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101. The applicant argued that Article 8 was clearly engaged by the covert surveillance of consultations with his legal advisor. Although he accepted that the purposes identified in the legislation permitting covert surveillance amounted to a legitimate aim, he maintained that the relevant legal framework failed both the “quality of law” and “necessity” tests under paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
86. The applicant companies, disputing the Government’s contention, maintained that the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention had been fulfilled. The core issue in the domestic proceedings had been whether the tax authorities had had the necessary statutory authority to carry out the contested measures thereby coercing them to surrender the relevant backup tape for inspection at the tax office. That issue was now the subject of their complaint to the Court. Referring to their written pleadings before the Supreme Court (see paragraphs 31-37 above) and also to certain parts of the High Court’s reasoning (see paragraph 30 above), they stressed that they had clearly raised before the national courts the matter they were now pursuing under the Convention. As could be seen from their domestic pleadings, the applicant companies had expressly invoked Article <mask> of the Convention and had clearly argued the substance of their complaint before the national courts, which thus had had the opportunity, both in fact and in law, to assess the matter under this Article. | 11 |
158. The applicants complained that the searches of their premises violated their right to respect for their private lives and homes because: (i) the warrants permitted entry and search “on one occasion” only which could not be equated with continuous occupation; (ii) the warrants were drawn too widely, thereby permitting search for, and seizure of, almost any item of property. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 11 |
29. The applicant company argued that the images recorded by the use of a hidden camera concerned the behaviour of a public figure who had been at the time a member of the Hellenic Parliament and chairman of the inter-party committee on the widespread use of electronic gambling. Therefore his participation in gambling games had been a matter of public interest in the light of A.C.’s public role and could have affected his duties as a member of parliament and as chairman of the parliamentary committee on electronic gambling. Viewers had had the right to learn the truth about an elected deputy. In any event, electronic gambling had been a matter of general interest in Greece at the time as many citizens had been financially destroyed owing to their participation in similar games. That had been the reason why the two television shows had prepared the broadcasts in question. In view of the above, the broadcasting of videos that had been filmed by the use of a hidden camera had been necessary, and A.C.’s right to private life had been outweighed by the applicant company’s right to impart information concerning a matter of public interest. Both the National Radio and Television Council (which had imposed the administrative sanctions) and the Supreme Administrative Court (which had dismissed the application for annulment) had failed in the present case to strike a fair balance between the applicant company’s right under Article 10 and A.C.’s right under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
51. The applicants contended that there was no opportunity before the County Court to test the proportionality of the interference with their Article 8 rights because the gateway (b) defence (see paragraph 20 above) was insufficiently broad to permit the issue of proportionality to be considered by the county court and because, in any event, the facts relevant to the issue of proportionality were not determined by the court. The only defences available in a case such as the applicants' were that the relevant law was incompatible with Article <mask> of the Convention or that the decision of the public authority to recover possession was one that no reasonable person would consider justifiable, which set a higher threshold than that required under the Article 8 § 2 test of proportionality. | 11 |
49. The applicant complained that the Swedish courts’ protracted custody proceedings, including their handling of his request under the Hague Convention, and the Tax Authority’s decision to remove N. from the population register, constituted a violation of his and his daughter’s right to family life as provided in Article <mask> of the Convention. He also relied on Article 6 of the Convention. | 11 |
32. The Government submitted that, to the extent that the drafting of the report was to be regarded as an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, it had been in accordance with the domestic legislation in force at the material time. Furthermore, it had been necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety and the prevention of disorder. | 11 |
23. The applicant maintained that the domestic courts’ decision not to grant him compensation and legal costs violated his right under Article <mask> of the Convention. He submitted that he should not have to accept being called a rapist without having been convicted of such a crime. In the applicant’s opinion, the domestic courts’ conclusions meant that anyone could call him a rapist in speech or in writing without him being able to defend himself. | 11 |
37. The Government emphasised that even supposing that there had been interference, the German legal system guaranteed sufficient protection. They observed that the present application did not concern the applicant’s right to seek an injunction against the advertisement (Unterlassungsansruch), which the Regional Court had recognised and which had therefore not been the subject of the impugned proceedings. The question was not whether but how the German courts should have intervened. On that point the Government took the view that the possibility provided for in German law of applying for an injunction provided adequate protection against advertising. The applicant had not in fact made any attempt to seek protection against the advertisement, but rather had hoped to derive a pecuniary advantage, even though Article <mask> of the Convention did not provide for any such compensation. | 11 |
66. The applicant complained that during his detention he had been deprived of personal contact with his family. He complained that the prosecutor’s decision of 4 July 2008 refusing a visit by his wife and sons had been arbitrary and that the domestic law had not indicated with reasonable clarity the scope of the prosecutor’s discretion. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention which provides as relevant: | 11 |
79. The Government admitted that the national courts’ decisions to order the applicant’s eviction had constituted an inference with her rights set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered, however, that such interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and had been proportionate to that aim. They further pointed out that the applicant had resided in the flat for only eleven months. Such a brief period could not have resulted in the applicant establishing close ties with the flat as her home. Lastly, the Government argued that the applicant had a place to live. | 11 |
30. The applicant complained that his allegations in respect of Article 3 also gave rise to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, he complained about restrictions on telephone calls. As regards the latter, the applicant submitted that he had often been under pressure from other inmates to terminate his telephone conversations before the allotted time had expired. | 11 |
46. The applicant complained that the adoption of K.O.S. had adversely affected her family life and had completely blocked her attempt to become his legal tutor. Allegedly, this interference with her right to respect for her family life had been unlawful, disproportionate and arbitrary. The applicant also stated that it had not been in the child’s interests, as his links with the applicant, his half-sister and his grandparents had been essentially severed by the impugned adoption. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows: | 11 |
