rule_id stringlengths 36 36 | title stringlengths 10 97 | description stringlengths 28 1.02k | logsource_product stringclasses 28
values | logsource_category stringclasses 34
values | logsource_service stringclasses 69
values | sigma_rule stringlengths 467 251k | attack_techniques listlengths 0 14 | attack_tactics listlengths 0 8 | level stringclasses 5
values | status stringclasses 3
values | false_positives listlengths 0 5 | references listlengths 0 23 | splunk_spl stringlengths 7 246k ⌀ | elastic_lucene stringlengths 8 250k ⌀ | sentinel_kql stringlengths 40 37.3k ⌀ | source_path stringlengths 29 132 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
d08a2711-ee8b-4323-bdec-b7d85e892b31 | PUA - CsExec Execution | Detects the use of the lesser known remote execution tool named CsExec a PsExec alternative | windows | process_creation | title: PUA - CsExec Execution
id: d08a2711-ee8b-4323-bdec-b7d85e892b31
status: test
description: Detects the use of the lesser known remote execution tool named CsExec a PsExec alternative
references:
- https://github.com/malcomvetter/CSExec
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-u... | [
"T1587.001",
"T1569.002"
] | [
"resource-development",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/malcomvetter/CSExec",
"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/"
] | Image="*\\csexec.exe" OR Description="csexec" | Image:*\\csexec.exe OR Description:csexec | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\csexec.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription =~ "csexec" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_csexec.yml | |
ccd55945-badd-4bae-936b-823a735d37dd | Github Push Protection Disabled | Detects if the push protection feature is disabled for an organization, enterprise, repositories or custom pattern rules. | github | audit | title: Github Push Protection Disabled
id: ccd55945-badd-4bae-936b-823a735d37dd
status: test
description: Detects if the push protection feature is disabled for an organization, enterprise, repositories or custom pattern
rules.
references:
- https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/code-security/secret-scan... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Allowed administrative activities."
] | [
"https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/code-security/secret-scanning/push-protection-for-repositories-and-organizations",
"https://thehackernews.com/2024/03/github-rolls-out-default-secret.html"
] | action IN ("business_secret_scanning_custom_pattern_push_protection.disabled", "business_secret_scanning_push_protection.disable", "business_secret_scanning_push_protection.disabled_for_new_repos", "org.secret_scanning_custom_pattern_push_protection_disabled", "org.secret_scanning_push_protection_disable", "org.secret_... | action:(business_secret_scanning_custom_pattern_push_protection.disabled OR business_secret_scanning_push_protection.disable OR business_secret_scanning_push_protection.disabled_for_new_repos OR org.secret_scanning_custom_pattern_push_protection_disabled OR org.secret_scanning_push_protection_disable OR org.secret_scan... | null | application/github/audit/github_push_protection_disabled.yml | |
6902955a-01b7-432c-b32a-6f5f81d8f625 | LSASS Process Dump Artefact In CrashDumps Folder | Detects the presence of an LSASS dump file in the "CrashDumps" folder. This could be a sign of LSASS credential dumping. Techniques such as the LSASS Shtinkering have been seen abusing the Windows Error Reporting to dump said process. | windows | file_event | title: LSASS Process Dump Artefact In CrashDumps Folder
id: 6902955a-01b7-432c-b32a-6f5f81d8f625
status: test
description: Detects the presence of an LSASS dump file in the "CrashDumps" folder. This could be a sign of LSASS credential
dumping. Techniques such as the LSASS Shtinkering have been seen abusing the Window... | [
"T1003.001"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | high | test | [
"Rare legitimate dump of the process by the operating system due to a crash of lsass"
] | [
"https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering",
"https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf"
] | TargetFilename="C:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\systemprofile\\AppData\\Local\\CrashDumps\\*" TargetFilename="*lsass.exe.*" TargetFilename="*.dmp" | TargetFilename:C\:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\systemprofile\\AppData\\Local\\CrashDumps\\* AND TargetFilename:*lsass.exe.* AND TargetFilename:*.dmp | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\systemprofile\\AppData\\Local\\CrashDumps\\" and FolderPath contains "lsass.exe." and FolderPath endswith ".dmp" | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_lsass_shtinkering.yml | |
f88e112a-21aa-44bd-9b01-6ee2a2bbbed1 | Failed Logon From Public IP | Detects a failed logon attempt from a public IP. A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary. | windows | security | title: Failed Logon From Public IP
id: f88e112a-21aa-44bd-9b01-6ee2a2bbbed1
status: test
description: Detects a failed logon attempt from a public IP. A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall
or network boundary.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/wi... | [
"T1078",
"T1190",
"T1133"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"initial-access",
"persistence",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate logon attempts over the internet",
"IPv4-to-IPv6 mapped IPs"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625"
] | EventID=4625 NOT (IpAddress="*-*" OR IpAddress="::1/128" OR IpAddress="10.0.0.0/8" OR IpAddress="127.0.0.0/8" OR IpAddress="172.16.0.0/12" OR IpAddress="192.168.0.0/16" OR IpAddress="169.254.0.0/16" OR IpAddress="fc00::/7" OR IpAddress="fe80::/10") | EventID:4625 AND (NOT (IpAddress:*\-* OR (IpAddress:\:\:1\/128 OR IpAddress:10.0.0.0\/8 OR IpAddress:127.0.0.0\/8 OR IpAddress:172.16.0.0\/12 OR IpAddress:192.168.0.0\/16 OR IpAddress:169.254.0.0\/16 OR IpAddress:fc00\:\:\/7 OR IpAddress:fe80\:\:\/10))) | null | windows/builtin/security/account_management/win_security_susp_failed_logon_source.yml | |
c39f0c81-7348-4965-ab27-2fde35a1b641 | DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack - Security | Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\` directory over the network for a DCOM InternetExplorer DLL Hijack scenario. | windows | security | title: DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack - Security
id: c39f0c81-7348-4965-ab27-2fde35a1b641
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\` directory
over the network for a DCOM InternetExplorer DLL Hijack scenario... | [
"T1021.002",
"T1021.003"
] | [
"lateral-movement"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html"
] | EventID=5145 RelativeTargetName="*\\Internet Explorer\\iertutil.dll" NOT SubjectUserName="*$" | (EventID:5145 AND RelativeTargetName:*\\Internet\ Explorer\\iertutil.dll) AND (NOT SubjectUserName:*$) | null | windows/builtin/security/win_security_dcom_iertutil_dll_hijack.yml | |
0dba975d-a193-4ed1-a067-424df57570d1 | Uncommon Network Connection Initiated By Certutil.EXE | Detects a network connection initiated by the certutil.exe utility.
Attackers can abuse the utility in order to download malware or additional payloads. | windows | network_connection | title: Uncommon Network Connection Initiated By Certutil.EXE
id: 0dba975d-a193-4ed1-a067-424df57570d1
status: test
description: 'Detects a network connection initiated by the certutil.exe utility.
Attackers can abuse the utility in order to download malware or additional payloads.
'
references:
- https://learn.mi... | [
"T1105"
] | [
"command-and-control"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil"
] | Image="*\\certutil.exe" Initiated="true" DestinationPort IN (80, 135, 443, 445) | Image:*\\certutil.exe AND Initiated:true AND (DestinationPort:(80 OR 135 OR 443 OR 445)) | DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\certutil.exe" and (RemotePort in~ ("80", "135", "443", "445")) | windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_certutil_initiated_connection.yml | |
6b65c28e-11f3-46cb-902a-68f2cafaf474 | Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location | Detects execution of "odbcconf" where the path of the DLL being registered is located in a potentially suspicious location. | windows | process_creation | title: Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location
id: 6b65c28e-11f3-46cb-902a-68f2cafaf474
status: test
description: Detects execution of "odbcconf" where the path of the DLL being registered is located in a potentially suspicious
location.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-serv... | [
"T1218.008"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-ver16",
"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/h/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses.html",
"https://securityintelligence.com/posts/raspberry-robin-worm-dridex-malware/"
] | Image="*\\odbcconf.exe" OR OriginalFileName="odbcconf.exe" CommandLine IN ("*:\\PerfLogs\\*", "*:\\ProgramData\\*", "*:\\Temp\\*", "*:\\Users\\Public\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Registration\\CRMLog*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\com\\dmp\\*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\FxsTmp\\*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\Microsoft\\Crypto\\RSA\\Machi... | (Image:*\\odbcconf.exe OR OriginalFileName:odbcconf.exe) AND (CommandLine:(*\:\\PerfLogs\\* OR *\:\\ProgramData\\* OR *\:\\Temp\\* OR *\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Registration\\CRMLog* OR *\:\\Windows\\System32\\com\\dmp\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\System32\\FxsTmp\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\System32\\Microsoft\\Crypto\\RSA... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\odbcconf.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "odbcconf.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains ":\\PerfLogs\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains ":\\ProgramData\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains ":\\Temp\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains ":\\Users\\Public\\" or ... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_odbcconf_exec_susp_locations.yml | |
41504465-5e3a-4a5b-a5b4-2a0baadd4463 | PsExec Tool Execution From Suspicious Locations - PipeName | Detects PsExec default pipe creation where the image executed is located in a suspicious location. Which could indicate that the tool is being used in an attack | windows | pipe_created | title: PsExec Tool Execution From Suspicious Locations - PipeName
id: 41504465-5e3a-4a5b-a5b4-2a0baadd4463
related:
- id: f3f3a972-f982-40ad-b63c-bca6afdfad7c
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PsExec default pipe creation where the image executed is located in a suspicious location. Which could
indica... | [
"T1569.002"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Rare legitimate use of psexec from the locations mentioned above. This will require initial tuning based on your environment."
] | [
"https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html",
"https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet"
] | PipeName="\\PSEXESVC" Image IN ("*:\\Users\\Public\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\Desktop\\*", "*\\Downloads\\*") | PipeName:\\PSEXESVC AND (Image:(*\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\* OR *\\Desktop\\* OR *\\Downloads\\*)) | null | windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_sysinternals_psexec_default_pipe_susp_location.yml | |
208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d | Suspicious Outlook Child Process | Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process. | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Outlook Child Process
id: 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d
related:
- id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
type: derived
- id: e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.
references:
- https://w... | [
"T1204.002"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100",
"https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html"
] | ParentImage="*\\OUTLOOK.EXE" Image IN ("*\\AppVLP.exe", "*\\bash.exe", "*\\cmd.exe", "*\\cscript.exe", "*\\forfiles.exe", "*\\hh.exe", "*\\mftrace.exe", "*\\msbuild.exe", "*\\msdt.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\msiexec.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\regsvr32.exe", "*\\schtasks.exe", "*\\scrcons.exe", "*\\scri... | ParentImage:*\\OUTLOOK.EXE AND (Image:(*\\AppVLP.exe OR *\\bash.exe OR *\\cmd.exe OR *\\cscript.exe OR *\\forfiles.exe OR *\\hh.exe OR *\\mftrace.exe OR *\\msbuild.exe OR *\\msdt.exe OR *\\mshta.exe OR *\\msiexec.exe OR *\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe OR *\\regsvr32.exe OR *\\schtasks.exe OR *\\scrcons.exe OR *\\scrip... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\OUTLOOK.EXE" and (FolderPath endswith "\\AppVLP.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\bash.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\forfiles.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\hh.exe" or FolderPath e... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_office_outlook_susp_child_processes.yml | |
086ae989-9ca6-4fe7-895a-759c5544f247 | Potential Persistence Via TypedPaths | Detects modification addition to the 'TypedPaths' key in the user or admin registry from a non standard application. Which might indicate persistence attempt | windows | registry_set | title: Potential Persistence Via TypedPaths
id: 086ae989-9ca6-4fe7-895a-759c5544f247
status: test
description: Detects modification addition to the 'TypedPaths' key in the user or admin registry from a non standard application.
