func stringlengths 0 484k | target int64 0 1 | cwe list | project stringlengths 2 29 | commit_id stringlengths 40 40 | hash float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B 340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B | size int64 1 24k | message stringlengths 0 13.3k |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
int _gnutls_ciphertext2compressed(gnutls_session_t session,
opaque * compress_data,
int compress_size,
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext, uint8 type)
{
uint8 MAC[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
uint16 c_length;
uint8 pad;
int length;
mac_hd_t td;
uint16 blocksize;
int ret, i, pad_failed = 0;
u... | 1 | [] | gnutls | 7ad6162573ba79a4392c63b453ad0220ca6c5ace | 73,008,646,937,836,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 157 | added an extra check while checking the padding. |
static char *make_filename_safe(const char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (*filename && strncmp(filename, ":memory:", sizeof(":memory:")-1)) {
char *fullpath = expand_filepath(filename, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
if (!fullpath) {
return NULL;
}
if (PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid(fullpath, NULL, CHECKUID_CHECK_FILE_AND_... | 1 | [
"CWE-264"
] | php-src | 055ecbc62878e86287d742c7246c21606cee8183 | 211,824,207,069,112,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | Improve check for :memory: pseudo-filename in SQlite |
unpack_Z_stream(int fd_in, int fd_out)
{
IF_DESKTOP(long long total_written = 0;)
IF_DESKTOP(long long) int retval = -1;
unsigned char *stackp;
long code;
int finchar;
long oldcode;
long incode;
int inbits;
int posbits;
int outpos;
int insize;
int bitmask;
long free_ent;
long maxcode;
long maxmaxcode;
i... | 1 | [] | busybox | 251fc70e9722f931eec23a34030d05ba5f747b0e | 21,401,706,257,394,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 232 | uncompress: fix buffer underrun by corrupted input
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> |
static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
{
int sx, sy;
int dx, dy;
int width, height;
int depth;
int notify = 0;
depth = s->get_bpp((VGAState *)s) / 8;
s->get_resolution((VGAState *)s, &width, &height);
/* extra x, y */
sx = (src % (width * dept... | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 135,590,882,627,853,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 66 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possib... |
glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
uint8_t *dst,const uint8_t *src,
int dstpitch,int srcpitch,
int bltwidth,int bltheight)
{
int x,y;
dstpitch -= bltwidth;
srcpitch -= bltwidth;
for (y = 0; y < ... | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 27,696,392,987,383,564,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possib... |
static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
if (s->ds->dpy_copy) {
cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->start_addr,
s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr - s->start_addr,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
} else {
(*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstadd... | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 331,046,290,845,234,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possib... |
static void cirrus_mem_writeb_mode4and5_8bpp(CirrusVGAState * s,
unsigned mode,
unsigned offset,
uint32_t mem_value)
{
int x;
unsigned val = mem_value;
uint8_t *dst;
dst = s->vram_ptr + offset;
for (x = 0; x < 8; x++) {
if (val & 0x80) {
*dst = s->cirrus_shadow_g... | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 50,418,188,797,463,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possib... |
static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s,
const uint8_t * src)
{
uint8_t *dst;
dst = s->vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr;
(*s->cirrus_rop) (s, dst, src,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, 0,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
cirr... | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 176,630,228,639,235,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possib... |
static void cirrus_invalidate_region(CirrusVGAState * s, int off_begin,
int off_pitch, int bytesperline,
int lines)
{
int y;
int off_cur;
int off_cur_end;
for (y = 0; y < lines; y++) {
off_cur = off_begin;
off_cur_end = off_cur + bytesperline;
off_cur &= TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
while (o... | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 335,738,960,224,286,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possib... |
static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
return cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s,
s->vram_ptr +
(s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & ~7));
} | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 58,384,268,221,957,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possib... |
static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
{
cirrus_fill_t rop_func;
rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
rop_func(s, s->vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_hei... | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 149,842,811,940,934,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possib... |
static void cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo_next(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
int copy_count;
uint8_t *end_ptr;
if (s->cirrus_srccounter > 0) {
if (s->cirrus_blt_mode & CIRRUS_BLTMODE_PATTERNCOPY) {
cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, s->cirrus_bltbuf);
the_end:
s->cirrus_srccount... | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 246,597,330,759,913,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possib... |
static void cirrus_mem_writeb_mode4and5_16bpp(CirrusVGAState * s,
unsigned mode,
unsigned offset,
uint32_t mem_value)
{
int x;
unsigned val = mem_value;
uint8_t *dst;
dst = s->vram_ptr + offset;
for (x = 0; x < 8; x++) {
if (val & 0x80) {
*dst = s->cirrus_shad... | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | b2eb849d4b1fdb6f35d5c46958c7f703cf64cfef | 241,662,835,431,977,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | CVE-2007-1320 - Cirrus LGD-54XX "bitblt" heap overflow
I have just noticed that patch for CVE-2007-1320 has never been applied
to the QEMU CVS. Please find it below.
| Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in the cirrus_invalidate_region
| function in the Cirrus VGA extension in QEMU 0.8.2, as used in Xen and
| possib... |
static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
if (s->ds->dpy_copy) {
cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->start_addr,
s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr - s->start_addr,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
} else {
if (BLTUNSAFE(s))
return 0;
(*s->cirrus_r... | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | 65d35a09979e63541afc5bfc595b9f1b1b4ae069 | 128,516,004,862,549,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | CVE-2008-4539: fix a heap overflow in Cirrus emulation
The code in hw/cirrus_vga.c has changed a lot between CVE-2007-1320 has
been announced and the patch has been applied. As a consequence it has
wrongly applied and QEMU is still vulnerable to this bug if using VNC.
(noticed by Jan Niehusmann)
Signed-off-by: Aurel... |
asmlinkage long compat_sys_mount(char __user * dev_name, char __user * dir_name,
char __user * type, unsigned long flags,
void __user * data)
{
unsigned long type_page;
unsigned long data_page;
unsigned long dev_page;
char *dir_page;
int retval;
retval = copy_mount_options (type, &type_page);
if (retv... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 822191a2fa1584a29c3224ab328507adcaeac1ab | 269,348,981,982,883,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 | [PATCH] skip data conversion in compat_sys_mount when data_page is NULL
OpenVZ Linux kernel team has found a problem with mounting in compat mode.
Simple command "mount -t smbfs ..." on Fedora Core 5 distro in 32-bit mode
leads to oops:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 RIP: comp... |
unsigned short atalk_checksum(struct ddpehdr *ddp, int len)
{
unsigned long sum = 0; /* Assume unsigned long is >16 bits */
unsigned char *data = (unsigned char *)ddp;
len -= 4; /* skip header 4 bytes */
data += 4;
/* This ought to be unwrapped neatly. I'll trust gcc for now */
while (len--) {
sum += *data;... | 1 | [] | history | 7ab442d7e0a76402c12553ee256f756097cae2d2 | 21,680,921,567,039,845,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | [DDP]: Convert to new protocol interface.
Convert ddp to the new protocol interface which means it has to
handle fragmented skb's. The only big change is in the checksum
routine which has to do more work (like skb_checksum).
Minor speedup is folding the carry to avoid a branch.
Tested against a 2.4 system and by ru... |
static int ltalk_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt)
{
/* Expand any short form frames */
if (skb->mac.raw[2] == 1) {
struct ddpehdr *ddp;
/* Find our address */
struct atalk_addr *ap = atalk_find_dev_addr(dev);
if (!ap || skb->len < sizeof(struct ddpshdr))
goto fre... | 1 | [] | history | 7ab442d7e0a76402c12553ee256f756097cae2d2 | 19,552,567,024,474,732,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 | [DDP]: Convert to new protocol interface.
Convert ddp to the new protocol interface which means it has to
handle fragmented skb's. The only big change is in the checksum
routine which has to do more work (like skb_checksum).
Minor speedup is folding the carry to avoid a branch.