33. The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint did not fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention because the impugned advertisement only mentioned his forename, which was very common and could not on its own have suggested any connection with him. Only the allusion to the circumstances surrounding the publication of the applicant’s book – which, indeed, were attributable to him – had linked the advertisement to the applicant. The Government asserted that the only option available to the applicant was to seek an injunction, under Article 8 of the Convention, against any further public reference to the incidents in question. However, the company had agreed to the applicant’s request to refrain from further publication of the advertisement. The Government took the view that although Article 8 protected an individual’s reputation, it did not confer any right to compensation in the form of a notional licence where the individual’s reputation had been damaged by his own behaviour. | 11 |
137. The applicant claimed that in substance she had also complained of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention with regard to the restrictions on her liberty, her immobilisation and the medical treatment she had received against her will during her stays in Dr Heines’s clinic both from 1977 to 1979 and in 1981. She argued that these facts should also be examined under Article 3 of the Convention. | 11 |
43. The Government submitted that there had been no interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. While they accepted that matters such as dignity and personal autonomy fell within the ambit of Article 8, they argued that the care provided to the applicant during the relevant period had respected her dignity and private life even if it was not the care package that she had wanted. However, the Government accepted that if the Court were to find that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 8, that interference would have constituted a violation from 21 November 2008 to 4 November 2009 because it was not “in accordance with the law” as required by the second paragraph of that Article. | 11 |
42. The Government admitted that the refusal to return of the child to the USA had constituted an interference with the applicant’s right under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, the interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of the child, and had been necessary in the circumstances. As regards the length of proceedings, the Government pointed out that the applicant had contributed to it significantly as he had failed to provide the courts with the information relevant to his case and had changed his position on the facts during the course of the proceedings, which had complicated the overall examination of the case by the courts. | 11 |
23. The Government admitted that the applicant’s eviction had constituted an inference with her right set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered, however, that such interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and had been proportionate to that aim. Lastly, the Government submitted that the flat had not been recovered by the State and the applicant continued to reside there. | 11 |
59. The applicant further contended that the relationship he enjoyed with his children belonged to the sphere of family life protected by Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, he contested the Government’s argument that the interference with his family life had been lawful under Article 13 § 2 of the Hague Convention. Moreover, by refusing to return his children to the U.S., the Romanian courts had forced him to become a party to divorce‑and‑custody proceedings in two different countries and had ignored the proceedings pending before the American courts. Furthermore, he had been unable to exercise his parental rights because of the geographical distance. | 11 |
55. The applicant submitted that his dismissal by his employer had been based on a breach of his right to respect for his private life and correspondence and that, by not revoking that measure, the domestic courts had failed to comply with their obligation to protect the right in question. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 11 |
27. The Government accepted that the residence prohibition interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life. In the Government’s view, the measure at issue was justified under paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention as being in accordance with the law, namely the relevant provisions of the 1992 and 1997 Aliens Act. In this respect they submitted that the applicant did not meet the requirements of Section 38 § 1 (4) of the 1997 Aliens Act, as he clearly had not grown up in Austria from an early age onwards since he had left Austria when he was only seven months old and did not return until he was ten. This had also been pointed out in the reasoning of the domestic authorities’ decisions of 25 March and 27 April 1998 which dismissed his application for lifting the residence prohibition. The measure also pursued the legitimate aim of the prevention of disorder or crime. Having regard to the seriousness of the offence and the severity of the penalty, the Government argued that the measure had been necessary in a democratic society, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention and that the Austrian authorities had not overstepped their margin of appreciation. | 11 |
158. The applicant also stated that the impugned refusals affected her adversely as she felt Austrian and did not want to have Bulgarian identity papers. In the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot accept that the alleged emotional distress resulting from the applicant’s being “forced” to remain Bulgarian citizen amounted to an interference with her right to respect for her private life as protected by Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
31. The Government further considered that the applicant could not plead that a decision on the application was in the public interest, because the Court had already clarified the relevant issues regarding Article <mask> of the Convention in its Pretty judgment (cited above), and Article 37 § 1 of the Convention was not applicable to a case in which the immediate victim of a measure taken by the State had died before lodging an application with the Court. | 11 |
114. The applicants claimed that the intrusion by the Russian military into their house on 10 December 2002 and the ensuing search had been unlawful and had infringed their right to respect for their home, private and family life, as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicants further complained that the seizure of their belongings during the search on 10 December 2002 had not been justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Those Articles, in so far as relevant, read as follows: | 11 |
35. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the withdrawal of night-time care disproportionately interfered with her right to respect for her private life. In the alternative, she complained that by withdrawing the service the respondent State was in breach of its positive obligation to provide her with a service which enabled her to live with dignity. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows: | 11 |
39. The Government argued before the Court that Chapter 25 of the CCP constituted an effective remedy in respect of the applicant’s complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention (see paragraph 21 above). The applicant, in turn, insisted that the suggested remedy was ineffective and that there had been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention (see paragraph 29 above). | 11 |
32. The Government accepted that the exercise of the right to enter the applicant’s home by the investigating officer had amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his home within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered however that the interference had been justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention: the investigator had acted in accordance with Articles 178 and 179 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, which laid down the scope and manner of exercise of the power conferred on the investigator to inspect the scene of the crime; that his actions pursued the legitimate aim of investigating the incident of forgery of an official document; and that they were necessary in a democratic society. | 11 |
66. The applicant also complained that (i) the decisions to order her to undergo a psychiatric examination and to arrest her, (ii) her detention for a total period of eighty-three days, and (iii) the restriction on her right to see members of her family to one visit every month while in detention, were in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 11 |
428. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that, given that they had been at an advanced stage of the adoption procedure and a bond had already been formed between the prospective adoptive parents and the children, the introduction and application to them of the ban on the adoption of Russian children by nationals of the United States provided by Law no. 272-FZ constituted an unlawful and disproportionate interference with their family life. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows: | 11 |
157. The Government concluded, in view of the above, that the present case was different from Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria (no. 62540/00, 28 June 2007) where the Court had refused to apply the “reasonable likelihood” test because of the absence of any safeguards against unlawful interception in Bulgaria. Given that Russian law provided for adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse in the sphere of interception of communications, including available remedies, in the Government’s opinion the applicant could not claim an interference as a result of the mere existence of legislation permitting secret surveillance. In the absence of a “reasonable likelihood” that his telephone communications had been intercepted, he could not claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
62. The Government referred to the Court’s conclusions in Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev, cited above, and acknowledged that before 2008 the first applicant had had no domestic remedies in respect of his complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, in 2009 the SSMA had been amended and a special parliamentary commission had been created whose task was to oversee the services authorised to use covert surveillance measures. The Government observed that the commission was empowered, under certain conditions, to notify individuals of unlawful surveillance measures used in respect of them. Finally, they stated that the new point 7 of section 2(1) of the SMRDA introduced in March 2009 had made it possible to seek damages in respect of unlawful interception of communications. | 11 |
30. The applicant contended under Article <mask> of the Convention that his privacy had not been respected during the strip search in the stairwell, because the doors leading to the stairwell had transparent glass windows. His search could therefore have been seen by other prisoners who had been waiting behind the door to be let into the building. It was impossible to conduct strip searches privately in the stairwell; such searches should have been carried out in specially designated rooms located on each floor of the building. | 11 |
147. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies, as he had never raised any of the specific allegations in the present complaint before any domestic authority and had never relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, or provisions of domestic law of the same or a similar nature, in his applications to the domestic authorities. The Government noted that, under Article 449 of the CCrP, it was open to the applicant to complain to the domestic courts about any actions of the prosecuting or investigating authorities that violated his rights. | 11 |
82. The Government highlighted the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State in the present case. That margin depended on the nature of the activities in question and the aim pursued by the restrictions. In its recent case-law, the Court had moreover left the State a broad margin of appreciation in cases concerning Article <mask> of the Convention (see A. v. Norway, no. 28070/06, § 66, 9 April 2009, and Armonienė v. Lithuania, no. 36919/02, § 38, 25 November 2008). Generally speaking, the margin enjoyed by the States was broader where there was no European consensus. In the Government’s submission, whilst there was admittedly a trend towards harmonisation of the legal systems in Europe, differences nevertheless remained, as evidenced by the failure of the negotiations for the adoption of a regulation of the European Union on conflict-of-law rules regarding non-contractual obligations (Regulation EC No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 – Rome II Regulation). The margin of appreciation was also broad where the national authorities had to strike a balance between competing private and public interests or Convention rights (see Dickson v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 44362/04, § 78, ECHR 2007‑V, and Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, § 77, ECHR 2007‑I). Moreover, the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union apparently took the same approach (cases of Schmidberger of 12 June 2003, C-112/00, and Omega of 14 October 2004, C-36/02). | 11 |
47. The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the enforcement order issued in the administrative proceedings instituted in 1988 had never been carried out. He further complained that the courts had taken no action about the length of the civil proceedings he instituted in April 2002 in the Split Municipal Court seeking the eviction of Z.G. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his right to respect for his home had been infringed. | 11 |
40. The Government maintained that Article 8 was not applicable to the case since the issue at stake was only the personal comfort of the applicant, who had wanted to give birth at home, which could not be part of her right to respect for her private life. There was no scientific proof that giving birth in a medical facility could in any way damage the physical or psychological integrity of a mother or child and thus the legislation concerning home birth as such could not be the subject of an examination by the Court under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
99. The Government further submitted that the interference in issue had been “prescribed by law”. Not only had the legal provisions on which the domestic courts had based their decisions been accessible, but the Court of Cassation’s position had been entirely foreseeable. Its case-law concerning preventive and restrictive measures affecting the exercise of freedom of expression had been well established since the judgment of 9 December 1981 (see paragraph 39 above) and had been applied on many subsequent occasions. In addition, the Belgian Parliament had had occasion to enact a number of measures entailing general bans on expression, for example through Articles 383 and 378 bis of the Criminal Code. A reading of Article 144 of the Constitution and Article 18, second paragraph, Article 19, second paragraph, and Articles 584 and 1039 of the Judicial Code, taken together, suggested that preventive measures affecting the exercise of freedom of expression could be taken by the urgent-applications judge on an interim basis, in the event of an emergency, to prevent the infringement of a civil right protected by the Constitution and the Convention, after the judge had weighed up the interests at stake, such measures being limited to cases involving flagrant violations of the rights of others. Lastly, the Court of Cassation had taken the view that only the provisions of the Judicial Code and Article 144 of the Constitution counted as the “law” forming the basis for the interference in issue, and not Article <mask> of the Convention, which could serve solely as the legitimate aim that could be pursued by an interference with freedom of expression but not as the law on which the interference was based. | 11 |
31. The Government agreed that the search and seizure at the applicant's home constituted an interference within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Because of the urgency of the matter, the search had been conducted on the basis of an order given orally by an officer with power of arrest only a few hours after the arrival in Finland of persons suspected of illegally entering the country. It had been necessary to conduct the search immediately to verify whether there had been other such persons in the applicant's home, and to ensure that no evidence of an offence had been destroyed. Therefore, in the Government's view, there had been a justified reason, as required by Chapter 5, section 5, subsection 2, of the Coercive Measures Act, to conduct the search at 10 p.m. The search had been performed for the purposes of the prevention of crime and it had therefore pursued a legitimate aim. It had not been possible to inform the applicant about the possibility to be present during the search as neither her telephone number nor that of her counsel had been known to the officers. The applicant had, however, been immediately informed about the search by a hand-written note left in her apartment, mentioning, inter alia, the contact details of the officers who had carried out the search. The written search warrant and the records of the seizure had been communicated to the applicant as soon as she had been located for the purposes of questioning, namely a day and a half after the search. The search and seizure had thus been carried out in accordance with the law. | 11 |
