 |
25. The applicant also complained under Article 5 § 2 about the authorities’ failure to provide him with an interpreter at a certain stage of the investigation. He further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the excessive length of the proceedings against him. Under the same Article he complained that his right to be presumed innocent had been breached by the length of his pre-trial detention and by the fact that during his pre-trial detention he had been held in a cell together with convicted prisoners. Finally, the applicant complained in substance under Article 6 § 3 (b) that one of the hearings on the extension of his pre-trial detention had been held in the presence of a court-appointed lawyer who had not been afforded sufficient time for the preparation of his defence. | 9 |
31. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been denied a fair trial because the initial compensation proceedings before the Van Administrative Court had been dismissed erroneously on the ground that he had not paid some of the court fees, whereas he had duly made all the payments requested by that court. He further complained of the excessive length of the compensation proceedings and claimed, in broad terms, that courts in Turkey were not impartial. The relevant part of Article 6 of the Convention reads as follows: | 9 |
50. The Government contested the applicability of Article 6 to the dispute raised by the applicant. Relying on the Court's judgment in the case of Pellegrin v. France ([GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999‑VIII), they argued that the complaint brought by the applicant was outside the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention, since the proceedings in the domestic courts concerned a dispute between the applicant and his employer, the Ministry of Defence. | 9 |
92. The applicant company disagreed and argued that the quashing of the judgment of 27 October 1999 had violated its right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The letter of the Prosecutor General's Office of 8 June 2004 had not disclosed any “new and essential facts or circumstances which were unknown and could not have been known earlier” in the sense of Article 449(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The submissions made by the Prosecutor General's Office in that letter, namely that Oferta Plus had not presented enough evidence concerning the electricity supplied, had already been made by the Ministry of Finance and by the Prosecutor General's Office and had been dismissed by the Supreme Court of Justice in its judgments of 7 February 2001 and 7 May 2001. | 9 |
51. The Government pointed out that no evidence of the alleged pecuniary damage had been adduced and that there was no causal link with the alleged violation. They argued, in particular, that although the applicant’s ex-husband had admittedly stopped paying her maintenance following the declaration of enforceability of the decision annulling the marriage, the applicant had subsequently secured a friendly settlement of the issue (see paragraph 30 above): she had therefore already obtained, at least in part, payment of the maintenance due for the years 1992-99. The Government further maintained that a finding of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention would constitute sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage alleged. | 9 |
31. The Government argued that the case was of some complexity as the trial court had had to order an expert examination to determine the degree of the applicant's disability. They also stated that on four occasions the hearings had been adjourned because of the applicant's and his lawyer's failure to appear and once following a request by the applicant. The applicant had made four challenges to the presiding judge, which had further contributed to the length of the proceedings. The Government submitted that even though the applicant was entitled to make use of his right of appeal, he had in fact appealed on five occasions and had thereby prolonged the proceedings for a considerable time. The domestic courts had fixed hearings at reasonable intervals and had not been responsible for any delays. In sum, the Government contended that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the length of the proceedings. | 9 |
240. The applicants complained that, in addition to amounting to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, their conviction for “organising mass disorder” following an unfair trial had also constituted an unjustified interference with their rights under Article 11 of the Convention. They submitted that the main motivation behind their conviction was the fact that they were leaders of the opposition who had called for a public protest against the results of the presidential election. | 9 |
37. The applicant complained that the five judges of the Constitutional Court who had been called upon to decide on his case had not been impartial for the reasons he had set out in detail before the Constitutional Court and, in particular, because each of the challenged judges had taken part in the decisions on the motions for bias against the remaining four judges. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
79. The applicant alleged that he had not been given a fair hearing in criminal proceedings, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. He submitted that the courts had disregarded the arguments and evidence of excessive use of force by the police and had convicted him solely on the basis of the police officers’ statements. Furthermore, the courts had classified the same acts as two separate criminal offences. The applicant further complained under Article 18 of the Convention that the security measures at the demonstration and his ensuing prosecution for criminal offences had been acts of reprisal for his expressing views critical of the authorities. Moreover, it had pursued the aim of discouraging public events led by opposition activists. Articles 6 and 18 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, provide as follows: | 9 |
125. The Government observed that the applicant had not availed himself of the possibility of withdrawing his request for adoption of the summary procedure, provided for in Article 8 § 2 of Legislative Decree no. 341 of 2000 (see paragraph 31 above). Under the terms of Article 8 § 2 the applicant had until 21 February 2001 to exercise his right to withdraw his request, and if he had done so he would have been entitled to an ordinary trial attended by all the safeguards enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention. | 9 |
27. The Government contested that argument. They argued that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that his personal presence in court was indispensable for the proper administration of justice. In any event, given the nature of his claims, his presence in court was not required. It was also open to him to assign a representative as provided for by the applicable legislation. Given that the applicant had been convicted of a serious crime and was serving a sentence in a penitentiary establishment with strict conditions of detention, his request for participation in the civil proceedings was merely an attempt to be detained, even if briefly, in less strict conditions than those imposed on him. The domestic judicial authorities had observed all the fair-trial guarantees set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant had been duly informed of the dates and time of the hearings. He had been provided with copies of the records of hearings and other documents from the case file. The court had advised him of his rights and had facilitated the collection of the evidence needed to substantiate his claims. As a result, the applicant's claims had been granted in part. | 9 |
