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41. The Government submitted that these complaints had been lodged outside the six-month time-limit established in Article <mask> of the Convention. They considered that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 9 September 2008 (see paragraph 36 above), on which the applicant had put much emphasis, had been the final domestic decision in respect of the complaints under Article 3. Therefore, the present application (lodged on 10 June 2009) was out of time. | 6 |
23. The Government relied on the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 21 June 2011, and considered that by virtue of that judgment the applicant had lost his “victim” status within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention in respect of the alleged violation of his rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. It was true that the Constitutional Court had granted the applicant no compensation for non‑pecuniary damage. However, in the Government’s submission, this was compatible with the Court’s own approach in cases where it had found that the finding of a violation of applicants’ Article 5 rights constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non‑pecuniary damage they had sustained. | 6 |
97. The Government maintained in their submissions to the Grand Chamber that the applicant was not a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention because the case was lodged with the Court before Law no. 273 had been promulgated. Relying on Očič v. Croatia ((dec.), no. 46306/99, ECHR 1999-VIII), they further contended that the applicant’s claim was an actio popularis seeking review of legislation in the abstract as at the time of his application to the Court, the Law in question had never been applied to him to his detriment. The cases to which the Chamber referred to support its conclusion that the applicant was a victim were distinguished by the Government because, in those cases, unlike in the present case, the Law being challenged had entered into force. Although the Court had considered an applicant a potential victim of an enacted Law which had never been applied to him, it had never before found an applicant to be a victim or a potential victim of a draft law. The Government relied on The Christian Federation of Jehovah’s Witnesses in France v. France ((dec.), no. 53430/99, ECHR 2001-XI), where the Court observed that it had accepted the notion of a potential victim in cases where the applicant was not in a position to demonstrate that the legislation about which he complained had actually been applied to him because of the secret nature of the measures it authorised (see Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28); where a Law punishing homosexual acts was likely to be applied to a certain category of the population, to which the applicant belonged (see Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45); and, lastly, where the forced removal of aliens had already been decided on but not yet carried out and enforcement of the measure would have exposed the persons concerned to the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 in the country of destination (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161) or would have infringed the right to respect for family life (see Beldjoudi v. France, 26 March 1992, Series A no. 234‑A). The Government argued that States Parties had not agreed when ratifying the Convention that draft laws could be challenged before the Court. If such challenges were possible, where there was no possibility at domestic level to challenge a draft law applicants would be encouraged to come directly to the Court, breaching the principle of subsidiarity and leading to a large increase in the number of cases before the Court. | 6 |
69. The applicant noted that he had received correspondence from the Court with significant delay and, further, that the envelope itself had already been opened by others. In this connection he suggested that this could either have been an “innocent mistake” on the part of the Serbian postal services or a deliberate hindrance in the effective exercise of his right of petition to the Court within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In support of the latter proposition, the applicant recalled that the Serbian postal services were State-run, and emphasised that his application before the Court involved sensitive police-related issues. | 6 |
24. The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of the alleged violations within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They noted that the applicant had obtained a decision of the Constitutional Court, which had found a violation of Article 5 of the Convention and ordered his release. Hence, he could not still claim to be a victim of the alleged violation. | 6 |
99. The Government pointed out that in the judgment of 7 May 2003 the Constitutional Court had acknowledged that the District Court had violated the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time. The Constitutional Court had ordered the District Court to avoid further delays in the proceedings and to reimburse the applicant’s costs. In view of the applicant’s conduct that decision provided appropriate redress to the applicant in the circumstances. The Government concluded that the applicant had lost the status of a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 6 |
34. The applicants emphasised the clear consequences of the contested proceedings on their civil rights. Firstly, they pointed out that they all lived in Itoiz, where their immovable property was situated. Construction of the dam would result in flooding of this area and, consequently, of their homes and other assets. In addition, they submitted that, as members of the Coordinadora de Itoiz association since its formation in 1988, they had taken part in the proceedings with that association as their intermediary. They stressed the indisputable direct link between them and the damage that would be sustained from the dam's construction, and submitted that the remedy used was the only one which, if successful, would have allowed for the definitive protection of their civil rights and interests. In this connection, they stressed that they would have been acting unreasonably had each of them brought a separate individual appeal against the proposed dam and thus entered long and costly proceedings with the same final outcome as that achieved by the association. Moreover, it was clear that, from the outset, they had entrusted the association with the defence of their civil rights and interests. Indeed, this was the logical result of one of the association's stated aims, namely the “defence of an alternative way of life on the site”. In conclusion, they contended that they could claim to be victims of a violation within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 6 |
51. The Government submitted that the Regional Court had already expressly acknowledged that the period of inactivity between 30 January 2013 and 11 February 2015 had been in contravention of the principle of the rule of law. The applicant, however, had already been compensated for that delay by having had three months of the prison sentence declared as served. The court had thereby reduced the applicant’s sentence in an express and measurable manner. The fact that the applicant had been given a prison sentence suspended on probation had not changed the fact that sufficient redress had been granted. In the event that the suspension of the sentence had been revoked, the applicant would have had to serve only five months instead of eight. Therefore, the mental strain of the sentence had been less severe. In addition, a condition of a suspended sentence was that compensation by means of a reduced sentence would only take effect if the suspension was revoked. In that regard, the consequences of the “new” execution approach had been the same as those of the previous mitigation approach. As pointed out by the Federal Court of Justice in its judgment (see paragraph 33 above), under both approaches compensation would only be actually awarded if the suspension was revoked and the prison sentence then had to be executed. Furthermore, in determining the sentence the Regional Court had not only expressly reduced the sentence but had also taken into account, in the applicant’s favour, the lengthy overall duration of the proceedings and the time that had elapsed since the criminal act. According to the Government, this had resulted in a quite lenient prison sentence of only eight months. Having regard to the above, the Government concluded that the applicant had already been compensated for the excessive length of the proceedings and could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 6 |