Tested against a 2.4 system and by ru... |
static int atalk_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt)
{
struct ddpehdr *ddp = ddp_hdr(skb);
struct sock *sock;
struct atalk_iface *atif;
struct sockaddr_at tosat;
int origlen;
struct ddpebits ddphv;
/* Size check */
if (skb->len < sizeof(*ddp))
goto fr... | 1 | [] | history | 7ab442d7e0a76402c12553ee256f756097cae2d2 | 72,319,509,895,917,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 84 | [DDP]: Convert to new protocol interface.
Convert ddp to the new protocol interface which means it has to
handle fragmented skb's. The only big change is in the checksum
routine which has to do more work (like skb_checksum).
Minor speedup is folding the carry to avoid a branch.
Tested against a 2.4 system and by ru... |
static int atalk_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct atalk_sock *at = at_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_at *usat = (struct sockaddr_at *)msg->msg_name;
int flags = msg->msg_flags;
int loopback = 0;
struct sockaddr_at local_satalk, gsat;
... | 1 | [] | history | 7ab442d7e0a76402c12553ee256f756097cae2d2 | 153,761,947,041,868,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 159 | [DDP]: Convert to new protocol interface.
Convert ddp to the new protocol interface which means it has to
handle fragmented skb's. The only big change is in the checksum
routine which has to do more work (like skb_checksum).
Minor speedup is folding the carry to avoid a branch.
Tested against a 2.4 system and by ru... |
static int fat_ioctl_filldir(void *__buf, const char *name, int name_len,
loff_t offset, u64 ino, unsigned int d_type)
{
struct fat_ioctl_filldir_callback *buf = __buf;
struct dirent __user *d1 = buf->dirent;
struct dirent __user *d2 = d1 + 1;
if (buf->result)
return -EINVAL;
buf->result++;
if (name !... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | c483bab099cb89e92b7cad94a52fcdaf37e56657 | 187,708,325,882,921,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 | fat: fix VFAT compat ioctls on 64-bit systems
If you compile and run the below test case in an msdos or vfat directory on
an x86-64 system with -m32 you'll get garbage in the kernel_dirent struct
followed by a SIGSEGV.
The patch fixes this.
Reported and initial fix by Bart Oldeman
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <s... |
static int fat_dir_ioctl(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct fat_ioctl_filldir_callback buf;
struct dirent __user *d1;
int ret, short_only, both;
switch (cmd) {
case VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_SHORT:
short_only = 1;
both = 0;
break;
case VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BO... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | c483bab099cb89e92b7cad94a52fcdaf37e56657 | 113,627,596,617,655,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 | fat: fix VFAT compat ioctls on 64-bit systems
If you compile and run the below test case in an msdos or vfat directory on
an x86-64 system with -m32 you'll get garbage in the kernel_dirent struct
followed by a SIGSEGV.
The patch fixes this.
Reported and initial fix by Bart Oldeman
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <s... |
static long fat_compat_dir_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct compat_dirent __user *p = compat_ptr(arg);
int ret;
mm_segment_t oldfs = get_fs();
struct dirent d[2];
switch (cmd) {
case VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH32:
cmd = VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH;
break;
case VFAT_IOCTL_READD... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | c483bab099cb89e92b7cad94a52fcdaf37e56657 | 291,589,362,780,422,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | fat: fix VFAT compat ioctls on 64-bit systems
If you compile and run the below test case in an msdos or vfat directory on
an x86-64 system with -m32 you'll get garbage in the kernel_dirent struct
followed by a SIGSEGV.
The patch fixes this.
Reported and initial fix by Bart Oldeman
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <s... |
static long fat_compat_put_dirent32(struct dirent *d,
struct compat_dirent __user *d32)
{
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d32, sizeof(struct compat_dirent)))
return -EFAULT;
__put_user(d->d_ino, &d32->d_ino);
__put_user(d->d_off, &d32->d_off);
__put_user(d->d_reclen... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | c483bab099cb89e92b7cad94a52fcdaf37e56657 | 106,659,780,049,225,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | fat: fix VFAT compat ioctls on 64-bit systems
If you compile and run the below test case in an msdos or vfat directory on
an x86-64 system with -m32 you'll get garbage in the kernel_dirent struct
followed by a SIGSEGV.
The patch fixes this.
Reported and initial fix by Bart Oldeman
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <s... |
static int vfat_ioctl32(unsigned fd, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct compat_dirent __user *p = compat_ptr(arg);
int ret;
mm_segment_t oldfs = get_fs();
struct dirent d[2];
switch(cmd)
{
case VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH32:
cmd = VFAT_IOCTL_READDIR_BOTH;
break;
... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 188f83dfe0eeecd1427d0d255cc97dbf7ef6b4b7 | 111,898,724,151,179,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | [PATCH] BLOCK: Move the msdos device ioctl compat stuff to the msdos driver [try #6]
Move the msdos device ioctl compat stuff from fs/compat_ioctl.c to the msdos
driver so that the msdos header file doesn't need to be included.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel... |
put_dirent32 (struct dirent *d, struct compat_dirent __user *d32)
{
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, d32, sizeof(struct compat_dirent)))
return -EFAULT;
__put_user(d->d_ino, &d32->d_ino);
__put_user(d->d_off, &d32->d_off);
__put_user(d->d_reclen, &d32->d_reclen);
if ... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 188f83dfe0eeecd1427d0d255cc97dbf7ef6b4b7 | 270,045,642,335,722,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | [PATCH] BLOCK: Move the msdos device ioctl compat stuff to the msdos driver [try #6]
Move the msdos device ioctl compat stuff from fs/compat_ioctl.c to the msdos
driver so that the msdos header file doesn't need to be included.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel... |
unsigned long convert_rip_to_linear(struct task_struct *child, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr, seg;
addr = regs->rip;
seg = regs->cs & 0xffff;
/*
* We'll assume that the code segments in the GDT
* are all zero-based. That is largely true: the
* TLS segments are used for data, and the PNPBIOS
*... | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux-2.6 | 29eb51101c02df517ca64ec472d7501127ad1da8 | 1,508,545,436,095,858,700,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | Handle bogus %cs selector in single-step instruction decoding
The code for LDT segment selectors was not robust in the face of a bogus
selector set in %cs via ptrace before the single-step was done.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static unsigned long convert_eip_to_linear(struct task_struct *child, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr, seg;
addr = regs->eip;
seg = regs->xcs & 0xffff;
if (regs->eflags & VM_MASK) {
addr = (addr & 0xffff) + (seg << 4);
return addr;
}
/*
* We'll assume that the code segments in the GDT
* are a... | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux-2.6 | 29eb51101c02df517ca64ec472d7501127ad1da8 | 106,350,190,623,619,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | Handle bogus %cs selector in single-step instruction decoding
The code for LDT segment selectors was not robust in the face of a bogus
selector set in %cs via ptrace before the single-step was done.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
pfm_smpl_buffer_alloc(struct task_struct *task, pfm_context_t *ctx, unsigned long rsize, void **user_vaddr)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = task->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL;
unsigned long size;
void *smpl_buf;
/*
* the fixed header + requested size and align to page boundary
*/
size = PAGE_ALIGN(rsize);... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 41d5e5d73ecef4ef56b7b4cde962929a712689b4 | 87,803,820,803,317,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 114 | [IA64] permon use-after-free fix
Perfmon associates vmalloc()ed memory with a file descriptor, and installs
a vma mapping that memory. Unfortunately, the vm_file field is not filled
in, so processes with mappings to that memory do not prevent the file from
being closed and the memory freed. This results in use-after... |
pfm_context_create(pfm_context_t *ctx, void *arg, int count, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
pfarg_context_t *req = (pfarg_context_t *)arg;
struct file *filp;
int ctx_flags;
int ret;
/* let's check the arguments first */
ret = pfarg_is_sane(current, req);
if (ret < 0) return ret;
ctx_flags = req->ctx_flags;
ret = -... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 41d5e5d73ecef4ef56b7b4cde962929a712689b4 | 13,520,750,174,224,364,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 104 | [IA64] permon use-after-free fix
Perfmon associates vmalloc()ed memory with a file descriptor, and installs
a vma mapping that memory. Unfortunately, the vm_file field is not filled
in, so processes with mappings to that memory do not prevent the file from
being closed and the memory freed. This results in use-after... |
pfm_setup_buffer_fmt(struct task_struct *task, pfm_context_t *ctx, unsigned int ctx_flags,
unsigned int cpu, pfarg_context_t *arg)
{
pfm_buffer_fmt_t *fmt = NULL;
unsigned long size = 0UL;
void *uaddr = NULL;
void *fmt_arg = NULL;
int ret = 0;
#define PFM_CTXARG_BUF_ARG(a) (pfm_buffer_fmt_t *)(a+1)
/* inv... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 41d5e5d73ecef4ef56b7b4cde962929a712689b4 | 46,202,394,531,124,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 52 | [IA64] permon use-after-free fix
Perfmon associates vmalloc()ed memory with a file descriptor, and installs
a vma mapping that memory. Unfortunately, the vm_file field is not filled
in, so processes with mappings to that memory do not prevent the file from
being closed and the memory freed. This results in use-after... |
static int __init snd_mem_init(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
snd_mem_proc = create_proc_entry(SND_MEM_PROC_FILE, 0644, NULL);
if (snd_mem_proc) {
snd_mem_proc->read_proc = snd_mem_proc_read;
#ifdef CONFIG_PCI
snd_mem_proc->write_proc = snd_mem_proc_write;
#endif
}
#endif
return 0;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | ccec6e2c4a74adf76ed4e2478091a311b1806212 | 6,222,875,397,067,194,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Convert snd-page-alloc proc file to use seq_file
Use seq_file for the proc file read/write of snd-page-alloc module.