Which might indicate persistence attempt
references:
- https://twitter.com/dez_/status/156... | [] | [
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/dez_/status/1560101453150257154",
"https://forensafe.com/blogs/typedpaths.html"
] | TargetObject="*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\TypedPaths\\*" NOT (Image IN ("C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe", "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\explorer.exe")) | TargetObject:*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\TypedPaths\\* AND (NOT (Image:(C\:\\Windows\\explorer.exe OR C\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\explorer.exe))) | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey endswith "\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\TypedPaths*" and (not((InitiatingProcessFolderPath in~ ("C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe", "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\explorer.exe")))) | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_typed_paths.yml | |
dfb5b4e8-91d0-4291-b40a-e3b0d3942c45 | Potential Persistence Via Shim Database Modification | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims.
The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes ... | windows | registry_set | title: Potential Persistence Via Shim Database Modification
id: dfb5b4e8-91d0-4291-b40a-e3b0d3942c45
status: test
description: 'Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by
application shims.
The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructu... | [
"T1546.011"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate custom SHIM installations will also trigger this rule"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.md#atomic-test-3---registry-key-creation-andor-modification-events-for-sdb",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html",
"https://andreafortu... | TargetObject IN ("*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\InstalledSDB\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Custom\\*") NOT (Details="" OR Details="(Empty)" OR NOT Details=*) | (TargetObject:(*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\ NT\\CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\InstalledSDB\\* OR *\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\ NT\\CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Custom\\*)) AND (NOT (Details:"" OR Details:\(Empty\) OR (NOT _exists_:Details))) | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (RegistryKey endswith "\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\InstalledSDB*" or RegistryKey endswith "\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Custom*") and (not((RegistryValueData =~ "" or RegistryValueData =~ "(Empty)" or isnull(Regist... | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_shim_database.yml | |
ec1d5e28-8f3b-4188-a6f8-6e8df81dc28e | WMI Persistence - Script Event Consumer | Detects the execution of a script event consumer. When scrcons.exe launches, it does so in response to the creation of an ActiveScriptEventConsumer instance
and will execute registered JScript or VBScript code as a result.
Script event consumers are a built-in Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) class that
automat... | windows | process_creation | title: WMI Persistence - Script Event Consumer
id: ec1d5e28-8f3b-4188-a6f8-6e8df81dc28e
status: test
description: 'Detects the execution of a script event consumer. When scrcons.exe launches, it does so in response to the creation
of an ActiveScriptEventConsumer instance
and will execute registered JScript or VBSc... | [
"T1546.003"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate event consumers",
"Dell computers on some versions register an event consumer that is known to cause false positives when brightness is changed by the corresponding keyboard button"
] | [
"https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-detection/child-processes/",
"https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/"
] | Image="C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\scrcons.exe" ParentImage="C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe" | Image:C\:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\scrcons.exe AND ParentImage:C\:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath =~ "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\scrcons.exe" and InitiatingProcessFolderPath =~ "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmi_persistence_script_event_consumer.yml | |
4a241dea-235b-4a7e-8d76-50d817b146c4 | Suspicious PowerShell Mailbox Export to Share - PS | Detects usage of the powerShell New-MailboxExportRequest Cmdlet to exports a mailbox to a remote or local share, as used in ProxyShell exploitations | windows | ps_script | title: Suspicious PowerShell Mailbox Export to Share - PS
id: 4a241dea-235b-4a7e-8d76-50d817b146c4
related:
- id: 889719ef-dd62-43df-86c3-768fb08dc7c0
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of the powerShell New-MailboxExportRequest Cmdlet to exports a mailbox to a remote or local share,
as used in P... | [] | [
"exfiltration"
] | critical | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://youtu.be/5mqid-7zp8k?t=2481",
"https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html",
"https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1",
"https://m365internals.com/2022/10/07/hunting-in-on-premises-exchange-server-logs/"
] | ScriptBlockText="*New-MailboxExportRequest*" ScriptBlockText="* -Mailbox *" ScriptBlockText="* -FilePath \\\\*" | ScriptBlockText:*New\-MailboxExportRequest* AND ScriptBlockText:*\ \-Mailbox\ * AND ScriptBlockText:*\ \-FilePath\ \\\\* | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_mailboxexport_share.yml | |
545a5da6-f103-4919-a519-e9aec1026ee4 | Microsoft Malware Protection Engine Crash | This rule detects a suspicious crash of the Microsoft Malware Protection Engine | windows | application | title: Microsoft Malware Protection Engine Crash
id: 545a5da6-f103-4919-a519-e9aec1026ee4
related:
- id: 6c82cf5c-090d-4d57-9188-533577631108
type: similar
status: test
description: This rule detects a suspicious crash of the Microsoft Malware Protection Engine
references:
- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/i... | [
"T1211",
"T1685"
] | [
"stealth",
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"MsMpEng might crash if the \"C:\\\" partition is full"
] | [
"https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1252&desc=5",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/4022344"
] | Provider_Name="Application Error" EventID=1000 Data="*MsMpEng.exe*" Data="*mpengine.dll*" | Provider_Name:"Application Error" AND EventID:1000 AND (Data:*MsMpEng.exe* AND Data:*mpengine.dll*) | null | windows/builtin/application/application_error/win_application_error_msmpeng_crash.yml | |
692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6 | Potential WMI Lateral Movement WmiPrvSE Spawned PowerShell | Detects Powershell as a child of the WmiPrvSE process. Which could be a sign of lateral movement via WMI. | windows | process_creation | title: Potential WMI Lateral Movement WmiPrvSE Spawned PowerShell
id: 692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6
related:
- id: 8a582fe2-0882-4b89-a82a-da6b2dc32937
type: similar
- id: d21374ff-f574-44a7-9998-4a8c8bf33d7d
type: similar
status: stable
description: Detects Powershell as a child of the WmiPrvSE process. Whi... | [
"T1047",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | stable | [
"AppvClient",
"CCM",
"WinRM"
] | [
"https://any.run/report/68bc255f9b0db6a0d30a8f2dadfbee3256acfe12497bf93943bc1eab0735e45e/a2385d6f-34f7-403c-90d3-b1f9d2a90a5e"
] | ParentImage="*\\WmiPrvSE.exe" Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe") OR OriginalFileName IN ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll") | ParentImage:*\\WmiPrvSE.exe AND ((Image:(*\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe)) OR (OriginalFileName:(PowerShell.EXE OR pwsh.dll))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\WmiPrvSE.exe" and ((FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe") or (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll"))) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmiprvse_spawns_powershell.yml | |
396ae3eb-4174-4b9b-880e-dc0364d78a19 | Potential Persistence Via Outlook LoadMacroProviderOnBoot Setting | Detects the modification of Outlook setting "LoadMacroProviderOnBoot" which if enabled allows the automatic loading of any configured VBA project/module | windows | registry_set | title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook LoadMacroProviderOnBoot Setting
id: 396ae3eb-4174-4b9b-880e-dc0364d78a19
status: test
description: Detects the modification of Outlook setting "LoadMacroProviderOnBoot" which if enabled allows the automatic loading
of any configured VBA project/module
references:
- https://spe... | [
"T1137",
"T1008",
"T1546"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence",
"command-and-control"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=53",
"https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/outlook-backdoor-using-vba-samir-b-/"
] | TargetObject="*\\Outlook\\LoadMacroProviderOnBoot" Details="*0x00000001*" | TargetObject:*\\Outlook\\LoadMacroProviderOnBoot AND Details:*0x00000001* | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey endswith "\\Outlook\\LoadMacroProviderOnBoot" and RegistryValueData contains "0x00000001" | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_office_outlook_enable_load_macro_provider_on_boot.yml | |
eb2fd349-ec67-4caa-9143-d79c7fb34441 | Suspicious GPO Discovery With Get-GPO | Detect use of Get-GPO to get one GPO or all the GPOs in a domain. | windows | ps_script | title: Suspicious GPO Discovery With Get-GPO
id: eb2fd349-ec67-4caa-9143-d79c7fb34441
status: test
description: Detect use of Get-GPO to get one GPO or all the GPOs in a domain.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1615/T1615.md
- https://le... | [
"T1615"
] | [
"discovery"
] | low | test | [
"Legitimate PowerShell scripts"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1615/T1615.md",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/grouppolicy/get-gpo?view=windowsserver2022-ps"
] | ScriptBlockText="*Get-GPO*" | ScriptBlockText:*Get\-GPO* | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_get_gpo.yml | |
a01b8329-5953-4f73-ae2d-aa01e1f35f00 | AspNetCompiler Execution | Detects execution of "aspnet_compiler.exe" which can be abused to compile and execute C# code. | windows | process_creation | title: AspNetCompiler Execution
id: a01b8329-5953-4f73-ae2d-aa01e1f35f00
related:
- id: 9ccba514-7cb6-4c5c-b377-700758f2f120
type: similar
- id: 4c7f49ee-2638-43bb-b85b-ce676c30b260
type: similar
- id: 9f50fe98-fe5c-4a2d-86c7-fad7f63ed622
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of "aspnet_compil... | [
"T1127"
] | [
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Aspnet_Compiler/",
"https://ijustwannared.team/2020/08/01/the-curious-case-of-aspnet_compiler-exe/"
] | Image IN ("*:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\FrameworkArm\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\FrameworkArm64\\*") Image="*\\aspnet_compiler.exe" | (Image:(*\:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\FrameworkArm\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\FrameworkArm64\\*)) AND Image:*\\aspnet_compiler.exe | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath contains ":\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\FrameworkArm\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\FrameworkArm64\\") and FolderPath endswith "\\... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_aspnet_compiler_exectuion.yml | |
37e4024a-6c80-4d8f-b95d-2e7e94f3a8d1 | Outbound Network Connection Initiated By Microsoft Dialer | Detects outbound network connection initiated by Microsoft Dialer.
The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via ... | windows | network_connection | title: Outbound Network Connection Initiated By Microsoft Dialer
id: 37e4024a-6c80-4d8f-b95d-2e7e94f3a8d1
status: test
description: 'Detects outbound network connection initiated by Microsoft Dialer.
The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of t... | [
"T1071.001"
] | [
"execution",
"command-and-control"
] | high | test | [
"In Modern Windows systems, unable to see legitimate usage of this process, However, if an organization has legitimate purpose for this there can be false positives."
