107/replication_package/Other/commitment.bib

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@article{zhang2021,
	author = {Zhang, Qing and Greiner, Ben},
	date-added = {2021-07-25 15:46:06 -0600},
	date-modified = {2021-07-25 15:47:09 -0600},
	journal = {Economic Letters},
	nameorder = {random},
	pages = {Article 109982},
	title = {Time Inconsistency, Sophistication, and Commitment: An Experimental Study},
	volume = {203},
	year = {2021}}

@article{oettingen2015,
	author = {Oettingen, Gabriele and Kappes, Heather Barry and Guttenberg, Katie B. and Gollwitzer, Peter M.},
	date-modified = {2021-07-27 01:35:38 -0600},
	eprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/ejsp.2090},
	journal = {European Journal of Social Psychology},
	number = {2},
	pages = {218-229},
	title = {Self-regulation of Time Management: Mental Contrasting with Implementation Intentions},
	volume = {45},
	year = {2015},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/ejsp.2090},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2090}}

@article{levy2020,
	author = {Matthew R. Levy and Psquale Schiraldi},
	date-added = {2021-03-03 13:21:20 -0500},
	date-modified = {2021-03-03 13:21:44 -0500},
	journal = {working paper},
	title = {Identification of intertemporal preferences in history-dependent dynamic discrete choice models},
	year = {2020}}

@article{magnac2002,
	author = {Thiery Magnac and David Thesmar},
	date-added = {2021-03-03 13:12:22 -0500},
	date-modified = {2021-03-03 13:13:07 -0500},
	journal = {Econometrica},
	number = {2},
	pages = {801-816},
	title = {Identifying Dynamic Discrete Decision Processes},
	volume = {70},
	year = {2002}}

@article{abbring2020,
	author = {Jaap H. Abbring and Oystein Daljord},
	date-added = {2021-03-03 13:10:51 -0500},
	date-modified = {2021-03-03 13:11:54 -0500},
	journal = {Quantitative Economics},
	number = {2},
	pages = {471-501},
	title = {Identifying the Discount Factor in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models},
	volume = {11},
	year = {2020}}

@unpublished{huffman2020,
	author = {David Huffman and Collin Raymond and Julia Shvets},
	date-added = {2021-02-23 17:27:43 -0500},
	date-modified = {2021-07-25 15:28:46 -0600},
	note = {Working Paper},
	title = {Persistent Overconfidence and Biased Memory: Evidence from Managers},
	year = {2020}}

@article{schwartzstein2014,
	author = {Joshua Schwartzstein},
	date-added = {2021-02-23 17:22:56 -0500},
	date-modified = {2021-02-23 17:24:00 -0500},
	journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
	number = {6},
	pages = {1423-1452},
	title = {Selective Attention and Learning},
	volume = {12},
	year = {2014}}

@article{hanna2014,
	author = {Rema Hanna and Sendhil Mullainathan and Joshua Schwartzstein},
	date-added = {2021-02-23 17:20:08 -0500},
	date-modified = {2021-02-23 17:22:20 -0500},
	journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	number = {3},
	pages = {1311-1353},
	title = {Learning Through Noticing: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment},
	volume = {129},
	year = {2014}}

@article{Echenique2019,
	author = {Federico Echenique and Kota Saito},
	date-added = {2021-02-11 15:26:15 -0500},
	date-modified = {2021-02-11 15:26:53 -0500},
	journal = {Economic Theory},
	number = {4},
	pages = {811-826},
	title = {General Luce Model},
	volume = {68},
	year = {2019}}

@article{Milgrom2002,
	author = {Paul Milgrom and Ilya Segal},
	date-added = {2020-09-25 17:26:17 -0400},
	date-modified = {2021-07-25 15:08:18 -0600},
	journal = {Econometrica},
	number = {2},
	pages = {583-601},
	title = {Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets},
	volume = {70},
	year = {2002}}

@article{Gruber2001,
	author = {Gruber, Jonathan and K{\H{o}}szegi, Botond},
	date-added = {2020-09-20 18:59:53 -0400},
	date-modified = {2020-09-20 19:00:50 -0400},
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	number = {4},
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	title = {Is Addiction Rational? Theory and Evidence?},
	volume = {116},
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@unpublished{Imai2020,
	author = {Imai, Taisuke and Tom Rutter and Colin Camerer},
	date-added = {2020-09-14 19:44:33 -0400},
	date-modified = {2020-09-14 19:44:33 -0400},
	month = {April},
	note = {Working Paper},
	title = {Meta-Analysis of Present-Bias Estimation Using Convex Time Budget},
	year = {2020}}

@article{bisin2020,
	author = {Bisin, Alberto and Hyndman, Kyle},
	date-added = {2020-08-28 16:25:30 -0600},
	date-modified = {2020-08-28 16:26:07 -0600},
	journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
	pages = {339--357},
	title = {Present-Bias, Procrastination and Deadlines in a Field Experiment},
	volume = {119},
	year = {2020}}

@unpublished{avery2019,
	author = {Avery, Mallory and Giuntella, Osea and Jiao, Peiran},
	date-added = {2020-08-26 16:38:51 -0600},
	date-modified = {2020-09-08 11:59:26 -0600},
	note = {IZA Discussion Paper, No. 12772},
	title = {Why Don't We Sleep Enough? A Field Experiment among College Students},
	year = {2019}}

@article{beshears2020,
	author = {Beshears, John and Choi, James J. and Harris, Christopher and Laibson, David and Madrian, Brigitte C. and Sakong, Jung},
	date-added = {2020-08-26 16:28:22 -0600},
	date-modified = {2021-07-25 13:44:16 -0600},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	pages = {Article 104144},
	publisher = {Elsevier},
	title = {Which Early Withdrawal Penalty Attracts the Most Deposits to a Commitment Savings Account?},
	volume = {183},
	year = {2020}}