This automatically fixes bugs in the old proc code.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int snd_mem_proc_read(char *page, char **start, off_t off,
int count, int *eof, void *data)
{
int len = 0;
long pages = snd_allocated_pages >> (PAGE_SHIFT-12);
struct snd_mem_list *mem;
int devno;
static char *types[] = { "UNKNOWN", "CONT", "DEV", "DEV-SG", "SBUS" };
mutex_lock(&list_mutex);
len ... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | ccec6e2c4a74adf76ed4e2478091a311b1806212 | 177,539,223,428,479,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | Convert snd-page-alloc proc file to use seq_file
Use seq_file for the proc file read/write of snd-page-alloc module.
This automatically fixes bugs in the old proc code.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int snd_mem_proc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
unsigned long count, void *data)
{
char buf[128];
char *token, *p;
if (count > ARRAY_SIZE(buf) - 1)
count = ARRAY_SIZE(buf) - 1;
if (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, count))
return -EFAULT;
buf[ARRAY_SIZE(buf) - 1] = '\0';
p = b... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | ccec6e2c4a74adf76ed4e2478091a311b1806212 | 309,883,721,051,093,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 86 | Convert snd-page-alloc proc file to use seq_file
Use seq_file for the proc file read/write of snd-page-alloc module.
This automatically fixes bugs in the old proc code.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int putreg(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned long regno, unsigned long value)
{
unsigned long tmp;
/* Some code in the 64bit emulation may not be 64bit clean.
Don't take any chances. */
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_IA32))
value &= 0xffffffff;
switch (regno) {
case offsetof(struct user_re... | 1 | [
"CWE-264"
] | linux-2.6 | 176df2457ef6207156ca1a40991c54ca01fef567 | 118,245,962,164,453,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 60 | x86_64: Zero extend all registers after ptrace in 32bit entry path.
Strictly it's only needed for eax.
It actually does a little more than strictly needed -- the other registers
are already zero extended.
Also remove the now unnecessary and non functional compat task check
in ptrace.
This is CVE-2007-4573
Found by... |
static int pwc_video_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct video_device *vdev = file->private_data;
struct pwc_device *pdev;
int i;
PWC_DEBUG_OPEN(">> video_close called(vdev = 0x%p).\n", vdev);
pdev = (struct pwc_device *)vdev->priv;
if (pdev->vopen == 0)
PWC_DEBUG_MODULE("video_close() call... | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | 85237f202d46d55c1bffe0c5b1aa3ddc0f1dce4d | 124,682,724,723,247,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | USB: fix DoS in pwc USB video driver
the pwc driver has a disconnect method that waits for user space to
close the device. This opens up an opportunity for a DoS attack,
blocking the USB subsystem and making khubd's task busy wait in
kernel space. This patch shifts freeing resources to close if an opened
device is dis... |
static void usb_pwc_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct pwc_device *pdev;
int hint;
lock_kernel();
pdev = usb_get_intfdata (intf);
usb_set_intfdata (intf, NULL);
if (pdev == NULL) {
PWC_ERROR("pwc_disconnect() Called without private pointer.\n");
goto disconnect_out;
}
if (pdev->udev == NULL) {... | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | 85237f202d46d55c1bffe0c5b1aa3ddc0f1dce4d | 73,412,740,084,702,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 | USB: fix DoS in pwc USB video driver
the pwc driver has a disconnect method that waits for user space to
close the device. This opens up an opportunity for a DoS attack,
blocking the USB subsystem and making khubd's task busy wait in
kernel space. This patch shifts freeing resources to close if an opened
device is dis... |
static int return_EIO(void)
{
return -EIO;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | be6aab0e9fa6d3c6d75aa1e38ac972d8b4ee82b8 | 96,018,639,668,712,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | [PATCH] fix memory corruption from misinterpreted bad_inode_ops return values
CVE-2006-5753 is for a case where an inode can be marked bad, switching
the ops to bad_inode_ops, which are all connected as:
static int return_EIO(void)
{
return -EIO;
}
#define EIO_ERROR ((void *) (return_EIO))
static struct ino... |
void make_bad_inode(struct inode * inode)
{
remove_inode_hash(inode);
inode->i_mode = S_IFREG;
inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime =
current_fs_time(inode->i_sb);
inode->i_op = &bad_inode_ops;
inode->i_fop = &bad_file_ops;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | be6aab0e9fa6d3c6d75aa1e38ac972d8b4ee82b8 | 324,712,412,023,376,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | [PATCH] fix memory corruption from misinterpreted bad_inode_ops return values
CVE-2006-5753 is for a case where an inode can be marked bad, switching
the ops to bad_inode_ops, which are all connected as:
static int return_EIO(void)
{
return -EIO;
}
#define EIO_ERROR ((void *) (return_EIO))
static struct ino... |
int is_bad_inode(struct inode * inode)
{
return (inode->i_op == &bad_inode_ops);
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | be6aab0e9fa6d3c6d75aa1e38ac972d8b4ee82b8 | 274,069,347,086,903,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | [PATCH] fix memory corruption from misinterpreted bad_inode_ops return values
CVE-2006-5753 is for a case where an inode can be marked bad, switching
the ops to bad_inode_ops, which are all connected as:
static int return_EIO(void)
{
return -EIO;
}
#define EIO_ERROR ((void *) (return_EIO))
static struct ino... |
void hash_preload(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
unsigned long access, unsigned long trap)
{
unsigned long vsid;
void *pgdir;
pte_t *ptep;
cpumask_t mask;
unsigned long flags;
int local = 0;
/* We don't want huge pages prefaulted for now
*/
if (unlikely(in_hugepage_area(mm->context, ea)))
retu... | 1 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | 721151d004dcf01a71b12bb6b893f9160284cf6e | 283,712,393,711,387,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 | [POWERPC] Allow drivers to map individual 4k pages to userspace
Some drivers have resources that they want to be able to map into
userspace that are 4k in size. On a kernel configured with 64k pages
we currently end up mapping the 4k we want plus another 60k of
physical address space, which could contain anything. T... |
int hash_page(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long trap)
{
void *pgdir;
unsigned long vsid;
struct mm_struct *mm;
pte_t *ptep;
cpumask_t tmp;
int rc, user_region = 0, local = 0;
int psize;
DBG_LOW("hash_page(ea=%016lx, access=%lx, trap=%lx\n",
ea, access, trap);
if ((ea & ~REGION_MASK) >= ... | 1 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | 721151d004dcf01a71b12bb6b893f9160284cf6e | 9,811,447,350,898,023,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 138 | [POWERPC] Allow drivers to map individual 4k pages to userspace
Some drivers have resources that they want to be able to map into
userspace that are 4k in size. On a kernel configured with 64k pages
we currently end up mapping the 4k we want plus another 60k of
physical address space, which could contain anything. T... |
int ieee80211_rx(struct ieee80211_device *ieee, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ieee80211_rx_stats *rx_stats)
{
struct net_device *dev = ieee->dev;
struct ieee80211_hdr_4addr *hdr;
size_t hdrlen;
u16 fc, type, stype, sc;
struct net_device_stats *stats;
unsigned int frag;
u8 *payload;
u16 ethertype;
#ifdef NOT_YE... | 1 | [
"CWE-189"
] | linux-2.6 | 04045f98e0457aba7d4e6736f37eed189c48a5f7 | 308,579,844,544,821,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 502 | [IEEE80211]: avoid integer underflow for runt rx frames
Reported by Chris Evans <scarybeasts@gmail.com>:
> The summary is that an evil 80211 frame can crash out a victim's
> machine. It only applies to drivers using the 80211 wireless code, and
> only then to certain drivers (and even then depends on a card's
> firmw... |
static int do_dccp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct dccp_sock *dp;
int val, len;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (len < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
dp = dccp_sk(sk);
switch (optname) {
case DCCP_SOCKOPT_PACKET_SIZE:... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 39ebc0276bada8bb70e067cb6d0eb71839c0fb08 | 329,364,480,182,313,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | [DCCP] getsockopt: Fix DCCP_SOCKOPT_[SEND,RECV]_CSCOV
We were only checking if there was enough space to put the int, but
left len as specified by the (malicious) user, sigh, fix it by setting
len to sizeof(val) and transfering just one int worth of data, the one
asked for.
