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Stories have emerged, popular myths which are widely believed and yet may be untrue. It is important to understand our past. Every day, we make decisions based on our own personal history. When we seek to grow as people, we seek to understand ourselves by thinking carefully about our past. A country is no different. Every day, our government makes decisions based on their understanding of our past. Our people make decisions also based on our understanding of our shared history. Today, as Singapore embarks on its Golden Jubilee, marking 50 years since separation with Malaysia, we are also entering a new era. In order to fully understand ourselves, to make the best decisions for our future, we must make decisions based on our past. We also need to stop and understand where we have come from. One such myth that governments perpetuate is the idea that their country's borders are natural, logical and represent a unique nation. That somehow, the nation perfectly overlaps with the state and that they are one and the same. And equally, that this nation, that the national identity, also has something timeless and inherent about it. To a great extent, governments have to perpetuate this idea. After all, a government can't call its own borders into question. But in pursuit of a coherent national identity, governments often take the shortcut of suppressing and erasing other visions of national identity, especially those of minorities, or the marginalised, or the weak and powerless, rather than the more difficult but constructive path of building a nation. And in the case of former colonies, we often overlook the fact that both these national borders and these national identities are the products of colonialism, that were constructed out of the compromises that were made during the process of decolonisation, and were designed to perpetuate the influence of the colonial power long after decolonisation. And so it is with Singapore and Malaysia. And it is with the Act that first set the modern boundaries of Singapore and West Malaysia that we begin. The Partition of Malaya in 1946. Now, the Partition of Singapore from the rest of the Malayan Peninsula in 1946 actually passed with little excitement. The population was wrapped up in the rebuilding of Malaya after the Japanese occupation. Newspapers and newspapers were not so interested in the revolution. The newspaper headlines focused on the Indonesian republican struggle for independence against the violent British and allied reoccupation of Indonesia. In stark contrast with the later partitions of India and Palestine in 1948, there were no riots over boundaries, or over citizenship, or over population transfers. The British, colonial masters of Malaya, did not even consider it a partition. On the contrary, they saw it as an act of union. The Malayan Union drew together the separate administrations that the British had direct or indirect rule over. Except for Singapore. Yet for the people of Malaya, the partition would have consequences that were no less profound than India or Palestine. What was the Malayan Union? In 1943, in the middle of World War II, Britain announced its intention to prepare Malaya for eventual independence. Britain announced its intention to prepare Malaya for eventual independence. The vehicle for this would be the Malayan Union. The British believed that a strong centralized state and multiracial politics was necessary for the stability and development of Malaya. To gain experience in running a democratic country, and to be loyal to Malaya, all the people of Malaya had to have a stick in the country, be given the opportunity to practice democracy, and to be given a role in the administration. The best way to learn how to do something, after all, is to practice, practice, practice. So the British accordingly unified 11 of the 12 Malayan states into the Malayan Union, removed the sovereignty of the Malay rulers, established a strong central government under direct British rule, and aimed to create a Malayan nation and Malayan people by offering citizenship to all who regarded Malaya as their own. To give Malaya citizens a stake in the country and encourage democratization, the Malayan Union introduced a unitary Malayan citizenship. All Malayan-born, regardless of ancestry, were Malayan. A clear and equitable path to citizenship was offered for immigrants. But, race dictated its composition from the outset. Singapore's inclusion would mean non-Malays would understand Malay, and outnumber Malays in the Malayan Union. The Malay elite were worried about their community being overwhelmed by the Chinese, and more prosaically, would not agree to be part of a democratic state in which they were the minority and therefore no longer the elite. So Singapore was excluded. Many Malayans and former Malaya colonial officials protested that it was illogical to exclude Malaya's social, economic and cultural capital, but to no avail. You see, before 1946, there was little conception of Singapore as a separate independent state. Historically, Singapore was part of Johor, and it was with the Sultan of Johor that Sir Stamford Raffle signed a treaty with in 1819, which gave the British the right to set up a trading port. Throughout