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Threat actor: Big Panda
UUID: 4777aa1a-1bc4-4f81-8c1d-9c50c739d314
First seen:
Source last modified: 2020-04-19
Threat actor aliases
Big Panda (CrowdStrike)
Description
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.
Sponsor type and motivation
Sponsor:
Motivation:
Country of origin
China
Observed attacked sectors where victims operate in
Observed attacked countries where victims operate in
Observed usage of tools
Reported hacking operations
Reported counter operations against threat actor
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Big_Panda.md
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21fc39088816-0
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Reference for threat actor for "Big Panda"
Title: CrowdStrike Falcon Traces Attacks Back To Hackers
Source: http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/crowdstrike-falcon-traces-attacks-back-to-hackers/d/d-id/1110402
Content
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CrowdStrike_Falcon_Traces_Attacks_Back_To_Hackers.md
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21fc39088816-1
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CrowdStrike Falcon Traces Attacks Back To HackersDark Reading is part of the Informa Tech Division of Informa PLCInforma PLC|ABOUT US|INVESTOR RELATIONS|TALENTThis site is operated by a business or businesses owned by Informa PLC and all copyright resides with them. Informa PLC's registered office is 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG. Registered in England and Wales and Scotlan. Number 8860726.Black Hat NewsOmdia CybersecurityNewsletter Sign-UpNewsletter Sign-UpCybersecurity TopicsRelated TopicsApplication SecurityCybersecurity CareersCloud SecurityCyber RiskCyberattacks & Data BreachesCybersecurity AnalyticsCybersecurity OperationsData PrivacyEndpoint SecurityICS/OT SecurityIdentity & Access Mgmt SecurityInsider ThreatsIoTMobile SecurityPerimeterPhysical SecurityRemote WorkforceThreat IntelligenceVulnerabilities & ThreatsWorld Related TopicsDR GlobalMiddle East & AfricaSee AllThe EdgeDR TechnologyEventsRelated TopicsUpcoming EventsWebinarsSEE ALLResourcesRelated TopicsLibraryNewslettersReportsVideosWebinarsWhitepapers Partner Perspectives:> MicrosoftSEE ALLSponsored ByCyberattacks & Data BreachesStartup that encourages playing offense on security launches cloud-based service to help businesses identify adversaries, mitigate attacks and pursue responses.Mathew J. SchwartzJune 17, 20135 Min ReadThe Syrian Electronic Army: 9 Things We Know(click image for larger view)The Syrian Electronic Army: 9 Things We Know Who's launching online attacks against your network? How can you better detect those attacks and -- if an attack turns out to be successful -- identify what was stolen?Enabling businesses to answer those questions is the premise of a cloud-based service announced Tuesday by security startup CrowdStrike. Dubbed Falcon, the big-data "active defense platform" is designed to identify intrusions in real time, attribute attacks – correlate with a known group of attackers – and help businesses block attacks or even engage in counterintelligence or deception by feeding attackers fake information."This is the real-time damage assessment that no one is doing today," said Dmitri Alperovitch, the co-founder and CTO of CrowdStrike, speaking by phone. "It shows you who the adversary is, what did they do [on your network], what did they take, which commands did they execute?" The service works in part by running a small (400 KB) "sensor" on Windows 7 and Mac OS X systems, bolstered
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is, what did they do [on your network], what did they take, which commands did they execute?" The service works in part by running a small (400 KB) "sensor" on Windows 7 and Mac OS X systems, bolstered by DNS, email and API sensors on servers, to track the types of attacks that are being launched. CrowdStrike then correlates attack information with intelligence that the company gathers on attack groups.[ NSA whistleblower's accusations deepen. Read Snowden Says U.S. Hacking Chinese Civilians Since 2009. ]As highlighted by successful spear-phishing attacks against everyone from security giant RSA to the White House, stopping every last information security attack might be impossible. So-called advanced persistent threat (APT) groups often use fake emails and attachments to infect targeted PCs and steal data, oftentimes without end users or security teams being aware. Once attackers infect a single PC, unless they're detected, they can lurk in corporate networks indefinitely: telecommunications giant Nortel was compromised for 10 years, defense contractor QinetiQ for three years.Such attacks are cheap to build and inexpensive to launch. Even if only one attack out of every 100 or 1,000 attempts succeeds, that might equal success for attackers. Given that reality, CrowdStrike's play is to help businesses identify not just when they've been attacked, but also who stole the information, what they stole and why they targeted the business in the first place -- what's their bigger goal?"The problem you've had for the past six to seven years is the emergence of targeted attackers, and for them, it doesn't mater how many layers of defense you put in place; what they want is you," said Alperovitch. "They want money, national secrets, intellectual property, and they're going to worm their way in, because the return on that investment is gigantic."Could defenders gain an edge by better understanding their attackers? "From an adversary perspective, we really focus on the targeted attackers," said Alperovitch. "We're tracking lots of nation-state-sponsored groups that are working to penetrate companies," he said, and "understanding their campaigns, and tradecraft, as well as who they're targeting."CrowdStrike has grouped attackers into "adversary groups" -- to date, about 48 in total -- named for country characteristics: "pandas" for groups operating from China; "cats" as in Persian cats for Iran;
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CrowdStrike_Falcon_Traces_Attacks_Back_To_Hackers.md
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targeting."CrowdStrike has grouped attackers into "adversary groups" -- to date, about 48 in total -- named for country characteristics: "pandas" for groups operating from China; "cats" as in Persian cats for Iran; "bears" for Russia; "saints" for Georgia; and "tigers" for India. "Some in the community refer to the adversary by the malware detection name from a specific antivirus vendor, e.g. Hydraq," said Adam Meyers, director of intelligence at CrowdStrike, in a blog post, referring to the name of the malware used in the so-called Aurora attacks against Google. "This is sometimes useful, but when the adversary is using a malware that is detected as Generic.Downloader.234, you have a much harder time communicating," Meyers said.CrowdStrike recommends that businesses use its intelligence on online adversaries to identify and focus on the attackers they're most likely to face. "For example, if you're in the financial service industry, you'll care about Big Panda, which is going after financial services firms, but not Karma Panda that's going after dissident groups," said Alperovitch. "If you're trying to go after everyone and defend against everything, you're really defending against nothing."For instance, one group that CrowdStrike has been tracking -- dubbed Anchor Panda -- has launched 124 attacks over the past six months, many of which appear to be aimed in part at building out deep-sea capabilities. Adam Meyers, head of intelligence for Crowdstrike, recently told The New Yorker that the information being targeted by the group bears more than a passing resemblance to China's five-year plan for modernizing its infrastructure.Once businesses have identified the group behind an attack, or used new intelligence to identify previously unidentified attacks that were successful as well as what was stolen, what happens next? According to Alperovitch, "if you want to work with the government, we can help with that as well, on our services side," which is headed by Shawn Henry, whose prior job was serving as the executive assistant director of the FBI's criminal, cyber, response and services branch. "Or you take the attribution and take legal action against that individual or the company," he said. "A lot of companies are multinationals, so you can actually sue them in the United States -- or in a jurisdiction of your choosing overseas, and get criminal damages or injunctive
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legal action against that individual or the company," he said. "A lot of companies are multinationals, so you can actually sue them in the United States -- or in a jurisdiction of your choosing overseas, and get criminal damages or injunctive relief for stolen information."Alperovitch said that when it comes to responding to hack attacks, there can be strength in numbers: "If you're one company going up against China, you're going to be afraid of retaliation, of your business being shut out of China. But if you're in a band of 20 or 30 Fortune 100 companies, China can't really retaliate; it needs them all.""Ultimately we'll only solve this problem together, not individually trying to build castles to protect ourselves," said Alperovitch. "That model hasn't worked in the physical world in over 400 years, and certainly not in cyber space."About the Author(s)Mathew J. SchwartzContributorMathew Schwartz served as the InformationWeek information security reporter from 2010 until mid-2014.See more from Mathew J. SchwartzKeep up with the latest cybersecurity threats, newly discovered vulnerabilities, data breach information, and emerging trends. Delivered daily or weekly right to your email inbox.SubscribeYou May Also LikeMore InsightsWebinarsMaking Sense of Security Operations DataFeb 21, 2024Unbiased Testing. Unbeatable ResultsFeb 22, 2024Your Everywhere Security Guide: 4 Steps to Stop CyberattacksFeb 27, 2024API Security: Protecting Your Application's Attack SurfaceFeb 29, 2024Securing the Software Development Life Cycle from Start to FinishMar 06, 2024More WebinarsEventsCybersecurity's Hottest New Technologies - Dark Reading March 21 EventMar 21, 2024Black Hat Asia - April 16-19 - Learn MoreApr 16, 2024Black Hat Spring Trainings - March 12-15 - Learn MoreMar 12, 2024More EventsEditor's ChoiceFemale Cybersecurity Analyst or Manager in large Cyber Security Operations Center SOC handling ThreatsCybersecurity OperationsCISO Corner: DoD Regs, Neurodiverse Talent & Tel Aviv's Light RailCISO Corner: DoD Regs, Neurodiverse Talent & Tel Aviv's Light RailbyTara Seals, Managing Editor, News, Dark ReadingFeb 9, 20249 Min
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Talent & Tel Aviv's Light RailCISO Corner: DoD Regs, Neurodiverse Talent & Tel Aviv's Light RailbyTara Seals, Managing Editor, News, Dark ReadingFeb 9, 20249 Min ReadA survey asking is stress good or bad Сloud SecurityIvanti Gets Poor Marks for Cyber Incident ResponseIvanti Gets Poor Marks for Cyber Incident ResponsebyBecky Bracken, Editor, Dark ReadingFeb 13, 20245 Min ReadPadlocks on a black background, indicating information securityCybersecurity OperationsCISO and CIO Convergence: Ready or Not, Here It ComesCISO and CIO Convergence: Ready or Not, Here It ComesbyArthur LozinskiFeb 13, 20244 Min ReadReportsIndustrial Networks in the Age of DigitalizationHow Enterprises Assess Their Cyber-RiskPasswords Are Passe: Next Gen Authentication Addresses Today's ThreatsThe State of Supply Chain ThreatsHow to Deploy Zero Trust for Remote Workforce SecurityMore ReportsWhite PapersUse the 2023 MITRE ATT&CK Evaluation Results for Turla to Inform EDR Buying DecisionsCauses and Consequences of IT and OT ConvergenceStrengthen Microsoft Defender with MDREndpoint Best Practices to Block Ransomware2023 Gartner Magic Quadrant for Single-Vendor SASEMore WhitepapersEventsCybersecurity's Hottest New Technologies - Dark Reading March 21 EventMar 21, 2024Black Hat Asia - April 16-19 - Learn MoreApr 16, 2024Black Hat Spring Trainings - March 12-15 - Learn MoreMar 12, 2024More EventsDiscover More With Informa TechBlack HatOmdiaWorking With UsAbout UsAdvertiseReprintsJoin UsNewsletter Sign-UpFollow UsCopyright © 2024 Informa PLC Informa UK Limited is a company registered in England and Wales with company number 1072954 whose registered office is 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WG.Home|Cookie Policy|Privacy|Terms of Use
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CrowdStrike_Falcon_Traces_Attacks_Back_To_Hackers.md
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c66693ce84f3-0
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Threat actor: Boulder Bear
UUID: fb8e2216-5e84-49ad-b187-58b457cfa95f
First seen:
Source last modified: 2020-04-19
Threat actor aliases
Boulder Bear (CrowdStrike)
Description
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.
Sponsor type and motivation
Sponsor:
Motivation:
Country of origin
Russia
Observed attacked sectors where victims operate in
Observed attacked countries where victims operate in
Observed usage of tools
Reported hacking operations
Reported counter operations against threat actor
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Boulder_Bear.md
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2d9170f36175-0
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Threat actor: Clockwork Spider
UUID: 93000251-ee2f-4865-9972-3ffe37bc62dd
First seen:
Source last modified: 2020-04-19
Threat actor aliases
Clockwork Spider (CrowdStrike)
Description
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.
Sponsor type and motivation
Sponsor:
Motivation:
Country of origin
[Unknown]
Observed attacked sectors where victims operate in
Observed attacked countries where victims operate in
Observed usage of tools
Reported hacking operations
Reported counter operations against threat actor
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Clockwork_Spider.md
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4cd2e1e6de27-0
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Threat actor: Corsair Jackal
UUID: 232c92dc-f380-4291-beca-a2e59b502449
First seen:
Source last modified: 2020-04-22
Threat actor aliases
Corsair Jackal (CrowdStrike), TunisianCyberArmy (?)
Description
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.
Sponsor type and motivation
Sponsor:
Motivation:
Country of origin
Tunisia
Observed attacked sectors where victims operate in
Observed attacked countries where victims operate in
Observed usage of tools
Reported hacking operations
Reported counter operations against threat actor
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Corsair_Jackal.md
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9d1b3dffcca3-0
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Reference for threat actor for "Corsair Jackal"
Title: Research & Threat Intel Archives - crowdstrike.com
Source: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/regional-conflict-and-cyber-blowback/
Content
Research & Threat Intel Archives - crowdstrike.com
Research & Threat Intel
TRY CROWDSTRIKE FREE FOR 15 DAYS
GET STARTED WITH A FREE TRIAL
Copyright © 2023 CrowdStrike
Privacy
Request Info
Blog
Contact Us
1.888.512.8906
|
Research_&_Threat_Intel_Archives_-_crowdstrike.com.md
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50c724dcca17-0
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Threat actor: Dextorous Spider
UUID: e7fb49f3-44b5-427d-93fc-570fcd7b4573
First seen:
Source last modified: 2022-12-31
Threat actor aliases
Dextorous Spider (CrowdStrike)
Description
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.