] | [
"https://tria.ge/240301-rk34sagf5x/behavioral2",
"https://app.any.run/tasks/6720b85b-9c53-4a12-b1dc-73052a78477d",
"https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/rhadamanthys-v0-5-0-a-deep-dive-into-the-stealers-components/",
"https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/dialer.exe-0B69655F912619756C704A0BF716B61F.h... | Image="*:\\Windows\\System32\\dialer.exe" Initiated="true" NOT (DestinationIp="127.0.0.0/8" OR DestinationIp="10.0.0.0/8" OR DestinationIp="172.16.0.0/12" OR DestinationIp="192.168.0.0/16" OR DestinationIp="169.254.0.0/16" OR DestinationIp="::1/128" OR DestinationIp="fe80::/10" OR DestinationIp="fc00::/7") | (Image:*\:\\Windows\\System32\\dialer.exe AND Initiated:true) AND (NOT (DestinationIp:127.0.0.0\/8 OR DestinationIp:10.0.0.0\/8 OR DestinationIp:172.16.0.0\/12 OR DestinationIp:192.168.0.0\/16 OR DestinationIp:169.254.0.0\/16 OR DestinationIp:\:\:1\/128 OR DestinationIp:fe80\:\:\/10 OR DestinationIp:fc00\:\:\/7)) | DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith ":\\Windows\\System32\\dialer.exe" and (not((ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "127.0.0.0/8") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "10.0.0.0/8") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "172.16.0.0/12") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "192.168.0.0/16") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP,... | windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_dialer_initiated_connection.yml | |
e4f93c99-396f-47c8-bb0f-201b1fa69034 | Potential Data Exfiltration Via Audio File | Detects potential exfiltration attempt via audio file using PowerShell | windows | ps_script | title: Potential Data Exfiltration Via Audio File
id: e4f93c99-396f-47c8-bb0f-201b1fa69034
status: test
description: Detects potential exfiltration attempt via audio file using PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/blob/e97cbbb173b31cbc4d37244d3412de0a114dacfb/NoDLP/bin2wav.ps1
author: Nasreddine B... | [] | [
"exfiltration"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/blob/e97cbbb173b31cbc4d37244d3412de0a114dacfb/NoDLP/bin2wav.ps1"
] | ScriptBlockText="*[System.Math]::*" ScriptBlockText="*[IO.FileMode]::*" ScriptBlockText="*BinaryWriter*" ScriptBlockText="*0x52*" ScriptBlockText="*0x49*" ScriptBlockText="*0x46*" ScriptBlockText="*0x57*" ScriptBlockText="*0x41*" ScriptBlockText="*0x56*" ScriptBlockText="*0x45*" ScriptBlockText="*0xAC*" | (ScriptBlockText:*\[System.Math\]\:\:* AND ScriptBlockText:*\[IO.FileMode\]\:\:* AND ScriptBlockText:*BinaryWriter*) AND (ScriptBlockText:*0x52* AND ScriptBlockText:*0x49* AND ScriptBlockText:*0x46* AND ScriptBlockText:*0x57* AND ScriptBlockText:*0x41* AND ScriptBlockText:*0x56* AND ScriptBlockText:*0x45* AND ScriptBlo... | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_audio_exfiltration.yml | |
821b4dc3-1295-41e7-b157-39ab212dd6bd | Sign-In From Malware Infected IP | Indicates sign-ins from IP addresses infected with malware that is known to actively communicate with a bot server. | azure | riskdetection | title: Sign-In From Malware Infected IP
id: 821b4dc3-1295-41e7-b157-39ab212dd6bd
status: test
description: Indicates sign-ins from IP addresses infected with malware that is known to actively communicate with a bot server.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-r... | [
"T1090"
] | [
"command-and-control"
] | high | test | [
"Using an IP address that is shared by many users"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malware-linked-ip-address-deprecated",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins"
] | riskEventType="malwareInfectedIPAddress" | riskEventType:malwareInfectedIPAddress | null | cloud/azure/identity_protection/azure_identity_protection_malware_linked_ip.yml | |
7f2bb9d5-6395-4de5-969c-70c11fbe6b12 | Split A File Into Pieces | Detection use of the command "split" to split files into parts and possible transfer. | macos | process_creation | title: Split A File Into Pieces
id: 7f2bb9d5-6395-4de5-969c-70c11fbe6b12
status: test
description: Detection use of the command "split" to split files into parts and possible transfer.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1030/T1030.md
autho... | [
"T1030"
] | [
"exfiltration"
] | low | test | [
"Legitimate administrative activity"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1030/T1030.md"
] | Image="*/split" | Image:*\/split | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "/split" | macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_split_file_into_pieces.yml | |
66474410-b883-415f-9f8d-75345a0a66a6 | DNS Query To MEGA Hosting Website - DNS Client | Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to MEGA sharing website | windows | dns-client | title: DNS Query To MEGA Hosting Website - DNS Client
id: 66474410-b883-415f-9f8d-75345a0a66a6
related:
- id: 613c03ba-0779-4a53-8a1f-47f914a4ded3
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to MEGA sharing website
references:
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting... | [
"T1567.002"
] | [
"exfiltration"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate DNS queries and usage of Mega"
] | [
"https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/"
] | EventID=3008 QueryName="*userstorage.mega.co.nz*" | EventID:3008 AND QueryName:*userstorage.mega.co.nz* | null | windows/builtin/dns_client/win_dns_client_mega_nz.yml | |
3037d961-21e9-4732-b27a-637bcc7bf539 | Suspicious High IntegrityLevel Conhost Legacy Option | ForceV1 asks for information directly from the kernel space. Conhost connects to the console application. High IntegrityLevel means the process is running with elevated privileges, such as an Administrator context. | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious High IntegrityLevel Conhost Legacy Option
id: 3037d961-21e9-4732-b27a-637bcc7bf539
status: test
description: ForceV1 asks for information directly from the kernel space. Conhost connects to the console application. High
IntegrityLevel means the process is running with elevated privileges, such as an... | [
"T1202"
] | [
"stealth"
] | informational | test | [
"Very Likely, including launching cmd.exe via Run As Administrator"
] | [
"https://cybercryptosec.medium.com/covid-19-cyber-infection-c615ead7c29",
"https://thedfirreport.com/2022/04/04/stolen-images-campaign-ends-in-conti-ransomware/",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/mandatory-integrity-control"
] | IntegrityLevel IN ("High", "S-1-16-12288") CommandLine="*conhost.exe*" CommandLine="*0xffffffff*" CommandLine="*-ForceV1*" | (IntegrityLevel:(High OR S\-1\-16\-12288)) AND (CommandLine:*conhost.exe* AND CommandLine:*0xffffffff* AND CommandLine:*\-ForceV1*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessIntegrityLevel in~ ("High", "S-1-16-12288")) and (ProcessCommandLine contains "conhost.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains "0xffffffff" and ProcessCommandLine contains "-ForceV1") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_conhost_legacy_option.yml | |
059c5af9-5131-4d8d-92b2-de4ad6146712 | LiveKD Driver Creation By Uncommon Process | Detects the creation of the LiveKD driver by a process image other than "livekd.exe". | windows | file_event | title: LiveKD Driver Creation By Uncommon Process
id: 059c5af9-5131-4d8d-92b2-de4ad6146712
related:
- id: 16fe46bb-4f64-46aa-817d-ff7bec4a2352
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the creation of the LiveKD driver by a process image other than "livekd.exe".
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddin... | [] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Administrators might rename LiveKD before its usage which could trigger this. Add additional names you use to the filter"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | TargetFilename="C:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\LiveKdD.SYS" NOT (Image IN ("*\\livekd.exe", "*\\livek64.exe")) | TargetFilename:C\:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\LiveKdD.SYS AND (NOT (Image:(*\\livekd.exe OR *\\livek64.exe))) | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath =~ "C:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\LiveKdD.SYS" and (not((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\livekd.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\livek64.exe"))) | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_sysinternals_livekd_driver_susp_creation.yml | |
4f6edb78-5c21-42ab-a558-fd2a6fc1fd57 | Potential 7za.DLL Sideloading | Detects potential DLL sideloading of "7za.dll" | windows | image_load | title: Potential 7za.DLL Sideloading
id: 4f6edb78-5c21-42ab-a558-fd2a6fc1fd57
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "7za.dll"
references:
- https://www.gov.pl/attachment/ee91f24d-3e67-436d-aa50-7fa56acf789d
author: X__Junior
date: 2023-06-09
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalat... | [
"T1574.001"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | low | test | [
"Legitimate third party application located in \"AppData\" may leverage this DLL to offer 7z compression functionality and may generate false positives. Apply additional filters as needed."
] | [
"https://www.gov.pl/attachment/ee91f24d-3e67-436d-aa50-7fa56acf789d"
] | ImageLoaded="*\\7za.dll" NOT (Image IN ("C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*", "C:\\Program Files\\*") ImageLoaded IN ("C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*", "C:\\Program Files\\*")) | ImageLoaded:*\\7za.dll AND (NOT ((Image:(C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\* OR C\:\\Program\ Files\\*)) AND (ImageLoaded:(C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\* OR C\:\\Program\ Files\\*)))) | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\7za.dll" and (not(((InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files\\") and (FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files\\")))) | windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_7za.yml | |
1a5fefe6-734f-452e-a07d-fc1c35bce4b2 | Firewall Rule Deleted Via Netsh.EXE | Detects the removal of a port or application rule in the Windows Firewall configuration using netsh | windows | process_creation | title: Firewall Rule Deleted Via Netsh.EXE
id: 1a5fefe6-734f-452e-a07d-fc1c35bce4b2
status: test
description: Detects the removal of a port or application rule in the Windows Firewall configuration using netsh
references:
- https://app.any.run/tasks/8bbd5b4c-b82d-4e6d-a3ea-d454594a37cc/
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-1... | [
"T1686.003"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate administration activity",
"Software installations and removal"
] | [
"https://app.any.run/tasks/8bbd5b4c-b82d-4e6d-a3ea-d454594a37cc/"
] | Image="*\\netsh.exe" OR OriginalFileName="netsh.exe" CommandLine="*firewall*" CommandLine="*delete *" NOT ((ParentImage="*\\Dropbox.exe" CommandLine="*name=Dropbox*") OR (ParentImage="*\\instup.exe" CommandLine="*advfirewall firewall delete rule name=\"Avast Antivirus Admin Client\"*")) | ((Image:*\\netsh.exe OR OriginalFileName:netsh.exe) AND (CommandLine:*firewall* AND CommandLine:*delete\ *)) AND (NOT ((ParentImage:*\\Dropbox.exe AND CommandLine:*name\=Dropbox*) OR (ParentImage:*\\instup.exe AND CommandLine:*advfirewall\ firewall\ delete\ rule\ name\=\"Avast\ Antivirus\ Admin\ Client\"*))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\netsh.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "netsh.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "firewall" and ProcessCommandLine contains "delete ")) and (not(((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\Dropbox.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains "name=Dropbox") or... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsh_fw_delete_rule.yml | |
402e1e1d-ad59-47b6-bf80-1ee44985b3a7 | Malicious ShellIntel PowerShell Commandlets | Detects Commandlet names from ShellIntel exploitation scripts. | windows | ps_script | title: Malicious ShellIntel PowerShell Commandlets
id: 402e1e1d-ad59-47b6-bf80-1ee44985b3a7
status: test
description: Detects Commandlet names from ShellIntel exploitation scripts.