the 19th century, it was the military and economic power of Singapore that made the British the paramount power in the peninsula. And this was formalized in 1896, when four Malay states were federated, with Kuala Lumpur as its capital. The British High Commissioner in Malaya was also the governor of the straight settlements based in Singapore, and superior to the Resident General of the Federated Malay States based in Kuala Lumpur. Because of its status as a military, communications and trading hub, and its proximity to wealth, Singapore was de facto the political capital of Malaya. But more than that, Singapore was the intellectual, social and economic capital of Malaya. If you were a young man or woman who wanted to make it big, you headed for the bright lights of Malaya's biggest city. If you wanted a higher education, you headed for Raffles College in Singapore. If you wanted to become a successful artist, or singer, or writer, or journalist, you headed for Singapore, because that's where the money was. It was in Singapore that you'd find the big multinational companies, the big artistic companies, the theatres, the museums, the newspapers, and the newspapers. The movie industry. And the intellectual industries, the publishers, the newspapers, the schools. If Kuala Lumpur was Washington DC, Singapore was New York. But all these links were thrown overboard by a colonial office that was anxious not to jeopardise elite Malay opinion. Singapore's exclusion, of course, also ensured the protection of its free port, and more importantly, the British naval base. But with this act, Malaya was split into two. Welcome back. So for all the progressive ideals of the Malayan Union, separating Singapore from the rest of Malaya was a tacit admission that in Malaya, some people were more equal than others. Malaya was not an inalienable whole, but a political arrangement subject to political needs. By calculating politics on ethnic terms, it legitimised and reinforced race as central to the political process. Within a year of the creation of the Malayan Union, two opposing forces had coalesced, articulating two different Malayan identities. On the right, the Federation-based United Malays National Organisation, or UMNO, was the party of the Malay bureaucratic elite, the sons of the Malay aristocracy who had been trained for decades by the British to run the country. They formed an alliance with the Sultans. They objected to the granting of citizenship to non-Malays, the loss of autonomy for the Malay states, and the removal of the Sultans' powers. They sought to do the right thing for Malayers-Malays, to protect their people. But their constitutional proposals also enshrined the idea that, the Malay-Malayan identity, was exclusively Malay, and cemented their elite status atop a rigid social-political hierarchy. On the left was a Singapore-centred AMCJA Putra, the All-Malaya Council of Joint Action , and the Pusat Tenaga Rakyat , a coalition of left-wing groups who supported the union, but wanted the inclusion of Singapore. Amongst its leaders, were the Malayan Democratic Union , the Parti Kembangsaan Melayu-Malaya , the Malay Nationalist Party of Malaya, and the Malayan Communist Party . They articulated an inclusive, multi-racial, civic Malayan identity, based on progressive values, and embodied this in their constitutional proposals. But their vision was also, by definition, far more vague, far more unstable. Far more uncertain. The visions of the two sides can be seen in the constitutional proposals presented by the two sides. The British chose to negotiate exclusively and secretly with UMNO and the Malay rulers, and in November 1946, this produced the Federation Agreement. This defined Malaya as a Malay state, subject to the authority of the rulers, and stressed the individuality of the states. Citizenship was not a nationality, and citizens did not possess equal rights. Political power was concentrated in Malay hands. Power emanated from the rulers, and amendments required their approval. The agreement accepted the British concept of tutelage, and accepted that Malaya would progress to independence by gradual and planned stages of constitutional reform. AMCJA Putra, on the other hand, chiefly based in Singapore, included the PKMM, MDU, MCP, the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions, the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, the Malayan Indian Congress, and the Malayan Chinese Chambers of Commerce. After exhausting negotiations between them, they presented the People's Constitutional Proposals for Malaya. This was a compromise between conservative Chinese Chambers of Commerce, and a variety of other left-wing nationalist, intellectual, and labour organisations. It asserted that Malaya was a multiracial country, that there should be a common citizenship, which was a nationality, and conferred equal rights on all citizens. It assumed that power flowed from the people, and that the best way for Malayans to learn self-government was to actually start governing themselves. The failure of the coalition led to its splitting apart. The Chinese capitalists formed the MCA and joined UMNO, along with the MIC, in the Alliance to Rule Malaya, where they remain to this day. The MCP concluded that if