Sponsor type and motivation
Sponsor:
Motivation:
Country of origin
[Unknown]
Observed attacked sectors where victims operate in
Observed attacked countries where victims operate in
Observed usage of tools
Reported hacking operations
Reported counter operations against threat actor
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Dextorous_Spider.md
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858e2f380084-0
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Threat actor: Dizzy Panda
UUID: d15c1ebf-af3b-4672-9900-e99ca12fa672
First seen:
Source last modified: 2022-12-31
Threat actor aliases
Dizzy Panda (CrowdStrike), LadyBoyle (FireEye)
Description
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.
Sponsor type and motivation
Sponsor:
Motivation:
Country of origin
China
Observed attacked sectors where victims operate in
Observed attacked countries where victims operate in
Observed usage of tools
Reported hacking operations
Reported counter operations against threat actor
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Dizzy_Panda.md
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f54c534ab5fd-0
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Threat actor: Electric Panda
UUID: 8910334c-3302-4ecd-9119-8d78a02b58ea
First seen:
Source last modified: 2020-04-19
Threat actor aliases
Electric Panda (CrowdStrike)
Description
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.
Sponsor type and motivation
Sponsor:
Motivation:
Country of origin
China
Observed attacked sectors where victims operate in
Observed attacked countries where victims operate in
Observed usage of tools
Reported hacking operations
Reported counter operations against threat actor
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Electric_Panda.md
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85df15c08c49-0
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Reference for threat actor for "Electric Panda"
Title: CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem | PPT
Source: http://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem
Content
CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem | PPTSubmit SearchUploadCrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary ProblemCrowdStrikeCrowdStrikeFollow•6 likes•20,900 viewsReportShareTechnologyBusinessYou Have an Adversary Problem. Who's Targeting You and Why?
Nation-States, Hacktivists, Industrial Spies, and Organized Criminal Groups are attacking your enterprise on a daily basis. Their goals range from espionage for technology advancement and disruption of critical infrastructure to for-profit theft of trade secrets and supporting a political agenda. You no longer have a malware problem, you have an adversary problem, and you must incorporate an intelligence-driven approach to your security strategy.
During this CrowdCast, you will learn how to:
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Read moreCrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem1 of 35Download NowDownload to read offlineRecommendedCyber espionage nation state-apt_attacks_on_the_riseCyber espionage nation state-apt_attacks_on_the_riseCyphort You Can't Stop The Breach Without Prevention And DetectionYou Can't Stop The Breach Without Prevention And DetectionCrowdStrike Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill (v2.0)Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill (v2.0)Frode Hommedal No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016Matthew Dunwoody Effective Threat Hunting with Tactical Threat IntelligenceEffective Threat Hunting with Tactical Threat IntelligenceDhruv Majumdar Threat Hunting with Data ScienceThreat Hunting with Data ScienceAustin Taylor Projects to Impact- Operationalizing Work from the CenterProjects to Impact- Operationalizing Work from the CenterMITRE ATT&CK How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsHow MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsSergey Soldatov More Related ContentWhat's hotOpen Source Intelligence (OSINT)Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)festival ICT 2016 MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Prioritizing Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection; ...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Prioritizing Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection; ...MITRE - ATT&CKcon MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...MITRE - ATT&CKcon MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: ATT&CK Updates - Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR); Ivan ...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: ATT&CK Updates - Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR); Ivan ...MITRE - ATT&CKcon Advanced Persistent ThreatAdvanced Persistent ThreatAmmar WK Threat IntelligenceThreat IntelligenceDeepak Kumar (D3) Knowledge for the masses: Storytelling with ATT&CKKnowledge for the masses: Storytelling with ATT&CKMITRE ATT&CK Cyber Threat IntelligenceCyber Threat Intelligenceseadeloitte Threat Hunting with Splunk
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for the masses: Storytelling with ATT&CKKnowledge for the masses: Storytelling with ATT&CKMITRE ATT&CK Cyber Threat IntelligenceCyber Threat Intelligenceseadeloitte Threat Hunting with Splunk Hands-onThreat Hunting with Splunk Hands-onSplunk Threat Hunting - Moving from the ad hoc to the formalThreat Hunting - Moving from the ad hoc to the formalPriyanka Aash RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...Adam Pennington Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...MITRE - ATT&CKcon Red Team vs. Blue TeamRed Team vs. Blue TeamEC-Council Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018Christopher Korban MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, TripwireMITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, TripwireMITRE - ATT&CKcon ATT&CK Updates- CampaignsATT&CK Updates- CampaignsMITRE ATT&CK What is Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)What is Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)Molfar ATT&CK Updates- ATT&CK for ICSATT&CK Updates- ATT&CK for ICSMITRE ATT&CK Threat Intelligence 101 - Steve Lodin - SubmittedThreat Intelligence 101 - Steve Lodin - SubmittedSteve Lodin Welcome to the world of Cyber Threat IntelligenceWelcome to the world of Cyber Threat IntelligenceAndreas Sfakianakis What's hot (20)Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Prioritizing Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection; ...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Prioritizing Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection; ... MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of
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Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection; ...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Prioritizing Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection; ... MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,... MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: ATT&CK Updates - Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR); Ivan ...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: ATT&CK Updates - Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR); Ivan ... Advanced Persistent ThreatAdvanced Persistent Threat Threat IntelligenceThreat Intelligence Knowledge for the masses: Storytelling with ATT&CKKnowledge for the masses: Storytelling with ATT&CK Cyber Threat IntelligenceCyber Threat Intelligence Threat Hunting with Splunk Hands-onThreat Hunting with Splunk Hands-on Threat Hunting - Moving from the ad hoc to the formalThreat Hunting - Moving from the ad hoc to the formal RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio... Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R... Red Team vs. Blue TeamRed Team vs. Blue Team Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018 MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, TripwireMITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, Tripwire ATT&CK Updates- CampaignsATT&CK Updates- Campaigns What is Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)What is Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) ATT&CK Updates- ATT&CK for ICSATT&CK Updates- ATT&CK for ICS Threat Intelligence 101 - Steve Lodin - SubmittedThreat Intelligence 101 - Steve Lodin - Submitted Welcome to the world of Cyber Threat IntelligenceWelcome to the world of Cyber Threat Intelligence Similar to CrowdCasts
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for ICS Threat Intelligence 101 - Steve Lodin - SubmittedThreat Intelligence 101 - Steve Lodin - Submitted Welcome to the world of Cyber Threat IntelligenceWelcome to the world of Cyber Threat Intelligence Similar to CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary ProblemCrowdCast Monthly: Operationalizing IntelligenceCrowdCast Monthly: Operationalizing IntelligenceCrowdStrike KASPERSKY SECURITY BULLETIN 2013KASPERSKY SECURITY BULLETIN 2013Kappa Data CrowdCasts Monthly: When Pandas AttackCrowdCasts Monthly: When Pandas AttackCrowdStrike wp-cyber-threats-to-the-mining-industrywp-cyber-threats-to-the-mining-industryNumaan Huq Cybersecurity A Community Approach - 20151109Cybersecurity A Community Approach - 20151109Frank Backes Dave Mahon - CenturyLink & Cyber Security - How Modern Cyber Attacks Are Disr...Dave Mahon - CenturyLink & Cyber Security - How Modern Cyber Attacks Are Disr...Alisha Deboer You Are the TargetYou Are the TargetEMC RSA Monthly Online Fraud Report -- May 2013RSA Monthly Online Fraud Report -- May 2013EMC Bear Hunting: History and Attribution of Russian Intelligence OperationsBear Hunting: History and Attribution of Russian Intelligence OperationsCrowdStrike Proactive Counterespionage as a Part of Business Continuity and ResiliencyProactive Counterespionage as a Part of Business Continuity and ResiliencyDr. Lydia Kostopoulos COMMON GOOD DIGITAL FRAMEWORKCOMMON GOOD DIGITAL FRAMEWORKBoston Global Forum D&D Forum – Week 5Select oneof the Questions to Ponder as .docxD&D Forum – Week 5Select oneof the Questions to Ponder as .docxruthannemcmullen 2019 11 terp_breuer_disclosure_master2019 11 terp_breuer_disclosure_masterbodaceacat Data science unit introductionData science unit introductionGregg Barrett A Report On The Attack Automation StrategyA Report On The Attack Automation StrategyJennifer Reither Forrester no more chewy centers- the zero trust modelForrester no more chewy centers- the zero trust modelCristian Garcia G. Is Your Organization in Crisis?Is Your Organization in Crisis?BlackBerry Mistrust
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no more chewy centers- the zero trust modelForrester no more chewy centers- the zero trust modelCristian Garcia G. Is Your Organization in Crisis?Is Your Organization in Crisis?BlackBerry Mistrust vs Misinformation: Fake News, AI and Privacy -- The Next Frontiers i...Mistrust vs Misinformation: Fake News, AI and Privacy -- The Next Frontiers i...Charles Mok Russian and Worldwide Internet Security Trends 2015Russian and Worldwide Internet Security Trends 2015Qrator Labs DDoS Cyber Attacks Against Global Markets | ProlexicDDoS Cyber Attacks Against Global Markets | ProlexicProlexic Similar to CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem (20)CrowdCast Monthly: Operationalizing IntelligenceCrowdCast Monthly: Operationalizing Intelligence KASPERSKY SECURITY BULLETIN 2013KASPERSKY SECURITY BULLETIN 2013 CrowdCasts Monthly: When Pandas AttackCrowdCasts Monthly: When Pandas Attack wp-cyber-threats-to-the-mining-industrywp-cyber-threats-to-the-mining-industry Cybersecurity A Community Approach - 20151109Cybersecurity A Community Approach - 20151109 Dave Mahon - CenturyLink & Cyber Security - How Modern Cyber Attacks Are Disr...Dave Mahon - CenturyLink & Cyber Security - How Modern Cyber Attacks Are Disr... You Are the TargetYou Are the Target RSA Monthly Online Fraud Report -- May 2013RSA Monthly Online Fraud Report -- May 2013 Bear Hunting: History and Attribution of Russian Intelligence OperationsBear Hunting: History and Attribution of Russian Intelligence Operations Proactive Counterespionage as a Part of Business Continuity and ResiliencyProactive Counterespionage as a Part of Business Continuity and Resiliency COMMON GOOD DIGITAL FRAMEWORKCOMMON GOOD DIGITAL FRAMEWORK D&D Forum – Week 5Select oneof the Questions to Ponder as .docxD&D Forum – Week 5Select oneof the Questions to Ponder as .docx 2019 11 terp_breuer_disclosure_master2019 11 terp_breuer_disclosure_master Data science unit introductionData science unit introduction A Report On The Attack Automation StrategyA Report On The Attack Automation Strategy Forrester no more chewy centers-
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11 terp_breuer_disclosure_master Data science unit introductionData science unit introduction A Report On The Attack Automation StrategyA Report On The Attack Automation Strategy Forrester no more chewy centers- the zero trust modelForrester no more chewy centers- the zero trust model Is Your Organization in Crisis?Is Your Organization in Crisis? Mistrust vs Misinformation: Fake News, AI and Privacy -- The Next Frontiers i...Mistrust vs Misinformation: Fake News, AI and Privacy -- The Next Frontiers i... Russian and Worldwide Internet Security Trends 2015Russian and Worldwide Internet Security Trends 2015 DDoS Cyber Attacks Against Global Markets | ProlexicDDoS Cyber Attacks Against Global Markets | Prolexic More from CrowdStrikeState of Endpoint Security: The Buyers MindsetState of Endpoint Security: The Buyers MindsetCrowdStrike Understanding Fileless (or Non-Malware) Attacks and How to Stop ThemUnderstanding Fileless (or Non-Malware) Attacks and How to Stop ThemCrowdStrike Cyber Security Extortion: Defending Against Digital Shakedowns Cyber Security Extortion: Defending Against Digital Shakedowns CrowdStrike An Inside Look At The WannaCry Ransomware OutbreakAn Inside Look At The WannaCry Ransomware OutbreakCrowdStrike Proactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond AlertingProactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond AlertingCrowdStrike DEFENDING AGAINST THREATS TARGETING THE MAC PLATFORMDEFENDING AGAINST THREATS TARGETING THE MAC PLATFORMCrowdStrike CrowdStrike CrowdCast: Is Ransomware Morphing Beyond The Ability Of Standard ...CrowdStrike CrowdCast: Is Ransomware Morphing Beyond The Ability Of Standard ...CrowdStrike How to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrikeHow to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrikeCrowdStrike Cloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint SecurityCloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint SecurityCrowdStrike Battling Unknown Malware with Machine Learning Battling Unknown Malware with Machine Learning CrowdStrike Java Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging JavaJava Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging JavaCrowdStrike Venom Venom CrowdStrike CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the
