id stringlengths 17 17 | body stringlengths 0 19.5k | posted_at stringlengths 24 24 | karma int64 -6 185 | parent_comment_id stringlengths 17 17 ⌀ | post_id stringlengths 17 17 | post_title stringlengths 2 127 | post_slug stringlengths 2 61 | post_url stringlengths 20 146 | post_author stringclasses 214
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oHBLWWFckri4P3B37 | Consider tasks that quite good software engineers (maybe top 40% at Jane Street) typically do in 8 hours without substantial prior context on that exact task. (As in, 8 hour median completion time.) Now, we'll aim to sample these tasks such that the distribution and characteristics of these tasks are close to the distr... | 2025-02-13T23:36:50.331Z | 16 | bA7miafttNQkLckqw | gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt | ≤10-year Timelines Remain Unlikely Despite DeepSeek and o3 | 10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt/10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | Rafael Harth | 2025-02-13T19:21:35.392Z |
pwqSm7fqtDSxyuQRt | I think if you look at "horizon length"---at what task duration (in terms of human completion time) do the AIs get the task right 50% of the time---the trends will indicate doubling times of maybe 4 months (though 6 months is plausible). Let's say 6 months more conservatively. I think AIs are at like 30 minutes on math... | 2025-02-13T23:46:13.830Z | 12 | M5irFzmnddJjHFmWy | gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt | ≤10-year Timelines Remain Unlikely Despite DeepSeek and o3 | 10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt/10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | Rafael Harth | 2025-02-13T19:21:35.392Z |
vtYtRtCcsoEiivcAH | Importantly, this is an example of developing a specific application (surgical robot) rather than advancing the overall field (robots in general). It's unclear whether the analogy to an individual application or an overall field is more appropriate for AI safety. | 2025-02-13T23:47:16.468Z | 2 | nzHmPi8WtFnpRiCbd | Hgj84BSitfSQnfwW6 | So You Want To Make Marginal Progress... | so-you-want-to-make-marginal-progress | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Hgj84BSitfSQnfwW6/so-you-want-to-make-marginal-progress | johnswentworth | 2025-02-07T23:22:19.825Z |
knwahJiREnLT7dNfo | No, sorry I was mostly focused on "such that if you didn't see them within 3 or 5 years, you'd majorly update about time to the type of AGI that might kill everyone". I didn't actually pick up on "most impressive" and actually tried to focus on something that occurs substantially before things get crazy.
Most impressi... | 2025-02-13T23:50:16.206Z | 9 | fycZ8fjqHzXbyoCZb | gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt | ≤10-year Timelines Remain Unlikely Despite DeepSeek and o3 | 10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt/10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | Rafael Harth | 2025-02-13T19:21:35.392Z |
eABhutT7yKt6NfDLH | I think you can add mirror enzymes which can break down mirror carbs. Minimally we are aware of enzymes which break down mirror glucose. | 2025-02-13T23:57:30.569Z | 3 | mar9ZByKGrPpSShox | KFJ2LFogYqzfGB3uX | How AI Takeover Might Happen in 2 Years | how-ai-takeover-might-happen-in-2-years | https://x.com/joshua_clymer/status/1887905375082656117 | joshc | 2025-02-07T17:10:10.530Z |
aawHBx4eTPXJGtEud | I mean, I don't think AI R&D is a particularly hard field persay, but I do think it involves lots of tricky stuff and isn't much easier than automating some other plausibly-important-to-takeover field (e.g., robotics). (I could imagine that the AIs have a harder time automating philosophy even if they were trying to wo... | 2025-02-14T00:01:44.613Z | 9 | Mcwmrg9PBvNuXAqRQ | gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt | ≤10-year Timelines Remain Unlikely Despite DeepSeek and o3 | 10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt/10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | Rafael Harth | 2025-02-13T19:21:35.392Z |
QtxDyySpgxajDEYdp | The question of context might be important, see [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt/10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3?commentId=oHBLWWFckri4P3B37). I wouldn't find 15 minutes that surprising for ~50% success rate, but I've seen numbers more like 1.5 hours. I thought this was... | 2025-02-14T00:58:50.339Z | 7 | MrGPFJ7f7QekZ2Rvh | gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt | ≤10-year Timelines Remain Unlikely Despite DeepSeek and o3 | 10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt/10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | Rafael Harth | 2025-02-13T19:21:35.392Z |
Ke45eerx8kTiK9QF3 | (I don't expect o3-mini is a much better agent than 3.5 sonnet new out of the box, but probably a hybrid scaffold with o3 + 3.5 sonnet will be substantially better than 3.5 sonnet. Just o3 might also be very good. Putting aside cost, I think o1 is usually better than o3-mini on open ended programing agency tasks I thin... | 2025-02-14T01:47:36.372Z | 6 | wvDiPKhLSarLcW5cT | gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt | ≤10-year Timelines Remain Unlikely Despite DeepSeek and o3 | 10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt/10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | Rafael Harth | 2025-02-13T19:21:35.392Z |
fQkr7AaepGNiFjbRv | > Some things are true simply because they are true and in general there's no reason to expect a simpler explanation.
You could believe:
Some things are true simply because they are true, but only when being true isn't very surprising. (For instance, it isn't very surprising that there are some cellular automata that... | 2025-02-18T00:10:03.622Z | 9 | qaLYLmswHv5H8GkpJ | Xt9r4SNNuYxW83tmo | A computational no-coincidence principle | a-computational-no-coincidence-principle | https://www.alignment.org/blog/a-computational-no-coincidence-principle/ | Eric Neyman | 2025-02-14T21:39:39.277Z |
z89CmZXfDT8j5Rtci | Note that the capability milestone forecasted in the linked short form is substantially weaker than the notion of transformative AI in the 2020 model. (It was defined as AI with an effect at least as large as the industrial revolution.)
I don't expect this adds many years, for me it adds like ~2 years to my median.
(... | 2025-02-20T00:58:48.782Z | 10 | 7bZGiKqmLbMgumH5A | TTFsKxQThrqgWeXYJ | How might we safely pass the buck to AI? | how-might-we-safely-pass-the-buck-to-ai | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/TTFsKxQThrqgWeXYJ/how-might-we-safely-pass-the-buck-to-ai | joshc | 2025-02-19T17:48:32.249Z |
j3KEdDjMLGSJCTtp7 | I think there is an important component of trustworthiness that you don't emphasize enough. It isn't sufficient to just rule out alignment faking, we need the AI to actually try hard to faithfully pursue our interests including on long, confusing, open-ended, and hard to check tasks. You discuss establishing this with ... | 2025-02-20T03:21:37.535Z | 24 | null | TTFsKxQThrqgWeXYJ | How might we safely pass the buck to AI? | how-might-we-safely-pass-the-buck-to-ai | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/TTFsKxQThrqgWeXYJ/how-might-we-safely-pass-the-buck-to-ai | joshc | 2025-02-19T17:48:32.249Z |
ZwPBae2EdimyXgiLz | But it isn't a capabilities condition? Maybe I would be happier if you renamed this section. | 2025-02-20T04:32:16.098Z | 4 | P94ttWmdzFWPE4ycg | TTFsKxQThrqgWeXYJ | How might we safely pass the buck to AI? | how-might-we-safely-pass-the-buck-to-ai | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/TTFsKxQThrqgWeXYJ/how-might-we-safely-pass-the-buck-to-ai | joshc | 2025-02-19T17:48:32.249Z |
SzPwzMz96qwCAyN3x | To be clear, I think there are important additional considerations related to the fact that we don't just care about capabilities that aren't covered in that section, though that section is not that far from what I would say if you renamed it to "behavioral tests", including both capabilities and alignment (that is, al... | 2025-02-20T07:46:01.619Z | 2 | ZwPBae2EdimyXgiLz | TTFsKxQThrqgWeXYJ | How might we safely pass the buck to AI? | how-might-we-safely-pass-the-buck-to-ai | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/TTFsKxQThrqgWeXYJ/how-might-we-safely-pass-the-buck-to-ai | joshc | 2025-02-19T17:48:32.249Z |
2o8475t3hCHoNTbZa | Something important is that "significantly accelerate alignment research" isn't the same as "making AIs that we're happy to fully defer to". This post is talking about conditions needed for deference and how we might achieve them.
