Chunk-level Retrieval Eval
Collection
Contextualized chunk-level (query2chunk) retrieval eval for the Citras benchmark. • 19 items • Updated
chunk_id string | chunk string | source_url string | title string | chunk_idx int64 | chunk_start_char int64 | chunk_end_char int64 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0_0 | GONZALES V. OREGON
1. [LII](https://www.law.cornell.edu)
2. [Supreme Court](https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt)
GONZALES V. OREGON (04-623)
368 F.3d 1118, affirmed. | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 0 | 0 | 180 | |
0_1 |
| **Syllabus** | **Opinion** [ Kennedy ] | **Dissent** [ Scalia ] | **Dissent** [ Thomas ] |
| [HTML version](/supct/html/04-623.ZS.html) [PDF version](/supct/pdf/04-623P.ZS) | [HTML version](/supct/html/04-623.ZO.html) [PDF version](/supct/pdf/04-623P.ZO) | [HTML version](/supct/html/04-6 | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 1 | 180 | 475 | |
0_2 | 23.ZD.html) [PDF version](/supct/pdf/04-623P.ZD) | [HTML version](/supct/html/04-623.ZD1.html) [PDF version](/supct/pdf/04-623P.ZD1) |
---
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a
syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in
connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
issued. | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 2 | 475 | 777 | |
0_3 |
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader.
See *United States*
v. *Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,* [200 U.S. 321](/supremecourt/text/200/321),
337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES
### GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENER... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 3 | 777 | 1,126 | |
0_4 |
#### CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
---
No. 04—623. | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 4 | 1,126 | 1,221 | |
0_5 | Argued October
5, 2005–Decided January 17, 2006
---
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA or Act),
which was enacted in 1970 with the main objectives of combating
drug abuse and controlling legitimate and illegitimate traffic
in controlled substances, criminalizes, *inter alia*, the
unauthorized distribution and disp... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 5 | 1,221 | 1,604 | |
0_6 | The Attorney General
may add, remove, or reschedule substances only after making
particular findings, and on scientific and medical matters, he
must accept the findings of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (Secretary). These proceedings must be on the record
after an opportunity for comment. The dispute here ... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 6 | 1,604 | 2,080 | |
0_7 | A 1971 regulation promulgated by the Attorney
General requires that such prescriptions be used “for a
legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting
in the usual course of his professional practice.” [21 CFR §
1306.04](/cfr/text/21/1306.04). To prevent diversion of controlled substances,
the CSA regul... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 7 | 2,080 | 2,528 | |
0_8 | He may deny, suspend, or revoke a
registration that, as relevant here, would be
“inconsistent with the public interest.” [21 U.S.C. §
824](/uscode/text/21/824)(a)(4), 822(a)(2). In determining consistency with the
public interest, he must consider five factors, including the
State’s recommendation, compliance with sta... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 8 | 2,528 | 2,948 | |
0_9 | The CSA explicitly
contemplates a role for the States in regulating controlled
substances. See §903.
The Oregon
Death With Dignity Act (ODWDA) exempts from civil or criminal
liability state-licensed physicians who, in compliance with
ODWDA’s specific safeguards, dispense or prescribe a
lethal dose of drugs upon the r... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 9 | 2,948 | 3,303 | |
0_10 | In 2001, the Attorney General issued an Interpretive
Rule to address the implementation and enforcement of the CSA
with respect to ODWDA, declaring that using controlled
substances to assist suicide is not a legitimate medical
practice and that dispensing or prescribing them for this
purpose is unlawful under the CSA.... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 10 | 3,303 | 3,779 | |
0_11 | The Ninth Circuit invalidated the Rule, reasoning
that, by making a medical procedure authorized under Oregon law
a federal offense, it altered the balance between the States
and the Federal Government without the requisite clear
statement that the CSA authorized the action; and in the
alternative, that the Rule could... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 11 | 3,779 | 4,253 | |
0_12 |
*Held:* The CSA does not allow the
Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated
drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide under state law
permitting the procedure. Pp. 8—28.