61. The applicant complained that on many occasions the authorities had interfered with his correspondence with the Court. In particular, he alleged that his copies of documents concerning the criminal proceedings against him had been unlawfully confiscated by the prison administration, that the authorities had refused to send some of his letters, that the Court’s letter of 28 June 2007 had been opened by an officer of the correctional institution and that he had not received many of the Court’s letters. The Court decided to examine his complaint from the standpoint of the right of individual petition guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads: | 6 |
29. The Government argued that in view of the Constitutional Court's judgment of 21 July 2004 the applicant had lost his status as a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged the violation of the applicant's right, that it had ordered acceleration of the proceedings and that this order had been effectively implemented. Furthermore, they considered that the reasons relied on by the Constitutional Court in its ruling dismissing the applicant's claim for just satisfaction and compensation in respect of costs and expenses were sufficient. | 6 |
22. The Government argued that the applicant company could not claim to be the “victim”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of the facts complained of. They observed that the Constitutional Court had indeed acknowledged a violation of the “reasonable-time” principle and awarded the applicant company MTL 100 for non-pecuniary damage, thus providing adequate redress for the breach of the Convention. | 6 |
50. The Government contested the admissibility of this complaint on several grounds. First of all, they submitted that the applicant had failed to comply with Article <mask> of the Convention and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because he had failed to provide relevant documents, to fill in an application form, and to inform the Court of the change of his address resulting from his transfer to a prison in Russia. Secondly, they contended that the applicant had not wished to pursue his application and invited the Court to strike it out of the Court’s list of cases. Thirdly, they considered that the applicant had not suffered any significant disadvantage within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention. They did not, however, provide more detail with respect to this argument. | 6 |
99. The Government contended that there had been no hindrance of the applicant’s right of individual petition. Referring to the Court’s case-law, the Government stated that in order to find that the State failed to comply with requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention, the applicant’s allegations should be supported by facts and, in particular, the State’s intention to hinder the applicant’s right to lodge an individual petition should be demonstrated (see, among other authorities, Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], no. 30078/06, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). | 6 |
150. The applicant’s representatives complained that by repatriating the applicant or by aiding his repatriation to Tajikistan despite the interim measure issued by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, Russia had failed to comply with its undertaking under Article <mask> of the Convention not to hinder the applicant in the exercise of his right of individual application. | 6 |
62. The applicant agreed that the complaint was to be examined under Article 8. He nevertheless considered that the incident was also incompatible with the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention in that the reading by prison staff of letters from the Court which might concern allegations against prison authorities or prison officials could create the risk of reprisals by prison staff against the prisoner concerned. In this regard the applicant referred to the case of Klyakhin v. Russia (no. 46082/99, § 118, 30 November 2004). | 6 |
23. The Government stressed that, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, an applicant who has obtained reparation at the national level for an alleged violation of the Convention can no longer be considered a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention (see, Marchenko v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 63520/01, 17 September 2002). Accordingly, as the decision of 16 June 1998 had been executed, the applicant can no longer be considered a victim of a violation of his rights under Article 6 § 1. They therefore proposed that the application be declared inadmissible or struck out of the Court’s list of cases. | 6 |
49. The Government submitted that Mrs Sardaryan could not claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention and invited the Court to strike the application out of its list of cases. In particular, they pleaded that no “civil rights and obligations” of Mrs Sardaryan had been determined in the divorce and in rem proceedings between her parents. | 6 |
55. The Government submitted that, in light of the agreement on post-adoption contact of 30 March 2007, the applicants were no longer victims for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention. They had received contact on the terms recommended by Professor Triseliotis and had not been prejudiced by the approach taken by the Trust, which found suitable adopters who agreed to post-adoption contact. The agreement had worked as intended so the applicants had been afforded all that they could reasonably have wanted or expected. | 6 |
61. The Government also noted that the Constitutional Court had concluded that the Convention had been violated, although in respect of a different provision of the Convention from Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. The applicant had received certain satisfaction and therefore was not a victim of a violation of the Convention within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government added that more than seven and a half years had passed since the applicant’s release from custody. | 6 |
136. The Government maintained that the applicant had not been prevented from exercising his right of individual petition under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, he was able to do so only through his mother – his official guardian. Since his mother had never asked Mr Bartenev (the lawyer) to represent her son, he was not his legal representative in the eyes of the domestic authorities. Consequently, the authorities acted lawfully in not allowing him to meet the applicant in hospital. | 6 |
24. The applicants submitted that, in spite of the Constitutional Court's decision of 28 April 2004, they were still “victims” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that the amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002-II). | 6 |
36. The Government argued that in so far as the Regional Court had already found a delay in the proceedings, the excessively long duration of the proceedings had already been acknowledged and redressed. In addition, the Regional Court had also taken into account the long duration of the proceedings when determining the applicant’s criminal sentence. Therefore, the applicant had lost the status of victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 6 |
197. The applicant complained that he had been hindered in the exercise of his right of individual application in that his lawyers in Amsterdam had not been permitted to contact him after his arrest and that the Government had delayed in replying to the Court's request for information. He alleged a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 6 |
