text
stringlengths 100
9.93M
| category
stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used malware to set LoadAppInit_DLLs in the Registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows in order to establish persistence.[4]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake abuses the accessibility service to prevent removing administrator permissions, accessibility permissions, and to set itself as the default SMS handler.[8]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such as servers or endpoints.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0695
ATT&CK Technique Name:Donut
Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via Python.[15]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0204
ATT&CK Technique Name:Briba
Briba uses rundll32 within Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder entries to execute malicious DLLs.[24]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0549
ATT&CK Technique Name:SilkBean
SilkBean can retrieve files from external storage and can collect browser data.[9]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0545
ATT&CK Technique Name:TERRACOTTA
TERRACOTTA can download additional modules at runtime via JavaScript eval statements.[26]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Use least privilege and protect administrative access to the Domain Controller and Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server. Do not create service accounts with administrative privileges.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has XOR-encrypted collected system information prior to sending to a C2. AppleJeus has also used the open source ADVObfuscation library for its components.[15]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0339
ATT&CK Technique Name:Micropsia
Micropsia creates a new hidden directory to store all components' outputs in a dedicated sub-folder for each.[32]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can send collected victim data to its C2 server.[143]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used "ipconfig" to identify the network configuration of a victim machine.[250]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0598
ATT&CK Technique Name:P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell has the ability to create reverse shells with Perl scripts.[39]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0437
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kivars
Kivars has the ability to list drives on the infected host.[170]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware has used VBS scripts for execution.[85]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit access to the root account and prevent users from modifying PAM components through proper privilege separation (ex SELinux, grsecurity, AppArmor, etc.) and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group tools have registered Run keys in the registry to give malicious VBS files persistence.[98][99][100]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser abuses the Windows DLL load order by using a legitimate Symantec anti-virus binary, VPDN_LU.exe, to load a malicious DLL that mimics a legitimate Symantec DLL, navlu.dll.[24]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:T1027.009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Embedded Payloads
Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content. In some cases, embedded payloads may also enable adversaries to Subvert Trust Controls by not impacting execution controls such as digital signatures and notarization tickets.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be wary of granting applications dangerous or privacy-intrusive permissions, such as keyboard registration or accessibility service access.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has collected the username from the victim's machine.[113]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0205
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naid
Naid collects a unique identifier (UID) from a compromised host.[245]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
If Shamoon cannot access shares using current privileges, it attempts access using hard coded, domain-specific credentials gathered earlier in the intrusion.[19][20]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:T1036
ATT&CK Technique Name:Masquerading
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
|
secon
|
titleblackhat:asia-22 Remote Memory-Deduplication Attacks
Cloud providers use memory deduplication to reduce the memory utilization of their systems. Memory deduplication merges memory pages with identical content and maps them under a copy-on-write semantic. Previous work showed that memory deduplication can be exploited in a local scenario to perform ASLR breaks, Rowhammer attacks and fingerprint applications.Countermeasures have been proposed to disable memory deduplication across security domains. Memory deduplication was re-enabled within a security domain on Windows as well as on Linux server systems.In this talk, we will present remote memory-deduplication attacks. We will show that memory-deduplication attacks are not only limited to local code execution by mounting powerful attacks over the internet. We will demonstrate that web applications that use in-memory caching like Memcached can be remotely exploited without any user interaction. An attacker can use this remote timing side channel to leak sensitive information. Using amplification, our side channel leaks up to 34.41 B/h across the internet (14 hops). We will show how fingerprinting can be performed on operating systems and shared libraries. Our remote KASLR break can break KASLR on a remote server in a few minutes via both HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2. By using a leakage primitive to change the alignment of attacker-controlled data, we enable byte-by-byte data leakage of MySQL database records.We will evaluate state-of-the-art mitigations and argue that some are insufficient to mitigate remote memory-deduplication attacks.Finally, we will outline challenges for future research on remote memory-deduplication attacks.