@article{BernheimRangel2009,
	author = {B. Douglas Bernheim and Antonio Rangel},
	date-added = {2020-08-25 19:17:14 +0000},
	date-modified = {2020-08-25 19:17:14 +0000},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	month = {February},
	number = {1},
	pages = {51-104},
	title = {Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics},
	volume = {124},
	year = {2009},
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@article{Bernheim2016,
	author = {B. Douglas Bernheim},
	date-added = {2020-08-25 19:17:12 +0000},
	date-modified = {2020-08-25 19:17:12 +0000},
	journal = {Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis},
	number = {1},
	pages = {12-68},
	title = {The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Unified Approach to Behavioral Welfare Economics},
	volume = {7},
	year = {2016},
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@unpublished{schwartzstein2021,
	author = {Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch and Matthew Rabin and Joshua Schwartzstein},
	date-added = {2020-08-23 22:49:41 +0000},
	date-modified = {2021-07-25 15:44:08 -0600},
	note = {Working Paper},
	title = {Channeled Attention and Stable Errors},
	year = {2021}}

@unpublished{ShuiAnsubel2005,
	author = {Haiyan Shui and Lawrence M. Ausubel},
	date-added = {2020-08-19 20:52:52 +0000},
	date-modified = {2020-08-19 20:52:52 +0000},
	note = {Working Paper},
	title = {Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card Market},
	year = {2005},
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@unpublished{Mahajanetal2020,
	author = {Mahajan, Aprajit and Michel, Christian and Tarozzi, Alessandro},
	date-added = {2020-08-19 20:52:37 +0000},
	date-modified = {2020-09-08 11:58:45 -0600},
	note = {NBER Working Paper 27198},
	title = {Identification of Time-Inconsistent Models: The Case of Insecticide Treated Nets},
	year = {2020}}

@unpublished{FangSilverman2004,
	author = {Hanming Fang and Dan Silverman},
	date-added = {2020-08-19 20:52:23 +0000},
	date-modified = {2020-08-19 20:52:23 +0000},
	month = {July},
	note = {Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1465},
	title = {Time Inconsistency and Welfare Program Participation: Evidence from the NLSY},
	year = {2004}}

@unpublished{Auglenblick2018,
	author = {Ned Augenblick},
	date-added = {2020-08-19 20:52:05 +0000},
	date-modified = {2020-08-19 20:52:05 +0000},
	note = {Working Paper},
	title = {Short-Term Discounting of Unpleasant Tasks},
	year = {2018},
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@unpublished{AclandLevy2012,
	author = {Dan Acland and Matthew R. Levy},
	date-added = {2020-08-19 20:51:15 +0000},
	date-modified = {2020-08-19 20:51:15 +0000},
	note = {Working Paper: GSPP13-002},
	title = {Naivet{\'e}, Projection Bias, and Habit Formation in Gym Attendance},
	year = {2012},
	Bdsk-File-1 = {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}}

@unpublished{SkibaTobacman2018,
	author = {Paige Marta Skiba and Jeremy Tobacman},
	date-added = {2020-08-19 20:49:49 +0000},
	date-modified = {2020-09-08 11:26:15 -0600},
	note = {Working Paper},
	title = {Payday Loans, Uncertainty, and Discounting: Explaining Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment, and Default},
	year = {2018}}

@unpublished{Chaloupka2019,
	author = {Chaloupka, Frank J. and Matthew R. Levy and White, Justin S.},
	date-added = {2020-08-19 20:49:17 +0000},
	date-modified = {2020-09-08 11:58:29 -0600},
	note = {NBER Working Paper 26522},
	title = {Estimating Biases in Smoking Cessation: Evidence from a Field Experiment},
	year = {2019}}

@article{moser2019,
	author = {Christian Moser and Pedro Olea de Souza e Silva},
	date-added = {2019-11-22 19:22:23 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-11-22 19:23:03 +0000},
	journal = {working paper},
	title = {Optimal Paternalistic Savings Policies},
	year = {2019}}

@article{beshears2017,
	author = {John Beshears and James Choi and Chirstopher Clayton and Christopher Harris and David Laibson and Brigitte Madrian},
	date-added = {2019-11-22 19:20:19 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-11-22 19:21:09 +0000},
	journal = {working paper},
	title = {Optimal Illuquidity},
	year = {2019}}

@article{lizzeri2017,
	author = {Allesandro Lizzeri and Leeat Yariv},
	date-added = {2019-11-22 19:18:57 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-11-22 19:19:46 +0000},
	journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
	number = {3},
	title = {Collective Self-Control},
	volume = {9},
	year = {2017}}

@article{bisin2015,
	author = {Alberto Bisin and Alessandro Lizzeri and Leeat Yariv},
	date-added = {2019-11-22 19:17:30 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-11-22 19:23:33 +0000},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	number = {6},
	pages = {1711-1737},
	title = {Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters},
	volume = {105},
	year = {2015}}

@article{alan2015,
	author = {Alan, Sule and Ertac, Seda},
	date-added = {2019-11-07 18:02:42 -0500},
	date-modified = {2019-11-07 18:02:54 -0500},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
	pages = {111--122},
	title = {Patience, self-control and the demand for commitment: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment},
	volume = {115},
	year = {2015}}

@article{sadoffjebo2019,
	author = {Sadoff, Sally and Samek, Anya},
	date-added = {2019-11-07 17:21:44 -0500},
	date-modified = {2019-11-07 17:23:33 -0500},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
	pages = {90--109},
	title = {Can Interventions Affect Commitment Demand? A Field Experiment on Food Choice},
	volume = {158},
	year = {2019}}

@unpublished{karlan2017,
	author = {Karlan, Dean and Linden, Leigh L.},
	date-added = {2019-11-07 17:15:59 -0500},
	date-modified = {2021-07-25 13:51:54 -0600},
	note = {NBER Working Paper 19863},
	title = {Loose Knots: Strong Versus Weak Commitments to Save for Education in Uganda},
	year = {2017}}

@article{houser2018,
	author = {Houser, Daniel and Schunk, Daniel and Winter, Joachim and Xiao, Erte},
	date-added = {2019-11-07 17:11:15 -0500},
	date-modified = {2019-11-07 17:11:23 -0500},
	journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
	pages = {329--344},
	rating = {5},
	title = {Temptation and Commitment in the Laboratory},
	volume = {107},
	year = {2018}}