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Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging JavaJava Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging JavaCrowdStrike Venom Venom CrowdStrike CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the IndicatorCrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the IndicatorCrowdStrike CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the HashCrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the HashCrowdStrike End-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware FamilyEnd-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware FamilyCrowdStrike TOR... ALL THE THINGSTOR... ALL THE THINGSCrowdStrike End-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family WhitepaperEnd-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family WhitepaperCrowdStrike TOR... ALL THE THINGS WhitepaperTOR... ALL THE THINGS WhitepaperCrowdStrike I/O, You Own: Regaining Control of Your Disk in the Presence of BootkitsI/O, You Own: Regaining Control of Your Disk in the Presence of BootkitsCrowdStrike Hacking Exposed Live: Mobile Targeted ThreatsHacking Exposed Live: Mobile Targeted ThreatsCrowdStrike More from CrowdStrike (20)State of Endpoint Security: The Buyers MindsetState of Endpoint Security: The Buyers Mindset Understanding Fileless (or Non-Malware) Attacks and How to Stop ThemUnderstanding Fileless (or Non-Malware) Attacks and How to Stop Them Cyber Security Extortion: Defending Against Digital Shakedowns Cyber Security Extortion: Defending Against Digital Shakedowns An Inside Look At The WannaCry Ransomware OutbreakAn Inside Look At The WannaCry Ransomware Outbreak Proactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond AlertingProactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond Alerting DEFENDING AGAINST THREATS TARGETING THE MAC PLATFORMDEFENDING AGAINST THREATS TARGETING THE MAC PLATFORM CrowdStrike CrowdCast: Is Ransomware Morphing Beyond The Ability Of Standard ...CrowdStrike CrowdCast: Is Ransomware Morphing Beyond The Ability Of Standard ... How to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrikeHow to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrike Cloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint SecurityCloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint
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Morphing Beyond The Ability Of Standard ... How to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrikeHow to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrike Cloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint SecurityCloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint Security Battling Unknown Malware with Machine Learning Battling Unknown Malware with Machine Learning Java Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging JavaJava Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging Java Venom Venom CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the IndicatorCrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the Indicator CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the HashCrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the Hash End-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware FamilyEnd-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family TOR... ALL THE THINGSTOR... ALL THE THINGS End-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family WhitepaperEnd-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family Whitepaper TOR... ALL THE THINGS WhitepaperTOR... ALL THE THINGS Whitepaper I/O, You Own: Regaining Control of Your Disk in the Presence of BootkitsI/O, You Own: Regaining Control of Your Disk in the Presence of Bootkits Hacking Exposed Live: Mobile Targeted ThreatsHacking Exposed Live: Mobile Targeted Threats Recently uploadedTowards a Docker-based architecture for open multi-agent systemsTowards a Docker-based architecture for open multi-agent systemsIAESIJAI Centre of Circumference - Shot List.docxCentre of Circumference - Shot List.docx17ogil170 Unlocking Hidden Profits: How GenAI Supercharges Industrial OTUnlocking Hidden Profits: How GenAI Supercharges Industrial OTShashi Singh Cfgmgmtcamp 2024 — eBPF-based Security Observability & Runtime Enforcement wi...Cfgmgmtcamp 2024 — eBPF-based Security Observability & Runtime Enforcement wi...Raphaël PINSON 2) Presentation_Overview_ISO_16140-3_Method_verification_20210322.pptx2) Presentation_Overview_ISO_16140-3_Method_verification_20210322.pptxssuser796efb Navigating the Never Normal Strategies for Portfolio LeadersNavigating the Never Normal Strategies for Portfolio
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Presentation_Overview_ISO_16140-3_Method_verification_20210322.pptxssuser796efb Navigating the Never Normal Strategies for Portfolio LeadersNavigating the Never Normal Strategies for Portfolio LeadersOnePlan Solutions Getting Started with MSP360 Managed Backup: Secure Your Data and Save Money ...Getting Started with MSP360 Managed Backup: Secure Your Data and Save Money ...MSP360 Dissecting Real-World Database Performance DilemmasDissecting Real-World Database Performance DilemmasScyllaDB FOSDEM 2024 Electronic boards production automation with KiCAD scriptsFOSDEM 2024 Electronic boards production automation with KiCAD scriptsOlimex Bulgaria Z-Wave Fan coil Thermostat Heltun_HE-HT01_User_Manual.pdfZ-Wave Fan coil Thermostat Heltun_HE-HT01_User_Manual.pdfDomotica daVinci CIRCLE geometry lesson 2nd quarter grade 10CIRCLE geometry lesson 2nd quarter grade 10RicFernandez4 Screen Sharing on Raspberry Pi 5 Using VNC in Weston and Wayland with the Yoc...Screen Sharing on Raspberry Pi 5 Using VNC in Weston and Wayland with the Yoc...Leon Anavi Production calculation.pptProduction calculation.pptJSathish3 Classifying electrocardiograph waveforms using trained deep learning neural n...Classifying electrocardiograph waveforms using trained deep learning neural n...IAESIJAI Simplified DevOps Bliss -with OpenAI APISimplified DevOps Bliss -with OpenAI APIVictorSzoltysek User Privacy and Data SovereigntyUser Privacy and Data SovereigntyLiveplex GDSC MMCOE - ML CampaignGDSC MMCOE - ML CampaignLavesh Akhadkar Connector Corner: Connect to your processes with UiPath Integration Service...Connector Corner: Connect to your processes with UiPath Integration Service...DianaGray10 Apollo Price Model - 20180521Apollo Price Model - 20180521Jamie (Taka) Wang Apollo Cloud Edge Solution - 20180518Apollo Cloud Edge Solution - 20180518Jamie (Taka) Wang Recently uploaded (20)Towards a Docker-based architecture for open multi-agent systemsTowards a Docker-based architecture for open multi-agent systems Centre of Circumference - Shot List.docxCentre of Circumference - Shot
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(Taka) Wang Recently uploaded (20)Towards a Docker-based architecture for open multi-agent systemsTowards a Docker-based architecture for open multi-agent systems Centre of Circumference - Shot List.docxCentre of Circumference - Shot List.docx Unlocking Hidden Profits: How GenAI Supercharges Industrial OTUnlocking Hidden Profits: How GenAI Supercharges Industrial OT Cfgmgmtcamp 2024 — eBPF-based Security Observability & Runtime Enforcement wi...Cfgmgmtcamp 2024 — eBPF-based Security Observability & Runtime Enforcement wi... 2) Presentation_Overview_ISO_16140-3_Method_verification_20210322.pptx2) Presentation_Overview_ISO_16140-3_Method_verification_20210322.pptx Navigating the Never Normal Strategies for Portfolio LeadersNavigating the Never Normal Strategies for Portfolio Leaders Getting Started with MSP360 Managed Backup: Secure Your Data and Save Money ...Getting Started with MSP360 Managed Backup: Secure Your Data and Save Money ... Dissecting Real-World Database Performance DilemmasDissecting Real-World Database Performance Dilemmas FOSDEM 2024 Electronic boards production automation with KiCAD scriptsFOSDEM 2024 Electronic boards production automation with KiCAD scripts Z-Wave Fan coil Thermostat Heltun_HE-HT01_User_Manual.pdfZ-Wave Fan coil Thermostat Heltun_HE-HT01_User_Manual.pdf CIRCLE geometry lesson 2nd quarter grade 10CIRCLE geometry lesson 2nd quarter grade 10 Screen Sharing on Raspberry Pi 5 Using VNC in Weston and Wayland with the Yoc...Screen Sharing on Raspberry Pi 5 Using VNC in Weston and Wayland with the Yoc... Production calculation.pptProduction calculation.ppt Classifying electrocardiograph waveforms using trained deep learning neural n...Classifying electrocardiograph waveforms using trained deep learning neural n... Simplified DevOps Bliss -with OpenAI APISimplified DevOps Bliss -with OpenAI API User Privacy and Data SovereigntyUser Privacy and Data Sovereignty GDSC MMCOE - ML CampaignGDSC MMCOE - ML Campaign Connector Corner: Connect to your processes with UiPath Integration Service...Connector Corner: Connect to your processes with UiPath Integration Service... Apollo Price Model -
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MMCOE - ML CampaignGDSC MMCOE - ML Campaign Connector Corner: Connect to your processes with UiPath Integration Service...Connector Corner: Connect to your processes with UiPath Integration Service... Apollo Price Model - 20180521Apollo Price Model - 20180521 Apollo Cloud Edge Solution - 20180518Apollo Cloud Edge Solution - 20180518 CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem1. You Have an
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ADVERSARY PROBLEM.
Who’s Targeting You and Why?
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
AGENDA
YOU HAVE AN ADVERSARY PROBLEM.
1.
INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN SECURITY
2.
ADVERSARY CATEGORIZATION
3.
ADVERSARY GROUPS - OVERVIEW
4.
NOTABLE ACTIVITY – Q3
5.
NEW ACTORS
6.
ACTIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Today’s Speakers
ADAM MEYERS |
VP, INTELLIGENCE
Recognized speaker, trainer, and intelligence expert with 15+ years
of cyber security industry experience
10 years in the DIB supporting US GOV customers on topics
ranging from wireless, pen testing, IR, and malware analysis
@ADAM_CYBER
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Today’s Speakers
MATT DAHL |
SENIOR ANALYST/ LEGAL COUNSEL
Cyber threat analyst focused on targeted intrusion activity
Focused on investigating indicators of compromise to identify
specific adversary activity
Legal liaison to the CrowdStrike Intelligence Team
@CROWDSTRIKE
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversaries are humans
Targeted Attackers:
WHO ARE THE
ADVERSARIES?
Motivation can range from disruption,
theft, to even destruction
They need to get in
They will likely need to move laterally
Spray and Pray (Prey):
They don’t care who they target
(sometimes what)
The more they compromise the
more they win
Motivation can range from disruption,
theft, to even destruction
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN SECURITY
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversary Categorization
CATEGORIZATION| Adversary Groups
Tactics, Techniques, and Practices
Never assume relationships exist
Between indicators
Recognize adversaries are constantly changing
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Adversary Categorization
CATEGORIZATION| Adversary Groups
Tactics, Techniques, and Practices
Never assume relationships exist
Between indicators
Recognize adversaries are constantly changing
But RECOGNIZE they are HUMAN
CATEGORIZATION
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
Intelligence: Adversary Groups
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
CHINA
Anchor Panda
Comment Panda
Impersonating Panda
Temper Panda
Keyhole Panda
Aurora Panda
Stone Panda
Vixen Panda
Union Panda
Poisonous Panda
Pirate Panda
Dagger Panda
Violin Panda
Putter Panda
Test Panda
Gibberish Panda
Electric Panda
Wet Panda
Karma Panda
Dynamite Panda
Radio Panda
Samurai Panda
Toxic Panda
Numbered Panda
Pitty Panda
Foxy Panda
Deep Panda
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
Intelligence
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversary Groups
IRAN
Clever Kitten: Energy Companies
Cutting Kitten: For Hire
NORTH KOREA
Silent Chollima:
Energy Companies
RUSSIA
Energetic Bear: Oil and Gas
Companies
INDIA
Viceroy Tiger Government,
Legal, Financial, Media,
Telecom
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
Intelligence
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversary Groups
HACKTIVIST/ACTIVIST/
TERRORIST
CRIMINAL
Deadeye Jackal Commercial,
Singing Spider Commercial, Financial
Financial, Media, Social Networking
Union Spider Manufacturing
Ghost Jackal Commercial, Energy,
Andromeda Spider Numerous
Financial
Corsair Jackal Commercial,
Technology, Financial, Energy
Extreme Jackal Military,
Government
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
10
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Notable Activity – Q3
NEW ADVERSARIES
STONE PANDA | NIGHTSHADE PANDA | GOBLIN PANDA | CORSAIR JACKAL
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Notable Activity – Q3
NEW ADVERSARIES
STONE PANDA | NIGHTSHADE PANDA | GOBLIN PANDA | CORSAIR JACKAL
NOTABLE ACTIVITY
DEADEYE JACKAL | NUMBERED PANDA | SILENT CHOLLIMA
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
11
NEW ACTORS
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
12
Intelligence: STONE PANDA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
May 2010 to Present
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Healthcare
Defense
Aerospace
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Lateral movement
Data exfiltration
Government
TOOLS
Poison Ivy RAT
IEChecker/EvilGrab
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
13
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Healthcare, Defense,
Aerospace, Government
Delivery: Likely spearphishing
WHO IS
STONE PANDA?
Malware: Poison Ivy and EvilGrab/
IEChecker
Known Poison Ivy passwords:
menuPass, happyyongzi, Thankss,
Xgstone, keaidestone, and admin
C2 Indicators: fbi.sexxxy.biz;
u1.FartIT.com; jj.mysecondarydns.com;
54.241.13.219; 184.169.176.71;
114.80.96.8
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
14
Intelligence: NIGHTSHADE PANDA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
Feb 2008 to Present
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Lateral movement
Data exfiltration
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Media
NGO/Int’l Relations
Universities
TOOLS
Poison Ivy
PlugX
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
15
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Media; NGO/Int’l
Relations; Universities
WHO IS
NIGHTSHADE
PANDA?
