idx int64 0 25.4k | project stringclasses 707
values | project_url stringclasses 735
values | filepath stringlengths 4 100 | commit_id stringlengths 7 40 | commit_message stringlengths 0 18.3k ⌀ | is_vulnerable bool 2
classes | hash stringlengths 32 32 | func_name stringlengths 3 112 | func_body stringlengths 23 235k | changed_lines stringlengths 2 27.6k | changed_statements stringlengths 2 161k | cve_list listlengths 1 19 | cwe_list listlengths 1 6 | fixed_func_idx int64 1 25.4k ⌀ | context dict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
200 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/pwm/core.c | a297d07b9a1e4fb8cda25a4a2363a507d294b7c9 | pwm: Fix out-of-bounds access in of_pwm_single_xlate()
With args->args_count == 2 args->args[2] is not defined. Actually the
flags are contained in args->args[1].
Fixes: 3ab7b6ac5d82 ("pwm: Introduce single-PWM of_xlate function")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/243908750d306e018a3d4bf2eb74... | true | 9b557b297e70915143979a63656d8f46 | of_pwm_single_xlate | struct pwm_device *
of_pwm_single_xlate(struct pwm_chip *chip, const struct of_phandle_args *args)
{
struct pwm_device *pwm;
if (chip->of_pwm_n_cells < 1)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/* validate that one cell is specified, optionally with flags */
if (args->args_count != 1 && args->args_count != 2)
return ERR_PT... | [[155, "\tif (args->args_count == 2 && args->args[2] & PWM_POLARITY_INVERTED)\n"]] | [[155, "if (args->args_count == 2 && args->args[2] & PWM_POLARITY_INVERTED)"]] | [
"CVE-2024-26599"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 201 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"args"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct of_phandle_args"
]
} |
201 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/pwm/core.c | a297d07b9a1e4fb8cda25a4a2363a507d294b7c9 | pwm: Fix out-of-bounds access in of_pwm_single_xlate()
With args->args_count == 2 args->args[2] is not defined. Actually the
flags are contained in args->args[1].
Fixes: 3ab7b6ac5d82 ("pwm: Introduce single-PWM of_xlate function")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/243908750d306e018a3d4bf2eb74... | false | 9fba1458293135743905280c540efdde | of_pwm_single_xlate | struct pwm_device *
of_pwm_single_xlate(struct pwm_chip *chip, const struct of_phandle_args *args)
{
struct pwm_device *pwm;
if (chip->of_pwm_n_cells < 1)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/* validate that one cell is specified, optionally with flags */
if (args->args_count != 1 && args->args_count != 2)
return ERR_PT... | [[155, "\tif (args->args_count == 2 && args->args[1] & PWM_POLARITY_INVERTED)\n"]] | [[155, "if (args->args_count == 2 && args->args[1] & PWM_POLARITY_INVERTED)"]] | [
"CVE-2024-26599"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 201 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"args"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct of_phandle_args"
]
} |
202 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/key/af_key.c | a5cc68f3d63306d0d288f31edfc2ae6ef8ecd887 | af_key: fix info leaks in notify messages
key_notify_sa_flush() and key_notify_policy_flush() miss to initialize
the sadb_msg_reserved member of the broadcasted message and thereby
leak 2 bytes of heap memory to listeners. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.... | true | 1ab4b52b3bb8f7d2aa5f19709f256083 | key_notify_sa_flush | static int key_notify_sa_flush(const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
skb = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return -ENOBUFS;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_satype = pfkey_proto2satype(c->data.proto);
... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2013-2234"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 203 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct sadb_msg"
]
} |
203 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/key/af_key.c | a5cc68f3d63306d0d288f31edfc2ae6ef8ecd887 | af_key: fix info leaks in notify messages
key_notify_sa_flush() and key_notify_policy_flush() miss to initialize
the sadb_msg_reserved member of the broadcasted message and thereby
leak 2 bytes of heap memory to listeners. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.... | false | 5fbf8b07753635ad9eab921c031d9371 | key_notify_sa_flush | static int key_notify_sa_flush(const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
skb = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return -ENOBUFS;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_satype = pfkey_proto2satype(c->data.proto);
... | [[1713, "\thdr->sadb_msg_reserved = 0;\n"]] | [[1713, "hdr->sadb_msg_reserved = 0;"]] | [
"CVE-2013-2234"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 203 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct sadb_msg"
]
} |
204 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/key/af_key.c | a5cc68f3d63306d0d288f31edfc2ae6ef8ecd887 | af_key: fix info leaks in notify messages
key_notify_sa_flush() and key_notify_policy_flush() miss to initialize
the sadb_msg_reserved member of the broadcasted message and thereby
leak 2 bytes of heap memory to listeners. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.... | false | 6df009726a904ea9e42b5e54a16da382 | key_notify_policy_flush | static int key_notify_policy_flush(const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb_out;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
skb_out = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb_out)
return -ENOBUFS;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb_out, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_SPDFLUSH;
... | [[2703, "\thdr->sadb_msg_reserved = 0;\n"]] | [[2703, "hdr->sadb_msg_reserved = 0;"]] | [
"CVE-2013-2234"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | null | {
"Execution Environment": null,
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": null,
"Function Argument": null,
"Globals": null,
"Type Execution Declaration": null
} |
205 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | a5ec6ae161d72f01411169a938fa5f8baea16e8f | bpf: force strict alignment checks for stack pointers
Force strict alignment checks for stack pointers because the tracking of
stack spills relies on it; unaligned stack accesses can lead to corruption
of spilled registers, which is exploitable.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-b... | true | d4f1e855bfb53d7472639c5a8ea1bafc | check_ptr_alignment | static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off, int size)
{
bool strict = env->strict_alignment;
const char *pointer_desc = "";
switch (reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
/* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. G... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2017-17856"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 206 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"check_pkt_ptr_alignment",
"check_generic_ptr_alignment"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
206 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | a5ec6ae161d72f01411169a938fa5f8baea16e8f | bpf: force strict alignment checks for stack pointers
Force strict alignment checks for stack pointers because the tracking of
stack spills relies on it; unaligned stack accesses can lead to corruption
of spilled registers, which is exploitable.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-b... | false | b7bdf66fb0bd8f6689c0c4d3508fa08d | check_ptr_alignment | static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off, int size)
{
bool strict = env->strict_alignment;
const char *pointer_desc = "";
switch (reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
/* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. G... | [[1062, "\t\t/* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write()\n"], [1063, "\t\t * and check_stack_read() relies on stack accesses being\n"], [1064, "\t\t * aligned.\n"], [1065, "\t\t */\n"], [1066, "\t\tstrict = true;\n"]] | [[1062, "/* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write()\n\t\t * and check_stack_read() relies on stack accesses being\n\t\t * aligned.\n\t\t */"], [1066, "strict = true;"]] | [
"CVE-2017-17856"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 206 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"check_pkt_ptr_alignment",
"check_generic_ptr_alignment"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
207 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/media/usb/airspy/airspy.c | aa93d1fee85c890a34f2510a310e55ee76a27848 | media: fix airspy usb probe error path
Fix a memory leak on probe error of the airspy usb device driver.
The problem is triggered when more than 64 usb devices register with
v4l2 of type VFL_TYPE_SDR or VFL_TYPE_SUBDEV.
The memory leak is caused by the probe function of the airspy driver
mishandeling errors and not ... | true | 53884b7c886b1df78e6ba852d402cf25 | airspy_probe | static int airspy_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct airspy *s;
int ret;
u8 u8tmp, buf[BUF_SIZE];
s = kzalloc(sizeof(struct airspy), GFP_KERNEL);
if (s == NULL) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Could not allocate memory for state\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
mutex_init(&s->v4l2_lo... | [[1075, "\t\tgoto err_unregister_v4l2_dev;\n"], [1084, "err_unregister_v4l2_dev:\n"]] | [[1075, "goto err_unregister_v4l2_dev;"], [1084, "err_unregister_v4l2_dev:"]] | [
"CVE-2016-5400"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 208 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"formats",
"bands",
"bands_rf",
"airspy_ctrl_ops",
"airspy_template",
"VFL_TYPE_SDR",
"V4L2_BUF_TYPE_SDR_CAPTURE",
"VB2_MMAP",
"VB2_USERPTR",
"VB2_READ",
... |
208 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/media/usb/airspy/airspy.c | aa93d1fee85c890a34f2510a310e55ee76a27848 | media: fix airspy usb probe error path
Fix a memory leak on probe error of the airspy usb device driver.
The problem is triggered when more than 64 usb devices register with
v4l2 of type VFL_TYPE_SDR or VFL_TYPE_SUBDEV.
The memory leak is caused by the probe function of the airspy driver
mishandeling errors and not ... | false | 830c9a56deb9e0d2b817c65afb144e07 | airspy_probe | static int airspy_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct airspy *s;
int ret;
u8 u8tmp, buf[BUF_SIZE];
s = kzalloc(sizeof(struct airspy), GFP_KERNEL);
if (s == NULL) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Could not allocate memory for state\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
mutex_init(&s->v4l2_lo... | [[1075, "\t\tgoto err_free_controls;\n"]] | [[1075, "goto err_free_controls;"]] | [
"CVE-2016-5400"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 208 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"formats",
"bands",
"bands_rf",
"airspy_ctrl_ops",
"airspy_template",
"VFL_TYPE_SDR",
"V4L2_BUF_TYPE_SDR_CAPTURE",
"VB2_MMAP",
"VB2_USERPTR",
"VB2_READ",
... |
209 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c | ad3e14d7c5268c2e24477c6ef54bbdf88add5d36 | HID: logitech: perform bounds checking on device_id early enough
device_index is a char type and the size of paired_dj_deivces is 7
elements, therefore proper bounds checking has to be applied to
device_index before it is used.
We are currently performing the bounds checking in
logi_dj_recv_add_djhid_device(), which ... | true | bbf30c67d7486355afc9ee9e2632010b | logi_dj_recv_add_djhid_device | static void logi_dj_recv_add_djhid_device(struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev,
struct dj_report *dj_report)
{
/* Called in delayed work context */
struct hid_device *djrcv_hdev = djrcv_dev->hdev;
struct usb_interface *intf = to_usb_interface(djrcv_hdev->dev.parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usb... | [[241, "\tif ((dj_report->device_index < DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MIN) ||\n"], [242, "\t (dj_report->device_index > DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MAX)) {\n"], [243, "\t\tdev_err(&djrcv_hdev->dev, \"%s: invalid device index:%d\\n\",\n"], [244, "\t\t\t__func__, dj_report->device_index);\n"], [245, "\t\treturn;\n"], [246, "\t}\n"], [247, "\n... | [[241, "if ((dj_report->device_index < DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MIN) ||\n\t (dj_report->device_index > DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MAX))"], [243, "dev_err(&djrcv_hdev->dev, \"%s: invalid device index:%d\\n\",\n\t\t\t__func__, dj_report->device_index);"], [245, "return;"], [246, "\t}\n"], [247, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2014-3182"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | null | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"djrcv_dev",
"dj_report"
],
"Globals": [
"DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MIN",
"DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MAX"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct dj_receiver_dev",
"struct dj_report"
]
} |
210 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c | ad3e14d7c5268c2e24477c6ef54bbdf88add5d36 | HID: logitech: perform bounds checking on device_id early enough
device_index is a char type and the size of paired_dj_deivces is 7
elements, therefore proper bounds checking has to be applied to
device_index before it is used.
We are currently performing the bounds checking in
logi_dj_recv_add_djhid_device(), which ... | false | a31af9d7d82485ba3058af009321760e | logi_dj_raw_event | static int logi_dj_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
struct hid_report *report, u8 *data,
int size)
{
struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct dj_report *dj_report = (struct dj_report *) data;
unsigned long flags;
bool report_processed = false;
dbg_hid("%s, size:%d\n", __... | [[686, "\tif ((dj_report->device_index < DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MIN) ||\n"], [687, "\t (dj_report->device_index > DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MAX)) {\n"], [688, "\t\tdev_err(&hdev->dev, \"%s: invalid device index:%d\\n\",\n"], [689, "\t\t\t\t__func__, dj_report->device_index);\n"], [690, "\t\treturn false;\n"], [691, "\t}\n"]] | [[686, "if ((dj_report->device_index < DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MIN) ||\n\t (dj_report->device_index > DJ_DEVICE_INDEX_MAX))"], [688, "dev_err(&hdev->dev, \"%s: invalid device index:%d\\n\",\n\t\t\t\t__func__, dj_report->device_index);"], [690, "return false;"], [691, "\t}\n"]] | [
"CVE-2014-3182"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | null | {
"Execution Environment": null,
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": null,
"Function Argument": null,
"Globals": null,
"Type Execution Declaration": null
} |
211 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/udf/super.c | adee11b2085bee90bd8f4f52123ffb07882d6256 | udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> | true | 443d87e2f32cc8e3c3f535f5ad131077 | udf_load_logicalvol | static int udf_load_logicalvol(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block,
struct kernel_lb_addr *fileset)
{
struct logicalVolDesc *lvd;
int i, j, offset;
uint8_t type;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
struct genericPartitionMap *gpm;
uint16_t ident;
struct buffer_head *bh;
int ret = 0;
bh = udf_re... | [[1241, "\t i < sbi->s_partitions && offset < le32_to_cpu(lvd->mapTableLength);\n"]] | [[1240, "for (i = 0, offset = 0;\n\t i < sbi->s_partitions && offset < le32_to_cpu(lvd->mapTableLength);\n\t i++, offset += gpm->partitionMapLength)"]] | [
"CVE-2012-3400"
] | [
"CWE-787"
] | null | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"udf_read_tagged",
"UDF_SB",
"le32_to_cpu"
],
"Function Argument": [
"sb",
"block"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct logicalVolDesc",
"struct udf_sb_info"
]
} |
212 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c | af1689a9b7701d9907dfc84d2a4b57c4bc907144 | smb: client: fix potential OOBs in smb2_parse_contexts()
Validate offsets and lengths before dereferencing create contexts in
smb2_parse_contexts().