24. The Government maintained that the application in the present case had not been lodged by the alleged victim of the Convention violation, namely the applicant’s husband, who had died on 15 April 2002 before the final decision of 24 April 2002 of the Supreme Court. The Government argued that the widow did not have the requisite standing under Article <mask> of the Convention and therefore the application must be rejected as being incompatible ratione personae pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. | 6 |
17. The Government submitted that, in line with the Court’s case-law, an applicant who has obtained reparation at the national level for an alleged violation of the Convention can no longer be considered a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention (see, Marchenko v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 63520/01, 17 September 2002). Accordingly, as the sum of the award has been deposited with the Bailiffs’ Service and will be transferred to the applicant, provided he informs the Bailiffs about his banking details, the judgment of the Bagaliyskyy Court of 18 December 2000 has been enforced and the applicant can no longer be considered a victim of a violation of his rights under Article 6 § 1. | 6 |
48. The Government submitted that the applicant was not a victim of the alleged violation of the Convention because he had not requested that the national authorities recognise him as a victim during the domestic criminal proceedings even though he was not precluded from doing so and such recognition would have significantly expanded his procedural rights. Although the Government accepted that victim status in the context of Article <mask> of the Convention was not necessarily the same as the national criteria relating to locus standi in legal proceedings, its purpose was to provide practical safeguards for persons who were not able to seek redress under domestic law for violations of their Convention rights. This was not the applicant’s case, as he had had an available domestic remedy for the complaints raised before this Court. | 6 |
14. The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaints should not be examined by the Court, as he had not observed the provisions of Article <mask> of the Convention and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They contended that although the applicant had sent a letter to the Registry on 30 August 2006, he had never submitted a duly completed application form. | 6 |
110. The Government submitted that the applicants could not claim to be “victims”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of the events of which they complained. They disputed the existence of a genuine risk that the applicants would be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment as a result of their return to Libya. That danger had to be assessed on the basis of substantial grounds relating to the circumstances of each applicant. The information provided by the parties concerned was vague and insufficient. | 6 |
60. The applicant lastly complained that on 20 January 2006, when delivering him a letter from the Registry of the Court, a prison guard had started opening the envelope, and when the applicant objected had made the applicant open the envelope himself in the presence of the guard, who had threatened him with having his cell searched if he refused. In its partial inadmissibility decision of 9 February 2010 the Court had erroneously indicated that the events described had taken place in Jelgava Prison. The applicant was transferred to Jelgava Prison only on 6 April 2006. Thus the applicant’s complaint pertains to events in the Central Prison. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court decided to communicate the complaint under Articles 8 and 34 of the Convention, which, in so far as is relevant, read as follows: | 6 |
141. The Government contested the applicants’ submissions. They stated that in the course of the investigation the first and fifth applicants had been questioned with regard to their application before the Court. During the questioning on 25 October 2005 the first applicant had stated that neither he nor other members of his family had applied directly to the Court, but that he had applied to human rights organisations. The fifth applicant, questioned on 26 October 2005, had stated that she had not applied to any organisations in connection with her brother’s abduction. The search for her brother had been conducted by her father. The Government clarified that in the reply of 12 April 2006 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic referred to two transcripts of the first applicant’s questioning on 21 and 26 October 2005, when no questions concerning the application before the Court had been put to him. They averred that all transcripts had been authentic and accurate and reflected the applicants’ statements made during the questioning. The Government argued that there was no interference with the applicants’ right of individual petition under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 6 |
87. The Government submitted that on 17 June 2015 the Constitutional Court had found a violation of Article 5 § 1 as regards the period of the applicant’s detention between 21 March 2013 and 14 March 2014 (see paragraph 43 above). The applicant could therefore no longer claim to be a victim of the alleged violation within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention in relation to that period. | 6 |
28. The applicant argued that the Government’s failure to ensure he have a medical examination to answer the questions asked by the Court had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rule of Court and had thus violated his right to individual application. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 6 |
24. The Government argued that the applicant could not claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, because the domestic courts had acknowledged the violation of Article 8 and had granted her adequate redress. The Government also contended that the complaint had the nature of an actio popularis by which the applicant was seeking a review in abstracto of the contested legislation in the light of the Convention. Finally the Government claimed that the application was manifestly ill-founded because the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies for the breach of her right to privacy. | 6 |
52. The Government submitted that the applicants had entered Turkish territory illegally and had been deported to Iraq, where they had come from, pursuant to the national legislation prior to their arrest on 21 June 2008. They maintained that, despite this, the applicants did not have victim status within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention as no deportation order was issued in their respect. | 6 |
14. The Government submitted that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicants' constitutional complaint, found a violation of their constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time, and awarded them compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicants had lost their victim status. | 6 |
24. The Government argued in the first place that the application should be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They maintained that the applicant had failed to lodge an appeal against the Buca District Governor’s decision, dated 28 December 2001, not to prosecute the gendarme officers. They also maintained that the application must be dismissed for failure to comply with the six-month rule. Furthermore, they contended that the applicant could not be considered as a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention as no medical examination had been performed on her since she had not given her consent. | 6 |
20. The Government argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time as regards the period that had already been examined by the Constitutional Court. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court had provided the applicant with preventive and compensatory redress. The Government considered this redress adequate and sufficient. | 6 |
140. The applicant complained that his extradition to the United States had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court in accordance with Rule 39 of its Rules of Court, and that the extradition had therefore amounted to a violation of his right of individual petition. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 6 |