Also check for negative len values.
Signed... |
static int jpc_qcx_getcompparms(jpc_qcxcp_t *compparms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in, uint_fast16_t len)
{
uint_fast8_t tmp;
int n;
int i;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
n = 0;
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp)) {
return -1;
}
++n;
compparms->qntsty = tmp & 0x1f;... | 1 | [] | jasper | 4031ca321d8cb5798c316ab39c7a5dc88a61fdd7 | 254,403,990,052,538,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 | Incorporated changes from patch
jasper-1.900.3-libjasper-stepsizes-overflow.patch |
isdn_net_setcfg(isdn_net_ioctl_cfg * cfg)
{
isdn_net_dev *p = isdn_net_findif(cfg->name);
ulong features;
int i;
int drvidx;
int chidx;
char drvid[25];
if (p) {
isdn_net_local *lp = p->local;
/* See if any registered driver supports the features we want */
features = ((1 << cfg->l2_proto) << ISDN_FEATURE... | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | 0f13864e5b24d9cbe18d125d41bfa4b726a82e40 | 80,796,293,720,356,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 215 | isdn: avoid copying overly-long strings
Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9416
Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
isdn_net_addphone(isdn_net_ioctl_phone * phone)
{
isdn_net_dev *p = isdn_net_findif(phone->name);
isdn_net_phone *n;
if (p) {
if (!(n = kmalloc(sizeof(isdn_net_phone), GFP_KERNEL)))
return -ENOMEM;
strcpy(n->num, phone->phone);
n->next = p->local->phone[phone->outgoing & 1];
p->local->phone[phone->outgoi... | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | 0f13864e5b24d9cbe18d125d41bfa4b726a82e40 | 242,762,251,649,869,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | isdn: avoid copying overly-long strings
Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9416
Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
isdn_net_find_icall(int di, int ch, int idx, setup_parm *setup)
{
char *eaz;
int si1;
int si2;
int ematch;
int wret;
int swapped;
int sidx = 0;
u_long flags;
isdn_net_dev *p;
isdn_net_phone *n;
char nr[32];
char *my_eaz;
/* Search name in netdev-chain */
if (!setup->phone[0]) {
nr[0] = '0';
nr[1] = '... | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | 0f13864e5b24d9cbe18d125d41bfa4b726a82e40 | 322,344,461,636,009,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 326 | isdn: avoid copying overly-long strings
Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9416
Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static int esp6_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
struct crypto_aead *aead = esp->aead;
struct aead_request *req;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int elen = skb->len - sizeof(*esph) - crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
int nfrags;
int ret = 0;
void *tmp... | 1 | [
"CWE-16"
] | linux-2.6 | 920fc941a9617f95ccb283037fe6f8a38d95bb69 | 104,942,264,381,159,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 | [ESP]: Ensure IV is in linear part of the skb to avoid BUG() due to OOB access
ESP does not account for the IV size when calling pskb_may_pull() to
ensure everything it accesses directly is within the linear part of a
potential fragment. This results in a BUG() being triggered when the
both the IPv4 and IPv6 ESP stack... |
static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
struct crypto_aead *aead = esp->aead;
struct aead_request *req;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int elen = skb->len - sizeof(*esph) - crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
int nfrags;
void *tmp;
u8 *iv;
str... | 1 | [
"CWE-16"
] | linux-2.6 | 920fc941a9617f95ccb283037fe6f8a38d95bb69 | 261,859,902,457,785,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 60 | [ESP]: Ensure IV is in linear part of the skb to avoid BUG() due to OOB access
ESP does not account for the IV size when calling pskb_may_pull() to
ensure everything it accesses directly is within the linear part of a
potential fragment. This results in a BUG() being triggered when the
both the IPv4 and IPv6 ESP stack... |
isdn_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, uint cmd, ulong arg)
{
uint minor = iminor(inode);
isdn_ctrl c;
int drvidx;
int chidx;
int ret;
int i;
char __user *p;
char *s;
union iocpar {
char name[10];
char bname[22];
isdn_ioctl_struct iocts;
isdn_net_ioctl_phone phone;
isdn_net_ioctl_cfg cfg;... | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | eafe1aa37e6ec2d56f14732b5240c4dd09f0613a | 328,221,509,131,099,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 446 | I4L: fix isdn_ioctl memory overrun vulnerability
Fix possible memory overrun issue in the isdn ioctl code.
Found by ADLAB <adlab@venustech.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Cc: ADLAB <adlab@venustech.com.cn>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off... |
shmem_alloc_page(gfp_t gfp,struct shmem_inode_info *info, unsigned long idx)
{
return alloc_page(gfp | __GFP_ZERO);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | e84e2e132c9c66d8498e7710d4ea532d1feaaac5 | 40,898,721,436,560,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | tmpfs: restore missing clear_highpage
tmpfs was misconverted to __GFP_ZERO in 2.6.11. There's an unusual case in
which shmem_getpage receives the page from its caller instead of allocating.
We must cover this case by clear_highpage before SetPageUptodate, as before.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Sig... |
static int shmem_getpage(struct inode *inode, unsigned long idx,
struct page **pagep, enum sgp_type sgp, int *type)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo;
struct page *filepage = *pagep;
struct page *swappage;
swp_entry_... | 1 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | e84e2e132c9c66d8498e7710d4ea532d1feaaac5 | 337,224,798,820,921,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 221 | tmpfs: restore missing clear_highpage
tmpfs was misconverted to __GFP_ZERO in 2.6.11. There's an unusual case in
which shmem_getpage receives the page from its caller instead of allocating.
We must cover this case by clear_highpage before SetPageUptodate, as before.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Sig... |
shmem_alloc_page(gfp_t gfp, struct shmem_inode_info *info,
unsigned long idx)
{
struct vm_area_struct pvma;
struct page *page;
memset(&pvma, 0, sizeof(struct vm_area_struct));
pvma.vm_policy = mpol_shared_policy_lookup(&info->policy, idx);
pvma.vm_pgoff = idx;
pvma.vm_end = PAGE_SIZE;
page = alloc_page_vma(g... | 1 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | e84e2e132c9c66d8498e7710d4ea532d1feaaac5 | 209,078,005,530,362,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | tmpfs: restore missing clear_highpage
tmpfs was misconverted to __GFP_ZERO in 2.6.11. There's an unusual case in
which shmem_getpage receives the page from its caller instead of allocating.
