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<|scenario|>
FACTS:
, appellant is asserting about a right which existed
and is seeking to safeguard and continue to exercise such right –
Case pleaded is not to the effect that any of them own the drain but
that the respondent is seeking to alter that position and thus, be
restrained – Such relief is to be considered in the suit based on the
evidence that would be tendered – Thus, such relief is not barred
F
under a
SUBMISSIONS BY PARTIES:
,
through its order dated 29.08.2013 had agreed with the decision of the
C
lower appellate court that the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain
the suit was to be decided at the outset. The revision petition was
accordingly disposed of. The parties were allowed to urge their
contentions in the court of the learned Munsif.
4. Pursuant thereto the learned Munsif has considered the issue
D
relating to jurisdiction and has by its
Analyse the submissions and provide a reasoned judgment.
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (1974) 1 SCC 567; AIR 1964 SC 807; AIR 1974 SC 1069
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , appellant is asserting about a right which existed
and is seeking to safeguard and continue to exercise such right –
Case pleaded is not to the effect that any of them own the drain but
that the respondent is seeking to alter that position and thus, be
restrained – Such relief is to be considered in the suit based on the
evidence that would be tendered – Thus, such relief is not barred
F
under a...
: Is not an issue regarding
which a specific bar is contemplated against approaching the civil
court for relief – ss. 246, 247 and 248 though referred to the
ownership and the manner in which the drains connected to
D
municipal drain are to be used and the Commissioner is given the
authority to compel the owner of a drain to permit another property
owner to use the same, the said provisions cannot be considered
either as an express or an implied bar on the civil court to entertain
a suit relating to the declaration of an existing right to use of the
E drain – On.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
,
through its order dated 29.08.2013 had agreed with the decision of the
C
lower appellate court that the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain
the suit was to be decided at the outset. The revision petition was
accordingly disposed of. The parties were allowed to urge their
contentions in th...
CONCLUSION:
provided under Section 438 of GMC Act. However, it is not
considered as an alternate and efficacious remedy in a case of
the present nature. The relief sought in the instant suit is in the
H
RATUL MAHANTA V. NIRMALENDU SAHA 95
nature of declaratory relief in an inter se dispute between the A
parties. The consideration by the statutory authority as provided
under GMC Act is of summary nature. Further, the appeal
provided is in respect of any notice issued or action taken or
proposed to be taken b
</think>
<|answer|>
: Is not an issue regarding
which a specific bar is contemplated against approaching the civil
court for relief – ss. 246, 247 and 248 though referred to the
ownership and the manner in which the drains connected to
D
municipal drain are to be used and the Commissioner is given the
authority to compel the owner of a drain to permit another property
owner to use the same, the said provisions cannot be considered
either as an express or an implied bar on the civil court to entertain
a suit relating to the declaration of an existing right to use of the
E drain – On
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
FACTS:
and
circumstances of the present case.
D
14. For the· reasons, as discussed above, we are not
inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the
High Court. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The bail
granted to the appellant Indra Vijay Alok is cancelled. The trial
E court shall take him into custody to serve out the remaining
part of the sentence.
Devika Gujral Appeal dismissed.
SUBMISSIONS BY PARTIES:
of learned counsel
B for the appellant and learned counsel for the State, and after
going through the papers on record, we do not find any illegality
in appreciation of evidence by the courts below. We further
agree with the sentence recorded against the appellant by the
trial court and affirmed by the High Court against the appellant.
C Sanction of prosecution is also proved on the record by PW-5
S. R. Tiwari. The request of learned counsel for the appellant
to reduce the period of sentence to the period already
undergone too cannot be accepted, in the
Analyse the submissions and provide a reasoned judgment.
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
:
The statement of PW-3 got corroboration by the statement
of the superior officer of the appellant's own department-As
such courts below committed no error of law in relying on
testimony of these witnesses and in convicting the appellant.
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — and
circumstances of the present case.
D
14. For the· reasons, as discussed above, we are not
inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the
High Court. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The bail
granted to the appellant Indra Vijay Alok is cancelled. The trial
E court shall take him into custody to serve out the remaining
part of the sentence.
Devika Gujral Appeal dismissed.
:
The statement of PW-3 got corroboration by the statement
of the superior officer of the appellant's own department-As
such courts below committed no error of law in relying on
testimony of these witnesses and in convicting the appellant. E
Dismissing the appeal, the Court.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
of learned counsel
B for the appellant and learned counsel for the State, and after
going through the papers on record, we do not find any illegality
in appreciation of evidence by the courts below. We further
agree with the sentence recorded against the appellant by the
trial court and affirmed by...
CONCLUSION:
directed against H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 10 S.C.R..
A judgment and order dated 31.8.2007, passed by the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur (Gwalior Bench), whereby said
Court has dismissed Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2000, and
affirmed conviction and sentence recorded against accused
Indra Vijay Alok under Sections 7 and 13(1 )(d) read with
B Section 13(2) of Prevention and Corruption Act, 1988 by the
Special Judge, Datiya, in Special Case No. 1 of 1992.
2. We have heard learned co
</think>
<|answer|>
:
The statement of PW-3 got corroboration by the statement
of the superior officer of the appellant's own department-As
such courts below committed no error of law in relying on
testimony of these witnesses and in convicting the appellant.
E
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 226 of 2010)
APRIL 04
Applicant: AJIT KAUR @ SURJIT KAUR
Court: finding to be reviewed by this Court in the instant appeal.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
, claim of the appellant-daughter
from the second marriage, that property orally gifted to her mother
by her father in 1950, became her mother’s absolute property after
the commencement of the 1956 Act, and Will executed by the father
could not operate qua that property even if it is assumed to be valid,
cannot be accepted – Appellant though was holding possession but
not any valid possession over the subject property and opening of
fiscal proceedings would not confer a right of acquisition by either
of the devise which has been referred to under the explanation to
s. 14(1).
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant and recover possession of the premises
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (1977) 3
SCC 99; AIR 1996 SC 1879
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , claim of the appellant-daughter
from the second marriage, that property orally gifted to her mother
by her father in 1950, became her mother’s absolute property after
the commencement of the 1956 Act, and Will executed by the father
could not operate qua that property even if it is assumed to be valid,
cannot be accepted – Appellant though was holding possession but
not any valid possession over...
the appellant.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
as correct. At the
time of Eran Gowda’s death the Hindu Women’s Right to Property
Act, 1937 (Act 18 of 1937) had not come into force. It is admitted
by Mr. Sinha that the Act was extended to Hyderabad State with
effect from February 7, 1953. It is manifest that at the time of
promulgation of Hindu S...
CONCLUSION:
of.
Nidhi Jain
Appeal dismissed.
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
of.
Nidhi Jain
Appeal dismissed.
REASONS:
: Mere
possession would not confer pre-existing right of possession over
the subject property to claim full ownership rights after the Act,
1956 came into force by operation of law – Section 14(1) clearly
envisage that the possession of the female must be under some vestige
of a claim, right or title or under any of the devise which has been
purported under the law – On facts, claim of the appellant-daughter
from the second marriage, that property orally gifted to her mother
by her father in 1950, became her mother’s absolute property after
the commencement of the 1956 Act, and Will executed b
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2019 5 495 498 EN.pdf
Applicant: STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ORS. A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
sed – Revision – Dismissed by the Additional Director
General of Police – Writ petition thereagainst filed by the respondent
– Dismissed by Single Judge – Division Bench of the High Court D
allowed the appeal by the respondent directing that the dismissal
be converted to compulsory retirement – Held: Having regard to
the seriousness of the charge of misconduct and the fact that the
respondent was a member of the police service, no justification for
the High Court to interfere with the order of dismissal – Single Judge
E
justified in dismissing the writ petition – Order of the Single Judge
did not suffer from any error of fact or law – Order of the Division
Bench set aside Respondent joined the police service as Constable. He was
dismissed from the service for misconduct on charge of
F
drunkenness and misbehavior with public. Writ petition filed by
the respondent. High Court relegated him to the remedy of
statutory appeal. Appeal filed by the respondent before the
Inspector General of Police, was dismissed. Revision was
dismissed by the Additional Director General of Police. Writ
petition filed by the respondent challenging the said order, was G
dismissed by Single Judge of the High Court. Division Bench
allowed the appeal by the respondent, directing that the dismissal
of the respondent be converted to compulsory retirement. Hence,
the present appeal.
H
495
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 5 S.C.R.
A Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The charge against the respondent was of a
serious act of misconduct involving drunkenness and misbehavior
with the public. The fact of intoxication was duly proved in the
medical report. Having regard to the seriousness of the charge
B of misconduct and the fact that the respondent was a member of
the police service, no justification is found for the High Court to
interfere with the order of dismissal. The single Judge was
justified in dismissing the writ petition. The Division Bench erred
in allowing the Special Appeal. The or
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
: Having regard to
the seriousness of the charge of misconduct and the fact that the
respondent was a member of the police service, no justification for
the High Court to interfere with the order of dismissal – Single Judge
E
justified in dismissing the writ petition –.
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — sed – Revision – Dismissed by the Additional Director
General of Police – Writ petition thereagainst filed by the respondent
– Dismissed by Single Judge – Division Bench of the High Court D
allowed the appeal by the respondent directing that the dismissal
be converted to compulsory retirement – Held: Having regard to
the seriousness of the charge of misconduct and the fact that the
respondent was...
: Having regard to
the seriousness of the charge of misconduct and the fact that the
respondent was a member of the police service, no justification for
the High Court to interfere with the order of dismissal – Single Judge
E
justified in dismissing the writ petition –.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
– Revision – Dismissed by the Additional Director
General of Police – Writ petition thereagainst filed by the respondent
– Dismissed by Single Judge – Division Bench of the High Court D
allowed the appeal by the respondent directing that the dismissal
be converted to compulsory retirement –
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
– Revision – Dismissed by the Additional Director
General of Police – Writ petition thereagainst filed by the respondent
– Dismissed by Single Judge – Division Bench of the High Court D
allowed the appeal by the respondent directing that the dismissal
be converted to compulsory retirement –
REASONS:
: Having regard to
the seriousness of the charge of misconduct and the fact that the
respondent was a member of the police service, no justification for
the High Court to interfere with the order of dismissal – Single Judge
E
justified in dismissing the writ petition –
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2015 9 126 137 EN.pdf
Applicant: HARAM CHAND
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
in para (2) of the affidavit about
the incident which took place in 2011 and, thereafter, security B
arrangement was reviewed with the Delhi Police and a
decision was taken on the administrative side not to allow any
hawkers nearthe Supreme Court premises.
15. After considering the aforesaid affidavits, this Court C
on 01.05.2015 directed Secretary General, Supreme Court
of India and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Supreme
Court Security to inform this Court as to whether after 2011
· any incident has been reported in and around the_Supreme
Court premises. Deputy Commissioner of Police, Supreme D
Court Security, vide his affidavit dated 301 June, 2015 has
h
submitted that since 2011 no such incident of.bomb blast has
taken place in and around the Supreme Court premises.
According to the Affidavit, DCP/New Delhi District has also
opined that keeping in view the movement of traffic and general E
public, the surroundings of the Hon'ble Court are always
vulnerable. Paragraphs 3 to 5 of the Affidavit are, therefore,
extracted herein below:
F
"3. That the deponent states that since 2011 no such
incident of bomb bias has taken place in an around the
Hon'ble Supreme Court premises. DCP/New Delhi
District has also stated that no such incident took place
after 2011. DCP/New Delhi District has further stated
G
that keeping in view the movement of traffic and general
public the surroundings of the Hon'ble Court are always
vulnerable.
4. That in the present security scenario and high threat
perception to the various vital installations and institutions H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 9 S.C.R.
A including the higher judiciary in the country, as such it is
not in the interest of the security to allow any squatting on
the pavements and area around Supreme Court of India.
5. That the existing arrangements of not allowing any
B squatter on the pavements and adjacent area around the
periphery of Hon'ble Supreme. Court should be
maintained and no change in the existing arrangements
in this regard should be made so as not to adversely
affect the security of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India."
c
16. Secretary General of the Supreme Court of India has
also submitted that no incident with regard to bomb blast has
been reported in and around the Supreme Court of India after
the bomb blast outside Delhi High Court on 07.09.2011.
D
17. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the
appellant and the respondents on several dates. On the final
date of hearing, Mr. Salman Khurshid, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant tried to convince us by showing a .
E rough sketch map to the effect that the Kiosk in question is not
located within the Supreme Court compound. It was contended
that after the Supreme Court compound wall, there is a road
called Bhagwan Das Road. After crossing the road, there is a
huge car parking and thereafter the building of Indian Law
F Institute and lawyers' chambers are located. Within that
compound of Indian Law Institute, the Kio
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (1985) 3 SCC 528; (1985) 3 SCC 545; (1989) 4 SCC 155
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — in para (2) of the affidavit about
the incident which took place in 2011 and, thereafter, security B
arrangement was reviewed with the Delhi Police and a
decision was taken on the administrative side not to allow any
hawkers nearthe Supreme Court premises.
15. After considering the aforesaid affidavits, this Court C
on 01.05.2015 directed Secretary General, Supreme Court
of India and the Deputy Co...
:
Though the squatter has a right to earn his livelihood - But
in view of serious issue of safety and security, court cannot
D direct the administration to allow continuance of such a kiosk
- The purpose involving general interest of community as
opposed to the individual interest has to be balanced - The.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
the Letters Patent Appeal
C preferred by the appellant against the decision of learned
Single Judge of the High Court, which dismissed the
appellant's writ petition challenging the order dated 03.12.2013
issued by the Enforcement Department, New Delhi Municipal
Council (NDMC) deciding to relocate the appellant (a squatter)
D from his existing site outside Supreme Court to a site near
Gate of Baroda House adjacent to the existing stalls due to
security reasons.
3. The appellant's case in brief is
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
the Letters Patent Appeal
C preferred by the appellant against the decision of learned
Single Judge of the High Court, which dismissed the
appellant's writ petition challenging the order dated 03.12.2013
issued by the Enforcement Department, New Delhi Municipal
Council (NDMC) deciding to relocate the appellant (a squatter)
D from his existing site outside Supreme Court to a site near
Gate of Baroda House adjacent to the existing stalls due to
security reasons.
3. The appellant's case in brief is
REASONS:
:
Though the squatter has a right to earn his livelihood - But
in view of serious issue of safety and security, court cannot
D direct the administration to allow continuance of such a kiosk
- The purpose involving general interest of community as
opposed to the individual interest has to be balanced - The
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2021 11 954 967 EN.pdf
Applicant: S.C.R.
A VINOD KUMAR
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
before it can bring a
case under S. 300, “Thirdly”; first, it must establish, quite objectively,
that a bodily injury is present; secondly, the nature of the injury
must be proved; these are purely objective investigations; thirdly,
it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that
C
particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or
unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.”
[Para 16][964-B-F]
Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 4654
: SCR 1495 – relied on.
D
1.2 The first two elements laid down in paragraph 12 have
been established in this case as the factum of bodily injuries and
its nature have been duly established. The question is whether
the third element of intention to inflict the particular bodily injuries
was present. As narrated by PW2, he along with deceased were
E
forcibly taken in a vehicle. When the vehicle reached unmetalled
road, it was stopped. Thereafter, the accused banged the deceased
flat on the ground. While the accused no.1 was holding the
deceased, accused nos.4 and 5 started assaulting deceased. There
was no scope for the deceased to resist. Thereafter, the accused
started assaulting him. Apart from the injuries on non-vital parts,
F
there was a fracture of 6th to 10th ribs on the right side and the
right lung was ruptured. Even the wind pipe and food pipe were
ruptured. There was an injury to liver. The cause of death as
certified by the Board was excessive bleeding due to injuries on
vital parts like right lung as well as liver and the resultant shock.
G
Therefore, it is impossible to say that the injuries on the chest
which resulted into fracture of 5 ribs and rupture of right lung
were accidental or unintentional. Therefore, even the third
element was established. Once the prosecution establishes the
existence of the three ingredients forming a part of “thirdly” in
Section 300, it is irrelevant whether there was an intention on
H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11 S.C.R.
A the part of the accused to cause death. The absence of intention
to kill is not relevant in the
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt and what the appropriate sentence is
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: AIR 1958 SC 465; AIR 1958 SC 4654
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — before it can bring a
case under S. 300, “Thirdly”; first, it must establish, quite objectively,
that a bodily injury is present; secondly, the nature of the injury
must be proved; these are purely objective investigations; thirdly,
it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that
C
particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or
unintentional, or that some oth...
: The factum of
bodily injuries and its nature was duly established – Apart from the
injuries on non-vital parts, there were fractured ribs on the right
side and the right lung was ruptured – Even the wind pipe and food
pipe were ruptured – There was an injury to liver – The cause of
E
death as certified by the medical board was excessive bleeding due
to injuries on vital parts like right lung as well as liver and the
resultant shock – Deposition of eye witness that one of the accused.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
6. Mr. Manish K. Bishnoi, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant has taken us through the impugned Judgment and order of the
High Court. His submission is that the injuries on the person of the G
deceased were on vital parts of his body. He pointed out that 6th to
10th ribs of the deceased...
CONCLUSION:
into death of a person if any damage is caused to internal
organs. H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.
A 14. Though, the PW1 has not specifically stated that the injuries
on the deceased were inflicted by using iron rod or stick, there is no
dispute that the accused have caused the injuries.
15. Now the only question to be decided is whether the offence
of culpable homicide not amounting to murder is made out. In the
B impugned
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
into death of a person if any damage is caused to internal
organs. H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11 S.C.R.
A 14. Though, the PW1 has not specifically stated that the injuries
on the deceased were inflicted by using iron rod or stick, there is no
dispute that the accused have caused the injuries.