51. The Government submitted that domestic remedies had not been exhausted, as the applicant had requested leave from the Hague Regional Court to join a pending civil action in tort brought by another former EBI detainee claiming, inter alia, compensation for non-pecuniary damage suffered on account of having been subjected to allegedly humiliating and unnecessary strip-searches in the EBI. Furthermore, if the applicant were to be awarded any compensation in those proceedings, he could no longer be regarded as a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government were therefore of the opinion that the application should be declared inadmissible. | 6 |
15. The Government relied on the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 24 September 2014, and considered that by virtue of that judgment the applicants had lost their “victim” status within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In so far as the applicants claimed to have been awarded insufficient compensation by the Constitutional Court, the Government further submitted that they had failed to comply with the requirement of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention to exhaust domestic remedies, since they had failed to claim damages under the State Liability for Damage Act (Law no. 514/2003 Coll., as amended - “the SLD Act”). | 6 |
62. The applicant argued that, as in Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien], cited above, he could still claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. According to him, the alleged violation of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 8 had already occurred by the time the Administrative Court gave judgment. At the hearing he explained that at the time of his arrest and removal he had just turned 18, and as a result, under French law he should have had until June 2007 to regularise his situation (see paragraphs 26 and 27 above). He had nevertheless been expelled and obliged to run the risk of paying a smuggler to return him to French Guiana illegally. | 6 |
24. The applicant submitted that, in spite of the Constitutional Court's decision of 7 July 2004, he was still a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. He argued that the amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002‑II). | 6 |
28. The Government argued that in view of the Constitutional Court’s judgment (nález) of 29 April 2004 the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged the infringement of the applicant’s right of which he complained before the Court. The Constitutional Court further provided the applicant compensatory redress. The Government considered this redress adequate and sufficient and maintained that it was compatible with the relevant principles and practice of both the Constitutional Court and the Court. | 6 |
26. The applicant argued that it was unjust for the Government now to seek to rely on a point that they had agreed not to advance during the domestic proceedings, during which they had conceded it was irrelevant to the issues of principle at stake. She objected strenuously to the attempt to re-introduce the issue before the Court. The applicant further argued that the notion of victim under Article <mask> of the Convention was without reference to detriment, prejudice or damage. This was a matter for consideration under Article 41, in the event of the Court holding that there had been a violation of Convention rights. Even supposing that the material disadvantage in her case had ultimately been reduced – which she did not concede – she argued that the basis for her complaint was that the child support system offended her dignity by ignoring a most important and intimate aspect of her private life and personality. This was not excused or justified by the operation of a mechanism that was entirely unconnected to the alleged discrimination. | 6 |
94. The applicant also complained under Articles 5 §§ 1(a) and (c), 6 §§ 1, 2, 3(b) and (d), 13 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 that he had been detained arbitrarily and unlawfully, that the proceedings had been unfair, and that he had been discriminated against due to his status. He also submitted under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that his property rights, including a right to an old age pension and security of his assets, had been breached and under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had not been provided with copies of properly certified and signed copies of the domestic courts’ decisions. He further referred to Article 13 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 in so far as his appeals had not been examined in due time. Relying on the provisions of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and without referring to any provision of the Convention, the applicant also complained about the refusal to grant him a pension. | 6 |
86. The Government argued that the applicant could not claim to be a “victim” of the alleged violation of Article 6, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, as it was the Voskhod company, and not the applicant in his personal capacity, who had been a claimant in the proceedings before the commercial courts. In this respect they referred to the cases of F. Santos Lda. and Fachadas v. Portugal ((dec.), no. 49020/99, 19 September 2000), and Pires da Silva and Pereira v. Portugal (no. 19157/91, Commission decision of 5 July 1993), stating that a person cannot complain of a violation of his or her rights in proceedings to which he or she was not a party, despite the fact that she or he was a shareholder and/or executive director of a company which was a party to the proceedings. | 6 |
30. The Government opened their argument with an assertion that it could not be inferred from Article <mask> of the Convention or “from any other source” that the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 was legally binding. They further stressed that the Rules of Court, and accordingly the interim measure applied, did not have binding force on the State Party and that, accordingly, their failure to submit answers to the questions raised by the Court did not entail a violation of Article 34, or of any other provision of the Convention. | 6 |
131. The applicants argued that the Government’s failure to submit the documents requested by the Court, namely the entire criminal investigation file, disclosed a failure to comply with their obligations under Articles 34 and 38 § 1 (a) of the Convention. The Court finds that in the circumstances of the present case the above issue should be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows: | 6 |
101. The applicant claimed 65,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage in relation to the suffering and mental distress caused to her by her husband’s disappearance and the violation of her right to respect for her home. In addition, in the event that the Court found a breach of the State’s obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention the applicant sought an award of EUR 10,000 for herself and an equal amount for each of her two sons and for her nephew. | 6 |
80. The Government contested that argument. They firstly submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. The Government noted that the applicant ought to have lodged complaints with a prosecutor’s office or with the Prison Administration. In this regard, the Court observes that a complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention is of a procedural nature and therefore does not give rise to any issue of admissibility under the Convention (see Ponushkov v. Russia, no. 30209/04, § 78, 6 November 2008). The Government’s objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies is therefore misconceived. | 6 |
30. The applicant argued that the situation was analogous to the case of Amirov (cited above) in which the Court had found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention following the Government’s failure to comply with an interim measure imposed under Rule 39. As in the Amirov case (ibid.), the Russian authorities had again failed to comply with an order by the Court to provide an expert opinion by independent medical specialists assessing the applicant’s state of health. | 6 |