@unpublished{ek2020,
	author = {Ek, Claes and Samahita, Margaret},
	date-added = {2019-11-07 17:08:27 -0500},
	date-modified = {2021-07-25 15:57:32 -0600},
	note = {Working Paper},
	title = {Pessimism and Overcommitment},
	year = {2020}}

@article{dupas2013,
	author = {Dupas, Pascaline and Robinson, Jonathan},
	date-added = {2019-11-07 17:06:52 -0500},
	date-modified = {2019-11-07 17:07:10 -0500},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	number = {4},
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	title = {Why Don't the Poor Save More? Evidence from Health Savings Experiments},
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	date-modified = {2019-05-28 17:44:25 +0000},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	keywords = {behavioral, opt_nudge},
	number = {9},
	pages = {1959--1987},
	publisher = {Elsevier},
	title = {Tax incidence when individuals are time-inconsistent: the case of cigarette excise taxes},
	volume = {88},
	year = {2004},
	Bdsk-File-1 = {YnBsaXN0MDDSAQIDBFxyZWxhdGl2ZVBhdGhZYWxpYXNEYXRhXxB4Li4vLi4vLi4vLi4vLi4vTGlicmFyeS9Nb2JpbGUgRG9jdW1lbnRzLzRZNjgyNzJMTjh+Y29tfnJlYWRkbGV+UmVhZGRsZURvY3NJUGFkL0RvY3VtZW50cy9MaWJyYXJ5L0dydWJlcl9Lb3N6ZWdpXzIwMDQucGRmTxECRAAAAAACRAACAAAMQkxPQ0tXT09ELUhEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAzRinH0grAAABOmPcF0dydWJlcl9Lb3N6ZWdpXzIwMDQucGRmAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAIbCyXPkdVYAAAAAAAAAAAABQAGAAAJIAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAdMaWJyYXJ5AAAQAAgAAM0Y7W8AAAARAAgAAM+SDZgAAAABABwBOmPcANhhHADYYRsAFzC4AANV6QADVc8AA1XGAAIAhkJMT0NLV09PRC1IRDpVc2VyczoAYmxvY2t3b29kOgBMaWJyYXJ5OgBNb2JpbGUgRG9jdW1lbnRzOgA0WTY4MjcyTE44fmNvbX5yZWFkZGxlflIjRDg2MTFCOgBEb2N1bWVudHM6AExpYnJhcnk6AEdydWJlcl9Lb3N6ZWdpXzIwMDQucGRmAA4AMAAXAEcAcgB1AGIAZQByAF8ASwBvAHMAegBlAGcAaQBfADIAMAAwADQALgBwAGQAZgAPABoADABCAEwATwBDAEsAVwBPAE8ARAAtAEgARAASAHlVc2Vycy9ibG9ja3dvb2QvTGlicmFyeS9Nb2JpbGUgRG9jdW1lbnRzLzRZNjgyNzJMTjh+Y29tfnJlYWRkbGV+UmVhZGRsZURvY3NJUGFkL0RvY3VtZW50cy9MaWJyYXJ5L0dydWJlcl9Lb3N6ZWdpXzIwMDQucGRmAAATAAEvAAAVAAIAEP//AAAACAANABoAJACfAAAAAAAAAgEAAAAAAAAABQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuc=}}

@article{gabaix2014,
	author = {Xavier Gabaix},
	date-added = {2019-05-28 17:44:15 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-05-28 17:44:15 +0000},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	number = {4},
	pages = {1661-1710},
	title = {A Sparsity Based Model of Bounded Rationality},
	volume = {129},
	year = {2014}}

@article{DellaVigna2009,
	author = {DellaVigna, Stefano},
	date-added = {2019-05-28 17:44:01 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-05-28 17:44:01 +0000},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
	keywords = {behavioral},
	number = {2},
	pages = {315--372},
	publisher = {Citeseer},
	title = {Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field},
	volume = {47},
	year = {2009},
	Bdsk-File-1 = {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}}

@article{DellaVigna2005,
	author = {DellaVigna, Stefano and Paserman, M Daniele},
	date-added = {2019-05-28 17:43:57 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-05-28 17:43:57 +0000},
	journal = {Journal of Labor Economics},
	number = {3},
	title = {Job Search and Impatience},
	volume = {23},
	year = {2005},
	Bdsk-File-1 = {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}}

@article{Beshears2008,
	author = {Beshears, John and Choi, James J and Laibson, David and Madrian, Brigitte C},
	date-added = {2019-05-28 17:43:25 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-05-28 17:43:25 +0000},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	keywords = {behavioral, opt_nudge},
	number = {8},
	pages = {1787--1794},
	publisher = {Elsevier},
	title = {How are preferences revealed?},
	volume = {92},
	year = {2008},
	Bdsk-File-1 = {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}}

@article{milkman2014,
	author = {Katherine L. Milkman and Julia A. Minson and Kevin G. M. Volpp},
	date-added = {2019-05-27 23:31:27 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-05-27 23:32:23 +0000},
	journal = {Management Science},
	number = {2},
	pages = {283-299},
	title = {Holding the Hunger Games Hostage at the Gym: An Evaluations of Temptation Bundling},
	volume = {60},
	year = {2014}}

@article{Sun2014,
	author = {Kai Sun and Jing Song and Larry M. Manheim and Rowland W. Chang and Kent C. Kwoh and Pamela A. Semanik and Charles B. Eaton and Dorothy D. Dunlop},
	date-added = {2019-05-27 15:30:58 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-05-27 15:32:50 +0000},
	journal = {Seminars in Arthritis and Rheumatism},
	number = {3},
	pages = {264-270},
	title = {Relationship of Meeting Physical Activity Guidelines with Quality Adjusted Life Years},
	volume = {44},
	year = {2014}}

@article{Blair1989,
	author = {Steven N. Blair and Harold W. Kohl and Ralph S. Paffenbarger and Debra G. Clark and Kenneth H. Cooper and Larry W. Gibbons},
	date-added = {2019-05-27 15:27:17 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-05-27 15:30:15 +0000},
	journal = {Journal of the American Medical Association},
	number = {17},
	pages = {2395-2401},
	title = {Physical Fitness and All-Cause Mortality A Prospective Study of Healthy Men and Women},
	volume = {262},
	year = {1989}}