(Some) acceleration doesn't require being fully competitive with humans while deference ... | 2025-02-25T01:54:08.420Z | 9 | NP5Puxne6Njp5mbRm | 5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr | Training AI to do alignment research we don’t already know how to do | training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr/training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | joshc | 2025-02-24T19:19:43.067Z |
WckskPDPhY3kojg9t | FWIW, I don't think "data-efficient long-horizon RL" (which is sample efficient in a online training sense) implies you can make faithful simulations.
> but you do get a machine that pursues the metric that you fine-tuned it to pursue, even out of distribution (with a relatively small amount of data).
I think if the ... | 2025-02-25T22:37:13.659Z | 4 | aLBiFt2t8i9Y2wfid | 5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr | Training AI to do alignment research we don’t already know how to do | training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr/training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | joshc | 2025-02-24T19:19:43.067Z |
2GdrZuNh9fbdF5FWa | A typical crux is that I think we can increase our chances of "real alignment" using prosaic and relatively unenlightened ML reasearch without any deep understanding.
I both think:
1. We can significantly accelerate prosaic ML safety research (e.g., of the sort people are doing today) using AIs that are importantly l... | 2025-02-25T22:40:24.188Z | 3 | WNsrDf3JW6XjDrcDK | 5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr | Training AI to do alignment research we don’t already know how to do | training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr/training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | joshc | 2025-02-24T19:19:43.067Z |
mouqe5fkSFhrwfPHB | I don't think "what is the necessary work for solving alignment" is a frame I really buy. My perspective on alignment is more like:
- Avoiding egregious misalignment (where AIs intentionally act in ways that make our tests highly misleading or do [pretty obviously unintended/dangerous actions](https://www.lesswrong.co... | 2025-02-26T01:20:42.410Z | 3 | Mf8ASbnBM66pKtGEt | 5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr | Training AI to do alignment research we don’t already know how to do | training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr/training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | joshc | 2025-02-24T19:19:43.067Z |
gomb2WAdKdnDpGZeS | Oh, yeah I meant "perform well according to your metrics" not "behave well" (edited) | 2025-02-26T02:28:22.065Z | 2 | 2Bf42LQ8SBQAaasvd | 5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr | Training AI to do alignment research we don’t already know how to do | training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr/training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | joshc | 2025-02-24T19:19:43.067Z |
4ipCySAZ3WKNycadt | > On some axes, but won't there to be axes where AIs are more difficult than humans also? Sycophancy&slop being the most salient. Misalignment issues being another.
Yes, I just meant on net. (Relative to the current ML community and given a similar fraction of resources to spend on AI compute.) | 2025-02-26T04:13:08.437Z | 2 | TXQK4ECryYmKiZxwR | 5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr | Training AI to do alignment research we don’t already know how to do | training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr/training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | joshc | 2025-02-24T19:19:43.067Z |
vaParfzSGXoAa3jiH | I certainly agree it isn't clear, just my current best guess. | 2025-02-26T05:02:15.662Z | 4 | N9EqDigK48D9tzKku | 5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr | Training AI to do alignment research we don’t already know how to do | training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/5gmALpCetyjkSPEDr/training-ai-to-do-alignment-research-we-don-t-already-know | joshc | 2025-02-24T19:19:43.067Z |
jChY95BeDeptDpnZK | I think something like this is a live concern, though I'm skeptical that control is net negative for this reason.
My baseline guess is that trying to detect AIs doing problematic actions makes it more likely that we get evidence for misalignment that triggers a useful response from various groups. I think it would be ... | 2025-03-11T19:18:43.349Z | 56 | null | rZcyemEpBHgb2hqLP | AI Control May Increase Existential Risk | ai-control-may-increase-existential-risk | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/rZcyemEpBHgb2hqLP/ai-control-may-increase-existential-risk | Jan_Kulveit | 2025-03-11T14:30:05.972Z |
ekegtfZ7nxvDonWrp | > I do understand this line of reasoning, but yes, my intuition differs. For some sort of a weird case study, consider Sydney. [...] My guess is that none of that would have happened with properly implemented control measures.
Sure, or with properly implemented ~anything related to controlling the AIs behavior. I don... | 2025-03-12T16:16:01.280Z | 6 | Sx6xczrvwirTnXHRp | rZcyemEpBHgb2hqLP | AI Control May Increase Existential Risk | ai-control-may-increase-existential-risk | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/rZcyemEpBHgb2hqLP/ai-control-may-increase-existential-risk | Jan_Kulveit | 2025-03-11T14:30:05.972Z |
irkfgCzSMu5L9P3Ld | Related question: are you in favor of making AGI open weights? By AGI, I mean AIs which effectively operate autonomously and can acquire automously acquire money/power. This includes AIs capable enough to automate whole fields of R&D (but not much more capable than this). I think the case for this being useful on your ... | 2025-03-12T16:38:48.742Z | 6 | null | rZcyemEpBHgb2hqLP | AI Control May Increase Existential Risk | ai-control-may-increase-existential-risk | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/rZcyemEpBHgb2hqLP/ai-control-may-increase-existential-risk | Jan_Kulveit | 2025-03-11T14:30:05.972Z |
bEnBYNQK5HbCugCvk | You could have the view that open weights AGI is too costly on takeover risk and escape is bad, but we'll hopefully have some pre-AGI AIs which do strange misaligned behaviors that don't really get them much/any influence/power. If this is the view, then it really feels to me like preventing escape/rogue internal deplo... | 2025-03-12T17:06:01.883Z | 6 | irkfgCzSMu5L9P3Ld | rZcyemEpBHgb2hqLP | AI Control May Increase Existential Risk | ai-control-may-increase-existential-risk | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/rZcyemEpBHgb2hqLP/ai-control-may-increase-existential-risk | Jan_Kulveit | 2025-03-11T14:30:05.972Z |
bqdfaTaPz22ZnsHAt | My guess is that the parts of the core leadership of Anthropic which are thinking actively about misalignment risks (in particular, Dario and Jared) think that misalignment risk is like ~5x smaller than I think it is while also thinking that risks from totalitarian regimes are like 2x worse than I think they are. I thi... | 2025-03-14T23:27:04.929Z | 37 | null | 7uTPrqZ3xQntwQgYz | Anthropic, and taking "technical philosophy" more seriously | anthropic-and-taking-technical-philosophy-more-seriously | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/7uTPrqZ3xQntwQgYz/anthropic-and-taking-technical-philosophy-more-seriously | Raemon | 2025-03-13T01:48:54.184Z |
vyDvoWaHxKfBcffEy | > Dario Amodei says AI will be writing 90% of the code in 6 months and almost all the code in 12 months.