15. The Government, relying on the Court’s judgments in the cases of Pellegrin v. France ([GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999‑VIII) and Kanayev v. Russia (no. 43726/02, 27 July 2006), argued that the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention was incompatible ratione materiae because the applicant had been a military officer and the judgment award had concerned allowances for his military service. They further argued that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was also inapplicable because the applicant had not had a “possession” within the meaning of the invoked Convention provision as he had had no right to receive “payments in the amount claimed”. He neither had an “existing possession”, nor a “legitimate expectation”. As to the merits of the complaint, the Government noted that the judgment of 14 April 2003 had been quashed because the Military Court of the Ryazan Garrison had incorrectly interpreted and applied substantive law. | 9 |
30. The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to the contested proceedings, because the applicants had been charged with an administrative rather than a criminal offence. They further argued that the applicants had not raised the jurisdictional issue before the trial court and/or the appeal court and therefore had not exhausted domestic remedies. The Government also mentioned that the CAO did not provide for mandatory participation of a public prosecutor in each case concerning an administrative offence. Their submissions in that respect were similar to those made in Karelin v. Russia (no. 926/08, §§ 46-48, 20 September 2016). | 9 |
44. The Government raised an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They argued that the applicant could have challenged the Kúria’s judgment before the Constitutional Court under Article XXVIII of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, which guaranteed the right to a fair trial. They referred to decision no. 7/2013 (see paragraph 33 above) in which the Constitutional Court examined, in the light of both Article XXVIII of the Fundamental Law and Article <mask> of the Convention, the fairness of a high court’s final judgment, with particular regard to the question of whether the high court had observed its obligation to give appropriate reasons for its decision. In the Government’s view, the Constitutional Court’s decision demonstrated that the applicant could have brought his complaint relating to the unfairness of the proceedings and, in particular, the lack of appropriate reasoning, before the Constitutional Court – a legal avenue of which he had not availed himself. | 9 |
36. The Government argued that none of the applicant’s requests lodged with the office of the Mayor of Bucharest District No. 5 had specifically asked for the identity to be established of the person who erected the fence. Also the applicant’s submissions to the domestic courts of 9 May 2008 had not mentioned the identity of the fence owner. According to the Court’s case-law – in particular MacKay and BBC Scotland v. the United Kingdom, no. 10734/05, § 22, 7 December 2010, and Geraguyn Khorhur Patgamavorakan Akumb v. Armenia (dec.), no. 11721/04, 14 April 2009 – proceedings concerning access to information could not be described as regarding rights which are civil in nature for the purpose of Article <mask> of the Convention. Unlike in the case of Shapovalov v. Ukraine, no. 45835/05, § 22, 30 July 2012 – where the applicant had had a pressing professional need to access the requested information – in the instant case the information the applicant had been seeking did not lend itself to any immediate use; rather, it could have proved useful in subsequent proceedings. | 9 |
151. The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the criminal proceedings, alleging in particular that he had not been given adequate time to study the case and that counsel F. had been removed from the proceedings unlawfully. The Court has examined these complaints as submitted by the applicant. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, it finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. | 9 |
30. The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article <mask> of the Convention that the expropriation of their land had not been in the public interest and that they had suffered an excessive individual burden, in view of the failure to institute compensation proceedings and the subsequent length of the proceedings, together with the fact that Maltese law did not provide for adequate compensation. The relevant provisions read, in so far as relevant, as follows: | 9 |
37. The applicants further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the lack of a public hearing before the Constitutional Court. They also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the Republic of Austria, by repeatedly appealing against the decisions of the agricultural authorities, was trying deliberately to delay the exchange of the right to the use of the wood for ownership of the land. | 9 |
20. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been denied the right to a fair trial since the defendant’s observations in reply to his appeals had not been communicated to him, and since the courts had not considered his arguments and had decided solely on the basis of evidence submitted by the defendant. He further complained that they had not provided sufficient reasons for their decisions, that they had been biased and that the proceedings had not complied with the “reasonable time” requirement. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
62. The Government observed that, when examining the applicant company’s case, the Supreme Administrative Court had considered that the matter was comparable in principle to criminal charges to which Article <mask> of the Convention applied. Both the Market Court and the Supreme Administrative Court had held an oral hearing in the matter to hear witnesses, and the applicant company had actively used its right to cross-examine those witnesses. The applicant company had not asked the Supreme Administrative Court to hear any witnesses other than those it had heard. | 9 |
49. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the lustration proceedings had been unfair. He contested their outcome and alleged that the courts had refused to call all his witnesses. The applicant further complained that he had been required to formally undertake that everything which he had learned during the proceedings would be kept confidential. In this respect he submitted that all notes taken from the case file and during the hearings had to be deposited with the court and could not be taken away. | 9 |
68. The Government pointed out that the applicant's request for legal aid for the purposes of legal assistance in connection with the cassation proceedings had been granted by the appellate court. The State had thereby discharged its obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention to ensure effective access to a court by acceding to the applicant's request for legal aid. | 9 |