@article{Neumann2014,
	author = {Peter J. Neumann and Joushua T. Cohen and Milton C. Weinstein},
	date-added = {2019-05-27 15:25:01 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-05-27 16:19:07 +0000},
	journal = {The New England Journal of Medicine},
	number = {9},
	pages = {796-797},
	title = {Updating Cost-Effectiveness: The Curious Resilience of the \$50,000 per-QALY-Threshold},
	volume = {371},
	year = {2014}}

@article{hansen1982,
	author = {Lars Peter Hansen},
	date-added = {2019-05-21 00:45:18 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-05-21 00:46:51 +0000},
	journal = {Econometrica},
	number = {4},
	pages = {1029-1054},
	title = {Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators},
	volume = {50},
	year = {1982}}

@article{Odonoghue2001,
	author = {Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin},
	date-added = {2019-05-16 01:58:22 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-05-16 01:59:28 +0000},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	number = {1},
	pages = {121-160},
	title = {Choice and Procrastination},
	volume = {116},
	year = {2001}}

@article{Gul2001,
	author = {Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer},
	date-added = {2019-05-16 01:56:09 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-05-16 01:56:55 +0000},
	journal = {Econometrica},
	number = {6},
	pages = {1403-1435},
	title = {Temptation and Self-Control},
	volume = {69},
	year = {2001}}

@article{fudenberg2006,
	author = {Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine},
	date-added = {2019-05-16 01:42:58 +0000},
	date-modified = {2019-05-16 01:44:06 +0000},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	number = {5},
	pages = {1449-1476},
	title = {A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control},
	volume = {96},
	year = {2006}}

@article{kaur2015,
	abstract = {Self-control problems change the logic of agency theory by partly aligning the interests of the firm and worker: both now value contracts that elicit future effort. Findings from a year-long field experiment with full-time data entry workers support this idea. First, workers increase output by voluntarily choosing dominated contracts (which penalize low output but give no additional rewards for high output). Second, effort increases closer to (randomly assigned) paydays. Third, the contract and payday effects are strongly correlated within workers, and this correlation grows with experience. We suggest that workplace features such as high-powered incentives or effort monitoring may provide self-control benefits.},
	author = {Kaur, Supreet and Kremer, Michael and Mullainathan, Sendhil},
	date = {2015-12-01},
	date-modified = {2021-07-27 01:38:16 -0600},
	file = {Full Text PDF:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\4V5JVZ8H\\Kaur et al. - 2015 - Self-Control at Work.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\MXNGT7AR\\683822.html:text/html},
	issn = {0022-3808},
	journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
	journaltitle = {Journal of Political Economy},
	number = {6},
	pages = {1227--1277},
	shortjournal = {Journal of Political Economy},
	title = {Self-Control at Work},
	volume = {123},
	year = {2015},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/683822},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1086/683822}}

@article{heidhues2009,
	author = {Paul Heidhues and Botond K{\H{o}}szegi},
	date-modified = {2021-07-25 13:51:28 -0600},
	file = {Heidhues and K{\H o}szegi - 2009 - Futile Attempts at Self-Control.pdf:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\H58JLC29\\Heidhues and K{\H o}szegi - 2009 - Futile Attempts at Self-Control.pdf:application/pdf},
	issn = {1542-4766, 1542-4774},
	journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
	journaltitle = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
	langid = {english},
	number = {2},
	pages = {423--434},
	title = {Futile Attempts at Self-Control},
	volume = {7},
	year = {2009},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article-lookup/doi/10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.2-3.423},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.2-3.423}}

@article{exley2017,
	abstract = {Previous research often interprets the choice to restrict one's future opportunity set as evidence for sophisticated time inconsistency. We propose an additional mechanism that may contribute to the demand for commitment technology: the desire to signal to others. We present a field experiment where participants can choose to give up money if they do not follow through with an action. When commitment choices are made public rather than kept private, we find significantly higher uptake rates.Data are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2501.This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.},
	author = {Exley, Christine L. and Naecker, Jeffrey K.},
	date = {2017-10},
	date-modified = {2021-07-27 01:37:46 -0600},
	file = {Full Text:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\NTHW4TIQ\\Exley and Naecker - 2016 - Observability Increases the Demand for Commitment .pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\HZ5VZSAR\\mnsc.2016.html:text/html},
	issn = {0025-1909},
	journal = {Management Science},
	journaltitle = {Management Science},
	number = {10},
	pages = {3262--3267},
	shortjournal = {Management Science},
	title = {Observability Increases the Demand for Commitment Devices},
	volume = {63},
	year = {2017},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2501},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2501}}

@article{mckelvey1995,
	abstract = {We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility and assume other players do so as well. We define a quantal response equilibrium ({ORE}) as a fixed point of this process and establish existence. For a logit specification of the error structure, we show that as the error goes to zero, {QRE} approaches a subset of Nash equilibria and also implies a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibria in generic games. We fit the model to a variety of experimental data sets by using maximum likelihood estimation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C19, C44, C72, C92.},
	author = {{McKelvey}, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R.},
	date = {1995-07-01},
	date-modified = {2021-07-27 01:35:01 -0600},
	file = {ScienceDirect Full Text PDF:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\PY3UMW6N\\McKelvey and Palfrey - 1995 - Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games.pdf:application/pdf;ScienceDirect Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\RMXG4CF9\\S0899825685710238.html:text/html},
	issn = {0899-8256},
	journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
	journaltitle = {Games and Economic Behavior},
	number = {1},
	pages = {6--38},
	shortjournal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
	title = {Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games},
	volume = {10},
	year = {1995},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825685710238},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1023}}