(a) An
administrative rule interpreting the issuing agency’s own
ambiguous regulation may receive substantial deference.
*... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 12 | 4,253 | 4,645 | |
0_13 | So may an interpretation of an ambiguous
statute, *Chevron U.S. A. Inc.* v. *Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,* [467 U.S. 837](/supremecourt/text/467/837),
842—845, but only “when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency in... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 13 | 4,645 | 5,073 | |
0_14 | Corp.,* [533 U.S. 218](/supremecourt/text/533/218),
226—227. Otherwise, the interpretation is “entitled
to respect” only to the extent it has the “power to
persuade.” *Skidmore* v. *Swift & Co.,* [323 U.S. 134](/supremecourt/text/323/134), 140.
Pp. 8—9. | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 14 | 5,073 | 5,327 | |
0_15 |
(b) The
Interpretive Rule at issue is not entitled to *Auer*
deference as an interpretation of [21 CFR §
1306.04](/cfr/text/21/1306.04). Unlike the underlying regulations in *Auer,*
which gave specificity to a statutory scheme the Secretary of
Labor was charged with enforcing and reflected the Labor
Department’s cons... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 15 | 5,327 | 5,775 | |
0_16 | The CSA allows prescription of
drugs that have a “currently accepted medical use,”
[21 U.S.C. §
812](/uscode/text/21/812)(b); requires a “medical purpose” for
dispensing the least controlled substances of those on the
schedules, §829(c); and defines a “valid
prescription” as one “issued for a legitimate medical
purpos... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 16 | 5,775 | 6,130 | |
0_17 |
Similarly, physicians are considered practitioners if they
dispense controlled substances “in the course of
professional practice.” [21 U.S.C. §
802](/uscode/text/21/802)(21). The regulation just repeats two of these
statutory phrases and attempts to summarize the others. An
agency does not acquire special authority t... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 17 | 6,130 | 6,614 | |
0_18 | Furthermore, any statutory authority for
the Interpretive Rule would have to come from 1984 CSA
amendments adding the “public interest” requirement,
but [21 CFR §
1306.04](/cfr/text/21/1306.04) was adopted in 1971. That the current
interpretation runs counter to the intent at the time of the
regulation’s promulgation ... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 18 | 6,614 | 7,004 | |
0_19 |
(c) The
Interpretive Rule is also not entitled to *Chevron*
deference. The statutory phrase “legitimate medical
purpose” is ambiguous in the relevant sense. However,
*Chevron* deference is not accorded merely because the
statute is ambiguous and an administrative official is
involved. A rule must be promulgated pursu... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 19 | 7,004 | 7,380 | |
0_20 | The specific respects
in which the Attorney General is authorized to make rules under
the CSA show that he is not authorized to make a rule declaring
illegitimate a medical standard for patient care and treatment
specifically authorized under state law. Congress delegated to
the Attorney General only the authority to ... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 20 | 7,380 | 7,895 | |
0_21 | §
871](/uscode/text/21/871)(b). Control means “to add a … substance to a
schedule,” §802(5), following specified procedures.