15. Now the only question to be decided is whether the offence
of culpable homicide not amounting to murder is made out. In the
B impugned
REASONS:
: The factum of
bodily injuries and its nature was duly established – Apart from the
injuries on non-vital parts, there were fractured ribs on the right
side and the right lung was ruptured – Even the wind pipe and food
pipe were ruptured – There was an injury to liver – The cause of
E
death as certified by the medical board was excessive bleeding due
to injuries on vital parts like right lung as well as liver and the
resultant shock – Deposition of eye witness that one of the accused
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2017 2 415 433 EN.pdf
Applicant: BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON LONDON BRANCH A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
, application for registration
of Reference by respondent no. l company - Dismissal of, by
Registrar, Secretary and Chairman of the Board, on the ground
that respondent no. 1 company was not an industrial company within D
the meaning of s. 3(e), (j) - Meanwhile,
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2000)5SCC515; (2000) 5
SCC 51; (1998) 5 SCC 554
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , application for registration
of Reference by respondent no. l company - Dismissal of, by
Registrar, Secretary and Chairman of the Board, on the ground
that respondent no. 1 company was not an industrial company within D
the meaning of s. 3(e), (j) - Meanwhile,
I-Company by the High Court, upheld by the Division
Bench - Subsequently, respondent-company challenged the orders
of the Secretary and Chairman of the Board rejecting the application
for Reference - High Court.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
issne. In the instant case,
it certainly was. The specific stand of the respondent No. 1
company in this regard need not detain the Court save and except
to state that by a detailed description of the manufacturing process
the respondent No. 1 company had sought to contend that it is an
B
indnstrial...
CONCLUSION:
on 13.09.2013. There was a further appeal to the Chairman
oft he Board againstthe orderofthe Secretary. Though the maintainability
of the second appeal before the Chairman of the Board would be in
serious doubt in view oft he provisions ofRegulation 19( 4) read with sub
Regulation 8 (I) and (2) of Regulation 19 oft he Board for Industri:d and
Financial Reconstruction Regulations, I 987 (hereinafter for short "the
H
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON LONDON BRANCH v. 423
ZENITH INFOTECH LIMITED [RANJAN GOGO
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
on 13.09.2013. There was a further appeal to the Chairman
oft he Board againstthe orderofthe Secretary. Though the maintainability
of the second appeal before the Chairman of the Board would be in
serious doubt in view oft he provisions ofRegulation 19( 4) read with sub
Regulation 8 (I) and (2) of Regulation 19 oft he Board for Industri:d and
Financial Reconstruction Regulations, I 987 (hereinafter for short "the
H
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON LONDON BRANCH v. 423
ZENITH INFOTECH LIMITED [RANJAN GOGO
REASONS:
of winding up of
respondent no. I-Company by the High Court, upheld by the Division
Bench - Subsequently, respondent-company challenged the orders
of the Secretary and Chairman of the Board rejecting the application
for Reference - High Court
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2015 10 325 333 EN.pdf
Applicant: STEEL COMPANY LTD. A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
nd school bus - School
bus is used for carrying the children wards of the employees
0
of the appellant from and to educational institutions purely
as welfare measure - Tipping trucks are used for handling of
coal within the mining area for production purposes -
Explosive vans are used for transfer of explosives - Likewise
other vehicles are also used captively for business purpose E
- Thus these vehicles are used by appellant for its own
purpose and would not be treated as vehicle for public or
third party- Therefore, in such situation, appellant is not liable
to pay additional tax in terms of s.6(1A) of the Act.
F
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The High Court has held that the
expression 'adapted' in Section 2(j) has to be given its
full meaning and when the vehicle was capable of being
used for carrying of passengers and goods, it would be G
treated as "Public Service Motor Vehicle." This approach
is clearly faulty. There was r'lo dispute about the first
requirement. The appellant had rested its case on the
325 H
326 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1O S .C.R.
A submission that the second requirement namely 'hire'
or 'reward' had not been fulfilled. The expression 'hire'
or 'reward' would mean that the vehicle must be run for
the benefit of another. Obviously, the appellant is the
owner, if the vehicle is given on 'hire' to a third person
B and charges are received therefrom, it would amount to
using the vehicle for 'hire'. Likewise, when the owner of
the vehicle uses the vehicle himself but for the benefit of
another person i.e. third person and receives some
C charges for the said use, that may fulfill the requirement
of 'reward'. Insofar as the present c~se is concerned,
the vehicles ar~ not used for the third party at all. Most
of the vehicles are used for business purposes. Some
vehicles are used for carrying the children of the
employees from their residence to schools and back.
0
That would not be treated as using the vehicle for public
or third part
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (1999) 8 SCC 169; (1999)8 SCC 169; (1979) 1 SCC 208
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — nd school bus - School
bus is used for carrying the children wards of the employees
0
of the appellant from and to educational institutions purely
as welfare measure - Tipping trucks are used for handling of
coal within the mining area for production purposes -
Explosive vans are used for transfer of explosives - Likewise
other vehicles are also used captively for business purpose E
- Thus these v...
Most
of the vehicles are used for business purposes. Some
vehicles are used for carrying the children of the
employees from their residence to schools and back. 0
That would not be treated as using the vehicle for public
or third party.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
by the impugned judgment dated 2Qlh
C August, 2004, out of which the present appeal arises.
5. After perusing the impugned judgment it would be seen
that the aforesaid contention of the appellant challenging the
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
by the impugned judgment dated 2Qlh
C August, 2004, out of which the present appeal arises.
5. After perusing the impugned judgment it would be seen
that the aforesaid contention of the appellant challenging the
REASONS:
: 1. The High Court has held that the
expression 'adapted' in Section 2(j) has to be given its
full meaning and when the vehicle was capable of being
used for carrying of passengers and goods, it would be G
treated as "Public Service Motor Vehicle." This approach
is clearly faulty. There was r'lo dispute about the first
requirement. The appellant had rested its case on the
325 H
326 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1O S .C.R.
A submission that the second requirement namely 'hire'
or 'reward' had not been fulfilled. The expression 'hire'
or 'reward' would mean that the vehicle must be run for
the
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2021 7 710 730 EN.pdf
Applicant: S.C.R.
A RAJASTHAN RAJYA VIDYUT PRASARAN NIGAM LIMITED
AND ANOTHER
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
of the case on hand, the impugned
B
order passed by the Division Bench dismissing the appeal and
confirming the order passed by the Single Judge quashing and
setting aside the order of termination terminating the services
of the employee on the ground of non-disclosure/suppression of
material fact and filing a false declaration and directing the
appellants to reinstate the respondent-employee is unsustainable. C
[Para 9][728-B-D]
2. Apart from the fact that at the time when the respondent
applied in the month of October/November, 2013 though he was
already convicted by the competent court and was given the
benefit under Section 3 of the Act 1958 only, he did not disclose
D
his conviction, but even at the time when he filed a declaration
on 14.04.2015 he filed a false declaration that neither any criminal
case is pending against him nor he has been convicted by any
court of law and relying upon such a declaration the appellants
gave him appointment. Only on police verification/receipt of the
E
antecedent’s report from the Superintendent of Police, the
appellants came to know about the conviction of the respondent.
Therefore, the appellants were absolutely justified in terminating
the services of the respondent. [Para 10][728-D-F]
3. Even the conduct on the part of the respondent to obtain
the
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt and what the appropriate sentence is
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2000) 6 SCC 224; (2013) 7 SCC 685; (2003) 3 SCC 437
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — of the case on hand, the impugned
B
order passed by the Division Bench dismissing the appeal and
confirming the order passed by the Single Judge quashing and
setting aside the order of termination terminating the services
of the employee on the ground of non-disclosure/suppression of
material fact and filing a false declaration and directing the
appellants to reinstate the respondent-employee is u...
, the respondent was required to produce a
character certification/verification report issued by the
D Superintendent of Police (SP) of the concerned District from
where he belonged – SP informed the appellants that the respondent
was convicted by the trial Court for the offences u/s 341, 323 IPC,
however, given the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act,
1958 and the respondent-employee was ordered to be released on
probation for good conduct – Having found that the respondent
E
deliberately suppressed the fact of conviction and penalty, not only
at the time of applying post, but also when he submitted a declaration
during documents verification that neither criminal case is pending
against him nor he has suffered any conviction by any court of law
in any criminal case – Appellant was terminated – Writ Petition –
F The High Court quashed and set aside the.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
and relying upon the decisions
of this Court in the cases of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Ram
Ratan Yadav, (2003) 3 SCC 437; Secretary, Department of Home
C
Secretary, A.P. v. B. Chinnam Naidu, (2005) 2 SCC 746; Daya
Shankar Yadav v. Union of India, (2010) 14 SCC 103; Jainendra
Singh v. State of...
CONCLUSION:
of within a period of one month,
i.e., on 9.9.2015 and the Sessions Court granted the benefit of
Section 12 of the Act 1958. From the judgment and order passed
by the Sessions Court, it appears that the respondent only prayed
B
for giving the benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958 and nothing
was contended by him with regard to conviction and
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
of within a period of one month,
i.e., on 9.9.2015 and the Sessions Court granted the benefit of
Section 12 of the Act 1958. From the judgment and order passed
by the Sessions Court, it appears that the respondent only prayed
B
for giving the benefit of Section 12 of the Act 1958 and nothing
was contended by him with regard to conviction and
REASONS:
, the respondent was required to produce a
character certification/verification report issued by the
D Superintendent of Police (SP) of the concerned District from
where he belonged – SP informed the appellants that the respondent
was convicted by the trial Court for the offences u/s 341, 323 IPC,
however, given the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act,
1958 and the respondent-employee was ordered to be released on
probation for good conduct – Having found that the respondent
E
deliberately suppressed the fact of conviction and penalty, not only
at the time of applying post, but also w
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2015 9 36 55 EN.pdf
Applicant: A CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
of the case, it is manifest that the
instrument of mortgage came into existence only after
separate loan ·agreements were executed by the
borrower with the lenders with regard to separate loan C
advanced by those lenders to the respondent borrower.
[Para 28) [50-G]
4. It appears from the trustee document that
o
altogether 13 banks lent money to the mortgagor, details
of which have been described in the schedule and for
the repayment of money, the borrower entered into
separate loan agreements with 13 financial institutions.
Had the respondent-borrower entered into a separate
mortgage deed with these financial institutions in
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid and enforceable contract and whether a breach occurred entitling the claimant to relief
RULE:
: The Mortgage Deed came into existence only after
E separate loan agreements were executed by the borrower-
Company with the 13 financial institutions-lenders with regard
to separate loan advanced - On proper construction of the
Mortgage Deed, it can safely be regarded as 13 distinct
transactions which fall uls.
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — of the case, it is manifest that the
instrument of mortgage came into existence only after
separate loan ·agreements were executed by the
borrower with the lenders with regard to separate loan C
advanced by those lenders to the respondent borrower.
[Para 28) [50-G]
4. It appears from the trustee document that
o
altogether 13 banks lent money to the mortgagor, details
of which have been described i...
: The Mortgage Deed came into existence only after
E separate loan agreements were executed by the borrower-
Company with the 13 financial institutions-lenders with regard
to separate loan advanced - On proper construction of the
Mortgage Deed, it can safely be regarded as 13 distinct
transactions which fall uls. 5 - Demand of additional stamp
F
duty confirmed.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
vide order dated March,
28, 2011. The respondentthereafter made an application under
Section 54(1-A] of the Act thereby giving rise to the Reference
·Proceedings.
D 10. By way of the Reference, the opinion of the High Court
was sought on the questions referred hereinabove.
11. The High Court opined that the State of Gujarat is not
entitled to recover any additional stamp duty based upon its
perception of the legislative intendment behind Section 5 of
E the Act. The Court noted that stamp du.ty i
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
vide order dated March,
28, 2011. The respondentthereafter made an application under
Section 54(1-A] of the Act thereby giving rise to the Reference
·Proceedings.
D 10. By way of the Reference, the opinion of the High Court
was sought on the questions referred hereinabove.
11. The High Court opined that the State of Gujarat is not
entitled to recover any additional stamp duty based upon its
perception of the legislative intendment behind Section 5 of
E the Act. The Court noted that stamp du.ty i
REASONS:
: The Mortgage Deed came into existence only after
E separate loan agreements were executed by the borrower-
Company with the 13 financial institutions-lenders with regard
to separate loan advanced - On proper construction of the
Mortgage Deed, it can safely be regarded as 13 distinct
transactions which fall uls. 5 - Demand of additional stamp
F
duty confirmed.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2019 14 704 715 EN.pdf
Applicant: the accused
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
in directions to the Tamil
Nadu State Election Commission was challenged – It was claimed
D therein that the State Government was deliberately postponing
elections; unconstitutionally altering constituencies and refusing
to effect rotation for gaining undue political advantage – On
12.11.2019, the State Government issued notification dividing four
existing districts of Tamil Nadu to create nine new districts – In
view of deference to various Supreme Court orders, the State
E
Election Commission on 02.12.2019 announced the Elections
Programme for all Panchayats at the village, intermediate and
district levels – Present IAs filed inter alia to strike down the said
Notification and direction to conduct local body elections only after
delimitation of the newly carved districts – Held: Constitutional
object of Part IX, envisaging democratisation of grass-root level
F
administration, cannot be effectively achieved unless the
delimitation exercise for constitution of local bodies at all levels
is properly undertaken – Such exercise in the State of Tamil Nadu
must keep in view the criteria for delimitation of wards prescribed
under the 2017 Regulations, which criteria must itself not be
G contrary to Art.243-C r/w Art.243-B(1) – Election process as
notified on 02.12.2019, in respect of the newly constituted nine
districts cannot be held unless fresh delimitation exercise in respect
thereto is first completed – State Government cannot justify holding
local body elections of these nine districts by relying upon Supreme
Court’s order dated. 18.11.2019 as the said order itself mandates
H
704
DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM (DMK) v. 705
SECRETARY GOVERNORS SECRETARIAT AND ORS.
notification of elections only after completing “all legal A
formalities”– Directions issued – Further, the only grievance raised
in the main appeals was that the local body elections ought be held
on the basis of the 2011 Census and not of 2001; and considering
how the respondents have already used the 2011 Cen
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2000) 8 SCC 216
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — in directions to the Tamil
Nadu State Election Commission was challenged – It was claimed
D therein that the State Government was deliberately postponing
elections; unconstitutionally altering constituencies and refusing
to effect rotation for gaining undue political advantage – On
12.11.2019, the State Government issued notification dividing four
existing districts of Tamil Nadu to create nine ne...
of the
Madras High Court refusing to issue certain directions to the Tamil
Nadu State Election Commission was challenged – It was claimed
D therein that the State Government was deliberately postponing
elections; unconstitutionally altering constituencies and refusing
to effect rotation for gaining undue political advantage – On
12. 2019, the State Government issued notification dividing four
existing districts of Tamil Nadu to create nine new districts – In
view of deference to various Supreme Court orders, the State
E
Election Commission on 02. 2019 announced the Elections
Programme for all Panchayats at the village, intermediate and
district levels – Present IAs filed inter alia to strike down the said
Notification and direction to conduct local body elections only after
delimitation of the newly carved districts –.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
of
accordingly. [Paras 16, 17] [715-D-F]
Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar and
Others (2000) 8 SCC 216 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 34
C
– relied on.
Case Law Reference
[2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 34 relied on Para 13
CIVIL APPELLATE/JURISDICTION : I.A. No. 182868 of 2019
in Civil Appeal Nos. 5467-5469 of 2017. D
From the
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
of
accordingly. [Paras 16, 17] [715-D-F]
Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar and
Others (2000) 8 SCC 216 : 3 Suppl. SCR 34
C
– relied on.
Case Law Reference
3 Suppl. SCR 34 relied on Para 13
CIVIL APPELLATE/JURISDICTION : I.A. No. 182868 of 2019
in Civil Appeal Nos. 5467-5469 of 2017. D
From the
REASONS:
of the
Madras High Court refusing to issue certain directions to the Tamil
Nadu State Election Commission was challenged – It was claimed
D therein that the State Government was deliberately postponing
elections; unconstitutionally altering constituencies and refusing
to effect rotation for gaining undue political advantage – On
12.11.2019, the State Government issued notification dividing four
existing districts of Tamil Nadu to create nine new districts – In
view of deference to various Supreme Court orders, the State
E
Election Commission on 02.12.2019 announced the Elections
Programme for
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2023 10 742 757 EN.pdf
Applicant: S.C.R.
A THE MADRAS ALUMINIUM CO. LTD.
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
, it is not open for the respondents to contend
that the petitioner is not liable for the refund of the amount deposited
under protest towards the bills so generated taking the maximum
load to be 23000 KVA – Particularly, when at no point in time, the
appellant neither sought for nor consumed the electricity more than
F the maximum demand of 10000 KVA – Acknowledging the financial
health of the appellant, in the 1999 agreement, the respondent ought
to have taken a decision on the appellant request with a reasonable
dispatch and terms which ought to have been within a period latest
by six months and not two and a half years as was eventually done
–
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid and enforceable contract and whether a breach occurred entitling the claimant to relief
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2023) 2 SCC 643; (1991) 1 SCC 212; (1984) 1 SCC 125
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , it is not open for the respondents to contend
that the petitioner is not liable for the refund of the amount deposited
under protest towards the bills so generated taking the maximum
load to be 23000 KVA – Particularly, when at no point in time, the
appellant neither sought for nor consumed the electricity more than
F the maximum demand of 10000 KVA – Acknowledging the financial
health of the ap...