@article{khaw2017,
	abstract = {The theory of expected utility maximization ({EUM}) explains risk aversion as due to diminishing marginal utility of wealth. However, observed choices between risky lotteries are difficult to reconcile with {EUM}: for example, in the laboratory, subjects' responses on individual trials involve a random element, and cannot be predicted purely from the terms offered; and subjects often appear to be too risk averse with regard to small gambles (while still accepting sufficiently favorable large gambles) to be consistent with any utility-of-wealth function. We propose a unified explanation for both anomalies, similar to the explanation given for related phenomena in the case of perceptual judgments: they result from judgments based on imprecise (and noisy) mental representation of the decision situation. In this model, risk aversion is predicted without any need for a nonlinear utility-of-wealth function, and instead results from a sort of perceptual bias --- but one that represents an optimal Bayesian decision, given the limitations of the mental representation of the situation. We propose a specific quantitative model of the mental representation of a simple lottery choice problem, based on other evidence regarding numerical cognition, and test its ability to explain the choice frequencies that we observe in a laboratory experiment.},
	author = {Khaw, Mel Win and Li, Ziang and Woodford, Michael},
	date-modified = {2021-07-25 15:05:51 -0600},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
	number = {4},
	pages = {1979--2013},
	title = {Cognitive Imprecision and Small-Stakes Risk Aversion},
	volume = {88},
	year = {2021},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w23294},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.3386/w23294}}

@article{john2020,
	abstract = {Commitment products can remedy self-control problems. However, imperfect
knowledge about their preferences may (discontinuously) lead individuals to select into
incentive-incompatible commitments, which reduce their welfare. I conducted a field
experiment in which low-income individuals were randomly offered a new installmentsavings commitment account. Individuals chose a personalized savings plan and a default
penalty themselves. A majority appears to choose a harmful contract: While the average
effect on bank savings is large, 55% of clients default and incur monetary losses. A possible
explanation is that the chosen penalties were too low (the commitment was too weak) to
overcome clients' self-control problems. Measures of sophisticated hyperbolic discounting
correlate negatively with take-up and default, and positively with penalty choices. This
finding is consistent with theoretical predictions that partial sophisticates adopt weak
commitments and then default, whereas full sophisticates are more cautious about committing, but better able to choose incentive-compatible contracts.},
	author = {John, Anett},
	date-modified = {2021-07-27 01:40:33 -0600},
	file = {John - When Commitment Fails -- Evidence from a Field Expe.pdf:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\R92E3DTR\\John - When Commitment Fails -- Evidence from a Field Expe.pdf:application/pdf},
	journal = {Management Science},
	langid = {english},
	number = {2},
	pages = {503--529},
	title = {When Commitment Fails: Evidence from a Field Experiment},
	volume = {66},
	year = {2020}}

@article{gine2010,
	abstract = {We designed and tested a voluntary commitment product to help smokers quit smoking. The product ({CARES}) offered smokers a savings account in which they deposit funds for six months, after which they take a urine test for nicotine and cotinine. If they pass, their money is returned; otherwise, their money is forfeited to charity. Of
smokers offered {CARES}, 11 percent took up, and smokers randomly offered {CARES} were 3 percentage points more likely to pass the 6-month test than the control group. More importantly, this effect
persisted in surprise tests at 12 months, indicating that {CARES} produced
lasting smoking cessation. ({JEL} D12, I12, O15)},
	author = {Xavier Gin{\'e} and Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman},
	date = {2010-10},
	date-modified = {2021-07-27 01:38:00 -0600},
	file = {Full Text PDF:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\PKT3RAEU\\Gin{\'e} et al. - 2010 - Put Your Money Where Your Butt Is A Commitment Co.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\UV43SVEF\\articles.html:text/html},
	issn = {1945-7782},
	journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
	keywords = {Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis, Health Production, Economic Development: Human Resources, Human Development, Income Distribution, Migration},
	langid = {english},
	number = {4},
	pages = {213--235},
	shorttitle = {Put Your Money Where Your Butt Is},
	title = {Put Your Money Where Your Butt Is: A Commitment Contract for Smoking Cessation},
	volume = {2},
	year = {2010},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.2.4.213},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1257/app.2.4.213}}

@article{schwartz2014,
	abstract = {We tested a voluntary self-control commitment device to help grocery shoppers make healthier food purchases. Participants, who were already enrolled in a large-scale incentive program that discounts the price of eligible groceries by 25\%, were offered the chance to put their discount on the line. Agreeing households pledged that they would increase their purchases of healthy food by 5 percentage points above their household baseline for each of 6 months. If they reached that goal, their discount was awarded as usual; otherwise, their discount was forfeited for that month. Thirty-six percent of households that were offered the binding commitment agreed; they subsequently showed an average 3.5-percentage-point increase in healthy grocery items purchased in each of the 6 months; households that declined the commitment and control-group households that were given a hypothetical option to precommit did not show such an increase. These results suggest that self-aware consumers will seize opportunities to create restrictive choice environments for themselves, even at some risk of financial loss.},
	author = {Schwartz, Janet and Mochon, Daniel and Wyper, Lauren and Maroba, Josiase and Patel, Deepak and Ariely, Dan},
	date = {2014-02-01},
	date-modified = {2021-07-27 10:03:19 -0600},
	file = {SAGE PDF Full Text:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\V4UUC7SM\\Schwartz et al. - 2014 - Healthier by Precommitment.pdf:application/pdf},
	issn = {0956-7976},
	journal = {Psychological Science},
	journaltitle = {Psychological Science},
	langid = {english},
	number = {2},
	pages = {538--546},
	shortjournal = {Psychol Sci},
	title = {Healthier by Precommitment},
	volume = {25},
	year = {2014},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613510950}}

