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Since Greene, this court has rejected similar charges of misconduct where the government supplied counterfeit credit cards to detect which merchants would accept them. See Citro, 842 F.2d at 1153. In a case where an FBI agent bribed a state senator, we found no misconduct. See United States v. Carpenter, 961 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir.1992). Most recently, we declined to dismiss an indictment where the government established fake bank accounts and wired money to Mexican banks suspected of money laundering. See United States v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944, 948-49 (9th Cir.2003). We noted that the outrageous misconduct claim is limited to “extreme cases,” id. at 950, for example those characterized by “dominant fomentation” or “aggressive solicitation” of criminal activity. REDACTED Here, the FBI did not actually create a criminal enterprise. It constructed a fake travel agency Web site, and Agent Hamer lied about the arrangements he had made for the group. Like the agent who bribed the legislator in Carpenter, Agent Hamer engaged in fictional criminal conduct and lied about being able to facilitate access for Mayer. See also United States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing to dismiss indictment where prison authorities may have encouraged but did not actually aid jailbreak attempt). Moreover, the agent did not pay for Mayer’s trip, coerce him into buying a ticket, or plant the idea of traveling for illicit sexual conduct in Mayer’s mind. While Mayer points out there | [
"clear predisposition, his conviction was reversed: This egregious conduct on the part of government agents generated new crimes by the defendant merely for the sake of pressing criminal charges against him when, as far as the record reveals, he was lawfully and peacefully minding his own • affairs. Fundamental fai... | [
"scheme, id. at 900. In United States v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944 (9th Cir.2003), one of the largest undercover operations in history, the defendants were already part of a massive money laundering scheme in which Mexican banks laundered money to various drug cartels, id. at 948. In United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d... |
1015(b), to provide for the joint administration of the respective debtors’ estates. But joint administration should not be confused with consolidation. Consolidation results in the creation of one estate from two or more; joint administration does not, but is rather done for procedural convenience by avoiding the duplication of effort that would result if cases involving related debtors were to proceed separately. In re Blair, 226 B.R. 502, 505 (Bankr.D.Me.1998). See also Fed. R.Bankr.P.2009(e) (trustee shall keep separate accounts for each jointly administered estate). Therefore, for all the reasons just explained, the Debtor, Mr. Toland, is not entitled to claim an exemption in his wife’s vehicle. This holding is consistent with past decisions of a similar nature decided by this Court: REDACTED where title to vehicle reflected debtor as sole owner, debtor could not claim that son was intended owner; In re Smith, 310 B.R. 320, 323-24 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 2004), a non-debtor spouse, whose wages did not contribute to a tax overpayments, had no interest in the ensuing refund which could operate to exclude it from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. In reaching the conclusions found herein, the Court has considered all of the evidence, exhibits and arguments of counsel, regardless of whether or not they are specifically referred to in this Decision. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Trustee’s Objection to the claim of exemption of the Debtor, James W. Toland, Sr., in the motor vehicle titled in the name of the Co-debtor, | [
"owner. On the Chapter 7 schedules the Debtors listed the promissory note as a debt and the pickup truck as property of the estate. The Debtors also claimed the truck as an exemption from the estate. The Trustee objected to the claim of exemption, an Objection which was sustained by this Court on February 23, 1984.... | [
"which courts hear two or more related cases of entities that have filed bankruptcy petitions as a single case. The purpose of joint administration is to make case administration easier and less costly. The process has been called a “creature of procedural convenience,” because it avoids the duplication of effort t... |
F.2d 934, 50 CCPA 1153. Appellant’s reply brief in rebuttal argues that since this is solely a question of law, rather than a question of technical facts, the issue may be raised here for the first time. We do not think the solicitor is correct in his contention. The section 102 (e) question may be properly raised here for the first time because we must determine whether the reference is available. The particular question, whether we may consider the Murray reference, must be settled prior to determining the legal effect of the disclosure of that reference. We find no compelling reason to overrule our recent decisions in In re Harry, supra, or In re Kander, 312 F.2d 834, 50 CCPA 928, REDACTED d 316, 44 CCPA 904, or go contrary to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia circuit, Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Ladd, 340 F.2d 786, cert. granted 380 U.S. 960, 85 S.Ct. 1108. Thus Murray being available as prior art for a section 103 rejection, we look next to see whether that section is satisfied. Minion describes production of cortisone hemisuccinate by the same proc ess as appellant uses with hydrocortisone. Cortisone differs from hydrocortisone in having a keto group [0=C<] rather than a hydroxyl group [HO<X] at the 11 position. The hemisuccinate of cortisone is found by Minion to be four times as soluble in water as the | [