I think it's somewhat unclear how big of a deal this is. In particular, situations where AIs write 90% of lines of code, but are very far (in time, effective compute, and qualitative capabilities) from being able t... | 2025-03-15T00:56:22.418Z | 9 | null | XFGTJz9vGwjJADeFB | AI #107: The Misplaced Hype Machine | ai-107-the-misplaced-hype-machine | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XFGTJz9vGwjJADeFB/ai-107-the-misplaced-hype-machine | Zvi | 2025-03-13T14:40:05.318Z |
Yc5mCkpBS8aLv53f7 | I don't expect 90% of code in 6 months and more confidently don't expect "almost all" in 12 months for a reasonable interpretation of almost all. However, I think this prediction is also weaker than it might seem, see [my comment here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XFGTJz9vGwjJADeFB/ai-107-the-misplaced-hype-machine?... | 2025-03-15T01:02:34.950Z | 5 | GXtpNwunm6XGWTfav | XFGTJz9vGwjJADeFB | AI #107: The Misplaced Hype Machine | ai-107-the-misplaced-hype-machine | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XFGTJz9vGwjJADeFB/ai-107-the-misplaced-hype-machine | Zvi | 2025-03-13T14:40:05.318Z |
TeofHxezeNfKWyMxh | > IMO actively torch the "long pause" worlds
Not sure how interesting this is to discuss, but I don't think I agree with this. Stuff they're doing does seem harmful to worlds where you need a long pause, but feels like at the very least Anthropic is a small fraction of the torching right? Like if you think Anthropic i... | 2025-03-15T04:10:15.688Z | 5 | rxtpytGBquCwEAMp7 | 7uTPrqZ3xQntwQgYz | Anthropic, and taking "technical philosophy" more seriously | anthropic-and-taking-technical-philosophy-more-seriously | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/7uTPrqZ3xQntwQgYz/anthropic-and-taking-technical-philosophy-more-seriously | Raemon | 2025-03-13T01:48:54.184Z |
frp73opG8oTogtxBd | Yep, just the obvious. (I'd say "much less bought in" than "isn't bought in", but whatever.)
I don't really have dots I'm trying to connect here, but this feels more central to me than what you discuss. Like, I think "alignment might be really, really hard" (which you focus on) is less of the crux than "is misalignmen... | 2025-03-15T04:17:21.912Z | 4 | DXdq9ab3xScHsFuFy | 7uTPrqZ3xQntwQgYz | Anthropic, and taking "technical philosophy" more seriously | anthropic-and-taking-technical-philosophy-more-seriously | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/7uTPrqZ3xQntwQgYz/anthropic-and-taking-technical-philosophy-more-seriously | Raemon | 2025-03-13T01:48:54.184Z |
gPqiyqfFTssBAjaKH | > The "extreme philosophical competence" hypothesis is that you need such competence to achieve "seriously aligned" in this sense. It sounds like you disagree, but I don't know why since your reasoning just sidesteps the problem.
Yes, my reasoning is definitely part, but not all of the argument. Like the thing I said ... | 2025-03-15T05:09:22.858Z | 14 | 2jBvsucWWM7MTvsuM | 7uTPrqZ3xQntwQgYz | Anthropic, and taking "technical philosophy" more seriously | anthropic-and-taking-technical-philosophy-more-seriously | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/7uTPrqZ3xQntwQgYz/anthropic-and-taking-technical-philosophy-more-seriously | Raemon | 2025-03-13T01:48:54.184Z |
uXkW78Kykz4H4ansQ | > Orcas have about 43 billion cortical neurons - humans have about 21 billion. The orca cortex has 6 times the area of the human cortex, though the neuron density is about 3 times lower.
>
> [...]
>
> My uncertain guess is that, within mammalian brains, scaling matters a lot more for individual intelligence,
This post... | 2025-03-16T20:25:18.694Z | 14 | null | dzLwCBvwC4hWytnus | Considerations on orca intelligence | considerations-on-orca-intelligence | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/dzLwCBvwC4hWytnus/considerations-on-orca-intelligence | Towards_Keeperhood | 2024-12-29T14:35:16.445Z |
ugLqGyNJCiJFJZWaY | > This makes sense as a crux for the claim "we need philosophical competence to align unboundedly intelligent superintelligences." But, it doesn't make sense for the claim "we need philosophical competence to align general, openended intelligence."
I was thinking of a slightly broader claim: "we need extreme philosoph... | 2025-03-16T20:47:49.519Z | 2 | rE2RnTiv4i9mqwECe | 7uTPrqZ3xQntwQgYz | Anthropic, and taking "technical philosophy" more seriously | anthropic-and-taking-technical-philosophy-more-seriously | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/7uTPrqZ3xQntwQgYz/anthropic-and-taking-technical-philosophy-more-seriously | Raemon | 2025-03-13T01:48:54.184Z |
g7YyfoiCovX4P3SWL | Yes, I was intending my comment to refer to just code at Anthropic. (Otherwise I would talk much more about serious integration lags and lack of compute.) | 2025-03-17T15:39:15.034Z | 5 | CB6rcgYyhn8yCfYok | XFGTJz9vGwjJADeFB | AI #107: The Misplaced Hype Machine | ai-107-the-misplaced-hype-machine | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XFGTJz9vGwjJADeFB/ai-107-the-misplaced-hype-machine | Zvi | 2025-03-13T14:40:05.318Z |
RcKjDmZbtQcamqpuP | Some quick (and relatively minor) notes:
- I expect that full stack intelligence explosion could look more like "make the whole economy bigger using a bunch of AI labor" rather than specifically automating the chip production process. (That said, in practice I expect explicit focused automation of chip production to b... | 2025-03-17T18:24:14.708Z | 28 | null | PzbEpSGvwH3NnegDB | Three Types of Intelligence Explosion | three-types-of-intelligence-explosion | https://www.forethought.org/research/three-types-of-intelligence-explosion | rosehadshar | 2025-03-17T14:47:46.696Z |
K9qoqBNBnFB7r7oMW | > Number cortical neurons != brain size. Orcas have ~2x the number of cortical neurons, but much larger brains. Assuming brain weight is proportional to volume, with human brains being typically 1.2-1.4kg, and orca brains being typically 5.4-6.8kg, orca brains are actually like 6.1/1.3=4.7 times larger than human brain... | 2025-03-17T18:40:35.922Z | 4 | FaBd8sM8T9ax3cJsM | dzLwCBvwC4hWytnus | Considerations on orca intelligence | considerations-on-orca-intelligence | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/dzLwCBvwC4hWytnus/considerations-on-orca-intelligence | Towards_Keeperhood | 2024-12-29T14:35:16.445Z |
3Dhs5jZpBimxS9gz7 | It looks like the images aren't showing up on LW. | 2025-03-20T02:29:34.750Z | 2 | null | ZhDtfuBnxhC6X8ycG | Improved visualizations of METR Time Horizons paper. | improved-visualizations-of-metr-time-horizons-paper | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ZhDtfuBnxhC6X8ycG/improved-visualizations-of-metr-time-horizons-paper | LDJ | 2025-03-19T23:36:52.771Z |
C3H7LgZcFk5eu2jKf | I'd guess that the benchmarks which METR uses have enough label noise and other issues (e.g. specification ambiguity) that measuring >=95% reliability isn't meaningful. 80% probably is meaningful.