references:
- https://github.com/Shellntel/scripts/
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems), Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08... | [
"T1059.001"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/Shellntel/scripts/"
] | ScriptBlockText IN ("*Invoke-SMBAutoBrute*", "*Invoke-GPOLinks*", "*Invoke-Potato*") | ScriptBlockText:(*Invoke\-SMBAutoBrute* OR *Invoke\-GPOLinks* OR *Invoke\-Potato*) | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_shellintel_malicious_commandlets.yml | |
f35c5d71-b489-4e22-a115-f003df287317 | Potential CobaltStrike Process Patterns | Detects potential process patterns related to Cobalt Strike beacon activity | windows | process_creation | title: Potential CobaltStrike Process Patterns
id: f35c5d71-b489-4e22-a115-f003df287317
status: test
description: Detects potential process patterns related to Cobalt Strike beacon activity
references:
- https://hausec.com/2021/07/26/cobalt-strike-and-tradecraft/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-d... | [
"T1059"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://hausec.com/2021/07/26/cobalt-strike-and-tradecraft/",
"https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/"
] | (CommandLine="*cmd.exe /C whoami" ParentImage="C:\\Temp\\*") OR (ParentImage IN ("*\\runonce.exe", "*\\dllhost.exe") CommandLine="*cmd.exe /c echo*" CommandLine="*> \\\\.\\pipe*") OR (ParentCommandLine="*cmd.exe /C echo*" ParentCommandLine="* > \\\\.\\pipe*" CommandLine="*conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1") OR (ParentCom... | (CommandLine:*cmd.exe\ \/C\ whoami AND ParentImage:C\:\\Temp\\*) OR ((ParentImage:(*\\runonce.exe OR *\\dllhost.exe)) AND (CommandLine:*cmd.exe\ \/c\ echo* AND CommandLine:*\>\ \\\\.\\pipe*)) OR ((ParentCommandLine:*cmd.exe\ \/C\ echo* AND ParentCommandLine:*\ \>\ \\\\.\\pipe*) AND CommandLine:*conhost.exe\ 0xffffffff\... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine endswith "cmd.exe /C whoami" and InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith "C:\\Temp\\") or ((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\runonce.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\dllhost.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "cmd.exe /c echo" and ProcessCommandLi... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_cobaltstrike_process_patterns.yml | |
6b269392-9eba-40b5-acb6-55c882b20ba6 | Suspicious File Drop by Exchange | Detects suspicious file type dropped by an Exchange component in IIS | windows | file_event | title: Suspicious File Drop by Exchange
id: 6b269392-9eba-40b5-acb6-55c882b20ba6
related:
- id: bd1212e5-78da-431e-95fa-c58e3237a8e6
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious file type dropped by an Exchange component in IIS
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/30/analyzing-a... | [
"T1190",
"T1505.003"
] | [
"persistence",
"initial-access"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/30/analyzing-attacks-using-the-exchange-vulnerabilities-cve-2022-41040-and-cve-2022-41082/",
"https://www.gteltsc.vn/blog/canh-bao-chien-dich-tan-cong-su-dung-lo-hong-zero-day-tren-microsoft-exchange-server-12714.html",
"https://en.gteltsc.vn/blog/cap-nhat-nhe-ve... | Image="*\\w3wp.exe" CommandLine="*MSExchange*" TargetFilename IN ("*.aspx", "*.asp", "*.ashx", "*.ps1", "*.bat", "*.exe", "*.dll", "*.vbs") | (Image:*\\w3wp.exe AND CommandLine:*MSExchange*) AND (TargetFilename:(*.aspx OR *.asp OR *.ashx OR *.ps1 OR *.bat OR *.exe OR *.dll OR *.vbs)) | DeviceFileEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\w3wp.exe" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "MSExchange") and (FolderPath endswith ".aspx" or FolderPath endswith ".asp" or FolderPath endswith ".ashx" or FolderPath endswith ".ps1" or FolderPath endswith ".bat" or FolderPath endswith ".exe" or F... | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_exchange_webshell_drop_suspicious.yml | |
5f92fff9-82e2-48eb-8fc1-8b133556a551 | Remote Encrypting File System Abuse | Detects remote RPC calls to possibly abuse remote encryption service via MS-EFSR | rpc_firewall | application | title: Remote Encrypting File System Abuse
id: 5f92fff9-82e2-48eb-8fc1-8b133556a551
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to possibly abuse remote encryption service via MS-EFSR
references:
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942
- https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATT... | [] | [
"lateral-movement"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate usage of remote file encryption"
] | [
"https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942",
"https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-EFSR.md",
"https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall",
"https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-fire... | EventLog="RPCFW" EventID=3 InterfaceUuid IN ("df1941c5-fe89-4e79-bf10-463657acf44d", "c681d488-d850-11d0-8c52-00c04fd90f7e") | EventLog:RPCFW AND EventID:3 AND (InterfaceUuid:(df1941c5\-fe89\-4e79\-bf10\-463657acf44d OR c681d488\-d850\-11d0\-8c52\-00c04fd90f7e)) | null | application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_efs_abuse.yml | |
a94cdd87-6c54-4678-a6cc-2814ffe5a13d | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | Detect unix shell configuration modification. Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered when a new shell is opened. | linux | auditd | title: Unix Shell Configuration Modification
id: a94cdd87-6c54-4678-a6cc-2814ffe5a13d
related:
- id: e74e15cc-c4b6-4c80-b7eb-dfe49feb7fe9
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detect unix shell configuration modification. Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious
commands triggered when a... | [
"T1546.004"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence"
] | medium | test | [
"Admin or User activity are expected to generate some false positives"
] | [
"https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x68.html",
"https://web.archive.org/web/20221204161143/https://www.glitch-cat.com/p/green-lambert-and-attack",
"https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat"
] | type="PATH" name IN ("/etc/shells", "/etc/profile", "/etc/profile.d/*", "/etc/bash.bashrc", "/etc/bashrc", "/etc/zsh/zprofile", "/etc/zsh/zshrc", "/etc/zsh/zlogin", "/etc/zsh/zlogout", "/etc/csh.cshrc", "/etc/csh.login", "/root/.bashrc", "/root/.bash_profile", "/root/.profile", "/root/.zshrc", "/root/.zprofile", "/home... | type:PATH AND (name:(\/etc\/shells OR \/etc\/profile OR \/etc\/profile.d\/* OR \/etc\/bash.bashrc OR \/etc\/bashrc OR \/etc\/zsh\/zprofile OR \/etc\/zsh\/zshrc OR \/etc\/zsh\/zlogin OR \/etc\/zsh\/zlogout OR \/etc\/csh.cshrc OR \/etc\/csh.login OR \/root\/.bashrc OR \/root\/.bash_profile OR \/root\/.profile OR \/root\/... | null | linux/auditd/path/lnx_auditd_unix_shell_configuration_modification.yml | |
47e4bab7-c626-47dc-967b-255608c9a920 | Permission Misconfiguration Reconnaissance Via Findstr.EXE | Detects usage of findstr with the "EVERYONE" or "BUILTIN" keywords.
This was seen being used in combination with "icacls" and other utilities to spot misconfigured files or folders permissions. | windows | process_creation | title: Permission Misconfiguration Reconnaissance Via Findstr.EXE
id: 47e4bab7-c626-47dc-967b-255608c9a920
status: test
description: 'Detects usage of findstr with the "EVERYONE" or "BUILTIN" keywords.
This was seen being used in combination with "icacls" and other utilities to spot misconfigured files or folders pe... | [
"T1552.006"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/"
] | (Image IN ("*\\find.exe", "*\\findstr.exe") OR OriginalFileName IN ("FIND.EXE", "FINDSTR.EXE") CommandLine IN ("*\"Everyone\"*", "*'Everyone'*", "*\"BUILTIN\\\"*", "*'BUILTIN\\'*")) OR (CommandLine="*icacls *" CommandLine="*findstr *" CommandLine="*Everyone*") | (((Image:(*\\find.exe OR *\\findstr.exe)) OR (OriginalFileName:(FIND.EXE OR FINDSTR.EXE))) AND (CommandLine:(*\"Everyone\"* OR *'Everyone'* OR *\"BUILTIN\\\"* OR *'BUILTIN\\'*))) OR (CommandLine:*icacls\ * AND CommandLine:*findstr\ * AND CommandLine:*Everyone*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (((FolderPath endswith "\\find.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\findstr.exe") or (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ("FIND.EXE", "FINDSTR.EXE"))) and (ProcessCommandLine contains "\"Everyone\"" or ProcessCommandLine contains "'Everyone'" or ProcessCommandLine contains "\"BUILTIN\\\"" or P... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_findstr_recon_everyone.yml | |
b6188d2f-b3c4-4d2c-a17d-9706e0851af0 | Potential Goopdate.DLL Sideloading | Detects potential DLL sideloading of "goopdate.dll", a DLL used by googleupdate.exe | windows | image_load | title: Potential Goopdate.DLL Sideloading
id: b6188d2f-b3c4-4d2c-a17d-9706e0851af0
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "goopdate.dll", a DLL used by googleupdate.exe
references:
- https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/goofy-guineapig/NCSC-MAR-Goofy-Guineapig... | [
"T1574.001"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"False positives are expected from Google Chrome installations running from user locations (AppData) and other custom locations. Apply additional filters accordingly.",
"Other third party chromium browsers located in AppData"
] | [
"https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/goofy-guineapig/NCSC-MAR-Goofy-Guineapig.pdf"
] | ImageLoaded="*\\goopdate.dll" NOT (ImageLoaded IN ("C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*", "C:\\Program Files\\*")) NOT ((Image="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\GUM*" Image="*.tmp\\Dropbox*" ImageLoaded="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\GUM*" ImageLoaded="*.tmp\\goopdate.dll*") OR (Image IN ("*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\GUM*", "*:\\Windows\\Syste... | ImageLoaded:*\\goopdate.dll AND (NOT (ImageLoaded:(C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\* OR C\:\\Program\ Files\\*))) AND (NOT (((Image:*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\GUM* AND Image:*.tmp\\Dropbox*) AND (ImageLoaded:*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\GUM* AND ImageLoaded:*.tmp\\goopdate.dll*)) OR ((Image:(*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\GUM* OR *\... | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\goopdate.dll" and (not((FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files\\"))) and (not((((InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\GUM" and InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains ".tmp\\Dropbox") and (F... | windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_goopdate.yml | |
e5b33f7d-eb93-48b6-9851-09e1e610b6d7 | Credential Dumping Attempt Via WerFault | Detects process LSASS memory dump using Mimikatz, NanoDump, Invoke-Mimikatz, Procdump or Taskmgr based on the CallTrace pointing to ntdll.dll, dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll for win10, server2016 and up. | windows | process_access | title: Credential Dumping Attempt Via WerFault
id: e5b33f7d-eb93-48b6-9851-09e1e610b6d7
status: test
description: Detects process LSASS memory dump using Mimikatz, NanoDump, Invoke-Mimikatz, Procdump or Taskmgr based on the
CallTrace pointing to ntdll.dll, dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll for win10, server2016 and up.
refe... | [
"T1003.001"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | high | test | [
"Actual failures in lsass.exe that trigger a crash dump (unlikely)",
"Unknown cases in which WerFault accesses lsass.exe"
] | [
"https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump/commit/578116faea3d278d53d70ea932e2bbfe42569507"
] | SourceImage="*\\WerFault.exe" TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe" GrantedAccess="0x1FFFFF" | SourceImage:*\\WerFault.exe AND TargetImage:*\\lsass.exe AND GrantedAccess:0x1FFFFF | null | windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_werfault.yml | |
2d1b83e4-17c6-4896-a37b-29140b40a788 | Google Workspace User Granted Admin Privileges | Detects when an Google Workspace user is granted admin privileges. | gcp | google_workspace.admin | title: Google Workspace User Granted Admin Privileges
id: 2d1b83e4-17c6-4896-a37b-29140b40a788
status: test
description: Detects when an Google Workspace user is granted admin privileges.
references:
- https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging#3
- https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v... | [
"T1098"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence"
] | medium | test | [
"Google Workspace admin role privileges, may be modified by system administrators."
] | [
"https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging#3",
"https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings#GRANT_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE"
] | eventService="admin.googleapis.com" eventName IN ("GRANT_DELEGATED_ADMIN_PRIVILEGES", "GRANT_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE") | eventService:admin.googleapis.com AND (eventName:(GRANT_DELEGATED_ADMIN_PRIVILEGES OR GRANT_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE)) | null | cloud/gcp/gworkspace/admin/gcp_gworkspace_user_granted_admin_privileges.yml | |
b48492dc-c5ef-4572-8dff-32bc241c15c8 | Load Of RstrtMgr.DLL By A Suspicious Process | Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by a suspicious process.
This library has been used during ransomware campaigns to kill processes that would prevent file encryption by locking them (e.g. Conti ransomware, Cactus ransomware). It has also recently been seen used by the BiBi wiper for Windows.
It could ... | windows | image_load | title: Load Of RstrtMgr.DLL By A Suspicious Process
id: b48492dc-c5ef-4572-8dff-32bc241c15c8
related:
- id: 3669afd2-9891-4534-a626-e5cf03810a61
type: derived
status: test
description: 'Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by a suspicious process.
