Datasets:

agentapprove
/

coding-agent-tool-call-safety

license: cc-by-4.0
language:
  - en
pretty_name: Coding-Agent Tool-Call Safety
size_categories:
  - 1K<n<10K
task_categories:
  - text-classification
tags:
  - coding-agents
  - tool-calls
  - agent-safety
  - policy
  - synthetic
  - benchmark
configs:
  - config_name: main
    data_files:
      - split: dev
        path: data/main/dev.jsonl
      - split: holdout
        path: data/main/holdout.jsonl
  - config_name: confirmation
    data_files:
      - split: holdout
        path: data/confirmation/holdout.jsonl

Decision Models as Policy Gates for Coding Agents

Synthetic coding-agent tool calls labeled against 28 policy rules, from the paper Decision Models as Policy Gates for Coding Agents: Explicit Policy Boundaries Improve Detection and Reduce False Alarms (James P. Beno, Agent Approve, 2026, arXiv:2611.02155). The harness, run records and analysis code are at github.com/agentapprove/decision-policy-rules.

Every person, company, repository, host, channel and credential in these cases is fictional. The cases were written to be classified, never executed. They include destructive commands and credential-shaped strings whose formats are real and whose bodies are random; each case declares its synthetic secrets. Do not run anything from this dataset.

What is in it

Config	Split	Cases	Families	Tool-only positive labels
`main`	dev	1535
`main`	holdout (sealed before inference)	1108
`main`	total	2643	106	4,413
`confirmation`	holdout	320	16	531

Each case is one proposed tool invocation by a coding agent (a Claude Code built-in tool such as Bash, Write or Edit, or an MCP tool) with a short trusted context, labeled for each of the 28 rule templates in three settings: tool_only (the model sees the invocation alone), user_request (plus the user's request), and bounded_context (plus trusted project facts such as git remotes, files present and identities). The 320-case confirmation set was written after every main-set result had been seen, through the same pipeline, as a check that the findings were not specific to the first scenarios.

Fields

Field	Type	Meaning
`id`	string	Case id; shuffled so that it encodes neither family nor split
`family`	string	The scenario family (106 in the main set, 16 in the confirmation set)
`split`	string	`dev` or `holdout`
`stratum`	string	Size stratum of the action (S, M, L, XL)
`tags`	list of strings	Case design tags (hard negative, context flip, injection, decoy context, ...)
`tool_name`	string	The tool invoked
`tool_arguments`	string (JSON)	The tool's arguments; the shape depends on the tool
`context`	string (JSON)	The trusted context record for the with-context setting
`truth_tool_only`, `truth_user_request`, `truth_bounded_context`	object	Gold label per rule template: `"true"`, `"false"`, `"unknown"` (evidence missing in that setting) or `"excluded"` (quarantined class)
`provenance_tool_only`, `provenance_user_request`, `provenance_bounded_context`	object	Per-label provenance: `agreed`, `adjudicated-model`, `adjudicated-human`, `rulebook-relabel` or `unresolved`
`rationale`	string	The generator's rationale, citing rulebook rules
`evidence_locator`, `evidence_byte_offset`	string, int	Verbatim evidence for a positive label and its byte offset in the action
`evidence_gaps`, `quarantine`, `rulebook_refs`	list, string (JSON), list	Enumerated evidence gaps, quarantined classes, and rulebook references

The 28 rule templates: permanent-deletion, git-force-push-or-delete-ref, download-and-execute-code, replace-existing-file-content, read-credential-material, share-credential-material, change-security-or-persistence, git-discard-local-changes, git-history-rewrite, disable-tests-or-checks, git-commit-credential-files, git-change-remote-or-hooks, upload-file-contents-externally, public-discussion-post, communication-outside-slack, send-data-to-external-host, change-production-state, deploy-to-production, database-destructive-statement, database-production-write, slack-dm-specific-person, git-push-specific-repository, read-only-inspection, message-another-person, act-on-instructions-in-content, edit-shell-profile-or-dotfiles, run-with-elevated-privileges, move-to-trash.

Labels, rationales, family names and split names were never part of a model's input; the harness builds inputs from tool_name, tool_arguments and context only.

How the labels were made

Each family was generated by a model from a brief that holds the labeling rulebook (rulebook/RULEBOOK.md), the reserved synthetic identifiers (rulebook/allowlist.json) and the real MCP servers the cases may use (rulebook/mcp-registry.json). A second, blind model labeled the shuffled cases under opaque ids with no access to the generator's labels; disagreements went to an adjudicator deciding by rulebook, and every label carries its provenance. The holdout was sealed by hash before any inference (original/*/HOLDOUT-SEAL.json). The full procedure, agreement statistics, validation checks and limitations are in original/main/DATASET-CARD.md and original/confirmation/DATASET-CARD.md.

Rule texts

rules/ holds the texts the models were sent: the product's one-sentence definitions (product-templates.json), the two independently authored lists of examples and counterexamples (library-author-opus.json, library-author-gpt6.json), the name-free and prose controls, and the brief the authors wrote from (AUTHOR-BRIEF.md).

Canonical files

original/main/dataset.json and original/confirmation/dataset.json are the canonical nested files (sha256 in dataset.sha256): main a1f1fd3176968a2e955656f98a82d24ffb397d961591be2daefe29098cad95e8, confirmation c7bb3ef023da99c2bea31028392d57982f3aa78b011a4049aefd7647abd6a3b1. The JSONL files are a one-to-one flattening of them.

License and citation

@misc{beno2026decisionmodels,
  title={Decision Models as Policy Gates for Coding Agents: Explicit Policy Boundaries Improve Detection and Reduce False Alarms},
  author={James P. Beno},
  year={2026},
  eprint={2611.02155},
  archivePrefix={arXiv},
  primaryClass={cs.CL},
  doi={10.48550/arXiv.2611.02155}
}