Because the Interpretive Rule does not concern scheduling of
substances and was not issued under the required procedures, it
cannot fall under the Attorney General’s control
authority. Even if “... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 21 | 7,895 | 8,425 | |
0_22 |
It does not undertake the Act’s five-factor analysis for
determining when registration is “inconsistent with the
public interest,” §823(f), and it deals with much
more than registration. It purports to declare that using
controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide is a
crime, an authority going well beyond th... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 22 | 8,425 | 8,819 | |
0_23 | It would be anomalous for Congress to have
painstakingly described the Attorney General’s limited
authority to deregister a single physician or schedule a single
drug, but to have given him, just by implication, authority to
declare an entire class of activity outside the course of
professional practice and therefore ... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 23 | 8,819 | 9,341 | |
0_24 | *Sutton* v. *United
Air Lines, Inc.,* [527 U.S. 471](/supremecourt/text/527/471). The
first two terms do not call on the Attorney General, or any
Executive official, to make an independent assessment of the
meaning of federal law. The Attorney General did not base the
Interpretive Rule on an application of the five-fa... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 24 | 9,341 | 9,736 | |
0_25 | Even if he had, it is doubtful that he could
cite those factors to deregister a physician simply because he
deemed a controversial practice permitted by state law to have
an illegitimate medical purpose. The federal-law factor
requires the Attorney General to decide
“[c]ompliance” with the law but does not suggest tha... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 25 | 9,736 | 10,211 | |
0_26 | §
871](/uscode/text/21/871)(b) in considerable tension with the narrowly defined
control and registration delegation. It would go, moreover,
against the plain language of the text to treat a delegation
for the “execution” of his functions as a further
delegation to define other functions well beyond the Act’s
specific... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 26 | 10,211 | 10,552 | |
0_27 | The authority desired by the
Government is inconsistent with the Act’s design in other
fundamental respects, *e.g.,* the Attorney General must
share power with, and in some respect defer to, the Secretary,
whose functions are likewise delineated and confined by the
Act. Postenactment congressional commentary on the CS... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 27 | 10,552 | 10,969 | |
0_28 | The
Government’s claim that the Attorney General’s
decision is a legal, not medical, one does not suffice, for the
Interpretive Rule places extensive reliance on medical
judgments and views of the medical community in concluding that
assisted suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose. The idea
that Congress gave him... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 28 | 10,969 | 11,513 | |
0_29 |
(d) The
Attorney General’s opinion is unpersuasive under
*Skidmore*. The CSA and this Court’s case law amply
support the conclusion that Congress regulates medical practice
insofar as it bars doctors from using their
prescription-writing powers as a means to engage in illicit
drug dealing and trafficking as conventio... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 29 | 11,513 | 12,009 | |
0_30 | The CSA’s
structure and operation presume and rely upon a functioning
medical profession regulated under the States’ police
powers. The Federal Government can set uniform standards for
regulating health and safety. In connection with the CSA,
however, the only provision in which Congress set general,
uniform medical p... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 30 | 12,009 | 12,358 | |
0_31 | §
2990bb](/uscode/text/42/2990bb)2a, strengthens the understanding of the CSA as a
statute combating recreational drug abuse, and also indicates
that when Congress wants to regulate medical practice in the
given scheme, it does so by explicit statutory language. The
difficulty in defending the Attorney General’s decla... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 31 | 12,358 | 12,925 | |
0_32 | The Government’s contention that the terms
“medical” or “medicine” refer to a healing
or curative art, and thus cannot embrace the intentional
hastening of a patient’s death, rests on a reading of [21 U.S.C. §
829](/uscode/text/21/829)(a)’s prescription requirement without the
illumination of the rest of the statute. ... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 32 | 12,925 | 13,433 | |
0_33 | To read
prescriptions for assisted suicide as “drug abuse”
under the CSA is discordant with the phrase’s consistent
use throughout the Act, not to mention its ordinary meaning.
The Government’s interpretation of the prescription
requirement also fails under the objection that the Attorney
General is an unlikely recipi... | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 33 | 13,433 | 13,957 | |
0_34 |
Kennedy, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Thomas, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a
dissenting opinion. | 1-1.1-q1-supp-1 | 34 | 13,957 | 14,207 | |
1_0 | ##### Learning Objective
1. Compare criminal law and criminal procedure.
This book focuses on **criminal law**, but it occasionally touches on issues of **criminal procedure**, so it is important to differentiate between the two.
Criminal law generally defines the *rights* and *obligations* of individuals in society... | 1-1.2 | 0 | 0 | 685 | |
1_1 |
## Example of Criminal Law Issues
Clara and Linda go on a shopping spree. Linda insists that they browse an expensive department store. Moments after they enter the lingerie department, Linda surreptitiously places a bra in her purse. Clara watches, horrified, but does not say anything, even though a security guard ... | 1-1.2 | 1 | 685 | 1,236 | |
1_2 | You learn the answer to issue (1) in Chapter 11 and issue (2) in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7.