61. The Government accepted that the domestic authorities had been unable to organise a meeting between the applicant and his daughter until February 2017. However, they had taken all the necessary steps that could have reasonably been required to secure the applicant’s contact with the child. There had been no omissions or delays in the conduct of the enforcement proceedings, which had been handled with due regard to the best interests of the child and the family as a whole. The Government noted that the unresolved conflict between the applicant and the child’s mother had rendered the judgment’s enforcement very difficult: A.D. had been absent from home at the time scheduled for meetings because the child had been unwilling to see the applicant; had strongly opposed the applicant’s presence while the bailiff was carrying out enforcement actions; had hidden the child; and had complained that the bailiff’s actions had put too much pressure on her. She had made it clear to the bailiffs that no meetings between the applicant and the child would take place. The Government accordingly concluded that the State had complied with their positive obligation under Article <mask> of the Convention to ensure the applicant’s right to respect for his family life and that there had been no violation of that Convention provision. | 11 |
37. The applicants contended that the secret surveillance carried out in respect of them had been unlawful because it had not been based on orders by the investigating judge containing proper reasoning. They also argued that the domestic authorities had failed to demonstrate that the interference with their right to respect for their private life and correspondence had been justified and necessary, as required under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
93. The Government contested the applicants’ arguments and argued that the restrictions provided for in the domestic regulations were necessary to maintain order and were completely reasonable. According to the Government, the applicants had been able to receive visits twice a week for two hours and use the telephone for at least ten minutes twice a week. The Government further submitted that the applicants Mr Klanšek and Mr Dukić made no complaints as regards their visiting arrangements. The applicant Mr Štrucl had not indicated any person whom he had wished to call or have written correspondence with. However, he had received and sent a number of letters, like the other two applicants, which was confirmed by the prison records of incoming and outgoing letters submitted to the Court. According to the Government, the applicants’ allegations that the situation as regards visits, use of the telephone and correspondence had amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention were unsubstantiated. | 11 |
14. The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention about the outcome of the proceedings. The Court notes, however, that the proceedings are still pending before the domestic courts, rendering this complaint premature. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. | 11 |
63. The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable in the absence of a registered marriage between the applicant and Ms A. An unregistered partnership (“common-law marriage”) is not recognised and does not confer any specific rights under Russian law, in particular as regards mutual pecuniary obligations of spouses, succession or benefits. The applicant failed to display the requisite diligence in seeking to obtain permission to stay in Russia, to formalise his relationship with Ms A. and to establish his paternity in respect of her daughter. He was found liable for violations of residence regulations for foreign nationals. Thus, it does not appear that the applicant was particularly concerned with the normal exercise of his “family life” in Russia. Despite this, the national courts had given a thorough examination to the related grievances. | 11 |
53. The Government took the view that the domestic courts’ decisions had not interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life. They noted, at the outset, that it had not been proved that the applicant was indeed the biological father of the child M. Even assuming biological kinship, this would not be sufficient to attract the protection of Article <mask> of the Convention. In the present case, M. lived together with her mother and her legal father in a stable family unit. No factual family relationship existed between the applicant and the child M. The Government stressed that the marriage between the applicant and Ms D. had ended six months before the child’s birth. The applicant had neither been present at the child’s birth, nor had he lodged a request to be granted contact rights. | 11 |
33. The Government admitted that the applicants’ eviction had constituted an inference with their right set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered, however, that such interference had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible to social housing and had been proportionate to that aim. As regards Ms Lunina (application, no. 7359/14), the Government noted that she had not resided in the flat. Instead she had rented it to a third party and resided with her family in a different place. | 11 |
61. The applicant complained that his employer had arbitrarily collected, retained, and used sensitive, obsolete and irrelevant data concerning his mental health in considering his application for promotion, and had unlawfully and unfairly disclosed this data to the applicant’s colleagues and to a civil court during a public hearing. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 11 |
40. The applicant complained of an unjustified interference with her right to respect for her family life as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention due to the refusal of the Netherlands Government to grant her a residence permit, based primarily on an old conviction of a narcotics offence committed in Germany. In so far as relevant, Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows: | 11 |
33. The Government accepted that the impossibility for the applicant to have his father’s paternity established after the expiry of the five-year time-limit had constituted an interference with his private life under Article <mask> of the Convention. The impugned measures had had a basis in Finnish legislation, namely in section 7, subsection 2, of the Implementing Act of the Paternity Act. | 11 |
43. The Government then submitted that, while acknowledging that the States enjoyed a margin of appreciation regarding the protection of the traditional family, in 2010 the Court had started examining under Article <mask> of the Convention forms of cohabitation between same-sex couples (see, inter alia, Kozak v. Poland, no. 13102/02, 2 March 2010). In the case of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010) the Court had acknowledged that same-sex couples could rely on their right to respect for family life, but pointed out that the Convention did not guarantee them the right to marry. It had also observed that where a State chose to provide same-sex couples with an alternative means of recognition, it enjoyed a certain margin of appreciation as regards the exact status conferred (see, inter alia, Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07, § 66, ECHR 2012). | 11 |
36. The applicant complained that the respondent State had failed to discharge its positive obligation to ensure respect for his private and family life, and in particular in that it had not provided him with any legal means to challenge the declaration of paternity after he discovered in 2004 that he was not I.'s biological father. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows: | 11 |
19. The applicants further submitted that although male and female life prisoners had been in a similar situation (namely serving a sentence in a correctional colony for a particularly serious crime), they had been treated differently as regards their entitlement to long visits from family members. Such a difference in treatment, which had existed until 2014, had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not had any reasonable justification, in breach of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
115. The applicants alleged that the search carried out in their houses on 14 January 2003 was illegal and constituted a violation of their right to respect for home. Under the same heading they complained that the disappearance of their relatives after their detention by the State authorities caused them distress and anguish which had amounted to a violation of their right to family life. It thus disclosed a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 11 |