constitutional methods mean that the government simply can ignore us, then we have no choice but to return to armed conflict. The PKMM, the MDU, and the trade unions would be banned during the ensuing Malayan emergency. Their leaders arrested and detained without trial. In this period, a whole host of issues that would define Malaysian and Singaporean politics to this day burst into life. Once the British overlords had lost their mythical right to rule, and had declared that they would leave, the battle began in earnest for the future of independent Malaya. In particular, two important questions were deeply contested. First, what is the meaning and purpose of Malaya? And, what is the role of government? This is of course a question that has shaped politics in all countries, not just Malaysia or Singapore. Who rules? And for whose benefit? And to what purpose? People argued over different frameworks of governance, depending on their own background and ideology. Some frameworks were based on class. For example, whether you were a rich businessman, a poor dog worker, or a farmer, affected how you thought of government. Others were based on ideology. The Malay community in particular was torn between the idealism and dynamism of Indonesian republicanism, and the tradition and cohesiveness of the Malay Sultanates. Others drew inspiration from conflicting legal and constitutional precedents. The English-speaking political elite, for example, drew upon a template of citizenship and governance that derived from a British democratic parliamentary tradition. But, paradoxically, was created and imposed by colonial rule. But the second question is the one which is most prominent, and that is the definition and shape of Malaya. What is Malaya? Who are the Malayans? What values should Malaya embody? Even where people agreed, for example, that Malaya would be democratic, the meaning of the word was fiercely contested. From whom did Malaya come? From whom does sovereignty flow? The Sultans or the people? What does it mean to be an independent country? What does it mean to be Malayan? This is the central theme of this series, Identity in Malaya, how it has been negotiated, constructed, disputed, and manipulated. These issues were fiercely argued and fought over up and down Malaya, in different languages, and in a wide variety of contexts. But the two poles initially were of course the KL-based UMNO and the Singapore-centred AMCJA Putra. The story of UMNO and how it came to lead Malaysia has been well studied. In a nutshell, Malaysian nationalism was a conflict between three forces in Malay society, the Malay Sultans, the bureaucratic elite, and the Malay Nationalists. The bureaucratic elite formed the political party, UMNO. And despite a difficult relationship with the Malay Sultans, they were both threatened by a third force, the Malay Nationalists, who aspired to a Malayan Republic that was inspired by Indonesian Republicanism. Hence, Malay rulers and UMNO formed an alliance between themselves and with the British to defeat the Malay Nationalists. But we know far less about the Malay Nationalists and about the story of Singapore. Why were the Malays of Singapore so much more left-wing than Malays in Singapore? And more broadly, how did a vastly disparate group of people, overwhelmingly immigrant, from a wide variety of backgrounds, chiefly with ancestry from China, but also from India, from Riau, Sumatra and Java, how did they become Malayan? Why did the people of Singapore fight so hard to be Malayan? Why didn't they just go their own way and fight for a separate Singapore? Why did they keep fighting for reunification, to the point where they would be forced to leave? Why did they have to leave the country, where this desire would shape their entire independence movement and provide a lever that the British and their local allies would use to manipulate the people of Singapore? And of course, how did this interact with the conflict that was being waged within the rest of Malaya, over the meaning of Malaya, over the meaning and purpose of government? To answer these questions, we need to delve into the history of Singapore's past, from its founding as a British trading port, and understand the demographic, economic, political and intellectual trends which shaped its evolution from immigrant colony to settled nation. This story matters because the two issues of identity and government were never resolved. The manner of Singapore's merger and separation from Malaysia left them only temporarily suppressed through violence and regulation. Today, our leaders continue to grapple with these long-running dilemmas. They strive to create distinctly Singaporean institutions and an authentically Singaporean national identity. But they are limited by being deeply invested in a single, valid but limited perspective of Singapore's history. They continue to work within institutions, values and assumptions which are still fundamentally derived from a colonial tradition. This prevents them from fully engaging with the issues. Understanding Singapore's data and its decolonisation, therefore, is not merely a historic need, but a contemporary one. It helps us understand Singapore's politics today, and gives us ideas about how to find a way forward.