When analyzing the high reliability regime, I think you'd want to get a ceiling on performance by baselining with human do... | 2025-03-20T02:40:13.687Z | 3 | null | ZhDtfuBnxhC6X8ycG | Improved visualizations of METR Time Horizons paper. | improved-visualizations-of-metr-time-horizons-paper | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ZhDtfuBnxhC6X8ycG/improved-visualizations-of-metr-time-horizons-paper | LDJ | 2025-03-19T23:36:52.771Z |
a7mR7p2ZbHpgNY6Pq | > However, this strongly limits the space of possible aggregated agents. Imagine two EUMs, Alice and Bob, whose utilities are each linear in how much cake they have. Suppose they’re trying to form a new EUM whose utility function is a weighted average of their utility functions. Then they’d only have three options:
>
>... | 2025-03-22T00:54:22.653Z | 22 | null | 5tYTKX4pNpiG4vzYg | Towards a scale-free theory of intelligent agency | towards-a-scale-free-theory-of-intelligent-agency | https://www.mindthefuture.info/p/towards-a-scale-free-theory-of-intelligent | Richard_Ngo | 2025-03-21T01:39:42.251Z |
jos5sTh9KeDGZsZ5c | Actually, progress in 2024 is roughly 2x faster than earlier progress which seems consistent with thinking there is some distribution shift. It's just that this distribution shift didn't kick in until we had Anthropic competing with OpenAI and reasoning models. (Note that OpenAI didn't release a notably better model th... | 2025-03-24T00:15:29.266Z | 11 | xCL4hw97qCEkDXtJR | deesrjitvXM4xYGZd | METR: Measuring AI Ability to Complete Long Tasks | metr-measuring-ai-ability-to-complete-long-tasks | https://metr.org/blog/2025-03-19-measuring-ai-ability-to-complete-long-tasks/ | Zach Stein-Perlman | 2025-03-19T16:00:54.874Z |
n2j2Nkgi4G5yzB6k7 | My sense is that the GPT-2 and GPT-3 results are somewhat dubious, especially the GPT-2 result. It really depends on how you relate SWAA (small software engineering subtasks) to the rest of the tasks. My understanding is that no iteration was done though.
However, note that it wouldn't be wildly more off trend if GPT-... | 2025-03-24T00:21:44.644Z | 12 | QCdyw2pK4Mt39Locf | deesrjitvXM4xYGZd | METR: Measuring AI Ability to Complete Long Tasks | metr-measuring-ai-ability-to-complete-long-tasks | https://metr.org/blog/2025-03-19-measuring-ai-ability-to-complete-long-tasks/ | Zach Stein-Perlman | 2025-03-19T16:00:54.874Z |
AxXr5gpLBqd9fY6Dv | The list doesn't exclude Baumal effects as these are just the implication of:
> - Physical bottlenecks and delays prevent growth. Intelligence only goes so far.
> - Regulatory and social bottlenecks prevent growth this fast, INT only goes so far.
Like Baumal effects are just some area of the economy with more limited... | 2025-03-25T18:07:43.160Z | 11 | bsm8ZSPzoD4mYac9K | aD2RA3vtXs4p4r55b | On (Not) Feeling the AGI | on-not-feeling-the-agi | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/aD2RA3vtXs4p4r55b/on-not-feeling-the-agi | Zvi | 2025-03-25T14:30:02.215Z |
i8JRxp4PpaRsun8tu | Sorry if my comment was triggering [@nostalgebraist](https://www.lesswrong.com/users/nostalgebraist?mention=user). : ( | 2025-03-26T03:29:40.275Z | 2 | AxXr5gpLBqd9fY6Dv | aD2RA3vtXs4p4r55b | On (Not) Feeling the AGI | on-not-feeling-the-agi | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/aD2RA3vtXs4p4r55b/on-not-feeling-the-agi | Zvi | 2025-03-25T14:30:02.215Z |
tve3ipC9vbr3DbR2h | METR has found that substantially different scaffolding is most effective for o-series models. I get the sense that they weren't optimized for being effective multi-turn agents. At least, the o1 series wasn't optimized for this, I think o3 may have been. | 2025-03-26T06:11:51.534Z | 8 | EAndFgfynLJ8FaoRq | 4mvphwx5pdsZLMmpY | Recent AI model progress feels mostly like bullshit | recent-ai-model-progress-feels-mostly-like-bullshit | https://zeropath.com/blog/on-recent-ai-model-progress | lc | 2025-03-24T19:28:43.450Z |
3yNEed3p9TsGszNkg | Is this an accurate summary:
- 3.5 substantially improved performance for your use case and 3.6 slightly improved performance.
- The o-series models didn't improve performance on your task. (And presumably 3.7 didn't improve perf.)
So, by "recent model progress feels mostly like bullshit" I think you basically just m... | 2025-03-26T06:20:16.973Z | 30 | null | 4mvphwx5pdsZLMmpY | Recent AI model progress feels mostly like bullshit | recent-ai-model-progress-feels-mostly-like-bullshit | https://zeropath.com/blog/on-recent-ai-model-progress | lc | 2025-03-24T19:28:43.450Z |
KexMzGJQ6eChztXpP | See also [Different senses in which two AIs can be "the same"](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/4j6HJt8Exowmqp245/different-senses-in-which-two-ais-can-be-the-same). | 2025-03-30T11:27:29.790Z | 9 | null | wQKskToGofs4osdJ3 | The Pando Problem: Rethinking AI Individuality | the-pando-problem-rethinking-ai-individuality | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wQKskToGofs4osdJ3/the-pando-problem-rethinking-ai-individuality | Jan_Kulveit | 2025-03-28T21:03:28.374Z |
ydxoFix7bhnyTbzSE | Shouldn't a 32% increase in prices only make a modest difference to training FLOP? In particular, see the [compute forecast](https://ai-2027.com/research/compute-forecast). Between Dec 2026 and Dec 2027, compute increases by roughly an OOM and generally it looks like compute increases by a bit less than 1 OOM per year ... | 2025-04-03T17:17:26.257Z | 18 | QjCdBBPnrkBJBAEFD | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
MCGcxRgZ4e5xzvrna | Of course, tariffs could have more complex effects than just reducing GPUs purchased by 32%, but this seems like a good first guess. | 2025-04-03T17:18:00.418Z | 6 | ydxoFix7bhnyTbzSE | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
dyXpH4RtznCpQ727M | Sure, but note that the story "tariffs -> recession -> less AI investment" doesn't particularly depend on GPU tariffs! | 2025-04-03T17:31:54.864Z | 7 | wnDJQLEGgjAfB9bke | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
xRf8CgJoz4ekYptfC | > I’ll define an “SIE” as “we can get >=5 OOMs of increase in effective training compute in <1 years without needing more hardware”. I
This is as of the point of full AI R&D automation? Or as of any point? | 2025-04-04T19:07:27.275Z | 7 | null | XDF6ovePBJf6hsxGj | Will compute bottlenecks prevent a software intelligence explosion? | will-compute-bottlenecks-prevent-a-software-intelligence-1 | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XDF6ovePBJf6hsxGj/will-compute-bottlenecks-prevent-a-software-intelligence-1 | Tom Davidson | 2025-04-04T17:41:37.088Z |
zAv7aQfWTWpzz23X2 | I think it would be a mistake to interpret this paper as a substantial update against large safety gains from inspecting CoT.