## Example of Criminal Procedure Issues
Review the example in Section 1.2.1 "Example of Criminal Law Issues". Assume that Linda and Clara attempt to leave the store and an alarm is activated. Linda begins sprinting down the str... | 1-1.2 | 2 | 1,236 | 1,784 | |
1_3 | Linda is treated at the hospital for her injury, and when she is released, Colin arrests her and transports her to the police station. He brings her to an isolated room and leaves her there alone. Twelve hours later, he reenters the room and begins questioning Linda. Linda immediately requests an attorney. Colin ignor... | 1-1.2 | 3 | 1,784 | 2,445 | |
1_4 | You learn the answer to this question in Chapter 5.
Figure 1.1 Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure
### KEY TAKEAWAY
* Criminal law generally defines the rights and obligations of individuals in society. Criminal procedure generally con... | 1-1.2 | 5 | 2,656 | 3,049 | |
2_0 | ##### Learning Objectives
1. Compare civil and criminal law.
2. Ascertain the primary differences between civil litigation and a criminal prosecution.
Law can be classified in a variety of ways. One of the most general classifications divides law into civil and criminal. A basic definition of civil law is “the body o... | 1-1.3 | 0 | 0 | 580 | |
2_1 | Criminal law involves regulations enacted and enforced by government action, while civil law provides a remedy for individuals who need to enforce private rights against other individuals. Some examples of civil law are family law, wills and trusts, and contract law. If individuals need to resolve a *civil dispute*, t... | 1-1.3 | 1 | 580 | 1,176 | |
2_2 | Civil and criminal cases share the same courts, but they have very different goals, purposes, and results. Sometimes, one set of facts gives way to a civil lawsuit *and* a criminal prosecution. This does not violate double jeopardy and is actually quite common.
## Parties in Civil Litigation
In civil litigation, an ... | 1-1.3 | 2 | 1,176 | 1,786 | |
2_3 | A plaintiff must hire and pay for an attorney or represent himself or herself. Hiring an attorney is one of the many costs of litigation and should be carefully contemplated before jumping into a lawsuit.
The alleged wrongdoer and the person or entity being sued are called the **defendant**. While the term *plaintiff... | 1-1.3 | 3 | 1,786 | 2,395 | |
2_4 | A defendant in a civil litigation matter must hire and pay for an attorney *even if that defendant did nothing wrong*. The right to a free attorney does not apply in civil litigation, so a defendant who cannot afford an attorney must represent himself or herself.
## Goal of Civil Litigation
The *goal* of civil litig... | 1-1.3 | 4 | 2,395 | 3,010 | |
2_5 | The goal is to make the plaintiff whole, not to punish, so *fault* is not really an issue. If the defendant has the resources to pay, sometimes the law requires the defendant to pay so that society does not bear the cost of the plaintiff’s injury.
A defendant may be liable without fault in two situations. First, the ... | 1-1.3 | 5 | 3,010 | 3,610 | |
2_6 | Another situation where the defendant may be liable without fault is if the defendant did not actually commit any act but is associated with the acting defendant through a *special relationship*. The policy of holding a separate entity or individual liable for the defendant’s action is called **vicarious liability**. ... | 1-1.3 | 6 | 3,610 | 4,193 | |
2_7 | Clearly, between the employer and the employee, the employer generally has the better ability to pay.