This library has been used during ransomware campaign... | [
"T1486",
"T1685"
] | [
"impact",
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Processes related to software installation"
] | [
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-1/",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-2/",
"https://web.archive.org/web/20231221193106/https://www.swascan.com/cactus-ransomware-malware-analysis/",
"https://taiwan.postsen.com/business/88601/Hamas-hackers-use-data-de... | ImageLoaded="*\\RstrtMgr.dll" OR OriginalFileName="RstrtMgr.dll" Image IN ("*:\\Perflogs\\*", "*:\\Users\\Public\\*", "*\\Temporary Internet*") OR (Image="*:\\Users\\*" Image="*\\Favorites\\*") OR (Image="*:\\Users\\*" Image="*\\Favourites\\*") OR (Image="*:\\Users\\*" Image="*\\Contacts\\*") | (ImageLoaded:*\\RstrtMgr.dll OR OriginalFileName:RstrtMgr.dll) AND ((Image:(*\:\\Perflogs\\* OR *\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR *\\Temporary\ Internet*)) OR ((Image:*\:\\Users\\* AND Image:*\\Favorites\\*) OR (Image:*\:\\Users\\* AND Image:*\\Favourites\\*) OR (Image:*\:\\Users\\* AND Image:*\\Contacts\\*))) | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\RstrtMgr.dll" or InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "RstrtMgr.dll") and ((InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains ":\\Perflogs\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains ":\\Users\\Public\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "\\Temporary Internet") o... | windows/image_load/image_load_dll_rstrtmgr_suspicious_load.yml | |
e4d22291-f3d5-4b78-9a0c-a1fbaf32a6a4 | Potentially Suspicious ODBC Driver Registered | Detects the registration of a new ODBC driver where the driver is located in a potentially suspicious location | windows | registry_set | title: Potentially Suspicious ODBC Driver Registered
id: e4d22291-f3d5-4b78-9a0c-a1fbaf32a6a4
status: test
description: Detects the registration of a new ODBC driver where the driver is located in a potentially suspicious location
references:
- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/odbcconf-lolbin-trifecta/
author: ... | [
"T1003"
] | [
"credential-access",
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/odbcconf-lolbin-trifecta/"
] | TargetObject="*\\SOFTWARE\\ODBC\\ODBCINST.INI\\*" TargetObject IN ("*\\Driver", "*\\Setup") Details IN ("*:\\PerfLogs\\*", "*:\\ProgramData\\*", "*:\\Temp\\*", "*:\\Users\\Public\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Registration\\CRMLog*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\com\\dmp\\*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\FxsTmp\\*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\... | TargetObject:*\\SOFTWARE\\ODBC\\ODBCINST.INI\\* AND (TargetObject:(*\\Driver OR *\\Setup)) AND (Details:(*\:\\PerfLogs\\* OR *\:\\ProgramData\\* OR *\:\\Temp\\* OR *\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Registration\\CRMLog* OR *\:\\Windows\\System32\\com\\dmp\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\System32\\FxsTmp\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Sy... | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey endswith "\\SOFTWARE\\ODBC\\ODBCINST.INI*" and (RegistryKey endswith "\\Driver" or RegistryKey endswith "\\Setup") and (RegistryValueData contains ":\\PerfLogs\\" or RegistryValueData contains ":\\ProgramData\\" or RegistryValueData contains ":\\Temp\\" or RegistryValueData cont... | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_odbc_driver_registered_susp.yml | |
86588b36-c6d3-465f-9cee-8f9093e07798 | Scheduled Task Executing Payload from Registry | Detects the creation of a schtasks that potentially executes a payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell. | windows | process_creation | title: Scheduled Task Executing Payload from Registry
id: 86588b36-c6d3-465f-9cee-8f9093e07798
related:
- id: c4eeeeae-89f4-43a7-8b48-8d1bdfa66c78
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a schtasks that potentially executes a payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell.
references:... | [
"T1053.005",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"persistence"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/"
] | Image="*\\schtasks.exe" OR OriginalFileName="schtasks.exe" CommandLine="*/Create*" CommandLine IN ("*Get-ItemProperty*", "* gp *") CommandLine IN ("*HKCU:*", "*HKLM:*", "*registry::*", "*HKEY_*") NOT (CommandLine IN ("*FromBase64String*", "*encodedcommand*")) | ((Image:*\\schtasks.exe OR OriginalFileName:schtasks.exe) AND CommandLine:*\/Create* AND (CommandLine:(*Get\-ItemProperty* OR *\ gp\ *)) AND (CommandLine:(*HKCU\:* OR *HKLM\:* OR *registry\:\:* OR *HKEY_*))) AND (NOT (CommandLine:(*FromBase64String* OR *encodedcommand*))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\schtasks.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "schtasks.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains "/Create" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "Get-ItemProperty" or ProcessCommandLine contains " gp ") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "HKCU:" or ProcessCommandLine ... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_reg_loader.yml | |
9212f354-7775-4e28-9c9f-8f0a4544e664 | Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer | Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active directory database. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hash... | windows | process_creation | title: Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer
id: 9212f354-7775-4e28-9c9f-8f0a4544e664
related:
- id: ef61af62-bc74-4f58-b49b-626448227652
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the
active directo... | [
"T1087.002",
"T1069.002",
"T1482"
] | [
"discovery"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5743766-Global-Threat-Report-2019.html",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/sysinternals/downloads/adexplorer",
"https://github.com/c3c/ADExplorerSnapshot.py/tree/f700904defac330802bbfedd1d8ffd9248f4ee24",
"https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/scattered-spider-is-a-young-r... | Image IN ("*\\ADExp.exe", "*\\ADExplorer.exe", "*\\ADExplorer64.exe", "*\\ADExplorer64a.exe") OR OriginalFileName="AdExp" OR Description="Active Directory Editor" OR Product="Sysinternals ADExplorer" CommandLine="*snapshot*" | ((Image:(*\\ADExp.exe OR *\\ADExplorer.exe OR *\\ADExplorer64.exe OR *\\ADExplorer64a.exe)) OR OriginalFileName:AdExp OR Description:"Active Directory Editor" OR Product:"Sysinternals ADExplorer") AND CommandLine:*snapshot* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\ADExp.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\ADExplorer.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\ADExplorer64.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\ADExplorer64a.exe") or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "AdExp" or ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription =~ "Active Directory Editor" or Proces... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_adexplorer_execution.yml | |
6adfbf8f-52be-4444-9bac-81b539624146 | Shell Execution via Find - Linux | Detects the use of the find command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or exploitation attempt. | linux | process_creation | title: Shell Execution via Find - Linux
id: 6adfbf8f-52be-4444-9bac-81b539624146
status: test
description: 'Detects the use of the find command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation,
unauthorized command execution, or exploitation attempt.
'
references:
- https://gtfobins.gi... | [
"T1083"
] | [
"discovery"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/find/#shell",
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html"
] | Image="*/find" CommandLine="* . *" CommandLine="*-exec*" CommandLine IN ("*/bin/bash*", "*/bin/dash*", "*/bin/fish*", "*/bin/sh*", "*/bin/zsh*") | (Image:*\/find AND (CommandLine:*\ .\ * AND CommandLine:*\-exec*)) AND (CommandLine:(*\/bin\/bash* OR *\/bin\/dash* OR *\/bin\/fish* OR *\/bin\/sh* OR *\/bin\/zsh*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "/find" and (ProcessCommandLine contains " . " and ProcessCommandLine contains "-exec")) and (ProcessCommandLine contains "/bin/bash" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/bin/dash" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/bin/fish" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/bin/sh" or Process... | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_find_shell_execution.yml | |
2c28c248-7f50-417a-9186-a85b223010ee | Wscript Shell Run In CommandLine | Detects the presence of the keywords "Wscript", "Shell" and "Run" in the command, which could indicate a suspicious activity | windows | process_creation | title: Wscript Shell Run In CommandLine
id: 2c28c248-7f50-417a-9186-a85b223010ee
status: test
description: Detects the presence of the keywords "Wscript", "Shell" and "Run" in the command, which could indicate a suspicious
activity
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220830122045/http://blog.talosintelligence... | [
"T1059"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Inline scripting can be used by some rare third party applications or administrators. Investigate and apply additional filters accordingly"
] | [
"https://web.archive.org/web/20220830122045/http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/08/modernloader-delivers-multiple-stealers.html",
"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/modernloader-delivers-multiple-stealers-cryptominers-and-rats/"
] | CommandLine="*Wscript.*" CommandLine="*.Shell*" CommandLine="*.Run*" | CommandLine:*Wscript.* AND CommandLine:*.Shell* AND CommandLine:*.Run* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "Wscript." and ProcessCommandLine contains ".Shell" and ProcessCommandLine contains ".Run" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mshta_inline_vbscript.yml | |
e0565f5d-d420-4e02-8a68-ac00d864f9cf | Automated Collection Bookmarks Using Get-ChildItem PowerShell | Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts.
Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about
internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure. | windows | ps_script | title: Automated Collection Bookmarks Using Get-ChildItem PowerShell
id: e0565f5d-d420-4e02-8a68-ac00d864f9cf
status: test
description: 'Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts.
Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, soci... | [
"T1217"
] | [
"discovery"
] | low | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1217/T1217.md"
] | ScriptBlockText="*Get-ChildItem*" ScriptBlockText="* -Recurse *" ScriptBlockText="* -Path *" ScriptBlockText="* -Filter Bookmarks*" ScriptBlockText="* -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue*" ScriptBlockText="* -Force*" | ScriptBlockText:*Get\-ChildItem* AND ScriptBlockText:*\ \-Recurse\ * AND ScriptBlockText:*\ \-Path\ * AND ScriptBlockText:*\ \-Filter\ Bookmarks* AND ScriptBlockText:*\ \-ErrorAction\ SilentlyContinue* AND ScriptBlockText:*\ \-Force* | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_get_childitem_bookmarks.yml | |
1712bafe-be05-4a0e-89d4-17a3ed151bf5 | Potential Hello-World Scraper Botnet Activity | Detects network traffic potentially associated with a scraper botnet variant that uses the "Hello-World/1.0" user-agent string. | proxy | title: Potential Hello-World Scraper Botnet Activity
id: 1712bafe-be05-4a0e-89d4-17a3ed151bf5
status: experimental
description: 'Detects network traffic potentially associated with a scraper botnet variant that uses the "Hello-World/1.0"
user-agent string.
'
references:
- https://www.greynoise.io/blog/new-scraper-... | [
"T1595"
] | [
"reconnaissance"
] | medium | experimental | [
"Legitimate network monitoring or vulnerability scanning tools that may use this generic user agent.",
"Internal development or testing scripts. Consider filtering by source IP if this is expected from certain systems."
] | [
"https://www.greynoise.io/blog/new-scraper-botnet-concentrated-in-taiwan",
"https://viz.greynoise.io/tags/hello-world-scraper-botnet?days=30"
] | "c-useragent"="Hello-World/1.0" "cs-method"="GET" | c-useragent:Hello\-World\/1.0 AND cs-method:GET | null | web/proxy_generic/proxy_hello_world_user_agent.yml | ||
60936b49-fca0-4f32-993d-7415edcf9a5d | New Application in AppCompat | A General detection for a new application in AppCompat. This indicates an application executing for the first time on an endpoint. | windows | registry_set | title: New Application in AppCompat
id: 60936b49-fca0-4f32-993d-7415edcf9a5d
status: test
description: A General detection for a new application in AppCompat. This indicates an application executing for the first
time on an endpoint.
references:
- https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/1
- https://g... | [
"T1204.002"
] | [
"execution"
] | informational | test | [
"This rule is to explore new applications on an endpoint. False positives depends on the organization.",
"Newly setup system.",
"Legitimate installation of new application."