This paper exposes unfaithfulness in cases where the non-visible reasoning is extremely minimal such that it can easily happen within a forward pass (e.g. a simple reward hack or an easy-to-not... | 2025-04-04T22:56:45.451Z | 34 | null | TmaahE9RznC8wm5zJ | AI CoT Reasoning Is Often Unfaithful | ai-cot-reasoning-is-often-unfaithful | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/TmaahE9RznC8wm5zJ/ai-cot-reasoning-is-often-unfaithful | Zvi | 2025-04-04T14:50:05.538Z |
aFwbvo2xkycXBAWg5 | > I'm skeptical regarding are the economic and practical implications (AGI labs' revenue tripling and 50% faster algorithmic progress)
Notably, the trend in the last few years is that AI companies triple their revenue each year. So, the revenue tripling seems very plausible to me.
As far as 50% algorithmic progress, ... | 2025-04-07T16:30:25.781Z | 6 | g4sYfioiSWw9S9qJc | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
JyLo2QGGb73ciEEyP | I think the best source for revenue growth is [this](https://epoch.ai/data-insights/ai-companies-revenue) post from epoch. I think we only have the last 2 years really, (so "last few years" is maybe overstating it), but we do have revenue projections and we have more than 1 data point per year. | 2025-04-07T18:32:55.990Z | 5 | pdJPZSfRsBobptAYB | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
wjCb34a7LWTR4xmR2 | > A "no" to either would mean this work falls under milling behavior, and will not meaningfully contribute toward keeping humanity safe from DeepMind's own actions.
I think it's probably possible greatly improve safety given a moderate budget for safety and not nearly enough buy in for (1) and (2). (At least not enoug... | 2025-04-07T18:40:46.803Z | 7 | msnnJwRMdvwtBzCLi | 3ki4mt4BA6eTx56Tc | Google DeepMind: An Approach to Technical AGI Safety and Security | google-deepmind-an-approach-to-technical-agi-safety-and | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.01849 | Rohin Shah | 2025-04-05T22:00:14.803Z |
eAjsrSrqxCiiHdG4v | I only skimmed this essay and I'm probably more sympathetic to moral patienthood of current AI systems than many, but I think this exact statement is pretty clearly wrong:
> Statistically speaking, if you're an intelligent mind that came into existence in the past few years, you're probably running on a large language... | 2025-04-07T22:36:30.512Z | 1 | null | m4ZpDyHQ2sz8FPDuN | Factory farming intelligent minds | factory-farming-intelligent-minds | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/m4ZpDyHQ2sz8FPDuN/factory-farming-intelligent-minds | Odd anon | 2025-04-07T20:05:04.064Z |
7RQToQkKnRHrz55Y9 | > the median narrative is probably around 2030 or 2031. (At least according to me. Eli Lifland is smarter than me and says December 2028, so idk.)
Notably, this is Eli's forecast for "superhuman coder" which could be substantially before AIs are capable enough for takeover to be plausible.
I think Eli's median for "A... | 2025-04-09T22:25:06.824Z | 5 | null | Yzcb5mQ7iq4DFfXHx | Thoughts on AI 2027 | thoughts-on-ai-2027 | https://intelligence.org/2025/04/09/thoughts-on-ai-2027/ | Max Harms | 2025-04-09T21:26:23.926Z |
MhwFxpEkawrx4bezb | I think it would be a mistake to interpret this paper as a substantial update against large safety gains from inspecting CoT.
This paper exposes unfaithfulness in cases where the non-visible reasoning is extremely minimal such that it can easily happen within a forward pass (e.g. a simple reward hack or an easy-to-not... | 2025-04-10T17:01:03.173Z | 9 | null | PrcBFPkoRNGWrvdPk | Reasoning models don't always say what they think | reasoning-models-don-t-always-say-what-they-think-1 | https://www.anthropic.com/research/reasoning-models-dont-say-think | Joe Benton | 2025-04-09T19:48:58.733Z |
SzBMzQzKAXAmbXkzP | Are you sure that we see "vestigial reasoning" when:
- We run a bunch of RL while aggressively trying to reduce CoT length (e.g., with a length penalty);
- The input is in distribution with respect to the training distribution;
- The RL is purely outcome based.
I'd guess this mostly doesn't occur in this case and the... | 2025-04-13T23:02:25.226Z | 7 | null | 6AxCwm334ab9kDsQ5 | Vestigial reasoning in RL | vestigial-reasoning-in-rl | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6AxCwm334ab9kDsQ5/vestigial-reasoning-in-rl | Caleb Biddulph | 2025-04-13T15:40:11.954Z |
bTakJ5ZSuvoyquruZ | My distribution is very uncertain, but I'd say 25% by June 2027 and 50% by Jan 2031.
(I answer a similar question, but for a slightly higher bar of capabilties and operationalized somewhat differently [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/FG54euEAesRkSZuJN/ryan_greenblatt-s-shortform?commentId=iwodobEWjt9qwHbb2). I'v... | 2025-04-14T20:47:12.610Z | 4 | uYCcCaDEwXpaDeryg | gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt | ≤10-year Timelines Remain Unlikely Despite DeepSeek and o3 | 10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/gsj3TWdcBxwkm9eNt/10-year-timelines-remain-unlikely-despite-deepseek-and-o3 | Rafael Harth | 2025-02-13T19:21:35.392Z |
bC5AiCjTS6AinFyXg | > This contradicts METR timelines, which, IMO, is the best piece of info we currently have for predicting when AGI will arrive.
Have you read the [timelines supplement](https://ai-2027.com/research/timelines-forecast)? One of their main methodologies [involves using this exact data from METR](https://ai-2027.com/resea... | 2025-04-19T21:36:15.326Z | 6 | xDkzLmzgK7K7uazFC | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
JgMRCYMr3p2iiKoE8 | Looks like Eli beat me to the punch! | 2025-04-19T21:38:32.112Z | 6 | bC5AiCjTS6AinFyXg | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
CAvWEwEvCuo8cGsZo | Isn't it kinda unreasonable to put 10% on superhuman coder in a year if current AIs have a 15 nanosecond time horizon? TBC, it seems fine IMO if the model just isn't very good at predicting the 10th/90th percentile, especially with extreme hyperparameters.