@article{royer2015,
	abstract = {Financial incentives have shown strong positive short-run effects for problematic health behaviors that likely stem from time inconsistency. However, the effects often disappear once incentive programs end. This paper analyzes the results of a large-scale workplace field experiment to examine whether self-funded commitment contracts can improve the long-run effects of an incentive program. A four week incentive program targeting use of the company gym generated only small lasting effects on behavior. Those that also offered a commitment contract at the end of the program, however, showed demand for commitment and significant long-run changes, detectable even several years after the incentive ended. ({JEL} D03, I10, J32)},
	author = {Royer, Heather and Stehr, Mark and Sydnor, Justin},
	date = {2015-07},
	date-modified = {2021-07-27 01:35:54 -0600},
	file = {Full Text PDF:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\HJLEPIQR\\Royer et al. - 2015 - Incentives, Commitments, and Habit Formation in Ex.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\3KSB5EKY\\articles.html:text/html},
	issn = {1945-7782},
	journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
	journaltitle = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
	keywords = {Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles, Health: General, Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits, Private Pensions, Retirement Plans},
	langid = {english},
	number = {3},
	pages = {51--84},
	shorttitle = {Incentives, Commitments, and Habit Formation in Exercise},
	title = {Incentives, Commitments, and Habit Formation in Exercise: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Workers at a Fortune-500 Company},
	volume = {7},
	year = {2015},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20130327},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20130327}}

@article{augenblick2015,
	abstract = {Experimental tests of dynamically inconsistent time preferences have largely relied on choices over time-dated monetary rewards. Several recent studies have failed to find the standard patterns of present bias. However, such monetary studies contain often-discussed confounds. In this article, we sidestep these confounds and investigate choices over consumption (real effort) in a longitudinal experiment. We pair this effort study with a companion monetary discounting study. We confirm very limited time inconsistency in monetary choices. However, subjects show considerably more present bias in effort. Furthermore, present bias in the allocation of work has predictive power for demand of a meaningfully binding commitment device. Therefore our findings validate a key implication of models of dynamic inconsistency, with corresponding policy implications. {JEL} Codes: C91, D12, D81.},
	author = {Augenblick, Ned and Niederle, Muriel and Sprenger, Charles},
	date = {2015},
	date-modified = {2021-07-25 13:41:06 -0600},
	file = {RePEc Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\XKUP7B2D\\v_3a130_3ay_3a2015_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a1067-1115..html:text/html},
	journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	journaltitle = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	number = {3},
	pages = {1067--1115},
	shorttitle = {Working over Time},
	title = {Working Over Time: Dynamic Inconsistency in Real Effort Tasks},
	urldate = {2019-03-24},
	volume = {130},
	year = {2015},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://econpapers.repec.org/article/oupqjecon/v_3a130_3ay_3a2015_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a1067-1115..htm}}

@article{kaur2010,
	author = {Kaur, Supreet and Kremer, Michael and Mullainathan, Sendhil},
	date = {2010},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	journal = {The American Economic Review},
	journaltitle = {The American Economic Review},
	number = {2},
	pages = {624--628},
	title = {Self-Control and the Development of Work Arrangements},
	url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/27805070},
	urldate = {2019-03-24},
	volume = {100},
	year = {2010},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/27805070}}

@article{sadoffsprenger2019,
	abstract = {Despite the great deal of research on dynamic inconsistency in time preferences, few studies have ventured into investigating the question in a natural context. To address this gap, we conduct a natural field experiment with over 200 customers at a grocery store to investigate dynamic inconsistency and the demand for commitment in food choice. Over a 3 week time period, subjects are invited to allocate and re-allocate food items received as part of a grocery delivery program. We observe substantial dynamic inconsistency in our experiment, as well as a demand for commitment among a non-negligible number of subjects. Interestingly, individuals who demand commitment are more likely to be dynamically consistent in their prior behavior. For academics, our work provides direct evidence of dynamic inconsistency in consumption choices in the field and points towards potential extensions to models of temptation. For policy-makers, our findings provide insights on innovations to alter food choices.},
	author = {Sadoff, Sally and Samek, Anya Savikhin and Sprenger, Charles},
	date-modified = {2019-11-07 17:32:29 -0500},
	journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
	pages = {1--35},
	title = {Dynamic Inconsistency in Food Choice: Experimental Evidence from a Food Desert},
	year = {2019},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2572821}}

@article{acland2018,
	abstract = {Abstract We conduct an experiment on an online game, exploring the effect on gameplay behavior of voluntary commitment devices that allow players to limit their gameplay. Approximately 25\% of players use the devices. Median and 75th percentile device users use devices approximately 60 and 100\% of the time, respectively. Players who chose to use the device were those who had previously played longer and more frequently than those who chose not to use the device. Offering the commitment devices decreased session length and session frequency by 2.8 and 6.1\%, respectively, while increasing weeks of play by 5.5\%. Our results are consistent with some players having self-identified self-control problems, leading to longer and more frequent play than they would prefer, and to demand for commitment, and also with commitment devices creating a more rewarding experience, leading to longer-lasting involvement with the game. Our results suggest incentivizing or requiring commitment devices in computer games.},
	author = {Acland, Dan and Chow, Vinci},
	date = {2018},
	date-modified = {2021-07-25 13:41:44 -0600},
	file = {Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\ES8572PM\\v4y2018i1d10.1007_s40881-018-0048-3.html:text/html},
	journal = {Journal of the Economic Science Association},
	keywords = {Commitment devices, Libertarian paternalism, Online experiment, Online games, Self-control},
	langid = {english},
	number = {1},
	pages = {46--62},
	shorttitle = {Self-control and demand for commitment in online game playing},
	title = {Self-Control and Demand for Commitment in Online Game Playing: Evidence from a Field Experiment},
	urldate = {2019-03-24},
	volume = {4},
	year = {2018},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jesaex/v4y2018i1d10.1007_s40881-018-0048-3.html}}