This fixes following oops when accessing invalid create contexts from
server:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8881178d8cc3
#PF: supervisor read ac... | true | e77de617f5a0d6300ab711edfbd8a6e1 | open_cached_dir | int open_cached_dir(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
const char *path,
struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
bool lookup_only, struct cached_fid **ret_cfid)
{
struct cifs_ses *ses;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
struct cifs_open_parms oparms;
struct smb2_create_rsp *o_rsp = NULL;
struct smb2_qu... | [[294, "\trc = -EINVAL;\n"], [300, "\tsmb2_parse_contexts(server, o_rsp,\n"], [301, "\t\t\t &oparms.fid->epoch,\n"], [302, "\t\t\t oparms.fid->lease_key, &oplock,\n"], [303, "\t\t\t NULL, NULL);\n"]] | [[294, "rc = -EINVAL;"], [300, "smb2_parse_contexts(server, o_rsp,\n\t\t\t &oparms.fid->epoch,\n\t\t\t oparms.fid->lease_key, &oplock,\n\t\t\t NULL, NULL);"]] | [
"CVE-2023-52434"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 213 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"smb2_parse_contexts"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
213 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/smb/client/cached_dir.c | af1689a9b7701d9907dfc84d2a4b57c4bc907144 | smb: client: fix potential OOBs in smb2_parse_contexts()
Validate offsets and lengths before dereferencing create contexts in
smb2_parse_contexts().
This fixes following oops when accessing invalid create contexts from
server:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8881178d8cc3
#PF: supervisor read ac... | false | ab9491f3ce298566ae72b4a422be00e3 | open_cached_dir | int open_cached_dir(unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
const char *path,
struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
bool lookup_only, struct cached_fid **ret_cfid)
{
struct cifs_ses *ses;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
struct cifs_open_parms oparms;
struct smb2_create_rsp *o_rsp = NULL;
struct smb2_qu... | [[294, "\n"], [296, "\t\tspin_unlock(&cfids->cfid_list_lock);\n"], [297, "\t\trc = -EINVAL;\n"], [298, "\t\tgoto oshr_free;\n"], [299, "\t}\n"], [300, "\n"], [301, "\trc = smb2_parse_contexts(server, rsp_iov,\n"], [302, "\t\t\t\t &oparms.fid->epoch,\n"], [303, "\t\t\t\t oparms.fid->lease_key,\n"], [304, "\t\t\t\t &oplo... | [[294, "\n"], [296, "spin_unlock(&cfids->cfid_list_lock);"], [297, "rc = -EINVAL;"], [298, "goto oshr_free;"], [299, "\t}\n"], [300, "\n"], [301, "rc = smb2_parse_contexts(server, rsp_iov,\n\t\t\t\t &oparms.fid->epoch,\n\t\t\t\t oparms.fid->lease_key,\n\t\t\t\t &oplock, NULL, NULL);"], [305, "if (rc)"], [310, "rc = -EI... | [
"CVE-2023-52434"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 213 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"smb2_parse_contexts"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
214 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | af1689a9b7701d9907dfc84d2a4b57c4bc907144 | smb: client: fix potential OOBs in smb2_parse_contexts()
Validate offsets and lengths before dereferencing create contexts in
smb2_parse_contexts().
This fixes following oops when accessing invalid create contexts from
server:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8881178d8cc3
#PF: supervisor read ac... | true | 86607b041f4ce37bb91040e96d6bdd40 | smb2_parse_contexts | void
smb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
struct smb2_create_rsp *rsp,
unsigned int *epoch, char *lease_key, __u8 *oplock,
struct smb2_file_all_info *buf,
struct create_posix_rsp *posix)
{
char *data_offset;
struct create_context *cc;
unsigned int next;
unsigned int remaining;... | [[2239, "void\n"], [2240, "smb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,\n"], [2241, "\t\t struct smb2_create_rsp *rsp,\n"], [2242, "\t\t unsigned int *epoch, char *lease_key, __u8 *oplock,\n"], [2243, "\t\t struct smb2_file_all_info *buf,\n"], [2244, "\t\t struct create_posix_rsp *posix)\n"], [2246, ... | [[2239, "void\nsmb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,\n\t\t struct smb2_create_rsp *rsp,\n\t\t unsigned int *epoch, char *lease_key, __u8 *oplock,\n\t\t struct smb2_file_all_info *buf,\n\t\t struct create_posix_rsp *posix)"], [2246, "char *data_offset;"], [2248, "unsigned int next;"], [2249, "u... | [
"CVE-2023-52434"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 216 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"server",
"rsp"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct TCP_Server_Info",
"struct smb2_create_rsp",
"struct create_context"
]
} |
215 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | af1689a9b7701d9907dfc84d2a4b57c4bc907144 | smb: client: fix potential OOBs in smb2_parse_contexts()
Validate offsets and lengths before dereferencing create contexts in
smb2_parse_contexts().
This fixes following oops when accessing invalid create contexts from
server:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8881178d8cc3
#PF: supervisor read ac... | true | 81b8e03ac17eb9f5169e2521e76f57d7 | SMB2_open | int
SMB2_open(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_open_parms *oparms, __le16 *path,
__u8 *oplock, struct smb2_file_all_info *buf,
struct create_posix_rsp *posix,
struct kvec *err_iov, int *buftype)
{
struct smb_rqst rqst;
struct smb2_create_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon = oparms->tcon;
struct cif... | [[3127, "\tsmb2_parse_contexts(server, rsp, &oparms->fid->epoch,\n"], [3128, "\t\t\t oparms->fid->lease_key, oplock, buf, posix);\n"]] | [[3127, "smb2_parse_contexts(server, rsp, &oparms->fid->epoch,\n\t\t\t oparms->fid->lease_key, oplock, buf, posix);"]] | [
"CVE-2023-52434"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 217 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"smb2_parse_contexts"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
216 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | af1689a9b7701d9907dfc84d2a4b57c4bc907144 | smb: client: fix potential OOBs in smb2_parse_contexts()
Validate offsets and lengths before dereferencing create contexts in
smb2_parse_contexts().
This fixes following oops when accessing invalid create contexts from
server:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8881178d8cc3
#PF: supervisor read ac... | false | 6982a29f511c776b7a561ea604f1ab39 | smb2_parse_contexts | int smb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
struct kvec *rsp_iov,
unsigned int *epoch,
char *lease_key, __u8 *oplock,
struct smb2_file_all_info *buf,
struct create_posix_rsp *posix)
{
struct smb2_create_rsp *rsp = rsp_iov->iov_base;
struct create_context *cc;
size_t rem, off, len;
size_t ... | [[2239, "int smb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,\n"], [2240, "\t\t\tstruct kvec *rsp_iov,\n"], [2241, "\t\t\tunsigned int *epoch,\n"], [2242, "\t\t\tchar *lease_key, __u8 *oplock,\n"], [2243, "\t\t\tstruct smb2_file_all_info *buf,\n"], [2244, "\t\t\tstruct create_posix_rsp *posix)\n"], [2246, "\tstruct ... | [[2239, "int smb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,\n\t\t\tstruct kvec *rsp_iov,\n\t\t\tunsigned int *epoch,\n\t\t\tchar *lease_key, __u8 *oplock,\n\t\t\tstruct smb2_file_all_info *buf,\n\t\t\tstruct create_posix_rsp *posix)"], [2246, "struct smb2_create_rsp *rsp = rsp_iov->iov_base;"], [2248, "size_t rem,... | [
"CVE-2023-52434"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 216 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"server",
"rsp"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct TCP_Server_Info",
"struct smb2_create_rsp",
"struct create_context"
]
} |
217 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | af1689a9b7701d9907dfc84d2a4b57c4bc907144 | smb: client: fix potential OOBs in smb2_parse_contexts()
Validate offsets and lengths before dereferencing create contexts in
smb2_parse_contexts().
This fixes following oops when accessing invalid create contexts from
server:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8881178d8cc3
#PF: supervisor read ac... | false | a6019b36718d19f8f98592755eef47b2 | SMB2_open | int
SMB2_open(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_open_parms *oparms, __le16 *path,
__u8 *oplock, struct smb2_file_all_info *buf,
struct create_posix_rsp *posix,
struct kvec *err_iov, int *buftype)
{
struct smb_rqst rqst;
struct smb2_create_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon = oparms->tcon;
struct cif... | [[3146, "\trc = smb2_parse_contexts(server, &rsp_iov, &oparms->fid->epoch,\n"], [3147, "\t\t\t\t oparms->fid->lease_key, oplock, buf, posix);\n"]] | [[3146, "rc = smb2_parse_contexts(server, &rsp_iov, &oparms->fid->epoch,\n\t\t\t\t oparms->fid->lease_key, oplock, buf, posix);"]] | [
"CVE-2023-52434"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 217 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"smb2_parse_contexts"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
218 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/hid/hid-core.c | b12fece4c64857e5fab4290bf01b2e0317a88456 | HID: check empty report_list in hid_validate_values()
Add a check for empty report_list in hid_validate_values().
The missing check causes a type confusion when issuing a list_entry()
on an empty report_list.
The problem is caused by the assumption that the device must
have valid report_list. While this will be true f... | true | b292f7927b362dce49ac8d92a330b1c2 | hid_validate_values | struct hid_report *hid_validate_values(struct hid_device *hid,
enum hid_report_type type, unsigned int id,
unsigned int field_index,
unsigned int report_counts)
{
struct hid_report *report;
if (type > HID_FEATURE_REPORT) {
hid_err(hid, "invalid HID report type %u\n", type);
retur... | [[996, "\t\treport = list_entry(\n"], [997, "\t\t\t\thid->report_enum[type].report_list.next,\n"]] | [[996, "report = list_entry(\n\t\t\t\thid->report_enum[type].report_list.next,\n\t\t\t\tstruct hid_report, list);"]] | [
"CVE-2023-1073"
] | [
"CWE-787",
"CWE-119"
] | 219 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"list_entry",
"list_first_entry_or_null",
"hid_err"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"HID_FEATURE_REPORT",
"HID_MAX_IDS"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct hid_device",
"struct hid_repo... |
219 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/hid/hid-core.c | b12fece4c64857e5fab4290bf01b2e0317a88456 | HID: check empty report_list in hid_validate_values()
Add a check for empty report_list in hid_validate_values().
The missing check causes a type confusion when issuing a list_entry()
on an empty report_list.
The problem is caused by the assumption that the device must
have valid report_list. While this will be true f... | false | 2835d9556051775995f2cbb5b186746b | hid_validate_values | struct hid_report *hid_validate_values(struct hid_device *hid,
enum hid_report_type type, unsigned int id,
unsigned int field_index,
unsigned int report_counts)
{
struct hid_report *report;
if (type > HID_FEATURE_REPORT) {
hid_err(hid, "invalid HID report type %u\n", type);
retur... | [[996, "\t\treport = list_first_entry_or_null(\n"], [997, "\t\t\t\t&hid->report_enum[type].report_list,\n"]] | [[996, "report = list_first_entry_or_null(\n\t\t\t\t&hid->report_enum[type].report_list,\n\t\t\t\tstruct hid_report, list);"]] | [
"CVE-2023-1073"
] | [
"CWE-787",
"CWE-119"
] | 219 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"list_entry",
"list_first_entry_or_null",
"hid_err"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"HID_FEATURE_REPORT",
"HID_MAX_IDS"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct hid_device",
"struct hid_repo... |
220 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb | USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the inp... | true | eb96182af7669f4c0a3a65047b2f5cf3 | usbip_recv_xbuff | int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
{
int ret;
int size;
if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
/* the direction of urb must be OUT. */
if (usb_pipein(urb->pipe))
return 0;
size = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
} else {
/* the direction of urb must be IN. */
if (usb_pipeout(urb->pipe)... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2016-3955"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 221 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"usbip_recv"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
221 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb | USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the inp... | false | 77ec3bdcbcad036012f8b06a9a529f35 | usbip_recv_xbuff | int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
{
int ret;
int size;
if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
/* the direction of urb must be OUT. */
if (usb_pipein(urb->pipe))
return 0;
size = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
} else {
/* the direction of urb must be IN. */
if (usb_pipeout(urb->pipe)... | [[744, "\tif (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) {\n"], [745, "\t\t/* should not happen, probably malicious packet */\n"], [746, "\t\tif (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {\n"], [747, "\t\t\tusbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);\n"], [748, "\t\t\treturn 0;\n"], [749, "\t\t} else {\n"], [750, "\t\t\tusbip_event_add(ud, VDE... | [[744, "if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length)"], [745, "/* should not happen, probably malicious packet */"], [746, "if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB)"], [747, "usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);"], [748, "return 0;"], [749, "else"], [750, "usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);"], [751, "return -EPIPE;"], [752... | [
"CVE-2016-3955"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 221 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"usbip_recv"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
222 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c | b5a1eeef04cc7859f34dec9b72ea1b28e4aba07c | batman-adv: Only write requested number of byte to user buffer
Don't write more than the requested number of bytes of an batman-adv icmp
packet to the userspace buffer. Otherwise unrelated userspace memory might get
overridden by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lind... | true | 95cf28f64370c040a82fdfc9e6360e37 | bat_socket_read | static ssize_t bat_socket_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct socket_client *socket_client = file->private_data;
struct socket_packet *socket_packet;
size_t packet_len;
int error;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) && (socket_client->queue_len == 0))
return -EA... | [[139, "\terror = copy_to_user(buf, &socket_packet->icmp_packet,\n"], [140, "\t\t\t socket_packet->icmp_len);\n"], [142, "\tpacket_len = socket_packet->icmp_len;\n"]] | [[139, "error = copy_to_user(buf, &socket_packet->icmp_packet,\n\t\t\t socket_packet->icmp_len);"], [142, "packet_len = socket_packet->icmp_len;"]] | [
"CVE-2011-4604"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 223 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"count"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct socket_packet"
]
} |
223 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c | b5a1eeef04cc7859f34dec9b72ea1b28e4aba07c | batman-adv: Only write requested number of byte to user buffer
Don't write more than the requested number of bytes of an batman-adv icmp
packet to the userspace buffer. Otherwise unrelated userspace memory might get
overridden by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lind... | false | 7d8290302bcdc93ed7f4421adfa9194f | bat_socket_read | static ssize_t bat_socket_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct socket_client *socket_client = file->private_data;
struct socket_packet *socket_packet;
size_t packet_len;
int error;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) && (socket_client->queue_len == 0))
return -EA... | [[139, "\tpacket_len = min(count, socket_packet->icmp_len);\n"], [140, "\terror = copy_to_user(buf, &socket_packet->icmp_packet, packet_len);\n"]] | [[139, "packet_len = min(count, socket_packet->icmp_len);"], [140, "error = copy_to_user(buf, &socket_packet->icmp_packet, packet_len);"]] | [
"CVE-2011-4604"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 223 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"count"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct socket_packet"
]
} |
224 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c | b5e2f339865fb443107e5b10603e53bbc92dc054 | staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Rep... | true | f7d36ffd78fc888e6f117d44ad71498a | wvlan_uil_put_info | int wvlan_uil_put_info(struct uilreq *urq, struct wl_private *lp)
{
int result = 0;
ltv_t *pLtv;
bool_t ltvAllocated = FALSE;
ENCSTRCT sEncryption;
// #ifdef USE_WDS
hcf_16 hcfPort = HCF_PORT_0;
#endif /* USE_WDS */
/*------... | [[689, "\t\t\t\t\tmemcpy((void *)lp->StationName, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);\n"]] | [[689, "memcpy((void *)lp->StationName, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);"]] | [
"CVE-2013-4514"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 226 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct uilreq",
"struct wl_private",
"ltv_t"
]
} |
225 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c | b5e2f339865fb443107e5b10603e53bbc92dc054 | staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Rep... | true | 2ab61c0f23eaad358d39c511eb6a23e4 | wvlan_set_station_nickname | int wvlan_set_station_nickname(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
union iwreq_data *wrqu,
char *extra)
{
struct wl_private *lp = wl_priv(dev);
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC... | [[1796, "\n"], [1797, "\tmemcpy(lp->StationName, extra, wrqu->data.length);\n"]] | [[1796, "\n"], [1797, "memcpy(lp->StationName, extra, wrqu->data.length);"]] | [
"CVE-2013-4514"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 227 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"wl_priv"
],
"Function Argument": [
"dev",
"wrqu",
"extra"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct wl_private"
]
} |
226 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c | b5e2f339865fb443107e5b10603e53bbc92dc054 | staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Rep... | false | 3406393fb7963f3506ac52d6f2d691aa | wvlan_uil_put_info | int wvlan_uil_put_info(struct uilreq *urq, struct wl_private *lp)
{
int result = 0;
ltv_t *pLtv;
bool_t ltvAllocated = FALSE;
ENCSTRCT sEncryption;
size_t len;
// #ifdef USE_WDS
hcf_16 hcfPort = HCF_PORT_0;
#endif /* USE_W... | [[573, "\tsize_t\t\t\tlen;\n"], [690, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = min_t(size_t, pLtv->u.u16[0], sizeof(lp->StationName));\n"], [691, "\t\t\t\t\tstrlcpy(lp->StationName, &pLtv->u.u8[2], len);\n"]] | [[573, "size_t\t\t\tlen;"], [690, "len = min_t(size_t, pLtv->u.u16[0], sizeof(lp->StationName));"], [691, "strlcpy(lp->StationName, &pLtv->u.u8[2], len);"]] | [
"CVE-2013-4514"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 226 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct uilreq",
"struct wl_private",
"ltv_t"
]
} |
227 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c | b5e2f339865fb443107e5b10603e53bbc92dc054 | staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Rep... | false | eb45543a428bf497eacf92c2002e57d7 | wvlan_set_station_nickname | int wvlan_set_station_nickname(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
union iwreq_data *wrqu,
char *extra)
{
struct wl_private *lp = wl_priv(dev);
unsigned long flags;
size_t len;
int ret = 0;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*... | [[1788, "\tsize_t len;\n"], [1799, "\tlen = min_t(size_t, wrqu->data.length, sizeof(lp->StationName));\n"], [1800, "\tstrlcpy(lp->StationName, extra, len);\n"]] | [[1788, "size_t len;"], [1799, "len = min_t(size_t, wrqu->data.length, sizeof(lp->StationName));"], [1800, "strlcpy(lp->StationName, extra, len);"]] | [
"CVE-2013-4514"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 227 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"wl_priv"
],
"Function Argument": [
"dev",
"wrqu",
"extra"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct wl_private"
]
} |
228 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/cifs/sess.c | b854b4ee66437e6e1622fda90529c814978cb4ca | cifs: fix double-fault crash during ntlmssp
The crash occurred because we were calling memzero_explicit() on an
already freed sess_data::iov[1] (ntlmsspblob) in sess_free_buffer().