~~I also don't know how they ran this, I tried looking for mod... | 2025-04-19T21:59:15.457Z | 4 | Dotw7krkeELvLP83p | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
7tzuoQbmsDnuNofjt | > I wouldn't be surprised if 3-5% of questions were mislabeled or impossible to answer, but 25-50%? You're basically saying that HLE is worthless. I'm curious why.
Various people looked at randomly selected questions and found similar numbers.
(I don't think the dataset is worthless, I think if you filtered down to t... | 2025-04-19T22:15:06.092Z | 9 | 7i4LAvKkzwwftWxpX | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
qz4iEse2S837qmPeX | It's notable that you're just generally arguing against having probabilistic beliefs about events which are unprecedented[^cont], nothing is specific to this case of doing AI forecasting. You're mostly objecting to the idea of having (e.g.) medians on events like this.
[^cont]: Of course, the level of precedentedness ... | 2025-04-21T01:06:27.442Z | 4 | vG9AJAkWX4Z7bFDtg | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
pd2ijtiHoovyvmgWH | (Yes, I'm aware you meant imprecise probabilities. These aren't probablities though (in the same sense that a range of numbers isn't a number), e.g., you're unwilling to state a median.) | 2025-04-21T15:54:53.082Z | 2 | AokZ9hinwdJc28YGN | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
Jfh5BRoLGCZoAdKnc | Hmm, I think your argument is roughly right, but missing a key detail. In particular, the key aspect of the SARs (and higher levels of capability) is that they can be **strictly better than humans at everything** while simultaneously being 30x faster *and* 30x more numerous. (Or, there is 900x more parallel labor, but ... | 2025-04-21T18:16:41.319Z | 3 | fzrqNyKgheH3mM4QG | bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK | AI 2027 is a Bet Against Amdahl's Law | ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK/ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | snewman | 2025-04-21T03:09:40.751Z |
TygofbgeG6g9d562j | > I note that I am confused by this diagram. In particular, the legend indicates a 90th percentile forecast of ">2100" for ASI, but the diagram appears to show the probability dropping to zero around the beginning of 2032.
I think it's just that the tail is very long and flat with <1% per year. So, it looks like it go... | 2025-04-21T18:24:14.182Z | 7 | null | bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK | AI 2027 is a Bet Against Amdahl's Law | ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK/ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | snewman | 2025-04-21T03:09:40.751Z |
z3tjK5oLFa5JkXtFX | Sure, but for output quality *better* than what humans could (ever) do to matter for the relative speed up, you have to argue about compute bottlenecks, not Amdahl's law for just the automation itself! (As in, if some humans would have done something in 10 years and it doesn't have any environmental bottleneck, then 1... | 2025-04-21T18:37:08.279Z | 2 | 2dx57dRaDrATYkHpL | bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK | AI 2027 is a Bet Against Amdahl's Law | ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK/ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | snewman | 2025-04-21T03:09:40.751Z |
9nckXCButbztEynJE | I'm worried that you're missing something important because you mostly argue against large AI R&D multipliers, but you don't spend much time directly referencing compute bottlenecks in your arguments that the forecast is too aggressive.
Consider the case of doing pure math research (which we'll assume for simplicity d... | 2025-04-21T18:47:06.538Z | 15 | null | bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK | AI 2027 is a Bet Against Amdahl's Law | ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK/ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | snewman | 2025-04-21T03:09:40.751Z |
r7mLTXGg36RK4eCNB | > I'm having trouble parsing this sentence
You said "This is valid for activities which benefit from speed and scale. But when output quality is paramount, speed and scale may not always provide much help?". But, when considering activities that aren't bottlenecked on the environment, then to achieve 10x acceleration ... | 2025-04-21T19:05:38.720Z | 2 | D2dy6FvahqEbG5DHy | bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK | AI 2027 is a Bet Against Amdahl's Law | ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK/ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | snewman | 2025-04-21T03:09:40.751Z |
iXCmtnpx7gZqziBjb | Another way to put this disagreement is that you can interpret all of the AI 2027 capability milestones as refering to the capability of the weakest bottlenecking capability, so:
- Superhuman coder has to dominate *all* research engineers at *all* pure research engineering tasks. This includes the most bottlenecking c... | 2025-04-21T19:15:51.958Z | 9 | fzrqNyKgheH3mM4QG | bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK | AI 2027 is a Bet Against Amdahl's Law | ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK/ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | snewman | 2025-04-21T03:09:40.751Z |
ame49sHq5BXfgbSEn | > This is both projected forward and treated with either 1 (in 45% of cases) or 2 (in all cases) super-exponential terms that make it significantly faster than an inferred 4.6x per year.
Hmm, I think you're looking at the [more basic trend extrapolation for the timelines model](https://ai-2027.com/research/timelines-f... | 2025-04-21T23:01:02.094Z | 6 | 62uRL6KFZytcrdRGL | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
Ahd4tCfF2zFRsS9tp | > zero-shot WikiText103 perplexity and 5-shot MMLU
These are somewhat awkward benchmarks because they don't actually measure downstream usefulness at software engineering or AI research. In particular, these tasks might not measure improvements in RL which can have huge effects on usefulness and have seen fast algorit... | 2025-04-21T23:09:51.312Z | 13 | 62uRL6KFZytcrdRGL | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
QNcgmdLNk78fAatCq | > In all timelines models presented there is acknowledgement that compute does not accelerate.
When you say "accelerate" do you mean "the rate of compute scaling increases"? I agree they aren't expecting this (and roughly model a fixed rate of compute progress which matches historical trends as this is just an extrapo... | 2025-04-21T23:16:03.536Z | 4 | oAoF9zuBmruqdcTNn | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
FhujzkmBNbPyGAMve | > I said there was no compute acceleration not that there was no more compute scaling?
(Yes, sorry, edited my original comment to clarify.)
> a equal and super-accelerated algorithmic or efficiency term (v_algorithmic) as shown in the code here
I don't think the "AI assisted AI R&D" speed ups along the way to super... | 2025-04-21T23:20:50.137Z | 4 | kHtiJNBBujKu6BdH5 | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
rrzRWKhEMHv8hqT88 | Sure. [Epoch estimates](https://epoch.ai/data/notable-ai-models?view=table) 2e25 flop for GPT-4 and 3.4e24 for deepseek V3. So a bit less than 10x actually, but quite close. (And V3 is substantially better.) R1 is [around 1/6 of deepseek V3 cost](https://epoch.ai/gradient-updates/what-went-into-training-deepseek-r1). | 2025-04-21T23:25:03.990Z | 4 | EMCKmSyrvpNkBztHX | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
7qF5o4zfeHfKipeTL | For context, my preregistered guess would be that AI R&D speed ups along the way to superhuman coder make it come around 1.5x faster, though between 1.25-2 all are consistent with my best guess. (So e.g., rather than ~2029.0 median on Eli's model without intermediate AI R&D speed ups we'd see around 2031.0 or so. I'd e... | 2025-04-21T23:28:47.276Z | 4 | aqbiCR4ZbYDw67Y2w | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
G8uD8x5vybYDJkutx | Just ran the code and it looks like I'm spot on and the median goes to Mar 2031. | 2025-04-21T23:32:41.572Z | 2 | 7qF5o4zfeHfKipeTL | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
dAwRr9dFe9br2NXkK | > it does not meet the standard.