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Media; NGO/Int’l
Relations; Universities
WHO IS
NIGHTSHADE
PANDA?
Delivery: Likely spearphishing
Malware: PlugX and Poison Ivy
Known Poison Ivy passwords: synnia
C2 Indicators: www.adv138mail.com;
pu.flowershow.org; tech.network-sec.net;
184.105.178.83; 199.59.243.106;
112.137.162.151
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
16
Intelligence: GOBLIN PANDA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
July 2012 to July 2013
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Lateral movement
Data exfiltration
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Aerospace
Defense
Energy
Government
Shipping
TOOLS
Technology
Spearphishing using office doc
ZeGhost specific mutexes
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
17
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Aerospace; Defense;
Energy; Government; Shipping;
Technology; Telecommunications
WHO IS
GOBLIN PANDA?
Delivery: Spearphishing
Malware: HttpTunnel (AV detection = Zegost)
Mutexes: HttpTunnel@@ or Http@@@
C2 Indicators: vnpt.conimes.com;
mofa.conimes.com;
pvep.scvhosts.com; 112.175.79.55;
223.26.55.122; 198.100.97.245
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
18
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Intelligence: CORSAIR JACKAL
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
February 2013 to May 2013
OBJECTIVES
Information Disclosure
TARGETING
Energy
Financial
Government
Shipping
Telecom
TOOLS
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
19
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Timeline: CORSAIR JACKAL
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TOOLS
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
19
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Timeline: CORSAIR JACKAL
2012 XTnR3v0LT
colludes with Anonymous
group XL3gi0n
January 25, 2013 New
members added
January 22, 2013
XTnR3v0LT announce
formation of TCA
March 1 2013 Announced
compromise of US financial
February 2013
Announced
participation in
opblacksummer
July 29 2013 Ben Khlifa
announces new personal page
May 7, 2013
XTnR3v0LT
arrested by Tunisian
Authorities
September 2, 2013
Tweets XSS
vulnerability on
Sourceforge
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
20
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Energy; Financial;
Government; Shipping;
Telecommunications
WHO IS
CORSAIR
JACKAL?
Primarily One Individual: Fahmi Ben
Khlifa (XTnR3v0LT)
Professed nationalistic motivations for
malicious activity, but also white hat
activity.
Cross-site scripting attacks used to
compromise databases at target
organizations.
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
21
NOTABLE ACTIVITY
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
22
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Intelligence: DEADEYE JACKAL
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
TARGETING
May 2011 to Present
Financial Institution
Media/News
Social Network Platforms
OBJECTIVES
Propaganda
Disinformation
Disruption
TOOLS
Spearphishing
Web Exploitation
Facebook Spamming
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
23
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Timeline: DEADEYE JACKAL
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Timeline: DEADEYE JACKAL
August 26, 2011
May 5, 2011 SEA Mohammad Ahmad Fall 2011 – Spring 2013
Officially Formed Kabbani Killed
Web Defacements
Facebook
Spamming
September 2011
Harvard
Defacement
July 2013 3rd Party
Provider Breaches
February 2013
Twitter Account
Takeovers
August 2013
Domain
Hijacking
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
24
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Financial Institutions;
Media/News; Social Network Platforms
WHO IS
DEADEYE
JACKAL?
Delivery: Spearphishing
Nationalistic, pro-Syrian regime
motivations
Defacement, account takeover,
third-party provider attacks,
credential collection
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
25
Intelligence: NUMBERED PANDA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
2009 - Present
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Lateral movement
Data exfiltration
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Government
Financial
Telecom
Technology
Media
TOOLS
Spearphishing
Dynamic Calculation
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
26
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Government; Financial;
Telecommunications; Media
WHO IS
NUMBERED
PANDA?
Delivery: Spearphishing
Malware: Ixeshe, Mswab, Gh0st,
ShowNews, 3001
C2 Indicators: getfresh.dnsrd.com;
serial.ddns.ms; gfans.onmypc.us;
23.19.122.202; 192.154.108.10;
192.154.111.200
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
27
Intelligence: SILENT CHOLLIMA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
2007 to Present
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Multiple targets in ROK
Global Targets of Opportunity
OBJECTIVES
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2007 to Present
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Multiple targets in ROK
Global Targets of Opportunity
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Criminal Monetization
Lateral movement
Data Destruction
TOOLS
Custom Malware
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
28
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Media
WHO IS
SILENT
CHOLLIMA?
Delivery: Spearphishing
Malware: HTTP/IRC-based; Tdrop;
Concealment Troy; LSG
C2 indicators: www.designface.net;
www.sdmp.kr; www.socrates.tw;
202.172.28.111; 63.115.31.15;
209.137.232.3
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
29
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE| Adversary-Centric
INTELLIGENCE
Understand the adversaries targeting your
Vertical | Company | Geo-Location | Customers
Build appropriate defenses to counter/detect
these adversaries
Perform other security practices from an
Adversary-centric perspective
Pen Testing (Red Team)
Security Operations Briefings
Log Review
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
30
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE| Making it Actionable
1
ACTIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence is difficult to consume
Lots of information to keep straight
New data constantly flowing in (possibly unvetted)
Security Operations need to change shis & people
Actionable Intelligence
Pass down can’t possibly occur with all indicators
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
31
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversary Microsite
COMING SOON
TRACK: Track current
Adversaries against other
Industry nomenclature
OVERVIEW: Gain insight
Into adversary – new groups
Added weekly
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Adversary Microsite
COMING SOON
TRACK: Track current
Adversaries against other
Industry nomenclature
OVERVIEW: Gain insight
Into adversary – new groups
Added weekly
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
32
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
RESOURCES
Next up: Enterprise Activity Monitoring
The Power to HUNT
November 5th | 2PM ET/11AM PT
Download a Sample
Adversary Intelligence Report
http://www.crowdstrike.com/
sites/default/files/deeppanda.pdf
For additional information,
CONTACT SALES@CROWDSTRIKE.COM
NEW Videos Every Thursday | 1PM ET
http://www.crowdstrike.com/crowdcasts/index.html
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
33
Q&A
Q&A
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Please type all questions into the
Q&A section of the
GoToWebinar Control Panel
If you have additional ?’s, contact us
At crowdcasts@crowdstrike.com
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
34
Download NowAboutSupportTermsPrivacyCopyrightCookie PreferencesDo not sell or share my personal informationEverandEnglishCurrent LanguageEnglishEspañolPortuguesFrançaisDeutsche© 2024 SlideShare from Scribd
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d2e2025ce999-0
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Threat actor: Eloquent Panda
UUID: b01e489b-df53-40aa-9b98-d9d856de7074
First seen:
Source last modified: 2020-04-19
Threat actor aliases
Eloquent Panda (CrowdStrike)
Description
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.
Sponsor type and motivation
Sponsor:
Motivation:
Country of origin
China
Observed attacked sectors where victims operate in
Observed attacked countries where victims operate in
Observed usage of tools
Reported hacking operations
Reported counter operations against threat actor
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Reference for threat actor for "Eloquent Panda"
Title: CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem | PPT
Source: http://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem
Content
CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem | PPTSubmit SearchUploadCrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary ProblemCrowdStrikeCrowdStrikeFollow•6 likes•20,900 viewsReportShareTechnologyBusinessYou Have an Adversary Problem. Who's Targeting You and Why?
Nation-States, Hacktivists, Industrial Spies, and Organized Criminal Groups are attacking your enterprise on a daily basis. Their goals range from espionage for technology advancement and disruption of critical infrastructure to for-profit theft of trade secrets and supporting a political agenda. You no longer have a malware problem, you have an adversary problem, and you must incorporate an intelligence-driven approach to your security strategy.
During this CrowdCast, you will learn how to:
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ADVERSARY PROBLEM.
Who’s Targeting You and Why?
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
AGENDA
YOU HAVE AN ADVERSARY PROBLEM.
1.
INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN SECURITY
2.
ADVERSARY CATEGORIZATION
3.
ADVERSARY GROUPS - OVERVIEW
4.
NOTABLE ACTIVITY – Q3
5.
NEW ACTORS
6.
ACTIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Today’s Speakers
ADAM MEYERS |
VP, INTELLIGENCE
Recognized speaker, trainer, and intelligence expert with 15+ years
of cyber security industry experience
10 years in the DIB supporting US GOV customers on topics
ranging from wireless, pen testing, IR, and malware analysis
@ADAM_CYBER
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Today’s Speakers
MATT DAHL |
SENIOR ANALYST/ LEGAL COUNSEL
Cyber threat analyst focused on targeted intrusion activity
Focused on investigating indicators of compromise to identify
specific adversary activity
Legal liaison to the CrowdStrike Intelligence Team
@CROWDSTRIKE
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversaries are humans
Targeted Attackers:
WHO ARE THE
ADVERSARIES?
Motivation can range from disruption,
theft, to even destruction
They need to get in
They will likely need to move laterally
Spray and Pray (Prey):
They don’t care who they target
(sometimes what)
The more they compromise the
more they win
Motivation can range from disruption,
theft, to even destruction
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN SECURITY
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversary Categorization
CATEGORIZATION| Adversary Groups
Tactics, Techniques, and Practices
Never assume relationships exist
Between indicators
Recognize adversaries are constantly changing
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Adversary Categorization
CATEGORIZATION| Adversary Groups
Tactics, Techniques, and Practices
Never assume relationships exist
Between indicators
Recognize adversaries are constantly changing
But RECOGNIZE they are HUMAN
CATEGORIZATION
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
Intelligence: Adversary Groups
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
CHINA
Anchor Panda
Comment Panda
Impersonating Panda
Temper Panda
Keyhole Panda
Aurora Panda
Stone Panda
Vixen Panda
Union Panda
Poisonous Panda
Pirate Panda
Dagger Panda
Violin Panda
Putter Panda
Test Panda
Gibberish Panda
Electric Panda
Wet Panda
Karma Panda
Dynamite Panda
Radio Panda
Samurai Panda
Toxic Panda
Numbered Panda
Pitty Panda
Foxy Panda
Deep Panda
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
Intelligence
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversary Groups
IRAN
Clever Kitten: Energy Companies
Cutting Kitten: For Hire
NORTH KOREA
Silent Chollima:
Energy Companies
RUSSIA
Energetic Bear: Oil and Gas
Companies
INDIA
Viceroy Tiger Government,
Legal, Financial, Media,
Telecom
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
Intelligence
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversary Groups
HACKTIVIST/ACTIVIST/
TERRORIST
CRIMINAL
Deadeye Jackal Commercial,
Singing Spider Commercial, Financial
Financial, Media, Social Networking
Union Spider Manufacturing
Ghost Jackal Commercial, Energy,
Andromeda Spider Numerous
Financial
Corsair Jackal Commercial,
Technology, Financial, Energy
Extreme Jackal Military,
Government
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
10
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Notable Activity – Q3
NEW ADVERSARIES
STONE PANDA | NIGHTSHADE PANDA | GOBLIN PANDA | CORSAIR JACKAL
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Notable Activity – Q3
NEW ADVERSARIES
STONE PANDA | NIGHTSHADE PANDA | GOBLIN PANDA | CORSAIR JACKAL
NOTABLE ACTIVITY
DEADEYE JACKAL | NUMBERED PANDA | SILENT CHOLLIMA
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
11
NEW ACTORS
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
12
Intelligence: STONE PANDA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
May 2010 to Present
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Healthcare
Defense
Aerospace
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Lateral movement
Data exfiltration
Government
TOOLS
Poison Ivy RAT
IEChecker/EvilGrab
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
13
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Healthcare, Defense,
Aerospace, Government
Delivery: Likely spearphishing
WHO IS
STONE PANDA?
Malware: Poison Ivy and EvilGrab/
IEChecker
Known Poison Ivy passwords:
menuPass, happyyongzi, Thankss,
Xgstone, keaidestone, and admin
C2 Indicators: fbi.sexxxy.biz;
u1.FartIT.com; jj.mysecondarydns.com;
54.241.13.219; 184.169.176.71;
114.80.96.8
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
14
Intelligence: NIGHTSHADE PANDA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
Feb 2008 to Present
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Lateral movement
Data exfiltration
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Media
NGO/Int’l Relations
Universities
TOOLS
Poison Ivy
PlugX
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
15
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Media; NGO/Int’l
Relations; Universities
WHO IS
NIGHTSHADE
PANDA?
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Media; NGO/Int’l
Relations; Universities
WHO IS
NIGHTSHADE
PANDA?
Delivery: Likely spearphishing
Malware: PlugX and Poison Ivy
Known Poison Ivy passwords: synnia
C2 Indicators: www.adv138mail.com;
pu.flowershow.org; tech.network-sec.net;
184.105.178.83; 199.59.243.106;
112.137.162.151
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
16
Intelligence: GOBLIN PANDA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
July 2012 to July 2013
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Lateral movement
Data exfiltration
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Aerospace
Defense
Energy
Government
Shipping
TOOLS
Technology
Spearphishing using office doc
ZeGhost specific mutexes
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
17
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Aerospace; Defense;
Energy; Government; Shipping;
Technology; Telecommunications
WHO IS
GOBLIN PANDA?