Fix this by not calling memzero_explicit() on sess_data::iov[1] as
it's already by handled by callers.
Fixes: a4e430c8c8ba ("cifs: repla... | true | 86ccfff853ef388978cd775be88a6718 | sess_free_buffer | static void
sess_free_buffer(struct sess_data *sess_data)
{
int i;
/* zero the session data before freeing, as it might contain sensitive info (keys, etc) */
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
if (sess_data->iov[i].iov_base)
memzero_explicit(sess_data->iov[i].iov_base, sess_data->iov[i].iov_len);
free_rsp_buf(sess_data... | [[1211, "\tint i;\n"], [1213, "\t/* zero the session data before freeing, as it might contain sensitive info (keys, etc) */\n"], [1214, "\tfor (i = 0; i < 3; i++)\n"], [1215, "\t\tif (sess_data->iov[i].iov_base)\n"], [1216, "\t\t\tmemzero_explicit(sess_data->iov[i].iov_base, sess_data->iov[i].iov_len);\n"], [1218, "\tf... | [[1211, "int i;"], [1213, "/* zero the session data before freeing, as it might contain sensitive info (keys, etc) */"], [1214, "for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)"], [1215, "if (sess_data->iov[i].iov_base)"], [1216, "memzero_explicit(sess_data->iov[i].iov_base, sess_data->iov[i].iov_len);"], [1218, "free_rsp_buf(sess_data->buf0_... | [
"CVE-2022-3595"
] | [
"CWE-415",
"CWE-119"
] | 229 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"free_rsp_buf"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"CIFS_NO_BUFFER"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct sess_data",
"struct kvec"
]
} |
229 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/cifs/sess.c | b854b4ee66437e6e1622fda90529c814978cb4ca | cifs: fix double-fault crash during ntlmssp
The crash occurred because we were calling memzero_explicit() on an
already freed sess_data::iov[1] (ntlmsspblob) in sess_free_buffer().
Fix this by not calling memzero_explicit() on sess_data::iov[1] as
it's already by handled by callers.
Fixes: a4e430c8c8ba ("cifs: repla... | false | 9fc8ba1584db24fe892ccffb5a95bcc0 | sess_free_buffer | static void
sess_free_buffer(struct sess_data *sess_data)
{
struct kvec *iov = sess_data->iov;
/*
* Zero the session data before freeing, as it might contain sensitive info (keys, etc).
* Note that iov[1] is already freed by caller.
*/
if (sess_data->buf0_type != CIFS_NO_BUFFER && iov[0].iov_base)
memzero_e... | [[1211, "\tstruct kvec *iov = sess_data->iov;\n"], [1213, "\t/*\n"], [1214, "\t * Zero the session data before freeing, as it might contain sensitive info (keys, etc).\n"], [1215, "\t * Note that iov[1] is already freed by caller.\n"], [1216, "\t */\n"], [1217, "\tif (sess_data->buf0_type != CIFS_NO_BUFFER && iov[0].io... | [[1211, "struct kvec *iov = sess_data->iov;"], [1213, "/*\n\t * Zero the session data before freeing, as it might contain sensitive info (keys, etc).\n\t * Note that iov[1] is already freed by caller.\n\t */"], [1217, "if (sess_data->buf0_type != CIFS_NO_BUFFER && iov[0].iov_base)"], [1218, "memzero_explicit(iov[0].iov... | [
"CVE-2022-3595"
] | [
"CWE-415",
"CWE-119"
] | 229 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"free_rsp_buf"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"CIFS_NO_BUFFER"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct sess_data",
"struct kvec"
]
} |
230 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/core/sock.c | b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290 | net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since ... | true | 1048343781017aeb3c425ec4b2c21096 | sock_setsockopt | int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int val;
int valbool;
struct linger ling;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Options without arguments
*/
if (optname == SO_BINDTODEVICE)
return sock_setbindtodevice(sk, optval, o... | [[718, "\t\tsk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF);\n"], [754, "\t\tsk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF);\n"]] | [[718, "sk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF);"], [754, "sk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(u32, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF);"]] | [
"CVE-2016-9793"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 231 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF",
"SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"max_t"
]
} |
231 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/core/sock.c | b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290 | net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since ... | false | 87415db8bda7604c629e03244b465a2c | sock_setsockopt | int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int val;
int valbool;
struct linger ling;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Options without arguments
*/
if (optname == SO_BINDTODEVICE)
return sock_setbindtodevice(sk, optval, o... | [[718, "\t\tsk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF);\n"], [754, "\t\tsk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF);\n"]] | [[718, "sk->sk_sndbuf = max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF);"], [754, "sk->sk_rcvbuf = max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF);"]] | [
"CVE-2016-9793"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 231 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF",
"SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"max_t"
]
} |
232 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/uwb/uwbd.c | bbf26183b7a6236ba602f4d6a2f7cade35bba043 | uwb: properly check kthread_run return value
uwbd_start() calls kthread_run() and checks that the return value is
not NULL. But the return value is not NULL in case kthread_run() fails,
it takes the form of ERR_PTR(-EINTR).
Use IS_ERR() instead.
Also add a check to uwbd_stop().
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andr... | true | f21288a3cd2e13d43f080f83724ba65d | uwbd_start | void uwbd_start(struct uwb_rc *rc)
{
rc->uwbd.task = kthread_run(uwbd, rc, "uwbd");
if (rc->uwbd.task == NULL)
printk(KERN_ERR "UWB: Cannot start management daemon; "
"UWB won't work\n");
else
rc->uwbd.pid = rc->uwbd.task->pid;
}
| [[305, "\trc->uwbd.task = kthread_run(uwbd, rc, \"uwbd\");\n"], [306, "\tif (rc->uwbd.task == NULL)\n"], [309, "\telse\n"]] | [[305, "rc->uwbd.task = kthread_run(uwbd, rc, \"uwbd\");"], [306, "if (rc->uwbd.task == NULL)"], [309, "else"]] | [
"CVE-2017-16526"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 234 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"kthread_run"
],
"Function Argument": [
"rc"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct uwb_rc",
"struct task_struct"
]
} |
233 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/uwb/uwbd.c | bbf26183b7a6236ba602f4d6a2f7cade35bba043 | uwb: properly check kthread_run return value
uwbd_start() calls kthread_run() and checks that the return value is
not NULL. But the return value is not NULL in case kthread_run() fails,
it takes the form of ERR_PTR(-EINTR).
Use IS_ERR() instead.
Also add a check to uwbd_stop().
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andr... | true | 73e1ea02771cc0a342ce05995ca73d12 | uwbd_stop | void uwbd_stop(struct uwb_rc *rc)
{
kthread_stop(rc->uwbd.task);
uwbd_flush(rc);
}
| [[316, "\tkthread_stop(rc->uwbd.task);\n"]] | [[316, "kthread_stop(rc->uwbd.task);"]] | [
"CVE-2017-16526"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 235 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"rc"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
234 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/uwb/uwbd.c | bbf26183b7a6236ba602f4d6a2f7cade35bba043 | uwb: properly check kthread_run return value
uwbd_start() calls kthread_run() and checks that the return value is
not NULL. But the return value is not NULL in case kthread_run() fails,
it takes the form of ERR_PTR(-EINTR).
Use IS_ERR() instead.
Also add a check to uwbd_stop().
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andr... | false | b4587577b8bb91d8d177548160fe3084 | uwbd_start | void uwbd_start(struct uwb_rc *rc)
{
struct task_struct *task = kthread_run(uwbd, rc, "uwbd");
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
rc->uwbd.task = NULL;
printk(KERN_ERR "UWB: Cannot start management daemon; "
"UWB won't work\n");
} else {
rc->uwbd.task = task;
rc->uwbd.pid = rc->uwbd.task->pid;
}
}
| [[305, "\tstruct task_struct *task = kthread_run(uwbd, rc, \"uwbd\");\n"], [306, "\tif (IS_ERR(task)) {\n"], [307, "\t\trc->uwbd.task = NULL;\n"], [310, "\t} else {\n"], [311, "\t\trc->uwbd.task = task;\n"], [313, "\t}\n"]] | [[305, "struct task_struct *task = kthread_run(uwbd, rc, \"uwbd\");"], [306, "if (IS_ERR(task))"], [307, "rc->uwbd.task = NULL;"], [310, "else"], [311, "rc->uwbd.task = task;"], [313, "\t}\n"]] | [
"CVE-2017-16526"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 234 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"kthread_run"
],
"Function Argument": [
"rc"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct uwb_rc",
"struct task_struct"
]
} |
235 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/uwb/uwbd.c | bbf26183b7a6236ba602f4d6a2f7cade35bba043 | uwb: properly check kthread_run return value
uwbd_start() calls kthread_run() and checks that the return value is
not NULL. But the return value is not NULL in case kthread_run() fails,
it takes the form of ERR_PTR(-EINTR).
Use IS_ERR() instead.
Also add a check to uwbd_stop().