@article{toussaert2018,
	abstract = {Unlike present-biased individuals, agents who suffer self-control costs as in Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001 may choose to restrict their choice set even when they expect to resist temptation. To identify these self-control types, I design an experiment in which the temptation was to read a story during a tedious task. The identification strategy relies on a two-step procedure. First, I measure commitment demand by eliciting subjects' preferences over menus that did or did not allow access to the story. I then implement preferences using a random mechanism, allowing to observe subjects who faced the choice yet preferred commitment. A quarter to a third of subjects can be classified as self-control types according to their menu preferences. When confronted with the choice, virtually all of them behaved as they anticipated and resisted temptation. These findings suggest that policies restricting the availability of tempting options could have larger welfare benefits than predicted by standard models of present bias.},
	author = {Toussaert, S{\'e}verine},
	date = {2018},
	date-modified = {2021-07-27 01:36:34 -0600},
	file = {Full Text PDF:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\EN9G3BBN\\Toussaert - 2018 - Eliciting Temptation and Self-Control Through Menu.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\HM6CP22U\\ECTA14172.html:text/html},
	issn = {1468-0262},
	journal = {Econometrica},
	journaltitle = {Econometrica},
	keywords = {curiosity, experiment, menu choice, self-control, Temptation},
	langid = {english},
	number = {3},
	pages = {859--889},
	rights = {{\copyright} 2018 The Econometric Society},
	shorttitle = {Eliciting Temptation and Self-Control Through Menu Choices},
	title = {Eliciting Temptation and Self-Control Through Menu Choices: A Lab Experiment},
	volume = {86},
	year = {2018},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA14172},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14172}}

@article{schilbach2019,
	author = {Schilbach, Frank},
	date = {2019},
	date-modified = {2021-07-27 01:36:14 -0600},
	file = {Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\R5QWSEVK\\articles.html:text/html},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	journaltitle = {American Economic Review},
	langid = {english},
	number = {4},
	pages = {1290--1322},
	shorttitle = {Alcohol and Self-Control},
	title = {Alcohol and Self-Control: A Field Experiment in India},
	volume = {109},
	year = {2019},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20170458},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170458}}

@article{sadoffjpe2019,
	abstract = {A large literature examines the use of recipient contribution requirements in social programs to target people who most need and value aid. Yet little is known about public support for such requirements. In a field experiment with a nationally representative sample, we examine the effect of recipient contributions on charitable donations to a food aid program. The response to recipient monetary contributions is non-monotonic: donations increase when recipients make small monetary contributions and return to baseline under large recipient contributions. Recipient time contribution requirements also increase program support. Results from additional treatments suggest that individuals use contribution requirements to increase both allocative efficiency (screening recipients who most value the good) and targeting efficiency (screening recipients most in need). Our work informs the design of social programs, which must respond to the preferences of voters and donors who provide political and financial support.},
	author = {Sadoff, Sally and Samek, Anya},
	date = {2019-01-01},
	date-modified = {2019-11-07 17:23:41 -0500},
	doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.10.011},
	file = {ScienceDirect Full Text PDF:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\IL4MJZE3\\Sadoff and Samek - 2019 - The effect of recipient contribution requirements .pdf:application/pdf;ScienceDirect Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\EELHFDGY\\S0047272718302093.html:text/html},
	issn = {0047-2727},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	journaltitle = {Journal of Public Economics},
	keywords = {Charitable giving, Experiment, Recipient contributions, Social programs},
	pages = {1--16},
	shortjournal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	title = {The effect of recipient contribution requirements on support for social programs},
	url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272718302093},
	urldate = {2019-03-24},
	volume = {169},
	year = {2019},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272718302093},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.10.011}}

@article{augenblick2019,
	abstract = {Abstract.  We experimentally investigate the time-inconsistent taste for immediate gratification and future-preference misprediction. Across 7 weeks, 100 partic},
	author = {Augenblick, Ned and Rabin, Matthew},
	date = {2019},
	date-modified = {2021-07-27 01:30:22 -0600},
	file = {Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\7ES28D7L\\4996235.html:text/html},
	journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
	journaltitle = {The Review of Economic Studies},
	langid = {english},
	number = {3},
	pages = {941-975},
	shortjournal = {Rev Econ Stud},
	title = {An Experiment on Time Preference and Misprediction in Unpleasant Tasks},
	urldate = {2019-03-24},
	volume = {86},
	year = {2019},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://academic.oup.com/restud/advance-article/doi/10.1093/restud/rdy019/4996235},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy019}}

@article{odonoghue1999,
	abstract = {The authors examine self-control problems--modeled as time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences--in a model where a person must do an activity exactly once. They emphasize two distinctions: do activities involve immediate costs or immediate rewards, and are people sophisticated or naive about future self-control problems? Naive people procrastinate immediate-cost activities and preproperate--do too soon--immediate-reward activities. Sophistication mitigates procrastination but exacerbates preproperation. Moreover, with immediate costs, a small present bias can severely harm only naive people, whereas with immediate rewards it can severely harm only sophisticated people. Lessons for savings, addiction, and elsewhere are discussed.},
	author = {O'Donoghue, Ted and Rabin, Matthew},
	date = {1999-03},
	date-modified = {2021-07-27 01:35:20 -0600},
	file = {Full Text PDF:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\FJYALIDC\\O'Donoghue and Rabin - 1999 - Doing It Now or Later.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\BN2M6H4I\\articles.html:text/html},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	journaltitle = {American Economic Review},
	keywords = {Intertemporal Consumer Choice, Life Cycle Models and Saving, Consumer Economics: Theory},
	langid = {english},
	number = {1},
	pages = {103--124},
	title = {Doing It Now or Later},
	volume = {89},
	year = {1999},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.89.1.103},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.1.103}}

@incollection{harberger1964,
	author = {Harberger, Arnold},
	booktitle = {The role of direct and indirect taxes in the Federal Reserve System},
	date-modified = {2020-09-08 11:44:42 -0600},
	pages = {25--80},
	publisher = {Princeton University Press},
	title = {Taxation, Resource Allocation, and Welfare},
	year = {1964}}