23. The applicants complained that their right to respect for their family life, protected by Article <mask> of the Convention, had been infringed, in so far as the courts ordering the return of the second and third applicants to Italy had failed to take into account the grave risk that they would be subject to physical or psychological harm at the hands of their father. For the same reasons, the applicants considered that, in failing to protect the children against the risk of abuse, the authorities had breached their positive obligations enshrined in Article 3 of the Convention. | 11 |
31. The Government did not contest that the flat in question had been the applicant’s “home” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention and that her eviction from that flat had amounted to an interference with her right to respect for her home. The Court accepts that that interference was in accordance with law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others, namely A. The central question in this case is therefore whether the interference was proportionate to the aim pursued and thus “necessary in a democratic society”. | 11 |
61. The Government agreed that the refusal to grant the applicant prison leave in order for him to attend his father’s funeral had interfered with his right to family life, as guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention. This interference had, nonetheless, been based on law and had pursued the aim of furthering the interests of public safety, preventing crime and protecting the rights or freedoms of others. According to the Government, this restriction had been based on an individual assessment, as after an inmate had served a certain proportion of the sentence, a special body could decide to transfer him to a lower-security prison. It also drew the Court’s attention to the opinion of the Ombudsperson emphasising the dangerous nature of the inmates to whom this restriction applied (see paragraph 14 above). Furthermore, in the light of the cases of Laduna v. Slovakia (no. 31827/02, ECHR 2011) and Dickson v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 44362/04, ECHR 2007‑V) a wide margin of appreciation applied in questions of prisoners, penal policy and social strategy and, according to Khoroshenko v. Russia ([GC], no. 41418/04, ECHR 2015), the gravity of a sentence could be tied, a least to some extent, to a type of a prison regime. Hence, the Government considered that this interference had corresponded to a pressing social need and had been proportionate to the legitimate aim, thereby being justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. | 11 |
61. The Government highlighted the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State in the present case. That margin depended on the nature of the activities in question and the aim pursued by the restrictions. In its recent case-law, the Court had moreover left the State a broad margin of appreciation in cases concerning Article <mask> of the Convention. (Armonienė v. Lithuania, no. 36919/02, § 38, 25 November 2008, and A. v. Norway, no. 28070/06, § 66, 9 April 2009). Generally speaking, the margin enjoyed by the States was broader where there was no European consensus. In the Government’s submission, whilst there was admittedly a trend towards harmonisation of the legal systems in Europe, differences nevertheless remained, as evidenced by the failure of the negotiations for the adoption of a regulation of the European Union on conflict-of-law rules regarding non-contractual obligations (Regulation EC No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 – Rome II Regulation). The margin of appreciation was also broad where the national authorities had to strike a balance between competing private and public interests or Convention rights (Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, § 77, ECHR 2007‑I, and Dickson v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 44362/04, § 78 ECHR 2007‑XIII). Moreover, the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union apparently took the same approach (cases of Omega of 14 October 2004, C‑36/02, and Schmidberger of 12 June 2003, C-112/00). | 11 |
57. The applicants complained that the Migration Court of Appeal’s decision not to grant the first, second and fourth applicants residence permits was in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that although the third applicant was to be considered legally an adult, his health and development were at such a stage that he still had a right to respect for family life with his parents. | 11 |
119. The Government also referred to the case of Guichard v. France ((dec.), no. 56838/00, 2 September 2003) where the removal of the child by the mother had not been considered to be “wrongful” within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and where the Court had found that Article <mask> of the Convention had not therefore imposed positive obligations on the French authorities to secure the return of the child. | 11 |
47. The applicant complained about the content of the programme broadcast on 24 June 1997 and the courts’ dismissal of his claim for damages. He considered that the making of a video recording without his consent during a meeting organised without his knowledge by the journalists and the transmission of that video recording had amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention | 11 |
78. The Government did not contest that the domestic court decisions establishing the girls’ place of residence with their father constituted an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Notwithstanding this, the decisions had basis in domestic law, namely Article 3.174 of the Civil Code, and pursued a legitimate aim – the best interests of the children, one of the most important factors according to the Court’s case-law (the Government referred to Pascal v. Romania, no. 805/09, § 72, 17 April 2012; and X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, § 96, ECHR 2013). The interference also was necessary and proportionate. | 11 |
115. The applicants alleged that the search carried out in the house of the first applicant family on 10 December 2002 was unlawful and constituted a violation of their right to respect of their home. They further complained that the disappearance of their close relatives after their detention by the State authorities caused them distress and anguish which had amounted to a violation of their right to family life. They referred to Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 11 |
152. The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention and that there had been no interference with his rights. He had not complained that his communications had been intercepted. The gist of his complaint before the domestic courts and the Court was that communications service providers had installed special equipment enabling the authorities to perform operational-search activities. In the Government’s opinion, the case of Orange Slovensko, a. s. v. Slovakia ((dec.), no. 43983/02, 24 October 2006) confirmed that installation of interception equipment, or even its financing, by private companies was not in itself contrary to the Convention. | 11 |
98. The applicant also complained that Z. had unlawfully moved into the house which she had constructed and that the authorities had failed to evict and prosecute Z. for the alleged fraud. She also complained about the supervisory review proceedings of 13 September 2001, arguing that they breached her rights to respect for home under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
51. The Government maintained that Article <mask> of the Convention could not be interpreted as stipulating the right to give birth at home and the corresponding obligation of the State to provide related healthcare services. In their view, the right to choose the circumstances of giving birth, although acknowledged by the Court in Ternovszky v. Hungary (no. 67545/09, § 22, 14 December 2010), to a greater extent was linked not to the right to choose a particular place (such as one’s home) for giving birth but with the right to choose the method of delivery, the right to refuse unnecessary medical interventions, the right to choose particular medical personnel (doctors or midwives) to assist during delivery, the right for the father to be present in the delivery room, and the right to stay with a newborn after the delivery. Moreover, the right to give birth at home was not explicitly recognised under the Lithuanian legal system. The Government thus considered that the complaint was inadmissible ratione materiae. | 11 |