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used fast flux to mask botnets by distributing payloads across multiple IPs.[8]
|
secon
|
titleblackhat:asia-21 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 1
At the end of day one of this year's virtual conference, join Black Hat Review Board members Mika Devonshire, Ty Miller, Pamela O'Shea and Fyodor Yarochkin for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote will feature a candid discussion on the key takeaways from day one and how these trends will impact future InfoSec strategies.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used netstat -oan to obtain information about the victim network connections.[37]
|
secon
|
titleblackhat:asia-20 Walking Your Dog in Multiple Forests - Breaking AD Trust Boundaries through Kerberos Vulnerabilities
In larger enterprise environments multiple Active Directory forests are often in use to separate different environments or parts of the business. To enable integration between the different environments, forests trusts are set up. The goal of this trust is to allow users from the other forest to authenticate while maintaining the security boundary that an Active Directory forest offers. In 2018, this boundary was broken through default delegation settings and Windows features with unintended consequences. In 2019 the security boundary was once again established through a set of changes in Active Directory. This research introduces a vulnerability in Kerberos and forest trusts that allows attackers to break the trust once again. The talk will provide technical details on how Kerberos works over forest trusts and how the security boundary is normally enforced. Then the talk will discuss a flaw in how AD forest trusts operate and how this can be combined with a vulnerability in the Windows implementation of Kerberos to take over systems in a different forest (from a compromised trusted forest). The talk will be accompanied by a proof-of-concept and a demonstration of abusing the vulnerability.
|
secon
|
title:blackhat:asia-19 Reverse Engineering Custom ASICs by Exploiting Potential Supply-Chain Leaks
Many industry specific solutions in the field of SCADA consist of unknown custom chips without public documentation. These Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) are often simple System on Chip (SoC) solutions with standardized modules and few custom functionalities like additional CAN-Bus interfaces etc.During this talk we will present hardware reverse engineering of custom chips and how to find vulnerabilities by using the Siemens S7-1200 (v1 and v4) series as exemplary targets.After opening the PLC, it was clear that all parts, except the main SoC, were off-the-shelf components. This was the case for both versions of the Siemens PLCs. Leaked boards for both chips, MB87M2230 and SIEMENS-A5E30235063 were found and bought on a Chinese online shop.With these boards, more than 60 percent of the pins from both chips were reverse-engineered. With the help of an oscilloscope, the protocols and the different voltage levels were identified. Simple resistance measurements were also done to find all connections between the components and to determine the pin-resistance.Additionally, the interfaces for the flash memories, the RAM and the JTAG-ports were also identified on both chips.It was found that the SoC on the older S7-1200v1 series is a Fujitsu ARM-BE chip with the chip-ID 0x1406C009. After decapping the chip, a label became visible, setting the date when it was designed back to 2007.The SoC on the newer S7-1200v4 is a ARM-Cortex-R4 r1p3 in big endian mode. For the newer PLC series (S7-1200v4) a working debug setup with a JTAG-adapter was created. This enabled us to dump/write memory, set breakpoints, modify the program counter and use all other features to do live debugging on the Siemens PLC. Since all S7-1200 devices share the same SoC, it is possible to enable debugging on all PLCs of this series.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkVishnya
DarkVishnya performed port scanning to obtain the list of active services.[25]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Review changes to the cron schedule. cron execution can be reviewed within the /var/log directory. To validate the location of the cron log file, check the syslog config at /etc/rsyslog.conf or /etc/syslog.conf
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY contains a number of modules that can bypass UAC, including through Window's Device Manager, Manage Optional Features, and an image hijack on the .msc file extension.[59]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used an unnamed post-exploitation tool to steal cookies from the Chrome browser.[12]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has used an encrypted configuration file for its loader.[38]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:T1562.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impair Command History Logging
Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used mshta.exe to execute malicious payloads.[33][34]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0220
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaos
Chaos provides a reverse shell is triggered upon receipt of a packet with a special string, sent to any port.[7]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sys10
Sys10 collects the account name of the logged-in user and sends it to the C2.[178]
|
secon
|
titleblackhat:asia-23 Abusing Azure Active Directory: From MFA Bypass to Listing Global Administrators
The majority of Fortune 500 organizations are using Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) as Identity and Access Management (IAM) solution. The high adoption rate makes Azure AD a lucrative target for threat actors, including state-sponsored actors like APT29/Nobelium. Azure AD is leveraging Microsoft's not-so-well-documented Evolved Security Service (eSTS). eSTS hides multiple security token services so that users see only Azure AD. While studying how eSTS works, we were able to identify flaws that allow users to log in to resource tenants using just username and password, regardless of their home tenant Conditional Access (CA) policies or MFA settings.Azure AD Premium P2 includes an Identity Governance service which allows internal and external users to request entitlement to Access Packages. Access Packages are a collection of permissions to provide access to specified organization's services, such as SharePoint sites, Teams, and applications. We observed that the APIs used by the Identity Governance service allowed access to privileged information for anonymous users.This talk will provide technical details of our findings and how to exploit them. This includes viewing the target user's tenant membership information after bypassing home tenant MFA and listing creators (administrators) of all Access Packages of any organization.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict read/write access to systemd .timer unit files to only select privileged users who have a legitimate need to manage system services.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has created a Registry Run key named Dropbox Update Setup to establish persistence for a malicious Python binary.[286]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
The TrickBot downloader has used an icon to appear as a Microsoft Word document.[43]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can encrypt and encode its configuration file.[247]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used mshta.exe to run malicious scripts on the system.[18][12][19][20]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has created a scheduled task to execute additional malicious software, as well as maintain persistence.[113][114][115]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0169
ATT&CK Technique Name:RawPOS
RawPOS encodes credit card data it collected from the victim with XOR.[32][33][34]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT tests if it can reach its C2 server by first attempting a direct connection, and if it fails, obtaining proxy settings and sending the connection through a proxy, and finally injecting code into a running browser if the proxy method fails.[23]
|
secon
|
title:blackhat:us-21 A New Class of DNS Vulnerabilities Affecting Many DNS-as-Service Platforms
We present a novel class of DNS vulnerabilities that affect multiple DNS-as-a-Service (DNSaaS) providers. The vulnerabilities have been proven and successfully exploited on three major cloud providers including AWS Route 53 and may affect many others. Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities may allow exfiltration of sensitive information from service customers' corporate networks. The leaked information contains internal and external IP addresses, computer names, and sometimes NTLM / Kerberos tickets. The root cause of the problem is the non-standard implementation of DNS resolvers that, when coupled with specific unintended edge cases on the DNS service provider's side, cause major information leakage from internal corporate networks. In this research, we detail a specific vulnerability that is common across many major DNS service providers that leads to information leakage in connected corporate networks. Specifically, we show how Microsoft Windows endpoints reveal sensitive customer information when performing DNS update queries. The security risk is high. If an organization's DNS Updates are leaked to a malicious 3rd party, they reveal sensitive network information that can be used to map the organization and make operational goals. Internal IP addresses reveal the network segments of the organization; computer names hint at the potential content they may hold; external IP addresses expose geographical locations and the organization's sites throughout the world; and internal IPv6 addresses are sometimes accessible from the outside and allow an entry point into the organization. The impact is huge. Out of six major DNSaaS providers we examined, three were vulnerable to nameserver registration. Any cloud provider, domain registrar, and website host who provides DNSaaS could be vulnerable. The number of organizations vulnerable to this weakness is shocking. Over a few hours of DNS sniffing, we received DNS Updated from 992,597 Windows endpoints from around 15,000 potentially vulnerable companies, including 15 Fortune 500 companies. In some organizations, there were more than 20,000 endpoints that actively leaked their information out of the organization. Exploiting the weakness is very easy. A single attacker with a single cloud account can get information on thousands of organizations in one step. There are several possible mitigations to this problem. We will review the solutions for both DNSaaS providers and managed networks.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0199