@article{dellavigna2006,
	abstract = {How do consumers choose from a menu of contracts? We analyze a novel dataset
from three U.S. health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the
day-to-day attendance decisions of 7,752 members over three years. The observed
consumer behavior is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs.
First, members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over \$70 attend on
average 4.3 times per month. They pay a price per expected visit of more than \$17,
even though they could pay \$10 per visit using a 10-visit pass. On average, these
users forgo savings of \$600 during their membership. Second, consumers who
choose a monthly contract are 17 percent more likely to stay enrolled beyond one
year than users committing for a year. This is surprising because monthly members
pay higher fees for the option to cancel each month. We also document cancellation
delays and attendance expectations, among other findings. Leading explanations for
our findings are overconfidence about future self-control or about future efficiency.
Overconfident agents overestimate attendance as well as the cancellation probability
of automatically renewed contracts. Our results suggest that making inferences
from observed contract choice under the rational expectation hypothesis can
lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences. ({JEL} D00, D12, D91)},
	author = {{DellaVigna}, Stefano and Malmendier, Ulrike},
	date = {2006-06},
	doi = {10.1257/aer.96.3.694},
	file = {Full Text PDF:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\VDQMANZE\\DellaVigna and Malmendier - 2006 - Paying Not to Go to the Gym.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\56JPPJ6J\\articles.html:text/html},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	journaltitle = {American Economic Review},
	langid = {english},
	number = {3},
	pages = {694--719},
	title = {Paying Not to Go to the Gym},
	url = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.96.3.694},
	urldate = {2019-03-24},
	volume = {96},
	year = {2006},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.96.3.694},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.694}}

@article{carrera2018b,
	abstract = {Recent large-scale randomized experiments find that helping people form implementation intentions by asking when and where they plan to act increases one-time actions, such as vaccinations, preventative screenings and voting. We investigate the effect of a simple scalable planning intervention on a repeated behavior using a randomized design involving 877 subjects at a private gym. Subjects were randomized into i) a treatment group who selected the days and times they intended to attend the gym over the next two weeks or ii) a control group who instead recorded their days of exercise in the prior two weeks. In contrast to recent studies, we find that the planning intervention did not have a positive effect on behavior. We observe a tightly estimated null effect even though the majority of subjects believed that planning is helpful and despite clear evidence that they engaged with the planning process.},
	author = {Carrera, Mariana and Royer, Heather and Stehr, Mark and Sydnor, Justin and Taubinsky, Dmitry},
	date = {2018-11},
	doi = {10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.09.002},
	issn = {1879-1646},
	journal = {Journal of Health Economics},
	journaltitle = {Journal of Health Economics},
	keywords = {Behavioral economics, Exercise, Health behaviors, Implementation intentions, Nudge, Physical activity, Planning},
	pages = {95--104},
	pmid = {30336306},
	shortjournal = {J Health Econ},
	shorttitle = {The limits of simple implementation intentions},
	title = {The limits of simple implementation intentions: Evidence from a field experiment on making plans to exercise},
	volume = {62},
	year = {2018},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.09.002}}

@article{carrera2018a,
	author = {Carrera, Mariana and Royer, Heather and Stehr, Mark and Sydnor, Justin},
	journal = {Journal of health economics},
	pages = {202--214},
	publisher = {Elsevier},
	title = {Can financial incentives help people trying to establish new habits? Experimental evidence with new gym members},
	volume = {58},
	year = {2018}}

@article{odonoghue2006,
	author = {O'Donoghue, Ted and Rabin, Matthew},
	date = {2006},
	date-modified = {2021-07-25 15:13:08 -0600},
	file = {RePEc Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\GAJAQAC6\\v_3a90_3ay_3a2006_3ai_3a10-11_3ap_3a1825-1849.html:text/html},
	issn = {0047-2727},
	journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
	journaltitle = {Journal of Public Economics},
	number = {10},
	pages = {1825--1849},
	title = {Optimal Sin Taxes},
	urldate = {2019-03-24},
	volume = {90},
	year = {2006},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeepubeco/v_3a90_3ay_3a2006_3ai_3a10-11_3ap_3a1825-1849.htm}}

@article{allcott2019,
	abstract = {A common objection to ``sin taxes''---corrective taxes on goods that are thought to be overconsumed, such as cigarettes, alcohol, and sugary drinks---is that they often fall disproportionately on low-income consumers. This paper studies the interaction between corrective and redistributive motives in a general optimal taxation framework. We show that the implications of regressivity hinge on why consumption decreases with income. If the consumption-income relationship is driven by income effects, then regressivity is optimally offset by targeted transfers or income tax reforms, not by moderating the level of the sin tax. If the relationship is instead driven by between-income preference heterogeneity, the optimal sin tax depends on the demand elasticity: if demand is more elastic, then progressive benefits from reduced over-consumption can make the optimal sin tax larger than if there were no distributional concerns, while if demand is less elastic, the optimal tax is reduced. As an application, we estimate the optimal nationwide tax on sugar-sweetened beverages, using Nielsen Homescan data and a specially designed survey measuring nutrition knowledge and self-control. Our empirical estimates of elasticities, preference heterogeneity, incorrect beliefs, and self-control imply that current city-level taxes in Berkeley, San Francisco, and elsewhere are actually lower than the social optimum.},
	author = {Allcott, Hunt and Lockwood, Benjamin B. and Taubinsky, Dmitry},
	date = {2019},
	date-modified = {2019-08-21 02:51:11 +0000},
	file = {Allcott et al. - Regressive Sin Taxes, with an Application to the O.pdf:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\GVHCX85V\\Allcott et al. - Regressive Sin Taxes, with an Application to the O.pdf:application/pdf},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	langid = {english},
	number = {3},
	pages = {1557-1626},
	title = {Regressive Sin Taxes, with an Application to the Optimal Soda Tax},
	volume = {134},
	year = {2019}}

@article{ashraf2006,
	abstract = {Abstract.  We designed a commitment savings product for a Philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology. The savings product was int},
	author = {Ashraf, Nava and Karlan, Dean and Yin, Wesley},
	date-modified = {2021-07-27 01:37:03 -0600},
	file = {Full Text PDF:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\YWIB7XEU\\Ashraf et al. - 2006 - Tying Odysseus to the Mast Evidence From a Commit.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:C\:\\Users\\w63k131\\Zotero\\storage\\K75LMRUE\\1884028.html:text/html},
	issn = {0033-5533},
	journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	language = {en},
	month = may,
	number = {2},
	pages = {635--672},
	shorttitle = {Tying {Odysseus} to the {Mast}},
	title = {Tying {Odysseus} to the {Mast}: {Evidence} {From} a {Commitment} {Savings} {Product} in the {Philippines}},
	volume = {121},
	year = {2006},
	Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/121/2/635/1884028},
	Bdsk-Url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.635}}