text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
BACKSPACE is capable of deleting Registry keys, sub-keys, and values on a victim system.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Ensure that Driver Signature Enforcement is enabled to restrict unsigned drivers from being installed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain has delayed execution for five to six minutes during its persistence establishment process.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credential Access Protection
On Windows 10 and Server 2016, enable Windows Defender Credential Guard [5] to run lsass.exe in an isolated virtualized environment without any device drivers. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has registered itself as a system service in the Registry for automatic execution at system startup.[129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackTech
BlackTech has used e-mails with malicious links to lure victims into installing malware.[18] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Compromising LLMs: The Advent of AI Malware
We'll show that prompt injections are more than a novelty or nuisance- in fact, a whole new generation of malware and manipulation can now run entirely inside of large language models like ChatGPT. As companies race to integrate them with applications of ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can check for the existence of user email addresses using public Microsoft APIs.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0519
ATT&CK Technique Name:SYNful Knock
SYNful Knock is malware that is inserted into a network device by patching the operating system image.[6][7] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Open Sesame: Picking Locks with Cortana
Many new devices are trying to fit into our life seamlessly. As a result, there’s a quest for a “universal access methods” for all devices. Voice activation seems to be a natural candidate for the task and many implementations for it surfaced in recent years.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0577
ATT&CK Technique Name:FrozenCell
FrozenCell has collected phone metadata such as cell location, mobile country code (MCC), and mobile network code (MNC).[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady has the ability to collect information such as computer name, computer manufacturer, BIOS, operating system, and firmware, including through the use of systeminfo.exe.[359] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro can access the device's contact list.[37] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Critical Zero Days Remotely Compromise the Most Popular Real-Time OS
VxWorks is the most popular operating system you have never heard about. It is a real-time operating system, used by over 2 billion devices of all kinds - from airplanes to MRI machines, from firewalls to industrial control system... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors obtain legitimate credentials using a variety of methods and use them to further lateral movement on victim networks.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0535
ATT&CK Technique Name:Golden Cup
Golden Cup can obtain a list of installed applications.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can connect to and disable the Symantec server on the victim's network.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0187
ATT&CK Technique Name:Daserf
Daserf leverages Mimikatz and Windows Credential Editor to steal credentials.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky lists all installed software for the infected machine.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to identify the OS version, OS bit information and computer name.[145][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0922
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure proper process and file permissions are in place to inhibit adversaries from disabling or interfering with critical services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used the Invoke-Obfuscation framework to obfuscate their PowerShell.[11][12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Developers should use Android App Links[3] and iOS Universal Links[4] to provide a secure binding between URIs and applications, preventing malicious applications from intercepting redirections. Additionally, for OAuth use cases, PKCE[2] should be use... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 The Undeniable Truth: How Remote Attestation Circumvents Deniability Guarantees in Secure Messaging Protocols
In 2016, attackers broke into John Podesta's e-mail account and published his mailbox via WikiLeaks; many messages could be authenticated by their DKIM signatures. After this, secure messagi... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Design Pitfalls in Commercial Mini-Programs on Android and iOS
A new, commercial mobile-computing paradigm, dubbed app-in-app, is gaining high popularity in the past years. Under the paradigm, a mobile app, called host app or host, operates a set of sub-apps (a.k.a. mini-programs) as its in-app comp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Emissary injects its DLL file into a newly spawned Internet Explorer process.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT has a module for performing remote desktop access.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Babuk
Babuk has the ability to check running processes on a targeted system.[21][22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Leverage services provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations to filter traffic upstream from services.[2] Filter boundary traffic by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being tar... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used pass the hash for authentication to remote access software used in C2.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Search SYSVOL for any existing GGPs that may contain credentials and remove them.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0466
ATT&CK Technique Name:WindTail
WindTail has the ability to decrypt strings using hard-coded AES keys.[256] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has the ability to collect the username on the infected host.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used administrator credentials to gain access to restricted network segments.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack can add a service called WBService to establish persistence.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can acquire local and domain user account information.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad has sent data back to C2 every 8 hours.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Android 10 introduced changes to prevent malicious applications from fully suppressing their icon in the launcher.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay has been embedded in documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11882, and CVE-2017-8570.[71][72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation.[10][11] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Cutting Edge: Microsoft Browser Security — From People Who Owned It
Microsoft Edge, the new default browser for Windows 10, is heavily sandboxed. In fact, it is probably the only browser with its main process running inside a sandbox. Microsoft even goes to great length to design and implement plat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0186
ATT&CK Technique Name:DownPaper
DownPaper searches and reads the value of the Windows Update Registry Run key.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0941
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Encrypt any operational data with strong confidentiality requirements, including organizational trade-secrets, recipes, and other intellectual property (IP). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0682
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrailBlazer
TrailBlazer has the ability to use WMI for persistence.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge, sometimes using esentutl.[87][88][89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can collect the network interface MAC address on the infected host.[168][169] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0221
ATT&CK Technique Name:Umbreon