Delivery: Spearphishing
Malware: HttpTunnel (AV detection = Zegost)
Mutexes: HttpTunnel@@ or Http@@@
C2 Indicators: vnpt.conimes.com;
mofa.conimes.com;
pvep.scvhosts.com; 112.175.79.55;
223.26.55.122; 198.100.97.245
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
18
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Intelligence: CORSAIR JACKAL
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
February 2013 to May 2013
OBJECTIVES
Information Disclosure
TARGETING
Energy
Financial
Government
Shipping
Telecom
TOOLS
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
19
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Timeline: CORSAIR JACKAL
|
CrowdCasts_Monthly:_You_Have_an_Adversary_Problem_|_PPT.md
|
be950c94cf40-17
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TOOLS
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
19
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Timeline: CORSAIR JACKAL
2012 XTnR3v0LT
colludes with Anonymous
group XL3gi0n
January 25, 2013 New
members added
January 22, 2013
XTnR3v0LT announce
formation of TCA
March 1 2013 Announced
compromise of US financial
February 2013
Announced
participation in
opblacksummer
July 29 2013 Ben Khlifa
announces new personal page
May 7, 2013
XTnR3v0LT
arrested by Tunisian
Authorities
September 2, 2013
Tweets XSS
vulnerability on
Sourceforge
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
20
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Energy; Financial;
Government; Shipping;
Telecommunications
WHO IS
CORSAIR
JACKAL?
Primarily One Individual: Fahmi Ben
Khlifa (XTnR3v0LT)
Professed nationalistic motivations for
malicious activity, but also white hat
activity.
Cross-site scripting attacks used to
compromise databases at target
organizations.
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
21
NOTABLE ACTIVITY
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
22
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Intelligence: DEADEYE JACKAL
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
TARGETING
May 2011 to Present
Financial Institution
Media/News
Social Network Platforms
OBJECTIVES
Propaganda
Disinformation
Disruption
TOOLS
Spearphishing
Web Exploitation
Facebook Spamming
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
23
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Timeline: DEADEYE JACKAL
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23
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Timeline: DEADEYE JACKAL
August 26, 2011
May 5, 2011 SEA Mohammad Ahmad Fall 2011 – Spring 2013
Officially Formed Kabbani Killed
Web Defacements
Facebook
Spamming
September 2011
Harvard
Defacement
July 2013 3rd Party
Provider Breaches
February 2013
Twitter Account
Takeovers
August 2013
Domain
Hijacking
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
24
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Financial Institutions;
Media/News; Social Network Platforms
WHO IS
DEADEYE
JACKAL?
Delivery: Spearphishing
Nationalistic, pro-Syrian regime
motivations
Defacement, account takeover,
third-party provider attacks,
credential collection
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
25
Intelligence: NUMBERED PANDA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
2009 - Present
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Lateral movement
Data exfiltration
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Government
Financial
Telecom
Technology
Media
TOOLS
Spearphishing
Dynamic Calculation
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
26
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Government; Financial;
Telecommunications; Media
WHO IS
NUMBERED
PANDA?
Delivery: Spearphishing
Malware: Ixeshe, Mswab, Gh0st,
ShowNews, 3001
C2 Indicators: getfresh.dnsrd.com;
serial.ddns.ms; gfans.onmypc.us;
23.19.122.202; 192.154.108.10;
192.154.111.200
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
27
Intelligence: SILENT CHOLLIMA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
2007 to Present
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Multiple targets in ROK
Global Targets of Opportunity
OBJECTIVES
|
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be950c94cf40-19
|
2007 to Present
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Multiple targets in ROK
Global Targets of Opportunity
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Criminal Monetization
Lateral movement
Data Destruction
TOOLS
Custom Malware
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
28
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Media
WHO IS
SILENT
CHOLLIMA?
Delivery: Spearphishing
Malware: HTTP/IRC-based; Tdrop;
Concealment Troy; LSG
C2 indicators: www.designface.net;
www.sdmp.kr; www.socrates.tw;
202.172.28.111; 63.115.31.15;
209.137.232.3
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
29
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE| Adversary-Centric
INTELLIGENCE
Understand the adversaries targeting your
Vertical | Company | Geo-Location | Customers
Build appropriate defenses to counter/detect
these adversaries
Perform other security practices from an
Adversary-centric perspective
Pen Testing (Red Team)
Security Operations Briefings
Log Review
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
30
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE| Making it Actionable
1
ACTIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence is difficult to consume
Lots of information to keep straight
New data constantly flowing in (possibly unvetted)
Security Operations need to change shis & people
Actionable Intelligence
Pass down can’t possibly occur with all indicators
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
31
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversary Microsite
COMING SOON
TRACK: Track current
Adversaries against other
Industry nomenclature
OVERVIEW: Gain insight
Into adversary – new groups
Added weekly
|
CrowdCasts_Monthly:_You_Have_an_Adversary_Problem_|_PPT.md
|
be950c94cf40-20
|
Adversary Microsite
COMING SOON
TRACK: Track current
Adversaries against other
Industry nomenclature
OVERVIEW: Gain insight
Into adversary – new groups
Added weekly
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
32
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
RESOURCES
Next up: Enterprise Activity Monitoring
The Power to HUNT
November 5th | 2PM ET/11AM PT
Download a Sample
Adversary Intelligence Report
http://www.crowdstrike.com/
sites/default/files/deeppanda.pdf
For additional information,
CONTACT SALES@CROWDSTRIKE.COM
NEW Videos Every Thursday | 1PM ET
http://www.crowdstrike.com/crowdcasts/index.html
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
33
Q&A
Q&A
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Please type all questions into the
Q&A section of the
GoToWebinar Control Panel
If you have additional ?’s, contact us
At crowdcasts@crowdstrike.com
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
34
Download NowAboutSupportTermsPrivacyCopyrightCookie PreferencesDo not sell or share my personal informationEverandEnglishCurrent LanguageEnglishEspañolPortuguesFrançaisDeutsche© 2024 SlideShare from Scribd
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CrowdCasts_Monthly:_You_Have_an_Adversary_Problem_|_PPT.md
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102417e244c9-0
|
Threat actor: Flyfox
UUID: b958b665-65cf-4d36-9eb3-5cd95c566abf
First seen:
Source last modified: 2020-05-01
Threat actor aliases
Flyfox (Kaspersky)
Description
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.
Sponsor type and motivation
Sponsor:
Motivation:
Country of origin
[Unknown]
Observed attacked sectors where victims operate in
Observed attacked countries where victims operate in
Observed usage of tools
Reported hacking operations
Reported counter operations against threat actor
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Flyfox.md
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5a8b9067a656-0
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Reference for threat actor for "Flyfox"
Title: APT Review of the year | Securelist
Source: https://securelist.com/apt-review-of-the-year/89117/
Content
APT Review of the year | Securelist
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APT review of the year
APT reports
05 Dec 2018
minute read
Authors
Vicente Diaz
Costin Raiu
What the world's advanced threat actors got up to in 2018
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What were the most interesting developments in terms of APT activity throughout the year and what can we learn from them?
Not an easy question to answer; everybody has partial visibility and it’s never possible to really understand the motivations of some attacks or the developments behind them. Still, with the benefit of hindsight, let’s try to approach the problem from different angles to get a better understanding of what went on.
On big actors
There are a few ‘traditional’ actors that are very well known to the security community and that everybody has been tracking for the last few years. It has been business as usual for these actors in 2018 or, if anything, perhaps slightly quieter than usual.
In reality, it is the doctrines and modi operandi of these groups that determine how they react in the event of their operations becoming public knowledge. Some actors will simply abort their campaign and go into clean-up mode, while others carry on as normal. In order to do so, it is common for some of these actors to simultaneously work on several sets of activity. This allows them to compartmentalize operations, and if they are discovered, they simply improve their toolset to avoid detection next time.
We traditionally find many Russian-speaking actors in this second group, and we would like to highlight the 2018 activity of Sofacy, Turla and CozyBear.
Sofacy was probably the most active of the three. Throughout the year we detected it in various operations, updating their toolset and being blamed by authorities for several past operations. We have seen the actor deploying Gamefish and an updated version of its DealersChoice framework against embassies and EU agencies. One of the most high-profile incidents was abuse of Computrace LoJack by this actor in order to deploy its malware on victim machines, in what can be considered a UEFI-type rootkit.
Zebrocy is one of the tools traditionally used by this actor, but in reality the collection of cases where this tool was used can be considered a subset of activity in its own right. We saw different improvements for Zebrocy’s subset, including a new custom collector/downloader, new VBA implementing anti-sandboxing techniques and new .NET modules.
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During the year we understood that Sofacy appears to be changing at a structural level and is possibly already being split into different subgroups. With the OlympicDestroyer analysis we learnt that this highly sophisticated false flag operation was somehow related to Sofacy. However, we later observed more activity by the OlympicDestroyer subset in Europe and Ukraine, and it was then that we decided to treat it as the entity we call Hades.
Of particular interest is how, after the publication of the GreyEnergy set of activity that is believed to be a continuation of BlackEnergy/Sandworm, we found additional overlaps between GreyEnergy and Zebrocy, including the use of the same infrastructure and the same 0-day for ICS.
All that seems to link this new Hades actor with the Zebrocy subset of activity, traditionally attributed to Sofacy, as well as part of the BlackEnergy/GreyEnergy/Sandworm cluster.
Regarding Turla, we didn’t spot any big structural changes like those described above, though we did see this actor using some interesting implants such as LightNeuron (targeting Exchange servers as described in our previous APT summary for Q2), as well as a new backdoor that, according to ESET, infected Germany’s Federal Foreign Office in 2017, as well as other entities in the European Union.
We discovered this actor using a new variant of its Carbon malware in its traditional activity of targeting embassies and foreign affairs institutions throughout the year. It also started using a new framework that we call Phoenix, as well as (unsurprisingly) transitioning to scripting and open source tools for its lateral movement stage.
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Finally, some potential CozyDuke activity was detected during November 2018, apparently targeting diplomatic and governmental entities in Europe. The TTPs do not seem to be those that are usually attributed to this actor, which opened the door to speculation about this malware being used by a different group. The facts still seem to confirm that the malware used is attributable to CozyDuke. We are still investigating this new campaign by an actor that has been inactive for months.
It’s also worth mentioning Lazarus and BlueNoroff activity in 2018. We observed constant activity from this group targeting different regions including Turkey, other parts of Asia and Latin America, as well as various lines of business that provide it with financial gain, such as casinos, financial institutions and cryptocurrencies. In its more recent campaigns it has started deploying a new malware we call ThreatNeedle.
On false flags
It comes as no surprise to find false flags every now and again, sometimes implemented rather naively. But this year we witnessed what should be considered (so far) the mother of all false flags (more details can be found here). Other than the technical details themselves, what is also worth considering is the real purpose of this attack, and why these sophisticated false flags were planted in the malware.
The first obvious conclusion is that attackers now understand very well what techniques are used by the security industry to attribute attacks, so they have abused that knowledge to fool security researchers. Another consideration is that the main objective of an attack is not necessarily related to stealing information or disrupting operations – imitating an attacker might be more important.
This may actually be part of what some actors are doing at the moment. There are several groups that were apparently inactive for some time but now appear to be back. However, they are using different TTPs that are not necessarily better. As we shall see later, a couple of examples may be CozyDuke and APT10. As a purely speculative thought, it might be that their traditional toolset is now being used by different groups, maybe still related to the original operators. The purpose might be to make attribution more difficult in the future, or simply to distract from their real ongoing operations.
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The whole OlympicDestroyer story eventually resulted in the discovery of a new subset of activity related to both Sofacy and BlackEnergy that we call Hades. We will see how these more sophisticated false flags evolve in the future and how they are used to pursue less explicit goals.
On the forgotten ones
Throughout the year we also saw how several old ‘friends’ re-emerged from hibernation with new sets of activity. Here we are talking about several well-known actors that for unknown reasons (a lack of visibility might be one of them) didn’t display much activity in recent times. However, it seems they are back. In some cases they appear in different weaker forms, perhaps with different operators, or just pretending not to be in shape while they run other parallel operations; in others cases they are back with their usual capabilities.
We can summarize all this by dividing it up into the regions that showed most activity during the year. First place went to South East Asia, followed by the Middle East.
For South East Asia we can point to groups such as Kimsuky that developed a brand new toolset at the very beginning of the year, or activity that falls under the always difficult-to-attribute WinNTI ‘umbrella’. However, and most notably, we can highlight groups such as DarkHotel, LuckyMouse, or even APT10.
The OceanSalt campaign was attributed to APT10, though it’s not very clear how strong the connection is. It seems unlikely that this actor, after the public disclosure and so many years of no known activity, would return with anything that might be attributable to them. At the moment, this is difficult to assess.
LuckyMouse, the second Chinese-speaking group from this list, was very active all year. It hacked national data centers to deploy watering-hole attacks against high-profile victims in central Asia, used a driver signed by a Chinese security-related software developer, and is even suspected of being behind attacks against Oman immediately after the signing of a military agreement with India.