137. The applicant argued that the disclosure of the above-mentioned information constituted interference by the State authorities, the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, with her right to private and family life. She argued that the interference had not been in accordance with the law: the domestic legislation actually prohibited disclosing information relating to a person’s private life (see paragraphs 64 and 67 above). Furthermore, in any event, the interference had not pursued any of the legitimate aims listed in paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention, and had not been necessary. | 11 |
104. The applicants highlighted the similarities and differences between their case and previous cases in which the Court had dealt with similar issues under Article <mask> of the Convention. They pointed out that they were not trying to derive from that provision a right to die, but on the contrary a right to try to prolong life and avert death. The refusals to allow them access to an experimental medicinal product which might help them do so amounted to interference with their rights under that Article. The manner in which a person chose to live, even if that choice could entail harmful consequences, was part of that person’s private life. The refusals had been of a blanket nature, not taking into account the specifics of each case. They had been based on inadequate legal provisions which did not permit an individualised assessment, and did not correspond to a pressing social need. They had not been intended to protect the applicants’ lives, because all of them were terminally ill and, without recourse to some new medicinal product, had only a short span of life left. In that connection, it had to be borne in mind that the exception sought would simply have given the applicants a chance to prolong their lives, and would not have shielded anyone else from criminal liability. It might have helped them avert suffering and death, as had happened with some patients in other countries. | 11 |
17. The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression, which had been based on Article 823 § 1 in conjunction with Article 1004 § 1 of the Civil Code, had been necessary to safeguard Dr St.’s personality rights, as enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention. By calling abortions unlawful the applicant had created the false impression that Dr St. had been operating outside of the legal framework in performing such procedures. Unlike the leaflet in the case of Annen (cited above) the leaflets in the present case did not point out that abortions are permitted in Germany under the terms of Article 218a of the Criminal Code and therefore not subject to criminal liability. Moreover, given the applicant’s goal of forced “pavement counselling”, the applicant had severely disturbed the relationship of trust between doctor and patient. The Court had already rejected an earlier application by the same applicant against a desist order against similar conduct (see Annen v. Germany (dec.), nos. 2373/07 2396/07, 30 March 2010). In the present case, the domestic courts had relied on the judgment of the Federal Court of Justice, which had been the subject matter of the earlier inadmissibility decision of the Court, and concluded that the circumstances had been comparable and had not warranted deviating from the existing case-law. When coming to that conclusion the domestic courts had paid attention to the fact that Dr St. had taken a public position in the abortion debate. | 11 |
61. The applicant’s complaint concerned the respondent States’ alleged failure to secure contact with her estranged daughter. It is not disputed that these matters pertain to “family life” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention and that this provision is applicable. On the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the primary interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life may not be attributed to either of the respondent States but rather to the actions of the child’s grandparents, third parties, who had retained the child in Bulgaria (see R.S. v. Poland, no. 63777/09, §§ 56-57, 21 July 2015; López Guió v. Slovakia, no. 10280/12, § 85, 3 June 2014). It therefore remains to be ascertained whether there were any positive obligations on the part of the respondent States with a view to securing the applicant’s right to respect for her family life and, if so, whether any such positive obligations have been complied with by the respondent States. | 11 |
70. The applicant maintained that the case should be examined under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. Relying on the Court’s judgment in the case of M.C. v. Bulgaria (no. 39272/98, ECHR 2003‑XII), and Aydin v. Turkey (25 September 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VI,) she argued that the act of rape reached the level of cruelty necessary for the application of Article 3. She further argued that such an act violated the right to personal integrity protected under Article <mask> of the Convention. In the applicant’s view, States were under an obligation to ensure effective protection against acts of rape, even in relations between private individuals, through the adoption of criminal-law provisions which would ensure adequate punishment for acts of rape and the obligation to conduct a thorough, independent and effective investigation and criminal prosecution. | 11 |
43. The applicant complained of a breach of his right to respect for his family life under Article <mask> of the Convention because of the dismissal of his Hague Convention request. The applicant elaborated on this complaint, indicating that the unfavourable outcome of the impugned proceedings resulted from the misapplication of the Hague Convention and from various alleged shortcomings in the decision-making process. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows: | 11 |
68. The Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, the system operated as follows: (i) prisoners would submit their correspondence in two copies; (ii) the second copy would then be stamped and dated, in response to their own requests, and returned to them; and (iii) the first copy would be placed in an envelope and forwarded to the designated address. Prisoner’s correspondence was thus neither opened nor read by the prison authorities. | 11 |
37. The applicant specified that he was not complaining regarding the issuance of the ban prohibiting his return to Austria. His complaint to the Court solely concerned the withdrawal of his subsidiary protection status and his subsequent expulsion to Kosovo, which, in his view, had violated his right to respect for his private and family life as set out in Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads: | 11 |
42. The Government filed comments on the applicant’s son’s updated claims for just satisfaction on 30 June 2008 and 15 October 2008. They pointed out that the present application was part of a cluster of similar cases raising a number of problematic issues and maintained that the claims for just satisfaction were not ready for examination. The Government had in fact encountered serious problems in identifying the properties and their present owners. The information provided by the applicants in this regard was not based on reliable evidence. As concerns specifically the present application, the Government noted that the decision on the admissibility contained no specification of the property. In the application form the property at issue was described as “fields”; notwithstanding that, the applicant had also invoked Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, owing to the lapse of time since the lodging of the applications, new situations might have arisen: the properties could have been transferred, donated or inherited within the legal system of southern Cyprus. These facts would not have been known to the respondent Government and could be certified only by the Greek Cypriot authorities, who, since 1974, had reconstructed the registers and records of all properties in northern Cyprus. Applicants should be required to provide search certificates issued by the Department of Lands and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, in cases where the original applicant had passed away or the property had changed hands, questions might arise as to whether the new owners had a legal interest in the property and whether they were entitled to pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary damages. | 11 |