"application the art was fully aware of the substitution of Cl and CF3 potentiating groups in phenothiazines analogous to those now claimed by Zenitz. The examiner held, and the board agreed, that the substitution of CF3 for Cl in the phenothiazines disclosed by Cusic, would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in t... | [
"as to its availability. As to the Land and Eogers ’606 references, however, appellants raise the second part of the question about availability, based on our decision in In re Blout and Rogers, 52 CCPA 751, 333 F. 2d 928, 142 USPQ 173 (1964). They admit that they did not argue this point of law before the board, n... |
King, Kamehameha III., to himself and his successors, and not being in the lists of lands specially set apart as Government or Fort lands, must be one of those over which the Land Commission had jurisdiction to award to the claimant.” P.429. Haw. Civil Code, 1859, p. 14 et seq. United States v. Perot, 98 U. S. 428, 430; United States v. Chaves, 159 U. S. 452, 459. De Castro v. Board of Comm’rs, 322 U. S. 451, 459; Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U. S. 364, 380; compare Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363, 366; United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174, 183; REDACTED Fletcher v. Fuller, 120 U. S. 534, 545, 547; United States v. Chavez, 175 U. S. 509, 520. Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59, 109. See Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. VII, p. 343, et seq.; 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (12th Ed.), §17. 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th Ed.), § 45a: “Thus, also, though lapse of time does not, of itself, furnish a conclusive legal bar to the title of the sovereign, agreeably to the maxim, 'nullum tempus occurrit regi;’ yet, if the adverse claim could have had a legal commencement, juries are instructed or advised to presume such commencement, after many years of uninterrupted adverse possession or enjoyment. Accordingly, royal grants have been thus found by the jury, after an | [
"This second judgment was affirmed on appeal. In re S. R. A., Inc., 219 Minn. 493, 18 N. W. 2d 442. Certiorari was sought under § 237 (b) of the Judicial Code.- It was granted because of the importance and uncertainty of the question of the right of a State to tax realty sold by the United States in possession of a... | [
"p. 107. Hawaii, Statute Laws, 1847, vol. II, pp. 81-94; Revised Laws, Hawaii, 1905, p. 1164 et seq. Thurston v. Bishop, 7 Haw. 421, 429, 437. “The. Commission was authorized to consider possession of land acquired by oral gift of Kamehameha I., or one of his high chiefs, as sufficient evidence of title to authoriz... |
amend. . The court has recounted the standards applicable to a motion for summary judgment in more detail in a number of prior decisions. See, e.g., Swanson v. Van Otterloo, 993 F.Supp. 1224, 1230-31 (N.D.Iowa 1998); Dirks v. J.C. Robinson Seed Co., 980 F.Supp. 1303, 1305-07 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Laird v. Stilwill, 969 F.Supp. 1167, 1172-74 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Rural Water Sys. # 1 v. City of Sioux Ctr., 967 F.Supp. 1483, 1499-1501 (N.D.Iowa 1997), aff'd in pertinent part, 202 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 820, 121 S.Ct. 61, 148 L.Ed.2d 28 (2000); Tralon Corp. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 966 F.Supp. 812, 817-18 (N.D.Iowa 1997), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1347, 2000 WL 84400 (8th Cir.2000) (Table op.); REDACTED Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist., 963 F.Supp. 805 (N.D.Iowa 1997). The essentials of these standards are as follows. Rule 56 itself provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Rule 56. Summary Judgment (a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part thereof. (b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, | [
"1238 (8th Cir.1990). On the other hand, the Federal Rules of CM Procedure have authorized for nearly 60 years “motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus,... | [
"Standards For Summary Judgment This court has considered in some detail the standards applicable to motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 in a number of prior decisions. See, e.g., Swanson v. Van Otterloo, 993 F.Supp. 1224, 1230-31 (N.D.Iowa 1998); Dirks v. J.C. Robinson Seed Co., 980 F.Supp.... |
"ERISA preemption, for as we explain, the City does not act as a market participant in offering tax abatements."" (citing Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Foley , 37 F.3d 945, 955 n.15 (3d Cir. 1994) ). However, other district courts in this circuit, as well as other circuit courts, have applied the exception to insulate a municipality from ERISA's preemptive reach where the municipality acts as a proprietor, rather than a regulator. See Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist. , 623 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (""Because we conclude that the District acted as a market participant, the plaintiffs' ERISA and NLRA preemption claims fail at the threshold.""); REDACTED (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. , 159 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 1998) ); New Castle Cty. , 144 F.Supp.3d at 639 (""[T]here can be no dispute that the Route 9 Library Project is funded by NCC; therefore, NCC has a proprietary interest in the project.""); Lott Constructors, Inc. v. Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders , No. 93-5636 (JBS), 1994 WL 263851, at *20 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 1994) (concluding that plaintiffs' ERISA preemption claim failed ""because the challenged state action" | [