## Example of Respondeat Superior
Chris begins the first day at his new job as a cashier at a local McDonald’s restaurant. Chris attempts to multitask and pour hot coffee while simultaneously handing out change. He ... | 1-1.3 | 7 | 4,193 | 4,803 | |
2_8 |
## Harm Requirement
The goal of civil litigation is to compensate the plaintiff for injuries, so the plaintiff must be a bona fide **victim** that can prove **harm**. If there is no evidence of harm, the plaintiff has no basis for the civil litigation matter. An example would be when a defendant rear-ends a plaintif... | 1-1.3 | 8 | 4,803 | 5,391 | |
2_9 |
## Damages
Often the plaintiff sues the defendant for money rather than a different, performance-oriented remedy. In a civil litigation matter, any money the court awards to the plaintiff is called **damages**. Several kinds of damages may be appropriate. The plaintiff can sue for **compensatory damages**, which com... | 1-1.3 | 9 | 5,391 | 5,998 | |
2_10 | BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore*, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), accessed February 13, 2010, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/94-896.ZO.html>.
## Characteristics of a Criminal Prosecution
A criminal prosecution takes place after a defendant violates a federal or state criminal statute, or in some jurisdictions, after ... | 1-1.3 | 10 | 5,998 | 6,418 | |
2_11 |
## Parties in a Criminal Prosecution
The government institutes the criminal prosecution, rather than an individual plaintiff. If the defendant commits a federal crime, **the United States of America** pursues the criminal prosecution. If the defendant commits a state crime, the state government, often called the **P... | 1-1.3 | 11 | 6,418 | 7,011 | |
2_12 | In a federal criminal prosecution, this is the **United States Attorney**.United States Department of Justice, “United States Attorneys,” accessed February 15, 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/usao>. In a state criminal prosecution, this is generally a **state prosecutor** or a **district attorney**.“United States’ Prose... | 1-1.3 | 12 | 7,011 | 7,442 | |
2_13 | A state prosecutor works for the state but is typically an elected official who represents the county where the defendant allegedly committed the crime.
## Applicability of the Constitution in a Criminal Prosecution
The defendant in a criminal prosecution can be represented by a private attorney or a *free* attorney... | 1-1.3 | 13 | 7,442 | 7,886 | |
2_14 | Alabama v. Shelton*, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), accessed August 16, 2010, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/00-1214.ZO.html>. Attorneys provided by the government are called **public defenders**.18 U.S.C. § 3006A, accessed February 15, 2010, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/3006A.html>. | 1-1.3 | 14 | 7,886 | 8,177 | |
2_15 | This is a significant difference from a civil litigation matter, where both the plaintiff and the defendant must hire and pay for their own private attorneys. The court appoints a free attorney to represent the defendant in a criminal prosecution because *the Constitution is in effect* in any criminal proceeding. The ... | 1-1.3 | 15 | 8,177 | 8,821 | |
2_16 | The criminal defendant receives many constitutional *protections*, including the right to remain silent, the right to due process of law, the freedom from double jeopardy, and the right to a jury trial, among others.
## Goal of a Criminal Prosecution
Another substantial difference between civil litigation and crimin... | 1-1.3 | 16 | 8,821 | 9,475 | |
2_17 | This is unlike civil litigation, where the ability to pay is a priority consideration. Clearly, it is unfair to punish a defendant who did nothing wrong. This makes criminal law justice oriented and very satisfying for most students.
Injury and a victim are *not* necessary components of a criminal prosecution because... | 1-1.3 | 17 | 9,475 | 10,121 | |
2_18 | Steven gets his gun, which has a silencer on it, and puts it in the glove compartment of his car. He then begins driving to Bob’s house. While Steven is driving, he exceeds the speed limit on three different occasions. Steven arrives at Bob’s house and then he hides in the bushes by the mailbox and waits. After an hou... | 1-1.3 | 18 | 10,121 | 10,664 | |
2_19 | Bob does not notice the shots because of the silencer.