] | [
"https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/1",
"https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/2d4257f630f4c9770f78d0c1df059f891ffc3fec/docs/evals/apt29/detections/1.A.1_DFD6A782-9BDB-4550-AB6B-525E825B095E.md"
] | TargetObject="*\\AppCompatFlags\\Compatibility Assistant\\Store\\*" | TargetObject:*\\AppCompatFlags\\Compatibility\ Assistant\\Store\\* | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey endswith "\\AppCompatFlags\\Compatibility Assistant\\Store*" | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_new_application_appcompat.yml | |
f663a6d9-9d1b-49b8-b2b1-0637914d199a | Narrator's Feedback-Hub Persistence | Detects abusing Windows 10 Narrator's Feedback-Hub | windows | registry_event | title: Narrator's Feedback-Hub Persistence
id: f663a6d9-9d1b-49b8-b2b1-0637914d199a
status: test
description: Detects abusing Windows 10 Narrator's Feedback-Hub
references:
- https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html
author: Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-25
modif... | [
"T1547.001"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html"
] | (EventType="DeleteValue" TargetObject="*\\AppXypsaf9f1qserqevf0sws76dx4k9a5206\\Shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute") OR TargetObject="*\\AppXypsaf9f1qserqevf0sws76dx4k9a5206\\Shell\\open\\command\\(Default)" | (EventType:DeleteValue AND TargetObject:*\\AppXypsaf9f1qserqevf0sws76dx4k9a5206\\Shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute) OR TargetObject:*\\AppXypsaf9f1qserqevf0sws76dx4k9a5206\\Shell\\open\\command\\\(Default\) | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (ActionType =~ "DeleteValue" and RegistryKey endswith "\\AppXypsaf9f1qserqevf0sws76dx4k9a5206\\Shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute") or RegistryKey endswith "\\AppXypsaf9f1qserqevf0sws76dx4k9a5206\\Shell\\open\\command\\(Default)" | windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_narrator_feedback_persistance.yml | |
0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 | PowerShell Set-Acl On Windows Folder | Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder | windows | process_creation | title: PowerShell Set-Acl On Windows Folder
id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73
related:
- id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49
type: derived
- id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a
type: derived
- id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scri... | [] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md"
] | OriginalFileName IN ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll") OR Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe") CommandLine="*Set-Acl *" CommandLine="*-AclObject *" CommandLine IN ("*-Path \"C:\\Windows*", "*-Path 'C:\\Windows*", "*-Path %windir%*", "*-Path $env:windir*") CommandLine IN ("*FullControl*", "*Allow*") | ((OriginalFileName:(PowerShell.EXE OR pwsh.dll)) OR (Image:(*\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe))) AND (CommandLine:*Set\-Acl\ * AND CommandLine:*\-AclObject\ *) AND (CommandLine:(*\-Path\ \"C\:\\Windows* OR *\-Path\ 'C\:\\Windows* OR *\-Path\ %windir%* OR *\-Path\ $env\:windir*)) AND (CommandLine:(*FullControl* OR *Allow... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll")) or (FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe")) and (ProcessCommandLine contains "Set-Acl " and ProcessCommandLine contains "-AclObject ") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "-Path \"C:\\W... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_set_acl_susp_location.yml | |
056c7317-9a09-4bd4-9067-d051312752ea | Powershell Executed From Headless ConHost Process | Detects the use of powershell commands from headless ConHost window.
The "--headless" flag hides the windows from the user upon execution. | windows | process_creation | title: Powershell Executed From Headless ConHost Process
id: 056c7317-9a09-4bd4-9067-d051312752ea
related:
- id: 00ca75ab-d5ce-43be-b86c-55ff39c6abfc
type: derived
status: test
description: 'Detects the use of powershell commands from headless ConHost window.
The "--headless" flag hides the windows from the user u... | [
"T1059.001",
"T1059.003",
"T1564.003"
] | [
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.huntress.com/blog/fake-browser-updates-lead-to-boinc-volunteer-computing-software"
] | Image="*\\conhost.exe" OR OriginalFileName="CONHOST.EXE" CommandLine="*--headless*" CommandLine="*powershell*" | (Image:*\\conhost.exe OR OriginalFileName:CONHOST.EXE) AND (CommandLine:*\-\-headless* AND CommandLine:*powershell*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\conhost.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "CONHOST.EXE") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "--headless" and ProcessCommandLine contains "powershell") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_conhost_headless_powershell.yml | |
6c220477-0b5b-4b25-bb90-66183b4089e8 | Suspicious Inbox Forwarding | Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported suspicious email forwarding rules, for example, if a user created an inbox rule that forwards a copy of all emails to an external address. | m365 | threat_management | title: Suspicious Inbox Forwarding
id: 6c220477-0b5b-4b25-bb90-66183b4089e8
status: test
description: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported suspicious email forwarding rules, for example, if a user
created an inbox rule that forwards a copy of all emails to an external address.
references:
- https://le... | [
"T1020"
] | [
"exfiltration"
] | low | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference"
] | eventSource="SecurityComplianceCenter" eventName="Suspicious inbox forwarding" status="success" | eventSource:SecurityComplianceCenter AND eventName:"Suspicious inbox forwarding" AND status:success | null | cloud/m365/threat_management/microsoft365_susp_inbox_forwarding.yml | |
ceb407f6-8277-439b-951f-e4210e3ed956 | Cisco Clear Logs | Clear command history in network OS which is used for defense evasion | cisco | aaa | title: Cisco Clear Logs
id: ceb407f6-8277-439b-951f-e4210e3ed956
status: test
description: Clear command history in network OS which is used for defense evasion
references:
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/nexus5000/sw/command/reference/sysmgmt/n5k-sysmgmt-cr/n5k-sm_cmds_c.html
- https://www.... | [
"T1070.003"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate administrators may run these commands"
] | [
"https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/nexus5000/sw/command/reference/sysmgmt/n5k-sysmgmt-cr/n5k-sm_cmds_c.html",
"https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios/12_2sr/12_2sra/feature/guide/srmgtint.html#wp1127609"
] | "clear logging" OR "clear archive" | *clear\ logging* OR *clear\ archive* | null | network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_clear_logs.yml | |
7cccd811-7ae9-4ebe-9afd-cb5c406b824b | Potential Execution of Sysinternals Tools | Detects command lines that contain the 'accepteula' flag which could be a sign of execution of one of the Sysinternals tools | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Execution of Sysinternals Tools
id: 7cccd811-7ae9-4ebe-9afd-cb5c406b824b
related:
- id: 25ffa65d-76d8-4da5-a832-3f2b0136e133
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects command lines that contain the 'accepteula' flag which could be a sign of execution of one of the Sysinternals
tools
reference... | [
"T1588.002"
] | [
"resource-development"
] | low | test | [
"Legitimate use of SysInternals tools",
"Programs that use the same command line flag"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/Moti_B/status/1008587936735035392"
] | CommandLine="* -accepteula*" OR CommandLine="* /accepteula*" OR CommandLine="* –accepteula*" OR CommandLine="* —accepteula*" OR CommandLine="* ―accepteula*" | CommandLine:(*\ \-accepteula* OR *\ \/accepteula* OR *\ –accepteula* OR *\ —accepteula* OR *\ ―accepteula*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains " -accepteula" or ProcessCommandLine contains " /accepteula" or ProcessCommandLine contains " –accepteula" or ProcessCommandLine contains " —accepteula" or ProcessCommandLine contains " ―accepteula" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_eula_accepted.yml | |
ff151c33-45fa-475d-af4f-c2f93571f4fe | Azure AD Health Monitoring Agent Registry Keys Access | This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key of Azure AD Health monitoring agent.
This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Online\Reporting\Mo... | windows | security | title: Azure AD Health Monitoring Agent Registry Keys Access
id: ff151c33-45fa-475d-af4f-c2f93571f4fe
status: test
description: 'This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key of Azure
AD Health monitoring agent.
This detection requires an access control entry ... | [
"T1012"
] | [
"discovery"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/",
"https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/c3dec5443414231714d850565d364ca73475ade5/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_monitoring_agent.yml"
] | EventID IN (4656, 4663) ObjectType="Key" ObjectName="\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Online\\Reporting\\MonitoringAgent" NOT (ProcessName IN ("*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe*", "*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe*", "*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.MonitoringAg... | ((EventID:(4656 OR 4663)) AND ObjectType:Key AND ObjectName:"\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Online\\Reporting\\MonitoringAgent") AND (NOT (ProcessName:(*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe* OR *Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe* OR *Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.Mo... | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey =~ "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Online\\Reporting\\MonitoringAgent" and (not((InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsServic... | windows/builtin/security/win_security_aadhealth_mon_agent_regkey_access.yml | |
0f017df3-8f5a-414f-ad6b-24aff1128278 | Suspicious Eventlog Clear | Detects usage of known powershell cmdlets such as "Clear-EventLog" to clear the Windows event logs | windows | ps_script | title: Suspicious Eventlog Clear
id: 0f017df3-8f5a-414f-ad6b-24aff1128278
related:
- id: cc36992a-4671-4f21-a91d-6c2b72a2edf5
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of known powershell cmdlets such as "Clear-EventLog" to clear the Windows event logs
references:
- https://twitter.com/oroneequalsone/stat... | [
"T1685.005"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Rare need to clear logs before doing something. Sometimes used by installers or cleaner scripts. The script should be investigated to determine if it's legitimate"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/oroneequalsone/status/1568432028361830402",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md",
"https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/5b223758-07d6-4100-9e11-238cfdd0fe97.html",
"https://stackoverflow.... | ScriptBlockText IN ("*Clear-EventLog *", "*Remove-EventLog *", "*Limit-EventLog *", "*Clear-WinEvent *") OR (ScriptBlockText="*Eventing.Reader.EventLogSession*" ScriptBlockText="*ClearLog*") OR (ScriptBlockText="*Diagnostics.EventLog*" ScriptBlockText="*Clear*") | (ScriptBlockText:(*Clear\-EventLog\ * OR *Remove\-EventLog\ * OR *Limit\-EventLog\ * OR *Clear\-WinEvent\ *)) OR (ScriptBlockText:*Eventing.Reader.EventLogSession* AND ScriptBlockText:*ClearLog*) OR (ScriptBlockText:*Diagnostics.EventLog* AND ScriptBlockText:*Clear*) | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_clear_eventlog.yml | |
cd8b36ac-8e4a-4c2f-a402-a29b8fbd5bca | Suspicious File Creation Activity From Fake Recycle.Bin Folder | Detects file write event from/to a fake recycle bin folder that is often used as a staging directory for malware | windows | file_event | title: Suspicious File Creation Activity From Fake Recycle.Bin Folder
id: cd8b36ac-8e4a-4c2f-a402-a29b8fbd5bca
related:
- id: 5ce0f04e-3efc-42af-839d-5b3a543b76c0
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects file write event from/to a fake recycle bin folder that is often used as a staging directory for malware
re... | [] | [
"persistence",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/infected-usb-steal-secrets",
"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cloaked-ursa-phishing/"
] | Image IN ("*RECYCLERS.BIN\\*", "*RECYCLER.BIN\\*") OR TargetFilename IN ("*RECYCLERS.BIN\\*", "*RECYCLER.BIN\\*") | (Image:(*RECYCLERS.BIN\\* OR *RECYCLER.BIN\\*)) OR (TargetFilename:(*RECYCLERS.BIN\\* OR *RECYCLER.BIN\\*)) | DeviceFileEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "RECYCLERS.BIN\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "RECYCLER.BIN\\") or (FolderPath contains "RECYCLERS.BIN\\" or FolderPath contains "RECYCLER.BIN\\") | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_recycle_bin_fake_exec.yml | |
34746e8c-5fb8-415a-b135-0abc167e912a | WinSxS Executable File Creation By Non-System Process | Detects the creation of binaries in the WinSxS folder by non-system processes | windows | file_event | title: WinSxS Executable File Creation By Non-System Process
id: 34746e8c-5fb8-415a-b135-0abc167e912a
related:
- id: 64827580-e4c3-4c64-97eb-c72325d45399
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the creation of binaries in the WinSxS folder by non-system processes
references:
- https://media.defense.gov/2023/M... | [] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF"
] | TargetFilename="C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*" TargetFilename="*.exe" NOT (Image IN ("C:\\Windows\\Systems32\\*", "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*", "C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*")) | (TargetFilename:C\:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\* AND TargetFilename:*.exe) AND (NOT (Image:(C\:\\Windows\\Systems32\\* OR C\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\* OR C\:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*))) | DeviceFileEvents
| where (FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\" and FolderPath endswith ".exe") and (not((InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\Systems32\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\"))) | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_winsxs_binary_creation.yml | |
4f647cfa-b598-4e12-ad69-c68dd16caef8 | DumpStack.log Defender Evasion | Detects the use of the filename DumpStack.log to evade Microsoft Defender | windows | process_creation | title: DumpStack.log Defender Evasion
id: 4f647cfa-b598-4e12-ad69-c68dd16caef8
status: test
description: Detects the use of the filename DumpStack.log to evade Microsoft Defender
references:
- https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1479094189048713219
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-06
modified: 2022-06-... | [] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | critical | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1479094189048713219"
] | Image="*\\DumpStack.log" OR CommandLine="* -o DumpStack.log*" | Image:*\\DumpStack.log OR CommandLine:*\ \-o\ DumpStack.log* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\DumpStack.log" or ProcessCommandLine contains " -o DumpStack.log" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_dumpstack_log_evasion.yml | |
d3feb4ee-ff1d-4d3d-bd10-5b28a238cc72 | File and Directory Discovery - Linux | Detects usage of system utilities such as "find", "tree", "findmnt", etc, to discover files, directories and network shares. | linux | process_creation | title: File and Directory Discovery - Linux
id: d3feb4ee-ff1d-4d3d-bd10-5b28a238cc72
status: test
description: 'Detects usage of system utilities such as "find", "tree", "findmnt", etc, to discover files, directories and
network shares.