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|
Stories have emerged, popular myths which are widely believed and yet may be untrue.
|
|
It is important to understand our past.
|
|
Every day, we make decisions based on our own personal history.
|
|
When we seek to grow as people, we seek to understand ourselves by thinking carefully about our past.
|
|
A country is no different.
|
|
Every day, our government makes decisions based on their understanding of our past.
|
|
Our people make decisions also based on our understanding of our shared history.
|
|
Today, as Singapore embarks on its golden jubilee, marking 50 years since separation with Malaysia, we are also entering a new era.
|
|
In order to fully understand ourselves, to make the best decisions for our future, we
|
|
also need to stop and understand where we have come from.
|
|
One such myth that governments perpetuate is the idea that their country's borders are natural, logical and represent a unique nation.
|
|
that somehow the nation perfectly overlaps with the state, and that they are one and the same.
|
|
And equally, that this nation, that the national identity, also has something timeless and inherent about it.
|
|
To a great extent, governments have to perpetuate this idea.
|
|
After all, a government can't call its own borders into question.
|
|
But in pursuit of a coherent national identity, governments often take the shortcut of suppressing and erasing other visions of national identity.
|
|
especially those of minorities or the marginalized or the weak and powerless
|
|
rather than the more difficult but constructive path of building a
|
|
a new civic identity out of the diversity of the nation. And in the case of former colonies, we often overlook the fact that both these national borders and these national identities are the products of colonialism.
|
|
that were constructed out of the compromises that were made during the process of decolonisation.
|
|
and were designed to perpetuate the influence of the colonial power long after decolonisation.
|
|
And so it is with Singapore and Malaysia.
|
|
and it is with the act that first set the modern boundaries of Singapore and West Malaysia that we begin.
|
|
The Partition of Malaya in 1946
|
|
Now, the partition of Singapore from the rest of the Malayan Peninsula in 1946 actually passed with little excitement.
|
|
The population was wrapped up in the rebuilding of Malaya after the Japanese occupation. News
|
|
headlines focused on the Indonesian Republican struggle for independence against the violent British and allied reoccupation of Indonesia.
|
|
In stark contrast with the later partitions of India and Palestine in 1948,
|
|
There were no riots over boundaries, or over citizenship, or over population transfers.
|
|
The British, colonial masters of Malaya, did not even consider it a partition.
|
|
On the contrary, they saw it as an act of eulogy.
|
|
The Malayan Union drew together the separate administrations that the British had direct or indirect rule over.
|
|
except for Singapore.
|
|
Singapore. Yet for the people of Malaya, the partition would have consequences that were no less profound than India or Palestine.
|
|
What was the Malayan Union?
|
|
In 1943, in the middle of World War II,
|
|
Britain announced its intention
|
|
to prepare Malia for eventual independence.
|
|
independence. The vehicle for this would be the Malayan Union.
|
|
The British believed that a strong centralised state and multiracial politics was necessary for the stability and development of
|
|
Malaya. To gain experience in running a democratic country
|
|
and to be loyal to Malay
|
|
all the people of Malaya had to have a stick in the
|
|
country, be given the opportunity to practice democracy, and to be given a role in the
|
|
The best way to learn how to do something, after all, is to practice, practice, practice
|
|
So the British accordingly unified 11 of the 12 Malayan states into the Malayan Union,
|
|
removed the sovereignty of the Malay rulers, established a strong central government under direct British rule,
|
|
and aimed to create a Malayan nation and Malayan people by offering citizenship to all who regarded Malaya as home.