53. The Government further stated, with reference to Article 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by a Decision of the Constitutional Court of 14 February 2000, that the summoning of parties to a supervisory review hearing remained at the discretion of the relevant court provided the review procedure was not triggered by an application that would be to the applicant’s detriment. The Government noted that the application for supervisory review, as well as the prosecutor’s pleadings at the hearing, were not to the applicant’s detriment. Given that the supervisory review procedure had benefited the applicant, by sentencing him to a lesser term of imprisonment as a result of a new legal classification of his actions, and by releasing him from serving that sentence, the Government were of the view that the Presidium of the Moscow City Court’s failure to secure the attendance of the applicant and his counsel did not breach Article <mask> of the Convention. | 9 |
98. The Government of Cyprus submitted that the instant application was an exceptional case in which the applicant had been denied each and all of the basic fair-trial guarantees provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention. The violations of her rights included inter alia a failure to inform the applicant promptly, in a language that she understood, of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, to provide her with adequate time and facilities to find a lawyer of her own choosing and to prepare her defence, to allow the cross-examination of witnesses and to provide the applicant with proper interpretation and a transcript of the trial. Lastly, there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that the “court” which tried the applicant was neither impartial nor fair. | 9 |
130. The Government submitted at the outset that, under domestic law, the CSM was a management and disciplinary body for judges. Although it was not a judicial body, it nevertheless satisfied the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention in the exercise of its disciplinary powers. Hence, from the point at which the indictment was drawn up, the procedure before that body complied with the adversarial principle. The judge in question had the right to give evidence; he or she could be represented by a lawyer and could study the indictment and submit arguments in that regard. He or she also had the right to participate in the proceedings by contesting the charges, submitting requests, adducing evidence and raising grounds of nullity. Furthermore, the final decision was accompanied by reasons. The judicial investigator who conducted the investigation did not participate in the decision-making formation of the CSM. Moreover, the decisions of the CSM were open to appeal before the Supreme Court, with the result that the right of access to a court was guaranteed. | 9 |
15. The Government submitted that given the particular circumstances of the case and the procedural guarantees provided by the domestic legislation with regard to various types of appeal, the applicant had not suffered a significant disadvantage. The applicant had had access to two levels of jurisdiction as regulated by the applicable rules of civil procedure. The fact that the second-instance court sat as an ordinary court of appeal had resulted in a more detailed judicial review of the applicant’s case and on more flexible terms for the submission of evidence than in alternative circumstances. In addition, the fact that the appeal on points of law had been examined by a bench of two and not three judges had not had a decisive impact on the fairness of the proceedings, and the substance of the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention had not been breached. | 9 |
96. The applicant company complained about the length and alleged unfairness of the debt recovery proceedings initiated by it against LyNOS (named “the Lysychansk Oil Refinery” at the time) back in 1993 and continuing through 2004. It submitted, in particular, that the courts had breached the principle of res judicata by reconsidering the amount of the debt due to it after that amount had been established by the final judicial decision of 2 July 1998. It also contended that the courts dealing with the case could not be regarded impartial or independent given the intense pressure from high-ranking State officials. The applicant company relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, insofar as relevant, as follows: | 9 |
39. The Government argued that the applicant's case had been examined at two levels of jurisdiction. Neither the Convention nor domestic law guaranteed a right to have a civil case heard at three levels of jurisdiction. The right to a court was not absolute and could therefore be subject to certain limitations, in so far as they did not impair the very essence of that right. In particular, the criteria of admissibility of appeals to be lodged with the highest courts could be strict and the procedure more formal than that before the lower courts, without the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention being breached thereby. The mere fact that it was necessary for a cassation appeal to be lodged by a qualified representative was not open to criticism. | 9 |
47. The applicants further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic courts had failed to give reasons for their judgments, that they had refused to hear defence witnesses and that they had been denied access to court on account of the imposition of fines at the rectification of judgment stage. They further complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the damages awarded to the claimants had been excessive. | 9 |
23. The applicant also submitted other complaints under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In particular, she complained about the State's failure to provide her with a car, the length of the proceedings and the allegedly insufficient amount of compensation granted in 1998. Finally, she complained that she had been unable to withdraw those monies from her bank account and that the money had lost its purchasing value due to inflation. | 9 |
41. The applicant further complained of violations of Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, he alleged that he had been denied a fair hearing since the domestic court decisions were arbitrary and without reasoning. He also submitted that the compensation he had been ordered to pay to the plaintiff had amounted to a violation of his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. | 9 |
35. The applicant complained that he had been denied the assistance of a lawyer while in police custody. He also complained that the trial court had convicted him on the basis of his police statements, which he alleged had been obtained by torture. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court considers that these complaints should be examined under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, of which the relevant part reads as follows: | 9 |
30. The applicant complains under Article <mask> of the Convention that she was not notified of the hearings on 30 October 2001 and 22 April 2003 and therefore did not attend them. She also complains about the length of proceedings in the first land dispute. Finally, she complains in general terms that the courts were biased in favour of the other party and delayed the proceedings. | 9 |
77. The applicant submitted that she had been deprived of her right of access to court, as she had not received the plaintiff’s claim or summonses to the hearings. Hence, she had been unaware of the divorce proceedings. As a result, she had been deprived of other procedural rights emanating from the right to fair trial, such as the right to take part in the proceedings, present her arguments and evidence, consult the case file, contest the arguments and evidence of the other party, appeal against the judgment, and so forth. Also her right to an oral hearing and right to equality of arms had been violated. Besides, the conclusion of the Senate of the Supreme Court that Article <mask> of the Convention had not been applicable to the instant case, merely because it had viewed the case as having no prospects of success, had constituted a serious violation of her right to a fair trial. | 9 |