21. The Government submitted that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since on 31 July 2003 the Liability Act entered into force, which provided that the proceedings stayed under the 1996 Amendment were to be resumed. Moreover, the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicants’ constitutional complaint, found a violation of their constitutional right of access to a court, and awarded them compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicant had lost his victim status. | 6 |
54. The applicant further maintained that the case-law of the Court was clear on the point that the concept of “victim” under Article <mask> of the Convention should be interpreted broadly. The Government’s argument that he had not been sentenced to punishment was unfounded, as his conviction of a criminal offence had entailed various other legal consequences. Also, given the political nature of the proceedings, the severity of the sentence was not the key issue. Rather, the important elements were that the case had been brought against him and that he had been convicted for a punishable offence. In this respect, the applicant referred to the case of Lüdi v Switzerland (no. 12433/86, 15 June 1992). | 6 |
86. The Government contended that there was no breach of the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention since his application had been accepted for examination by the Court. They further argued that they had complied with their obligations under Article 38 § 1 (a), as they had furnished the Court with copies of the main procedural documents and provided information on investigative measures taken in the case. The Government reiterated that the submission of the entire case file would be contrary to Article 161 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure. | 6 |
27. The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They pointed out, in view of the fact that the civil proceedings had been stayed pending the outcome of the administrative proceedings, that the domestic courts had acknowledged a violation of his right to a trial within reasonable time, adopted their decisions within the relevant time-limit ordered by the higher court and awarded the applicant sufficient compensation. | 6 |
43. The applicant disagreed and insisted that her application, together with the enclosed documents, had complied with Article <mask> of the Convention and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. She had submitted the relevant available documents which, according to her, were the search warrant and the final decision dismissing her complaints. The latter document as well as the Ombudsman’s opinion contained a sufficient summary of her complaints at the national level. | 6 |
17. The Government argued that the applicant could not claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention because, despite his allegations to the contrary, he had seen his lawyer on 13 March 2003 prior to his questioning by the police, albeit briefly. In the alternative, the Government asked the Court to reject this complaint for failure to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention on the ground that the applicant had failed to raise it before the domestic courts. | 6 |
142. The Government submitted that Mr Voskoboynikov had applied to the Court on behalf of the applicant on 9 February 1998. According to the Government, the applicant had said that he had not met Mr Voskoboynikov a single time in his statement of 27 October 1998 to the Prosecutor General. Moreover, in his of 25 February, 29 April and 27 October 1998 to the Prosecutor General, he had not made any complaints concerning his detention conditions or medical care. The Government therefore contended that the applicant did not have the status of a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 6 |
64. The applicant complained that the authorities had refused to provide him with the copies of the documents which he needed to substantiate his complaint before the Court. Being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2008), the Court considers it appropriate to examine this complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 6 |
178. The applicant’s representatives reiterated their submission that the applicant’s forcible removal to Uzbekistan would not have been possible without the authorisation, or at least acquiescence, of the Russian authorities; thus, that removal had been performed in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. By failing to comply with the interim measure, the respondent State had violated its obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 6 |
72. The applicant complained that in February 2006 domestic authorities had questioned him in connection with his application to the Court and urged him to testify that his submissions to the Court had been untrue. He further complained that the authorities had put pressure on Mrs Gasanova, his mother, Mrs Lisina, his acquaintance and Mr Ya., his former counsel. The Court will examine this complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention which provides as follows: | 6 |
32. The Government argued that the time to be taken into in consideration in the present case should be only as regards the part of the proceedings conducted against the applicant and not the company. In the Government’s view the continuation of the proceedings against an owner of a company constitutes “singular legal succession”. Taking into account the part of the proceedings against the company for the examination of the complaint brought by the applicant would therefore be in contravention of Article <mask> of the Convention. According to the Government the duration of the part of the proceedings conducted against the applicant and not the company was not excessive (five years at two levels, see paragraph 15 et seq. above). The Government proposed that the Court should reject the application as manifestly ill-founded. | 6 |
25. The Government objected that, to the extent the proceedings had been reviewed and the applicant granted compensation by the Constitutional Court, he could no longer be considered a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained that the Constitutional Court had examined the applicant's constitutional complaint thoroughly and that the amount of just satisfaction awarded complied fully with the Constitutional Court's practice on the point. Moreover, the proceedings before it had been easily accessible to the applicant, they had been speedy and had been conducted in the applicant's language and the compensation had been paid to him without any delay. | 6 |
17. The Government argued that Ms Ljiljana Simović, Mr Kazimir Jurić, Mr Abdulah Burek, Mr Amer Sunulahpašić, Ms Nasira Kurtović, Mr Nidaz Ugarak, Mr Jasmin Hodžić and Ms Jasmina Mezildžić had submitted their applications outside the six-month time-limit laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The final decision concerning their complaints was taken by the Constitutional Court on 17 September 2014. The Government further submitted that Mr Hodžić and Ms Mezildžić could no longer claim to be victims of the alleged violation within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention in view of the fact that they had settled their claims with the cantonal government. | 6 |
63. The applicant complained that the Government had not complied with its obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention in the context of the interim measures indicated to it under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to provide the applicant with adequate medical care. However, in the light of the Court’s findings concerning the adequacy of the medical care administered to the applicant (see paragraphs 44-48 above), the respondent State cannot be considered to have failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention. | 6 |
103. The Government further objected that the first and second applicants had lost their victim status, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, in view of the redress which (i) the second applicant had obtained in the context of the civil proceedings, and (ii) both the first and second applicants had obtained from the Constitutional Court in respect of the alleged breach of their procedural rights under Article 3 of the Convention. | 6 |