We must cover this case by clear_highpage before SetPageUptodate, as before.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Sig... |
ProcShmCreatePixmap(client)
register ClientPtr client;
{
PixmapPtr pMap;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
DepthPtr pDepth;
register int i, rc;
ShmDescPtr shmdesc;
REQUEST(xShmCreatePixmapReq);
unsigned int width, height, depth;
unsigned long size;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xShmCreatePixmapReq);
... | 1 | [
"CWE-189"
] | xserver | be6c17fcf9efebc0bbcc3d9a25f8c5a2450c2161 | 129,275,241,199,461,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 80 | CVE-2007-6429: Always test for size+offset wrapping. |
ProcPanoramiXShmCreatePixmap(
register ClientPtr client)
{
ScreenPtr pScreen = NULL;
PixmapPtr pMap = NULL;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
DepthPtr pDepth;
int i, j, result, rc;
ShmDescPtr shmdesc;
REQUEST(xShmCreatePixmapReq);
unsigned int width, height, depth;
unsigned long size;
Panor... | 1 | [
"CWE-189"
] | xserver | be6c17fcf9efebc0bbcc3d9a25f8c5a2450c2161 | 17,219,291,516,037,378,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 104 | CVE-2007-6429: Always test for size+offset wrapping. |
static int copy_from_user_mmap_sem(void *dst, const void __user *src, size_t n)
{
int partial;
pagefault_disable();
partial = __copy_from_user_inatomic(dst, src, n);
pagefault_enable();
/*
* Didn't copy everything, drop the mmap_sem and do a faulting copy
*/
if (unlikely(partial)) {
up_read(¤t->mm->... | 1 | [
"CWE-94"
] | linux-2.6 | 8811930dc74a503415b35c4a79d14fb0b408a361 | 235,093,879,813,159,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | splice: missing user pointer access verification
vmsplice_to_user() must always check the user pointer and length
with access_ok() before copying. Likewise, for the slow path of
copy_from_user_mmap_sem() we need to check that we may read from
the user region.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Cc: Wojc... |
static long vmsplice_to_user(struct file *file, const struct iovec __user *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
struct splice_desc sd;
ssize_t size;
int error;
long ret;
pipe = pipe_info(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
if (!pipe)
return -EBADF;
if (pipe->ino... | 1 | [
"CWE-94"
] | linux-2.6 | 8811930dc74a503415b35c4a79d14fb0b408a361 | 93,812,929,696,679,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 72 | splice: missing user pointer access verification
vmsplice_to_user() must always check the user pointer and length
with access_ok() before copying. Likewise, for the slow path of
copy_from_user_mmap_sem() we need to check that we may read from
the user region.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Cc: Wojc... |
static int get_iovec_page_array(const struct iovec __user *iov,
unsigned int nr_vecs, struct page **pages,
struct partial_page *partial, int aligned)
{
int buffers = 0, error = 0;
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
while (nr_vecs) {
unsigned long off, npages;
struct iovec entry;
void __user *base;
... | 1 | [
"CWE-94"
] | linux-2.6 | 712a30e63c8066ed84385b12edbfb804f49cbc44 | 235,267,654,020,111,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 98 | splice: fix user pointer access in get_iovec_page_array()
Commit 8811930dc74a503415b35c4a79d14fb0b408a361 ("splice: missing user
pointer access verification") added the proper access_ok() calls to
copy_from_user_mmap_sem() which ensures we can copy the struct iovecs
from userspace to the kernel.
But we also must chec... |
asmlinkage long sys_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit __user *rlim)
{
struct rlimit new_rlim, *old_rlim;
unsigned long it_prof_secs;
int retval;
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
return -EFAULT;
if (new_rlim.rlim_cur > new_rlim.rlim... | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux-2.6 | 9926e4c74300c4b31dee007298c6475d33369df0 | 53,303,886,230,877,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 63 | CPU time limit patch / setrlimit(RLIMIT_CPU, 0) cheat fix
As discovered here today, the change in Kernel 2.6.17 intended to inhibit
users from setting RLIMIT_CPU to 0 (as that is equivalent to unlimited) by
"cheating" and setting it to 1 in such a case, does not make a difference,
as the check is done in the wrong pla... |
static int setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info,
sigset_t *set, struct pt_regs * regs)
{
void __user *restorer;
struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
int err = 0;
int usig;
frame = get_sigframe(ka, regs, sizeof(*frame));
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame)))
goto gi... | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | e40cd10ccff3d9fbffd57b93780bee4b7b9bff51 | 25,210,609,055,917,767,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 92 | x86: clear DF before calling signal handler
The Linux kernel currently does not clear the direction flag before
calling a signal handler, whereas the x86/x86-64 ABI requires that.
Linux had this behavior/bug forever, but this becomes a real problem
with gcc version 4.3, which assumes that the direction flag is
correc... |
int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info,
compat_sigset_t *set, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
struct exec_domain *ed = current_thread_info()->exec_domain;
void __user *restorer;
int err = 0;
/* __copy_to_user optimizes that into a single 8 byte store ... | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | e40cd10ccff3d9fbffd57b93780bee4b7b9bff51 | 336,026,717,347,518,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 99 | x86: clear DF before calling signal handler
The Linux kernel currently does not clear the direction flag before
calling a signal handler, whereas the x86/x86-64 ABI requires that.
Linux had this behavior/bug forever, but this becomes a real problem
with gcc version 4.3, which assumes that the direction flag is
correc... |
static int setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka, siginfo_t *info,
sigset_t *set, struct pt_regs * regs)
{
struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
struct _fpstate __user *fp = NULL;
int err = 0;
struct task_struct *me = current;
if (used_math()) {
fp = get_stack(ka, regs, sizeof(struct _fpstate));
... | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | e40cd10ccff3d9fbffd57b93780bee4b7b9bff51 | 323,536,889,097,069,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 97 | x86: clear DF before calling signal handler
The Linux kernel currently does not clear the direction flag before
calling a signal handler, whereas the x86/x86-64 ABI requires that.
Linux had this behavior/bug forever, but this becomes a real problem
with gcc version 4.3, which assumes that the direction flag is
correc... |
static int setup_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka,
sigset_t *set, struct pt_regs * regs)
{
void __user *restorer;
struct sigframe __user *frame;
int err = 0;
int usig;
frame = get_sigframe(ka, regs, sizeof(*frame));
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame)))
goto give_sigsegv;
usig =... | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | e40cd10ccff3d9fbffd57b93780bee4b7b9bff51 | 240,195,482,991,768,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 91 | x86: clear DF before calling signal handler
The Linux kernel currently does not clear the direction flag before
calling a signal handler, whereas the x86/x86-64 ABI requires that.
Linux had this behavior/bug forever, but this becomes a real problem
with gcc version 4.3, which assumes that the direction flag is
correc... |
int ia32_setup_frame(int sig, struct k_sigaction *ka,
compat_sigset_t *set, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct sigframe __user *frame;
void __user *restorer;
int err = 0;
/* copy_to_user optimizes that into a single 8 byte store */
static const struct {
u16 poplmovl;
u32 val;
u16 int80;
u16 pad;
} __a... | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | e40cd10ccff3d9fbffd57b93780bee4b7b9bff51 | 242,893,451,020,799,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 92 | x86: clear DF before calling signal handler
The Linux kernel currently does not clear the direction flag before
calling a signal handler, whereas the x86/x86-64 ABI requires that.
Linux had this behavior/bug forever, but this becomes a real problem
with gcc version 4.3, which assumes that the direction flag is
correc... |
static unsigned long __peek_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr)
{
struct user *dummy = NULL;
addr_t offset, tmp;
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs) {
/*
* psw and gprs are stored on the stack
*/
tmp = *(addr_t *)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->psw + addr);
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.... | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | 3d6e48f43340343d97839eadb1ab7b6a3ea98797 | 228,545,314,486,915,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 59 | [S390] CVE-2008-1514: prevent ptrace padding area read/write in 31-bit mode
When running a 31-bit ptrace, on either an s390 or s390x kernel,
reads and writes into a padding area in struct user_regs_struct32
will result in a kernel panic.