24. The applicants further complain under Article <mask> of the Convention about the lack of reasoning in the Supreme Administrative Court decisions. Article 6 of the Convention does not require that an appeal court, when rejecting an appeal by reference to the reasoning given by a lower court, accompanies its decision by detailed reasons (see Kabasakal and Atar v. Turkey, nos. 70084/01 and 70085/01, 19 September 2006). Accordingly, the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court has to be interpreted to have fully accepted the reasoning of the judgment of the Bursa First Instance Administrative Court. As such this complaint must be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. | 9 |
43. The applicants complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, of the quashing of the final judgment in their favour (see paragraph 12 above). The Court reiterates that the quashing of a final judgment is an instantaneous act which does not create a continuing situation, even if it entails a reopening of the proceedings (see Frunze v. Moldova (dec.), no. 42308/02, 14 September 2004). The quashing of the final judgment in this case took place on 26 January 2000. The six-month period started running from that date, while this application was introduced on 7 March 2003, more than three years later. | 9 |
70. The Government finally submitted that the applicant himself did not wish to have a lawyer, despite the fact that the police officers explained to him his right to have a lawyer and advised him to avail himself of this right. Moreover, the applicant did not wish to have a lawyer during the entire procedure, including the court hearing, which he indicated in the record of an administrative offence. In sum, the applicant's trial as a whole complied with the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 9 |
327. The applicant highlighted the importance of the right of access to court in a democratic society. Such a right entailed an opportunity for an individual to have a clear, practical opportunity to challenge an act which interfered with his rights. The applicant pointed out that there had been no trial in respect of his daughter’s death. He further complained about the failure of the Cypriot authorities to ensure his effective participation in the inquest proceedings and to provide free legal assistance. Accordingly, he submitted, the Cypriot authorities had violated his right of access to court guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 9 |
36. The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account. The Court further refers to its settled case-law to the effect that when an applicant has suffered an infringement of his rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, he should, as far as possible, be put in the position in which he would have been had the requirements of that provision not been disregarded, and that the most appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be the reopening of the proceedings, if requested (see, mutatis mutandis, Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 210 in fine, ECHR 2005-IV, and Popov v. Russia, no. 26853/04, § 264, 13 July 2006). The Court notes, in this connection, that Article 413 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure provides the basis for the reopening of the proceedings if the Court finds a violation of the Convention (see paragraph 17 above). | 9 |
82. The Government maintained that the proceedings in the applicant’s administrative cases had complied with Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the applicant had been given a fair opportunity on each occasion to state his case and to have the relevant witnesses called and cross‑examined. The Government contested the assertion that the domestic courts had taken on the function of the prosecution. They claimed that the administrative-offence case files had been prepared by the police, who had collected the evidence and had presented charges in writing, whereas the court had resolved the cases as an independent adjudicator. The Government considered that the video materials provided by the applicant were of limited evidentiary value and contended that it was in any event within the competence of the domestic courts to decide on the relevance and admissibility of particular items of evidence. | 9 |
45. The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that because of his unlawful conviction, he had been obliged to pay an administrative fine and compensation to the victim. The Court cannot speculate on the outcome of the proceedings had the applicant’s case been examined in full compliance with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. For these reasons, this part of the application should be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. | 9 |
28. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had been unable to participate in the proceedings in which he had been deprived of his membership of company A’s supervisory board. Under Article 13 the applicant also complained that the Ljubljana Higher Court had not considered his appeal on the merits. Bearing in mind that the role of Article 6 in relation to Article 13 is that of a lex specialis, the requirements of Article 13 being absorbed by the more stringent requirements of Article 6 (see Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 181, ECHR 2016), the Court will examine the applicant’s complaints solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943/11, § 65, 29 November 2016), the relevant parts of which read as follows: | 9 |
26. The Government submitted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had complied with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. The trial had been adjourned once, to ensure the presence of officers S. and A.; the authorities had made reasonable efforts in this respect but to no avail. The applicant had consented to the reading out of their pre-trial statements. Thus, he had unequivocally waived his right to examine them. This decision had been taken by him without legal advice since he had voluntary declined the services of counsel at an earlier hearing. | 9 |
50. The Government argued that the applicant’s case had been examined at two levels of jurisdiction. Neither the Convention nor domestic law guaranteed a right to have a civil case heard at three levels of jurisdiction. The right to a court was not absolute and could therefore be subject to certain limitations, in so far as they did not impair the very essence of that right. In particular, the criteria of admissibility of appeals to be lodged with the highest courts could be strict and the procedure more formal than that before the lower courts, without the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention being breached thereby. The mere fact that it was necessary for a cassation appeal to be lodged by a qualified representative was not open to criticism. | 9 |