18. The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicant’s constitutional complaint, found a violation of his constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time, and awarded him compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicant had lost his victim status. | 6 |
162. The Government reiterated their submission (see paragraph 121 above) that the essence of the applicant’s complaints had been his relationship with his wife and not “his continued incapacitation”. He could not therefore claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Furthermore, he had failed to lodge an appeal against the 17 May 2000 judgment or to ask for a restoration of the time-limit for the appeal. The Government considered that these remedies were still available to the applicant. | 6 |
52. The applicant submitted that he was a victim under Article <mask> of the Convention, since the revocation of his Maltese citizenship threatened the very basis of his ability to reside in Malta. He was directly affected by the impugned measure, in line with the Court’s case-law. In this connection, he referred to Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland (28 March 1990, § 47, Series A no. 173). The applicant submitted that even though a deportation or removal order was not in force, the threat of such an order was imminent. Indeed, the Government had not stated that a deportation or removal order would not be issued and had expressed the view that following the annulment of his first marriage, “the applicant’s stay in Malta was precarious”. It was probable that no such action had been taken by the authorities only because they had been informed that the case was pending before the Court and that therefore no further steps were to be taken. The applicant submitted that once the Maltese Government had accepted that he could establish his second family in Malta, as he had in fact done, any subsequent curtailment of his status in Malta would directly affect that family life. | 6 |
18. The Government argued that, as a result of the Constitutional Court's judgment of 16 April 2003, the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim, for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time as regards the period that had already been examined by the Constitutional Court. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged the infringement of the applicant's right and had provided him with preventive and compensatory redress. This redress was adequate and sufficient and it was compatible with the principles and practice of both the Constitutional Court and the Court. The Government emphasised the accessibility of the procedure before the Constitutional Court to the applicant and the promptness with which the Constitutional Court had dealt with his complaint and with which the just satisfaction had been paid to him. | 6 |
108. The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of its rights under the Convention to the extent that its complaints were directed against the CRTA’s decisions in cases nos. 18/2000(3) and 113/2000(3), which had been annulled by the Supreme Court and the amount paid as a fine by the applicant refunded. This applied to both the judicial review proceedings and the civil proceedings | 6 |
48. The Government argued that, as a result of the Constitutional Court's judgments of 8 December 2004 and 14 January 2005, the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time as regards the period that had already been examined by the Constitutional Court. They pointed out that the Constitutional Court had expressly acknowledged the infringement of the applicant's right and had provided him with preventive and compensatory redress. This redress was adequate and sufficient and it was compatible with the principles and practice of both the Constitutional Court and the Court. The Government emphasised the promptness with which the Constitutional Court had dealt with the applicant's complaints, submitted that further to the Constitutional Court's injunctions for acceleration of the proceedings there had no longer been any delays and concluded that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded. | 6 |
22. The applicant submitted that, in spite of the Constitutional Court's decision of 24 March 2004, he was still a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. He argued that the amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002‑II). | 6 |
80. The applicant asked the Grand Chamber to uphold the Chamber's judgment, which had found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. He considered that by transferring him to the prison hospital, the respondent Government had failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court. The Government Agent and the trial court had “deliberately disregarded the interim measure”, as had the medical authorities. There was sufficient evidence of the untruth of the Agent's assertion that he had taken action aimed at complying with the interim measure as early as Friday 11 November 2005. | 6 |
46. The Government contended that Ukraine had complied with Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that while a copy of the judgment convicting the applicant had been issued to the applicant’s wife upon her request (see paragraph 32 above), neither the applicant nor his relatives had lodged a written request with the courts for a copy of his appeal in cassation. The Government further stated that during the criminal proceedings against him, the applicant had been assisted by several lawyers who had been given the opportunity to make copies of all documents included in the case file. The Government also noted that a copy of the applicant’s appeal in cassation had been joined to their observations on the case. | 6 |
23. The Government raised a preliminary objection that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In their opinion, the domestic courts had acknowledged that there had been a breach of the applicant’s rights guaranteed by the Convention and he had been awarded proper compensation for the damage he had sustained. Additionally, the Government noted that the applicant had not appealed against the first‑instance judgment, which had deprived him of victim status. The Government requested that the application be declared inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. | 6 |
277. The applicant’s representatives contested the Government’s arguments, pointing out that the facts of the present application were different in crucial respects from the aforementioned case of Cruz Varas and Others, since in Cruz Varas the applicant had remained at liberty and had been able to contact his representatives before the Court. In the present case, on the contrary, the applicant had been transferred to Uzbekistan against his will, there had existed a serious risk of him being subjected to arrest and torture in the detention of the destination country, his whereabouts had remained unknown, and he had been deprived of any opportunity to contact his representatives or otherwise to participate in the Court proceedings. To that extent, the facts of the present case were similar to Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], (nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, §§ 128-29, ECHR 2005‑I), where a violation of Article 34 was found in similar circumstances. Referring further to the recent cases of Abdulkhakov (cited above, §§ 222-31), and Zokhidov (cited above, §§ 201-11), they maintained that the respondent State had failed to comply with the interim measure, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 6 |
51. The Government further disputed the applicant’s victim status as regards his complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They argued with reference to the certificates of 20 March and 13 June 1996 (see paragraph 27 above) that the mill complex and petrol station had been registered in the company’s name rather than in that of the applicant, whereas under the Court’s case-law only the person directly affected by the act or omission at issue may claim to be a “victim” of the alleged violation within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In this latter respect they relied on the case of Nosov v. Russia (no. 30877/02, decision of 20 October 2005). | 6 |