ATT&CK Technique Name:TURNEDUP
TURNEDUP is capable of injecting code into the APC queue of a created Rundll32 process as part of an "Early Bird injection."[2]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used mshta to execute DLLs.[13]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[59][60][61][62]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can attempt to run the program as admin, then show a fake error message and a legitimate UAC bypass prompt to the user in an attempt to socially engineer the user into escalating privileges.[54]
|
secon
|
title:blackhat:eu-22 How We Organize Large-Scale DDoS Exercises in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, following a large number of DDoS attacks experienced in January 2018, it was apparent that things needed to change. Specifically, we decided to implement the concept of cooperative DDoS mitigation at the national level. To that end, we set up the Dutch Anti-DDoS Coalition, a national voluntary consortium of seventeen organizations from various sectors. The coalition members include ISPs, banks, internet exchanges, not-for-profit DDoS scrubbing centers, government agencies, and the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration. While the backgrounds of the coalition members differ significantly, they share a common goal: to improve the resilience of Dutch online services by fighting DDoS attacks on a cooperative basis across organizations and sectors. The Coalition is unique because we utilize a combination of complementary collaborative capabilities:1. We have shared expertise and experience among coalition members.2. We are sharing metrics and characteristic properties of DDoS attacks.3. We are jointly carrying out DDoS exercises.4. We are providing the public with information about DDoS attacks.5. We are promoting security standards that help to protect against DDoS attacks.We're initially focusing on "critical" service providers; further phases will extend to include other organizations.The Dutch Anti-DDoS Coalition will be discussed during the presentation, briefly introducing the various working groups. One of the working groups is organizing large-scale DDoS exercises. The working group organizes large scale DDoS exercises in a RED/BLUE team setting twice a year, currently working towards a PURPLE team environment.We will discuss the technical as well as the organizational and legal aspects of organizing such an exercise.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has hidden payloads in Flash directories and fake installer files.[172]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has been observed using SQL injection to gain access to systems.[16][17]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has created a scheduled SYSTEM task that runs when a user logs in.[7]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy adds itself to the startup folder or adds itself to the Registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[209]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can decrypt and parse instructions sent from C2.[66]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter spoofed itself as AlphaZawgyl_font.exe, a specialized Unicode font.[147]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti Group
Winnti Group has downloaded an auxiliary program named ff.exe to infected machines.[481]
|
secon
|
title:blackhat:us-21 MFA-ing the Un-MFA-ble: Protecting Auth Systems' Core Secrets
Compromised credentials have been APT groups' favorite tool for accessing, propagating and maintaining access to their victims' networks. Consequently, aware defenders mitigate this risk, by adding additional factors (MFA), so no secret is a single point of failure (SPOF). However, the systems' most lucrative secrets, their "Golden Secrets", are still a SPOF and abused in practice by attackers.Golden secrets are at the heart of most current authentication systems. These secrets, such as KRBTGT for Kerberos or private key for SAML, are used to cryptographically secure the issuance of access tokens and protect their integrity. Consequently, they are also the attackers' most lucrative targets. When a golden secret is captured, it allows attackers to issue golden access tokens in an offline manner to take full control over the system.Recently, SUNBURST attackers were reported to use stolen private keys to create Golden SAML tokens to access victims' Office 365 environments and a stolen DUO 2FA "akey" secret to create a golden cookie to bypass 2FA access restriction to certain applications.In our talk, we will explain the two main issues historically preventing defenders from applying the highly effective MFA approach to Golden Secrets: backward compatibility and lack of orthogonal additional factors, and how they are solved by our solution, already battle-tested in the cryptocurrency domain. Specifically, we will show how some recent advancements in the Cryptography field of Threshold Signatures Schemes (TSS) can "split the atom" and break golden secrets into multiple less precious secrets ("lead secrets") in a fully backward compatible manner. The orthogonality of these secrets is assured with the solution architecture, unintuitively yet securely, requiring the deployment of some of these lead secrets on external service.We will share an actual open-source TSS implementation and demonstrate the practical applications of it.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0642