18. The applicant complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention numerous breaches of law allegedly committed by the domestic courts in the course of the criminal proceedings against him. In particular, he alleged that State-appointed lawyers, who had represented him before the trial and appeal courts, had failed to carry out their duties properly. In particular, counsel Sh. (1) had made an affirmative remark about the applicant’s guilt during the preliminary court hearing, (2) had referred to the applicant as “a robber and a drunkard” during the closing arguments, (3) had not visited him in prison and (4) had failed to appeal against the guilty verdict in the applicant’s case. He further complained that he had not been represented during the appeal hearing of 21 July 2005 and that State-appointed counsel R., who had represented him at the appeal hearing of 16 August 2007, had not provided an effective legal assistance. The applicant also alleged that the prosecution had failed to disclose promptly certain evidence to him, that he had been convicted on the basis of inadmissible evidence, that one member of the jury had been appointed in breach of applicable laws and that he had not been provided with adequate facilities to prepare for his defence. Lastly, he submitted that the supervisory-review hearings had not been unfair. The Court will examine the applicant’s grievances from the standpoint of Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
24. The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention did not apply to the proceedings at issue, because the applicant, as a judge, exercised State authority and therefore belonged to a group of public servants excluded from the scope of Article 6. Moreover, they submitted that the proceedings did not concern an ordinary labour law dispute, as the fundamental question was whether the applicant’s study visit was to be considered as an official journey or not – a question which did not constitute a civil law claim. | 9 |
28. The Government argued that the charges against the applicant were not “criminal” but “administrative”. They emphasised the necessity of keeping administrative offences independent of the criminal justice system, and they considered that a dividing line had been drawn between disciplinary and criminal charges in a manner consistent with Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government submitted that the offence was not of a criminal nature since it was punished with a sanction which had an “educational” and a “preventive” purpose. The sanction provided by the Code of Administrative Offences for the offence in question varied between MDL 36 and MDL 90 and the minimum fine was imposed on the applicant. According to the Government, the fine constituted approximately ten percent of the average monthly salary in Moldova at the material time and it was not converted into imprisonment. The Government also submitted that the applicant did not run any risk to have his fine converted to imprisonment. | 9 |
45. The applicant complained that she had lost her source of income, previously secured by the disability pension, because under the new system, in place as of 2012, she was no longer entitled to that, or a similar, benefit, although her health had not improved; and she submitted that this was a consequence of the amended legislation, which contained conditions she could not possibly fulfil. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. | 9 |
117. The Government submitted that the trial court’s judgment of 24 April 2003 had been set aside because of the unlawful composition of the trial bench. The Russian court had thus acknowledged that there had been violations relating to the trial. That acknowledgment, together with the fair retrial the applicant had received, constituted adequate redress. The applicant had received proper legal advice from counsel K and had unequivocally waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to be tried by a judge. Thus, the applicant was no longer a victim of the initial alleged violations under Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to the criminal proceedings against him. | 9 |
19. The applicant complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the quashing by way of supervisory review of the final judgment in her favour. She further complained of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in relation to the same facts. Both provisions, in so far as relevant, are read as follows: | 9 |
43. The applicants complained that they had not had access to a court as required by Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the Supreme Administrative Court did not have full jurisdiction over questions of fact and law in respect of the part of the proceedings which concerned their application lodged in 1990. This was so since under Polish law the court was only able to examine the lawfulness of the decision under appeal and could not consider any other aspects of the case, such as questions of facts and of expediency. | 9 |
64. The Government disagreed with the claim. They contended that the second applicant had failed to demonstrate that he had sustained any non‑pecuniary damage. Alternatively, the Government submitted that if the Court were to find a violation, that in itself would constitute sufficient just satisfaction. However, should the Court decide to make an award for the violation found under Article <mask> of the Convention, the Government invited it to award compensation on an equitable basis, taking into account the existing socio-economic circumstances in Latvia and the Court’s case-law under which, according to the Government, the amount of compensation should not exceed EUR 3,000. | 9 |
29. The Government underlined that the admissibility of evidence was primarily a matter for regulation by national law and that the use of evidence obtained at the pre-trial stage was not in itself incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. In the present case, the decision of the first‑instance court had been issued following an extensive and exhaustive hearing of evidence and had been upheld by all of the domestic appellate courts. The first-instance court had rightly based its judgment on the statement of J.G., who had been examined by the investigating judge in London and whose statement had been in all key respects identical to his defence before the criminal court in London and consistent with the findings of the final judgment of the Freiburg Regional Court sentencing the fourth member of the criminal group, D.M., for the same criminal offence. The possibility that J.G. had been manipulated should be excluded, as his mental capacity had been verified and several questions and follow-on questions had been put to him. | 9 |
40. The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He further submitted that he was convicted despite the fact that there was no evidence to support the charges against him. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. | 9 |
34. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention, alleging that his conviction had been based on unlawfully obtained evidence, in particular his fingerprint found in the cellar, in respect of which no search warrant had been issued; the domestic judgments had been based on the expert reports produced by the Bureau, which could not be considered an impartial expert; and the courts had refused to hear witnesses in his defence and admit as evidence alternative expert reports. The Court considers that these complaints should be examined under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, taken together, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