19. The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer be considered a “victim”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, because the domestic courts had acknowledged a violation of his rights and had provided him with monetary compensation. The Government argued that the amount awarded to the applicant had been adequate, taking into account the duration and extent of the violation, the negative consequences suffered by the applicant, and the economic conditions in the country, as well as other relevant criteria. | 6 |
37. The applicant also complained under Articles 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention that the courts had incorrectly determined the merits of her counterclaim, that the lay judges had been appointed in violation of Russian law, and that the length of the proceedings had been excessive. Lastly, she alleged under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that by bringing his claim against the applicant, the prosecutor had unlawfully interfered with her possessions. Lastly, she alleged under Article <mask> of the Convention that the resumption of the criminal proceedings against her was aimed at intimidating her. | 6 |
151. The Government reiterated that the submission of the case file would be contrary to Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They also pointed out that it had been suggested that a Court delegation have access to the file at the place where the preliminary investigation was being conducted. The Government further maintained that there was no breach of the applicant's rights under Article <mask> of the Convention since her application had been accepted for examination by the Court. As for the relevant domestic proceedings, she could have access to those materials of the investigation that could be produced to her at the present stage and, upon the completion of the investigation, to all the materials contained in the case file. | 6 |
23. The Government submitted that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention since on 31 July 2003 the Liability Act entered into force, which provided that the proceedings stayed under the 1996 Amendment were to be resumed. Moreover, the Constitutional Court had accepted the applicants' constitutional complaint, found a violation of their constitutional right of access to a court, and awarded them compensation. The violation complained of had, therefore, been remedied before the domestic authorities and the applicants had lost their victim status. | 6 |
51. The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a “victim” in terms of Article <mask> of the Convention. They contended that an applicant could be considered a victim only if the State had already decided to take steps against him, and interference would come about only upon the execution or implementation of that decision. In the present case, despite the lack of any interim measure by the Court, no removal order was awaiting execution or implementation, as no such order had been issued, and no practical steps had been taken by the authorities in order to remove the applicant from Malta. The Government referred to Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France (27 August 1992, § 46, Series A no. 241‑B), in which the Court had distinguished the applicants’ case from that of the applicant in Soering v. the United Kingdom (7 July 1989, Series A no. 161), since in the former case no expulsion order had been made in respect of the applicants. They explained that deprivation of Maltese citizenship did not mean that the person so deprived would be removed from Malta. In order for the person to be removed from Malta, a removal order would have to be issued. Such an order had not been issued in the case of the applicant in the present case. | 6 |
59. The applicant argued that pursuing civil proceedings would not be effective in her case. To date, there had been no final judgment of a Polish court in a case in which compensation had been awarded for damage to a woman’s health caused by a refusal of a therapeutic abortion allowed under the 1993 Act. She emphasised that the two cases referred to by the Government post-dated her petition to the Court under Article <mask> of the Convention. Importantly, they were immaterial to her case because they concerned situations fundamentally different from the applicant’s, both as to the facts and law: one related to a claim for damages arising from the unlawful refusal of an abortion where the pregnancy had been caused by rape; the second concerned a claim for damages arising from the refusal of a prenatal examination. | 6 |
53. The applicant argued that the Government’s failure to provide her with immediate access to the entire range of drugs available for cancer patients or to transfer her to a civilian medical institution was a breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rule of Court and had thus violated her right to individual application. She relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 6 |
27. The applicants replied that the constitutional complaint was not an effective remedy for alleged violations of the right of access to a court. In particular, the Constitutional Court had not responded to the first applicant's complaint regarding access to a court, but solely to his length complaint. Furthermore, the amount of compensation was insufficient and significantly lower than amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases (see Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, § 39, ECHR 2002‑II). For these reasons, the first applicant was still a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention of the alleged violation, and the second applicant had not had to lodge a constitutional complaint in order to exhaust domestic remedies. | 6 |
44. The Government argued that the applicant could not claim to be the victim, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, of the alleged violation of her property rights on account of the investigating authorities’ negligence. They pointed out that the domestic commercial courts had examined the applicant’s relevant claim and had explicitly acknowledged, at two higher levels of jurisdiction, that the negligent actions of Mr S., the investigator in charge of the criminal case concerning misappropriation of property belonging to the applicant’s company, had resulted in the loss by the company of that property, and had awarded it compensation for pecuniary damage as well as reimbursement of costs and expenses. As regards the awarded amount, the Government argued that the Federal Commercial Court of the North-Caucasus Circuit was justified in reducing the initial amount awarded to the applicant’s company; the new amount had been calculated on the basis of the price at which the applicant’s company had intended to sell the sugar before it had been lost, and had taken into account the intended profit. The Government also pointed out that the applicant’s company had not alleged before the commercial courts that it had sustained any non-pecuniary damage in connection with the investigator’s negligence and had not lodged a claim to that end; it had only sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of damage to its business reputation, which claim had been rejected in the absence of any causal link with the established negligence. The Government further stressed that the awarded amounts had been paid to the applicant’s company in full. Lastly, they argued that Akvilon had received back the equivalent of the amount of sugar lost, as on 6 August 2002 it had been transferred to the company for safe storage. Along with the amount awarded later by the commercial courts, that had constituted, in the Government’s view, double compensation. | 6 |
132. The applicant’s representative complained that, by expelling the applicant before the examination of his appeal against the removal order, and despite the measure indicated by the Court on 24 October 2006 under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, Russia had failed to comply with its obligations under the Convention. The Court considers that that complaint gives rise to an issue of whether the respondent State is in breach of its undertaking under Article <mask> of the Convention not to hinder the applicant in the exercise of his right of individual application. | 6 |