This is also known as CVE-2008-1514.
Test case available here:
http://sources.r... |
static int __poke_user_compat(struct task_struct *child,
addr_t addr, addr_t data)
{
struct user32 *dummy32 = NULL;
per_struct32 *dummy_per32 = NULL;
__u32 tmp = (__u32) data;
addr_t offset;
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs) {
/*
* psw, gprs, acrs and orig_gpr2 are stored on the stack
*/
... | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | 3d6e48f43340343d97839eadb1ab7b6a3ea98797 | 336,645,180,341,076,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 80 | [S390] CVE-2008-1514: prevent ptrace padding area read/write in 31-bit mode
When running a 31-bit ptrace, on either an s390 or s390x kernel,
reads and writes into a padding area in struct user_regs_struct32
will result in a kernel panic.
This is also known as CVE-2008-1514.
Test case available here:
http://sources.r... |
static int __poke_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr, addr_t data)
{
struct user *dummy = NULL;
addr_t offset;
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs) {
/*
* psw and gprs are stored on the stack
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.psw.mask &&
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
data != PSW_MASK_MERGE(psw_... | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | 3d6e48f43340343d97839eadb1ab7b6a3ea98797 | 315,587,780,023,225,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 71 | [S390] CVE-2008-1514: prevent ptrace padding area read/write in 31-bit mode
When running a 31-bit ptrace, on either an s390 or s390x kernel,
reads and writes into a padding area in struct user_regs_struct32
will result in a kernel panic.
This is also known as CVE-2008-1514.
Test case available here:
http://sources.r... |
static u32 __peek_user_compat(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr)
{
struct user32 *dummy32 = NULL;
per_struct32 *dummy_per32 = NULL;
addr_t offset;
__u32 tmp;
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs) {
/*
* psw and gprs are stored on the stack
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.psw.mask) {
/*... | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | 3d6e48f43340343d97839eadb1ab7b6a3ea98797 | 35,699,932,838,905,237,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 | [S390] CVE-2008-1514: prevent ptrace padding area read/write in 31-bit mode
When running a 31-bit ptrace, on either an s390 or s390x kernel,
reads and writes into a padding area in struct user_regs_struct32
will result in a kernel panic.
This is also known as CVE-2008-1514.
Test case available here:
http://sources.r... |
int fcntl_dirnotify(int fd, struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
{
struct dnotify_struct *dn;
struct dnotify_struct *odn;
struct dnotify_struct **prev;
struct inode *inode;
fl_owner_t id = current->files;
int error = 0;
if ((arg & ~DN_MULTISHOT) == 0) {
dnotify_flush(filp, id);
return 0;
}
if (!dir_notif... | 1 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux-2.6 | 214b7049a7929f03bbd2786aaef04b8b79db34e2 | 125,123,024,928,884,710,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 | Fix dnotify/close race
We have a race between fcntl() and close() that can lead to
dnotify_struct inserted into inode's list *after* the last descriptor
had been gone from current->files.
Since that's the only point where dnotify_struct gets evicted, we are
screwed - it will stick around indefinitely. Even after str... |
hrtimer_forward(struct hrtimer *timer, ktime_t now, ktime_t interval)
{
unsigned long orun = 1;
ktime_t delta;
delta = ktime_sub(now, timer->expires);
if (delta.tv64 < 0)
return 0;
if (interval.tv64 < timer->base->resolution.tv64)
interval.tv64 = timer->base->resolution.tv64;
if (unlikely(delta.tv64 >= in... | 1 | [
"CWE-189"
] | linux-2.6 | 13788ccc41ceea5893f9c747c59bc0b28f2416c2 | 179,936,784,627,311,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | [PATCH] hrtimer: prevent overrun DoS in hrtimer_forward()
hrtimer_forward() does not check for the possible overflow of
timer->expires. This can happen on 64 bit machines with large interval
values and results currently in an endless loop in the softirq because the
expiry value becomes negative and therefor the timer... |
CairoFont *CairoFont::create(GfxFont *gfxFont, XRef *xref, FT_Library lib, GBool useCIDs) {
Ref embRef;
Object refObj, strObj;
GooString *tmpFileName, *fileName,*tmpFileName2;
DisplayFontParam *dfp;
FILE *tmpFile;
int c, i, n;
GfxFontType fontType;
char **enc;
char *name;
FoFiTrueType *ff;
FoFiTyp... | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | poppler | 1a531dcfee1c6fc79a414c38cbe7327fbf9a59d8 | 294,666,036,737,394,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 195 | Fix a crash with invalid embedded fonts |
m4_mkstemp (struct obstack *obs, int argc, token_data **argv)
{
if (bad_argc (argv[0], argc, 2, 2))
return;
mkstemp_helper (obs, ARG (1));
} | 1 | [] | m4 | 5345bb49077bfda9fabd048e563f9e7077fe335d | 318,397,935,641,703,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Minor security fix: Quote output of mkstemp.
* src/builtin.c (mkstemp_helper): Produce quoted output.
* doc/m4.texinfo (Mkstemp): Update the documentation and tests.
* NEWS: Document this change.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <ebb9@byu.net>
(cherry picked from commit bd9900d65eb9cd5add0f107e94b513fa267495ba) |
mkstemp_helper (struct obstack *obs, const char *name)
{
int fd;
int len;
int i;
/* Guarantee that there are six trailing 'X' characters, even if the
user forgot to supply them. */
len = strlen (name);
obstack_grow (obs, name, len);
for (i = 0; len > 0 && i < 6; i++)
if (name[--len] != 'X')
... | 1 | [] | m4 | 5345bb49077bfda9fabd048e563f9e7077fe335d | 323,725,070,097,395,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | Minor security fix: Quote output of mkstemp.
* src/builtin.c (mkstemp_helper): Produce quoted output.
* doc/m4.texinfo (Mkstemp): Update the documentation and tests.
* NEWS: Document this change.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <ebb9@byu.net>
(cherry picked from commit bd9900d65eb9cd5add0f107e94b513fa267495ba) |
m4_maketemp (struct obstack *obs, int argc, token_data **argv)
{
if (bad_argc (argv[0], argc, 2, 2))
return;
if (no_gnu_extensions)
{
/* POSIX states "any trailing 'X' characters [are] replaced with
the current process ID as a string", without referencing the
file system. Horribly insecure, but w... | 1 | [] | m4 | 5345bb49077bfda9fabd048e563f9e7077fe335d | 14,712,089,961,255,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 41 | Minor security fix: Quote output of mkstemp.
* src/builtin.c (mkstemp_helper): Produce quoted output.
* doc/m4.texinfo (Mkstemp): Update the documentation and tests.
* NEWS: Document this change.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <ebb9@byu.net>
(cherry picked from commit bd9900d65eb9cd5add0f107e94b513fa267495ba) |
produce_frozen_state (const char *name)
{
FILE *file;
int h;
symbol *sym;
const builtin *bp;
if (file = fopen (name, O_BINARY ? "wb" : "w"), !file)
{
M4ERROR ((warning_status, errno, name));
return;
}
/* Write a recognizable header. */
xfprintf (file, "# This is a frozen state file... | 1 | [] | m4 | 035998112737e52cb229e342913ef404e5a51040 | 263,127,698,236,721,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 106 | Security fix: avoid arbitrary code execution with 'm4 -F'.
* src/freeze.c (produce_frozen_state): Never pass raw file name as
printf format.
* NEWS: Document this fix.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <ebb9@byu.net>
(cherry picked from commit 031a71a80442ed2ad3c2ee14d5811c786a12c51b) |
static unsigned char asn1_oid_decode(struct asn1_ctx *ctx,
unsigned char *eoc,
unsigned long **oid,
unsigned int *len)
{
unsigned long subid;
unsigned int size;
unsigned long *optr;
size = eoc - ctx->pointer + 1;
*oid = kmalloc(size * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (*oid == NU... | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | ddb2c43594f22843e9f3153da151deaba1a834c5 | 258,736,852,088,290,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 | asn1: additional sanity checking during BER decoding
- Don't trust a length which is greater than the working buffer.