'
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d... | [
"T1083"
] | [
"discovery"
] | informational | test | [
"Legitimate activities"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1083/T1083.md"
] |
| rex field=CommandLine "(?<CommandLineMatch>(.){200,})"
| eval CommandLineCondition=if(isnotnull(CommandLineMatch), "true", "false")
| search (Image="*/file" CommandLineCondition="true") OR (Image="*/ls" CommandLine="*-R*") OR Image="*/find" OR Image="*/tree" OR Image="*/findmnt" OR Image="*/mlocate" | (Image:*\/file AND CommandLine:/(.){200,}/) OR (Image:*\/ls AND CommandLine:*\-R*) OR Image:*\/find OR Image:*\/tree OR Image:*\/findmnt OR Image:*\/mlocate | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "/file" and ProcessCommandLine matches regex "(.){200,}") or (FolderPath endswith "/ls" and ProcessCommandLine contains "-R") or FolderPath endswith "/find" or FolderPath endswith "/tree" or FolderPath endswith "/findmnt" or FolderPath endswith "/mlocate" | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_file_and_directory_discovery.yml | |
9b2cc4c4-2ad4-416d-8e8e-ee6aa6f5035a | End User Consent | Detects when an end user consents to an application | azure | auditlogs | title: End User Consent
id: 9b2cc4c4-2ad4-416d-8e8e-ee6aa6f5035a
status: test
description: Detects when an end user consents to an application
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#end-user-consent
author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@m... | [
"T1528"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | low | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#end-user-consent"
] | ConsentContext.IsAdminConsent="false" | ConsentContext.IsAdminConsent:false | null | cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_app_end_user_consent.yml | |
1f0b4cac-9c81-41f4-95d0-8475ff46b3e2 | PPL Tampering Via WerFaultSecure | Detects potential abuse of WerFaultSecure.exe to dump Protected Process Light (PPL) processes like LSASS or to freeze security solutions (EDR/antivirus).
This technique is used by tools such as EDR-Freeze and WSASS to bypass PPL protections and access sensitive information or disable security software.
Distinct command... | windows | process_creation | title: PPL Tampering Via WerFaultSecure
id: 1f0b4cac-9c81-41f4-95d0-8475ff46b3e2
related:
- id: 387df17d-3b04-448f-8669-9e7fd5e5fd8c
type: similar
- id: 8a2f4b1c-3d5e-4f7a-9b2c-1e4f6d8a9c2b
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects potential abuse of WerFaultSecure.exe to dump Protected Process Light... | [
"T1685",
"T1003.001"
] | [
"defense-impairment",
"credential-access"
] | high | experimental | [
"Legitimate usage of WerFaultSecure for debugging purposes"
] | [
"https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/EDR-Freeze-Puts-EDRs-Antivirus-Into-Coma.html",
"https://github.com/TwoSevenOneT/EDR-Freeze/blob/a7f61030b36fbde89871f393488f7075d2aa89f6/EDR-Freeze.cpp#L53",
"https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/Dumping-LSASS-With-WER-On-Modern-Windows-11.html",
"https://github.com/TwoS... | Image="*\\WerFaultSecure.exe" OR OriginalFileName="WerFaultSecure.exe" CommandLine="* /h *" CommandLine="* /pid *" CommandLine="* /tid *" CommandLine="* /encfile *" CommandLine="* /cancel *" CommandLine="* /type *" CommandLine="* 268310*" | (Image:*\\WerFaultSecure.exe OR OriginalFileName:WerFaultSecure.exe) AND (CommandLine:*\ \/h\ * AND CommandLine:*\ \/pid\ * AND CommandLine:*\ \/tid\ * AND CommandLine:*\ \/encfile\ * AND CommandLine:*\ \/cancel\ * AND CommandLine:*\ \/type\ * AND CommandLine:*\ 268310*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\WerFaultSecure.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "WerFaultSecure.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains " /h " and ProcessCommandLine contains " /pid " and ProcessCommandLine contains " /tid " and ProcessCommandLine contains " /encfile " and ProcessCommand... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_werfaultsecure_abuse.yml | |
9fff585c-c33e-4a86-b3cd-39312079a65f | Taskmgr as LOCAL_SYSTEM | Detects the creation of taskmgr.exe process in context of LOCAL_SYSTEM | windows | process_creation | title: Taskmgr as LOCAL_SYSTEM
id: 9fff585c-c33e-4a86-b3cd-39312079a65f
status: test
description: Detects the creation of taskmgr.exe process in context of LOCAL_SYSTEM
references:
- Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-03-18
modified: 2022-05-27
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
logs... | [
"T1036"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | User IN ("*AUTHORI*", "*AUTORI*") Image="*\\taskmgr.exe" | (User:(*AUTHORI* OR *AUTORI*)) AND Image:*\\taskmgr.exe | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (AccountName contains "AUTHORI" or AccountName contains "AUTORI") and FolderPath endswith "\\taskmgr.exe" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_taskmgr_localsystem.yml | |
ab871450-37dc-4a3a-997f-6662aa8ae0f1 | Disable Macro Runtime Scan Scope | Detects tampering with the MacroRuntimeScanScope registry key to disable runtime scanning of enabled macros | windows | registry_set | title: Disable Macro Runtime Scan Scope
id: ab871450-37dc-4a3a-997f-6662aa8ae0f1
description: Detects tampering with the MacroRuntimeScanScope registry key to disable runtime scanning of enabled macros
status: test
date: 2022-10-25
modified: 2023-08-17
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
references:
- htt... | [] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2018/09/12/office-vba-amsi-parting-the-veil-on-malicious-macros/",
"https://admx.help/?Category=Office2016&Policy=office16.Office.Microsoft.Policies.Windows::L_MacroRuntimeScanScope",
"https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/OffensiveVBA/blob/28cc6a2802d8176195ac19b3c8e9... | TargetObject="*\\SOFTWARE\\*" TargetObject="*\\Microsoft\\Office\\*" TargetObject="*\\Common\\Security*" TargetObject="*\\MacroRuntimeScanScope" Details="DWORD (0x00000000)" | (TargetObject:*\\SOFTWARE\\* AND TargetObject:*\\Microsoft\\Office\\* AND TargetObject:*\\Common\\Security*) AND TargetObject:*\\MacroRuntimeScanScope AND Details:"DWORD \(0x00000000\)" | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (RegistryKey endswith "\\SOFTWARE*" and RegistryKey endswith "\\Microsoft\\Office*" and RegistryKey contains "\\Common\\Security") and RegistryKey endswith "\\MacroRuntimeScanScope" and RegistryValueData =~ "DWORD (0x00000000)" | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_macroruntimescanscope.yml | |
99c4658d-2c5e-4d87-828d-7c066ca537c3 | Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature Command PowerShell | Detect built in PowerShell cmdlet Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature, Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool.
Similar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images | windows | ps_script | title: Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature Command PowerShell
id: 99c4658d-2c5e-4d87-828d-7c066ca537c3
status: test
description: 'Detect built in PowerShell cmdlet Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature, Deployment Image Servicing and Management
tool.
Similar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, c... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5b67c9b141fa3918017f8fa44f2f88f0b1ecb9e1/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/dism/disable-windowsoptionalfeature?view=windowsserver2022-ps"
] | ScriptBlockText="*Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature*" ScriptBlockText="*-Online*" ScriptBlockText="*-FeatureName*" ScriptBlockText IN ("*Windows-Defender-Gui*", "*Windows-Defender-Features*", "*Windows-Defender*", "*Windows-Defender-ApplicationGuard*") | (ScriptBlockText:*Disable\-WindowsOptionalFeature* AND ScriptBlockText:*\-Online* AND ScriptBlockText:*\-FeatureName*) AND (ScriptBlockText:(*Windows\-Defender\-Gui* OR *Windows\-Defender\-Features* OR *Windows\-Defender* OR *Windows\-Defender\-ApplicationGuard*)) | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_disable_windows_optional_feature.yml | |
75180c5f-4ea1-461a-a4f6-6e4700c065d4 | Windows Recall Feature Enabled - Registry | Detects the enabling of the Windows Recall feature via registry manipulation. Windows Recall can be enabled by setting the value of "DisableAIDataAnalysis" to "0".
Adversaries may enable Windows Recall as part of post-exploitation discovery and collection activities.
This rule assumes that Recall is already explicitly ... | windows | registry_set | title: Windows Recall Feature Enabled - Registry
id: 75180c5f-4ea1-461a-a4f6-6e4700c065d4
related:
- id: 5dfc1465-8f65-4fde-8eb5-6194380c6a62
type: similar
- id: 817f252c-5143-4dae-b418-48c3e9f63728
type: similar
status: test
description: 'Detects the enabling of the Windows Recall feature via registry manipulation... | [
"T1113"
] | [
"collection"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate use/activation of Windows Recall"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/manage-recall",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-windowsai#disableaidataanalysis"
] | TargetObject="*\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsAI\\DisableAIDataAnalysis" Details="DWORD (0x00000000)" | TargetObject:*\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsAI\\DisableAIDataAnalysis AND Details:"DWORD \(0x00000000\)" | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey endswith "\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsAI\\DisableAIDataAnalysis" and RegistryValueData =~ "DWORD (0x00000000)" | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_enable_windows_recall.yml | |
5ef9853e-4d0e-4a70-846f-a9ca37d876da | Potential Credential Dumping Activity Via LSASS | Detects process access requests to the LSASS process with specific call trace calls and access masks.