: Yes – State action irrespective of being in the
contractual realm must abide by Article 14 – Appellant was
unjustifiably asked to furnish costs for unutilized electricity which
should not have extended beyond six months (considering
‘reasonable period’ to consider an application, to be so), for a
period much larger thereto, rendering such action unreasonable
E
and arbitrary – On.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
to take refuge of these
clauses while the company on the other side is saddled with heavy
cost in the interregnum of such decision. More so in view of the
F
communication dated 11th August 1994. [Paras 27 and 28][753-
F-H]
1.3 The Writ Court had observed that in the other instances
cited by the Appellant herein, the reduction sought was a small
amount of KVA as opposed to the 13000 KVA reduction sought
vide the instant application. While that may be true, it does not G
supply reason to the act o
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
to take refuge of these
clauses while the company on the other side is saddled with heavy
cost in the interregnum of such decision. More so in view of the
F
communication dated 11th August 1994. [Paras 27 and 28][753-
F-H]
1.3 The Writ Court had observed that in the other instances
cited by the Appellant herein, the reduction sought was a small
amount of KVA as opposed to the 13000 KVA reduction sought
vide the instant application. While that may be true, it does not G
supply reason to the act o
REASONS:
: Yes – State action irrespective of being in the
contractual realm must abide by Article 14 – Appellant was
unjustifiably asked to furnish costs for unutilized electricity which
should not have extended beyond six months (considering
‘reasonable period’ to consider an application, to be so), for a
period much larger thereto, rendering such action unreasonable
E
and arbitrary – On
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
LEGAL SCENARIO:
and circumstances of the instant case is disproportionate
to the charges levelled against the appellant. It is submitted that the
female constable – Rupasi Barman has been awarded punishment of
forfeiture of two years’ seniority in the rank of constable and forfeiture
of two years’ service for the purpose of promotion. She was also tried
by the SFC for an offence under Section 43 of the SSB Act. It is submitted
that therefore the learned Single Judge rightly interfered with the
punishment of ‘re
PRECEDENTS TO CONSIDER:
• (2016) 13 SCC 71
• (2013) 12 SCC 372
• (2006) 10 SCC 388
• AIR 1987
SC 2386
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
Section 43 of the Shashastra Seema Bal Act, 2007 Article 136 of the
Constitution Article 226 of the Constitution The following precedents are applicable: (2016) 13 SCC 71; (2013) 12 SCC 372; (2006) 10 SCC 388
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — and circumstances of the instant case is disproportionate
to the charges levelled against the appellant. It is submitted that the
female constable – Rupasi Barman has been awarded punishment of
forfeiture of two years’ seniority in the rank of constable and forfeiture
of two years’ service for the purpose of promotion. She was also tried
by the SFC for an offence under Section 43 of the SSB Act. I...
even the learned Single Judge held.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
were made before the learned Single Judge on the legality
and validity of the ROE and the SFC procedures. It was also submitted
on behalf of the appellant that a female constable, Rupasi Barman, who
was on sentry duty and who allowed entry of the delinquent during her
sentry duty and against whom pa...
CONCLUSION:
.
ANIL KUMAR UPADHYAY v. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL, SSB
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
</think>
<|answer|>
guilty of the charges and order of removal from service was passed
against him – Appellant filed writ petition – Plea of appellant was
that much lesser punishment was imposed against a female constable
who allowed the entry of the appellant and same was discriminatory
– On this ground, single judge set aside punishment of ‘removal
from service’ and remitted the matter to the disciplinary authority to
impose any lesser punishment which may facilitate the appellant to
retain his job – Disciplinary authority successfully challenged the
order of single judge before Division Bench – Hence instant appeal
by the delinquent – Held: The nature of misconduct committed by
the appellant was grave in nature and unpardonable – Misconduct
committed by a male Head Constable cannot be equated with the
misc
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2017 8 626 629 EN.pdf
Applicant: A APPARAJU MALHAR RAO
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
, High Court did not frame
C any substantial question of law as is required to be framed at the
time of admission of the second appeal and allowed the second
appeal filed by respondent No. I - Sustainability of-
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (1997) 4 SCC 413; (2001) 3 SCC 179; (1997) 5 SCC 438
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , High Court did not frame
C any substantial question of law as is required to be framed at the
time of admission of the second appeal and allowed the second
appeal filed by respondent No. I - Sustainability of-
: Impugned
order not legally sustainable and is set aside - Matter remanded to
the High Court for deciding the second appeal afresh. Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: The reasons to remand the case to the High Court
has occasioned because the High Court while allowing the second
appeal filed by the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 did not frame any
substantial question of law as is required to be framed at the time
of admission of the second appeal and proceeded to allow the
E appeal filed by the plaintiff.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
of counsel for the appellant that it so arises but not
beyond that as to whether it actually arises and, if so, what is that
question. Thus, the impugned order is not legally sustainable
F and is liable set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court
for deciding the second appeal afresh in accord...
CONCLUSION:
the second
appeal filed by respondent No. I - Sustainability of- Held: Impugned
order not legally sustainable and is set aside - Matter remanded to
the High Court for deciding the second appeal afresh.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
the second
appeal filed by respondent No. I - Sustainability of- Held: Impugned
order not legally sustainable and is set aside - Matter remanded to
the High Court for deciding the second appeal afresh.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
REASONS:
: Impugned
order not legally sustainable and is set aside - Matter remanded to
the High Court for deciding the second appeal afresh.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: The reasons to remand the case to the High Court
has occasioned because the High Court while allowing the second
appeal filed by the plaintiff-respondent No.1 did not frame any
substantial question of law as is required to be framed at the time
of admission of the second appeal and proceeded to allow the
E appeal filed by the plaintiff. Perusal of the impugned
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
FACTS:
need mention hereinbelow in brief to appreciate
the controversy involved in these appeals.
3. On 26.07.1989, the State Government made a reference under
Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Industrial Tribunal,
Kota for deciding the following disputes which read as under:
“Whether the demands raised in the demand letters by the
Secretary, Zila Petrol Pump Mazdoor Sangh before
SUBMISSIONS BY PARTIES:
filed on behalf
of respondent, we are inclined to allow the appeals, set aside the impugned
Analyse the submissions and provide a reasoned judgment.
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
: Since
inception, appellant did not get opportunity to contest the matter
because they did not have any knowledge of the proceedings –
Every party to a lis has a right to contest the case on merits, subject
to certain exceptions provided in law – Thus, case remanded to the
Industrial Tribunal.
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — need mention hereinbelow in brief to appreciate
the controversy involved in these appeals.
3. On 26.07.1989, the State Government made a reference under
Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Industrial Tribunal,
Kota for deciding the following disputes which read as under:
“Whether the demands raised in the demand letters by the
Secretary, Zila Petrol Pump Mazdoor Sangh before...
of the case including the written submission filed on behalf.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
filed on behalf
of respondent, we are inclined to allow the appeals, set aside the impugned
CONCLUSION:
) [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.
</think>
<|answer|>
: Since
inception, appellant did not get opportunity to contest the matter
because they did not have any knowledge of the proceedings –
Every party to a lis has a right to contest the case on merits, subject
to certain exceptions provided in law – Thus, case remanded to the
Industrial Tribunal.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The reasons for remand are: First, it is not in
dispute that the appellant did not get any opportunity to contest
the reference before the Industrial Tribunal and had to suffer
adverse award ex parte; Second, the cause shown for their absence
before the Industrial Tribunal constitutes a sufficient cause and
entitles the appellant to claim an opportunity to cont
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2019 3 663 672 EN.pdf
Applicant: RITU BHATIA A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
and circumstances of the case, the High court committed a
grave error in approving the order of termination on the ground that the
appellant was not having the requisite qualification of having experience
of five years as a Company Secretary. It is submitted by Shri Sunil
Kumar that the High Court has failed to appreciate the fact that though C
during seven years and three months experience shown in her application,
the appellant might have been appointed as Management Trainee and
Assistant Company Secretary and consequently might not have been
actually appointed as the Company Secretary, however, the appellant
was discharging certain or some functions/duties during the period of a
D
Company Secretary. It is submitted that therefore it can be said that the
appellant was having requisite experience of five years as a Company
Secretary. Therefore, the period during which the appellant was working
as a Management Trainee is required to be counted as the requisite
experience for the post of Company Secretary.
E
5.2 It is further submitted by Shri Sunil Kumar, learned senior
counsel that the object and purpose behind asking for the experience as
a Company Secretary was that the applicant has an experience of working
as Company Secretary and not that he/she had actually worked and/or
performed the duties as a Company Secretary under the provisions of
the Company Secretary Act 1980. It is submitted therefore, the High
F
Court committed an error to hold that the appellant was not having the
requisite experience as a Company Secretary.
5.3 Relying upon prescribed format of submitting the application
attached with the application form, it is submitted that what was required
was the qualification/ experience as Company Secretary and not actual
G
working as Company Secretary.
5.4 It is further submitted by Shri Sunil Kumar, learned senior
counsel that as far as the experience gained by the appellant while
working with Bharat Bhushan Shares and Commodity Brokers Limited
is concerned, the High Court has committed a grave error in considering
H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 3 S.C.R.
A the experience only till May, 2007, though the Form-32 shows the date
of cessation as 29.06.2007.
5.5 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Dr. Asim
Kumar Bose v. Union of India and Others (1983) 1 SCC 345, it is
submitted by Shri Sunil Kumar that as observed and
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (1983) 1 SCC 345
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — and circumstances of the case, the High court committed a
grave error in approving the order of termination on the ground that the
appellant was not having the requisite qualification of having experience
of five years as a Company Secretary. It is submitted by Shri Sunil
Kumar that the High Court has failed to appreciate the fact that though C
during seven years and three months experience shown...
2013 – Services of the appellant
rightly terminated. H
663
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 3 S. A Dismissing the appeal, the Court.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
it is prayed to allow the present
D
appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court as well as the
order of termination terminating the services of the appellant as a
Company Secretary.
6. Present appeal is opposed by Shri Gourab Banerji learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the resp...
CONCLUSION:
– Held: As per appellant she was working as
Assistant Company Secretary for the period between June 2008 to
May 2010 in Utkal Investments Limited, as Management Trainee in
the Delhi Stock Exchange Association Limited for the period between E
April 2005 to June 2006, and as Management Trainee in ONGC
for the period between May 2003 to June 2004 – Her appointment
as Management Trainee cannot be equated and/or considered as
appointment ‘as’ a Company Secretary – Word ‘as’ used in the
advertisement
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
– Held: As per appellant she was working as
Assistant Company Secretary for the period between June 2008 to
May 2010 in Utkal Investments Limited, as Management Trainee in
the Delhi Stock Exchange Association Limited for the period between E
April 2005 to June 2006, and as Management Trainee in ONGC
for the period between May 2003 to June 2004 – Her appointment
as Management Trainee cannot be equated and/or considered as
appointment ‘as’ a Company Secretary – Word ‘as’ used in the
advertisement
REASONS:
: As per appellant she was working as
Assistant Company Secretary for the period between June 2008 to
May 2010 in Utkal Investments Limited, as Management Trainee in
the Delhi Stock Exchange Association Limited for the period between E
April 2005 to June 2006, and as Management Trainee in ONGC
for the period between May 2003 to June 2004 – Her appointment
as Management Trainee cannot be equated and/or considered as
appointment ‘as’ a Company Secretary – Word ‘as’ used in the
advertisement should be given a literal meaning – It cannot be said
F
that the appellant had, while working as a ‘Manage
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2021 9 152 162 EN.pdf
Applicant: S.C.R.
A ANJALI RATHI AND OTHERS
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
before this Court reveals
that the petitioners have participated in the proceedings before
D
the RP and later, the CoC. The Resolution Plan which has been
submitted by the consortium of home buyers stands approved by
the CoC and the proceedings are now pending before the
Adjudicating Authority, awaiting its approval under Section 31(1)
of the IBC. If the petitioners have any objections to the Resolution
Plan, they are to submit them before the Adjudicating Authority. E
The NCLT is directed to ensure that the application for approval
is disposed of expeditiously and preferably within a period of six
weeks form the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2021) 6 SCC 258; (2012) 5
SCC 661
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — before this Court reveals
that the petitioners have participated in the proceedings before
D
the RP and later, the CoC. The Resolution Plan which has been
submitted by the consortium of home buyers stands approved by
the CoC and the proceedings are now pending before the
Adjudicating Authority, awaiting its approval under Section 31(1)
of the IBC. If the petitioners have any objections to the Reso...
of NCDRC
D before High Court and stay was granted in favour of first respondent
– Pending execution, proceedings were initiated against the first
respondent before NCLT by operational creditor – Adjudicating
Authority admitted s. 9 petition following which the corporate
insolvency resolution process was initiated and a moratorium was
declared under s.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
in the proceedings pending before this Court. The RP issued an
Information Memorandum to prospective Resolution Applicants in terms
of the IBC. Two Resolution Applicants came forth before the RP,
C
namely:(i) I & E Advertising Private Limited; and (ii) a consortium
representing the home buyers. It a...
CONCLUSION:
of expeditiously – Since
the Resolution Plan is still to be approved by the Adjudicating
Authority under the provisions of s.31(1) of the IBC, at this stage, it
H is held not appropriate to issue a direction to attach personal
152
ANJALI RATHI AND ORS. v. TODAY HOMES & INFRASTRUCTURE 153
PVT. LTD. AND ORS.
properties of the promoters – After the Resolution Plan is approved A
under the provisions of s.31(1), consequences emanating from the
statutory provision would ensue to the benefit of the hom
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
of expeditiously – Since
the Resolution Plan is still to be approved by the Adjudicating
Authority under the provisions of s.31(1) of the IBC, at this stage, it
H is held not appropriate to issue a direction to attach personal
152
ANJALI RATHI AND ORS. v. TODAY HOMES & INFRASTRUCTURE 153
PVT. LTD. AND ORS.
properties of the promoters – After the Resolution Plan is approved A
under the provisions of s.31(1), consequences emanating from the
statutory provision would ensue to the benefit of the hom
REASONS:
of NCDRC
D before High Court and stay was granted in favour of first respondent
– Pending execution, proceedings were initiated against the first
respondent before NCLT by operational creditor – Adjudicating
Authority admitted s.9 petition following which the corporate
insolvency resolution process was initiated and a moratorium was
declared under s.14 of the IBC – This
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2019 1 94 99 EN.pdf
Applicant: ANR.
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
taken note of supra,
we consider it just and reasonable to award a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-
(Rs.One lakh) to the respondent in lieu of his right to claim re-instatement
and back wages in full and final satisfaction of this dispute in place of
Rs.30,000/- awarded by the Labour Court. Only to this extent we modify
G
the award of the Labour Court in quantum of award of compensation by
enhancing it from Rs.30,000/- to Rs.1,00,000 (one lakh).
16. Let the payment of Rs.1,00,000/- be paid by the
appellant(State) to the respondent within three months from the date of
receipt of this
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2018) 12 SCC 298; (2018) 12
SCC 298; (2014) 7 SCC 177
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — taken note of supra,
we consider it just and reasonable to award a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-
(Rs.One lakh) to the respondent in lieu of his right to claim re-instatement
and back wages in full and final satisfaction of this dispute in place of
Rs.30,000/- awarded by the Labour Court. Only to this extent we modify
G
the award of the Labour Court in quantum of award of compensation by
enhancing it from R...
1 lakh awarded
to the respondent in full and final satisfaction of his claim of re-
instatement and other consequential benefits by taking recourse to
E
the powers under s. 30,000/- awarded
by the Labour Court – Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
– s. Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
F.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
vide order dated 27.06.2016
which has now given rise to two special leave to appeals by State
questioning the legality and correctness of the main order dated 24.11.2015
and review order dated 27.06.2016 by way of special leave before this
Court.
B 4. It is the case of the respondent (worker) that he worked as
Beldar in the State PWD Department (Haridwar) as a daily wager for
about a year from June 1986 to May 1987 and thereafter his services
were brought to an end by the State without following
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
vide order dated 27.06.2016
which has now given rise to two special leave to appeals by State
questioning the legality and correctness of the main order dated 24.11.2015
and review order dated 27.06.2016 by way of special leave before this
Court.
B 4. It is the case of the respondent (worker) that he worked as
Beldar in the State PWD Department (Haridwar) as a daily wager for
about a year from June 1986 to May 1987 and thereafter his services
were brought to an end by the State without following
REASONS:
: Respondent having worked as daily wager had no right to
D claim regularization or right to continue as daily wager – Dispute
was raised almost 25 years of alleged termination – The case of the
respondent squarely fell in the category of cases discussed in Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Ltd. – Monetary compensation of Rs.1 lakh awarded
to the respondent in full and final satisfaction of his claim of re-
instatement and other consequential benefits by taking recourse to
E
the powers under s.11-A of the Act in place of Rs.30,000/- awarded
by the Labour Court – Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: None
Applicant: PERIYASAMI AND ORS.
Court: absence of such satisfaction, the court should
FACTS OF THE CASE:
, in FIR or
in the statements recorded u/s. 161, the names of the appellants or
any other description not given so as to identify them – Allegations
in the FIR are vague – No strong or cogent evidence to make the
appellants stand the trial for the offences u/ss 147, 448, 294(b)
and 506 IPC – Additional accused cannot be summoned u/s. 319 in
casual and cavalier manner in the absence of strong and cogent
evidence – Thus, the High Court erred in setting aside the
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2014) 3 SCC 92
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , in FIR or
in the statements recorded u/s. 161, the names of the appellants or
any other description not given so as to identify them – Allegations
in the FIR are vague – No strong or cogent evidence to make the
appellants stand the trial for the offences u/ss 147, 448, 294(b)
and 506 IPC – Additional accused cannot be summoned u/s. 319 in
casual and cavalier manner in the absence of strong and c...
1680
of 2012 filed before the High Court of Madras was dismissed on
21. Thereafter, the Complainant has filed a petition under Section
173 (8) of the Code which was dismissed on 30. It is also pointed
out that names of the proposed accused were not disclosed in the First
Information Report nor came to light during investigation.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
of final report, no details or information
regarding the other 20 members have been found.
7…. Also under Section 319 of Cr.PC when the case is under
progress and a person is accused with proper evidence or witness
the court can
CONCLUSION:
.
PERIYASAMI AND ORS. v. S. NALLASAMY
[HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
.
PERIYASAMI AND ORS. v. S. NALLASAMY
[HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
REASONS:
:
U/s. 319 additional accused can be summoned only if there is more
than prima facie case as is required at the time of framing of charge
but which is less than the satisfaction required at the time of
conclusion of the trial convicting the accused – On facts, in FIR or
in the statements recorded u/s. 161, the names of the appellants or
any other description not given so as to identify them – Allegations
in the FIR are vague – No strong or cogent evidence to make the
appellants stand the trial for the offences u/ss 147, 448, 294(b)
and 506 IPC – Additional accused cannot be summoned u/s. 319 i
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
LEGAL SCENARIO:
of this case, our attention is not
drawn to any of the specific provision under the
Registration Act empowering the Registrar to entertain
a document of cancellation for registration on the ground
B
that the sale .consideration was not paid and
consequently, received by the vendor. Further, in our , ·
opinion, when the Registrar satisfies himself on the
perusal of the document, wherein it is stated that the full·
sale consideration is received and on such satisfaction, C
entertain the
PRECEDENTS TO CONSIDER:
• (1989) 2 SCC 691
• (2010) 15 SCC 207
• AIR 2010 Madras
18
• AIR 1955 SC 233
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
Section 69
of the Registration Act, 1908 Section 33 of the Registration Act, 1908 Article 300A of the Constitution Article
136 of the Constitution The following precedents are applicable: (1989) 2 SCC 691; (2010) 15 SCC 207; AIR 2010 Madras
18
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — of this case, our attention is not
drawn to any of the specific provision under the
Registration Act empowering the Registrar to entertain
a document of cancellation for registration on the ground
B
that the sale .consideration was not paid and
consequently, received by the vendor. Further, in our , ·
opinion, when the Registrar satisfies himself on the
perusal of the document, wherein it...
has also.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
urged on behalf of the Society is that as there was no
construction raised by the appellant or his deceased mother F
on the said plot ofland and therefore, there has been a violation
of the Bye-laws of the Society, as claimed by the Society and
hence, it has executed the Extinguishment Deed date...