Umbreon hides from defenders by hooking libc function calls, hiding artifacts that would reveal its presence, such as the user account it creates to provide access and undermining strace, a tool often used to identify malware.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar can download additional plugins, files, and tools.[265] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot checked if the compromised system is configured to use proxies.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can identify the OS version of a targeted system.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion can record audio from phone calls and the device microphone.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can enumerate the system drives and associated system name.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or modifying firewall settings. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Query Registry
Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Check and remediate unneeded existing authentication certificates as well as common abusable misconfigurations of CA settings and permissions, such as AD CS certificate enrollment permissions and published overly permissive certificate templates (which define available settin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer can use supplied user credentials to execute processes and stop services.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can discover active IP addresses, along with the machine name, within a targeted network.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be wary of granting applications dangerous or privacy-intrusive permissions, such as access to notifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1491.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Internal Defacement
An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discrediting the integrity of the systems. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the repla... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth creates a startup item for persistence. [31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[17] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Leveraging Streaming-Based Outlier Detection and SliceLine to Stop Heavily Distributed Bot Attacks
In this presentation, we will discuss how to leverage streaming-based outlier detection and SliceLine to quickly and safely generate large volumes of rules/signatures that can be used to block malic... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Threat Modeling in 2018: Attacks, Impacts and Other Updates
Attacks always get better, and that means your threat modeling needs to evolve. This talk looks at what's new and important in threat modeling, organizes it into a simple conceptual framework, and makes it actionable. This includes new p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0301
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dendroid
Dendroid can detect if it is being ran on an emulator.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Filter for protocols and payloads associated with program download activity to prevent unauthorized device configurations. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32's macOS backdoor hides the clientID file via a chflags function.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used domain credentials, including domain admin, for lateral movement and privilege escalation.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0942
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed to prevent risk of discovery and potential exploitation. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control configured to block execution of Odbcconf.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker checked if UCOMIEnumConnections and IActiveScriptParseProcedure32 Registry keys were detected as part of its anti-analysis technique.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent has the ability to add bytes to change the file hash.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has obtained and used a variety of tools including Mimikatz, PsExec, Cobalt Strike, and SDelete.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0281
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dok
Dok installs two LaunchAgents to redirect all network traffic with a randomly generated name for each plist file maintaining the format com.random.name.plist.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0613
ATT&CK Technique Name:PS1
PS1 is distributed as a set of encrypted files and scripts.[258] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
Devices that allow remote management of firmware should require authentication before allowing any changes. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious attachments that lead victims to credential harvesting websites.[6][7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used HTTP for C2.[225] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
The DEADEYE.EMBED variant of DEADEYE has the ability to embed payloads inside of a compiled binary.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0122
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silent Librarian
Silent Librarian has used compromised credentials to obtain unauthorized access to online accounts.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0095
ATT&CK Technique Name:ftp
ftp may be abused by adversaries to transfer tools or files between systems within a compromised environment.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus has used HTTP GET and POST requests for C2 communications.[228][229] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Remove unnecessary tools and software from containers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has exploited unpatched vulnerabilities on internally accessible servers including JIRA, GitLab, and Confluence for privilege escalation.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig has the ability to gather the victim's computer name.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT is capable of manipulating and deleting registry keys, including those used for persistence.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1548.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elevated Execution with Prompt
Adversaries may leverage the AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials. The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, suc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:macOS.OSAMiner
macOS.OSAMiner has used ps ax | grep <name> | grep -v grep | ... and ps ax | grep -E... to conduct process discovery.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hikit
Hikit has the ability to create a remote shell and run given commands.[158] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0362
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linux Rabbit
Linux Rabbit attempts to gain access to the server via SSH.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaRicto
During CostaRicto, the threat actors obtained open source tools to use in their operations.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor execution begins from a scheduled task named Microsoft\Windows\Power Efficiency Diagnostics\AnalyzeAll and it creates a separate scheduled task called mstask to run the wiper only once at 23:55:00.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has used a portable FAT16 partition image placed in %TEMP% as a hidden file system.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can use WMI queries to obtain system information.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has disguised their scripts with docker-related file names.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer can establish persistence through the system screensaver by configuring it to execute the malware.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet can reprogram a PLC and change critical parameters in such a way that legitimate commands can be overridden or intercepted. In addition, Stuxnet can apply inappropriate command sequences or parameters to cause damage to property. [6] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 USMA: Share Kernel Code With Me
The gadget is a mainstream attack method in the Linux kernel. It requires attackers to find available gadgets based on the vulnerability. This is a time-consuming task, and sometimes it is impossible to find a suitable gadget. In addition, the CFI mitigation (such a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT has a module that steals passwords saved in victim web browsers.[59][60][61] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.