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Scarcruft used a new backdoor we call PoorWeb, deployed a 0-day in their campaign at the beginning of the year and used Android malware specially designed for Samsung devices. DarkHotel was also back with a 0-day and new activity, targeting their traditional victims. We were able to establish a connection with a medium level of certainty between DarkHotel and the Konni/Nokki set of activity described by other vendors.
APT10 was especially active against Japanese victims, with new iterations of its malware, as was OceanLotus, which actively deployed watering holes targeting high-profile victims in South Asia with a new custom stager.
In the Middle East we observed groups such as Prince of Persia re-emerge with some activity, along with OilRig. We also detected new MuddyWaters activity, as well as GazaTeam, DesertFalcons and StrongPity among others deploying various campaigns in the region.
On the new kids
At the same time many new sets of activity emerged during the year that were also focused primarily on the Middle East and South East Asia.
This activity was driven by Asian actors such as ShaggyPanther, Sidewinder, CardinalLizard, TropicTrooper, DroppingElephant, Rancor, Tick group, NineBlog, Flyfox and CactusPete – all of them active in the region throughout the year. As a rule, these groups are not that technically advanced, using a variety of approaches to achieve their objectives. They are usually interested in regional targets, with their main objectives being governmental and also military.
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In the Middle East we saw activity by LazyMerkaats, FruityArmor, OpParliament, DarkHydrus and DomesticKitten among others. Sets of activity such as that by the Gorgon group are a bit of an exception as they also target victims outside the region.
Finally, we also detected new sets of activity that show an apparent interest in eastern European countries and former Soviet republics. In this group we find DustSquad, ParkingBear and Gallmaker. The latter seems to be interested in overseas embassies as well as military and defense targets in the Middle East.
On the big fishes
Even if some of the activity previously described doesn’t seem that technically advanced, it doesn’t mean it isn’t effective. Looking back we can cite a few public cases where it looks like these attacks are returning to the days when attackers were after major strategic research or blueprints that might be of the interest to state-sponsored groups, and not just some random data.
We have several examples. For instance, APT15 was suspected of targeting a company providing services to military and technology departments of the UK government. Intezer provided extra details about the activity of this group, though it is not clear who the ultimate victim was.
TEMP.Periscope was suspected of hacking maritime organizations related to the South China Sea. It wasn’t the only case in which the industry was targeted, as later it was discovered an unknown actor attacked companies related to Italian naval and defense industries.
Groups such as Thrip showed a clear interest in targeting satellite communication companies and defense organizations in the US and South East Asia.
Finally, the US Naval Undersea Warfare Center was attacked, according to the Washington Post, by a group linked to the Chinese Ministry of State Security, resulting in the theft of 614GB of data and blueprints.
The re-emergence of some of these groups and their victims don’t seem to be a coincidence. Some observers might even see the return of these big targeted attacks as the end of some sort of tacit agreement.
We also observed several attacks against journalists, activists, political dissidents and NGOs around the world. Many of these attacks involved malware developed by companies that provide surveillance tools to governments.
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We also observed several attacks against journalists, activists, political dissidents and NGOs around the world. Many of these attacks involved malware developed by companies that provide surveillance tools to governments.
For instance, NSO and its Pegasus malware was discovered in more than 43 countries according to an external investigation, showing that business in this field is blooming. On a darker note, there were reports on how Saudi dissidents and Amnesty International volunteers were targeted with this malware.
The Tibetan community was also specifically targeted with different malware families, including a Linux backdoor, PowerShell payloads, and fake social media to steal credentials.
Finally, CitizenLab provided details of a campaign where Sandvine and GammaGroup artifacts were used for surveillance through local ISPs in Egypt, Turkey and Syria.
On naming and shaming
This is clearly a new strategy, adopted as a defense mechanism and as a response to the attackers, in some cases being justice able to claim individual working for APT groups. This can later be used in diplomatic offensives and lead to tougher consequences at the state level. It seems that governments are no longer shy of making these attacks public and providing details of their investigations, while pointing fingers at the suspected attackers. This is an interesting development and we will see how it evolves in the future.
The end of the Obama-era cyber-agreement between the US and China could be the reason for the wave of Chinese-speaking groups making a comeback, as well as the targeting of some of the high-profile ‘big fishes’ described above. We saw how in this new period of hostility between the two countries, the US obtained the extradition from Belgium of a Chinese intelligence officer charged with conspiring and attempting to commit economic espionage and steal trade secrets from multiple US aviation and aerospace companies.
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The US also provided details about a North Korean citizen suspected of being part of the Lazarus group that was behind the Sony Entertainment attack and WannaCry activity, and who is now wanted by the FBI. Maybe in an unrelated note, the US Cert was very active during the year in providing indicators of compromise and detailing Lazarus (HiddenCobra) activity and the tools used by this actor.
After the infamous DNC hack, the US indicted 12 Russian citizens belonging to units 26165 and 74455 of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate. Seven officers of GRU were also indicted for their alleged role in a campaign to retaliate against the World Anti-Doping Agency that exposed the Russian state-sponsored doping program.
In Europe, UK Officials and the UK National Cyber Security Center attributed the not-Petya attack that took place in June 2017 to Russian military units.
Finally, and in a very interesting initiative, the US Cyber Command launched an ‘information warfare’ campaign with a message to Russian operatives not to even try influencing the US mid-term election process.
All the above, and several other cases, shows how there seems to be a new doctrine in dealing with such hacking attempts, making them public and providing tools for media campaigns, future negotiations and diplomacy, as well as directly targeting operatives.
On hardware
The closer malware gets to the hardware level, the more difficult it is to detect and delete. This is no easy task for the attackers, as it’s usually difficult to find the exploit chain to get that deep in the system, along with the difficulty in developing reliable malware working in such deep levels. That always raises the question of whether this malware already exists, quietly abusing modern CPU architecture characteristics, and we simply don’t see it.
Recent discoveries of vulnerabilities in different processors open the door to exploits that might be around for years, because replacing the CPU is not something that can be easily done. It is not clear yet how Meltdown/Specter and AMDFlaws among others might be exploited and abused in the future, but attackers don’t really need to rush as these vulnerabilities will probably be around for a long time. Even if we haven’t see them being exploited in the wild yet, we believe this is a very valuable piece of knowledge for attackers and maybe also a timely reminder for us all about how important hardware security is.
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That leads on to something we actually saw in the VPNFilter attack, in this case targeting networking devices on a massive scale. This campaign, attributed to a Russian-speaking set of activity, allowed attackers to infect hundreds of thousands of devices, providing control of the network traffic as well as allowing MITM attacks. We saw APT actors abusing network devices in the past but never in such an aggressive way.
On other stuff
Triton/Trisis is an industrial-targeting set of activity that gained popularity during the year as it was discovered in some victims, and is suspected of shutting down an oil refinery in an attack where the actor used a 0-day. According to FireEye, this actor might have Russian origins.
In our predictions we already discussed the possibility of destructive attacks becoming normal in situations where tensions exist between two adversaries, using collateral victims to cause harm and send messages in this dangerous grey zone between an open attack and diplomacy.
Financial attackers may not be using very new techniques, but that may be because they don’t need to. The Carbanak group was ‘beheaded’ with the arrest in Spain of one of their leaders; however, that doesn’t seem to have had any impact on subsequent Fin7 activity during the year. They deployed their new Griffon JavaScript backdoor targeting restaurant chains. Meanwhile, a suspected subset of this group – the CobaltGoblin group – was also very active targeting banks in a more direct way.
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APT
Industrial threats
Lazarus
Nation State Sponsored Espionage
Olympic Destroyer
Sofacy
Targeted attacks
Turla
Authors
Vicente Diaz
Costin Raiu
APT review of the year
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Boris Larin
Denis Legezo
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John Hultquist
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In the same category
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APT_Review_of_the_year_|_Securelist.md
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5a8b9067a656-12
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In the same category
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Reports
HrServ – Previously unknown web shell used in APT attack
In this report Kaspersky researchers provide an analysis of the previously unknown HrServ web shell, which exhibits both APT and crimeware features and has likely been active since 2021.
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Asian APT groups target various organizations from a multitude of regions and industries. We created this report to provide the cybersecurity community with the best-prepared intelligence data to effectively counteract Asian APT groups.
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APT_Review_of_the_year_|_Securelist.md
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A cascade of compromise: unveiling Lazarus’ new campaign
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How to catch a wild triangle
How Kaspersky researchers obtained all stages of the Operation Triangulation campaign targeting iPhones and iPads, including zero-day exploits, validators, TriangleDB implant and additional modules.
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13fd5db28e89-0
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Threat actor: Foxy Panda
UUID: d7c799fd-409a-4c6b-8785-4ece69624974
First seen:
Source last modified: 2020-04-19
Threat actor aliases
Foxy Panda (CrowdStrike)
Description
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.
Sponsor type and motivation
Sponsor:
Motivation:
Country of origin
China
Observed attacked sectors where victims operate in
Observed attacked countries where victims operate in
Observed usage of tools
Reported hacking operations
Reported counter operations against threat actor
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Foxy_Panda.md
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047723819c55-0
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Threat actor: Ghost Jackal
UUID: 681ddb54-e107-4bfc-a03a-22746088f3cb
First seen:
Source last modified: 2020-04-19
Threat actor aliases
Ghost Jackal (CrowdStrike)
Description
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.
Sponsor type and motivation
Sponsor:
Motivation:
Country of origin
[Unknown]
Observed attacked sectors where victims operate in
Observed attacked countries where victims operate in
Observed usage of tools
Reported hacking operations
Reported counter operations against threat actor
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Ghost_Jackal.md
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ce6688940ad1-0
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Threat actor: Gibberish Panda
UUID: 2e02e064-74f7-4bbe-8b3b-43be290f91f8
First seen:
Source last modified: 2020-04-19
Threat actor aliases
Gibberish Panda (CrowdStrike)
Description
A threat actor mentioned in a summary report only, so we don't know who they are yet.
Sponsor type and motivation
Sponsor:
Motivation:
Country of origin
China
Observed attacked sectors where victims operate in
Observed attacked countries where victims operate in
Observed usage of tools
Reported hacking operations
Reported counter operations against threat actor
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Gibberish_Panda.md
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0573fb772c06-0
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Reference for threat actor for "Gibberish Panda"
Title: CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem | PPT
Source: http://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem
Content
CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem | PPTSubmit SearchUploadCrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary ProblemCrowdStrikeCrowdStrikeFollow•6 likes•20,900 viewsReportShareTechnologyBusinessYou Have an Adversary Problem. Who's Targeting You and Why?
Nation-States, Hacktivists, Industrial Spies, and Organized Criminal Groups are attacking your enterprise on a daily basis. Their goals range from espionage for technology advancement and disruption of critical infrastructure to for-profit theft of trade secrets and supporting a political agenda. You no longer have a malware problem, you have an adversary problem, and you must incorporate an intelligence-driven approach to your security strategy.