In this example, Steven has committed several crimes: (1) If Steven does not have a special permit to carry a concealed weapon, putting the gun in his glove compartment is probably a crime in most states. (2) If Steven does not have a special permit to own a sile... | 1-1.3 | 19 | 10,664 | 11,231 | |
2_20 | (5) Each time Steven shot at Bob and missed, he probably committed the crime of attempted murder or assault with a deadly weapon in most states. Notice that none of the crimes Steven committed caused any discernible harm. However, common sense dictates that Steven should be punished so he does not commit a criminal ac... | 1-1.3 | 20 | 11,231 | 11,779 | |
2_21 | |
| Harm | No | Yes. This is the basis for damages. |
| Initiator of lawsuit | Federal or state government | Plaintiff |
| Attorney for the initiator | US Attorney or state prosecutor | Private attorney |
| Attorney for the defendant | Private attorney or public defender | Private attorney |
| Constitutional protectio... | 1-1.3 | 21 | 11,779 | 12,310 | |
2_22 | ](https://biz.libretexts.org/@api/deki/files/8674/02bed5ae9ecde1be2a1277d0fedf65eb.jpg?revision=1&size=bestfit&width=782&height=836)
Figure 1.2 Crack the Code
### LAW AND ETHICS: THE O. J. SIMPSON CASE
Two Different Trials—Two Different Results
O. J. Simpson was prosecuted criminally and sued civilly for the murde... | 1-1.3 | 22 | 12,310 | 12,697 | |
2_23 | Brown Simpson. In the criminal prosecution, which came first, the US Constitution provided O. J. Simpson with the right to a fair trial (due process) and the right to remain silent (privilege against self-incrimination). Thus the burden of proof was beyond a reasonable doubt, and O. J. Simpson did *not* have to testif... | 1-1.3 | 23 | 12,697 | 13,019 | |
2_24 | O. J. Simpson was acquitted, or found *not guilty*, in the criminal trial.Doug Linder, “The Trial of Orenthal James Simpson,” UMKC website, accessed August 18, 2010, www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Simpson/Simpsonaccount.htm.
In the subsequent civil lawsuit, the burden of proof was preponderance of evidence... | 1-1.3 | 24 | 13,019 | 13,460 | |
2_25 | The jury awarded $8.5 million in compensatory damages to Fred Goldman (Ron Goldman’s father) and his ex-wife Sharon Rufo. A few days later, the jury awarded punitive damages of $25 million to be shared between Nicole Brown Simpson’s children and Fred Goldman.Thomas L. Jones, “Justice for the Dead,” TruTV website, acce... | 1-1.3 | 25 | 13,460 | 13,882 | |
2_26 | Do you think it is ethical to give criminal defendants more legal protection than civil defendants? Why or why not?
2. Why do you think the criminal trial of O. J. Simpson took place before the civil trial? Check your answers to both questions using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
### Johnny Cochran Video
... | 1-1.3 | 26 | 13,882 | 14,357 | |
3_0 | **557 S.E.2d 189 (2001)**
### Kenneth J. JOHNSON, Plaintiff,
v.
Dallas M. PEARCE, Defendant.
[No. COA01-47.](/scholar?scidkt=3094068545204728735&as_sdt=2&hl=en)
**Court of Appeals of North Carolina.**
December 28, 2001. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 0 | 0 | 222 | |
3_1 |
H. Wood Vann, Durham, for the plaintiff-appellee. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 1 | 222 | 273 | |
3_2 |
Smith Debnam Narron Wyche Story & Myers, LLP, by John W. Narron and Nina G. Kilbride, Raleigh; Daughtry, Woodard, Lawrence & Starling, LLP, by Stephen C. Woodard, Jr., Smithfield; Vernon, Vernon, Wooten, Brown, Andrews & Garrett, P.A., by Wiley P. Wooten, Burlington; Morgenstern & Donuomo, P.L.L.C., by Barbara R. Mor... | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 2 | 273 | 670 | |
3_3 | Charlotte; Reid, Lewis, Deese, Nance & Person, by Renny W. Deese, Fayetteville; Davis & [190](#p190)[*190](#p190) Harwell, by Joslin Davis, Winston-Salem; and Sally, Burnett Sharp, Chapel Hill, for the defendant-appellant.
