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RRTcodebaseC

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ret_valid_signatures : NULL; /*if we already have fingerprints, do not add more; this ensures, only the fingerprints from the outer-most part are collected */
if (!dc_pgp_pk_decrypt(context, decoded_data, decoded_data_bytes, private_keyring, public_keyring_for_validate, 1, &plain_buf, &plain_bytes, add_signatures)
|| plain_buf==NULL || plain_bytes<=0) {
goto cleanup;
}
//{char* t1=dc_null_terminate(plain_buf,plain_bytes);printf("\n**********\n%s\n**********\n",t1);free(t1);}
{
size_t index = 0;
struct mailmime* decrypted_mime = NULL;
if (mailmime_parse(plain_buf, plain_bytes, &index, &decrypted_mime)!=MAIL_NO_ERROR
|| decrypted_mime==NULL) {
if(decrypted_mime) {mailmime_free(decrypted_mime);}
goto cleanup;
}
//mailmime_print(decrypted_mime);
*ret_decrypted_mime = decrypted_mime;
sth_decrypted = 1;
}
//mailmime_substitute(mime, new_mime);
//s. mailprivacy_gnupg.c::pgp_decrypt()
cleanup:
if (transfer_decoding_buffer) {
mmap_string_unref(transfer_decoding_buffer);
}
return sth_decrypted;
}
static int decrypt_recursive(dc_context_t* context,
struct mailmime* mime,
const dc_keyring_t* private_keyring,
const dc_keyring_t* public_keyring_for_validate,
dc_hash_t* ret_valid_signatures,
struct mailimf_fields** ret_gossip_headers,
int* ret_has_unencrypted_parts)
{
struct mailmime_content* ct = NULL;
clistiter* cur = NULL;
if (context==NULL || mime==NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (mime->mm_type==MAILMIME_MULTIPLE)
{
ct = mime->mm_content_type;
if (ct && ct->ct_subtype && strcmp(ct->ct_subtype, "encrypted")==0) {
/* decrypt "multipart/encrypted" -- child parts are eg. "application/pgp-encrypted" (uninteresting, version only),
"application/octet-stream" (the interesting data part) and optional, unencrypted help files */
for (cur=clist_begin(mime->mm_data.mm_multipart.mm_mp_list); cur!=NULL; cur=clist_next(cur)) {
struct mailmime* decrypted_mime = NULL;
if (decrypt_part(context, (struct mailmime*)clist_content(cur), private_keyring, public_keyring_for_validate, ret_valid_signatures, &decrypted_mime))
{
/* remember the header containing potentially Autocrypt-Gossip */
if (*ret_gossip_headers==NULL /* use the outermost decrypted part */
&& dc_hash_cnt(ret_valid_signatures) > 0 /* do not trust the gossipped keys when the message cannot be validated eg. due to a bad signature */)
{
size_t dummy = 0;
struct mailimf_fields* test = NULL;
if (mailimf_envelope_and_optional_fields_parse(decrypted_mime->mm_mime_start, decrypted_mime->mm_length, &dummy, &test)==MAILIMF_NO_ERROR
&& test) {
*ret_gossip_headers = test;
}
}
/* replace encrypted mime structure by decrypted one */
mailmime_substitute(mime, decrypted_mime);
mailmime_free(mime);
return 1; /* sth. decrypted, start over from root searching for encrypted parts */
}
}
*ret_has_unencrypted_parts = 1; // there is a part that could not be decrypted
}
else {
for (cur=clist_begin(mime->mm_data.mm_multipart.mm_mp_list); cur!=NULL; cur=clist_next(cur)) {
if (decrypt_recursive(context, (struct mailmime*)clist_content(cur), private_keyring, public_keyring_for_validate, ret_valid_signatures, ret_gossip_headers, ret_has_unencrypted_parts)) {
return 1; /* sth. decrypted, start over from root searching for encrypted parts */
}
}
}
}
else if (mime->mm_type==MAILMIME_MESSAGE)
{
if (decrypt_recursive(context, mime->mm_data.mm_message.mm_msg_mime, private_keyring, public_keyring_for_validate, ret_valid_signatures, ret_gossip_headers, ret_has_unencrypted_parts)) {
return 1; /* sth. decrypted, start over from root searching for encrypted parts */
}
}
else
{
*ret_has_unencrypted_parts = 1; // there is a part that was not encrypted at all. in combination with otherwise encrypted mails, this is a problem.
}
return 0;