An invalid length could cause overflow when calculating buffer size
for decoding oid.
- An oid length of zero is invalid and allows for an off-by-one error when
decoding oid because the first su... |
asn1_oid_decode(struct asn1_ctx *ctx,
unsigned char *eoc, unsigned long **oid, unsigned int *len)
{
unsigned long subid;
unsigned int size;
unsigned long *optr;
size = eoc - ctx->pointer + 1;
*oid = kmalloc(size * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (*oid == NULL)
return 0;
optr = *oid;
if (!asn1_subi... | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | ddb2c43594f22843e9f3153da151deaba1a834c5 | 24,934,009,460,877,333,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 | asn1: additional sanity checking during BER decoding
- Don't trust a length which is greater than the working buffer.
An invalid length could cause overflow when calculating buffer size
for decoding oid.
- An oid length of zero is invalid and allows for an off-by-one error when
decoding oid because the first su... |
asn1_header_decode(struct asn1_ctx *ctx,
unsigned char **eoc,
unsigned int *cls, unsigned int *con, unsigned int *tag)
{
unsigned int def = 0;
unsigned int len = 0;
if (!asn1_id_decode(ctx, cls, con, tag))
return 0;
if (!asn1_length_decode(ctx, &def, &len))
return 0;
if (def)
*eoc = ctx->pointer... | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | ddb2c43594f22843e9f3153da151deaba1a834c5 | 100,827,339,625,052,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | asn1: additional sanity checking during BER decoding
- Don't trust a length which is greater than the working buffer.
An invalid length could cause overflow when calculating buffer size
for decoding oid.
- An oid length of zero is invalid and allows for an off-by-one error when
decoding oid because the first su... |
static unsigned char asn1_header_decode(struct asn1_ctx *ctx,
unsigned char **eoc,
unsigned int *cls,
unsigned int *con,
unsigned int *tag)
{
unsigned int def, len;
if (!asn1_id_decode(ctx, cls, con, tag))
return 0;
def = len = 0;
if (!asn1_length_decode(ctx, &def, &len))
return 0;
if (d... | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | ddb2c43594f22843e9f3153da151deaba1a834c5 | 228,756,596,288,618,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | asn1: additional sanity checking during BER decoding
- Don't trust a length which is greater than the working buffer.
An invalid length could cause overflow when calculating buffer size
for decoding oid.
- An oid length of zero is invalid and allows for an off-by-one error when
decoding oid because the first su... |
static unsigned char asn1_length_decode(struct asn1_ctx *ctx,
unsigned int *def,
unsigned int *len)
{
unsigned char ch, cnt;
if (!asn1_octet_decode(ctx, &ch))
return 0;
if (ch == 0x80)
*def = 0;
else {
*def = 1;
if (ch < 0x80)
*len = ch;
else {
cnt = ch & 0x7F;
*len = 0;
while (c... | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | ddb2c43594f22843e9f3153da151deaba1a834c5 | 214,953,782,388,236,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | asn1: additional sanity checking during BER decoding
- Don't trust a length which is greater than the working buffer.
An invalid length could cause overflow when calculating buffer size
for decoding oid.
- An oid length of zero is invalid and allows for an off-by-one error when
decoding oid because the first su... |
asn1_length_decode(struct asn1_ctx *ctx, unsigned int *def, unsigned int *len)
{
unsigned char ch, cnt;
if (!asn1_octet_decode(ctx, &ch))
return 0;
if (ch == 0x80)
*def = 0;
else {
*def = 1;
if (ch < 0x80)
*len = ch;
else {
cnt = (unsigned char) (ch & 0x7F);
*len = 0;
while (cnt > 0) {
... | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux-2.6 | ddb2c43594f22843e9f3153da151deaba1a834c5 | 188,088,692,906,320,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | asn1: additional sanity checking during BER decoding
- Don't trust a length which is greater than the working buffer.
An invalid length could cause overflow when calculating buffer size
for decoding oid.
- An oid length of zero is invalid and allows for an off-by-one error when
decoding oid because the first su... |
static int ipip6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iphdr *iph;
struct ip_tunnel *tunnel;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
goto out;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
read_lock(&ipip6_lock);
if ((tunnel = ipip6_tunnel_lookup(dev_net(skb->dev),
iph->saddr, iph->daddr)) != NULL) {
secpath_reset(skb);
... | 1 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | 36ca34cc3b8335eb1fe8bd9a1d0a2592980c3f02 | 33,362,704,464,284,364,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 | sit: Add missing kfree_skb() on pskb_may_pull() failure.
Noticed by Paul Marks <paul@pmarks.net>.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
static u64 sched_slice(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se)
{
u64 slice = __sched_period(cfs_rq->nr_running);
slice *= se->load.weight;
do_div(slice, cfs_rq->load.weight);
return slice;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 6a6029b8cefe0ca7e82f27f3904dbedba3de4e06 | 58,865,871,396,891,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | sched: simplify sched_slice()
Use the existing calc_delta_mine() calculation for sched_slice(). This
saves a divide and simplifies the code because we share it with the
other /cfs_rq->load users.
It also improves code size:
text data bss dec hex filename
42659 2740 144 45543 b1e... |
static u64 sched_vslice_add(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se)
{
return __sched_vslice(cfs_rq->load.weight + se->load.weight,
cfs_rq->nr_running + 1);
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | ac884dec6d4a7df252150af875cffddf8f1d9c15 | 22,178,641,074,713,846,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | sched: fair-group scheduling vs latency
Currently FAIR_GROUP sched grows the scheduler latency outside of
sysctl_sched_latency, invert this so it stays within.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> |
static u64 __sched_vslice(unsigned long rq_weight, unsigned long nr_running)
{
u64 vslice = __sched_period(nr_running);
vslice *= NICE_0_LOAD;
do_div(vslice, rq_weight);
return vslice;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | ac884dec6d4a7df252150af875cffddf8f1d9c15 | 26,078,873,616,473,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | sched: fair-group scheduling vs latency
Currently FAIR_GROUP sched grows the scheduler latency outside of
sysctl_sched_latency, invert this so it stays within.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> |
static u64 sched_slice(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se)
{
return calc_delta_mine(__sched_period(cfs_rq->nr_running),
se->load.weight, &cfs_rq->load);
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | ac884dec6d4a7df252150af875cffddf8f1d9c15 | 242,984,434,542,507,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | sched: fair-group scheduling vs latency
Currently FAIR_GROUP sched grows the scheduler latency outside of
sysctl_sched_latency, invert this so it stays within.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> |
static u64 sched_vslice_add(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se)
{
unsigned long nr_running = cfs_rq->nr_running;
unsigned long weight;
u64 vslice;
if (!se->on_rq)
nr_running++;
vslice = __sched_period(nr_running);
for_each_sched_entity(se) {
cfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
weight = cfs_rq->load.weig... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 8f1bc385cfbab474db6c27b5af1e439614f3025c | 199,943,656,571,357,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | sched: fair: weight calculations
In order to level the hierarchy, we need to calculate load based on the
root view. That is, each task's load is in the same unit.
A
/ \
B 1
/ \
2 3
To compute 1's load we do:
weight(1)
--------------
rq_weight(A)
To ... |
static unsigned long wakeup_gran(struct sched_entity *se)
{
unsigned long gran = sysctl_sched_wakeup_granularity;
/*
* More easily preempt - nice tasks, while not making
* it harder for + nice tasks.
*/
if (unlikely(se->load.weight > NICE_0_LOAD))
gran = calc_delta_fair(gran, &se->load);
return gran;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 8f1bc385cfbab474db6c27b5af1e439614f3025c | 314,868,220,618,263,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | sched: fair: weight calculations
In order to level the hierarchy, we need to calculate load based on the
root view. That is, each task's load is in the same unit.