CONCLUSION:
ORDER
In view of the difference of opinion between us, the
C Registry is directed to place the matter before Hon'ble the Chief
Justice of India, so that an appropriate Bench could be
constituted for hearing the matter.
</think>
<|answer|>
that the controversy
927
H
928
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14 S.C.R.
A
raised by the appellant could not be adjudicated in the writ
proceeding; and that the authorities under the Act had
correctly stated that they have no jurisdiction to decide the
soundness of registration of Extinguishment Deed or the sale
deeds and declare them as null and void - Whether the Deed
B of Extinguishment and the subsequent sale deeds registered
by the Sub-Registrar under the Act could be cancelled by
the Sub-Registrar or by his superior authority in exercise of
powers conferred under the Act - Held (per Misra, J.): In
Thota Ganga Laxmi case, the Supreme Court, after making
c reference to a specific rule, namely, Rule 26(k)(i) framed by
the State of Andhra Pradesh u/s. 69 of the Registratio
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2017 2 645 661 EN.pdf
Applicant: SURESH SINGHAL A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
and circumstances of the case, we find it difficult
c to accept that the murder of Shyam Sunder and Kishan Lal
had been preplanned. Had Suresh Singhal and his father late
Pritpal Singhal preplanned the murder, they would have chosen
some other place to execute their plan and would not have
done it in the office oft he informant, in the presence ofa number
of persons. The convict Suresh Singhal and his father late
D Pritpal Singhal knew that a number of persons including the
informant Lala Harkishan Dass and the members of the
Gurdaspur Party would be present in the office of the informant
on that day and in the event of Krishan Lal and his brother(s)
having murdered there, all these persons would be eye
witnesses against them. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that
E
they would have planned to commit murders at that place. It is
true that both of them were armed with loaded revolvers when
they came to the office of the informant on that day. But that
in our view, in the
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2010)
2 SCC 333
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — and circumstances of the case, we find it difficult
c to accept that the murder of Shyam Sunder and Kishan Lal
had been preplanned. Had Suresh Singhal and his father late
Pritpal Singhal preplanned the murder, they would have chosen
some other place to execute their plan and would not have
done it in the office oft he informant, in the presence ofa number
of persons. The convict Suresh Singhal and...
: Evidence proved that there was a scujjle in which the appellant D
was pinned to the floor and deceased attempted to strangulate the
appellant - In the scujjle, appellant may have pulled out his gun
and upon seeing the gun, the deceased may have released the
appellant -and started running upon which the appellant may have
fired the shot which hit deceased on back - This also explains the
E
trajectory of the shot in which the bullet entered the body below the
right shoulder, and travelled upwards without exiting - Medical
evidence was also to the effect that shot was fired from a distant
range - No doubt, the appellant exceeded the power given to him
by law in.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
of premeditation but rather,
as the evidence suggests, the shooting took place in a sudden
fight in the heat of passion. It is not possible to accept the
B
argument of the prosecution that the appellant took undue
advantage of the situation and used the gun even though the
deceased and his brothers were unarmed. Given the murd~rous
assault on the appellant and the possibility of being attacked again,
may be with arms or may be with the help of the other persons, it
c is not possible to attribute
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
of premeditation but rather,
as the evidence suggests, the shooting took place in a sudden
fight in the heat of passion. It is not possible to accept the
B
argument of the prosecution that the appellant took undue
advantage of the situation and used the gun even though the
deceased and his brothers were unarmed. Given the murd~rous
assault on the appellant and the possibility of being attacked again,
may be with arms or may be with the help of the other persons, it
c is not possible to attribute
REASONS:
: Evidence proved that there was a scujjle in which the appellant D
was pinned to the floor and deceased attempted to strangulate the
appellant - In the scujjle, appellant may have pulled out his gun
and upon seeing the gun, the deceased may have released the
appellant -and started running upon which the appellant may have
fired the shot which hit deceased on back - This also explains the
E
trajectory of the shot in which the bullet entered the body below the
right shoulder, and travelled upwards without exiting - Medical
evidence was also to the effect that shot was fired from a distant
range
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2023 3 107 111 EN.pdf
Applicant: ANR. A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
of the case on hand,
more particularly, the fact that physical possession of the subject land
has been taken over and in fact the subject land has been put to use by
the beneficiary department – Irrigation and Flood Control Board for E
construction of Bankner Link Drain which has been duly built, there
shall not be any lapse of the acquisition with regard to the subject land as
observed and
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant and recover possession of the premises
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2015) 3 SCC 353; (2020) 8 SCC 129; (2018) 3 SCC 412
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — of the case on hand,
more particularly, the fact that physical possession of the subject land
has been taken over and in fact the subject land has been put to use by
the beneficiary department – Irrigation and Flood Control Board for E
construction of Bankner Link Drain which has been duly built, there
shall not be any lapse of the acquisition with regard to the subject land as
observed and
: Decision in
Pune Municipal Corporation case has been overruled by the
Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority D
v. reported as [2020] 3 SCR 1 – Applying the
law laid down therein, more particularly, the fact that physical
possession of the subject land was taken over and in fact was put
to use by the beneficiary department-Irrigation and Flood Control
Board for construction of Bankner Link Drain which was duly built,
E
there shall not be any lapse of the acquisition w.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
the writ petition and
declared that the acquisition proceedings initiated w.r.t the subject
land are deemed to have lapsed – On appeal, held: Decision in
Pune Municipal Corporation case has been overruled by the
Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority D
v. Manoharlal and Ors. reported as [2020] 3 SCR 1 – Applying the
law laid down therein, more particularly, the fact that physical
possession of the subject land was taken over and in fact was put
to use by the benefici
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
the writ petition and
declared that the acquisition proceedings initiated w.r.t the subject
land are deemed to have lapsed – On appeal, held: Decision in
Pune Municipal Corporation case has been overruled by the
Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority D
v. Manoharlal and Ors. reported as 3 SCR 1 – Applying the
law laid down therein, more particularly, the fact that physical
possession of the subject land was taken over and in fact was put
to use by the benefici
REASONS:
: Decision in
Pune Municipal Corporation case has been overruled by the
Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority D
v. Manoharlal and Ors. reported as 3 SCR 1 – Applying the
law laid down therein, more particularly, the fact that physical
possession of the subject land was taken over and in fact was put
to use by the beneficiary department-Irrigation and Flood Control
Board for construction of Bankner Link Drain which was duly built,
E
there shall not be any lapse of the acquisition w.r.t the subject land
– Impugned
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
FACTS:
of the case.
D
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. The ASI after producing the case property before
the Court, returned the case property to PW-3 with the seals
intact. ASI was not in possession of seals of either of the
investigating officer or of PW-3. Therfore, the question of
E
tampering with the case property by him did not arise at all. Further
he has returned the case property, after
SUBMISSIONS BY PARTIES:
, placed reliance on the following judgments:
(i) Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra1.
(ii) Noor Aga v. State of Punjab & Anr2.
D
(iii) Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab3.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-state
has submitted that the prosecution has proved the case by leading cogent
evidence, whichproved guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt
and there are no grounds to interfere with the same. Learned counsel E
has submitted that merely because prosecution has not examined any
independent witness, same would not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that the
Analyse the submissions and provide a reasoned judgment.
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant and recover possession of the premises
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2011)3 SCC 521; (2001) 1 SCC 652; (2018) 17
SCC 627
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — of the case.
D
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. The ASI after producing the case property before
the Court, returned the case property to PW-3 with the seals
intact. ASI was not in possession of seals of either of the
investigating officer or of PW-3. Therfore, the question of
E
tampering with the case property by him did not arise at all. Further
he has returned the case property, after...
The ASI after producing the case property before
the Court, returned the case property to PW-3 with the seals
intact. ASI was not in possession of seals of either of the
investigating officer or of PW-3. Therfore, the question of
E
tampering with the case property by him did not arise at all.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
, placed reliance on the following judgments:
(i) Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra1.
(ii) Noor Aga v. State of Punjab & Anr2.
D
(iii) Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab3.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-state
has submitted that the prosecution has proved the case by l...
CONCLUSION:
filed by the soleaccused, aggrieved by
the judgment dated 22.04.2008 passed in Criminal Appeal No.706-SB
of 1999 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.
2. The appellant herein was convicted for the offence punishable
under Section 18 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
E
1985 (for short ‘NDPS Act, 1985’), vide the
</think>
<|answer|>
: No
violation of s. 50 – Chain of evidence was complete – Non-
examination of ASI, ASP and independent witnesses was not fatal
in the facts of the case.
D
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. The ASI after producing the case property before
the Court, returned the case property to PW-3 with the seals
intact. ASI was not in possession of seals of either of the
investigating officer or of PW-3. Therfore, the question of
E
tampering with the case property by him did not arise at all. Further
he has returned the case property, after production of the same,
before the Illaqa Magistrate, with the seals intact, to PW3. In
that view of the matter, the Trial Court and the High Court have
right
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: None
Applicant: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Court: instant appeal, the State contended that High Court erred in
FACTS OF THE CASE:
. ‘Attempt’ is the direct movement towards the
commission after the preparations are over. It is essential to prove
that the attempt was with an intent to commit the offence. An
attempt is possible even when the accused is unsuccessful in
committing the principal offence. Similarly, if the attempt to
commit a crime is accomplished, then the crime stands committed
for all intents and purposes. [Para 20][145-D-E]
3.2 There is overwhelming evidence on record to prove
the respondent’s deliberate overt steps to take the minor girls
inside his house; closing the door(s); undressing the victims and
rubbing his genitals on those of the prosecutrices. As the victims
started crying, the respondent could not succeed in his
penultimate act and there was a sheer providential escape from
actual penetration. Had the respondent succeeded in penetration,
even partially, his act would have fallen within the contours of
‘Rape’ as it stood conservatively defined under Section 375 IPC
at that time. [Para 21][145-E-G]
3.3 The deposition by the victims (PW-1 and PW-2) are
impeccable. Both have unequivocally stated as to how the
respondent allured them and indulged in all those traumatic acts
which have already been narrated in the preceding paragraphs.
The statements of both the victim-children inspire full confidence,
establish their innocence and evince a natural version without
any remote possibility of tutoring. [Para 22][145-G-H]
3.4 Since the acts of the respondent exceeded the stage
beyond preparation and preceded the actual penetration, the Trial
Court rightly
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2004) 3 SCC 602; (2004) 4 SCC 379; (1997)
7 SCC 677
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — . ‘Attempt’ is the direct movement towards the
commission after the preparations are over. It is essential to prove
that the attempt was with an intent to commit the offence. An
attempt is possible even when the accused is unsuccessful in
committing the principal offence. Similarly, if the attempt to
commit a crime is accomplished, then the crime stands committed
for all intents and purposes. [Par...
Praveen Chaturvedi, learned Counsel for
the respondent has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in Aman
Kumar vs. State of Haryana1 to buttress his contention of distinct
features of mere ‘preparation’ to commit an offence, as compared to an
actual ‘attempt’ to commit it. He, in specific, relied upon the following
paragraphs of the cited decision:
“9.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
OF PARTIES:
7. Mr. Mukul Singh, learned Counsel for the State vehemently
contended that there are explicit allegations of ‘attempt to commit rape’
against the respondent. Both the prosecutrices have deposed as ‘X’
(PW-1) and ‘Y’ (PW-2) and supported the prosecution case. They
unshakably faced the gr...
CONCLUSION:
of in the above terms.
Devika Gujral
Appeal allowed.
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
of in the above terms.
Devika Gujral
Appeal allowed.
REASONS:
: The act of the respondent of luring the minor girls, taking
them inside the room, closing the doors and taking the victims to a
room with the motive of carnal knowledge, was the end of
‘preparation’ to commit the offence – His following action of
stripping the prosecutrices and himself, and rubbing his genitals
against those of the victims was indeed an endeavour to commit
sexual intercourse – These acts of the respondent were deliberately
done with manifest intention to commit the offence aimed and were
reasonably proximate to the consummation of the offence – Since
the acts of the responde
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2016 3 718 743 EN.pdf
Applicant: S MANUELSONS HOTELS
PRIVATE LIMITED
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
of
H r
718
M/S MANUELSONS HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED v. STATE OF · 719
KERALA
the present case is that for the period that s.3A was in force, no A
building tax was payable by the app~llants - However, for the period
post 1. 3.1993, no statutory provision for the grant of exemption
being available, no relief can be given to the appellants as the
doctrine of promissory estoppel must yield when it is found that it
' would be contrary to statute to grant such relief - Kera!a.Buildirig
B
Tax Act, 1975 - s.3A.
Partly ~llowing the appeal, the Court
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: AIR 1981 SC 1127; (2015) 9 SCC 132; AIR 1980
SC 882
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — of
H r
718
M/S MANUELSONS HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED v. STATE OF · 719
KERALA
the present case is that for the period that s.3A was in force, no A
building tax was payable by the app~llants - However, for the period
post 1. 3.1993, no statutory provision for the grant of exemption
being available, no relief can be given to the appellants as the
doctrine of promissory estoppel must yield when it is fou...
1986, exemption from building tax
granted if hotels set up in the State of Kera/a - Pursuant to
government order, s. 3A added to the Kera/a Building Tax Act, 1975
granting exemption from payment of building tax - Pursuant thereto,
appellant constructed hotel building -. 1997,
concession promised by way of government.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
and supported the im:
pugnedjudgment of the High Court. Aceording to Shri Radhakrishnan,
a mandamus cannot be issued to the executive to frame or amend the
law. In any event, according to the learned counsel, Section 3A having
been deleted w.e.f. I st March, 1993, it is clear that no relief can be
g...
CONCLUSION:
the original petition and directed the
F
Committee to consider the matter afresh in the light of the judgment of
the Supreme Court in MIS Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State
Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., ( 1979) 2 SCR 641 and Shrijee Sales
Corporation & Anr. v. Union of India, ( 1997) 3 SCC 398.
9. Vide·an
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
the original petition and directed the
F
Committee to consider the matter afresh in the light of the judgment of
the Supreme Court in MIS Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State
Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., ( 1979) 2 SCR 641 and Shrijee Sales
Corporation & Anr. v. Union of India, ( 1997) 3 SCC 398.
9. Vide·an
REASONS:
datecf 11.7.1986, exemption from building tax
granted if hotels set up in the State of Kera/a - Pursuant to
government order, s.3A added to the Kera/a Building Tax Act, 1975
granting exemption from payment of building tax - Pursuant thereto,
appellant constructed hotel building -. However, on 6.2.1997,
concession promised by way of government
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2019 12 255 269 EN.pdf
Applicant: ANR. A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
, on the date of the order passed by the
Rent Controller itself, the entire arrears as directed to be deposited D
by the tenants stood paid and also on the date of the order passed
by the Rent Controller striking out his defence, rent for the entire
intervening period and even beyond had been paid – Thus, the
charge of contumacious failure and deliberate default in making
payment levelled against the tenants is ill founded – Decision of the
E
Rent Controller as upheld by the High Court, striking out defence
of the tenant has not been exercised judiciously and with
circumspection and thus, is unsustainable and set aside.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant and recover possession of the premises
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (1995)1 SCC 356; (1996) 3 SCC 55; (2010) 15 SCC 510
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , on the date of the order passed by the
Rent Controller itself, the entire arrears as directed to be deposited D
by the tenants stood paid and also on the date of the order passed
by the Rent Controller striking out his defence, rent for the entire
intervening period and even beyond had been paid – Thus, the
charge of contumacious failure and deliberate default in making
payment levelled against...
15(7) is discretionary
C
and not mandatory – It depends on contumacious or deliberate
default and must be construed harmoniously so as to balance the
rights and obligations of the tenant and the landlord – Power u/s. 15(7) being an exception, is to be exercised with due care and
circumspection – On.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
heard u/s 15(1) of DRC Act. The rate of rent and
the relationship is not in dispute between the parties though the
petitioner claims the arrears w.e.f. 01.01.2007 and the respondent
G
states that he has paid rent upto October, 2007.
Since the orders u/s 15(1) of DRC Act are to be passed on the
admit...
CONCLUSION:
on comparison
of Section 13(5) of the Act, 1952 and Section 15(7) of Act, 1958
C
be that the Court would not be bound to strike out the defence
against ejectment in case of default in payment of rent in
compliance to the
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
on comparison
of Section 13(5) of the Act, 1952 and Section 15(7) of Act, 1958
C
be that the Court would not be bound to strike out the defence
against ejectment in case of default in payment of rent in
compliance to the
REASONS:
: Power vested u/s. 15(7) is discretionary
C
and not mandatory – It depends on contumacious or deliberate
default and must be construed harmoniously so as to balance the
rights and obligations of the tenant and the landlord – Power u/s.
