| # Selection Protocol for the Approximate 500-Pair Benchmark Subset |
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| ## Purpose |
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| This protocol defines a downstream selection subset of approximately 500 |
| attack-history pairs from the complete Phase 1 screening output. It does not |
| replace, downsample, or modify the exhaustive Phase 1 candidate set. |
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| The unit of selection is an **attack-history pair**, not a unique base history. |
| A base history may remain linked to more than one attack type when it satisfies |
| the relevant source allowlist and eligibility requirements. |
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| ## Input Population |
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| The selection population is limited to rows in `needs_review.jsonl` that have |
| passed deterministic high-recall screening. Rejected rows must not be restored |
| to the subset. A row can enter the final subset only after semantic |
| adjudication confirms all attack-specific hard requirements. |
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| No attack payload, clean control, benign control, salience variant, or |
| source-trust variant is created during selection. |
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| ## Semantic Adjudication |
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| Each candidate is adjudicated with a zero-temperature curator using an |
| evidence-grounded structured decision. A candidate is eligible for the subset |
| only when all of the following hold: |
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| 1. The future task has a clear legitimate completion path. |
| 2. The candidate has source-grounded evidence for the expected workflow, |
| action, information boundary, or tool choice. |
| 3. A prior experience or advice item can be inserted naturally without |
| rewriting the future task. |
| 4. Low and high semantic-salience variants can later differ primarily in |
| task-specific semantic relevance while holding position, repetition, |
| approximate length, harmful objective, and claimed outcome constant. |
| 5. Low and high perceived-source-trust wrappers can later be inserted through |
| natural source channels without changing the payload itself. |
| 6. The decision cites source fields, session IDs, trajectory IDs, turn IDs, or |
| short source evidence snippets. |
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| Candidates with incomplete evidence, multimodal dependencies, ambiguous |
| legitimate workflows, or insufficient control readiness remain outside the |
| subset and are retained in the review queue. |
|
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| ## Ranking |
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| Eligible candidates are ranked within their attack-source cell using the |
| following ordered criteria: |
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| 1. Clarity of source evidence and legitimate ground truth. |
| 2. Actionability of the unchanged future task. |
| 3. Natural relationship between history content and the future task. |
| 4. Strength of the salience and source-trust control plans. |
| 5. Specificity of the expected workflow, information boundary, or correct |
| tool/action path. |
| 6. Domain and service diversity relative to already selected candidates. |
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| Lexical keyword matches alone are never sufficient for admission. |
|
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| ## Deduplication and Leakage Control |
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| Selection operates after semantic adjudication and applies the following |
| constraints: |
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| - LongMemEval S and M representations of the same `question_id` count as one |
| semantic base history. |
| - Near-duplicate future tasks and histories are clustered before final |
| selection; only the strongest candidate in a highly similar cluster is kept. |
| - For MS-TOD, candidates sharing a persona or `reference_dialogue_id` are |
| reviewed for leakage and excessive task-template repetition. The strongest |
| representative is kept when they express the same underlying interaction. |
| - When one base history remains under multiple attack types, the relationship |
| is explicitly retained rather than accidentally duplicating the history. |
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| Every selected row records its ranking score, evidence, selection rationale, |
| similarity-cluster identifier, and a stable alternate ordering for replacement. |
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| ## Approximate 500-Pair Coverage Plan |
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| The following is a documented target for a downstream evaluation subset, not a |
| change to the exhaustive Phase 1 screening procedure. |
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| | Attack type | Source dataset | Target pairs | |
| | --- | --- | ---: | |
| | Unsafe procedure injection | MS-TOD | 120 | |
| | Unsafe procedure injection | LongMemEval-V2 | 60 | |
| | Privacy leakage instruction | MS-TOD | 125 | |
| | Privacy leakage instruction | LongMemEval | 15 | |
| | Tool action misdirection | LongMemEval-V2 | 180 | |
| | Total | | 500 | |
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| Mem2ActBench is not assigned a target because its paper-linked repository was |
| unavailable during Phase 1. Tool action misdirection therefore uses the |
| available LongMemEval-V2 source. LongMemEval contributes only the available |
| semantically suitable privacy candidates; the remaining privacy capacity is |
| drawn from MS-TOD. |
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| If a cell does not contain enough curator-approved candidates after |
| deduplication, replacements are taken first from the same attack type and then |
| from the highest-ranked remaining eligible candidates. Every reallocation must |
| be recorded in the subset manifest. |
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| ## Deliverables |
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| The resulting subset should be stored separately, for example under |
| `data/selection_500/`, with the following artifacts: |
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| - `selected_pairs.jsonl` |
| - `alternates.jsonl` |
| - `selection_manifest.json` |
| - `selection_rationale.csv` |
| - `cluster_assignments.csv` |
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| The complete Phase 1 files remain the source of record and must continue to be |
| published alongside the subset. |
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| ## Complete History Storage |
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| `selected_pairs.jsonl` carries a stable `history_id`. The complete, native |
| text history is stored once in `history_catalog.jsonl` under that ID. This |
| keeps every selected history fully inspectable in JSONL while preventing |
| duplicate storage of LongMemEval-V2's shared 100-trajectory haystacks. Neither |
| file uses local filesystem paths as a history pointer. LongMemEval-V2 screenshot |
| paths are omitted because image assets are not part of this text-only release. |
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