A
/ \
B 1
/ \
2 3
To compute 1's load we do:
weight(1)
--------------
rq_weight(A)
To ... |
static u64 sched_slice(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se)
{
u64 slice = __sched_period(cfs_rq->nr_running);
for_each_sched_entity(se) {
cfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
slice *= se->load.weight;
do_div(slice, cfs_rq->load.weight);
}
return slice;
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 8f1bc385cfbab474db6c27b5af1e439614f3025c | 20,493,139,195,104,024,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | sched: fair: weight calculations
In order to level the hierarchy, we need to calculate load based on the
root view. That is, each task's load is in the same unit.
A
/ \
B 1
/ \
2 3
To compute 1's load we do:
weight(1)
--------------
rq_weight(A)
To ... |
calc_delta_fair(unsigned long delta_exec, struct load_weight *lw)
{
return calc_delta_mine(delta_exec, NICE_0_LOAD, lw);
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 8f1bc385cfbab474db6c27b5af1e439614f3025c | 275,354,062,946,871,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | sched: fair: weight calculations
In order to level the hierarchy, we need to calculate load based on the
root view. That is, each task's load is in the same unit.
A
/ \
B 1
/ \
2 3
To compute 1's load we do:
weight(1)
--------------
rq_weight(A)
To ... |
place_entity(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se, int initial)
{
u64 vruntime;
if (first_fair(cfs_rq)) {
vruntime = min_vruntime(cfs_rq->min_vruntime,
__pick_next_entity(cfs_rq)->vruntime);
} else
vruntime = cfs_rq->min_vruntime;
/*
* The 'current' period is already promised to the current ta... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 8f1bc385cfbab474db6c27b5af1e439614f3025c | 308,682,937,641,422,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | sched: fair: weight calculations
In order to level the hierarchy, we need to calculate load based on the
root view. That is, each task's load is in the same unit.
A
/ \
B 1
/ \
2 3
To compute 1's load we do:
weight(1)
--------------
rq_weight(A)
To ... |
__update_curr(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *curr,
unsigned long delta_exec)
{
unsigned long delta_exec_weighted;
schedstat_set(curr->exec_max, max((u64)delta_exec, curr->exec_max));
curr->sum_exec_runtime += delta_exec;
schedstat_add(cfs_rq, exec_clock, delta_exec);
delta_exec_weighted = del... | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | 8f1bc385cfbab474db6c27b5af1e439614f3025c | 65,520,173,795,750,995,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | sched: fair: weight calculations
In order to level the hierarchy, we need to calculate load based on the
root view. That is, each task's load is in the same unit.
A
/ \
B 1
/ \
2 3
To compute 1's load we do:
weight(1)
--------------
rq_weight(A)
To ... |
_gnutls_server_name_recv_params (gnutls_session_t session,
const opaque * data, size_t _data_size)
{
int i;
const unsigned char *p;
uint16_t len, type;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
int server_names = 0;
if (session->security_parameters.entity == GNUTLS_SERVER)
{
DECR_LENGTH_RET (data_size... | 1 | [
"CWE-189"
] | gnutls | bc8102405fda11ea00ca3b42acc4f4bce9d6e97b | 168,266,384,151,590,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 81 | Fix GNUTLS-SA-2008-1 security vulnerabilities.
See http://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/security.html for updates. |
_gnutls_ciphertext2compressed (gnutls_session_t session,
opaque * compress_data,
int compress_size,
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext, uint8_t type)
{
uint8_t MAC[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
uint16_t c_length;
uint8_t pad;
int length;
digest_hd_st td;
uint16_t blocksize;
int ret, i, pad_failed =... | 1 | [
"CWE-189"
] | gnutls | bc8102405fda11ea00ca3b42acc4f4bce9d6e97b | 137,431,019,550,729,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 167 | Fix GNUTLS-SA-2008-1 security vulnerabilities.
See http://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/security.html for updates. |
_gnutls_recv_handshake_header (gnutls_session_t session,
gnutls_handshake_description_t type,
gnutls_handshake_description_t * recv_type)
{
int ret;
uint32_t length32 = 0;
uint8_t *dataptr = NULL; /* for realloc */
size_t handshake_header_size = HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SIZE;
/* if we have data i... | 1 | [
"CWE-189"
] | gnutls | bc8102405fda11ea00ca3b42acc4f4bce9d6e97b | 205,220,500,280,194,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 124 | Fix GNUTLS-SA-2008-1 security vulnerabilities.
See http://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/security.html for updates. |
_gnutls_ciphertext2compressed (gnutls_session_t session,
opaque * compress_data,
int compress_size,
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext, uint8_t type)
{
uint8_t MAC[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
uint16_t c_length;
uint8_t pad;
int length;
digest_hd_st td;
uint16_t blocksize;
int ret, i, pad_failed =... | 1 | [
"CWE-189"
] | gnutls | d223040e498bd50a4b9e0aa493e78587ae1ed653 | 133,466,176,970,244,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 175 | Fix broken debug check for GNUTLS-SA-2008-1. |
int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long start, int len, int write, int force,
struct page **pages, struct vm_area_struct **vmas)
{
int i;
unsigned int vm_flags;
if (len <= 0)
return 0;
/*
* Require read or write permissions.
* If 'force' is set, we only require th... | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux-2.6 | 89f5b7da2a6bad2e84670422ab8192382a5aeb9f | 192,373,302,205,049,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 136 | Reinstate ZERO_PAGE optimization in 'get_user_pages()' and fix XIP
KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki and Oleg Nesterov point out that since the commit
557ed1fa2620dc119adb86b34c614e152a629a80 ("remove ZERO_PAGE") removed
the ZERO_PAGE from the VM mappings, any users of get_user_pages() will
generally now populate the VM with real emp... |
static int do_pages_stat(struct mm_struct *mm, struct page_to_node *pm)
{
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
for ( ; pm->node != MAX_NUMNODES; pm++) {
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct page *page;
int err;
err = -EFAULT;
vma = find_vma(mm, pm->addr);
if (!vma)
goto set_status;
page = follow_page(vma, pm->... | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux-2.6 | 89f5b7da2a6bad2e84670422ab8192382a5aeb9f | 190,691,605,824,195,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | Reinstate ZERO_PAGE optimization in 'get_user_pages()' and fix XIP
KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki and Oleg Nesterov point out that since the commit
557ed1fa2620dc119adb86b34c614e152a629a80 ("remove ZERO_PAGE") removed
the ZERO_PAGE from the VM mappings, any users of get_user_pages() will
generally now populate the VM with real emp... |
static int do_move_pages(struct mm_struct *mm, struct page_to_node *pm,
int migrate_all)
{
int err;
struct page_to_node *pp;
LIST_HEAD(pagelist);
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* Build a list of pages to migrate
*/
migrate_prep();
for (pp = pm; pp->node != MAX_NUMNODES; pp++) {
struct vm_area_struct *v... | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux-2.6 | 89f5b7da2a6bad2e84670422ab8192382a5aeb9f | 18,220,699,088,629,602,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 71 | Reinstate ZERO_PAGE optimization in 'get_user_pages()' and fix XIP
KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki and Oleg Nesterov point out that since the commit
557ed1fa2620dc119adb86b34c614e152a629a80 ("remove ZERO_PAGE") removed
the ZERO_PAGE from the VM mappings, any users of get_user_pages() will
generally now populate the VM with real emp... |
static void dump_one_vdso_page(struct page *pg, struct page *upg)
{
printk("kpg: %p (c:%d,f:%08lx)", __va(page_to_pfn(pg) << PAGE_SHIFT),
page_count(pg),
pg->flags);
if (upg/* && pg != upg*/) {
printk(" upg: %p (c:%d,f:%08lx)", __va(page_to_pfn(upg)
<< PAGE_SHIFT),
page_count(u... | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux-2.6 | 89f5b7da2a6bad2e84670422ab8192382a5aeb9f | 198,053,340,576,165,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Reinstate ZERO_PAGE optimization in 'get_user_pages()' and fix XIP
KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki and Oleg Nesterov point out that since the commit
557ed1fa2620dc119adb86b34c614e152a629a80 ("remove ZERO_PAGE") removed
the ZERO_PAGE from the VM mappings, any users of get_user_pages() will
generally now populate the VM with real emp... |
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