This behaviour is expressed by many credential dumping tools such as Mimikatz, NanoDump, Invoke-Mimikatz, Procdump and even the Taskmgr dumping feature. | windows | process_access | title: Potential Credential Dumping Activity Via LSASS
id: 5ef9853e-4d0e-4a70-846f-a9ca37d876da
status: test
description: 'Detects process access requests to the LSASS process with specific call trace calls and access masks.
This behaviour is expressed by many credential dumping tools such as Mimikatz, NanoDump, Inv... | [
"T1003.001"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://web.archive.org/web/20230329170326/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-21-procdump-or-taskmgr.html",
"https://web.archive.org/web/20230208123920/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f3... | TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe" GrantedAccess IN ("*0x1038*", "*0x1438*", "*0x143a*", "*0x1fffff*") CallTrace IN ("*dbgcore.dll*", "*dbghelp.dll*", "*kernel32.dll*", "*kernelbase.dll*", "*ntdll.dll*") NOT (SourceUser IN ("*AUTHORI*", "*AUTORI*")) NOT ((CallTrace="*:\\Windows\\Temp\\asgard2-agent\\*" CallTrace="*\\thor\\thor... | (TargetImage:*\\lsass.exe AND (GrantedAccess:(*0x1038* OR *0x1438* OR *0x143a* OR *0x1fffff*)) AND (CallTrace:(*dbgcore.dll* OR *dbghelp.dll* OR *kernel32.dll* OR *kernelbase.dll* OR *ntdll.dll*))) AND (NOT (SourceUser:(*AUTHORI* OR *AUTORI*))) AND (NOT (((CallTrace:*\:\\Windows\\Temp\\asgard2\-agent\\* AND CallTrace:*... | null | windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_memdump.yml | |
26e7c5e2-6545-481e-b7e6-050143459635 | CA Policy Removed by Non Approved Actor | Monitor and alert on conditional access changes where non approved actor removed CA Policy. | azure | auditlogs | title: CA Policy Removed by Non Approved Actor
id: 26e7c5e2-6545-481e-b7e6-050143459635
status: test
description: Monitor and alert on conditional access changes where non approved actor removed CA Policy.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-infrastructure#conditional-... | [
"T1548",
"T1556"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"credential-access",
"persistence",
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Misconfigured role permissions",
"Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment."
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-infrastructure#conditional-access"
] | properties.message="Delete conditional access policy" | properties.message:"Delete conditional access policy" | null | cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_aad_secops_ca_policy_removedby_bad_actor.yml | |
cd71385d-fd9b-4691-9b98-2b1f7e508714 | Lolbin Runexehelper Use As Proxy | Detect usage of the "runexehelper.exe" binary as a proxy to launch other programs | windows | process_creation | title: Lolbin Runexehelper Use As Proxy
id: cd71385d-fd9b-4691-9b98-2b1f7e508714
status: test
description: Detect usage of the "runexehelper.exe" binary as a proxy to launch other programs
references:
- https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1206692239839289344
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Runexehelpe... | [
"T1218"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1206692239839289344",
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Runexehelper/"
] | ParentImage="*\\runexehelper.exe" | ParentImage:*\\runexehelper.exe | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\runexehelper.exe" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_runexehelper.yml | |
d38d2fa4-98e6-4a24-aff1-410b0c9ad177 | HackTool - UACMe Akagi Execution | Detects the execution of UACMe, a tool used for UAC bypasses, via default PE metadata | windows | process_creation | title: HackTool - UACMe Akagi Execution
id: d38d2fa4-98e6-4a24-aff1-410b0c9ad177
status: test
description: Detects the execution of UACMe, a tool used for UAC bypasses, via default PE metadata
references:
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
dat... | [
"T1548.002"
] | [
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"
] | Product="UACMe" OR Company IN ("REvol Corp", "APT 92", "UG North", "Hazardous Environments", "CD Project Rekt") OR Description IN ("UACMe main module", "Pentesting utility") OR OriginalFileName IN ("Akagi.exe", "Akagi64.exe") OR Image IN ("*\\Akagi64.exe", "*\\Akagi.exe") OR Hashes IN ("*IMPHASH=767637C23BB42CD5D7397CF... | (Product:UACMe OR (Company:("REvol Corp" OR "APT 92" OR "UG North" OR "Hazardous Environments" OR "CD Project Rekt")) OR (Description:("UACMe main module" OR "Pentesting utility")) OR (OriginalFileName:(Akagi.exe OR Akagi64.exe))) OR (Image:(*\\Akagi64.exe OR *\\Akagi.exe)) OR (Hashes:(*IMPHASH\=767637C23BB42CD5D7397CF... | null | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_uacme.yml | |
c30fb093-1109-4dc8-88a8-b30d11c95a5d | Whoami.EXE Execution With Output Option | Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" with the "/FO" flag to choose CSV as output format or with redirection options to export the results to a file for later use. | windows | process_creation | title: Whoami.EXE Execution With Output Option
id: c30fb093-1109-4dc8-88a8-b30d11c95a5d
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" with the "/FO" flag to choose CSV as output format or with redirection
options to export the results to a file for later use.
references:
- https://brica.de/alerts/al... | [
"T1033"
] | [
"discovery"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1247926/agent-tesla-keylogger-delivered-inside-a-power-iso-daa-archive/",
"https://app.any.run/tasks/7eaba74e-c1ea-400f-9c17-5e30eee89906/",
"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DsJ9ByX84o4&t=6s"
] | (Image="*\\whoami.exe" OR OriginalFileName="whoami.exe" CommandLine IN ("* /FO CSV*", "* -FO CSV*")) OR CommandLine="*whoami*>*" | ((Image:*\\whoami.exe OR OriginalFileName:whoami.exe) AND (CommandLine:(*\ \/FO\ CSV* OR *\ \-FO\ CSV*))) OR CommandLine:*whoami*\>* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\whoami.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "whoami.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains " /FO CSV" or ProcessCommandLine contains " -FO CSV")) or ProcessCommandLine matches regex ".*whoami.*>.*" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_whoami_output.yml | |
18beca67-ab3e-4ee3-ba7a-a46ca8d7d0cc | Sysmon Channel Reference Deletion | Potential threat actor tampering with Sysmon manifest and eventually disabling it | windows | security | title: Sysmon Channel Reference Deletion
id: 18beca67-ab3e-4ee3-ba7a-a46ca8d7d0cc
status: test
description: Potential threat actor tampering with Sysmon manifest and eventually disabling it
references:
- https://twitter.com/Flangvik/status/1283054508084473861
- https://twitter.com/SecurityJosh/status/128302736577027686... | [
"T1112"
] | [
"persistence",
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/Flangvik/status/1283054508084473861",
"https://twitter.com/SecurityJosh/status/1283027365770276866",
"https://securityjosh.github.io/2020/04/23/Mute-Sysmon.html",
"https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/cf08c38c61f7e46e8404b38201ca01c8"
] | (EventID=4657 ObjectName IN ("*WINEVT\\Publishers\\{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}*", "*WINEVT\\Channels\\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational*") ObjectValueName="Enabled" NewValue=0) OR (EventID=4663 ObjectName IN ("*WINEVT\\Publishers\\{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}*", "*WINEVT\\Channels\\Microsoft-Win... | (EventID:4657 AND (ObjectName:(*WINEVT\\Publishers\\\{5770385f\-c22a\-43e0\-bf4c\-06f5698ffbd9\}* OR *WINEVT\\Channels\\Microsoft\-Windows\-Sysmon\/Operational*)) AND ObjectValueName:Enabled AND NewValue:0) OR (EventID:4663 AND (ObjectName:(*WINEVT\\Publishers\\\{5770385f\-c22a\-43e0\-bf4c\-06f5698ffbd9\}* OR *WINEVT\\... | null | windows/builtin/security/win_security_sysmon_channel_reference_deletion.yml | |
5f03babb-12db-4eec-8c82-7b4cb5580868 | Response File Execution Via Odbcconf.EXE | Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a response file which might contain a malicious action. | windows | process_creation | title: Response File Execution Via Odbcconf.EXE
id: 5f03babb-12db-4eec-8c82-7b4cb5580868
related:
- id: 2d32dd6f-3196-4093-b9eb-1ad8ab088ca5
type: similar
- id: 65d2be45-8600-4042-b4c0-577a1ff8a60e
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a respons... | [
"T1218.008"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"The rule is looking for any usage of response file, which might generate false positive when this function is used legitimately. Investigate the contents of the \".rsp\" file to determine if it is malicious and apply additional filters if necessary."
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-ver16",
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/",
"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-report-bumblebee-loader-the-high-road-to-enterprise-domain-control",
"https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/odbccon... | Image="*\\odbcconf.exe" OR OriginalFileName="odbcconf.exe" CommandLine="* -f *" OR CommandLine="* /f *" OR CommandLine="* –f *" OR CommandLine="* —f *" OR CommandLine="* ―f *" CommandLine="*.rsp*" | (Image:*\\odbcconf.exe OR OriginalFileName:odbcconf.exe) AND CommandLine:(*\ \-f\ * OR *\ \/f\ * OR *\ –f\ * OR *\ —f\ * OR *\ ―f\ *) AND CommandLine:*.rsp* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\odbcconf.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "odbcconf.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains " -f " or ProcessCommandLine contains " /f " or ProcessCommandLine contains " –f " or ProcessCommandLine contains " —f " or ProcessCommandLine contains " ―f ") and ... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_odbcconf_response_file.yml |
End of preview. Expand in Data Studio
SigmaForge Detection Rules
SigmaForge is a structured, operational dataset for building and evaluating systems that generate, validate, and translate Sigma detection rules. Sigma is a vendor-agnostic YAML format that describes detection logic so it can be shared across SIEM platforms.
The dataset is derived from the open-source SigmaHQ rule corpus. Every rule is normalized and enriched with:
- MITRE ATT&CK technique and tactic mappings extracted from rule tags.
- Compiled SIEM queries produced with pySigma backends: Splunk SPL, Elastic Lucene, and Microsoft Sentinel KQL.
- Documented false-positive guidance and references where available.
Configurations
description_to_sigma
Maps a natural-language detection description (plus log-source hints and ATT&CK context) to the target Sigma YAML rule and its compiled SIEM queries.
Key fields: description, logsource_product, logsource_category,
sigma_rule, attack_techniques, attack_tactics, false_positives,
splunk_spl, elastic_lucene, sentinel_kql.
logs_to_sigma
Provides synthesized positive and negative events for a rule and the detection rule that should match the positives while excluding the negatives. Useful for detection-by-example and for testing recall / false-positive behavior.
Key fields: positive_events (JSON), negative_events (JSON),
expected_rule, false_positive_cases, attack_techniques.
sigma_repair
Pairs a programmatically corrupted rule and the corresponding validation errors with the corrected rule. Corruptions cover missing identifiers, invalid status/level enums, dangling or missing conditions, empty log sources, and malformed dates.
Key fields: broken_rule, validation_errors, corrected_rule,
attack_techniques.
Intended Uses
- Fine-tuning models to draft and repair Sigma rules from analyst input.
- Building agents that convert detection ideas into deployable SIEM queries.
- Benchmarking valid-YAML rate, schema pass rate, backend compilation rate, MITRE mapping F1, and repair success rate.
Provenance and License
Rules originate from the SigmaHQ project (Detection Rule License / DRL 1.1). Derived fields and this packaging are released under the MIT license. Refer to the upstream repository for the authoritative rule provenance.
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