33. The applicant company complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of a violation of its right to defend itself in the proceedings terminated by the final decision of 18 March 2005 (see paragraph 17 above), about the outcome of those proceedings and that the domestic courts had failed to assess the facts correctly, had misinterpreted the domestic law and had not been impartial. Without invoking any Article, it further complained that that judgment had violated its right to update the debt in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Proceedings and to receive the loss of profit or any benefit caused by the fact that the due amounts had not been paid in due time. | 9 |
37. The applicants complained that they had been unable to prepare their defence on account of lack of access to the secret surveillance file containing the complete transcripts of their telephone conversations; the secret surveillance file had not adequately been adduced and discussed at the trial in their presence, and the domestic courts had relied mainly on the unlawfully obtained recordings of their telephone conversations to convict them. Moreover, the domestic courts had lacked impartiality and independence, in so far as the third and the fourth applicant had been convicted by military courts and the courts had failed to examine the appeal point raised by the fourth applicant concerning his argument that no criminal investigation had been initiated against him. They all relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows: | 9 |
53. The applicant complained that the judgment by which her company had been awarded compensation for pecuniary damage had remained unenforced for approximately two years, and that this delay had been due to the State’s inactivity. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which, in their relevant parts, read as follows: | 9 |
88. The applicant complained that she had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the Van State Security Court which tried and convicted her. She further complained under the same head that her right to a public hearing as well as free legal assistance had been infringed. Finally, the applicant claimed that the principle of “equality of arms” had not been respected, since the bill of indictment was not in a language she could understand. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows: | 9 |
77. The applicant complained that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, had been infringed by the use of the confession extracted from him as a result of ill-treatment in police custody, when he had no access to a lawyer. The Court will examine his complaint under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c), which, in so far as relevant, provides: | 9 |
31. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention that, in the criminal proceedings against him, the appellate court had failed to deal with his appeal on the merits because he had not attended the hearing, despite the fact that his counsel had been present and ready to defend him. He claimed that his right of access to court, his right to be heard in court and his right to defend himself through a lawyer had been violated thereby. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
23. The applicant contested the Government’s submissions as giving misleading, erroneous interpretations of domestic and Convention law. According to the applicant his case required, both under the domestic legislation and under Article <mask> of the Convention, a mandatory oral hearing owing to his need for legal protection and the fact that the credibility of witness statements played a significant role in the determination of the case. According to the applicant the matter did not concern only 308.80 euros (EUR), but altogether a financial liability of EUR 7,374.92. The applicant maintained that the lack of an oral hearing de facto placed the burden of proof on him. He also emphasised the importance of the threat of the punishment and the impact on his business from having to pay unjustified taxes with no legal basis. | 9 |
31. The applicant complained that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He further submitted that he was convicted on the basis of his statements extracted under torture. Finally, the applicant maintained that the written opinion of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation was never served on him, thus depriving him of the opportunity to put forward his counter-arguments. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows: | 9 |
52. The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the outcome of the proceedings at issue and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that she was not able to purchase the flat at issue. She also relied on Articles 14 and 17 of the Convention, without substantiating those complaints by any relevant arguments. | 9 |
24. The applicant complained that his right to a fair hearing had not been ensured by the court. In particular, the courts had failed to give sufficient reasons for their findings and had not taken the requisite steps to procure and assess the evidence which was relevant to his civil claim. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows: | 9 |
17. The Government asked the Court to reject the complaint raised under Article <mask> of the Convention for failure to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies on the ground that the applicant had failed to raise his complaints before the domestic courts. In the alternative, the Government claimed that the applicant had failed to comply with the six months time-limit because he had not lodged his application within six months of the end of his police custody on 13 July 2002. | 9 |
24. The Government submitted that the judgment of 3 February 2004 had been fully enforced on 21 February 2006. They believed that the delay in the enforcement of the judgment was compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as far as the debtor had been reorganised and the applicant had failed to apply to a court in order to define the debtor's legal successor. | 9 |
35. The Government argued that the search and seizure had indeed been in accordance with the law. Referring to the Court’s finding in Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria (no. 74336/01, § 65, ECHR 2007‑XI) that the search of a lawyer’s premises and his professional and business activities could have an impact on the lawyer’s duty of professional secrecy and consequently on the proper administration of justice as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, the Government maintained that the search had been carried out in a way that had not interfered disproportionately with the applicant’s rights. | 9 |
69. The applicant alleged a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on the ground that the criminal proceedings were unfair because the additional security measures had prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury and therefore breached the principle of the presumption of innocence and/or his right to a public hearing; because the prosecution had failed to comply with its continuing duty of disclosure and/or because the law governing disclosure in the United Kingdom did not comply with Article 6 of the Convention; and because the trial judge had erred in allowing the statements of VO to be read to the jury. | 9 |
30. The applicant complained that the length of the criminal proceedings brought against him was excessive. He further complained in his application form, dated 7 January 1998, that the written observations of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation on the merits of his appeal were not served on him, thus depriving him of the opportunity to put forward his counter-arguments. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as follows: | 9 |