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andr... | false | 75c6b3210d1c653242a1f53580394dae | uwbd_stop | void uwbd_stop(struct uwb_rc *rc)
{
if (rc->uwbd.task)
kthread_stop(rc->uwbd.task);
uwbd_flush(rc);
}
| [[319, "\tif (rc->uwbd.task)\n"], [320, "\t\tkthread_stop(rc->uwbd.task);\n"]] | [[319, "if (rc->uwbd.task)"], [320, "kthread_stop(rc->uwbd.task);"]] | [
"CVE-2017-16526"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 235 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"rc"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
236 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/usb/core/config.c | bd7a3fe770ebd8391d1c7d072ff88e9e76d063eb | USB: fix out-of-bounds in usb_set_configuration
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for a USB interface
association descriptor. He writes:
It seems there's no proper size check of a USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION
descriptor. It's only checked that the size is >= 2 in
usb_parse_configuration(),... | true | b4bca6692e1370a373f3bca9c30aceed | usb_parse_configuration | static int usb_parse_configuration(struct usb_device *dev, int cfgidx,
struct usb_host_config *config, unsigned char *buffer, int size)
{
struct device *ddev = &dev->dev;
unsigned char *buffer0 = buffer;
int cfgno;
int nintf, nintf_orig;
int i, j, n;
struct usb_interface_cache *intfc;
unsigned char *buffer2;... | [[652, "\t\t\t\tconfig->intf_assoc[iad_num] =\n"], [653, "\t\t\t\t\t(struct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor\n"], [654, "\t\t\t\t\t*)header;\n"]] | [[652, "config->intf_assoc[iad_num] =\n\t\t\t\t\t(struct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor\n\t\t\t\t\t*)header;"]] | [
"CVE-2017-16531"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 237 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"dev_warn",
"plural"
],
"Function Argument": [
"dev",
"config",
"buffer",
"size"
],
"Globals": [
"USB_MAXIADS",
"USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION",
"USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION_SIZE"
],
"Type Ex... |
237 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/usb/core/config.c | bd7a3fe770ebd8391d1c7d072ff88e9e76d063eb | USB: fix out-of-bounds in usb_set_configuration
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for a USB interface
association descriptor. He writes:
It seems there's no proper size check of a USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION
descriptor. It's only checked that the size is >= 2 in
usb_parse_configuration(),... | false | 1f9a067cea2f5473a787e945f0cbec20 | usb_parse_configuration | static int usb_parse_configuration(struct usb_device *dev, int cfgidx,
struct usb_host_config *config, unsigned char *buffer, int size)
{
struct device *ddev = &dev->dev;
unsigned char *buffer0 = buffer;
int cfgno;
int nintf, nintf_orig;
int i, j, n;
struct usb_interface_cache *intfc;
unsigned char *buffer2;... | [[646, "\t\t\tstruct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor *d;\n"], [647, "\n"], [648, "\t\t\td = (struct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor *)header;\n"], [649, "\t\t\tif (d->bLength < USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION_SIZE) {\n"], [650, "\t\t\t\tdev_warn(ddev,\n"], [651, "\t\t\t\t\t \"config %d has an invalid interface association d... | [[646, "struct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor *d;"], [647, "\n"], [648, "d = (struct usb_interface_assoc_descriptor *)header;"], [649, "if (d->bLength < USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION_SIZE)"], [650, "dev_warn(ddev,\n\t\t\t\t\t \"config %d has an invalid interface association descriptor of length %d, skipping\\n\",\n\t\t\... | [
"CVE-2017-16531"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 237 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"dev_warn",
"plural"
],
"Function Argument": [
"dev",
"config",
"buffer",
"size"
],
"Globals": [
"USB_MAXIADS",
"USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION",
"USB_DT_INTERFACE_ASSOCIATION_SIZE"
],
"Type Ex... |
238 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/scsi/sg.c | bf33f87dd04c371ea33feb821b60d63d754e3124 | scsi: sg: check length passed to SG_NEXT_CMD_LEN
The user can control the size of the next command passed along, but the
value passed to the ioctl isn't checked against the usable max command
size.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Chang <dpf@google.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.co... | true | c613c586bd37e43d1606006ce124910e | sg_ioctl | static long
sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd_in, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *p = (void __user *)arg;
int __user *ip = p;
int result, val, read_only;
Sg_device *sdp;
Sg_fd *sfp;
Sg_request *srp;
unsigned long iflags;
if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
re... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2017-7187"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 239 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
239 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/scsi/sg.c | bf33f87dd04c371ea33feb821b60d63d754e3124 | scsi: sg: check length passed to SG_NEXT_CMD_LEN
The user can control the size of the next command passed along, but the
value passed to the ioctl isn't checked against the usable max command
size.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Chang <dpf@google.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.co... | false | bec3dfc5cadb39109a42df4c790561e4 | sg_ioctl | static long
sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd_in, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *p = (void __user *)arg;
int __user *ip = p;
int result, val, read_only;
Sg_device *sdp;
Sg_fd *sfp;
Sg_request *srp;
unsigned long iflags;
if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
re... | [[999, "\t\tif (val > SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE)\n"], [1000, "\t\t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n"]] | [[999, "if (val > SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE)"], [1000, "return -ENOMEM;"]] | [
"CVE-2017-7187"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 239 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
240 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c | c0f5ecee4e741667b2493c742b60b6218d40b3aa | USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundati... | true | 27d6ce487bbf36a0eca25eaedcd2110a | wdm_in_callback | static void wdm_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct wdm_device *desc = urb->context;
int status = urb->status;
spin_lock(&desc->iuspin);
clear_bit(WDM_RESPONDING, &desc->flags);
if (status) {
switch (status) {
case -ENOENT:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ENOENT");
goto s... | [[188, "\tdesc->reslength = urb->actual_length;\n"], [189, "\tmemmove(desc->ubuf + desc->length, desc->inbuf, desc->reslength);\n"], [190, "\tdesc->length += desc->reslength;\n"]] | [[188, "desc->reslength = urb->actual_length;"], [189, "memmove(desc->ubuf + desc->length, desc->inbuf, desc->reslength);"], [190, "desc->length += desc->reslength;"]] | [
"CVE-2013-1860"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 241 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct wdm_device"
]
} |
241 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c | c0f5ecee4e741667b2493c742b60b6218d40b3aa | USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundati... | false | 21bc77043b1a3a107adb5b4dab280397 | wdm_in_callback | static void wdm_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct wdm_device *desc = urb->context;
int status = urb->status;
int length = urb->actual_length;
spin_lock(&desc->iuspin);
clear_bit(WDM_RESPONDING, &desc->flags);
if (status) {
switch (status) {
case -ENOENT:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb sta... | [[159, "\tint length = urb->actual_length;\n"], [190, "\tif (length + desc->length > desc->wMaxCommand) {\n"], [191, "\t\t/* The buffer would overflow */\n"], [192, "\t\tset_bit(WDM_OVERFLOW, &desc->flags);\n"], [193, "\t} else {\n"], [194, "\t\t/* we may already be in overflow */\n"], [195, "\t\tif (!test_bit(WDM_OVER... | [[159, "int length = urb->actual_length;"], [190, "if (length + desc->length > desc->wMaxCommand)"], [191, "/* The buffer would overflow */"], [192, "set_bit(WDM_OVERFLOW, &desc->flags);"], [193, "else"], [194, "/* we may already be in overflow */"], [195, "if (!test_bit(WDM_OVERFLOW, &desc->flags))"], [196, "memmove(d... | [
"CVE-2013-1860"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 241 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct wdm_device"
]
} |
242 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c | c1fa0768a8713b135848f78fd43ffc208d8ded70 | powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
th... | true | 651e7c9c31f21a7ac56f02fcd80bbaba | flush_tmregs_to_thread | static void flush_tmregs_to_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/*
* If task is not current, it will have been flushed already to
* it's thread_struct during __switch_to().
*
* A reclaim flushes ALL the state or if not in TM save TM SPRs
* in the appropriate thread structures from live.
*/
if (tsk != curre... | [[134, "\tif (tsk != current)\n"]] | [[134, "if (tsk != current)"]] | [
"CVE-2018-1091"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 243 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"cpu_has_feature",
"mfmsr",
"tm_reclaim_current",
"tm_enable",
"tm_save_sprs"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"CPU_FTR_TM",
"current"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
243 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c | c1fa0768a8713b135848f78fd43ffc208d8ded70 | powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
th... | false | 5fd0d92f7814f303bca3c6f95cf7f6fc | flush_tmregs_to_thread | static void flush_tmregs_to_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/*
* If task is not current, it will have been flushed already to
* it's thread_struct during __switch_to().
*
* A reclaim flushes ALL the state or if not in TM save TM SPRs
* in the appropriate thread structures from live.
*/
if ((!cpu_has_fe... | [[134, "\tif ((!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM)) || (tsk != current))\n"]] | [[134, "if ((!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM)) || (tsk != current))"]] | [
"CVE-2018-1091"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 243 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"cpu_has_feature",
"mfmsr",
"tm_reclaim_current",
"tm_enable",
"tm_save_sprs"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"CPU_FTR_TM",
"current"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
244 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozcdev.c | c2c65cd2e14ada6de44cb527e7f1990bede24e15 | staging: ozwpan: prevent overflow in oz_cdev_write()
We need to check "count" so we don't overflow the ei->data buffer.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <t... | true | 55c1ad193837b1d15bf0eb99d82c605c | oz_cdev_write | static ssize_t oz_cdev_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *fpos)
{
struct oz_pd *pd;
struct oz_elt_buf *eb;
struct oz_elt_info *ei;
struct oz_elt *elt;
struct oz_app_hdr *app_hdr;
struct oz_serial_ctx *ctx;
spin_lock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
pd = g_cdev.active_pd;
if (pd)
oz_pd... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2013-4513"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 245 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"oz_elt_info_alloc"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct oz_elt_info"
]
} |
245 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozcdev.c | c2c65cd2e14ada6de44cb527e7f1990bede24e15 | staging: ozwpan: prevent overflow in oz_cdev_write()
We need to check "count" so we don't overflow the ei->data buffer.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <t... | false | 877dbf201aec4774795b1b555f6ffb88 | oz_cdev_write | static ssize_t oz_cdev_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *fpos)
{
struct oz_pd *pd;
struct oz_elt_buf *eb;
struct oz_elt_info *ei;
struct oz_elt *elt;
struct oz_app_hdr *app_hdr;
struct oz_serial_ctx *ctx;
if (count > sizeof(ei->data) - sizeof(*elt) - sizeof(*app_hdr))
re... | [[158, "\tif (count > sizeof(ei->data) - sizeof(*elt) - sizeof(*app_hdr))\n"], [159, "\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n"], [160, "\n"]] | [[158, "if (count > sizeof(ei->data) - sizeof(*elt) - sizeof(*app_hdr))"], [159, "return -EINVAL;"], [160, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2013-4513"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 245 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"oz_elt_info_alloc"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct oz_elt_info"
]
} |
246 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | c300aa64ddf57d9c5d9c898a64b36877345dd4a9 | KVM: x86: fix for buffer overflow in handling of MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME (CVE-2013-1796)
If the guest sets the GPA of the time_page so that the request to update the
time straddles a page then KVM will write onto an incorrect page. The
write is done byusing kmap atomic to get a pointer to the page for the time
structure ... | true | e3e249eaf850f4d5eff123980e4a9d8b | kvm_set_msr_common | int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
bool pr = false;
u32 msr = msr_info->index;
u64 data = msr_info->data;
switch (msr) {
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE:
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
case MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER:
case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2013-1796"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 247 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"vcpu",
"msr_info"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct kvm_vcpu",
"struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info"
]
} |
247 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | c300aa64ddf57d9c5d9c898a64b36877345dd4a9 | KVM: x86: fix for buffer overflow in handling of MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME (CVE-2013-1796)
If the guest sets the GPA of the time_page so that the request to update the
time straddles a page then KVM will write onto an incorrect page. The
write is done byusing kmap atomic to get a pointer to the page for the time
structure ... | false | 3152772315430af0f554aa096ca841c2 | kvm_set_msr_common | int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
bool pr = false;
u32 msr = msr_info->index;
u64 data = msr_info->data;
switch (msr) {
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE:
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
case MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER:
case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2... | [[1962, "\t\t/* Check that the address is 32-byte aligned. */\n"], [1963, "\t\tif (vcpu->arch.time_offset &\n"], [1964, "\t\t\t\t(sizeof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info) - 1))\n"], [1965, "\t\t\tbreak;\n"], [1966, "\n"]] | [[1962, "/* Check that the address is 32-byte aligned. */"], [1963, "if (vcpu->arch.time_offset &\n\t\t\t\t(sizeof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info) - 1))"], [1965, "break;"], [1966, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2013-1796"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 247 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"vcpu",
"msr_info"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct kvm_vcpu",
"struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info"
]
} |
248 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c | c54def7bd64d7c0b6993336abcffb8444795bf38 | HID: magicmouse: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that
magicmouse_emit_touch() gets only valid values of raw_id.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <scvitti... | true | 9955f502beb853acb724cccae0030cb2 | magicmouse_raw_event | static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size)
{
struct magicmouse_sc *msc = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct input_dev *input = msc->input;
int x = 0, y = 0, ii, clicks = 0, npoints;
switch (data[0]) {
case TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID:
/* Expect four bytes of pref... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2014-3181"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 249 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"magicmouse_emit_touch"
],
"Function Argument": [
"size",
"data"
],
"Globals": [
"TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID",
"MOUSE_REPORT_ID"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
249 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c | c54def7bd64d7c0b6993336abcffb8444795bf38 | HID: magicmouse: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that
magicmouse_emit_touch() gets only valid values of raw_id.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <scvitti... | false | 9d22756f6d6f60e5aa216189af0fc312 | magicmouse_raw_event | static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size)
{
struct magicmouse_sc *msc = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct input_dev *input = msc->input;
int x = 0, y = 0, ii, clicks = 0, npoints;
switch (data[0]) {
case TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID:
/* Expect four bytes of pref... | [[293, "\t\tif (npoints > 15) {\n"], [294, "\t\t\thid_warn(hdev, \"invalid size value (%d) for TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID\\n\",\n"], [295, "\t\t\t\t\tsize);\n"], [296, "\t\t\treturn 0;\n"], [297, "\t\t}\n"], [315, "\t\tif (npoints > 15) {\n"], [316, "\t\t\thid_warn(hdev, \"invalid size value (%d) for MOUSE_REPORT_ID\\n\",\n"],... | [[293, "if (npoints > 15)"], [294, "hid_warn(hdev, \"invalid size value (%d) for TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID\\n\",\n\t\t\t\t\tsize);"], [296, "return 0;"], [297, "\t\t}\n"], [315, "if (npoints > 15)"], [316, "hid_warn(hdev, \"invalid size value (%d) for MOUSE_REPORT_ID\\n\",\n\t\t\t\t\tsize);"], [318, "return 0;"], [319, "\t\t}... | [
"CVE-2014-3181"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 249 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"magicmouse_emit_touch"
],
"Function Argument": [
"size",
"data"
],
"Globals": [
"TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID",
"MOUSE_REPORT_ID"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
250 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c | c6688ef9f29762e65bce325ef4acd6c675806366 | usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input
Harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input that could trigger
large memory allocations. Add checks to validate transfer_buffer_length
and number_of_packets to protect against bad input requesting for
unbounded memory allocations. Validate early... | true | 36c076b764cd92dee1fac590506565f3 | get_pipe | static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, int epnum, int dir)
{
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd = NULL;
if (epnum < 0 || epnum > 15)
goto err_ret;
if (dir == USBIP_DIR_IN)
ep = udev->ep_in[epnum & 0x7f];
else
ep = udev->ep_out[epn... | [[325, "static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, int epnum, int dir)\n"], [372, "\tdev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, \"get pipe() invalid epnum %d\\n\", epnum);\n"]] | [[325, "static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, int epnum, int dir)"], [372, "dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, \"get pipe() invalid epnum %d\\n\", epnum);"]] | [
"CVE-2017-16913"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 252 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"struct stub_device *sdev"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct stub_device",
"struct usb_device",
"struct usb_host_endpoint",
"struct usb_endpoint_descriptor"
]
} |
251 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c | c6688ef9f29762e65bce325ef4acd6c675806366 | usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input
Harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input that could trigger
large memory allocations. Add checks to validate transfer_buffer_length
and number_of_packets to protect against bad input requesting for
unbounded memory allocations. Validate early... | true | 879cee16af86a3bd97020e2018797aed | stub_recv_cmd_submit | static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct stub_device *sdev,
struct usbip_header *pdu)
{
int ret;
struct stub_priv *priv;
struct usbip_device *ud = &sdev->ud;
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu->base.ep, pdu->base.direction);
if (pipe == -1)
return;
priv = stub_priv_alloc(... | [[437, "\tint pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu->base.ep, pdu->base.direction);\n"], [459, "\tif (pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length > 0) {\n"]] | [[437, "int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu->base.ep, pdu->base.direction);"], [459, "if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length > 0)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-16913"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 253 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"get_pipe"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
252 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c | c6688ef9f29762e65bce325ef4acd6c675806366 | usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input
Harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input that could trigger
large memory allocations. Add checks to validate transfer_buffer_length
and number_of_packets to protect against bad input requesting for
unbounded memory allocations. Validate early... | false | e2adf2d74d4ecfe8dee35b01c279fd6f | get_pipe | static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, struct usbip_header *pdu)
{
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd = NULL;
int epnum = pdu->base.ep;
int dir = pdu->base.direction;
if (epnum < 0 || epnum > 15)
goto err_ret;
if (dir == USBIP_DIR_IN... | [[325, "static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, struct usbip_header *pdu)\n"], [330, "\tint epnum = pdu->base.ep;\n"], [331, "\tint dir = pdu->base.direction;\n"], [344, "\n"], [345, "\t/* validate transfer_buffer_length */\n"], [346, "\tif (pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length > INT_MAX) {\n"], [347, "\t\tde... | [[325, "static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, struct usbip_header *pdu)"], [330, "int epnum = pdu->base.ep;"], [331, "int dir = pdu->base.direction;"], [344, "\n"], [345, "/* validate transfer_buffer_length */"], [346, "if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length > INT_MAX)"], [347, "dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev,\... | [
"CVE-2017-16913"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 252 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"struct stub_device *sdev"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct stub_device",
"struct usb_device",
"struct usb_host_endpoint",
"struct usb_endpoint_descriptor"
]
} |
253 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c | c6688ef9f29762e65bce325ef4acd6c675806366 | usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input
Harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input that could trigger
large memory allocations. Add checks to validate transfer_buffer_length
and number_of_packets to protect against bad input requesting for
unbounded memory allocations. Validate early... | false | 308bd453ce6d552be38caec78e357e41 | stub_recv_cmd_submit | static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct stub_device *sdev,
struct usbip_header *pdu)
{
int ret;
struct stub_priv *priv;
struct usbip_device *ud = &sdev->ud;
struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu);
if (pipe == -1)
return;
priv = stub_priv_alloc(sdev, pdu);
if (!priv)
retu... | [[463, "\tint pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu);\n"], [485, "\tif (pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length > 0 &&\n"], [486, "\t pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length <= INT_MAX) {\n"]] | [[463, "int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu);"], [485, "if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length > 0 &&\n\t pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length <= INT_MAX)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-16913"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 253 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"get_pipe"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
254 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/wireless/b43/dma.c | c85ce65ecac078ab1a1835c87c4a6319cf74660a | b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org | true | f553042dc05f8b2d378098cf03e3205e | dma_rx | static void dma_rx(struct b43_dmaring *ring, int *slot)
{
const struct b43_dma_ops *ops = ring->ops;
struct b43_dmadesc_generic *desc;
struct b43_dmadesc_meta *meta;
struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *rxhdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u16 len;
int err;
dma_addr_t dmaaddr;
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
sync_descbuf... | [[1539, "\tif (unlikely(len > ring->rx_buffersize)) {\n"]] | [[1539, "if (unlikely(len > ring->rx_buffersize))"]] | [
"CVE-2011-3359"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 255 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct b43_dmaring"
]
} |
255 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/wireless/b43/dma.c | c85ce65ecac078ab1a1835c87c4a6319cf74660a | b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org | false | f7fa61535c128e52623f88931e384229 | dma_rx | static void dma_rx(struct b43_dmaring *ring, int *slot)
{
const struct b43_dma_ops *ops = ring->ops;
struct b43_dmadesc_generic *desc;
struct b43_dmadesc_meta *meta;
struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *rxhdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u16 len;
int err;
dma_addr_t dmaaddr;
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
sync_descbuf... | [[1539, "\tif (unlikely(len + ring->frameoffset > ring->rx_buffersize)) {\n"]] | [[1539, "if (unlikely(len + ring->frameoffset > ring->rx_buffersize))"]] | [
"CVE-2011-3359"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 255 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct b43_dmaring"
]
} |
256 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/ipv6/route.c | c88507fbad8055297c1d1e21e599f46960cbee39 | ipv6: don't set DST_NOCOUNT for remotely added routes
DST_NOCOUNT should only be used if an authorized user adds routes
locally. In case of routes which are added on behalf of router
advertisments this flag must not get used as it allows an unlimited
number of routes getting added remotely.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dub... | true | 534f303ca7883afb167b89f8812f7561 | ip6_route_add | int ip6_route_add(struct fib6_config *cfg)
{
int err;
struct net *net = cfg->fc_nlinfo.nl_net;
struct rt6_info *rt = NULL;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
struct inet6_dev *idev = NULL;
struct fib6_table *table;
int addr_type;
if (cfg->fc_dst_len > 128 || cfg->fc_src_len > 128)
return -EINVAL;
// #ifndef CONF... | [[1516, "\trt = ip6_dst_alloc(net, NULL, DST_NOCOUNT, table);\n"]] | [[1516, "rt = ip6_dst_alloc(net, NULL, DST_NOCOUNT, table);"]] | [
"CVE-2014-2309"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 257 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"RTF_ADDRCONF",
"DST_NOCOUNT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
257 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/ipv6/route.c | c88507fbad8055297c1d1e21e599f46960cbee39 | ipv6: don't set DST_NOCOUNT for remotely added routes
DST_NOCOUNT should only be used if an authorized user adds routes
locally. In case of routes which are added on behalf of router
advertisments this flag must not get used as it allows an unlimited
number of routes getting added remotely.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dub... | false | 8f02c2490fd7d78db2641e35899085a8 | ip6_route_add | int ip6_route_add(struct fib6_config *cfg)
{
int err;
struct net *net = cfg->fc_nlinfo.nl_net;
struct rt6_info *rt = NULL;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
struct inet6_dev *idev = NULL;
struct fib6_table *table;
int addr_type;
if (cfg->fc_dst_len > 128 || cfg->fc_src_len > 128)
return -EINVAL;
// #ifndef CONF... | [[1516, "\trt = ip6_dst_alloc(net, NULL, (cfg->fc_flags & RTF_ADDRCONF) ? 0 : DST_NOCOUNT, table);\n"]] | [[1516, "rt = ip6_dst_alloc(net, NULL, (cfg->fc_flags & RTF_ADDRCONF) ? 0 : DST_NOCOUNT, table);"]] | [
"CVE-2014-2309"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 257 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"RTF_ADDRCONF",
"DST_NOCOUNT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
258 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c | c919a3069c775c1c876bec55e00b2305d5125caa | can: gs_usb: Don't use stack memory for USB transfers
Fixes: 05ca5270005c can: gs_usb: add ethtool set_phys_id callback to locate physical device
The gs_usb driver is performing USB transfers using buffers allocated on
the stack. This causes the driver to not function with vmapped stacks.
Instead, allocate memory for... | true | 94213c813f1156420a13194db8dfcaaf | gs_usb_probe | static int gs_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct gs_usb *dev;
int rc = -ENOMEM;
unsigned int icount, i;
struct gs_host_config hconf = {
.byte_order = 0x0000beef,
};
struct gs_device_config dconf;
/* send host config */
rc = usb_control_msg(interface_to_usbdev(in... | [[911, "\tstruct gs_host_config hconf = {\n"], [912, "\t\t.byte_order = 0x0000beef,\n"], [913, "\t};\n"], [914, "\tstruct gs_device_config dconf;\n"], [923, "\t\t\t &hconf,\n"], [924, "\t\t\t sizeof(hconf),\n"], [940, "\t\t\t &dconf,\n"], [941, "\t\t\t sizeof(dconf),\n"], [949, "\ticount = dconf.icount ... | [[911, "struct gs_host_config hconf = {\n\t\t.byte_order = 0x0000beef,\n\t};"], [914, "struct gs_device_config dconf;"], [917, "rc = usb_control_msg(interface_to_usbdev(intf),\n\t\t\t usb_sndctrlpipe(interface_to_usbdev(intf), 0),\n\t\t\t GS_USB_BREQ_HOST_FORMAT,\n\t\t\t USB_DIR_OUT|USB_TYPE_VENDOR|USB_RECI... | [
"CVE-2017-8066"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 259 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"CONFIG_VMAP_STACK"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"usb_control_msg",
"interface_to_usbdev",
"gs_make_candev"
],
"Function Argument": [
"intf"
],
"Globals": [
"GS_USB_BREQ_HOST_FORMAT",
"GS_USB_BREQ_DEVICE_CONFIG",
"USB_DIR_OUT... |
259 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c | c919a3069c775c1c876bec55e00b2305d5125caa | can: gs_usb: Don't use stack memory for USB transfers
Fixes: 05ca5270005c can: gs_usb: add ethtool set_phys_id callback to locate physical device
The gs_usb driver is performing USB transfers using buffers allocated on
the stack. This causes the driver to not function with vmapped stacks.