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADFLICK
BADFLICK has searched for files on the infected host.[35]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has exploited the Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2019-0604 and CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 in Exchange Server.[57]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has been observed turning off Windows Security Center and can hide the AV software window from the view of the infected user.[46][47]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can zip and encrypt data collected on a target system.[5]
|
secon
|
titleblackhat:asia-21 Stuxnet-in-a-Box: In-Field Emulation and Fuzzing of PLCs to Uncover the Next Zero-Day Threat in Industrial Control Systems
Recent years have been pivotal in the field of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) security, with a large number of high-profile attacks exposing the lack of a design-for-security initiative in ICS, as well as a substantial number of research works that try to proactively uncover underlying vulnerabilities. The main focus on both sides, though, has been the first and obvious choices when it comes to exploitation, namely the network level as the main gateway to an ICS and the control operation performed by it. As ICS evolve abstracting the control logic to a purely software level hosted on a generic OS, software level evaluation of multiple levels of an ICS is a straightforward choice. In this work, we will present a new tool for the cybersecurity assessment of ICS such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) for in-field security evaluation with no disruption to the actual process.More specifically, we will deploy system emulation to eliminate the need for experiments directly on the actual hardware device, massively improve scalability and compatibility for easy deployment on a multitude of platforms. On the emulated platform, we will apply fuzzing across software levels of the device, the system itself, the hosted PLC abstracting platform as well as the application performing the control logic. Through fuzzing we expose vulnerabilities existing on the system either by poor maintenance or sloppy programming. The PLC platform of choice is the Codesys runtime, an industry-leading solution existing in a quarter of the currently deployed PLC.Furthermore, we will combine the knowledge of the uncovered vulnerabilities with a custom reverse engineering tool to dynamically synthesize a new cyber threat that integrates operational manipulation, system exploitation and stealth to become a Stuxnet-level threat to an ICS.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\Windows\System32.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit the user accounts that have access to backups to only those required.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon obtains the target's IP address and local network segment.[207][208]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used malware like WhiskeyAlfa to overwrite the first 64MB of every drive with a mix of static and random buffers. A similar process is then used to wipe content in logical drives and, finally, attempt to wipe every byte of every sector on every drive. WhiskeyBravo can be used to overwrite the first 4.9MB of physical drives. WhiskeyDelta can overwrite the first 132MB or 1.5MB of each drive with random data from heap memory.[2]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates new services to establish persistence.[63][64][65]
|
secon
|
title:blackhat:eu-18 Video Killed the Text Star: OSINT Approach
In 1979 The Buggles launched the hit song "Video Killed the Radio Star." Nowadays The Buggles could write a new song titled "Video Killed the Text Star." Social networks are growing around video content. This means that if OSINT (Open Source INTelligence) wants to stay alive needs to start getting value from video content. Video analysis, and person recognition in particular, is a very interesting task to security managers, CISOs, and analysts with responsibilities in physical security. However, video and image processing is gaining prominence. Internet content grows exponentially and there is a trend of publishing content in a video format. It's time to focus on this kind of information and start to move OSINT techniques and technologies to be able to process this type of information. Human face recognition is one of the Machine Learning applications which has had more advances in recent years. This advances and the actual power of hardware make it possible to implement this kind of service at a very low cost.We can use Open Source components to implement a fast and scalable infrastructure that allows you to analyze hundreds of hours of video in a simple way. The work that will be shown in this presentation will allow people to be identified and compared with a series of images of people to determine if these people appear or not in the recorded video images.