208. The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that their property had been destroyed in the federal attack on Urus-Martan on 19 October 1999. The third applicant also complained that her right to respect for her home secured by Article <mask> of the Convention had been infringed as a result of that attack. The respective Convention provisions state as follows: | 11 |
52. The applicant complained that whenever he was outside a prison he wore hand-cuffs joined by chains with fetters. He further complained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention about the alleged unlawfulness of his arrest. Invoking Article <mask> of the Convention, the applicant also complained that his extended detention had put a severe strain on his family life. Finally, invoking the same Article, the applicant complained about the censorship of his correspondence with the Court, the Ombudsman and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. | 11 |
41. The Government submitted that there had been no breach of Article <mask> of the Convention because, at the material time, the applicant had been the owner of another flat in Lipetsk. The applicant replied that she lived, together with her husband and children, in the flat she had purchased from E.M.T., while the other flat, to which the Government referred, was occupied by her mother. | 11 |
56. The Government submitted that there was no causal link between the amount claimed in respect of the domestic proceedings and the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In any event, the applicant had not produced any documentary evidence of the costs and expenses incurred before the Greek courts and the overall amount claimed was excessive. The Government further stated that the legal fees for the proceedings before the Court were excessive and that the agreement between the applicant and her lawyer was not binding on the Court. They contended that a total sum not exceeding EUR 6,000 would be appropriate in respect of legal costs. | 11 |
76. The applicant complained that the domestic authorities violated her rights under Article <mask> of the Convention in that they did not enforce the 2001 judicial order granting her the custody of her minor daughter and eventually transferred the custody to the father. The applicant also complained that her daughter had suffered anguish and psychological trauma as a result of the interventions of the authorities and the protracted judicial proceedings. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows. | 11 |
60. The Government of the Russian Federation also stated that the judgment of 2 October 2012 had been given in violation of Article 167 of the Family Code of Ukraine (see paragraphs 36 above), and with no regard having been made to the opinion of the child’s relatives, including the applicant and his half-sister, which had led to the elimination of the child’s biological affinity with them and his existing family contacts. Essentially, there had been no adequate consideration of the child’s best interests, and the Ukrainian courts had provided no sufficient reasons to demonstrate that it had been in the child’s best interests to be adopted by a couple who had no family or personal link with him and who had met him only once, rather than to be taken into care by his relatives with whom the child had had emotional contact. Thus, the impugned interference had also not been necessary within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
38. The Government emphasised that even supposing that there had been interference, the German legal system guaranteed sufficient protection. They observed that the present application did not concern the applicant’s right to seek an injunction against the advertisement (Unterlassungsansruch), which the company had recognised and which had therefore not been the subject of any proceedings in the domestic courts. The question was not whether but how the German courts should have intervened. On that point the Government took the view that the possibility provided for in German law of applying for an injunction provided adequate protection against advertising. The applicant had not in fact made any attempt to seek protection against the advertisement, but rather had hoped to derive a pecuniary advantage, even though Article <mask> of the Convention did not provide for any such compensation. | 11 |
33. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the legislation authorising secret surveillance in Bulgaria did not provide sufficient safeguards against abuse and barred the authorities from giving out any information as to whether a person had been subjected to such surveillance. He further complained under Article 10 of the Convention that his first and second requests for information as to whether he had been subjected to secret surveillance had been rejected. | 11 |
38. The Government conceded that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, but considered that the interference was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was “necessary in a democratic society”. A number of Articles in the CCP clearly described the possibility of conducting searches and the manner of authorising and carrying them out. The searches were necessary in order to help an ongoing criminal investigation and were based on information in the file allowing a reasonable assumption that objects or documents important for the investigation could be found at the applicant’s office or apartment. The applicant and his lawyer had made no objections to the manner in which the search had been conducted, noting only that the search had been unlawful. The search was brief and nothing was taken from the office, with only one mobile telephone taken from the apartment. | 11 |
36. The applicants submitted that Mrs Y.B.'s flat had been their only home and that prior to their eviction they had occupied it lawfully for some ten years. The retrospective annulment of their tenancy registration and their eviction had constituted a serious, unlawful and disproportionate interference with their rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, when concluding the tenancy agreement and registering it with the competent authorities, they could not have anticipated that they would be qualified as “arbitrary occupants” ten years later. In their opinion, in authorising the tenancy, the flat owner had been of sound mind and the competent authorities at the material time had duly registered their tenancy without questioning this fact. Furthermore, in 1995-1996, when the owner had acted on her own behalf in a court dispute and attended hearings, the courts had never questioned her legal capacity to do so. | 11 |
93. The Government conceded that at the material time some of the applicant’s confidential correspondence would have been restricted in accordance with the domestic law (Article 15 of the Law on Pre-trial Detention and Article 41 of the Prison Code; paragraph 60 above). However, such restrictions had been compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention (cf. the aforementioned Peers v. Greece; Valašinas v. Lithuania; Puzinas v. Lithuania, no. 44800/98, 14 March 2002). Nevertheless, the applicant’s correspondence to the Court and State institutions, including the national courts, had not been censored. Moreover, when the applicant had complained of delays in the dispatch and receipt of correspondence, he had failed to provide the domestic courts with the details of the letters concerned. However, on an examination of the relevant prison records, it had been established that the applicant’s correspondence had been handled in a timely fashion, in accordance with the law. The Government therefore concluded that the applicant’s complaint was of a purely abstract nature. | 11 |
54. The applicant did not submit a claim for pecuniary damage. As for non-pecuniary damage, she submitted that as a result of a violation of her right under Article <mask> of the Convention, she had suffered from anguish and distress caused by the disruption to her family life with her husband and child and by the lack of information concerning the alleged threat she posed to Russia’s national security. The applicant left the determination of the amount of compensation to the Court and requested that, given that she was an American living in Prague, any award be paid directly to her bank account outside the Russian Federation. | 11 |
19. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that their right to freedom of correspondence had not been respected since the domestic law governing telephone tapping did not contain sufficient guarantees against abuse by the national authorities. They did not claim to have been victims of any specific interception of their telephone communications. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows: | 11 |