15(7) being an exception, is to be exercised with due care and
circumspection – On
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2019 11 739 751 EN.pdf
Applicant: CHENNADI JALAPATHI REDDY A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
of a given case
– Evidence of DW-3 (brother of the first respondent) belies the F
allegation of the first respondent that the signature found on Ext.A-
1 is forged – DW-3 admitted that he could identify the signature of
his elder brother, the first respondent– Merely because appellant’s
signature was not present on Ext.A-1, this would not ipso facto nullify
the agreement altogether – Ext.A-2, the receipt evidencing the
G
payment of earnest money in pursuance of Ext.A-1, bears the
signature of the first respondent on the revenue stamps affixed
thereon– No material brought on record to show that he did not
receive the amount under Ext.A-2– Plaintiff was ready and willing
to perform his part of the contract –
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid and enforceable contract and whether a breach occurred entitling the claimant to relief
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: AIR 1964 SC 529; (1980) 1 SCC 704; (2003) 1 SCC 21
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — of a given case
– Evidence of DW-3 (brother of the first respondent) belies the F
allegation of the first respondent that the signature found on Ext.A-
1 is forged – DW-3 admitted that he could identify the signature of
his elder brother, the first respondent– Merely because appellant’s
signature was not present on Ext.A-1, this would not ipso facto nullify
the agreement altogether – Ext.A-2, the...
reversed by the High Court – On appeal, held: Evidence D
of PWs-2, 3 (attesting witnesses) fully support the case of the
appellant – High Court not justified in rejecting their evidence on
mere assumptions and wrong reasons – It mainly relied upon the
opinion of the handwriting expert, who opined that the signature of
the first respondent on the agreement of sale, Ext. A-1 did not tally
E
with his admitted signatures – Court must be cautious while
evaluating expert evidence, which is a weak type of evidence and
not substantive in nature – Mere expert evidence as to a fact is not
regarded as conclusive proof of it and the Court may seek
independent and reliable corroboration in the.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
the suit
and disposed of the appeal and cross-objections arising out of the
judgment of the Trial Court. Hence, the instant appeals have been
preferred before this Court.
H
CHENNADI JALAPATHI REDDY v. BADDAM PRATAPA 745
REDDY (D) THR LRS. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]
4. During the trial, the agreement of sale Ext. A-1 was sent for A
obtaining expert opinion on the genuineness of the signature of the first
defendant thereon. DW-2 is the expert who examined it and his report is
at Ext. B-2. He op
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
the suit
and disposed of the appeal and cross-objections arising out of the
judgment of the Trial Court. Hence, the instant appeals have been
preferred before this Court.
H
CHENNADI JALAPATHI REDDY v. BADDAM PRATAPA 745
REDDY (D) THR LRS. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]
4. During the trial, the agreement of sale Ext. A-1 was sent for A
obtaining expert opinion on the genuineness of the signature of the first
defendant thereon. DW-2 is the expert who examined it and his report is
at Ext. B-2. He op
REASONS:
reversed by the High Court – On appeal, held: Evidence D
of PWs-2, 3 (attesting witnesses) fully support the case of the
appellant – High Court not justified in rejecting their evidence on
mere assumptions and wrong reasons – It mainly relied upon the
opinion of the handwriting expert, who opined that the signature of
the first respondent on the agreement of sale, Ext.A-1 did not tally
E
with his admitted signatures – Court must be cautious while
evaluating expert evidence, which is a weak type of evidence and
not substantive in nature – Mere expert evidence as to a fact is not
regarded as con
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2023 2 1014 1036 EN.pdf
Applicant: S.C.R.
A CARDINAL MAR GEORGE ALENCHERRY
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
, the trial
court (at Kakkanad) dismissed the complaint u/s. 203 of Cr.P.C.
with respect to offences u/ss. 409, 418, 420, 465, 467 and 468 of
the IPC, however issued summons to the appellants and other accused
persons for the offfences u/ss. 120-B, 406, 423 r/w s.34 IPC – The
E
appellant filed the revision application before the Sessions Court
but the same was dismissed and the petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. before
the High Court was also dismissed – Before the Supreme Court,
appellant contended that the instant complaint after dismissal of
the earlier complaint on same
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt and what the appropriate sentence is
RULE:
Article 226 of the Constitution The following precedents are applicable: (2013) 2 SCC 488; AIR 1960 SC 1113; (2009) 9 SCC 642
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , the trial
court (at Kakkanad) dismissed the complaint u/s. 203 of Cr.P.C.
with respect to offences u/ss. 409, 418, 420, 465, 467 and 468 of
the IPC, however issued summons to the appellants and other accused
persons for the offfences u/ss. 120-B, 406, 423 r/w s.34 IPC – The
E
appellant filed the revision application before the Sessions Court
but the same was dismissed and the petition u/s 482 Cr...
:
F Trial Court at Kakkanad in the instant complaint cases, before the
dismissal of the previous complaint, had already taken cognizance
by issuing summons to the appellant and others – It is true that the
complainant, in the instant complaint, should have disclosed the
full and correct.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
made by the counsels
for the parties in the petitions filed by the appellant under Section
B
482 of Cr.P.C. and upheld the order passed by the Sessions Court.
In view of the said observations made and prima facie findings
recorded by the three courts below as regards the alleged
involvement of the a...
CONCLUSION:
of certain immovable property belonging to the church –
The first complaint filed by the complainant was dismissed by the
court at Maradu on 30.09.2021 without taking cognizance of the
D complaint as the counsel for complainant did not appear – On
02.04.2019, in another complaint on same set of
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
of certain immovable property belonging to the church –
The first complaint filed by the complainant was dismissed by the
court at Maradu on 30.09.2021 without taking cognizance of the
D complaint as the counsel for complainant did not appear – On
02.04.2019, in another complaint on same set of
REASONS:
:
F Trial Court at Kakkanad in the instant complaint cases, before the
dismissal of the previous complaint, had already taken cognizance
by issuing summons to the appellant and others – It is true that the
complainant, in the instant complaint, should have disclosed the
full and correct
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2021 11 1138 1180 EN.pdf
Applicant: S.C.R.
A MANMOHAN NANDA
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
– Appellant intended to travel to the USA –
Appellant was issued a overseas mediclaim business and holiday
policy – The appellant was medically examined at the instance of
respondent No. 1 insurance company prior to the consideration of
his request for issuance of a mediclaim policy – The medical report
D categorically noted that the appellant had diabetes-type II (mellitus-
II) – No other adverse medical condition was found – In the medical
exam report, specific queries were sought as to whether any
abnormalities were observed in the electrocardiogram test of the
appellant and any possible illness or disease for which the appellant
may require medical treatment in the ensuing trip to the USA – To
E
both these queries, the doctor who examined the appellant had
answered “normal” and “no” respectively – The insurer thereafter
accepted the proposal form – Thereafter, the appellant boarded a
flight to USA, on exiting the airport, appellant felt weak and started
sweating – He was admittted at a medical centre – Three stents were
F inserted to remove blockage from his heart vessels – Appellant
claimed benefit under the mediclaim policy – However, appellant
received a letter from respondent stating that his claim had been
repudiated as the appellant had a history of hyperlipidaemia and
diabetes and the policy did not cover pre-existing conditions and
complications arising therefrom – Aggrieved, the appellant filed a
G
complaint u/s.21(9) of the 1986 Act – The Commission
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2009)
8 SCC 316; (2019) 18 SCC 209; AIR 1960
SC 953
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — – Appellant intended to travel to the USA –
Appellant was issued a overseas mediclaim business and holiday
policy – The appellant was medically examined at the instance of
respondent No. 1 insurance company prior to the consideration of
his request for issuance of a mediclaim policy – The medical report
D categorically noted that the appellant had diabetes-type II (mellitus-
II) – No other adverse...
that
concealment or non-disclosure of material facts regarding pre-
existing heart ailment was a valid ground for repudiation of the
insurance claim by the respondent-insurer – On appeal, held:
Appellant had in the proposal form disclosed that he was suffering
H from diabetes mellitus-II and for which the medical test reports were
1138
MANMOHAN NANDA v. submitted along with the proposal form which were considered by A
the insurance company before the policy was issued to the appellant
– In fact, the appellant stated in his representation against the
repudiation of the policy that he was taking lipid-lowering medicines
not because he was suffering from hyperlipidaemia but as it was
customary to take such medication for prevention of cardio-vascular
B
complications in diabetics – He also stated that he had informed
the physician-doctor, who examined him prior to obtaining the policy,
of the medicines he was taking – Therefore, the insurance company
was well aware of the fact that the insured was a diabetic and was
taking all necessary medication for preventing further complications
and controlling the disease – Hence, there was no suppression of C
any material fact by the appellant to the insurer – The repudiation
of the policy by the respondent insurance company was illegal and
not in accordance with law – Consequently, the appellant entitled
to be indemnified under the policy. Insurance – Mediclaim Policy – After assessment of medical
D
condition –.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
were filed by both sides. Subsequently, the Commission
dismissed the complaint filed by the appellant on the ground of non-
disclosure of material facts. Hence this appeal by the claimant.
B
9. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to encapsulate
the reasoning of the Commission for dismissin...
CONCLUSION:
.
2. The facts in a nutshell are that the appellant had sought an
overseas mediclaim policy- B (hereinafter referred to as “mediclaim
policy”) as he intended to travel to the United States of America (“USA”)
to attend the wedding of his sister-in-law’s daughter. The appellant was
C medically examined at the instance of respondent No. 1 insurance
company prior to the consideration of his request for issuance of a
mediclaim policy. On his medical examination, the report categorically
noted that th
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
.
2. The facts in a nutshell are that the appellant had sought an
overseas mediclaim policy- B (hereinafter referred to as “mediclaim
policy”) as he intended to travel to the United States of America (“USA”)
to attend the wedding of his sister-in-law’s daughter. The appellant was
C medically examined at the instance of respondent No. 1 insurance
company prior to the consideration of his request for issuance of a
mediclaim policy. On his medical examination, the report categorically
noted that th
REASONS:
that
concealment or non-disclosure of material facts regarding pre-
existing heart ailment was a valid ground for repudiation of the
insurance claim by the respondent-insurer – On appeal, held:
Appellant had in the proposal form disclosed that he was suffering
H from diabetes mellitus-II and for which the medical test reports were
1138
MANMOHAN NANDA v. UNITED INDIA ASSURANCE CO. 1139
LTD. & ANR.
submitted along with the proposal form which were considered by A
the insurance company before the policy was issued to the appellant
– In fact, the appellant stated in his representation against the
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
LEGAL SCENARIO:
, the High
Court dismissed the appeal. [Para 9][454-F-H]
2. In view of the powers of the Appellate Court under
Section 386 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the
High Court should have examined the evidence of each
prosecution witnesses on issues arising in the case and the same
should have been examined in the light of the challenge made by
the accused in appeal and then a
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
: In view of the powers of the Appellate Court under
s.
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , the High
Court dismissed the appeal. [Para 9][454-F-H]
2. In view of the powers of the Appellate Court under
Section 386 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the
High Court should have examined the evidence of each
prosecution witnesses on issues arising in the case and the same
should have been examined in the light of the challenge made by
the accused in appeal and then a
of the case, we are constrained to allow the appeal, set.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
of the appeal as expeditiously as possible preferably
within six months.
16. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
Devika Gujral
Matter remanded to High Court.
KANUBHAI BHAGVANBHAI NAYAK v. STATE OF GUJARAT
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
</think>
<|answer|>
: In view of the powers of the Appellate Court under
s.386(b), Cr.P.C., the High Court ought to have examined the
evidence of each prosecution witnesses on issues arising in the case
and the same should have been examined in the light of the challenge
made by the accused in appeal and then recorded a finding either
of affirmation or modification or reversal, as the case may be – It
was incumbent upon the High Court to deal with issues urged and
then record its finding one way or the other keeping in view the law
– Impugned order is set aside and matter remitted to High Court for
fresh consider
FINAL ORDER: of the appeal as expeditiously as possible preferably
within six months.
16. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
Devika Gujral
Matter remanded to High Court.
KANUBHAI BHAGVANBHAI NAYAK v. STATE OF GUJARAT
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2018 11 155 165 EN.pdf
Applicant: ABDUL WAHAB K. A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
and evidence of the case or
to direct retrial for that would be destructive of the object and
intent of the section.”
9. In Rahul Agarwal v. Rakesh Jain10, the Court while dealing
F
with the application under Section 321 CrPC, referred to certain decisions
where the earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in Sheonandan
Paswan (supra) has been referred and
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: AIR 1987 SC 877; (2016) 3 SCC 736; (2014) 10 SCC 380
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — and evidence of the case or
to direct retrial for that would be destructive of the object and
intent of the section.”
9. In Rahul Agarwal v. Rakesh Jain10, the Court while dealing
F
with the application under Section 321 CrPC, referred to certain decisions
where the earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in Sheonandan
Paswan (supra) has been referred and
:
Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the order not within the parameters
of s. 321 – Petitioners could not have been treated as strangers,
D
and the petition was of serious nature – High Court should have
applied its mind with regard to the correctness of the.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
by Chief Judicial Magistrate – Revision Petition
– High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioners
being third party had no locus to file the same – On appeal, held:
Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
by Chief Judicial Magistrate – Revision Petition
– High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioners
being third party had no locus to file the same – On appeal, held:
Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the
REASONS:
:
Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the order not within the parameters
of s. 321 – Petitioners could not have been treated as strangers,
D
and the petition was of serious nature – High Court should have
applied its mind with regard to the correctness of the
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 33 of 2003
Applicant: The General Manager, M/S Barsua Iron Ore Mines
Court: High Court of Orissa at Cuttack on 19.05.2019 challenging the
FACTS OF THE CASE:
:
4.
The respondent no.3 was employed as a Piece Rated Mazdoor at
Barsua Iron Ore Mines under Rourkela Steel Plant, a unit of Hindustan
Steel Limited (hereinafter referred to as “HSL”), which later merged
into Steel Authority of India Limited (hereinafter referred to as “SAIL”).
The respondent no.3 was offered employment on a casual basis vide
letter dated 14.04.1972 as a Piece Rated Mazdoor. On 27.12.1972,
he submitted the prescribed form of descriptive roll declaring his age
as 24 years but did not provide a specific date or any documentary
proof of date of birth. Based on his oral declaration, his date of
birth was recorded as 27.12.1948 and this date was accepted and
signed on by the respondent no.3 leading to his employment. Vide
Offer of Appointment dated 22.06.1981, the respondent no.3, initially
employed as a casual labourer, was regularized under the appellant
and worked as a Piece Rated Mazdoor in mining operations for SAIL
following the merger of HSL into SAIL.
66
[2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
5.
It appears that on 14.08.1982, the respondent no.3 submitted the
prescribed form of Descriptive Roll, wherein he changed his initially
recorded date of birth i.e. 27.12.1948 to 12.03.1955, again without
providing any documentary proof. Vide Office
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid and enforceable contract and whether a breach occurred entitling the claimant to relief
RULE:
Section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 Section 3 of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961 The following precedents are applicable: (2011)
9 SCC 664; (2020) 3 SCC 411; (1997) 4 SCC 647
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — :
4.
The respondent no.3 was employed as a Piece Rated Mazdoor at
Barsua Iron Ore Mines under Rourkela Steel Plant, a unit of Hindustan
Steel Limited (hereinafter referred to as “HSL”), which later merged
into Steel Authority of India Limited (hereinafter referred to as “SAIL”).
The respondent no.3 was offered employment on a casual basis vide
letter dated 14.04.1972 as a Piece Rated Mazdoor...
– The.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
BY THE APPELLANT:
11. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the conduct
of the respondent no.3 clearly dis-entitled him to any relief as he
could not have been allowed to resile from his initially declared date
of birth, that too after 9 years of his initial declaration, on 27....
CONCLUSION:
of the case:
Appeal allowed.
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
of the case:
Appeal allowed.
REASONS:
to have been rightly retired in terms
of his date of birth as 27.12.1948.
Headnotes
Service Law – Superannuation – Discrepancy in date of birth
– The CGIT passed its Award and held that the appellant’s
determination of the respondent no.3’s date of birth based
on the initial Descriptive Roll (27.12.1948) was unjustified
and thus, awarded him 50% back wages from his retirement
in 2008 until his supposed date of superannuation in 2015,
based on the date of birth disclosed in the STC i.e., 12.03.1955
– Propriety:
Held: The disclosure of the originally-given date of birth
(27.12.1948) by
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2015 12 867 881 EN.pdf
Applicant: ORS. A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
itnesses- Other circumstances D
of the case read along with .the version of the eye-witnesses
also sufficiently establish that the occurrence took place as
deposed by the eye-witn.esses - Involvement of the
appellants-accused was fully established - Hence, conviction
and sentence confirmed. E
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. It cannot be said tha1 registration of FIR
could not have been made at 10:45 p.m. inasmuch as
other consequential steps taken thereafter with F
particular reference to Exhibit P7, P1 A to Band P10 which
were all contemporaneous documents disclose that
immediately after the registration of FIR at 10:45p.m., P.W.
15 reached the place of occurrence anc! proceeded with G
further course of action. [Para 11] [875-D]
2. The injuries sustained by P.W. 3 could not be said
to have been fake and his presence doubtful, inasmuch
it is· evident from the evidence of the doctor (P.W.1) who
examined P.W.3 on the night of the date of the event itself. 1-1
867
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 12 S.C.R.
A There was a broad reference to the nature of injuries
sustained by P.W.3 in Exhibit P1A. Therefore, reading
Exhibits P1 A and P1 B together with the oral evidence of
P.W.1, it has come out in evidence that P.W.3 sustained
the injuries, in the night on the date of the event.
B Therefore, it is not correct to say that P.W. 3 could not
have been present at the place of occurrence. Evidence
. of P. W.3 as an eye-witness was cogent in every respect.
His account was fully supported by the version of P.W.6,
c
and also fully corroborated by the evidence of P.Ws. 7
and 11. [Paras 12, 13] [875-E-F; 876-A-B, D-E]
3. There is no serious discrepancy or infirmities in
the preparation of the statutory records as well as any
serious lacuna in the oral version of the witnesses
D examined in support of the charges. Non-mention of
PW.3 in Column 6 of Crime Details Form (Exhibit P7)
would not in any way vitiate the case of the prosecution
.'by virtue of the other cHnching e
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt and what the appropriate sentence is
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2011) 7 SCC 421; (2011) 7 SCC
421; (2011) 4 SCC 324
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — itnesses- Other circumstances D
of the case read along with .the version of the eye-witnesses
also sufficiently establish that the occurrence took place as
deposed by the eye-witn.esses - Involvement of the
appellants-accused was fully established - Hence, conviction
and sentence confirmed. E
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. It cannot be said tha1 registration of FIR
could not have been...
other witnesses- Other circumstances D
of the case read along with. the version of the eye-witnesses
also sufficiently establish that the occurrence took place as
deposed by the eye-witn. esses - Involvement of the
appellants-accused was fully established - Hence, conviction
and sentence confirmed.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
, Mr. Ray while making reference to
the version of P.Ws. 1,3, 10 and 15 and Exhibits P/1 A, P/1 B,
Pl and P10, contended that there were very many inconsistent
0
circumstances which would show that the case was not as
projected by the prosecution for implicating the appellants and,
therefore, the co...