EAGLES, Chief Judge. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 3 | 670 | 915 | |
3_4 |
Dallas M. Pearce ("defendant") appeals from the trial court's judgment awarding Kenneth J. Johnson ("plaintiff") $3,000.00 for defendant's criminal conversation with plaintiff's wife. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for directed verdict and finding that post-se... | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 4 | 915 | 1,416 | |
3_5 |
At trial, the evidence tended to show that plaintiff married Rhonda Mitchell on 14 September 1991. In 1994, the couple began to have marital difficulties. In December 1996, Ms. Mitchell began telephoning defendant, a member of her church. The two soon became close friends. On 14 July 1997, plaintiff discovered that M... | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 5 | 1,416 | 1,900 | |
3_6 | Ms. Mitchell and defendant began dating in December 1997. The two did not engage in sexual intercourse until January 1998, approximately five months after plaintiff and Ms. Mitchell separated.
On 1 June 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging alienation of affections and criminal conversation. A ... | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 6 | 1,900 | 2,359 | |
3_7 | At the close of all evidence, plaintiff made a motion for a directed verdict on the issue of criminal conversation, and the trial court granted the motion. Thereafter, Judge Spencer entered judgment concluding that defendant did not alienate the affections of Ms. Mitchell, that defendant did commit criminal conversati... | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 7 | 2,359 | 2,992 | |
3_8 | 458, 461, 297 S.E.2d 142, 145 (1982)](/scholar_case?case=5133333641678842455&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006). "[T]he gravamen of the cause of action ... is the defilement of plaintiff's wife by the defendant." | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 8 | 2,992 | 3,209 | |
3_9 | [*Chestnut v. Sutton,* 207 N.C. 256, 257, 176 S.E. 743, 743 (1934)](/scholar_case?about=9203340706843638588&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006). The elements of the tort "are the actual marriage between the spouses and sexual intercourse between defendant and the plaintiff's spouse during the coverture." | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 9 | 3,209 | 3,518 | |
3_10 | [*Brown v. Hurley,* 124 N.C.App. 377, 380, 477 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1996)](/scholar_case?case=1095921132354172461&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006). | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 10 | 3,518 | 3,668 | |
3_11 |
Our Supreme Court, and this Court following its lead, have made it abundantly clear that "`[t]he mere fact of separation will not bar an action for criminal conversation occurring during separation.'" [*Bryant v. Carrier,* 214 N.C. 191, 195, 198 S.E. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 11 | 3,668 | 3,920 | |
3_12 | 619, 621 (1938)](/scholar_case?about=14851227486030154440&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006) (quoting 30 C.J. 1156); *see also*[*Brown,* 124 N.C.App. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 12 | 3,920 | 4,074 | |
3_13 | at 380, 477 S.E.2d at 237](/scholar_case?case=1095921132354172461&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006); [*Cannon v. Miller,* 71 N.C.App. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 13 | 4,074 | 4,213 | |
3_14 | 460, 465, 322 S.E.2d 780, 785 (1984),](/scholar_case?case=8891747820741546634&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006) *vacated by,* [313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985)](/scholar_case?case=7707 | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 14 | 4,213 | 4,406 | |
3_15 | 969808020423362&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006). Here, the evidence showed that defendant and plaintiff's wife engaged in sexual intercourse during the coverture. Thus, the facts conclusively establish defendant's criminal conversation with plaintiff's wife.
On appeal, defendant contends that a 1995 amendment t... | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 15 | 4,406 | 4,889 | |
3_16 |
In 1995, the General Assembly amended G.S. § 50-16.1A(3) and redefined "marital misconduct" as including only those "acts that occur during the marriage and prior to or on the date of separation." *See* 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 319, § 2. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 16 | 4,889 | 5,128 | |
3_17 | Consequently, our divorce and alimony statutes currently permit only consideration of "incidents of post date-of-separation marital misconduct as corroborating evidence supporting other evidence that marital misconduct occurred during the marriage and prior to [the] date of separation." G.S. § 50-16.3A(b)(1). Neverthe... | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 17 | 5,128 | 5,566 | |
3_18 | These amendments do not concern, nor do they even refer to, the tort of criminal conversation. Accordingly, we hold that post-separation conduct is sufficient to establish a claim for criminal conversation.