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has searched the entire target system for DOC, DOCX, PPT, PPTX, XLS, XLSX, and PDF files.[203]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa can collect information about a compromised computer, including: Hardware UUID, Mac serial number, macOS version, and disk sizes.[214]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher enumerates directories and scans for certain files.[124][125]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton communicates with Triconex controllers using a custom component framework written entirely in Python. The modules that implement the TriStation communication protocol and other supporting components are found in a separate file -- library.zip -- the main script that employs this functionality is compiled into a standalone py2exe Windows executable -- trilog.exe which includes a Python environment. [6]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq connects to a predefined domain on port 443 to exfil gathered information.[6]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:T1036.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Masquerade Task or Service
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description. Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
BACKSPACE attempts to avoid detection by checking a first stage command and control server to determine if it should connect to the second stage server, which performs "louder" interactions with the malware.[3]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
A Gamaredon Group file stealer can gather the victim's computer name and drive serial numbers to send to a C2 server.[142][143][144]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used a file injector DLL to spawn a benign process on the victim's system and inject the malicious payload into it via process hollowing.[23]
|
secon
|
title:blackhat:eu-22 Keynote - Cybersecurity: The Next Generation
The pursuit and practice of cybersecurity is now entering its second generation. With the massive adoption of connected technologies in every part of our lives, the ability to secure these technologies is not just big business, it also has huge relevance and impact. Yet it’s still treated as niche, often overlooked or misunderstood. We have failed to win mainstream public support or engagement, though the cost and other harms of security risks have reached a level that is driving widespread government notice and intervention. With all these factors at play, it is time for security to mature into its next phase. To do this, what are the lessons we can learn from the past 30 years, what can we determine about where security is headed, and can we play a bigger role in shaping our own destinies?
|
secon
|
titleblackhat:us-18 Automated Discovery of Deserialization Gadget Chains
Although vulnerabilities stemming from the deserialization of untrusted data have been understood for many years, unsafe deserialization continues to be a vulnerability class that isn't going away. Attention on Java deserialization vulnerabilities skyrocketed in 2015 when Frohoff and Lawrence published an RCE gadget chain in the Apache Commons library and as recently as last year's Black Hat, Muñoz and Miroshis presented a survey of dangerous JSON deserialization libraries. While much research and automated detection technology has so far focused on the discovery of vulnerable entry points (i.e. code that deserializes untrusted data), finding a "gadget chain" to actually make the vulnerability exploitable has thus far been a largely manual exercise. In this talk, I present a new technique for the automated discovery of deserialization gadget chains in Java, allowing defensive teams to quickly identify the significance of a deserialization vulnerability and allowing penetration testers to quickly develop working exploits. At the conclusion, I will also be releasing a FOSS toolkit which utilizes this methodology and has been used to successfully develop many deserialization exploits in both internal applications and open source projects.
|
secon
|
titleblackhat:us-18 Remotely Attacking System Firmware
In recent years, we have been witnessing a steady increase in security vulnerabilities in firmware. Nearly all of these issues require local (often privileged) or physical access to exploit. In this talk, we will present novel *remote* attacks on system firmware. In this talk, we will show different remote attack vectors into system firmware, including networking, updates over the Internet, and error reporting. We will also be demonstrating and remotely exploiting vulnerabilities in different UEFI firmware implementations which can lead to installing persistent implants remotely at scale. The proof-of-concept exploit is less than 800 bytes.How can we defend against such firmware attacks? We will analyze the remotely exploitable UEFI and BMC attack surface of modern systems, explain specific mitigations for the discussed vulnerabilities, and provide recommendations to detect such attacks and discover compromised systems.