CONCLUSION:
.
B
Kalpana K Tripathy Appeals dismissed.
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
.
B
Kalpana K Tripathy Appeals dismissed.
REASONS:
: Prosecution case is
supported by the evidence of the two eye-witness which was
fully corroborated bY. other witnesses- Other circumstances D
of the case read along with .the version of the eye-witnesses
also sufficiently establish that the occurrence took place as
deposed by the eye-witn.esses - Involvement of the
appellants-accused was fully established - Hence, conviction
and sentence confirmed. E
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
LEGAL SCENARIO:
, search and
seizure of 11 kgs of intoxicated drug-ganja from the wife and
her husband - Wife apprehended, however, her husband
managed to escape - Trial court
PRECEDENTS TO CONSIDER:
• (1989) 3 SCC 5
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
Section 20 of the
G Narcotic Drugs and Psycotropic Substances Act, 1985 Section 50 of the
C Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 The following precedents are applicable: (1989) 3 SCC 5
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , search and
seizure of 11 kgs of intoxicated drug-ganja from the wife and
her husband - Wife apprehended, however, her husband
managed to escape - Trial court
as pointed out earlier, we are afraid that.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
.
</think>
<|answer|>
: Assessment of evidence
and consideration of the matter by both the courts as regards
E no independent witness; husband could not have fled in
presence of five police officers; and the link evidence of the
possession of seal 'RP' transferring from AS/ to 10 is not
proved, is erroneous and cannot be termed as a possible
view - Prosecution sufficiently proved its case to establish
F the guilt of the accused - Thus, the wife and her husband
convicted u/s. 20 and sentenced to simple imprisonment for
five years.
G
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The High Court and the trial court relied
on three points to decide the matter against the State-
no independent witness; husband could not have fled
in presence of five police officers; and the link evidence
H of the possession
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2017 7 731 735 EN.pdf
Applicant: ORS. A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
, in brief, to appreciate the issue
involved in these appeals.
G 3. The dispute in the suit out of which this appeal arises relates to
agricultural lands comprises of Khewat No. 280 Khata No. 350 Rect.
No. 258 Killa No. 25 area 5 kanal, Reel. No. 295 Killa No. 5 area -01
maria, Rect. No. 214 Killa 11 area 5 kanals 12 marlas, killa no. 12 area
8 kanal, Rect. Np. 255 Killa No. 6/1 area 2 kanals I 0 marlas, 6/2 area 2
kanals 17 mar las, 7I1 area 4 kanals 3 marl as, 712 are.a 3 killa 17 marlas
H
RAM CHAND (DECEASED) THR. L.RS. & ORS. v. UDAI 733
SINGH @DAYA RAM & ORS.[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
Killa 8 area 8 kanals, Rect. 258 killa 16 area 6 kanals 6 marlas, killa 24 A
. area 8 kanals, total area 54 kanals 6 marlas situated in Patti Bedha,
Hodel (hereinafter referred to as the "suit land").
4. The plaintiff (Ram Chand) since dead and now represented by
his legal representatives (appellants herein) filed a civil suit out of which
these appeals arise against the respondents (defendants) claiming right; B
title and interest in the suit land. The plaintiff(appellants) also claimed
possession of the suit lands from the defendants (respondents).
5. The claim of the plaintiff, in substance, is based on the law of
inheritance. It is, inter alia, alleged in the plaint that the suit land originally
c
belonged to one Hiri, son ofBhondu and on his death, the plaintiff claimed
his right, title and interest in the suit land as one of the nearest heirs of
the deceased Hiri through inheritance.
6. The defendants (respondents) denied the claim of the plaintiff
and further denied his right to claim the ownership of the suit land by
inheritance through Hiri. The defendants then claimed ownership over D
. the suit land on the basis of a Will said to have been executed in their
favour by the erstwhile owner of the suit land.
7. So the basic question, involved in the suit, was who is the owner
of the suit land-plaintiff or the defendants.
8. By
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (1997) 4 SCC 413; (2001) 3 SCC 179; (1997) 5 SCC 438
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , in brief, to appreciate the issue
involved in these appeals.
G 3. The dispute in the suit out of which this appeal arises relates to
agricultural lands comprises of Khewat No. 280 Khata No. 350 Rect.
No. 258 Killa No. 25 area 5 kanal, Reel. No. 295 Killa No. 5 area -01
maria, Rect. No. 214 Killa 11 area 5 kanals 12 marlas, killa no. 12 area
8 kanal, Rect. Np. 255 Killa No. 6/1 area 2 kanals I 0...
: Since the
High Court failed to frame substantial questions o. f law as is required D
to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal, the
impugned order is not sustainable - Case remanded to High Court
for deciding the second appeals afresh in accordance with law. Allowing the appeals, the Court
Hj:LD: 1.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
of learned counsel for
the appellants that it so arises but not beyond that as to whether it actually
arises and, if so, · vhat is that question.
19. ln the light of foregoing discussion and keeping in view the
D
law laid down in the case of Santosh Hazari (supra), we are of the
considered view that...
CONCLUSION:
- Second appeal by plaintiff as well as defendant - Decided in
favour of defendant by High Court - On appeal, held: Since the
High Court failed to frame substantial questions o.f law as is required D
to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal, the
impugned
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
- Second appeal by plaintiff as well as defendant - Decided in
favour of defendant by High Court - On appeal, held: Since the
High Court failed to frame substantial questions o.f law as is required D
to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal, the
impugned
REASONS:
: Since the
High Court failed to frame substantial questions o.f law as is required D
to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal, the
impugned order is not sustainable - Case remanded to High Court
for deciding the second appeals afresh in accordance with law.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
Hj:LD: 1. In
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2019 8 869 882 EN.pdf
Applicant: R. S. ANJAYYA GUPTA A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
as well as on
law which ought to receive proper attention of the High Court, the
first instance in exercise of powers u/s.96 of CPC – Additionally,
some of the documents which were crucial, were not exhibited
although the same were submitted during the trial – Thus, parties
relegated before the High Court for consideration of the first appeal G
afresh.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2005) 12 SCC 303; AIR 1951 SC 120; (1969) 1
SCC 386
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — as well as on
law which ought to receive proper attention of the High Court, the
first instance in exercise of powers u/s.96 of CPC – Additionally,
some of the documents which were crucial, were not exhibited
although the same were submitted during the trial – Thus, parties
relegated before the High Court for consideration of the first appeal G
afresh.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
: The first appellate court must
analyse the entire evidence produced by the concerned parties and E
express its opinion in the proper sense of the jurisdiction vested in
it and by elucidating, analysing and arriving at the conclusion that
the appeal is devoid of merit – In the impugned.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
made
during the elaborate arguments by the respective counsel and
H
869
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.
A who had invited our attention to the pleadings and evidence on
record, this Court deem it to appropriate to relegate the parties
before the High Court for consideration of the first ap...
CONCLUSION:
devoid of merit – In the impugned judgment High
Court after reproduction of the submission made by the parties,
straightaway proceeded to affirm the opinion of the Trial Court –
F
Appellant has also raised formidable issues on
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
devoid of merit – In the impugned judgment High
Court after reproduction of the submission made by the parties,
straightaway proceeded to affirm the opinion of the Trial Court –
F
Appellant has also raised formidable issues on
REASONS:
: The first appellate court must
analyse the entire evidence produced by the concerned parties and E
express its opinion in the proper sense of the jurisdiction vested in
it and by elucidating, analysing and arriving at the conclusion that
the appeal is devoid of merit – In the impugned
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
LEGAL SCENARIO:
. Further, since the role of the present
accused was not an active one, inasmuch as he only shouted what he
has supposed to have said, he should)n any case, even if conviction be
sustained, be sentenced to the period already undergone, which we are
informed is roughly almost two years in jail.
6. Ms. Bansuri Swaraj, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent - State of M.P. has, on the other hand, stated that the
concurrent
PRECEDENTS TO CONSIDER:
• (2009) 4 SCC
26
• (1991) 3 SCC 471
• (1991)
3 SCC 471
• (2009)
4 SCC 26
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
Article 136 of the
Constitution Article
136 of the Constitution The following precedents are applicable: (2009) 4 SCC
26; (1991) 3 SCC 471; (1991)
3 SCC 471
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — . Further, since the role of the present
accused was not an active one, inasmuch as he only shouted what he
has supposed to have said, he should)n any case, even if conviction be
sustained, be sentenced to the period already undergone, which we are
informed is roughly almost two years in jail.
6. Ms. Bansuri Swaraj, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent - State of M.P. has, o...
in view of.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
. The crime
committed is heinous in nature, and we agree with the learned counsel
for the respondent - State that the appellant - herein appears to have
got ~way lightly.
11. We also advert to a
CONCLUSION:
.
</think>
<|answer|>
: In order to make out charge uls. 307 an
intention coupled with some common act in execution thereof is
enough - It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing
death should have been inflicted - In the present case, in view of
nature of weapons, it can be inferred that the intention was to cause
death - Exhortation by the appellant-accused attracted the charge
uls. 307 rlw. s. 34 - Conviction affirmed.
Sentence/Sentencing:
Conviction uls. 307 rlw s. 34 !PC - Sentenced to three years
imprisonment - Plea to reduce the sentence to the period already
undergone i.e. about 2 years - Held: The accused got away very
lightly - Undue sympathy leading to inadequate sentence would do
more harm to the justice system and would undermine public
confidence in the efficacy of law -
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2022 2 376 393 EN.pdf
Applicant: OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD.
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
3*
B Submissions of Counsel 6*
G
C Analysis 9*
D Conclusion 17*
H * Ed. Note : Pagination is as per the original Judgment.
381
SAMRUDDHI CHS LTD. v. MUMBAI MAHALAXMI CONSTRUCTION
PVT. LTD. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
A Factual Background A
1. The appeal arises from a
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2020) 16 SCC 512; (2020) 1 SCC 1; (2019) 5 SCC 725
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — 3*
B Submissions of Counsel 6*
G
C Analysis 9*
D Conclusion 17*
H * Ed. Note : Pagination is as per the original Judgment.
381
SAMRUDDHI CHS LTD. v. MUMBAI MAHALAXMI CONSTRUCTION
PVT. LTD. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
A Factual Background A
1. The appeal arises from a
of SCDRC – Appellant also filed a complaint before
the NCDRC – NCDRC dismissed the complaint on the ground that it
G
was barred by limitation and that it was not maintainable under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 since it was in the nature of a
recovery proceeding and not a consumer dispute –.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
of Counsel 6*
G
C Analysis 9*
D Conclusion 17*
H * Ed. Note : Pagination is as per the original Judgment.
381
SAMRUDDHI CHS LTD. v. MUMBAI MAHALAXMI CONSTRUCTION
PVT. LTD. [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
A Factual Background A
1. The appeal arises from a
CONCLUSION:
the complaint on the ground that it
G
was barred by limitation and that it was not maintainable under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 since it was in the nature of a
recovery proceeding and not a consumer dispute –
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
the complaint on the ground that it
G
was barred by limitation and that it was not maintainable under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 since it was in the nature of a
recovery proceeding and not a consumer dispute –
REASONS:
of SCDRC – Appellant also filed a complaint before
the NCDRC – NCDRC dismissed the complaint on the ground that it
G
was barred by limitation and that it was not maintainable under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 since it was in the nature of a
recovery proceeding and not a consumer dispute –
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2015 2 678 686 EN.pdf
Applicant: ORS. A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
parity with the six
acquitted accused.
Motive -Absence -Affect of-Held: Mere absence of motive E
does not bring lesser charge.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The two injured eye witnesses i.e. PW3
and PW4 not only corroborated their respective F
accounts but were not shaken in cross-examination. It
is clear from a reading of the examination-in-chief as well
as the cross-examination that short of PW.3 not being
able to tell the Court as to how many injuries were G
received by the deceased and with what weapons, the
factum of their being beaten up by the persons who were
named, is not shaken. It is obvious that in the night it is
very difficult to make out who hit whom and with what.
The Doctor PW.8 -testified that the deaths were homicidal H
678
679
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 2 S.C.R.
A in nature. PW. 7 ~nd the Investigating Officer deposed as
to the recovery of the weapons that were used in the
incident. [Paras 5 and 7] [683-H; 685-C-E]
2. The appellants-accused also cannot be acquitted on
B the Doctrine of parity. The reasons for acquittal of the
six other accused by the High Court was only because
they were not named by PW3 the injured eye-witness.
The Doctrine of parity cannot replace the substantive
evidence of the two injured eye-witnesses namely PW3
C and PW4, who have been believed concurrently by the
courts below. [Para 9] [687-8-D]
3. It is not correct to say that this is a case which ought
to be converted into a case of culpable homicide not
D amounting to m~rder under Section 304 (Part-II) IPC on
the ground that the incident might have occurred on
sudden provocation, there being no reason or motive.
The evidence of the two injured eye-witnesses is clear
this is not a case of sudden provocation and the mere
E absence of motive does not bring home the lesser
charge. [Para 1 O] [686-E-F]
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 806 of 2009
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2007 of the High
Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur in DBCR
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt and what the appropriate sentence is
RULE:
: conviction of appellants-accused was justified
- The evidence of two injured eye-witnesses is reliable - The
accused also cannot be acquitted on parity with the six
acquitted accused.
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — parity with the six
acquitted accused.
Motive -Absence -Affect of-Held: Mere absence of motive E
does not bring lesser charge.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The two injured eye witnesses i.e. PW3
and PW4 not only corroborated their respective F
accounts but were not shaken in cross-examination. It
is clear from a reading of the examination-in-chief as well
as the cross-examination that...
: conviction of appellants-accused was justified
- The evidence of two injured eye-witnesses is reliable - The
accused also cannot be acquitted on parity with the six
acquitted accused.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
of the injuries. I and Radhey Shyam
were admitted in the hospital. I know the assaulters
among whom Lalita and Yamuna are present today in
the Court and I know rest of the accused too. My medical
examination and X-ray was done in the Jhunjhunu
G
hospital."
5. These two injured eye witnesses not only corroborated their
respective accounts but were not shaken in cross-examination.
PW.3 - Radhey Shyam, stated in cross-examination:-
H
•
BADRU RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 684
[R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
of the injuries. I and Radhey Shyam
were admitted in the hospital. I know the assaulters
among whom Lalita and Yamuna are present today in
the Court and I know rest of the accused too. My medical
examination and X-ray was done in the Jhunjhunu
G
hospital."
5. These two injured eye witnesses not only corroborated their
respective accounts but were not shaken in cross-examination.
PW.3 - Radhey Shyam, stated in cross-examination:-
H
•
BADRU RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 684
[R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
REASONS:
: conviction of appellants-accused was justified
- The evidence of two injured eye-witnesses is reliable - The
accused also cannot be acquitted on parity with the six
acquitted accused.
Motive -Absence -Affect of-
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2018 9 349 354 EN.pdf
Applicant: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
of the case liability cannot be fastened on the respondent-
accused (accused Nos. 2 to 9) – In view of medical evidence it is
evident that accused No.1 was not having intention to commit murder,
but his act was to cause bodily injury which was likely to cause
death – Therefore, conviction of accused No.1 u/s. 304 (Part I) and E
acquittal of rest of the accused by High Court was justified.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt and what the appropriate sentence is
RULE:
– Held: Statement of the eye-witness as well as dying
D
declaration of deceased not corroborated by medical evidence – In
the facts of the case liability cannot be fastened on the respondent-
accused (accused Nos.
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — of the case liability cannot be fastened on the respondent-
accused (accused Nos. 2 to 9) – In view of medical evidence it is
evident that accused No.1 was not having intention to commit murder,
but his act was to cause bodily injury which was likely to cause
death – Therefore, conviction of accused No.1 u/s. 304 (Part I) and E
acquittal of rest of the accused by High Court was justified.
Dismissi...
2 to 9) – In view of medical evidence it is
evident that accused No. 1 was not having intention to commit murder,
but his act was to cause bodily injury which was likely to cause
death – Therefore, conviction of accused No. 304 (Part I) and E
acquittal of rest of the accused by High Court was justified.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
of the learned
counsel appearing for the appellant-State and the learned advocate
appearing for the respondents. It is clear from the evidence on record
that the deceased Rajesh suffered only one injury on interior aspect of B
thigh, which was an exit wound. Injury No. 2 was a gunshot entry
wound on...
CONCLUSION:
dismissed.
F
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal dismissed.
G
H
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
dismissed.
F
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal dismissed.
G
H
REASONS:
– Held: Statement of the eye-witness as well as dying
D
declaration of deceased not corroborated by medical evidence – In
the facts of the case liability cannot be fastened on the respondent-
accused (accused Nos. 2 to 9) – In view of medical evidence it is
evident that accused No.1 was not having intention to commit murder,
but his act was to cause bodily injury which was likely to cause
death – Therefore, conviction of accused No.1 u/s. 304 (Part I) and E
acquittal of rest of the accused by High Court was justified.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2017 7 676 686 EN.pdf
Applicant: A TERAPALLI DYVASAHATA KUMAR
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
of the case or very scope and object of the legislation under
this Act. Hence, it has to be necessarily held that it is only
concerned District Court, where the society is registered that which
will have jurisdiction to entertain any dispute under Section 23 of
the said Act and not otherwise."
F 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has placed
before us the difference in phraseology between Section 23 of the 2001
Act and Section 13 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Further, he
has argued that since this distinction has not been kept in mind, the
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (1994) 1 SCC
34; (1994) 1 SCC 34
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — of the case or very scope and object of the legislation under
this Act. Hence, it has to be necessarily held that it is only
concerned District Court, where the society is registered that which
will have jurisdiction to entertain any dispute under Section 23 of
the said Act and not otherwise."
F 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has placed
before us the difference in phraseol...
special
Act), it must necessarily take with it all the trappings that go along
with a District Court that is established under the general law (i. ) - Therefore, for determining territorial jurisdiction ofD istrict
D
Court, provisions of C. would apply - Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 - s.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
the
. preliminaryobjection.
G
5. A Revision Petition filed before the High Court was, however,
allowed, and the judgment of the District Judge was set aside by the
High Court observing thus:
"On a comparative look at the expression used in the provisions
of the A.P. Societies Registration Act, 200 I as already pointed H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 7 S.C.R.