Importantly, it is much better than GPT-4 on the relevant downstream tasks. | 2025-04-22T00:09:11.335Z | 1 | pfnQFjececmFCE86g | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
BB7u5vJixhdYdXxH7 | > R1 can't possibly be below V3 cost because it is inclusive? If I'm not mistaken, R1 is not trained from scratch, but I could be wrong.
Yes, I meant 1/6 additional cost which is ~negligable. | 2025-04-22T00:10:20.795Z | 1 | pfnQFjececmFCE86g | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
x2gqgjzajDrNGCkKn | > Please let me know if you suspect I've over-interpreted that validation.
Slightly? My view is more like:
- For AIs to be superhuman AI researchers, they probably need to match humans at most underlying/fundamental cognitive tasks, including reasonably sample efficient learning. (Or at least learning which is compet... | 2025-04-22T00:37:11.063Z | 5 | DsLAJgwsfiBsW9pKe | bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK | AI 2027 is a Bet Against Amdahl's Law | ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK/ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | snewman | 2025-04-21T03:09:40.751Z |
Sk9DibiWyRuBypNGR | > If it is compute efficient according to even Kaplan or Chinchilla scaling laws, please demonstrate that for me.
We only have [leaked numbers confirming reasonably efficient training](https://semianalysis.com/2023/07/10/gpt-4-architecture-infrastructure/) but GPT-4 is widely believed to be a quite efficient model for... | 2025-04-22T00:48:40.468Z | 1 | 3YP9LjWfLRAgB9SY2 | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
TSRjhsmctLSRiKTtg | ("Has to" is maybe a bit strong, I think I probably should have said "will probably end up needing to be better competitive with the best human experts at basically everything (other than vision) and better at more central AI R&D given the realistic capability profile". I think I generally expect full automation to hit... | 2025-04-22T03:11:53.632Z | 3 | qZJgyF2cdMZ2JsHq7 | bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK | AI 2027 is a Bet Against Amdahl's Law | ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK/ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | snewman | 2025-04-21T03:09:40.751Z |
Y9cQMZ6Yse4oAt74u | > Maybe a crux here is maybe how big the speedup is?
What you describe are good reasons why companies are unlikely to want to release this information unilaterially, but from a safety perspective, we should instead consider how imposing such a policy alters the overall landscape.
From this perspective, the main quest... | 2025-04-22T15:11:04.944Z | 4 | Thbhg8TFBXim3WRjc | FGqfdJmB8MSH5LKGc | Training AGI in Secret would be Unsafe and Unethical | training-agi-in-secret-would-be-unsafe-and-unethical-1 | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/FGqfdJmB8MSH5LKGc/training-agi-in-secret-would-be-unsafe-and-unethical-1 | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-18T12:27:35.795Z |
XsSFj5qG4HozF6RbM | I think my description is consistent with "some activities on which the SAR is worse" as long as these aren't bottlenecking and it is overall dominating human researchers (as in, adding human researchers is negligable value).
But whatever, you're the author here.
Maybe "Superhuman coder has to dominate all research e... | 2025-04-22T17:05:32.632Z | 2 | fttRA6GCGZL476orB | bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK | AI 2027 is a Bet Against Amdahl's Law | ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/bfHDoWLnBH9xR3YAK/ai-2027-is-a-bet-against-amdahl-s-law | snewman | 2025-04-21T03:09:40.751Z |
EAtYrfAiks2EifQpx | I think o3 maybe does worse on RE-bench than 3.7 sonnet due to often attempting reward hacking. It could also be noise, it is just a small number of tasks. (Presumably these reward hacks would have worked better in the OpenAI training setup but METR filters it out?) It doesn't attempt reward hacking as much / as aggres... | 2025-04-24T18:07:52.430Z | 5 | htTyS4c7N3kwjsjbZ | TpSFoqoG2M5MAAesg | AI 2027: What Superintelligence Looks Like | ai-2027-what-superintelligence-looks-like-1 | https://ai-2027.com/ | Daniel Kokotajlo | 2025-04-03T16:23:44.619Z |
GFthzNEvfuecwqL4u | I buy your arguments for optimism about not needing to simplify/change our goals to compete. (I also think that there are other stronger reasons to expect we don't need goal simplification like just keeping humans alive and later giving back the resources which is quite simple and indirectly points to what humans want.... | 2025-04-24T18:16:33.444Z | 2 | nigkBt47pLMi5tnGd | 5tYTKX4pNpiG4vzYg | Towards a scale-free theory of intelligent agency | towards-a-scale-free-theory-of-intelligent-agency | https://www.mindthefuture.info/p/towards-a-scale-free-theory-of-intelligent | Richard_Ngo | 2025-03-21T01:39:42.251Z |
43Q72wsTwvojLGExz | This is one of my favorite current research directions. | 2025-04-25T00:15:14.049Z | 5 | null | ARQs7KYY9vJHeYsGc | Modifying LLM Beliefs with Synthetic Document Finetuning | modifying-llm-beliefs-with-synthetic-document-finetuning | https://alignment.anthropic.com/2025/modifying-beliefs-via-sdf/ | RowanWang | 2025-04-24T21:15:17.366Z |
xhB8JRFistvm2ehQQ | Some reasons for this (that I quickly wrote in response to someone asking a question about this):
- There aren't that many research direction we can do now which plausibly transfer to later much more powerful AIs while if we got really good at this it could transfer. (Up to around or a bit beyond full AI R&D automatio... | 2025-04-25T00:16:35.955Z | 16 | 43Q72wsTwvojLGExz | ARQs7KYY9vJHeYsGc | Modifying LLM Beliefs with Synthetic Document Finetuning | modifying-llm-beliefs-with-synthetic-document-finetuning | https://alignment.anthropic.com/2025/modifying-beliefs-via-sdf/ | RowanWang | 2025-04-24T21:15:17.366Z |
AJHftvL6RWM6uZqdb | And there is some ongoing future work which is currently trying to meet this higher standard! (Or at least something similar to it.) | 2025-04-25T16:17:05.234Z | 5 | jXKPs7bu7XGfbmbB9 | ARQs7KYY9vJHeYsGc | Modifying LLM Beliefs with Synthetic Document Finetuning | modifying-llm-beliefs-with-synthetic-document-finetuning | https://alignment.anthropic.com/2025/modifying-beliefs-via-sdf/ | RowanWang | 2025-04-24T21:15:17.366Z |
sZKbdhdrQ6HRLyXZe | > When AI companies have human-level AI systems, will they use them for alignment research, or will they use them (mostly) to advance capabilities instead?
It's not clear this is a crux for the automating alignment research plan to work out.