|
secon
|
title:blackhat:eu-21 ChaosDB: How We Hacked Databases of Thousands of Azure Customers
In August 2021, the Wiz Research Team uncovered ChaosDB - a critical cross-tenant vulnerability in Azure Cosmos DB, Azure's flagship managed database solution which is used by countless organizations. This vulnerability is every company’s worst nightmare: even a flawless environment is affected. Easily exploitable, this bug allowed any Azure user to have full admin access to thousands of customers' databases, including Fortune 500 companies, without any procedural authorization.This is an unprecedented cloud vulnerability, considered to be one of the most severe issues ever disclosed in any major cloud platform. This vulnerability triggered many questions regarding the security of managed cloud services. Since this vulnerability allowed stealing long-lasting secrets of the target database, attackers may use these secrets at their convenience, and the only solution is to rotate their secrets and hope they have not been used before.In this talk, we will take the attacker's point of view and discuss how we exploited a chain of misconfigurations and vulnerabilities in Azure Cosmos DB. From identifying the attack surface through leveraging a complex chain of vulnerabilities that enabled this exploitation, we will uncover obscure mechanisms in Azure's internal infrastructure that we managed to leverage to gain the ability to arbitrarily query data from customers' Cosmos DB instances.Finally, we will dive deep into the vulnerability's root cause and describe the potential attack vectors and the best practices learned for building more secure cloud services.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clop
Clop can use cmd.exe to help execute commands on the system.[73]
|
secon
|
titleblackhat:us-21 Use & Abuse of Personal Information
Virtually any meaningful interaction occurring across the Internet requires the establishment of a user profile, which in turn requires entry of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) as a way for service providers to verify and support/track user activity. Such PII often includes a person's name, age, address, email, phone number, or demographic information, which is often associated with the IP address of the device used to access online services, all of which contribute to tailored responses from the vendor. Most users understand and accept that these distant parties will use the information to optimize their interactions; however, substantially unrelated uses and abuses of users' personal information are common.Our talk explores the levels and depths of how online entities, and their affiliates, use and abuse our personal information. Our conclusions are based on a 12-month study tracking email, phone, SMS text, and web scraping activity for 300 false identities established at ~200 distinct organizations to determine which companies behave consistent with a consumer's interests and which companies are to blame for our culture of robocalls and spam. All of this activity is based on one-time interactions with the online entity, resulting in 16584 emails, 948 voicemails, and 753 text messages.Beyond quantifying the amount of activity associated with these identities and building the graph of information sharing, we also analyze received content in the context of a quantitative rubric applied to published privacy policies, political and/or special interest leanings, and make an attempt to identify tangible evidence of foreign interest in the 2020 presidential election. We plan to make this dataset available for others to investigate as well.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Consider disabling or restricting NTLM.[24] Consider disabling WDigest authentication.[25]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has included location tracking capabilities in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL and Operation ROCK.[38]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has the ability to enumerate running processes on a compromised host.[266]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:T1003.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cached Domain Credentials
Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet executes malicious SQL commands in the WinCC database server to propagate to remote systems. The malicious SQL commands include xp_cmdshell, sp_dumpdbilog, and sp_addextendedproc. [11]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:M0916
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vulnerability Scanning
Implement continuous monitoring of vulnerability sources. Also, use automatic and manual code review tools. [6]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0279
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proton
Proton modifies the tty_tickets line in the sudoers file.[6]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS has used useless code blocks to counter analysis.[31]
|
secon
|
titleblackhat:us-22 Human or Not: Can You Really Detect the Fake Voices?
Voice is an essential medium for humans to transfer information and build trust, and the trustworthiness of voice is of great importance to humans. With the development of deep learning technologies, attackers have started to use AI techniques to synthesize and even clone human voices. To combat the misuse of such techniques, researchers have proposed a series of AI-synthesized speech detection approaches and achieved very promising detection results in laboratory environments. Can these approaches really be as effective in the real world as they claim to be? This study provides an in-depth analysis of these works, identifies a set of potential problems, and designs a novel voice clone attack framework, SiF-DeepVC, based on these problems. This study first proposes the idea "bypass fake voice detection using speaker-irrelative features" and proves that detecting AI-synthesized speeches is still highly challenging, and existing approaches are not applicable in the real world. In a word, the Red is still far ahead of the Blue.
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used a tool to enumerate proxy settings in the target environment.[256]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies. [4]
|
secon
|
ATT&CK ID:S1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:OutSteel
OutSteel has relied on a user to click a malicious link within a spearphishing email.[30]
|
secon
|
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.