During this CrowdCast, you will learn how to:
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Read moreCrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem1 of 35Download NowDownload to read offlineRecommendedCyber espionage nation state-apt_attacks_on_the_riseCyber espionage nation state-apt_attacks_on_the_riseCyphort You Can't Stop The Breach Without Prevention And DetectionYou Can't Stop The Breach Without Prevention And DetectionCrowdStrike Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill (v2.0)Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill (v2.0)Frode Hommedal No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016Matthew Dunwoody Effective Threat Hunting with Tactical Threat IntelligenceEffective Threat Hunting with Tactical Threat IntelligenceDhruv Majumdar Threat Hunting with Data ScienceThreat Hunting with Data ScienceAustin Taylor Projects to Impact- Operationalizing Work from the CenterProjects to Impact- Operationalizing Work from the CenterMITRE ATT&CK How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsHow MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsSergey Soldatov More Related ContentWhat's hotOpen Source Intelligence (OSINT)Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)festival ICT 2016 MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Prioritizing Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection; ...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Prioritizing Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection; ...MITRE - ATT&CKcon MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...MITRE - ATT&CKcon MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: ATT&CK Updates - Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR); Ivan ...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: ATT&CK Updates - Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR); Ivan ...MITRE - ATT&CKcon Advanced Persistent ThreatAdvanced Persistent ThreatAmmar WK Threat IntelligenceThreat IntelligenceDeepak Kumar (D3) Knowledge for the masses: Storytelling with ATT&CKKnowledge for the masses: Storytelling with ATT&CKMITRE ATT&CK Cyber Threat IntelligenceCyber Threat Intelligenceseadeloitte Threat Hunting with Splunk
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for the masses: Storytelling with ATT&CKKnowledge for the masses: Storytelling with ATT&CKMITRE ATT&CK Cyber Threat IntelligenceCyber Threat Intelligenceseadeloitte Threat Hunting with Splunk Hands-onThreat Hunting with Splunk Hands-onSplunk Threat Hunting - Moving from the ad hoc to the formalThreat Hunting - Moving from the ad hoc to the formalPriyanka Aash RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...Adam Pennington Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...MITRE - ATT&CKcon Red Team vs. Blue TeamRed Team vs. Blue TeamEC-Council Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018Christopher Korban MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, TripwireMITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, TripwireMITRE - ATT&CKcon ATT&CK Updates- CampaignsATT&CK Updates- CampaignsMITRE ATT&CK What is Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)What is Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)Molfar ATT&CK Updates- ATT&CK for ICSATT&CK Updates- ATT&CK for ICSMITRE ATT&CK Threat Intelligence 101 - Steve Lodin - SubmittedThreat Intelligence 101 - Steve Lodin - SubmittedSteve Lodin Welcome to the world of Cyber Threat IntelligenceWelcome to the world of Cyber Threat IntelligenceAndreas Sfakianakis What's hot (20)Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Prioritizing Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection; ...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Prioritizing Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection; ... MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of
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Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection; ...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Prioritizing Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection; ... MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,... MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: ATT&CK Updates - Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR); Ivan ...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: ATT&CK Updates - Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR); Ivan ... Advanced Persistent ThreatAdvanced Persistent Threat Threat IntelligenceThreat Intelligence Knowledge for the masses: Storytelling with ATT&CKKnowledge for the masses: Storytelling with ATT&CK Cyber Threat IntelligenceCyber Threat Intelligence Threat Hunting with Splunk Hands-onThreat Hunting with Splunk Hands-on Threat Hunting - Moving from the ad hoc to the formalThreat Hunting - Moving from the ad hoc to the formal RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio...RH-ISAC Summit 2019 - Adam Pennington - Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK™ for Detectio... Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R... Red Team vs. Blue TeamRed Team vs. Blue Team Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018Purple Teaming with ATT&CK - x33fcon 2018 MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, TripwireMITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: ATT&CK as a Teacher, Travis Smith, Tripwire ATT&CK Updates- CampaignsATT&CK Updates- Campaigns What is Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)What is Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) ATT&CK Updates- ATT&CK for ICSATT&CK Updates- ATT&CK for ICS Threat Intelligence 101 - Steve Lodin - SubmittedThreat Intelligence 101 - Steve Lodin - Submitted Welcome to the world of Cyber Threat IntelligenceWelcome to the world of Cyber Threat Intelligence Similar to CrowdCasts
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for ICS Threat Intelligence 101 - Steve Lodin - SubmittedThreat Intelligence 101 - Steve Lodin - Submitted Welcome to the world of Cyber Threat IntelligenceWelcome to the world of Cyber Threat Intelligence Similar to CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary ProblemCrowdCast Monthly: Operationalizing IntelligenceCrowdCast Monthly: Operationalizing IntelligenceCrowdStrike KASPERSKY SECURITY BULLETIN 2013KASPERSKY SECURITY BULLETIN 2013Kappa Data CrowdCasts Monthly: When Pandas AttackCrowdCasts Monthly: When Pandas AttackCrowdStrike wp-cyber-threats-to-the-mining-industrywp-cyber-threats-to-the-mining-industryNumaan Huq Cybersecurity A Community Approach - 20151109Cybersecurity A Community Approach - 20151109Frank Backes Dave Mahon - CenturyLink & Cyber Security - How Modern Cyber Attacks Are Disr...Dave Mahon - CenturyLink & Cyber Security - How Modern Cyber Attacks Are Disr...Alisha Deboer You Are the TargetYou Are the TargetEMC RSA Monthly Online Fraud Report -- May 2013RSA Monthly Online Fraud Report -- May 2013EMC Bear Hunting: History and Attribution of Russian Intelligence OperationsBear Hunting: History and Attribution of Russian Intelligence OperationsCrowdStrike Proactive Counterespionage as a Part of Business Continuity and ResiliencyProactive Counterespionage as a Part of Business Continuity and ResiliencyDr. Lydia Kostopoulos COMMON GOOD DIGITAL FRAMEWORKCOMMON GOOD DIGITAL FRAMEWORKBoston Global Forum D&D Forum – Week 5Select oneof the Questions to Ponder as .docxD&D Forum – Week 5Select oneof the Questions to Ponder as .docxruthannemcmullen 2019 11 terp_breuer_disclosure_master2019 11 terp_breuer_disclosure_masterbodaceacat Data science unit introductionData science unit introductionGregg Barrett A Report On The Attack Automation StrategyA Report On The Attack Automation StrategyJennifer Reither Forrester no more chewy centers- the zero trust modelForrester no more chewy centers- the zero trust modelCristian Garcia G. Is Your Organization in Crisis?Is Your Organization in Crisis?BlackBerry Mistrust
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no more chewy centers- the zero trust modelForrester no more chewy centers- the zero trust modelCristian Garcia G. Is Your Organization in Crisis?Is Your Organization in Crisis?BlackBerry Mistrust vs Misinformation: Fake News, AI and Privacy -- The Next Frontiers i...Mistrust vs Misinformation: Fake News, AI and Privacy -- The Next Frontiers i...Charles Mok Russian and Worldwide Internet Security Trends 2015Russian and Worldwide Internet Security Trends 2015Qrator Labs DDoS Cyber Attacks Against Global Markets | ProlexicDDoS Cyber Attacks Against Global Markets | ProlexicProlexic Similar to CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem (20)CrowdCast Monthly: Operationalizing IntelligenceCrowdCast Monthly: Operationalizing Intelligence KASPERSKY SECURITY BULLETIN 2013KASPERSKY SECURITY BULLETIN 2013 CrowdCasts Monthly: When Pandas AttackCrowdCasts Monthly: When Pandas Attack wp-cyber-threats-to-the-mining-industrywp-cyber-threats-to-the-mining-industry Cybersecurity A Community Approach - 20151109Cybersecurity A Community Approach - 20151109 Dave Mahon - CenturyLink & Cyber Security - How Modern Cyber Attacks Are Disr...Dave Mahon - CenturyLink & Cyber Security - How Modern Cyber Attacks Are Disr... You Are the TargetYou Are the Target RSA Monthly Online Fraud Report -- May 2013RSA Monthly Online Fraud Report -- May 2013 Bear Hunting: History and Attribution of Russian Intelligence OperationsBear Hunting: History and Attribution of Russian Intelligence Operations Proactive Counterespionage as a Part of Business Continuity and ResiliencyProactive Counterespionage as a Part of Business Continuity and Resiliency COMMON GOOD DIGITAL FRAMEWORKCOMMON GOOD DIGITAL FRAMEWORK D&D Forum – Week 5Select oneof the Questions to Ponder as .docxD&D Forum – Week 5Select oneof the Questions to Ponder as .docx 2019 11 terp_breuer_disclosure_master2019 11 terp_breuer_disclosure_master Data science unit introductionData science unit introduction A Report On The Attack Automation StrategyA Report On The Attack Automation Strategy Forrester no more chewy centers-
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11 terp_breuer_disclosure_master Data science unit introductionData science unit introduction A Report On The Attack Automation StrategyA Report On The Attack Automation Strategy Forrester no more chewy centers- the zero trust modelForrester no more chewy centers- the zero trust model Is Your Organization in Crisis?Is Your Organization in Crisis? Mistrust vs Misinformation: Fake News, AI and Privacy -- The Next Frontiers i...Mistrust vs Misinformation: Fake News, AI and Privacy -- The Next Frontiers i... Russian and Worldwide Internet Security Trends 2015Russian and Worldwide Internet Security Trends 2015 DDoS Cyber Attacks Against Global Markets | ProlexicDDoS Cyber Attacks Against Global Markets | Prolexic More from CrowdStrikeState of Endpoint Security: The Buyers MindsetState of Endpoint Security: The Buyers MindsetCrowdStrike Understanding Fileless (or Non-Malware) Attacks and How to Stop ThemUnderstanding Fileless (or Non-Malware) Attacks and How to Stop ThemCrowdStrike Cyber Security Extortion: Defending Against Digital Shakedowns Cyber Security Extortion: Defending Against Digital Shakedowns CrowdStrike An Inside Look At The WannaCry Ransomware OutbreakAn Inside Look At The WannaCry Ransomware OutbreakCrowdStrike Proactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond AlertingProactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond AlertingCrowdStrike DEFENDING AGAINST THREATS TARGETING THE MAC PLATFORMDEFENDING AGAINST THREATS TARGETING THE MAC PLATFORMCrowdStrike CrowdStrike CrowdCast: Is Ransomware Morphing Beyond The Ability Of Standard ...CrowdStrike CrowdCast: Is Ransomware Morphing Beyond The Ability Of Standard ...CrowdStrike How to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrikeHow to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrikeCrowdStrike Cloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint SecurityCloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint SecurityCrowdStrike Battling Unknown Malware with Machine Learning Battling Unknown Malware with Machine Learning CrowdStrike Java Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging JavaJava Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging JavaCrowdStrike Venom Venom CrowdStrike CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the
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Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging JavaJava Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging JavaCrowdStrike Venom Venom CrowdStrike CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the IndicatorCrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the IndicatorCrowdStrike CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the HashCrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the HashCrowdStrike End-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware FamilyEnd-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware FamilyCrowdStrike TOR... ALL THE THINGSTOR... ALL THE THINGSCrowdStrike End-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family WhitepaperEnd-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family WhitepaperCrowdStrike TOR... ALL THE THINGS WhitepaperTOR... ALL THE THINGS WhitepaperCrowdStrike I/O, You Own: Regaining Control of Your Disk in the Presence of BootkitsI/O, You Own: Regaining Control of Your Disk in the Presence of BootkitsCrowdStrike Hacking Exposed Live: Mobile Targeted ThreatsHacking Exposed Live: Mobile Targeted ThreatsCrowdStrike More from CrowdStrike (20)State of Endpoint Security: The Buyers MindsetState of Endpoint Security: The Buyers Mindset Understanding Fileless (or Non-Malware) Attacks and How to Stop ThemUnderstanding Fileless (or Non-Malware) Attacks and How to Stop Them Cyber Security Extortion: Defending Against Digital Shakedowns Cyber Security Extortion: Defending Against Digital Shakedowns An Inside Look At The WannaCry Ransomware OutbreakAn Inside Look At The WannaCry Ransomware Outbreak Proactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond AlertingProactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond Alerting DEFENDING AGAINST THREATS TARGETING THE MAC PLATFORMDEFENDING AGAINST THREATS TARGETING THE MAC PLATFORM CrowdStrike CrowdCast: Is Ransomware Morphing Beyond The Ability Of Standard ...CrowdStrike CrowdCast: Is Ransomware Morphing Beyond The Ability Of Standard ... How to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrikeHow to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrike Cloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint SecurityCloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint
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Morphing Beyond The Ability Of Standard ... How to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrikeHow to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrike Cloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint SecurityCloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint Security Battling Unknown Malware with Machine Learning Battling Unknown Malware with Machine Learning Java Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging JavaJava Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging Java Venom Venom CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the IndicatorCrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the Indicator CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the HashCrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the Hash End-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware FamilyEnd-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family TOR... ALL THE THINGSTOR... ALL THE THINGS End-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family WhitepaperEnd-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family Whitepaper TOR... ALL THE THINGS WhitepaperTOR... ALL THE THINGS Whitepaper I/O, You Own: Regaining Control of Your Disk in the Presence of BootkitsI/O, You Own: Regaining Control of Your Disk in the Presence of Bootkits Hacking Exposed Live: Mobile Targeted ThreatsHacking Exposed Live: Mobile Targeted Threats Recently uploadedTowards a Docker-based architecture for open multi-agent systemsTowards a Docker-based architecture for open multi-agent systemsIAESIJAI Centre of Circumference - Shot List.docxCentre of Circumference - Shot List.docx17ogil170 Unlocking Hidden Profits: How GenAI Supercharges Industrial OTUnlocking Hidden Profits: How GenAI Supercharges Industrial OTShashi Singh Cfgmgmtcamp 2024 — eBPF-based Security Observability & Runtime Enforcement wi...Cfgmgmtcamp 2024 — eBPF-based Security Observability & Runtime Enforcement wi...Raphaël PINSON 2) Presentation_Overview_ISO_16140-3_Method_verification_20210322.pptx2) Presentation_Overview_ISO_16140-3_Method_verification_20210322.pptxssuser796efb Navigating the Never Normal Strategies for Portfolio LeadersNavigating the Never Normal Strategies for Portfolio
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MMCOE - ML CampaignGDSC MMCOE - ML Campaign Connector Corner: Connect to your processes with UiPath Integration Service...Connector Corner: Connect to your processes with UiPath Integration Service... Apollo Price Model - 20180521Apollo Price Model - 20180521 Apollo Cloud Edge Solution - 20180518Apollo Cloud Edge Solution - 20180518 CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem1. You Have an
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CrowdCasts_Monthly:_You_Have_an_Adversary_Problem_|_PPT.md
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ADVERSARY PROBLEM.
Who’s Targeting You and Why?
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CrowdCasts_Monthly:_You_Have_an_Adversary_Problem_|_PPT.md
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
AGENDA
YOU HAVE AN ADVERSARY PROBLEM.
1.
INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN SECURITY
2.
ADVERSARY CATEGORIZATION
3.
ADVERSARY GROUPS - OVERVIEW
4.
NOTABLE ACTIVITY – Q3
5.
NEW ACTORS
6.
ACTIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Today’s Speakers
ADAM MEYERS |
VP, INTELLIGENCE
Recognized speaker, trainer, and intelligence expert with 15+ years
of cyber security industry experience
10 years in the DIB supporting US GOV customers on topics
ranging from wireless, pen testing, IR, and malware analysis
@ADAM_CYBER
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Today’s Speakers
MATT DAHL |
SENIOR ANALYST/ LEGAL COUNSEL
Cyber threat analyst focused on targeted intrusion activity
Focused on investigating indicators of compromise to identify
specific adversary activity
Legal liaison to the CrowdStrike Intelligence Team
@CROWDSTRIKE
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversaries are humans
Targeted Attackers:
WHO ARE THE
ADVERSARIES?
Motivation can range from disruption,
theft, to even destruction
They need to get in
They will likely need to move laterally
Spray and Pray (Prey):
They don’t care who they target
(sometimes what)
The more they compromise the
more they win
Motivation can range from disruption,
theft, to even destruction
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN SECURITY
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversary Categorization
CATEGORIZATION| Adversary Groups
Tactics, Techniques, and Practices
Never assume relationships exist
Between indicators
Recognize adversaries are constantly changing
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Adversary Categorization
CATEGORIZATION| Adversary Groups
Tactics, Techniques, and Practices
Never assume relationships exist
Between indicators
Recognize adversaries are constantly changing
But RECOGNIZE they are HUMAN
CATEGORIZATION
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
Intelligence: Adversary Groups
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
CHINA
Anchor Panda
Comment Panda
Impersonating Panda
Temper Panda
Keyhole Panda
Aurora Panda
Stone Panda
Vixen Panda
Union Panda
Poisonous Panda
Pirate Panda
Dagger Panda
Violin Panda
Putter Panda
Test Panda
Gibberish Panda
Electric Panda
Wet Panda
Karma Panda
Dynamite Panda
Radio Panda
Samurai Panda
Toxic Panda
Numbered Panda
Pitty Panda
Foxy Panda
Deep Panda
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
Intelligence
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversary Groups
IRAN
Clever Kitten: Energy Companies
Cutting Kitten: For Hire
NORTH KOREA
Silent Chollima:
Energy Companies
RUSSIA
Energetic Bear: Oil and Gas
Companies
INDIA
Viceroy Tiger Government,
Legal, Financial, Media,
Telecom
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
Intelligence
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversary Groups
HACKTIVIST/ACTIVIST/
TERRORIST
CRIMINAL
Deadeye Jackal Commercial,
Singing Spider Commercial, Financial
Financial, Media, Social Networking
Union Spider Manufacturing
Ghost Jackal Commercial, Energy,
Andromeda Spider Numerous
Financial
Corsair Jackal Commercial,
Technology, Financial, Energy
Extreme Jackal Military,
Government
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Notable Activity – Q3
NEW ADVERSARIES
STONE PANDA | NIGHTSHADE PANDA | GOBLIN PANDA | CORSAIR JACKAL
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Notable Activity – Q3
NEW ADVERSARIES
STONE PANDA | NIGHTSHADE PANDA | GOBLIN PANDA | CORSAIR JACKAL
NOTABLE ACTIVITY
DEADEYE JACKAL | NUMBERED PANDA | SILENT CHOLLIMA
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
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NEW ACTORS
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
12
Intelligence: STONE PANDA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
May 2010 to Present
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Healthcare
Defense
Aerospace
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Lateral movement
Data exfiltration
Government
TOOLS
Poison Ivy RAT
IEChecker/EvilGrab
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
13
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Healthcare, Defense,
Aerospace, Government
Delivery: Likely spearphishing
WHO IS
STONE PANDA?
Malware: Poison Ivy and EvilGrab/
IEChecker
Known Poison Ivy passwords:
menuPass, happyyongzi, Thankss,
Xgstone, keaidestone, and admin
C2 Indicators: fbi.sexxxy.biz;
u1.FartIT.com; jj.mysecondarydns.com;
54.241.13.219; 184.169.176.71;
114.80.96.8
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
14
Intelligence: NIGHTSHADE PANDA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
Feb 2008 to Present
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Lateral movement
Data exfiltration
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Media
NGO/Int’l Relations
Universities
TOOLS
Poison Ivy
PlugX
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Media; NGO/Int’l
Relations; Universities
WHO IS
NIGHTSHADE
PANDA?
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Media; NGO/Int’l
Relations; Universities
WHO IS
NIGHTSHADE
PANDA?
Delivery: Likely spearphishing
Malware: PlugX and Poison Ivy
Known Poison Ivy passwords: synnia
C2 Indicators: www.adv138mail.com;
pu.flowershow.org; tech.network-sec.net;
184.105.178.83; 199.59.243.106;
112.137.162.151
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
16
Intelligence: GOBLIN PANDA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
July 2012 to July 2013
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Lateral movement
Data exfiltration
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Aerospace
Defense
Energy
Government
Shipping
TOOLS
Technology
Spearphishing using office doc
ZeGhost specific mutexes
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
17
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Aerospace; Defense;
Energy; Government; Shipping;
Technology; Telecommunications
WHO IS
GOBLIN PANDA?
Delivery: Spearphishing
Malware: HttpTunnel (AV detection = Zegost)
Mutexes: HttpTunnel@@ or Http@@@
C2 Indicators: vnpt.conimes.com;
mofa.conimes.com;
pvep.scvhosts.com; 112.175.79.55;
223.26.55.122; 198.100.97.245
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Intelligence: CORSAIR JACKAL
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
February 2013 to May 2013
OBJECTIVES
Information Disclosure
TARGETING
Energy
Financial
Government
Shipping
Telecom
TOOLS
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Timeline: CORSAIR JACKAL
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TOOLS
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Timeline: CORSAIR JACKAL
2012 XTnR3v0LT
colludes with Anonymous
group XL3gi0n
January 25, 2013 New
members added
January 22, 2013
XTnR3v0LT announce
formation of TCA
March 1 2013 Announced
compromise of US financial
February 2013
Announced
participation in
opblacksummer
July 29 2013 Ben Khlifa
announces new personal page
May 7, 2013
XTnR3v0LT
arrested by Tunisian
Authorities
September 2, 2013
Tweets XSS
vulnerability on
Sourceforge
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Energy; Financial;
Government; Shipping;
Telecommunications
WHO IS
CORSAIR
JACKAL?
Primarily One Individual: Fahmi Ben
Khlifa (XTnR3v0LT)
Professed nationalistic motivations for
malicious activity, but also white hat
activity.
Cross-site scripting attacks used to
compromise databases at target
organizations.
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
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NOTABLE ACTIVITY
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Intelligence: DEADEYE JACKAL
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
TARGETING
May 2011 to Present
Financial Institution
Media/News
Social Network Platforms
OBJECTIVES
Propaganda
Disinformation
Disruption
TOOLS
Spearphishing
Web Exploitation
Facebook Spamming
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
23
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Timeline: DEADEYE JACKAL
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@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Timeline: DEADEYE JACKAL
August 26, 2011
May 5, 2011 SEA Mohammad Ahmad Fall 2011 – Spring 2013
Officially Formed Kabbani Killed
Web Defacements
Facebook
Spamming
September 2011
Harvard
Defacement
July 2013 3rd Party
Provider Breaches
February 2013
Twitter Account
Takeovers
August 2013
Domain
Hijacking
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
24
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Financial Institutions;
Media/News; Social Network Platforms
WHO IS
DEADEYE
JACKAL?
Delivery: Spearphishing
Nationalistic, pro-Syrian regime
motivations
Defacement, account takeover,
third-party provider attacks,
credential collection
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
25
Intelligence: NUMBERED PANDA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
2009 - Present
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Lateral movement
Data exfiltration
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Government
Financial
Telecom
Technology
Media
TOOLS
Spearphishing
Dynamic Calculation
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
26
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Government; Financial;
Telecommunications; Media
WHO IS
NUMBERED
PANDA?
Delivery: Spearphishing
Malware: Ixeshe, Mswab, Gh0st,
ShowNews, 3001
C2 Indicators: getfresh.dnsrd.com;
serial.ddns.ms; gfans.onmypc.us;
23.19.122.202; 192.154.108.10;
192.154.111.200
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
27
Intelligence: SILENT CHOLLIMA
OPERATIONAL
WINDOW
2007 to Present
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Multiple targets in ROK
Global Targets of Opportunity
OBJECTIVES
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2007 to Present
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TARGETING
Multiple targets in ROK
Global Targets of Opportunity
OBJECTIVES
Recon
Criminal Monetization
Lateral movement
Data Destruction
TOOLS
Custom Malware
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
28
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Target Sectors: Media
WHO IS
SILENT
CHOLLIMA?
Delivery: Spearphishing
Malware: HTTP/IRC-based; Tdrop;
Concealment Troy; LSG
C2 indicators: www.designface.net;
www.sdmp.kr; www.socrates.tw;
202.172.28.111; 63.115.31.15;
209.137.232.3
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
29
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE| Adversary-Centric
INTELLIGENCE
Understand the adversaries targeting your
Vertical | Company | Geo-Location | Customers
Build appropriate defenses to counter/detect
these adversaries
Perform other security practices from an
Adversary-centric perspective
Pen Testing (Red Team)
Security Operations Briefings
Log Review
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
30
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE| Making it Actionable
1
ACTIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence is difficult to consume
Lots of information to keep straight
New data constantly flowing in (possibly unvetted)
Security Operations need to change shis & people
Actionable Intelligence
Pass down can’t possibly occur with all indicators
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
31
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Adversary Microsite
COMING SOON
TRACK: Track current
Adversaries against other
Industry nomenclature
OVERVIEW: Gain insight
Into adversary – new groups
Added weekly
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Adversary Microsite
COMING SOON
TRACK: Track current
Adversaries against other
Industry nomenclature
OVERVIEW: Gain insight
Into adversary – new groups
Added weekly
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
32
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
RESOURCES
Next up: Enterprise Activity Monitoring
The Power to HUNT
November 5th | 2PM ET/11AM PT
Download a Sample
Adversary Intelligence Report
http://www.crowdstrike.com/
sites/default/files/deeppanda.pdf
For additional information,
CONTACT SALES@CROWDSTRIKE.COM
NEW Videos Every Thursday | 1PM ET
http://www.crowdstrike.com/crowdcasts/index.html
2013 Crowdstrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
33
Q&A
Q&A
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Please type all questions into the
Q&A section of the
GoToWebinar Control Panel
If you have additional ?’s, contact us
At crowdcasts@crowdstrike.com
2013 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved.
34
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CrowdCasts_Monthly:_You_Have_an_Adversary_Problem_|_PPT.md
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c54206032fcd-0
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Threat actor: HolyWater
UUID: fd63031c-4147-4479-b8de-1f2f56289b36
First seen:
Source last modified: 2020-07-30
Threat actor aliases
HolyWater (Kaspersky)
Description
Not much is known about this actor yet.
Sponsor type and motivation
Sponsor:
Motivation:
Country of origin
[Unknown]
Observed attacked sectors where victims operate in
Observed attacked countries where victims operate in
Observed usage of tools
Reported hacking operations
Reported counter operations against threat actor
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HolyWater.md
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ec1e38a246fb-0
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Reference for threat actor for "HolyWater"
Title: Holy water: ongoing targeted water-holing attack in Asia | Securelist
Source: https://securelist.com/holy-water-ongoing-targeted-water-holing-attack-in-asia/96311/
Content
Holy water: ongoing targeted water-holing attack in Asia | Securelist
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Holy_water:_ongoing_targeted_water-holing_attack_in_Asia_|_Securelist.md
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KSB 2023
APT reports
Holy water: ongoing targeted water-holing attack in Asia
APT reports
31 Mar 2020
minute read
Authors
Ivan Kwiatkowski
Félix Aime
Pierre Delcher
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Holy_water:_ongoing_targeted_water-holing_attack_in_Asia_|_Securelist.md
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ec1e38a246fb-2
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APT reports
Holy water: ongoing targeted water-holing attack in Asia
APT reports
31 Mar 2020
minute read
Authors
Ivan Kwiatkowski
Félix Aime
Pierre Delcher
On December 4, 2019, we discovered watering hole websites that were compromised to selectively trigger a drive-by download attack with fake Adobe Flash update warnings. This campaign has been active since at least May 2019, and targets an Asian religious and ethnic group.
The threat actor’s unsophisticated but creative toolset has been evolving a lot since the inception date, may still be in development, and leverages Sojson obfuscation, NSIS installer, Python, open-source code, GitHub distribution, Go language, as well as Google Drive-based C2 channels.
The threat actor’s operational target is not clear because, unfortunately, we haven’t been able to observe many live operations, and we couldn’t identify any overlap with known intrusion sets.
Thou shalt update plugins: attack synopsis
The watering holes have been set-up on websites that belong to personalities, public bodies, charities and organizations of the targeted group. At the time of writing, some of these websites (all hosted on the same server) are still compromised, and continue to direct selected visitors to malicious payloads:
Domain
Description
corps.org
Voluntary service program
ct.org
Religious personality’s charity
policy.net
Policy institute
che.com
Religious personality
parliament.org
Public body
ialwork.org
Charity
nature.net
Environmental conservation network
airtrade.com
Fair trade organization
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