A out, a dispute as under Section 23 of the said Act has to be raised
in the District Court concerned. Even though the District Court
co
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
the
. preliminaryobjection.
G
5. A Revision Petition filed before the High Court was, however,
allowed, and the judgment of the District Judge was set aside by the
High Court observing thus:
"On a comparative look at the expression used in the provisions
of the A.P. Societies Registration Act, 200 I as already pointed H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 7 S.C.R.
A out, a dispute as under Section 23 of the said Act has to be raised
in the District Court concerned. Even though the District Court
co
REASONS:
: s.23 enables the person aggrieved to file
an application in the "District Court concerned" - The-expression
"District Court" having not been defined in the 2001 Act (i.e. special
Act), it must necessarily take with it all the trappings that go along
with a District Court that is established under the general law (i.e.
C.P. C.) - Therefore, for determining territorial jurisdiction ofD istrict
D
Court, provisions of C.P.C. would apply - Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 - s. 20.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
FACTS:
with
reference to the number of persons, the place from where he
was witnessing such an assembly, the nature of movement of
the persons gathered in front of his banana shop, his own
statement that he was frightened while looking at such a large
H group of persons and that even according to him he saw his
NOUSHAD@ NOUSHAD PASHA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
517
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.
SUBMISSIONS BY PARTIES:
stated that of the 49 witnesses, reliance
was mainly placed upon PWs-11, 14, 15, 19, 24, 30, 42, 43
and 44 out of whom many turned h.ostile and quite a number of
G them were found to be chance witnesses and unreliable. PW-
11 was relied upon by the prosecution as star witness who
was the complainant himself ancl J=xhibit P-18-complaint was
lodged by him. Apart from PW-11. PWs-19, 30 and 32 were
also claimed to be eye-witnesses. The learned Senior Counsel
H also submitted that no test identification parade was
Analyse the submissions and provide a reasoned judgment.
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
: In view of the conclusion by the trial court in D
respect of the eye-witnesses that they were unreliable and
unbelievable, it would be unsafe to-rely on them to confirm
the conviction of appellants-accused -
The High Court
without assigning any reason perfunctorily held that they were
believable, trustworthy and natural witnesses - Since the vel)I
version of the eye-witnesses resulted in acquittal of all the
E
accused, for the vel)I same reasoning, conviction of the
appellants-accused also cannot stand- Conviction set aside.
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — with
reference to the number of persons, the place from where he
was witnessing such an assembly, the nature of movement of
the persons gathered in front of his banana shop, his own
statement that he was frightened while looking at such a large
H group of persons and that even according to him he saw his
NOUSHAD@ NOUSHAD PASHA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
517
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J....
in its conclusion the.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
stated that of the 49 witnesses, reliance
was mainly placed upon PWs-11, 14, 15, 19, 24, 30, 42, 43
and 44 out of whom many turned h.ostile and quite a number of
G them were found to be chance witnesses and unreliable. PW-
11 was relied upon by the prosecution as star witness who
was the complai...
CONCLUSION:
.
</think>
<|answer|>
: In view of the conclusion by the trial court in D
respect of the eye-witnesses that they were unreliable and
unbelievable, it would be unsafe to-rely on them to confirm
the conviction of appellants-accused -
The High Court
without assigning any reason perfunctorily held that they were
believable, trustworthy and natural witnesses - Since the vel)I
version of the eye-witnesses resulted in acquittal of all the
E
accused, for the vel)I same reasoning, conviction of the
appellants-accused also cannot stand- Conviction set aside.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The High Court has totally omitted to note F
relevant findings of the trial Court as regards the
evidence of PWs-1
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2017 11 271 362 EN.pdf
Applicant: CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI AND ORS. A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
which are to the
knowledge of the applicant and hence the burden of proof is placed on
the claimant by Section 8.
16. The sta(c legislature was evidently not content with a mere
invalidation of a caste certificate which is founded on a false claim made
H by a candidate to belong to a designated caste, tribe or class. Section 6
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 303
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]
(2) provides that a candidate who desires to obtain a benefit must apply A
well in time to the Scrutiny Committee for verification and similarly the
appointing authority of a candidate who has been selected for appointment
but has not obtained a validity certificate must apply to the Scrutiny
Committee for verification. The legislature however was cognizant of
the fact that by the time a scrutiny takes place before the Scrutiny
B
Committee the candidate may have obtained the benefit of a concession
reserved for a caste, tribe or class. As a matter of public interest, the
legislation stipulates that the benefits which have been obtained on the
basis of a false caste certificate shall be withdrawn upon the invalidation
of the claim by the Scrutiny Committee. The ambit of Section I 0 (I)
c
extends, among other things, to an admission which is secured in an
educational institution against a scat reserved for one of the designated
castes, tribes or classes; an appointment in the government, local authority
or corporation owned or controlled by the government or any government
institution or co-operative society against a reserved post. A benefit which
is obtained on the foundation of a false caste claim which has been
D
invalidated is not permitted to be retained by the candidate. There is a
legislative mandate that the benefit of an admission granted or an
appointment to a post shall be withdrawn forthwith on the cancellation
of a caste I tr.ibc certificate. Any amount which is paid by way of
scholarship. grant, allowance or financial benefits has to be recovered
as arrears of land revenue. Sub-Section (3) of Section 10 contains a E
11011-obsta11te provision as a
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2012)
1 SCC 549; (2008) 9 SCC 54; (2011) 9 SCC 798
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — which are to the
knowledge of the applicant and hence the burden of proof is placed on
the claimant by Section 8.
16. The sta(c legislature was evidently not content with a mere
invalidation of a caste certificate which is founded on a false claim made
H by a candidate to belong to a designated caste, tribe or class. Section 6
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH 303
BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D...
: Where benefit is see11red
by an individual such as an appointment to a post or admission to
an educational institution 'on the basis that the candidate belongs D
to a reserved category for which the benefit is reserved. invalidation
of the caste or tribe claim upon verification would.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
in 'the
appointment or admission being rendered void or non est -
Withdrawal 0{ benefits secured on the basis of the false caste claim
is a necessary consequence - Exception to the above is in those E
cases where this Court exercises its power u!Art. 142 to render
complete justice - Though the pqwer of the Supreme Court u/Art.
142 is a constitutional power vested in the court for rendering
complete justice and is couched in wide terms, the exercise of the
jurisdiction must have due regard to leg
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
in 'the
appointment or admission being rendered void or non est -
Withdrawal 0{ benefits secured on the basis of the false caste claim
is a necessary consequence - Exception to the above is in those E
cases where this Court exercises its power u!Art. 142 to render
complete justice - Though the pqwer of the Supreme Court u/Art.
142 is a constitutional power vested in the court for rendering
complete justice and is couched in wide terms, the exercise of the
jurisdiction must have due regard to leg
REASONS:
: Where benefit is see11red
by an individual such as an appointment to a post or admission to
an educational institution 'on the basis that the candidate belongs D
to a reserved category for which the benefit is reserved. invalidation
of the caste or tribe claim upon verification would
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2022 16 609 614 EN.pdf
Applicant: ANR.
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
ourt
on 28.10.2014 – Inspite of this, solely on the ground that the
compensation was not tendered prior to coming into force of the
Act, 2013, High Court declared that the land acquisition with respect
to the land in question was deemed to have lapsed – Held: The view
D
taken by the High Court is not sustainable in view of the
Constitutional Bench decision of Supreme Court in Indore
Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors. wherein it was held
that in case possession was taken but compensation not paid then
there is no lapse – High Court order set aside.
E
Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors.
(2020) 8 SCC 129 : 3 SCR 1 – followed.
Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. v. Harakchand
Misirimal Solanki and Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 183 :
1 SCR 783 – referred to.
F
Case Law Reference
1 SCR 783 referred to Para 2.1
3 SCR 1 followed Para 2.2
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8932
G
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.01.2018 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (C) No. 11238 of 2015.
Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, Adv. for the Appellants.
H Krishan Kumar, Nitin Mishra, Advs. for the Respondents.
610
LAND AND BUILDING DEPT. THROUGH SECY., GOVT. OF 611
NCT OF DELHI v. MAHIPAL SINGH
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ
Petition(C) No. 11238 of 2015 by which the High Court has allowed the
B
said writ petition and has declared that theland acquisition proceedings
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to
as “Act, 1894”) with regard to the landin question isdeemed to have
lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”), the Government of NCT C
of Delhi and Anr.havepreferred the present appeal.
2.
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant and recover possession of the premises
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2015) 3 SCC 353; (2020) 8 SCC 129; (2018) 3 SCC 412
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — ourt
on 28.10.2014 – Inspite of this, solely on the ground that the
compensation was not tendered prior to coming into force of the
Act, 2013, High Court declared that the land acquisition with respect
to the land in question was deemed to have lapsed – Held: The view
D
taken by the High Court is not sustainable in view of the
Constitutional Bench decision of Supreme Court in Indore
Development Au...
: The view
D
taken by the High Court is not sustainable in view of the
Constitutional Bench decision of Supreme Court in Indore
Development Authority v. wherein it was held
that in case possession was taken but compensation not paid then
there is no lapse – High Court.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
the
B
said writ petition and has declared that theland acquisition proceedings
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to
as “Act, 1894”) with regard to the landin question isdeemed to have
lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”), the Government of NCT C
of Delhi and Anr.havepreferred the present appeal.
2. From the impugned
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
the
B
said writ petition and has declared that theland acquisition proceedings
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to
as “Act, 1894”) with regard to the landin question isdeemed to have
lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”), the Government of NCT C
of Delhi and Anr.havepreferred the present appeal.
2. From the impugned
REASONS:
: The view
D
taken by the High Court is not sustainable in view of the
Constitutional Bench decision of Supreme Court in Indore
Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors. wherein it was held
that in case possession was taken but compensation not paid then
there is no lapse – High Court
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
FACTS:
is not precluded by
s.34(2)(b) and that it was not necessary to consider the application
for amendment –
SUBMISSIONS BY PARTIES:
reliance has been placed on MSP Infrastructure Ltd.
vs. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. reported in
(2015) 13 SCC 713.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
685
4. Learned Advocate General for the State of M.P. submitted
that the amendment sought is formal. Legal plea arising on undisputed
facts is not precluded by Section 34(2)(b) of the Act. Even if an objection
to jurisdiction is not raised under Section 16 of the Act, the same can be
raised under Section 34 of the Act. It is not even necessary to consider
the application for amendment as it is a legal plea, on admitted facts,
which can be ra
Analyse the submissions and provide a reasoned judgment.
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
No such objection was raised u/s
RULE:
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 Section
16 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 Article 227 of the Constitution Article
1 of the Constitution The following precedents are applicable: (2011) 5 SCC
532; AIR 2015 SC 710; (2015) 13 SCC 713
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — is not precluded by
s.34(2)(b) and that it was not necessary to consider the application
for amendment –
We find merit in the contentions raised on behalf of the State. We proceed on the footing that the amendment being beyond limitation
is not to be allowed as the amendment is not pressed. We do not see any bar to plea of jurisdiction being raised by
way of an objection under Section 34 of the Act even if no such objection
was raised under Section 16.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
reliance has been placed on MSP Infrastructure Ltd.
vs. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. reported in
(2015) 13 SCC 713.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
685
4. Learned Advocate General for the State of M.P. submitted
that the amendment sought is formal. Legal plea arising on undisputed
facts is not...
CONCLUSION:
of accordingly.
Ankit Gyan
Appeals disposed of.
M/S LION ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS v. STATE OF M.P.
</think>
<|answer|>
: Since amendment application not pressed,
the appeal rendered infructuous – There is no bar to plea of
jurisdiction being raised by way of an objection u/s.34 of the Act
even if no such objection was raised u/s.16 – Matter remanded to
the trial Court for consideration of objections u/s.34 of the Act.
MSP Infrastructure Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh Road
Development Corporation Ltd. (2015) 13 SCC 713 :
AIR 2015 SC 710 – Partly overruled.
Case Law Reference
(2015) 13 SCC 713
Partly overruled
Para 7
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 8984-
8985 of 2017.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.2014 and Impugned
Order dated 09.03.2015 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Principal
Seat a
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2019 13 224 227 EN.pdf
Applicant: S.C.R.
A GAURAV HARGOVINDBHAI DAVE
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
of the present case, application u/s.
7 is time-barred – There is no equity about limitation – It is not open
D
to the court to interpret Articles of Limitation Act, when applicability
of a particular Article is clear.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
62 is applicable to only suits –
An application u/s.
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — of the present case, application u/s.
7 is time-barred – There is no equity about limitation – It is not open
D
to the court to interpret Articles of Limitation Act, when applicability
of a particular Article is clear.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
7 would fall within the residuary Art. 137, in the facts of the present case, application u/s. 7 is time-barred – There is no equity about limitation – It is not open
D
to the court to interpret Articles of Limitation Act, when applicability
of a particular Article is clear.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
of
which the application filed under Section 7 would clearly be time-
barred. [Para 6][227-A-B]
F
2. The Report of the Insolvency Law Committee itself
stated that the intent of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
could not have been to give a new lease of life to debts which are
already time-barred. Further, it is not for the Court to interpret,
commercially or otherwise, articles of the Limitation Act when it
G
is clear that a particular Article gets attracted. It is well settled
that there is n
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
of
which the application filed under Section 7 would clearly be time-
barred. [Para 6][227-A-B]
F
2. The Report of the Insolvency Law Committee itself
stated that the intent of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
could not have been to give a new lease of life to debts which are
already time-barred. Further, it is not for the Court to interpret,
commercially or otherwise, articles of the Limitation Act when it
G
is clear that a particular Article gets attracted. It is well settled
that there is n
REASONS:
: Art. 62 is applicable to only suits –
An application u/s. 7 would fall within the residuary Art. 137 –
Applying Art. 137, in the facts of the present case, application u/s.
7 is time-barred – There is no equity about limitation – It is not open
D
to the court to interpret Articles of Limitation Act, when applicability
of a particular Article is clear.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2020 7 117 130 EN.pdf
Applicant: SHYAM SAHNI A
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
which led to filing of this appeal are as follows:-
The appellant filed a civil suit being CS (OS) No.1134 of 2008
before the High Court seeking declaration, permanent injunction and
possession of the suit property being the first and second floor of the
D
residential house constructed upon Plot No.68, Friends Colony (West),
New Delhi. Alternatively, appellant has sought the partition of the suit
property. Case of the appellant is that in 1954, Late Niamat Sahni acquired
Plot No.68, Friends Colony (West), New Delhi, measuring 3000 sq. yards
from Friends Colony Cooperative Housing Building Society Limited
E wherein, she constructed a main building having a ground floor and first
floor. Niamat Sahni herself and with her son Shyam Sahni (appellant)
and his family were residing in the ground floor. Soon after the demise
of Niamat Sahni, the appellant came to know that Sarabjit Prakash and
respondent No.1 have executed documents purporting to be sale deeds
and other documents in their favour or in favour of other persons qua
F
first floor and second floor and terrace in the residential building
constructed upon 68, Friends Colony (West) New Delhi belonging to
mother of the appellant, the appellant has filed a civil suit seeking
declaration, possession and permanent injunction and also for partition in
CS (OS) No.1134 of 2008 which is pending at the stage of cross-
G examination of the defendants witnesses.
4 Respondent No.1 resisted the suit contending that first
respondent’s mother Usha Prakash took physical possession of the first
floor and terrace and the second floor in 1974 and the same was let out.
On 13.08.1984, Niamat Sahni made a registered will in Hindi dividing
H equal shares between her son- appellant Shyam Sahni and her daughter
SHYAM SAHNI v. ARJUN PRAKASH AND ORS. 121
[R. BANUMATHI, J.]
Usha Prakash (mother of respondent No.1). On 23.12.1992, Niamat A
Sahni also made another registered will in English which was identical to
her previous will made in 1984. It is stated that on 06.12.1999, an
Irrevocable Memorandum of Family Settlement was signed between
the appellant and Usha Prakash (mother of respondent No.1) which
was confirmed by Niamat Sahni thus, dividing 50% of the undivided
B
share in the plot of land between her son and daughter. According to
respondent No.1, as per settlement, ground floor of the suit property
was given to the appellant with the entire parking, garages and servant
quarters on the left side of the property; while the first floor and also
subsequent floors (with entire parking and front entrance on the right
side of the suit property) were given to Usha Prakash-mother of C
respondent No.1. According to respondent No.1, the family settlement
dated 06.12.1999 is an irrevocable Family Settlement between the
appellant and Usha Prakash and was also acted upon dividing the suit
property by meets and bounds Respondent No.1 has further stated that
Niamat Sahni had executed a General Power of Attonery on 03.01.2002
D
a
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant and recover possession of the premises
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2003)
10 SCC 767; (2003) 10 SCC 767
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — which led to filing of this appeal are as follows:-
The appellant filed a civil suit being CS (OS) No.1134 of 2008
before the High Court seeking declaration, permanent injunction and
possession of the suit property being the first and second floor of the
D
residential house constructed upon Plot No.68, Friends Colony (West),
New Delhi. Alternatively, appellant has sought the partition of the suit...
of the Court – Appellant filed a civil
suit seeking declaration, possession, permanent injunction and also
C
for partition of the suit property owned by his late mother – Mother
of the appellant had constructed a main building having ground
floor and first floor – According to respondent no. 1, the said
property was equally divided by mother of appellant between her
son-appellant and her daughter (respondent no. 1’s mother) – The
Single Judge of the High Court vide.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
of both the
sides and perused the impugned judgment and other materials on record.
19. Sarabjit Prakash was directed to be personally present before
D
the Court on 30.05.2013. On the next date of hearing i.e. 30.05.2013,
Sarabjit Prakash was not present in the Court and the matter was listed
for 02....
CONCLUSION:
the appeal filed by respondent No.1 (defendant No.4) herein by
holding that the passport of respondent No.1 (defendant No.4) ought not
to have been ordered to be detained and further directed return of the
C
passport of respondent No.1 (defendant No.4).
3. Brief
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
the appeal filed by respondent No.1 (defendant No.4) herein by
holding that the passport of respondent No.1 (defendant No.4) ought not
to have been ordered to be detained and further directed return of the
C
passport of respondent No.1 (defendant No.4).