47. The applicant complained that because lawyers were under obligation to report suspicious operations, as a lawyer he was required, subject to disciplinary action, to report people who came to him for advice. He considered this to be incompatible with the principles of lawyer-client privilege and professional confidentiality. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 11 |
20. The applicants submitted that they had victim status and that there had therefore been interference with their rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. Even though they did not all possess licences to practise issued by the Ministry of Justice, they all represented applicants before the European Court of Human Rights. They were all members of the Lawyers for Human Rights organisation, which was considered by the Government as a subversive organisation acting against the interests of the State. The Lawyers for Human Rights organisation represented many persons who met the criteria for the application of the interception measures referred to by the Government both in domestic proceedings and in proceedings before the Court. The applicants gave the example of such persons as P. Popovici, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment, P. Stici and M. Ursu, who were accused of having killed the son of the Speaker of the Parliament, and C. Becciev and E. Duca, both accused of very serious crimes. They also referred to many persons who had disputes with the leaders of the ruling Communist Party as well as two persons who had brought proceedings against the Secret Services of Moldova. The applicants submitted that, even though not all the members of their organisation worked on serious cases, all members used the telephones of the organisation and therefore risked interception. | 11 |
40. The applicant further argued that in holding that the pecuniary components were only protected by ordinary law, the Federal Court of Justice had disregarded the fact that Article <mask> of the Convention conferred on an individual the right to decide in person to whom and to what extent he or she wished to disclose personal information to others. The distinction drawn by the Federal Court of Justice between the pecuniary and non-pecuniary components of the right to protection of personality rights was in any case artificial because that right was indivisible. | 11 |
210. The Government acknowledged that during the applicant’s detention his right to family visits had been limited and that the restrictions imposed had amounted to an interference with his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, in their view, the measures applied were in accordance with the law, namely Article 217 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, and necessary for the purposes of that provision. | 11 |
79. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that they had been denied access to environmental information. The Court observes that this complaint was not included in the initial application but was raised in the applicants’ observations of 26 November 2007 and refers to correspondence with the relevant authorities from 26 September 2007 onwards, more than two years after they had lodged their application. Consequently, the Court considers that this complaint was not specified or elaborated early enough to allow for an exchange of observations between the parties on the subject. It finds that, in the circumstances of the case, it is not appropriate to examine the matter separately at this stage in the proceedings (see Nuray Şen v. Turkey (no. 2), no. 25354/94, § 200, 30 March 2004). | 11 |
49. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that, following his decision to move to the North of Finland in order to live with his former foster parents, the powers of his mentor had been enlarged to encompass matters pertaining to his person. His wishes had not been respected and it had been impossible to have his mentor replaced in matters concerning his place of residence and his education, even though he had lost confidence in her. All these measures violated his right to respect for private and family life. | 11 |
46. The applicant asserted that the restrictions placed on his personal contact with his family amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. He pointed out that neither his wife nor his son were witnesses in the proceedings in question, that the authorities have never explained the reasons for the refusal of contact, that they had failed to take his age into account and that the restrictions placed had not been indispensable to the proper conduct of the proceedings. | 11 |
65. The applicant complained that the United Kingdom had violated its positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention, taken alone and taken together with Article 13, by failing to impose a legal duty on the News of the World to notify him in advance in order to allow him the opportunity to seek an interim injunction and thus prevent publication of material which violated his right to respect for his private life. The Government contested that argument | 11 |
149. The applicant complained that the measure by which he was prohibited from entering or passing through Switzerland had breached his right to respect for his private life, including his professional life, and his family life. He contended that this ban had prevented him from seeing his doctors in Italy or in Switzerland and from visiting his friends and family. He further claimed that the addition of his name to the list annexed to the Taliban Ordinance had impugned his honour and reputation. In support of these complaints he relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 11 |
129. The Government admitted that while there were sufficient grounds for instituting administrative proceedings against O.H. under Article 5.35 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences for breaching the rights and the interests of her daughter by interfering with the latter’s right to communicate with her father and thwarting the exercise by the father of his parental rights, the domestic authorities had no practical opportunity to do so. They assured the Court that the domestic authorities, under the supervision of the St Petersburg City Prosecutor’s Office, were continuing to take further measures to establish the whereabouts of O.H. and the second applicant. There had therefore been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in the present case. | 11 |
42. The Government admitted that the national courts’ decision to order the applicant’s eviction had constituted an inference with her rights set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered that such an interference had been lawful, pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of persons eligible for social housing and that it had been proportionate to that aim. | 11 |
78. The applicant mentioned one tangible consequence of the refusal of naturalisation: he could not vote or stand for municipal and parliamentary elections, or elections to the European Parliament. However, the Court observes that the applicant’s complaint in the present case does not concern the rights laid down in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (contrast Ždanoka, cited above, § 73). Nor does the applicant allege a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of being unable to preserve his current civil status (contrast Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 314, ECHR 2012). Above all, the Court’s decision on the admissibility of the present application determines the scope of the case currently before it and it does not include any complaints other than those under Articles 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention (see paragraphs 3-4 above). | 11 |
35. The Government asserted that the application should be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded on the grounds, among others, that the Spanish courts had acted in order to protect the rights of the two police officers established by Article <mask> of the Convention, as well as citizens’ right to receive accurate information, as laid down in Article 10 of the Convention. | 11 |
54. The applicants argued that the admissibility of their complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention had already been examined and there was no reason to reconsider this matter. According to them, the situation in the case of Babjak and Others (cited above) was substantially different from their case. The applicants also emphasised that the Government had been unable to show a single final judicial decision confirming their argument that the action for protection of personal integrity was an effective remedy in a situation comparable to theirs. | 11 |
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