"Harbor, the state’s actions in Gould could only be understood as an “attempt to compel conformity with the NLRA” that was “unrelated to the employer’s performance of contractual obligations to the State.” Boston Harbor, 113 S.Ct. at 1197. Following the logic of Gould, courts have found preemption when government e... | [
"In general, Congress intends to preempt only state regulation, and not actions a state takes as a market participant. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders and Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc. (“Boston Harbor”), 507 U.S. 218, 227, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565 (1993); Engine Mfrs., 498 F.3d at... |
that counsel misjudged the admissibility of the confession. The second claim upon which petitioner seeks relief is the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the second degree-of-guilt trial to support a finding of murder in the first degree. Petitioner cites several Pennsylvania state court decisions which establish standards for sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction. We do not believe that petitioner’s cases are on point, however. Allegations of insufficient evidence in a state court trial are generally not reviewable by writ of habeas corpus. Young v. State of Ala., 443 F.2d 854 [5th Cir. 1971] ; Freeman v. Stone, 444 F.2d 113 [9th Cir. 1971]; United States ex rel Cook v. Cliff, 341 F.Supp. 1038 [E.D.Pa.1972]; REDACTED d 1211 [3rd Cir. 1972]. Only where a conviction has no evidentiary basis or is based on a gross insufficiency of evidence is it subject to collateral attack in the federal courts. Freeman v. Stone, cit. supra, and cases cited therein; United States ex rel Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691, 700 [E.D.Pa.1967], aff’d, 405 F.2d 1037 [3rd Cir. 1969]. We find that some evidence was presented at the second degree-of-guilt trial from which the inference of a robbery-murder might properly be drawn. See Commonwealth v. Marsh, 448 Pa. 292, 296, 293 A.2d 57, 60 [1972] where the sufficiency of the evidence to support the first degree finding is discussed. Petitioner’s final claim is that the failure of | [
"resulted in the inconsistencies. We are not insensitive to the anxiety suffered by relator while awaiting trial in a capital case. However, considering the record as a whole, considering the length of the delay involved, the procedural chronology of the case, its complexity, and all the attendant circumstances, th... | [
"that the evidence, as presented, was insufficient to support the verdict of first degree murder. This court follows established procedures which make it clear that an inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence is not within the proper functions of a federal court when reviewing a state conviction by way of habea... |
not be imposed on a municipality under § 1983. Id. at 691-92, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. The Supreme Court did not address directly whether a private corporate employer may be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. But numerous lower courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have understandably relied on Monell in holding that a corporate employer may not be made vicariously liable under § 1983. See Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 130 (7th Cir.1982) (private store not vicariously liable under § 1983 for acts of its employees); Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir.1982) (same); Draeger v. Grand Central, Inc., 504 F.2d 142, 145-46 (10th Cir.1974) (same); REDACTED Nor is there any doubt that this sensible principle applies where, as here, the corporate employer is a hospital. See Temple v. Albert, 719 F.Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (private hospital not vicariously liable under § 1983 for acts of its employees); Mitchell, 756 F.Supp. at 249 n. 9 (same). The record at bar shows that no actions by “employees” of the Hospital are alleged to have violated plaintiffs rights. Defendant Mathis is associated by contract with the Haymarket Correctional Facility, not with Prince William Hospital; the physicians who treated Mcllwain at the Hospital were private contractors, not employees of the Hospital. Even putting this aside, however, the factual record shows that the Hospital had no policy requiring the testing of | [
"were “reasonable grounds to believe” that the offense was being committed. The statute relied on is not sufficient to bridge the gap between private and State action. Security employees are not thereby made State officers nor are they granted the authority to detain suspected shoplifters. Rather, the statute permi... | [
"the Supreme Court has not directly said whether Monell applies to private corporations, and there are powerful reasons to say no. Yet we and all other circuits that have considered the question have said yes. Why? It’s not easy to say. Our opinion in Iskander and virtually all of the circuit opinions after Monell ... |
"transmitted forthwith to the clerk of the bankruptcy court. In the interest of justice, the court m(...TRUNCATED) | ["21,1975. The last day for filing claims was, therefore, February 21, 1976. Although the County did(...TRUNCATED) | ["has been noted thereon, be transmitted forthwith to the clerk of the bankruptcy court. In the inte(...TRUNCATED) |
"this fact. Once the plaintiff conclusively proves an inability to perform past jobs due to an impai(...TRUNCATED) | ["the medical-vocational regulations are reasonably related to the purposes of the statute and that (...TRUNCATED) | ["disabled within the meaning of the statute. Once the claimant has established an inability to retu(...TRUNCATED) |
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