In particular, suppose an AI company currently spends 5% of its resources on... | 2025-04-25T19:33:41.458Z | 4 | null | XLNxrFfkyrdktuzqn | Why would AI companies use human-level AI to do alignment research? | why-would-ai-companies-use-human-level-ai-to-do-alignment | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XLNxrFfkyrdktuzqn/why-would-ai-companies-use-human-level-ai-to-do-alignment | MichaelDickens | 2025-04-25T19:12:56.202Z |
DYb9tmHLHrewfqnNi | People interested in approaches to solving reward hacking which don't depend on supervision (and thus might scale to superintelligence) should consider looking at [our earlier work on measurement tampering](https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/inALbAqdx63KTaGgs/benchmarks-for-measurement-tampering-detection). I don't p... | 2025-04-27T02:21:54.720Z | 4 | jh7RMbXDfyzgum6ij | rKC4xJFkxm6cNq4i9 | Reward hacking is becoming more sophisticated and deliberate in frontier LLMs | reward-hacking-is-becoming-more-sophisticated-and-deliberate | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/rKC4xJFkxm6cNq4i9/reward-hacking-is-becoming-more-sophisticated-and-deliberate | Kei Nishimura-Gasparian | 2025-04-24T16:03:57.359Z |
KmhfBChzzsT7WmyBi | Ironically, arguably the most important/useful point of the essay is arguing for a rebranded version of the "precisely timed short slow/pause/pivot resources to safety" proposal. Dario's rebranded it as spending down a "security buffer".
(I don't have a strong view on whether this is a good rebrand, seems reasonable t... | 2025-04-28T02:16:08.406Z | 8 | n5fJLWCGBSDApESM9 | SebmGh9HYdd8GZtHA | "The Urgency of Interpretability" (Dario Amodei) | the-urgency-of-interpretability-dario-amodei | https://www.darioamodei.com/post/the-urgency-of-interpretability | RobertM | 2025-04-27T04:31:50.090Z |
fFKDdzNiQyYpdBfGi | Another potential crux[^related] is that Ege's world view seemingly doesn't depend at all on AIs which are much faster and smarter than any human. As far as I can tell, it doesn't enter into his modeling of takeoff (or timelines to full automation of remote work which partially depends on something more like takeoff).
... | 2025-04-28T02:52:47.776Z | 20 | null | xxxK9HTBNJvBY2RJL | The case for multi-decade AI timelines [Linkpost] | the-case-for-multi-decade-ai-timelines-linkpost | https://epoch.ai/gradient-updates/the-case-for-multi-decade-ai-timelines | Noosphere89 | 2025-04-27T15:31:47.902Z |
4arc3J2Z3G68rmrpi | I think your discussion (and Epoch's discussion) of the CES model is confused as you aren't taking into account the possibility that we're *already* bottlenecking on compute or labor. That is, I think you're making some assumption about the current marginal returns which is non-obvious and, more strongly, would be an a... | 2025-04-28T07:21:13.434Z | 83 | null | XDF6ovePBJf6hsxGj | Will compute bottlenecks prevent a software intelligence explosion? | will-compute-bottlenecks-prevent-a-software-intelligence-1 | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XDF6ovePBJf6hsxGj/will-compute-bottlenecks-prevent-a-software-intelligence-1 | Tom Davidson | 2025-04-04T17:41:37.088Z |
59NufM2Nkiux6QybX | As far as I can tell, this sort of consideration is at least somewhat damning for the literal CES model (with poor substitution) in any situation where the inputs have varied by hugely different amounts (many orders of magnitude of difference like in the compute vs labor case) and relative demand remains roughly simila... | 2025-04-28T07:32:42.197Z | 20 | 4arc3J2Z3G68rmrpi | XDF6ovePBJf6hsxGj | Will compute bottlenecks prevent a software intelligence explosion? | will-compute-bottlenecks-prevent-a-software-intelligence-1 | https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XDF6ovePBJf6hsxGj/will-compute-bottlenecks-prevent-a-software-intelligence-1 | Tom Davidson | 2025-04-04T17:41:37.088Z |
noxcihBEW3FGTFC43 | > I don’t see the trends that one would extrapolate in order to arrive at very short timelines on the order of a few years. The obvious trend extrapolations for AI’s economic impact give timelines to full remote work automation of around a decade, and I expect these trends to slow down by default.
Actually, I think t... | 2025-04-28T23:50:44.998Z | 8 | null | xxxK9HTBNJvBY2RJL | The case for multi-decade AI timelines [Linkpost] | the-case-for-multi-decade-ai-timelines-linkpost | https://epoch.ai/gradient-updates/the-case-for-multi-decade-ai-timelines | Noosphere89 | 2025-04-27T15:31:47.902Z |
unWYWWyNMfoF8Bybd | > If we adjust for the 5-18x speed improvement measured for experienced workers, and target an 80% task success rate, that pushes the timeline out by over three years
I don't think this is a good interpretation of the 5-18x multiplier. In particular, I think the "acquire context multiplier" will be increasingly small ... | 2025-04-30T05:39:32.273Z | 15 | null | fRiqwFPiaasKxtJuZ | Interpreting the METR Time Horizons Post | interpreting-the-metr-time-horizons-post | https://amistrongeryet.substack.com/p/measuring-ai-progress | snewman | 2025-04-30T03:03:19.928Z |
JieqtgAspBYFh3CCf | > In actuality, the study doesn’t say much about AGI, except to provide evidence against the most aggressive forecasts.
This feels quite wrong to me. Surely if AIs were completing 1 month long self contained software engineering tasks (e.g. what a smart intern might do in the first month) that would be a big update to... | 2025-04-30T05:51:22.817Z | 5 | null | fRiqwFPiaasKxtJuZ | Interpreting the METR Time Horizons Post | interpreting-the-metr-time-horizons-post | https://amistrongeryet.substack.com/p/measuring-ai-progress | snewman | 2025-04-30T03:03:19.928Z |
tT2qxAwDfsA5c9jxp | Personally, I updated toward shorter timelines upon seeing a preliminary version of their results which just showed the more recent doubling trend and then updated most of the way back on seeing the longer run trend. (Or maybe even toward slightly longer timelines than I started with, I forget.) | 2025-04-30T05:53:42.291Z | 3 | JieqtgAspBYFh3CCf | fRiqwFPiaasKxtJuZ | Interpreting the METR Time Horizons Post | interpreting-the-metr-time-horizons-post | https://amistrongeryet.substack.com/p/measuring-ai-progress | snewman | 2025-04-30T03:03:19.928Z |
qy8BGNeJjwKTcJ7my | To be clear, I agree it provides evidence against very aggressive timelines (if I had 2027 medians I would have updated to longer), I was disagreeing with "the study doesn’t say much about AGI, except to". I think the study does provide a bunch of evidence about when AGI might come! (And it seems you agree.) I edited m... | 2025-04-30T16:03:24.717Z | 3 | EgJQpJkRBBheZyGqp | fRiqwFPiaasKxtJuZ | Interpreting the METR Time Horizons Post | interpreting-the-metr-time-horizons-post | https://amistrongeryet.substack.com/p/measuring-ai-progress | snewman | 2025-04-30T03:03:19.928Z |
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