Instead, allocate memory for... | false | a0dedc1753c412eea93caee15c6e2efd | gs_usb_probe | static int gs_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct gs_usb *dev;
int rc = -ENOMEM;
unsigned int icount, i;
struct gs_host_config *hconf;
struct gs_device_config *dconf;
hconf = kmalloc(sizeof(*hconf), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hconf)
return -ENOMEM;
hconf->byte_order = 0x... | [[911, "\tstruct gs_host_config *hconf;\n"], [912, "\tstruct gs_device_config *dconf;\n"], [913, "\n"], [914, "\thconf = kmalloc(sizeof(*hconf), GFP_KERNEL);\n"], [915, "\tif (!hconf)\n"], [916, "\t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n"], [917, "\n"], [918, "\thconf->byte_order = 0x0000beef;\n"], [927, "\t\t\t hconf,\n"], [928, "\t\... | [[911, "struct gs_host_config *hconf;"], [912, "struct gs_device_config *dconf;"], [913, "\n"], [914, "hconf = kmalloc(sizeof(*hconf), GFP_KERNEL);"], [915, "if (!hconf)"], [916, "return -ENOMEM;"], [917, "\n"], [918, "hconf->byte_order = 0x0000beef;"], [921, "rc = usb_control_msg(interface_to_usbdev(intf),\n\t\t\t ... | [
"CVE-2017-8066"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 259 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"CONFIG_VMAP_STACK"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"usb_control_msg",
"interface_to_usbdev",
"gs_make_candev"
],
"Function Argument": [
"intf"
],
"Globals": [
"GS_USB_BREQ_HOST_FORMAT",
"GS_USB_BREQ_DEVICE_CONFIG",
"USB_DIR_OUT... |
260 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/partitions/ldm.c | cae13fe4cc3f24820ffb990c09110626837e85d4 | Fix for buffer overflow in ldm_frag_add not sufficient
As Ben Hutchings discovered [1], the patch for CVE-2011-1017 (buffer
overflow in ldm_frag_add) is not sufficient. The original patch in
commit c340b1d64000 ("fs/partitions/ldm.c: fix oops caused by corrupted
partition table") does not consider that, for subsequen... | true | bc4610d2126eb07642b198a42c1135b5 | ldm_frag_add | static bool ldm_frag_add (const u8 *data, int size, struct list_head *frags)
{
struct frag *f;
struct list_head *item;
int rec, num, group;
BUG_ON (!data || !frags);
if (size < 2 * VBLK_SIZE_HEAD) {
ldm_error("Value of size is to small.");
return false;
}
group = get_unaligned_be32(data + 0x08);
rec = ... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2011-2182"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 261 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"list_for_each",
"list_entry"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"VBLK_SIZE_HEAD"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct frag"
]
} |
261 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/partitions/ldm.c | cae13fe4cc3f24820ffb990c09110626837e85d4 | Fix for buffer overflow in ldm_frag_add not sufficient
As Ben Hutchings discovered [1], the patch for CVE-2011-1017 (buffer
overflow in ldm_frag_add) is not sufficient. The original patch in
commit c340b1d64000 ("fs/partitions/ldm.c: fix oops caused by corrupted
partition table") does not consider that, for subsequen... | false | 4233a8e0e75adf61cdb1d973312d78d7 | ldm_frag_add | static bool ldm_frag_add (const u8 *data, int size, struct list_head *frags)
{
struct frag *f;
struct list_head *item;
int rec, num, group;
BUG_ON (!data || !frags);
if (size < 2 * VBLK_SIZE_HEAD) {
ldm_error("Value of size is to small.");
return false;
}
group = get_unaligned_be32(data + 0x08);
rec = ... | [[1338, "\tif (rec >= f->num) {\n"], [1339, "\t\tldm_error(\"REC value (%d) exceeds NUM value (%d)\", rec, f->num);\n"], [1340, "\t\treturn false;\n"], [1341, "\t}\n"], [1342, "\n"]] | [[1338, "if (rec >= f->num)"], [1339, "ldm_error(\"REC value (%d) exceeds NUM value (%d)\", rec, f->num);"], [1340, "return false;"], [1341, "\t}\n"], [1342, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2011-2182"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 261 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"list_for_each",
"list_entry"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"VBLK_SIZE_HEAD"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct frag"
]
} |
262 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.c | cea4dcfdad926a27a18e188720efe0f2c9403456 | iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication ke... | true | 4642feb648b7ae9c561850abea6ee158 | iscsi_add_notunderstood_response | static int iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(
char *key,
char *value,
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list)
{
struct iscsi_extra_response *extra_response;
if (strlen(value) > VALUE_MAXLEN) {
pr_err("Value for notunderstood key \"%s\" exceeds %d,"
" protocol error.\n", key, VALUE_MAXLEN);
return -1;
}
extr... | [[761, "\tstrncpy(extra_response->key, key, strlen(key) + 1);\n"], [762, "\tstrncpy(extra_response->value, NOTUNDERSTOOD,\n"], [763, "\t\t\tstrlen(NOTUNDERSTOOD) + 1);\n"]] | [[761, "strncpy(extra_response->key, key, strlen(key) + 1);"], [762, "strncpy(extra_response->value, NOTUNDERSTOOD,\n\t\t\tstrlen(NOTUNDERSTOOD) + 1);"]] | [
"CVE-2013-2850"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 263 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"NOTUNDERSTOOD",
"VALUE_MAXLEN"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct iscsi_extra_response"
]
} |
263 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.c | cea4dcfdad926a27a18e188720efe0f2c9403456 | iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication ke... | false | 7f2ed0c2ead76b7c73cd7c6927442c8f | iscsi_add_notunderstood_response | static int iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(
char *key,
char *value,
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list)
{
struct iscsi_extra_response *extra_response;
if (strlen(value) > VALUE_MAXLEN) {
pr_err("Value for notunderstood key \"%s\" exceeds %d,"
" protocol error.\n", key, VALUE_MAXLEN);
return -1;
}
extr... | [[761, "\tstrlcpy(extra_response->key, key, sizeof(extra_response->key));\n"], [762, "\tstrlcpy(extra_response->value, NOTUNDERSTOOD,\n"], [763, "\t\tsizeof(extra_response->value));\n"]] | [[761, "strlcpy(extra_response->key, key, sizeof(extra_response->key));"], [762, "strlcpy(extra_response->value, NOTUNDERSTOOD,\n\t\tsizeof(extra_response->value));"]] | [
"CVE-2013-2850"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 263 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"NOTUNDERSTOOD",
"VALUE_MAXLEN"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct iscsi_extra_response"
]
} |
264 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozusbsvc1.c | d114b9fe78c8d6fc6e70808c2092aa307c36dc8e | ozwpan: Use proper check to prevent heap overflow
Since elt->length is a u8, we can make this variable a u8. Then we can
do proper bounds checking more easily. Without this, a potentially
negative value is passed to the memcpy inside oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf,
resulting in a remotely exploitable heap overflow with network
s... | true | 736a2567d1ed7efcc845706c26370127 | oz_usb_rx | void oz_usb_rx(struct oz_pd *pd, struct oz_elt *elt)
{
struct oz_usb_hdr *usb_hdr = (struct oz_usb_hdr *)(elt + 1);
struct oz_usb_ctx *usb_ctx;
spin_lock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB]);
usb_ctx = (struct oz_usb_ctx *)pd->app_ctx[OZ_APPID_USB];
if (usb_ctx)
oz_usb_get(usb_ctx);
spin_unlock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_... | [[393, "\t\t\tint data_len = elt->length -\n"], [394, "\t\t\t\t\tsizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) + 1;\n"], [395, "\t\t\tu16 offs = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned(&body->offset));\n"], [396, "\t\t\tu16 total_size =\n"]] | [[393, "int data_len = elt->length -\n\t\t\t\t\tsizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) + 1;"], [395, "u16 offs = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned(&body->offset));"], [396, "u16 total_size =\n\t\t\t\tle16_to_cpu(get_unaligned(&body->total_size));"]] | [
"CVE-2015-4002"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 265 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"le16_to_cpu",
"get_unaligned",
"oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"OZ_GET_DESC_RSP",
"OZ_SET_CONFIG_RSP",
"OZ_SET_INTERFACE_RSP",
"OZ_VENDOR_CLASS_RSP",
"OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DA... |
265 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozusbsvc1.c | d114b9fe78c8d6fc6e70808c2092aa307c36dc8e | ozwpan: Use proper check to prevent heap overflow
Since elt->length is a u8, we can make this variable a u8. Then we can
do proper bounds checking more easily. Without this, a potentially
negative value is passed to the memcpy inside oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf,
resulting in a remotely exploitable heap overflow with network
s... | false | 9aacfb5918a1ecb278d0a9f97dffe76d | oz_usb_rx | void oz_usb_rx(struct oz_pd *pd, struct oz_elt *elt)
{
struct oz_usb_hdr *usb_hdr = (struct oz_usb_hdr *)(elt + 1);
struct oz_usb_ctx *usb_ctx;
spin_lock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB]);
usb_ctx = (struct oz_usb_ctx *)pd->app_ctx[OZ_APPID_USB];
if (usb_ctx)
oz_usb_get(usb_ctx);
spin_unlock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_... | [[393, "\t\t\tu16 offs, total_size;\n"], [394, "\t\t\tu8 data_len;\n"], [395, "\n"], [396, "\t\t\tif (elt->length < sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) - 1)\n"], [397, "\t\t\t\tbreak;\n"], [398, "\t\t\tdata_len = elt->length -\n"], [399, "\t\t\t\t\t(sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) - 1);\n"], [400, "\t\t\toffs = le16_to_cpu(g... | [[393, "u16 offs, total_size;"], [394, "u8 data_len;"], [395, "\n"], [396, "if (elt->length < sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) - 1)"], [397, "break;"], [398, "data_len = elt->length -\n\t\t\t\t\t(sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) - 1);"], [400, "offs = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned(&body->offset));"], [401, "total_size =\n\t\t\... | [
"CVE-2015-4002"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 265 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"le16_to_cpu",
"get_unaligned",
"oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"OZ_GET_DESC_RSP",
"OZ_SET_CONFIG_RSP",
"OZ_SET_INTERFACE_RSP",
"OZ_VENDOR_CLASS_RSP",
"OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DA... |
266 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | d15d662e89fc667b90cd294b0eb45694e33144da | ALSA: seq: Fix racy pool initializations
ALSA sequencer core initializes the event pool on demand by invoking
snd_seq_pool_init() when the first write happens and the pool is
empty. Meanwhile user can reset the pool size manually via ioctl
concurrently, and this may lead to UAF or out-of-bound accesses since
the func... | true | 3195a996bc96da0163777f9be20b1ab2 | snd_seq_write | static ssize_t snd_seq_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
struct snd_seq_client *client = file->private_data;
int written = 0, len;
int err = -EINVAL;
struct snd_seq_event event;
if (!(snd_seq_file_flags(file) & SNDRV_SEQ_LFLG_OUTPUT))
return -ENXIO;
/* ch... | [[1006, "\tint err = -EINVAL;\n"], [1021, "\t\tif (snd_seq_pool_init(client->pool) < 0)\n"]] | [[1006, "int err = -EINVAL;"], [1021, "if (snd_seq_pool_init(client->pool) < 0)"]] | [
"CVE-2018-7566"
] | [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-119"
] | 267 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"snd_seq_pool_init",
"snd_seq_write_pool_allocated"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct snd_seq_client",
"struct snd_seq_client *client"
]
} |
267 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | d15d662e89fc667b90cd294b0eb45694e33144da | ALSA: seq: Fix racy pool initializations
ALSA sequencer core initializes the event pool on demand by invoking
snd_seq_pool_init() when the first write happens and the pool is
empty. Meanwhile user can reset the pool size manually via ioctl
concurrently, and this may lead to UAF or out-of-bound accesses since
the func... | false | d07061570dfa7835cfe1e0198a57ba9c | snd_seq_write | static ssize_t snd_seq_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
struct snd_seq_client *client = file->private_data;
int written = 0, len;
int err;
struct snd_seq_event event;
if (!(snd_seq_file_flags(file) & SNDRV_SEQ_LFLG_OUTPUT))
return -ENXIO;
/* check client... | [[1006, "\tint err;\n"], [1021, "\t\tmutex_lock(&client->ioctl_mutex);\n"], [1022, "\t\terr = snd_seq_pool_init(client->pool);\n"], [1023, "\t\tmutex_unlock(&client->ioctl_mutex);\n"], [1024, "\t\tif (err < 0)\n"], [1029, "\terr = -EINVAL;\n"]] | [[1006, "int err;"], [1021, "mutex_lock(&client->ioctl_mutex);"], [1022, "err = snd_seq_pool_init(client->pool);"], [1023, "mutex_unlock(&client->ioctl_mutex);"], [1024, "if (err < 0)"], [1029, "err = -EINVAL;"]] | [
"CVE-2018-7566"
] | [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-119"
] | 267 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"snd_seq_pool_init",
"snd_seq_write_pool_allocated"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct snd_seq_client",
"struct snd_seq_client *client"
]
} |
268 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/nilfs2/inode.c | d325dc6eb763c10f591c239550b8c7e5466a5d09 | nilfs2: fix use-after-free bug of struct nilfs_root
If the beginning of the inode bitmap area is corrupted on disk, an inode
with the same inode number as the root inode can be allocated and fail
soon after. In this case, the subsequent call to nilfs_clear_inode() on
that bogus root inode will wrongly decrement the r... | true | 564d7cee70b884c94011ad365eb1a45c | nilfs_new_inode | struct inode *nilfs_new_inode(struct inode *dir, umode_t mode)
{
struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb;
struct the_nilfs *nilfs = sb->s_fs_info;
struct inode *inode;
struct nilfs_inode_info *ii;
struct nilfs_root *root;
int err = -ENOMEM;
ino_t ino;
inode = new_inode(sb);
if (unlikely(!inode))
goto failed;
m... | [[346, "\terr = nilfs_ifile_create_inode(root->ifile, &ino, &ii->i_bh);\n"]] | [[346, "err = nilfs_ifile_create_inode(root->ifile, &ino, &ii->i_bh);"]] | [
"CVE-2022-3649"
] | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-119"
] | 269 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"nilfs_ifile_create_inode"
],
"Function Argument": [
"dir"
],
"Globals": [
"NILFS_USER_INO"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct the_nilfs",
"struct nilfs_inode_info",
"struct nilfs_root",
"str... |
269 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/nilfs2/inode.c | d325dc6eb763c10f591c239550b8c7e5466a5d09 | nilfs2: fix use-after-free bug of struct nilfs_root
If the beginning of the inode bitmap area is corrupted on disk, an inode
with the same inode number as the root inode can be allocated and fail
soon after. In this case, the subsequent call to nilfs_clear_inode() on
that bogus root inode will wrongly decrement the r... | false | 3a881c5ea74ff8347e5e8535f43a0f27 | nilfs_new_inode | struct inode *nilfs_new_inode(struct inode *dir, umode_t mode)
{
struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb;
struct the_nilfs *nilfs = sb->s_fs_info;
struct inode *inode;
struct nilfs_inode_info *ii;
struct nilfs_root *root;
struct buffer_head *bh;
int err = -ENOMEM;
ino_t ino;
inode = new_inode(sb);
if (unlikely(!i... | [[331, "\tstruct buffer_head *bh;\n"], [347, "\terr = nilfs_ifile_create_inode(root->ifile, &ino, &bh);\n"], [352, "\tif (unlikely(ino < NILFS_USER_INO)) {\n"], [353, "\t\tnilfs_warn(sb,\n"], [354, "\t\t\t \"inode bitmap is inconsistent for reserved inodes\");\n"], [355, "\t\tdo {\n"], [356, "\t\t\tbrelse(bh);\n"], [... | [[331, "struct buffer_head *bh;"], [347, "err = nilfs_ifile_create_inode(root->ifile, &ino, &bh);"], [352, "if (unlikely(ino < NILFS_USER_INO))"], [353, "nilfs_warn(sb,\n\t\t\t \"inode bitmap is inconsistent for reserved inodes\");"], [355, "do {"], [356, "brelse(bh);"], [357, "err = nilfs_ifile_create_inode(root->if... | [
