text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
An EMM/MDM can use the Android DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedAccessibilityServices method to set an explicit list of applications that are allowed to use Android's accessibility features. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0029
ATT&CK Technique Name:PsExec
PsExec, a tool that has been used by adversaries, writes programs to the ADMIN$ network share to execute commands on remote systems.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has compromised websites to redirect traffic and to host exploit kits.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1585.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Social Media Accounts
Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can inject into known, vulnerable binaries on targeted hosts.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT has been distributed as a malicious attachment within an email.[239][66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0659
ATT&CK Technique Name:Diavol
Diavol has encrypted files using an RSA key though the CryptEncrypt API and has appended filenames with ".lock64". [42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used a legitimately signed executable to execute a malicious payload within a DLL file.[44][45][46] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Safeguarding UEFI Ecosystem: Firmware Supply Chain is Hard(coded)
The UEFI ecosystem is very complicated in terms of supply chain security where we have multiple parties involved in the firmware code development like Intel/AMD with its reference code, or AMI, Phoenix and Insyde with its core framewo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth executes embedded JScript or VBScript in an XSL stylesheet located on a remote domain. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has exfiltrated archives of collected data previously staged on a target's OWA server via HTTPS.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 attempted to remove evidence of some of its activity by deleting Bash histories.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0555
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHEMISTGAMES
CHEMISTGAMES has used HTTPS for C2 communication.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:GeminiDuke
GeminiDuke collects information from the victim, including installed drivers, programs previously executed by users, programs and services configured to automatically run at startup, files and folders present in any user's home folder, files and folders present in any us... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1584.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Server
Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors copied files to company web servers and subsequently downloaded them.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0564
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackMould
BlackMould can enumerate local drives on a compromised host.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [8] [9] These audits should also include if default ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent has the ability to set persistence using the Task Scheduler.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta can check whether the service name FAX is present.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 used Kerberos ticket attacks for lateral movement.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 SDL That Won't Break the Bank
Over the last fifteen years, many large software development organizations have adopted Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) processes as effective approaches to delivering secure software. Motivation for SDL comes from the realization that software vulnerabilities can... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1481.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bidirectional Communication
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service channel as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Legal Pitfalls to Avoid in Security Incidents
Privilege, two-track investigations, OFAC, insurance coverage, and preserving evidence... Lawyers think about this stuff from the jump in a security incident, and you should be aware of them too. Often, attorneys are brought into a security incident afte... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk can use stolen domain admin accounts to move laterally within a victim domain.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
The password for the user's login keychain can be changed from the user's login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 has used search order hijacking to execute malicious payloads, such as Winnti RAT.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used wmic and rundll32 to load Cobalt Strike onto a target host.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can remove files from the compromised host.[219] | secon |
title:botconf2020 It Hurt Itself in Confusion: No distribute scanners and stealthy malware
No distribute antivirus scanners (NDSs) provide cybercriminals with the ability to test the stealthiness of their malware before ever using it. As NDSs do not distribute hashes, they’re the ideal cybercriminal testing ground, and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:DanBot
DanBot has the ability to execute arbitrary commands via cmd.exe.[93][94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
Adversaries can direct BACKSPACE to execute from the command line on infected hosts, or have BACKSPACE create a reverse shell.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover Group Policy details using the gpresult command.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0560
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEARDROP
TEARDROP ran as a Windows service from the c:\windows\syswow64 folder.[120][121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0384
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dridex
Dridex has collected the computer name and OS architecture information from the system.[115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos has used a compromised SSH client to capture the hostname, port, username and password used to establish an SSH connection from the compromised host.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has developed its own unique malware such as MailFetch.py for use in operations.[15][16] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Exploiting Windows COM/WinRT Services
The Component Object Model (COM) and Windows Runtime (WinRT) are widely used in windows systems, they are often used for cross-process communication and UWP Application. Both of them provide large attack surfaces for hackers to hunt for LPE, RCE and Sandbox Esc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Follow vendor device hardening best practices to disable unnecessary and unused features and services, avoid using default configurations and passwords, and introduce logging and auditing for detection. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0099
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT-C-36