|
|
To give Malay citizens a stake in the country and encourage democratisation,
|
|
the Malayan Union introduced a unitary Malayan citizenship.
|
|
All Malayan born, regardless of ancestry, were Malayan.
|
|
a clear and equitable path to citizenship was offered for immigrants.
|
|
but race dictated its composition from the outset.
|
|
Singapore's inclusion would mean non-Malays would outnumber
|
|
Malays in the Malayan Union. The Malay elite were worried about their community being overwhelmed by the Chinese.
|
|
and more prosaically, would not agree to be part of a democratic state in which they were the minority.
|
|
and therefore no longer the elite. So Singapore was excluded.
|
|
Many Malayans and former Malaya colonial officials protested that it was illogical to exclude Malaya's social, economic and cultural capital, but to no avail.
|
|
You see, before 1946, there was little conception of Singapore as a separate independent state.
|
|
Historically, Singapore was part of Johor.
|
|
and it was with the Sultan of Johor that Sir Stamford Raffle signed a treaty with in 1819.
|
|
which gave the British the right to set up a trading port
|
|
Throughout the 19th century, it was the military and economic power of Singapore
|
|
that made the British the paramount power in the peninsula.
|
|
And this was formalized in 1896
|
|
when four Malay states were federated with Kuala Lumpur as its capital.
|
|
The British High Commissioner in Malaya was also the governor of the straight settlements based in Singapore.
|
|
and superior to the Resident General of the Federated Malay States based in Kuala Lumpur.
|
|
Because of its status as a military, communications and trading hub, and its proximity to wealth,
|
|
Singapore was de facto the political capital of Malaya
|
|
but more than that Singapore was the intellectual, social
|
|
and economic capital of Malaya.
|
|
If you were a young man or woman who wanted to make it big,
|
|
you headed for the bright lights of Malaya's biggest city.
|
|
If you wanted a higher education,
|
|
You hit it for Raffles College in Singapore.
|
|
If you wanted to become a successful artist or singer or writer or journalist,
|
|
you hid it for Singapore because that's where the money was.
|
|
It was in Singapore that you'd find the big multinational companies.
|
|
The big artistic companies, the theatres, the movie industry,
|
|
and the intellectual industries, the publishers, the newspapers, the schools.
|
|
If Kuala Lumpur was Washington DC, Singapore was New York.
|
|
But all these links were thrown overboard by a colonial office that was anxious not to jeopardise elite Malay opinion.
|
|
Singapore's exclusion, of course, also ensured the protection of its free port and, more importantly, the British naval base.
|
|
But with this act, Malaya was split into two. Welcome back.
|
|
So for all the progressive ideals of the Malayan Union, separating Singapore from the rest of Malaya was a tacit admission that in Malaya, some people were more equal than others.
|
|
Malaya was not an inalienable home
|
|
by the political arrangements subject to political needs.
|
|
By calculating politics on ethnic terms, it legitimised and reinforced race as central to the political process.
|
|
Within a year of the creation of the Malayan Union, two opposing forces had coalesced, articulating two different Malayan identities.
|
|
On the right, the Federation-based United Malays National Organisation, or UMNO,
|
|
was the party of the Malay bureaucratic elite, the sons of the Malay aristocracy who had been trained for decades by the British to run the country.
|
|
They formed an alliance with the Sultan.
|
|
They objected to the granting of citizenship to non-Malays, the loss of autonomy for the Malay states, and the removal of the Sultan's powers.
|
|
they sought to do the right thing for Malay as Malays, to protect their people.
|
|
an exclusively Malay-Malayan identity and cemented their elite status atop a rigid social-political hierarchy.
|
|
On the left was the Singapore-centred AMCJA Putra, the All-Malaya Council of Joint Action and the Pusat Tenaga Rakyat .
|
|
a coalition of left-wing groups who supported the union but wanted the inclusion of Singapore.
|
|
Amongst its leaders were the Malayan Democratic Union, or MDU, the Parti Kembangsaan Melayu-Malaya, or PKMM, the Malay Nationalist Party,
|
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