We are aware that this Court recently relied on the 1995 amendments to G.S. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 18 | 5,566 | 5,850 | |
3_19 | §§ 50-16.1A(3) and 50-16.3A(b)(1) in holding that "an alienation of affection claim must be based on pre-separation conduct, and post-separation conduct is admissible only to the extent it corroborates pre-separation activities resulting in alienation of affection." [*Pharr v. Beck,* ___ N.C.App. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 19 | 5,850 | 6,148 | |
3_20 | ___, ___, 554 S.E.2d 851, 855 (2001)](/scholar_case?case=913708164863735006&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006). However, since *Pharr* dealt solely with alienation of affections, we are not bound by that panel's *dicta* stating that "the same principles would apply in a criminal conversation case." *Id.* | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 20 | 6,148 | 6,458 | |
3_21 | at ___ n. 4, [554 S.E.2d at 855 n. 4](/scholar_case?case=913708164863735006&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006).
We note that this is a controversial area in the legislative arena. However, our Supreme Court has made it clear that the tort of criminal conversation exists in our State. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 21 | 6,458 | 6,748 | |
3_22 | See [*Cannon v. Miller,* 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888](/scholar_case?case=7707969808020423362&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006). Only our General Assembly and Supreme Court have the authority to abrogate or modify a common law tort. *See*[*State v. Lane,* 115 N.C.App. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 22 | 6,748 | 7,022 | |
3_23 | 25, 30, 444 S.E.2d 233, 237 (1994)](/scholar_case?case=9666009400858444247&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006) ("[i]t is the province of our legislature to change the accepted common law in this state"); *see also*[*State v. Freeman,* 302 N.C. 591, 594, 2 | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 23 | 7,022 | 7,281 | |
3_24 | 76 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1981)](/scholar_case?case=3766245531945770538&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006) ("[a]bsent a legislative declaration, [the Supreme] Court possesses the authority to alter judicially created common law when it deems it necessary in light of experience and reason"). | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 24 | 7,281 | 7,570 | |
3_25 |
Until the legislature or Supreme Court acts to modify the tort of criminal conversation, we are bound by decisions of our Supreme Court and prior panels of this Court recognizing that the mere fact of separation does not bar a claim for criminal conversation occurring during the separation. *See*[*Bryant,* 214 N.C. a... | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 25 | 7,570 | 7,905 | |
3_26 | at 621](/scholar_case?about=14851227486030154440&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006); [*Brown,* 124 N.C.App. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 26 | 7,905 | 8,017 | |
3_27 | at 380, 477 S.E.2d at 237](/scholar_case?case=1095921132354172461&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006); [*Cannon,* 71 N.C.App. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 27 | 8,017 | 8,146 | |
3_28 | at 465, 322 S.E.2d at 785](/scholar_case?case=8891747820741546634&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006); *see also*[*Rogerson v. Fitzpatrick,* 121 N.C.App. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 28 | 8,146 | 8,303 | |
3_29 | 728, 732, 468 S.E.2d 447, 450 (1996)](/scholar_case?case=16431603054555443567&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006) ("[i]t is elementary that this Court is bound by holdings of the Supreme Court"); [*In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty,* 324 N.C. 373, 384, | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 29 | 8,303 | 8,569 | |
3_30 | 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989)](/scholar_case?case=8760977245142579947&q=Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2006) ("[w]here a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court"). | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 30 | 8,569 | 8,886 | |
3_31 | Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that a criminal conversation claim may be based solely on post-separation conduct.
Affirmed.
Judges BIGGS and SMITH concur. | 1-1.3-q2-supp-1 | 31 | 8,886 | 9,080 |
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