"CVE-2022-3649"
] | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-119"
] | 269 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"nilfs_ifile_create_inode"
],
"Function Argument": [
"dir"
],
"Globals": [
"NILFS_USER_INO"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct the_nilfs",
"struct nilfs_inode_info",
"struct nilfs_root",
"str... |
270 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/irda/iriap.c | d370af0ef7951188daeb15bae75db7ba57c67846 | irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <da... | true | 128f6f09adc04aa85dc8dcdd0d240e85 | iriap_getvaluebyclass_indication | static void iriap_getvaluebyclass_indication(struct iriap_cb *self,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ias_object *obj;
struct ias_attrib *attrib;
int name_len;
int attr_len;
char name[IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME + 1]; /* 60 bytes */
char attr[IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME + 1]; /* 60 bytes */
__u8 *fp;
int n;
IRDA_DEBUG(4, ... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2011-1180"
] | [
"CWE-787"
] | 271 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME",
"IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME"
]
} |
271 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/irda/iriap.c | d370af0ef7951188daeb15bae75db7ba57c67846 | irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <da... | false | ac55d8e46e48d0f54a71ae06f76750af | iriap_getvaluebyclass_indication | static void iriap_getvaluebyclass_indication(struct iriap_cb *self,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ias_object *obj;
struct ias_attrib *attrib;
int name_len;
int attr_len;
char name[IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME + 1]; /* 60 bytes */
char attr[IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME + 1]; /* 60 bytes */
__u8 *fp;
int n;
IRDA_DEBUG(4, ... | [[659, "\n"], [660, "\tIRDA_ASSERT(name_len < IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME + 1, return;);\n"], [661, "\n"], [666, "\n"], [667, "\tIRDA_ASSERT(attr_len < IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME + 1, return;);\n"], [668, "\n"]] | [[659, "\n"], [660, "IRDA_ASSERT(name_len < IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME + 1, return;);"], [661, "\n"], [666, "\n"], [667, "IRDA_ASSERT(attr_len < IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME + 1, return;);"], [668, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2011-1180"
] | [
"CWE-787"
] | 271 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME",
"IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME"
]
} |
272 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | sound/usb/mixer.c | daac07156b330b18eb5071aec4b3ddca1c377f2c | ALSA: usb-audio: Fix an OOB bug in parse_audio_mixer_unit
The `uac_mixer_unit_descriptor` shown as below is read from the
device side. In `parse_audio_mixer_unit`, `baSourceID` field is
accessed from index 0 to `bNrInPins` - 1, the current implementation
assumes that descriptor is always valid (the length of descript... | true | 8cb248595588db5199ba3908c4afda23 | uac_mixer_unit_get_channels | static int uac_mixer_unit_get_channels(struct mixer_build *state,
struct uac_mixer_unit_descriptor *desc)
{
int mu_channels;
void *c;
if (desc->bLength < sizeof(*desc))
return -EINVAL;
if (!desc->bNrInPins)
return -EINVAL;
switch (state->mixer->protocol) {
case UAC_VERSION_1:
case UAC_VERSION_2:... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2019-15117"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 273 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"uac_mixer_unit_bNrChannels",
"get_cluster_channels_v3",
"uac3_mixer_unit_wClusterDescrID",
"uac_mixer_unit_bmControls"
],
"Function Argument": [
"state",
"desc"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declarati... |
273 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | sound/usb/mixer.c | daac07156b330b18eb5071aec4b3ddca1c377f2c | ALSA: usb-audio: Fix an OOB bug in parse_audio_mixer_unit
The `uac_mixer_unit_descriptor` shown as below is read from the
device side. In `parse_audio_mixer_unit`, `baSourceID` field is
accessed from index 0 to `bNrInPins` - 1, the current implementation
assumes that descriptor is always valid (the length of descript... | false | e7382f6ce448cda02ad4eeef7f23863e | uac_mixer_unit_get_channels | static int uac_mixer_unit_get_channels(struct mixer_build *state,
struct uac_mixer_unit_descriptor *desc)
{
int mu_channels;
void *c;
if (desc->bLength < sizeof(*desc))
return -EINVAL;
if (!desc->bNrInPins)
return -EINVAL;
if (desc->bLength < sizeof(*desc) + desc->bNrInPins)
return -EINVAL;
swi... | [[747, "\tif (desc->bLength < sizeof(*desc) + desc->bNrInPins)\n"], [748, "\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n"]] | [[747, "if (desc->bLength < sizeof(*desc) + desc->bNrInPins)"], [748, "return -EINVAL;"]] | [
"CVE-2019-15117"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 273 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"uac_mixer_unit_bNrChannels",
"get_cluster_channels_v3",
"uac3_mixer_unit_wClusterDescrID",
"uac_mixer_unit_bmControls"
],
"Function Argument": [
"state",
"desc"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declarati... |
274 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c | dad48e73127ba10279ea33e6dbc8d3905c4d31c0 | f2fs: fix a bug caused by NULL extent tree
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount
-sbi->mount_opt.opt = 0;
<--- -f2fs_iget
-do_read_inode
-f2fs_init_extent_tree
-F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree is NULL
-default_options && parse_options
-remount return
... | true | 71521b5c0617487ad9a6ccf53f3d5a66 | f2fs_init_extent_tree | bool f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct extent_tree *et;
struct extent_node *en;
struct extent_info ei;
if (!f2fs_may_extent_tree(inode)) {
/* drop largest extent */
if (i_ext && i_ext->len) {
i_ext->len = 0;
return... | [[323, "bool f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)\n"]] | [[323, "bool f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-18193"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 275 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"F2FS_I_SB",
"f2fs_may_extent_tree",
"__grab_extent_tree",
"get_extent_info",
"__init_extent_tree"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct inode",
"struct f2fs_... |
275 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c | dad48e73127ba10279ea33e6dbc8d3905c4d31c0 | f2fs: fix a bug caused by NULL extent tree
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount
-sbi->mount_opt.opt = 0;
<--- -f2fs_iget
-do_read_inode
-f2fs_init_extent_tree
-F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree is NULL
-default_options && parse_options
-remount return
... | false | db5a36a9d1a70b6f8f750de101fbae27 | f2fs_init_extent_tree | bool f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)
{
bool ret = __f2fs_init_extent_tree(inode, i_ext);
if (!F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree)
set_inode_flag(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT);
return ret;
}
| [[361, "bool f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)\n"], [362, "{\n"], [363, "\tbool ret = __f2fs_init_extent_tree(inode, i_ext);\n"], [364, "\n"], [365, "\tif (!F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree)\n"], [366, "\t\tset_inode_flag(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT);\n"], [367, "\n"], [368, "\treturn ret;\n"], [... | [[361, "bool f2fs_init_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_extent *i_ext)"], [362, "{\n"], [363, "bool ret = __f2fs_init_extent_tree(inode, i_ext);"], [364, "\n"], [365, "if (!F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree)"], [366, "set_inode_flag(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT);"], [367, "\n"], [368, "return ret;"], [369, "}\n"]] | [
"CVE-2017-18193"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 275 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"F2FS_I_SB",
"f2fs_may_extent_tree",
"__grab_extent_tree",
"get_extent_info",
"__init_extent_tree"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct inode",
"struct f2fs_... |
276 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c | ded89912156b1a47d940a0c954c43afbabd0c42c | brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the... | true | 0fa6c5342d173fa660210419d72b47fa | brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap | static s32
brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *ndev,
struct cfg80211_ap_settings *settings)
{
s32 ie_offset;
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
const struct brcmf_tlv *ssid_ie;
const struct brcmf_tlv *country_ie;
struct b... | [[4530, "\t\tif (!ssid_ie)\n"]] | [[4530, "if (!ssid_ie)"]] | [
"CVE-2016-8658"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 277 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"brcmf_parse_tlvs"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
277 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c | ded89912156b1a47d940a0c954c43afbabd0c42c | brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the... | false | a599ab6e61bc231ee33e3121065ee53a | brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap | static s32
brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *ndev,
struct cfg80211_ap_settings *settings)
{
s32 ie_offset;
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
const struct brcmf_tlv *ssid_ie;
const struct brcmf_tlv *country_ie;
struct b... | [[4530, "\t\tif (!ssid_ie || ssid_ie->len > IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN)\n"]] | [[4530, "if (!ssid_ie || ssid_ie->len > IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN)"]] | [
"CVE-2016-8658"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 277 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"brcmf_parse_tlvs"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
278 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c | e9076ffbcaed5da6c182b144ef9f6e24554af268 | firmware: arm_scmi: Harden accesses to the reset domains
Accessing reset domains descriptors by the index upon the SCMI drivers
requests through the SCMI reset operations interface can potentially
lead to out-of-bound violations if the SCMI driver misbehave.
Add an internal consistency check before any such domains d... | true | 8268367e635c30d276c9252f3b56324a | scmi_domain_reset | static int scmi_domain_reset(const struct scmi_protocol_handle *ph, u32 domain,
u32 flags, u32 state)
{
int ret;
struct scmi_xfer *t;
struct scmi_msg_reset_domain_reset *dom;
struct scmi_reset_info *pi = ph->get_priv(ph);
struct reset_dom_info *rdom = pi->dom_info + domain;
if (rdom->async_reset)
flags... | [[169, "\tstruct reset_dom_info *rdom = pi->dom_info + domain;\n"]] | [[169, "struct reset_dom_info *rdom = pi->dom_info + domain;"]] | [
"CVE-2022-48655"
] | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-119"
] | 279 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"ph->get_priv"
],
"Function Argument": [
"ph",
"domain"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
279 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c | e9076ffbcaed5da6c182b144ef9f6e24554af268 | firmware: arm_scmi: Harden accesses to the reset domains
Accessing reset domains descriptors by the index upon the SCMI drivers
requests through the SCMI reset operations interface can potentially
lead to out-of-bound violations if the SCMI driver misbehave.
Add an internal consistency check before any such domains d... | false | 453e1dc5a4c4fac8584327ad092784e6 | scmi_domain_reset | static int scmi_domain_reset(const struct scmi_protocol_handle *ph, u32 domain,
u32 flags, u32 state)
{
int ret;
struct scmi_xfer *t;
struct scmi_msg_reset_domain_reset *dom;
struct scmi_reset_info *pi = ph->get_priv(ph);
struct reset_dom_info *rdom;
if (domain >= pi->num_domains)
return -EINVAL;
rdo... | [[169, "\tstruct reset_dom_info *rdom;\n"], [171, "\tif (domain >= pi->num_domains)\n"], [172, "\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n"], [173, "\n"], [174, "\trdom = pi->dom_info + domain;\n"]] | [[169, "struct reset_dom_info *rdom;"], [171, "if (domain >= pi->num_domains)"], [172, "return -EINVAL;"], [173, "\n"], [174, "rdom = pi->dom_info + domain;"]] | [
"CVE-2022-48655"
] | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-119"
] | 279 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"ph->get_priv"
],
"Function Argument": [
"ph",
"domain"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
280 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | ea25f914dc164c8d56b36147ecc86bc65f83c469 | bpf: fix missing error return in check_stack_boundary()
Prevent indirect stack accesses at non-constant addresses, which would
permit reading and corrupting spilled pointers.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@... | true | d2c8363ea72d3e2b1e0bbcadb6fafd6f | check_stack_boundary | static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i, slot, spi;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2017-17857"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 281 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"MAX_BPF_STACK",
"BPF_REG_SIZE",
"STACK_MISC"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"tnum_is_const"
]
} |
281 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | ea25f914dc164c8d56b36147ecc86bc65f83c469 | bpf: fix missing error return in check_stack_boundary()
Prevent indirect stack accesses at non-constant addresses, which would
permit reading and corrupting spilled pointers.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@... | false | f9b89f429be2bedd9cae4c372c03d51d | check_stack_boundary | static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i, slot, spi;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/... | [[1306, "\t\treturn -EACCES;\n"]] | [[1306, "return -EACCES;"]] | [
"CVE-2017-17857"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 281 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"MAX_BPF_STACK",
"BPF_REG_SIZE",
"STACK_MISC"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"tnum_is_const"
]
} |
282 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/packet/af_packet.c | edbd58be15a957f6a760c4a514cd475217eb97fd | packet: Don't write vnet header beyond end of buffer
... which may happen with certain values of tp_reserve and maclen.
Fixes: 58d19b19cd99 ("packet: vnet_hdr support for tpacket_rcv")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@goo... | true | 6bfca3c7e2cc37d40126962e05a85677 | tpacket_rcv | static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt, struct net_device *orig_dev)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct packet_sock *po;
struct sockaddr_ll *sll;
union tpacket_uhdr h;
u8 *skb_head = skb->data;
int skb_len = skb->len;
unsigned int snaplen, res;
unsigned long s... | [[2244, "\t\tif (po->has_vnet_hdr)\n"], [2262, "\t\t\tif ((int)snaplen < 0)\n"], [2301, "\tif (po->has_vnet_hdr) {\n"]] | [[2244, "if (po->has_vnet_hdr)"], [2262, "if ((int)snaplen < 0)"], [2301, "if (po->has_vnet_hdr)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-14497"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 283 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
283 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/packet/af_packet.c | edbd58be15a957f6a760c4a514cd475217eb97fd | packet: Don't write vnet header beyond end of buffer
... which may happen with certain values of tp_reserve and maclen.