198. The applicant also submitted that the overall length of the criminal proceedings against her had exceeded the reasonable time requirement of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court reiterates that the period to be taken into consideration in determining the length of criminal proceedings begins with the day on which a person is “charged” within the autonomous and substantive meaning of that term and ends with the day on which a charge is finally determined or the proceedings are discontinued (see, among many other authorities, Kalashnikov, cited above, § 124). In the present case, the applicant was detained and questioned as an accused on 28 February 2000 and her conviction was upheld on appeal and became final on 23 May 2001. Thus the overall length of the proceedings at issue was less than fifteen months, during which period the applicant's case was examined at two levels of jurisdiction. The Court does not find such a length of the proceedings excessive within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. | 9 |
56. The applicant also complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, that she had not been a party to the adoption proceedings, that she had not given her consent to the adoption and that she had never even been informed that such proceedings had been instituted. In this connection, the applicant complained that her child’s guardian N.J. had been an employee of the same Centre that had carried out the adoption proceedings, claiming that she had influenced the initiation of the adoption proceedings, instead of protecting the applicant’s rights. Lastly, she complained that she had been deprived of the right to an effective remedy in that she could not have appealed against the decision on the adoption. She relied in this respect on Article 13 of the Convention. | 9 |
37. The Government first submitted that under domestic law there was no civil right or claim to be appointed a liquidator, nor the State’s corresponding obligation to appoint someone in this capacity. The commercial courts were granted discretionary powers in this respect. Moreover, whereas it could be accepted that the court, when conducting insolvency proceedings, had been acting as a tribunal within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, the same did not hold true in respect of proceedings in which the applicant was dismissed from his post of a liquidator. In these proceedings the court had performed an act of administrative, not judicial, character. | 9 |
62. The Government submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable to the imposition of compulsory administration on the applicant bank and to any extension thereof since neither involved the determination by a tribunal of a dispute (“contestation”) concerning civil rights and obligations. The Prague Municipal Court did not determine such a dispute and neither Mr Moravec nor the applicant bank itself were capable of being parties to the proceedings before that court. To criticise the Municipal Court, as the Commission did in the course of finding a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, for not having used its competence to examine the reasons for which the compulsory administration had been imposed and extended, as if it were determining a dispute between the CNB on the one hand and Mr Moravec and the applicant bank on the other, is to reproach that court for something which formed no part of the proceedings before it. The essential function of the court under Article 200(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, when deciding on matters relating to entries in the Companies Register, is not to determine a dispute concerning civil rights and obligations but to verify whether the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation for making an entry in the Register have been fulfilled. In matters relating to the Companies Register, the court does not deliver a judgment or decision. Since the procedure is exclusively a written procedure and is in private, in the sense that there is no hearing, the final ruling of the court is not published. However, the ruling must be reduced to writing and notified to the party applying for registration, from which moment it becomes binding. While it is true that there exists a possibility of appeal from rulings of the court relating to the Companies Register, if by the ruling the application is granted in all respects, no appeal lies since an appeal can only be lodged by the party in whose favour the court has ruled. Subject to the conditions provided by Article 236 et suiv. of the Code of Civil Procedure an appeal of points of law possible even in respect of proceedings relating to the Companies Register. | 9 |
22. The applicant complained that the proceedings had been unfair, namely that she, unlike the public prosecutor, had been deprived of the opportunity to be present at the Court of Appeal's session of 16 November 2004. She further complained that the proceedings had been unreasonably lengthy; that her conviction had been based on inadmissible evidence, namely on evidence submitted in the form of photocopies; that the expert report of 2004 had been drawn up by the Bureau, which had operated within the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, which was the aggrieved party; that the trial court had refused to hear the claimants and lastly, that the courts had not provided sufficient reasons for their decisions. Article <mask> of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
34. The Government submitted that the proceedings in the applicant’s case had complied with the requirement of fairness set out in Article <mask> of the Convention: they had been carried out in accordance with the domestic law on criminal procedure; the applicant was assisted by counsel of his own choosing; the defence participated actively in the questioning of witnesses and victims; and the applicant had an opportunity to express his own position on the case before the court. As to the partial announcement of the 1990 judgment against the applicant, the Government stressed that this was done by the trial judge at the request of the prosecutor at the stage of the examination of the case file material, and not during the questioning of witnesses and victims as alleged by the applicant, and that the applicant did not raise any objections in this respect. The Government explained that a copy of the 1990 judgment was included in the case file because the applicant’s unspent conviction under this judgment had legal importance for determining the latter’s sentence, as account needed to be taken of the applicant’s recidivism and the type of correctional facility where the applicant was to serve his sentence. The Government further relied on the record of the hearing of 26 July 2004, from which it follows that witness M. and victims T. and P. testified without being subjected to any pressure by the trial judge. The applicant’s applications for the withdrawal of the trial judge were duly considered by the court and dismissed with relevant reasons being given. The Government summed up that the reading out of part of the 1990 judgment could not serve as a reasonable justification of the applicant’s doubts as to the court’s impartiality. | 9 |
27. The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.1 that the awards made by the Ankara Administrative Court in respect of compensation and his lawyer's costs and expenses were insufficient and disproportionate. He finally alleged under Article 14 of the Convention that he had not been appointed to a post in the civil service on account of his political opinions. | 9 |