3. Brief
REASONS:
of the Court – Appellant filed a civil
suit seeking declaration, possession, permanent injunction and also
C
for partition of the suit property owned by his late mother – Mother
of the appellant had constructed a main building having ground
floor and first floor – According to respondent no. 1, the said
property was equally divided by mother of appellant between her
son-appellant and her daughter (respondent no. 1’s mother) – The
Single Judge of the High Court vide
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
LEGAL SCENARIO:
of the respective cases. While the larger question
i.e. qua F\,mdamental Rights was not directly in issue before
the Kerala High Court, in Manuel Theodore D'souza (supra) c
the right to adopt was consistent with the canonical law
applicable to the parties who were Christians by faith. We hardly
need to reiterate the well settled principles of judicial restraint,
the fundamental of which requires the Court not to deal with
issues of Constitutional interpretation unless such an exercise
0
PRECEDENTS TO CONSIDER:
• AIR 1999 Kerala 187
• (1984) 2 SCC
244
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
Section 41 of the JJ Act, 2000
was substantially amended in 2006 and for the first time
the responsibility of giving in adoption was cast upon the
Court which was defined by the JJ Rules, 2007 Section 41 of the JJ Act, 2000 Article 44 of the Constitution Article 44 of the Constitution The following precedents are applicable: AIR 1999 Kerala 187; (1984) 2 SCC
244
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — of the respective cases. While the larger question
i.e. qua F\,mdamental Rights was not directly in issue before
the Kerala High Court, in Manuel Theodore D'souza (supra) c
the right to adopt was consistent with the canonical law
applicable to the parties who were Christians by faith. We hardly
need to reiterate the well settled principles of judicial restraint,
the fundamental of which requ...
Subhashini, Debasis Misra for the appearing
C parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANJAN GOGOi, J. Recognition of the right to adopt
and to be adopted as a fundamental right under Part-Ill of the
0
Constitution is the vision scripted by the public spirited
individual who has moved this Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
filed on
behalf of the petitioner it has also been stated that in view
G of the enactment of the JJ Act, 2000 and the Amending
Act of 2006 the prayers made in the writ petition with
regard to guidelines to enable and facilitate adoption of
children by persons irrespective of religion, caste, cr...
CONCLUSION:
of in .terms
of our directions and observations made above.
D.G.
Writ Petition disposed of.
E
</think>
<|answer|>
: Petitioner admitted
that JJ Act of 2000 is a secular law that enable adoption
D
irrespective of religion and meets prayers made with petition
- Muslim Personal Law Board claimed that Islamic law does
not recognize that an adopted child is at par with a biological
one; that it allows Kafala system under which adopted child
. remains descendent of biological parents and that child
E
welfare committee should keep this in mind - The 2000 Act
allows choice of personal Jaw and is an optional legislation
and is a small step towards fulfillment of Art 44 - Choice will
remain open till a Uniform Civil Code is made to sink
conflicting faiths. afld prevalent beliefs - The question of F
adoption to be deciared a fundamental right is not ripe and
must wait its evolution till different
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 4522 of 2021)
AUGUST 03
Applicant: TELANGANA STATE WAKF BOARD & ANR.
Court: High Court setting
FACTS OF THE CASE:
, suit
by Wakf Board before the Wakf tribunal seeking eviction of tenant
from property belonging to Wakf Institution – Case of the tenant
that suit property not a wakf property and extent of land also
disputed – Tribunal
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant and recover possession of the premises
RULE:
Article 227 of the Constitution The following precedents are applicable: (2014) 16 SCC 38; (2019)
4 SCC 698; (2010) 8 SCC 726
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , suit
by Wakf Board before the Wakf tribunal seeking eviction of tenant
from property belonging to Wakf Institution – Case of the tenant
that suit property not a wakf property and extent of land also
disputed – Tribunal
the tribunal had relied upon the.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
of
encroachment of 40 sq. yards which was described in Schedule
‘B’ to the suit it has indicated that there is no evidence of required
standard as to how the extent of Wakf property had increased
from 667.8 sq. yards to 998.66 sq. yards and by mere recital in
the gazette notification and the resurve...
CONCLUSION:
of.
Nidhi Jain
Appeal allowed.
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
of.
Nidhi Jain
Appeal allowed.
REASONS:
the suit properties to be the property
belonging to the Wakf institution and directed the tenant to vacate
the suit porperties – High Court set aside the order holding that the
suit was not maintainable before the Wakf tribunal – On appeal,
held: Judgment passed by the Wakf tribunal was rendered in a suit
which was maintainable before the Wakf tribunal and it had the
jurisdiction to do so – Tribunal relied upon the evidence available
and had arrived at the conclusion that the property in question is
Wakf property and had accordingly decreed the suit – Evidence
available on record has been anal
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: None
Applicant: SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY
Court: present case, this Court is
FACTS OF THE CASE:
of this case is to require him to
pay a fine under clause (e) of Section 21(1) of the Juvenile
Justice Act, 1986.”
21. Following the aforesaid ratio and the legal position elucidated
above, while we uphold the conviction of Satya Deo, we would set aside
the sentence of life imprisonment. We would remit the matter to the
jurisdiction of the Board for passing appropriate
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
s.25 of the 2015
Act, an accused cannot be denied his right to be treated as a juvenile
when he was less than eighteen years of age at the time of commission
of the offence, a right which he acquired and has fructified under
the 2000 Act, even if the offence was committed prior to enforcement
of the 2000 s.25 of the 2015 Act,
2000 Act would continue to apply and govern the proceedings which
were pending when the 2015 Article 20 of the Constitution Article 20 of the Constitution The following precedents are applicable: (2016) 11 SCC 786; (2005) 3 SCC 685; (1982) 2 SCC 202
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — of this case is to require him to
pay a fine under clause (e) of Section 21(1) of the Juvenile
Justice Act, 1986.”
21. Following the aforesaid ratio and the legal position elucidated
above, while we uphold the conviction of Satya Deo, we would set aside
the sentence of life imprisonment. We would remit the matter to the
jurisdiction of the Board for passing appropriate
this Court is.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
of.
Divya Pandey
Appeal partly allowed.
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
of.
Divya Pandey
Appeal partly allowed.
REASONS:
:
Supreme court at this stage can decide and determine the question
of juvenility of the appellant, notwithstanding the fact that he was
not entitled to the benefit of being a juvenile on the date of the
offence, under the 1986 Act, and had turned an adult when the
2000 Act was enforced – As the appellant was less than 18 years of
age on the date of commission of offence on 11.12.81, he is entitled
to be treated as a juvenile and be given benefit as per the 2000 Act
– Further, in light of s.6, General Clauses Act r/w s.25 of the 2015
Act, an accused cannot be denied his right to be treated as
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2020 3 1207 1218 EN.pdf
Applicant: MADHYA PRADESH HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE A
DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND ANOTHER
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
, this Court fails to understand how the modification A
in the layout plan which is in accordance with the Adhiniyam could
have been struck down. [Para 6][1215-E-H; 1216-A]
2. The writ petition challenging the orders dated 12th May
2008 (direction of the Commissioner to re-examine the request
for modification) and 24th September 2008 (
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2015) 10
SCC 400; (2015) 10 SCC 400; (2009) 3 SCC 281
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , this Court fails to understand how the modification A
in the layout plan which is in accordance with the Adhiniyam could
have been struck down. [Para 6][1215-E-H; 1216-A]
2. The writ petition challenging the orders dated 12th May
2008 (direction of the Commissioner to re-examine the request
for modification) and 24th September 2008 (
2008 – The first and
second respondents filed writ petition to quash and set aside the
order approving the change in the layout plan – The High Court
allowed the writ petition and applying the principle of promissory E
estoppel.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
the writ petition and applying the principle of promissory E
estoppel held that the appellant-board must develop the land
according to the original plan shown to the allottees at the time of
purchase – On appeal,
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
the writ petition and applying the principle of promissory E
estoppel held that the appellant-board must develop the land
according to the original plan shown to the allottees at the time of
purchase – On appeal,
REASONS:
dated 24.09.2008 – The first and
second respondents filed writ petition to quash and set aside the
order approving the change in the layout plan – The High Court
allowed the writ petition and applying the principle of promissory E
estoppel
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 2019 1 886 919 EN.pdf
Applicant: S.C.R.
A RELIANCE INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED
Court: Supreme Court of India
FACTS OF THE CASE:
discussed above, the
Commission does not find any merit in altering the MYT norms
for SHR. Therefore, though RInfra-G has proposed a SHR of
D
2,450 kCal/kWh, the Commission has considered the SHR as per
the MYT Regulations, 2011.
4.5.7
For FY 2011-12, the Commission has considered the SHR as
approved in the ARR
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
s.111 of the
Electricity Act 2003 The following precedents are applicable: (2011) 11 SCC 34; (2010) 4 SCC 603; (2002) 3 SCC 711
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — discussed above, the
Commission does not find any merit in altering the MYT norms
for SHR. Therefore, though RInfra-G has proposed a SHR of
D
2,450 kCal/kWh, the Commission has considered the SHR as per
the MYT Regulations, 2011.
4.5.7
For FY 2011-12, the Commission has considered the SHR as
approved in the ARR
111 of the
Electricity Act 2003 before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity
(APTEL) – Also, appellant instituted a Writ petition u/Art. 226 of the
E Constitution before the Bombay High Court for the purpose of
challenging regn 44. 2(d) which specifies a separate SHR for the
Dahanu TPS as compared to other generating stations in the State
– The High Court dismissed the Writ petition and imposed costs of
Rs.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
on the draft approach paper. On 4
February 2011, the MERC (Multi Year Tariff) Regulations, 20113 were
C
notified. Regulation 2(32) defines the Gross Station Heat Rate thus:
“(32) “Gross Station Heat Rate” means the heat energy input in
kcal required to generate one kWh of electrical energy at genera...
CONCLUSION:
the Writ petition and imposed costs of
Rs. 1 lakh on the appellant, and held that having approached the
Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, the appellant was not justified in
F
moving the High Court u/Art.226 “on the same issue” when the
Tribunal was in a position to provide adequate relief – On appeal,
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
the Writ petition and imposed costs of
Rs. 1 lakh on the appellant, and held that having approached the
Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, the appellant was not justified in
F
moving the High Court u/Art.226 “on the same issue” when the
Tribunal was in a position to provide adequate relief – On appeal,
REASONS:
that it had considered the norms for SHR based on the
MYT regulations and it did not find any merit in altering the MYT
norms for SHR – The appellant filed an appeal u/s.111 of the
Electricity Act 2003 before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity
(APTEL) – Also, appellant instituted a Writ petition u/Art.226 of the
E Constitution before the Bombay High Court for the purpose of
challenging regn 44.2(d) which specifies a separate SHR for the
Dahanu TPS as compared to other generating stations in the State
– The High Court dismissed the Writ petition and imposed costs of
Rs. 1 lakh on the appell
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
FACTS:
being that respondent
no.6 (mother) had the custody of the two minor children, for which
the petitioner (father) had already filed a petition u/s.12 of the
Guardians and Wards Act, which is pending consideration; and the
custody of the children with the mother, who is a natural guardian,
cannot be said to be illegal and, thus, the petition for habeas corpus
would not be maintainable and that too d
SUBMISSIONS BY PARTIES:
of Mr. Luthra with regard to the non-
maintainability of this Habeas Corpus Petition, especially when the custody
of the children is with the mother, who is a natural guardian. It is contended
that the maintenance amount awarded by the Trial Court under the
provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,2005
has not been paid by the petitioner to respondent No. 6/wife which would,
according to the learned counsel, clearly demonstrate that the petitioner
has no concern for the wellbeing of respondent No. 6/wife or the children.
It is lastly contended that in case the petitione
Analyse the submissions and provide a reasoned judgment.
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is entitled to bail and, if so, on what conditions
RULE:
Section
12 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 Article 32 of the Constitution Article 32 of
the Constitution The following precedents are applicable: (2020) 3
SCC 67; (2019) 7 SCC 42; (2020) 7 SCC 599
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — being that respondent
no.6 (mother) had the custody of the two minor children, for which
the petitioner (father) had already filed a petition u/s.12 of the
Guardians and Wards Act, which is pending consideration; and the
custody of the children with the mother, who is a natural guardian,
cannot be said to be illegal and, thus, the petition for habeas corpus
would not be maintainable and that too d...
the admitted facts being that respondent.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
of Mr. Luthra with regard to the non-
maintainability of this Habeas Corpus Petition, especially when the custody
of the children is with the mother, who is a natural guardian. It is contended
that the maintenance amount awarded by the Trial Court under the
provisions of the Protection of Women from...
CONCLUSION:
.
JOSE ANTONIO ZALBA DIEZ DEL CORRAL ALIAS JOSE ANTONIO
ZALBA v. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.
</think>
<|answer|>
: In the present case, the admitted facts being that respondent
no.6 (mother) had the custody of the two minor children, for which
the petitioner (father) had already filed a petition u/s.12 of the
Guardians and Wards Act, which is pending consideration; and the
custody of the children with the mother, who is a natural guardian,
cannot be said to be illegal and, thus, the petition for habeas corpus
would not be maintainable and that too directly u/Art.32 of the
Constitution – The statutory remedy available under the Guardians
and Wards Act is the appropriate remedy, which has already been
availed by the petitioner – There are no extra ordinary or exceptional
circumstances in the present case
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
FACTS:
of the case, the appellant cannot be called upon to answer
something which has transpired 27 years back. The appellant
has already undergone incarceration for a period of 10 years and
4 months. The conviction of the appellant stands vitiated. In the
SUBMISSIONS BY PARTIES:
by the appellant before the High Court, a specific contention was
raised that the only circumstance appearing against the appellant
was not put to him in the statement under Section 313 of CrPC.
It is not in dispute that this part of the argument is not considered
C by the High Court. The Trial Court has not reproduced the
submissions made by the counsel appearing for the accused. [Para
10][760-F-H; 761-A-B]
2.2 The only alleged incriminating circumstance appearing
against the appellant in the evidence produced by the prosecution
D has not been put to him in his statement under Section 313 of
Analyse the submissions and provide a reasoned judgment.
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt and what the appropriate sentence is
RULE:
The following precedents are applicable: (2014) 10 SCC 270; (1973) 2 SCC 793; (2020) 10 SCC 108
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — of the case, the appellant cannot be called upon to answer
something which has transpired 27 years back. The appellant
has already undergone incarceration for a period of 10 years and
4 months. The conviction of the appellant stands vitiated. In the
: The only alleged incriminating
circumstance against the appellant is in the evidence of PW5, who
stated that the appellant was standing with a katta in his hand outside
D
the premises where the offence took place–However, this was not
put to him in his statement u/s. 313– Therefore, he had no opportunity
to explain the said circumstance which was the only basis of his
conviction– Hence, serious prejudice was caused to him –
Conviction of the appellant was vitiated – Impugned.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
by the appellant before the High Court, a specific contention was
raised that the only circumstance appearing against the appellant
was not put to him in the statement under Section 313 of CrPC.
It is not in dispute that this part of the argument is not considered
C by the High Court. The Trial Cour...
CONCLUSION:
in failure of justice,
it becomes a curable defect. However, while deciding whether
the defect can be cured, one of the considerations will be the C
passage of time from the date of the incident; (vi) In case such
irregularity is curable, even the appellate court can question the
accused on the material circumstance which is not put to him;
and (vii) In a given case, the case can be remanded to the Trial
Court from the stage of recording the supplementary statement
D
of the concerned accused und
</think>
<|answer|>
: The only alleged incriminating
circumstance against the appellant is in the evidence of PW5, who
stated that the appellant was standing with a katta in his hand outside
D
the premises where the offence took place–However, this was not
put to him in his statement u/s.313– Therefore, he had no opportunity
to explain the said circumstance which was the only basis of his
conviction– Hence, serious prejudice was caused to him –
Conviction of the appellant was vitiated – Impugned
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
<|scenario|>
BAIL APPLICATION
Case: 6262 of 2010)
FEBRUARY 16
Applicant: CORPORATION (GWALIOR) M.P. LTD.
Court: High Court
FACTS OF THE CASE:
, however, need mention to appreciate the same.
3. The appellant is a limited company registered under the
Companies Act. It is a State Government Undertaking which is
established with a view to develop and assist the State in the development
of industrial growth centers/areas, to promote, encourage and assist the
establishment growth and development of industries in the State of M.P.
The appellant is an “assesse” under the Income Tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).
4. On 10.02.1999, the appellant filed an application in the format
prescribed under Section 12-A of the Act to the Commissioner of Income
Tax (hereinafter referred to as “the CIT”) for grant of registration.
According to the appellant, since they were engaged in public utility
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
485
activity which, according to them, was for a charitable purpose under
Section 2(15) of the Act, they were entitled to claim registration as
provided under Section 12 (A) of the Act. Since the application for
registration was delayed in its filing, the appellant also made an application
for condonation of delay in filing the application.
5. By
<|end_scenario|>
<think>
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed based on the facts and applicable law
RULE:
Section 12A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 The following precedents are applicable: (2002) 5 SCC 685; AIR
1958 SC 1018; AIR 2001 SC 3689
APPLICATION:
Considering the facts presented — , however, need mention to appreciate the same.
3. The appellant is a limited company registered under the
Companies Act. It is a State Government Undertaking which is
established with a view to develop and assist the State in the development
of industrial growth centers/areas, to promote, encourage and assist the
establishment growth and development of industries in the State of M.P.
The appellan...
of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal and.
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED:
No contrary submissions recorded in the judgment.
CONCLUSION:
.
INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEV. CORP. v. COMMNR.
OF INCOME TAX, GWALIOR [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
</think>
<|answer|>
ORDER:
.
INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEV. CORP. v. COMMNR.
OF INCOME TAX, GWALIOR [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
REASONS:
order of
cancellation as legal and proper – Aggrieved, appellant filed appeal
before Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), which set aside the
order of the CIT – However, High Court set aside the order of ITAT
and restored the order of the CIT and held that since there is no
express power in the Act for cancelling the registration certificate
u/s.12-A and hence power to cancel can be traced from s.21 of the
General Clauses Act to support such order – Propriety of – Held:
Not proper – There was no express provision in the Act vesting the
CIT with the power to cancel the registration certificate
<|end_answer|><|endoftext|> |
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