Fixes: 58d19b19cd99 ("packet: vnet_hdr support for tpacket_rcv")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@goo... | false | 1ced63ed3952f80896b4ef341ed6861d | tpacket_rcv | static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt, struct net_device *orig_dev)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct packet_sock *po;
struct sockaddr_ll *sll;
union tpacket_uhdr h;
u8 *skb_head = skb->data;
int skb_len = skb->len;
unsigned int snaplen, res;
unsigned long s... | [[2194, "\tbool do_vnet = false;\n"], [2245, "\t\tif (po->has_vnet_hdr) {\n"], [2247, "\t\t\tdo_vnet = true;\n"], [2248, "\t\t}\n"], [2265, "\t\t\tif ((int)snaplen < 0) {\n"], [2267, "\t\t\t\tdo_vnet = false;\n"], [2268, "\t\t\t}\n"], [2281, "\t\t\tdo_vnet = false;\n"], [2307, "\tif (do_vnet) {\n"]] | [[2194, "bool do_vnet = false;"], [2245, "if (po->has_vnet_hdr)"], [2247, "do_vnet = true;"], [2248, "\t\t}\n"], [2265, "if ((int)snaplen < 0)"], [2267, "do_vnet = false;"], [2268, "\t\t\t}\n"], [2281, "do_vnet = false;"], [2307, "if (do_vnet)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-14497"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 283 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
284 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | arch/x86/kvm/i8254.c | ee73f656a604d5aa9df86a97102e4e462dd79924 | KVM: PIT: control word is write-only
PIT control word (address 0x43) is write-only, reads are undefined.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> | true | 53b792883056135abdb0ed885459bab7 | pit_ioport_read | static int pit_ioport_read(struct kvm_io_device *this,
gpa_t addr, int len, void *data)
{
struct kvm_pit *pit = dev_to_pit(this);
struct kvm_kpit_state *pit_state = &pit->pit_state;
struct kvm *kvm = pit->kvm;
int ret, count;
struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *s;
if (!pit_in_range(addr))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2015-3214"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 285 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"pit_in_range",
"dev_to_pit",
"pit_get_count"
],
"Function Argument": [
"addr"
],
"Globals": [
"KVM_PIT_CHANNEL_MASK"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct kvm_io_device",
"struct kvm_pit",
... |
285 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | arch/x86/kvm/i8254.c | ee73f656a604d5aa9df86a97102e4e462dd79924 | KVM: PIT: control word is write-only
PIT control word (address 0x43) is write-only, reads are undefined.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> | false | 54e80d302c611b6957dd31df346c55ab | pit_ioport_read | static int pit_ioport_read(struct kvm_io_device *this,
gpa_t addr, int len, void *data)
{
struct kvm_pit *pit = dev_to_pit(this);
struct kvm_kpit_state *pit_state = &pit->pit_state;
struct kvm *kvm = pit->kvm;
int ret, count;
struct kvm_kpit_channel_state *s;
if (!pit_in_range(addr))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
... | [[470, "\tif (addr == 3)\n"], [471, "\t\treturn 0;\n"], [472, "\n"]] | [[470, "if (addr == 3)"], [471, "return 0;"], [472, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2015-3214"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 285 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"pit_in_range",
"dev_to_pit",
"pit_get_count"
],
"Function Argument": [
"addr"
],
"Globals": [
"KVM_PIT_CHANNEL_MASK"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct kvm_io_device",
"struct kvm_pit",
... |
286 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/media/usb/ttusb-dec/ttusbdecfe.c | f2e323ec96077642d397bb1c355def536d489d16 | [media] ttusb-dec: buffer overflow in ioctl
We need to add a limit check here so we don't overflow the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> | true | a1a750b6efcc04a55e1b271e6f87bdb3 | ttusbdecfe_dvbs_diseqc_send_master_cmd | static int ttusbdecfe_dvbs_diseqc_send_master_cmd(struct dvb_frontend* fe, struct dvb_diseqc_master_cmd *cmd)
{
struct ttusbdecfe_state* state = (struct ttusbdecfe_state*) fe->demodulator_priv;
u8 b[] = { 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00 };
memcpy(&b[4], cmd->msg, cmd->msg_len);
... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2014-8884"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 287 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"cmd"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
287 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/media/usb/ttusb-dec/ttusbdecfe.c | f2e323ec96077642d397bb1c355def536d489d16 | [media] ttusb-dec: buffer overflow in ioctl
We need to add a limit check here so we don't overflow the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> | false | 21adca1dc739dde9e05ebfd346920d49 | ttusbdecfe_dvbs_diseqc_send_master_cmd | static int ttusbdecfe_dvbs_diseqc_send_master_cmd(struct dvb_frontend* fe, struct dvb_diseqc_master_cmd *cmd)
{
struct ttusbdecfe_state* state = (struct ttusbdecfe_state*) fe->demodulator_priv;
u8 b[] = { 0x00, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00 };
if (cmd->msg_len > sizeof(b) - 4)
ret... | [[159, "\tif (cmd->msg_len > sizeof(b) - 4)\n"], [160, "\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n"], [161, "\n"]] | [[159, "if (cmd->msg_len > sizeof(b) - 4)"], [160, "return -EINVAL;"], [161, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2014-8884"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 287 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"cmd"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
288 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c | f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d | Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top | true | e8223d6665aab6cf577a26401e01f906 | ecryptfs_privileged_open | int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file **lower_file,
struct dentry *lower_dentry,
struct vfsmount *lower_mnt,
const struct cred *cred)
{
struct ecryptfs_open_req req;
int flags = O_LARGEFILE;
int rc = 0;
init_completion(&req.done);
req.lower_file = lower_file;
req.path.dentry = lower_de... | [[150, "\t\tgoto out;\n"], [168, "\tif (IS_ERR(*lower_file))\n"]] | [[150, "goto out;"], [168, "if (IS_ERR(*lower_file))"]] | [
"CVE-2016-1583"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 289 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"dentry_open"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"ecryptfs_kthread_ctl"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
289 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c | f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d | Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top | false | 291dac9b00cbf8f17d06f58817cdf480 | ecryptfs_privileged_open | int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file **lower_file,
struct dentry *lower_dentry,
struct vfsmount *lower_mnt,
const struct cred *cred)
{
struct ecryptfs_open_req req;
int flags = O_LARGEFILE;
int rc = 0;
init_completion(&req.done);
req.lower_file = lower_file;
req.path.dentry = lower_de... | [[151, "\t\tgoto have_file;\n"], [169, "\tif (IS_ERR(*lower_file)) {\n"], [171, "\t\tgoto out;\n"], [172, "\t}\n"], [173, "have_file:\n"], [174, "\tif ((*lower_file)->f_op->mmap == NULL) {\n"], [175, "\t\tfput(*lower_file);\n"], [176, "\t\t*lower_file = NULL;\n"], [177, "\t\trc = -EMEDIUMTYPE;\n"], [178, "\t}\n"]] | [[151, "goto have_file;"], [169, "if (IS_ERR(*lower_file))"], [171, "goto out;"], [172, "\t}\n"], [173, "have_file:"], [174, "if ((*lower_file)->f_op->mmap == NULL)"], [175, "fput(*lower_file);"], [176, "*lower_file = NULL;"], [177, "rc = -EMEDIUMTYPE;"], [178, "\t}\n"]] | [
"CVE-2016-1583"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 289 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"dentry_open"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"ecryptfs_kthread_ctl"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
290 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/proc/root.c | f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d | Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top | true | e3f2ebbfd8becd4d42db7db9c2095d26 | proc_mount | static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
{
int err;
struct super_block *sb;
struct pid_namespace *ns;
char *options;
if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT) {
ns = (struct pid_namespace *)data;
options = NULL;
} else {
ns = task_active_pid_ns(curren... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2016-1583"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 291 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"flags"
],
"Globals": [
"MS_KERNMOUNT",
"FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
291 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/proc/root.c | f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d | Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top | false | c362503008527f8499a5b98829eacf73 | proc_mount | static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
{
int err;
struct super_block *sb;
struct pid_namespace *ns;
char *options;
if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT) {
ns = (struct pid_namespace *)data;
options = NULL;
} else {
ns = task_active_pid_ns(curren... | [[124, "\t/*\n"], [125, "\t * procfs isn't actually a stacking filesystem; however, there is\n"], [126, "\t * too much magic going on inside it to permit stacking things on\n"], [127, "\t * top of it\n"], [128, "\t */\n"], [129, "\tsb->s_stack_depth = FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH;\n"], [130, "\n"]] | [[124, "/*\n\t * procfs isn't actually a stacking filesystem; however, there is\n\t * too much magic going on inside it to permit stacking things on\n\t * top of it\n\t */"], [129, "sb->s_stack_depth = FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH;"], [130, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2016-1583"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 291 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"flags"
],
"Globals": [
"MS_KERNMOUNT",
"FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
292 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/sched/core.c | f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d | Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top | true | f5c1fb7050c089b6f27e3ed8ad492bce | schedule_debug | static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev)
{
// #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
BUG_ON(task_stack_end_corrupted(prev));
#endif
if (unlikely(in_atomic_preempt_off())) {
__schedule_bug(prev);
preempt_count_set(PREEMPT_DISABLED);
}
rcu_sleep_check();
profile_hit(SCHED_PROFILING, __builtin_r... | [[3173, "\tBUG_ON(task_stack_end_corrupted(prev));\n"]] | [[3173, "BUG_ON(task_stack_end_corrupted(prev));"]] | [
"CVE-2016-1583"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 293 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"task_stack_end_corrupted"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
293 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/sched/core.c | f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d | Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top | false | b45767fdb14f8f5739f4288380caeca5 | schedule_debug | static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev)
{
// #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
if (task_stack_end_corrupted(prev))
panic("corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler\n");
#endif
if (unlikely(in_atomic_preempt_off())) {
__schedule_bug(prev);
preempt_count_set(PREEMPT_DISABLED);
}
rcu_s... | [[3173, "\tif (task_stack_end_corrupted(prev))\n"], [3174, "\t\tpanic(\"corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler\\n\");\n"]] | [[3173, "if (task_stack_end_corrupted(prev))"], [3174, "panic(\"corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler\\n\");"]] | [
"CVE-2016-1583"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 293 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"task_stack_end_corrupted"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
294 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/wireless/radiotap.c | f5563318ff1bde15b10e736e97ffce13be08bc1a | wireless: radiotap: fix parsing buffer overrun
When parsing an invalid radiotap header, the parser can overrun
the buffer that is passed in because it doesn't correctly check
1) the minimum radiotap header size
2) the space for extended bitmaps
The first issue doesn't affect any in-kernel user as they all
check the... | true | 77e0bc2d5926d898e60f925261c93971 | ieee80211_radiotap_iterator_init | int ieee80211_radiotap_iterator_init(
struct ieee80211_radiotap_iterator *iterator,
struct ieee80211_radiotap_header *radiotap_header,
int max_length, const struct ieee80211_radiotap_vendor_namespaces *vns)
{
/* Linux only supports version 0 radiotap format */
if (radiotap_header->it_version)
return -EINVAL;
/... | [[134, "\t\t\t (unsigned long)iterator->_rtheader >\n"]] | [[133, "if ((unsigned long)iterator->_arg -\n\t\t\t (unsigned long)iterator->_rtheader >\n\t\t\t (unsigned long)iterator->_max_length)"]] | [
"CVE-2013-7027"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 295 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"get_unaligned_le16",
"get_unaligned_le32"
],
"Function Argument": [
"max_length",
"radiotap_header"
],
"Globals": [
"IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_EXT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct ieee80211_radiotap... |
295 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/wireless/radiotap.c | f5563318ff1bde15b10e736e97ffce13be08bc1a | wireless: radiotap: fix parsing buffer overrun
When parsing an invalid radiotap header, the parser can overrun
the buffer that is passed in because it doesn't correctly check
1) the minimum radiotap header size
2) the space for extended bitmaps
The first issue doesn't affect any in-kernel user as they all
check the... | false | b6ba15988cf9720bf26164f9577bd007 | ieee80211_radiotap_iterator_init | int ieee80211_radiotap_iterator_init(
struct ieee80211_radiotap_iterator *iterator,
struct ieee80211_radiotap_header *radiotap_header,
int max_length, const struct ieee80211_radiotap_vendor_namespaces *vns)
{
/* check the radiotap header can actually be present */
if (max_length < sizeof(struct ieee80211_radiotap_... | [[100, "\t/* check the radiotap header can actually be present */\n"], [101, "\tif (max_length < sizeof(struct ieee80211_radiotap_header))\n"], [102, "\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n"], [103, "\n"], [138, "\t\t\t (unsigned long)iterator->_rtheader +\n"], [139, "\t\t\t sizeof(uint32_t) >\n"]] | [[100, "/* check the radiotap header can actually be present */"], [101, "if (max_length < sizeof(struct ieee80211_radiotap_header))"], [102, "return -EINVAL;"], [103, "\n"], [137, "if ((unsigned long)iterator->_arg -\n\t\t\t (unsigned long)iterator->_rtheader +\n\t\t\t sizeof(uint32_t) >\n\t\t\t (unsigned lon... | [
"CVE-2013-7027"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 295 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"get_unaligned_le16",
"get_unaligned_le32"
],
"Function Argument": [
"max_length",
"radiotap_header"
],
"Globals": [
"IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_EXT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct ieee80211_radiotap... |
296 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel_early.c | f84598bd7c851f8b0bf8cd0d7c3be0d73c432ff4 | x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader
mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make
sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing
the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead
to a kernel crash or potentially kerne... | true | 79cf489cf89a1a44bdf08beb2b904c4e | get_matching_model_microcode | static enum ucode_state __init
get_matching_model_microcode(int cpu, unsigned long start,
void *data, size_t size,
struct mc_saved_data *mc_saved_data,
unsigned long *mc_saved_in_initrd,
struct ucode_cpu_info *uci)
{
u8 *ucode_ptr = data;
unsigned int leftover = size;
enum ucode_state... | [[324, "\twhile (leftover) {\n"]] | [[324, "while (leftover) {"]] | [
"CVE-2015-2666"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 297 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"_save_mc"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"MAX_UCODE_COUNT",
"ARRAY_SIZE"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
297 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel_early.c | f84598bd7c851f8b0bf8cd0d7c3be0d73c432ff4 | x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader
mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make
sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing
the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead
to a kernel crash or potentially kerne... | false | 1d738c3470b80f4308d4c6c7135dd43d | get_matching_model_microcode | static enum ucode_state __init
get_matching_model_microcode(int cpu, unsigned long start,
void *data, size_t size,
struct mc_saved_data *mc_saved_data,
unsigned long *mc_saved_in_initrd,
struct ucode_cpu_info *uci)
{
u8 *ucode_ptr = data;
unsigned int leftover = size;
enum ucode_state... | [[324, "\twhile (leftover && mc_saved_count < ARRAY_SIZE(mc_saved_tmp)) {\n"]] | [[324, "while (leftover && mc_saved_count < ARRAY_SIZE(mc_saved_tmp)) {"]] | [
"CVE-2015-2666"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 297 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"_save_mc"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"MAX_UCODE_COUNT",
"ARRAY_SIZE"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
298 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/ksmbd/oplock.c | 02f76c401d17e409ed45bf7887148fcc22c93c85 | ksmbd: fix global-out-of-bounds in smb2_find_context_vals
Add tag_len argument in smb2_find_context_vals() to avoid out-of-bound
read when create_context's name_len is larger than tag length.
[ 7.995411] ==================================================================
[ 7.995866] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bou... | true | 1fca1cb502437de877e5e5d7cdbad4d7 | smb2_find_context_vals | struct create_context *smb2_find_context_vals(void *open_req, const char *tag)
{
struct create_context *cc;
unsigned int next = 0;
char *name;
struct smb2_create_req *req = (struct smb2_create_req *)open_req;
unsigned int remain_len, name_off, name_len, value_off, value_len,
cc_len;
/*
* CreateContextsO... | [[1456, "struct create_context *smb2_find_context_vals(void *open_req, const char *tag)\n"], [1495, "\t\tif (memcmp(name, tag, name_len) == 0)\n"]] | [[1456, "struct create_context *smb2_find_context_vals(void *open_req, const char *tag)"], [1495, "if (memcmp(name, tag, name_len) == 0)"]] | [
"CVE-2023-38426"
] | [
"CWE-125"
] | 299 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct create_context",
"struct smb2_create_req"
]
} |
299 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/ksmbd/oplock.c | 02f76c401d17e409ed45bf7887148fcc22c93c85 | ksmbd: fix global-out-of-bounds in smb2_find_context_vals
Add tag_len argument in smb2_find_context_vals() to avoid out-of-bound
read when create_context's name_len is larger than tag length.
[ 7.995411] ==================================================================
[ 7.995866] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bou... | false | dfa9c419999c25aff4a51035db289f89 | smb2_find_context_vals | struct create_context *smb2_find_context_vals(void *open_req, const char *tag, int tag_len)
{
struct create_context *cc;
unsigned int next = 0;
char *name;
struct smb2_create_req *req = (struct smb2_create_req *)open_req;
unsigned int remain_len, name_off, name_len, value_off, value_len,
cc_len;
/*
* Cr... | [[1457, "struct create_context *smb2_find_context_vals(void *open_req, const char *tag, int tag_len)\n"], [1496, "\t\tif (name_len == tag_len && !memcmp(name, tag, name_len))\n"]] | [[1457, "struct create_context *smb2_find_context_vals(void *open_req, const char *tag, int tag_len)"], [1496, "if (name_len == tag_len && !memcmp(name, tag, name_len))"]] | [
"CVE-2023-38426"
] | [
"CWE-125"
] | 299 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct create_context",
"struct smb2_create_req"
]
} |
Subsets and Splits
GitHub Repo File Analysis
Identifies the most common file types and their counts in GitHub repositories, providing insights into the predominant programming languages used.
Top 200 CWE-863
Retrieves 200 samples from the dataset where the CWE list includes CWE-863, providing basic filtering of specific security vulnerabilities.