29. The applicant, referring to his constitutional complaint, submitted that it was apparent from the documents available to the domestic courts that in 1952 he had been in a situation under pressure, which had been used to turn him into an informant against his will. He claimed that if he had been heard in person he would have been able to illustrate his desperate situation as an immature young man who consumed too much alcohol. Better than any file of the Ministry of State Security, he could have explained in person that he had never knowingly passed on information to harm others. Furthermore, the applicant referred to a judgment of the constitutional court of the Land of Brandenburg (Brandenburg Constitutional Court) of 24 January 2014 (VfGBbg 2/13) which set aside lower instance decisions revoking compensation grants on the grounds that a former prisoner had committed to work for the state security service. The constitutional court, also considering Article <mask> of the Convention, found, inter alia, that not holding a hearing, thus denying the claimant an opportunity to explain in person a situation of insupportable pressure because his submissions to that end had not been supported by evidence from the files of the state security service, was in breach of relevant provisions of the Land’s constitution. | 9 |
50. The applicants complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 thereto, that the domestic courts’ refusal to examine their civil claims on the merits deprived them of their right of access to court. Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of any case before it (see Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217/12, § 55, ECHR 2014 (extracts)) the Court considers that the applicants’ complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows: | 9 |
25. The applicant complained that the trial judge, R., had not been impartial, that the trial court had relied on the statements of five witnesses given earlier in the course of the investigation without questioning them in person, and that the appellate court had refused to accept his twelve additional statements of appeal. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 9 |
12. The Government, relying on the Court’s judgments in the cases of Pellegrin v. France ([GC], no. 28541/95, ECHR 1999‑VIII) and Kanayev v. Russia (no. 43726/02, 27 July 2006), argued that the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention was incompatible ratione materiae because the applicant had been a military officer at the material time and the judgment award had concerned allowances for his military service. They further argued that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was also inapplicable because the applicant had not had a “possession” within the meaning of that Convention provision as he had had no right to receive “payments in the amount claimed”. He had neither an “existing possession” nor a “legitimate expectation”. As to the merits of the complaint, the Government noted that the judgment of 25 July 2003 had been quashed because the Military Court of the Ryazan Garrison had incorrectly interpreted and applied substantive law. | 9 |
27. The applicant complained that she had been incited to commit the crime of accepting a bribe and that the domestic courts had not given sufficient reasons in their decisions. She also complained that her right to be presumed innocent had been breached by the prosecutor in charge of the case, who had stated in an interview that she had accepted a bribe. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows: | 9 |
57. The Government considered that the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation had properly analysed the applicant’s plea under Article <mask> of the Convention, but had dismissed it on the ground that he had never been refused legal assistance. Given that neither the Court of Appeal nor the Court of Cassation had found any breach of his defence rights, it had not been incumbent on those courts to provide redress. According to the Government, even if the Court of Appeal had decided to nullify the first interview, such a decision would have had no effect on his conviction, as the trial court had based the conviction on other elements in the case file. The Court should pursue a flexible approach based on an overall reading of the situation in the light of the whole proceedings in order to satisfy itself that the aims of Article 6 had been secured (see John Murray v. the United Kingdom, 8 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑I, and Rupa v. Romania (no. 2), no. 37971/02, 19 July 2011). | 9 |
72. The Government also argued that there had been no evidence that the applicant had actually paid the awarded costs and expenses to the respondents. The amount of costs and expenses awarded was the sole responsibility of her predecessor, who had committed errors in indicating the value of the subject matter of the dispute. At all events, in the Government’s view, this was a property issue that should be addressed under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, not under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government pointed out that the applicant’s predecessor had never asked for exemption from the payment of court fees. He had also had an opportunity to request a return of the erroneously calculated fee in the period of one year from the moment of its payment (until 5 June 2007), but he had never made such a request. In these circumstances, although the first-instance court’s error in its calculation of the costs and expenses of the proceedings was regrettable, the Government did not consider that this was sufficient in itself to find a violation of Article 6. | 9 |
27. The applicants stated that even if Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable to a decision to postpone enforcement until a final decision on the action under Section 35 of the Enforcement Act was taken, Article 6 of the Convention was applicable to the final decision which ordered the applicants to pay the costs. They stated that the subject-matter of their application to the Court was not the decision to postpone enforcement, but the fact that they had to bear the costs for the debtor's appeal without having been heard or having been able to settle the matter with the debtor. | 9 |
41. The applicant, on the other hand, considered that as the Constitutional Court had set aside the judgment of the Madrid Employment Tribunal, no court had examined the merits of her claim. She referred to the Hornsby case cited above, and submitted that the fact that the Constitutional Court had set aside the judgments of the lower court did not suffice to make the proceedings compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. | 9 |
54. The applicant bank complained that its rights under Article <mask> of the Convention had been violated in that it had no remedy in respect of the administrative decision of the CNB to place it in compulsory administration or in respect of the subsequent decisions of administrative and judicial organs. It submitted that, during the compulsory administration, its statutory organ should have retained limited competence regarding the acts of the CNB as a public authority, but that it was not notified about the registration of the compulsory administration or of its first extension and that its appeal against the registration of the second extension of the compulsory administration was dismissed as having been introduced by an unauthorised person. The statutory organ of the bank was therefore deprived of any means of redress in breach of the requirements of Article 6. | 9 |
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