91. The applicant further complained that on 17 October 2007 the administration of correctional colony no. IK-7, where he was serving a prison sentence, had failed to dispatch his application form to the Court. He relied on Articles 8 and 34 of the Convention. The Court will examine the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: | 6 |
56. The Government submitted that the applicants could not claim to be “victims”, for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention, of the facts of which they complained. The applicants had asserted, without providing official identity papers in support of their claims, that they had taken part in the assault on the Melilla border crossing at dawn on 13 August 2014 and had recognised themselves on the video footage which they supplied (see paragraph 14 above). Basing their assertions on expert assessments, the Government criticised the poor quality of the video recordings in question, which in their view made it impossible to compare the footage with the photos in the official identity archives that had been checked when the applicants had entered Spanish territory subsequently. Furthermore, even assuming that the persons visible in the video footage were indeed the applicants, the latter had ceased to have victim status in so far as, a few months later, they had succeeded in entering Spanish territory unlawfully via the same border crossing and had been the subject of expulsion orders issued in the context of proceedings which, in the Government’s submission, had been attended by all the necessary safeguards. Moreover, neither of the applicants had applied to the Spanish authorities for international protection before applying to the Court. Only N.D. had done so subsequently, despite the fact that, when they had entered Spain unlawfully after the events in the present applications, both applicants had been assisted by lawyers and interpreters. The Government therefore concluded that the applicants were not victims of the alleged violations. | 6 |
139. The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to provide him with copies of the documents from his case file which he had wished to submit to the Court in substantiation of his application. The applicant also complained that the authorities had blocked his correspondence with the Court. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides as follows: | 6 |
47. The Government observed that the applicant complained that she had been obliged to pay both the employer’s and employee’s social security contributions. However, in so far as her obligation to pay the employee’s contributions was concerned, she could not be regarded as a victim of the alleged violation within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. For the relevant period, namely September 1988 to June 1995, the contributions had been included in the amount paid by the United States in compliance with the Vienna Labour and Social Court’s judgment of 14 July 1995 (see paragraph 10 above). | 6 |
21. The Government submitted that the applicant had ceased to be a victim of a violation, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, as on 24 September 2003 he had received the entire amount which had been due to him under the judgment of the Pleven Regional Court. Unlike the situation obtaining in the case of Burdov v. Russia (no. 59498/00, ECHR 2002‑III), this payment had taken place before notice of the application had been given to the Government. Moreover, the applicant had signed a declaration to the effect that he had no further claims in respect of the amount due to him. | 6 |
34. The Government argued that the applicants were not victims within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They pointed out that the disciplinary sanctions imposed on the applicants by the University had been annulled by the domestic courts and that following the first-instance courts’ decisions to stay the execution of the impugned sanctions the applicants had been able to effectively attend their courses and sit their exams. In this connection, they considered that the applicants had abused the right of petition because they had failed to mention the latter fact in their application forms. | 6 |
13. The Government mentioned that, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Court, an applicant who has obtained reparation at the national level for an alleged violation of the Convention can no longer be considered a victim for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention (see, Marchenko v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 63520/01, 17 September 2002). Accordingly, as the judgment of the 13 May 1998 has been executed in full, the applicants can no longer be considered victims of a violation of their rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. They therefore proposed that the application be declared inadmissible or struck out of the Court's list of cases. | 6 |
37. The Government noted that the applicant had been “fully compensated” by S.B. and that the Municipal Court had sent her an official apology for the excessive length of the impugned proceedings. She was therefore no longer a “victim”, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention (see Faulkner v. United Kingdom, no. 37471/97, decision of 18 September 2001). | 6 |
39. The applicant argued that the situation was similar to the case of Amirov, cited above, in which the Court had found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention following the Government’s failure to comply with an interim measure imposed under Rule 39. As in the Amirov case (ibid.), the Russian authorities had again failed to comply with an order of the Court to provide an expert opinion by independent medical specialists assessing the applicant’s state of health. | 6 |
77. The Government took the view that the applicant had suffered no actual adverse consequences as a result of the facts complained of. There was, after all, no doubt that the applicant was aware of the sanction taken against him and the reasons for it: the Court of Appeal had explained the reasons for the order in question orally to the applicant in person. It followed that the applicant could not claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 6 |
79. The Government argued that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims of a violation of their rights within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention given that the Regional Court had found in respect of the Expert Panel that the applicants’ right to equal treatment and education had been violated by the Expert Panel’s failure to individualise their diagnoses or to specify the cause and nature of their special educational needs. Each of the applicants had been awarded HUF 1,000,000 as non-pecuniary damages. Moreover, the Supreme Court had found that the County Council was liable for its failure to supervise the legality of the functioning of the Expert Panel which had conducted a gravely unlawful practice by failing to observe the legal guarantees concerning the parents’ rights to be present, be informed, consent or seek a remedy. The prejudice suffered on account of the applicants’ deprivation of the right to a remedy provided for by law and thereby of the theoretical chance of obtaining a more favourable assessment of their learning abilities had been compensated by non-pecuniary damages. | 6 |
24. The Government further maintained that the first applicant was not a victim within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, because the amount of compensation he had claimed before the domestic courts (MDL 0.1) had been so low as to suggest that the true purpose of his libel action had not been to obtain redress for being defamed, but rather to make a political example of the President and the governing party. In the alternative, the Government submitted that the first applicant’s application was inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention because he had suffered no significant disadvantage. | 6 |
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