APT-C-36 has downloaded binary data from a specified domain after the malicious document is opened.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can use XOR 0x45 to decrypt obfuscated code.[247] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1489
ATT&CK Technique Name:Service Stop
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the enviro... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
If the QuasarRAT client process does not have administrator privileges it will add a registry key to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[215][216] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used links in e-mail to steal account information.[10][11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0238
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proxysvc
Proxysvc gathers product names from the Registry key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion ProductName and the processor description from the Registry key HKLM\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 ProcessorNameString.[73] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Attacking the WebAssembly Compiler of WebKit
WebAssembly (WASM) is a high-performance compiled language for execution in web browsers that interoperates with JavaScript. In general, the wasm compiler in the browser is integrated into the javascript engine, which has proven to be an important atta... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1591.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Business Relationships
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/doma... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has created system services to execute cryptocurrency mining software.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has lured victims to execute malware with spearphishing attachments containing macros to download either Emotet, Bokbot, TrickBot, or Bazar.[255][256] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can launch an instance of itself with administrative rights using runas.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
In some cases a local DNS sinkhole may be used to help prevent DGA-based command and control at a reduced cost. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 The COW (Container On Windows) Who Escaped the Silo
Virtualization and containers are the foundations of cloud services. Containers should be isolated from the real host's settings to ensure the security of the host.In this talk we'll answer these questions: "Are Windows process-isolated containers... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors relied on a victim to click on a malicious link distributed via phishing emails.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used valid accounts for persistence and lateral movement.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader spawns a new copy of c:\windows\syswow64\explorer.exe and then replaces the executable code in memory with malware.[35][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has used JPG files with encrypted payloads to mask their backdoor routines and evade detection.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury has been embedded into modified OpenSSH binaries to gain persistent access to SSH credential information.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos can capture data from the system’s microphone.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke used malware to download additional malicious files to the target system.[386] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy has used a plug-in to gather credentials from web browsers including FireFox, Google Chrome, and Internet Explorer.[14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used a CHM payload to load and execute another malicious file once delivered to a victim.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can use token manipulation to bypass UAC on Windows7 systems.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can collect information about installed software used by specific users, software executed on user login, and software executed by each system.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Installer Packages
Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by using an installer to trigger the execution of malicious content. Installer packages are OS specific and contain the resources an operating system needs to install applications on a system. Insta... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti has decrypted its payload using a hardcoded AES-256 key.[61][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors modified the IKEEXT and PrintNotify Windows services for persistence.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has staged and executed PowerShell scripts on compromised hosts.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it.[9] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Over-the-Air: How we Remotely Compromised the Gateway, BCM, and Autopilot ECUs of Tesla Cars
We, Keen Security Lab of Tencent, have successfully implemented two remote attacks on the Tesla Model S/X in year 2016 and 2017. Last year, at Black Hat USA, we presented the details of our first attack chai... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit access to the root account and prevent users from creating and/or modifying systemd timer unit files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0581
ATT&CK Technique Name:IronNetInjector
IronNetInjector can use an IronPython scripts to load a .NET injector to inject a payload into its own or a remote process.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 used the net view command to show all shares available, including the administrative shares such as C$ and ADMIN$.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Turn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System]to automatically deny elevation requests, add: "ConsentPromptBehaviorUser"=dword:00000000. Consider enabling installer detection ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0316
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android accesses sensitive data in files, such as messages stored by the WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter applications. It also has the ability to access arbitrary filenames and retrieve directory listings.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deep Panda
Deep Panda uses Web shells on publicly accessible Web servers to access victim networks.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti can enumerate through all open processes to search for any that have the string "sql" in their process name.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type runs tests to determine the privilege level of the compromised user.[117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used Metasploit’s PsExec NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the victim's Active Directory database.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used WinRAR to compress and encrypt stolen data prior to exfiltration.[30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be cautioned against granting administrative access to applications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius
Confucius has lured victims into clicking on a malicious link sent through spearphishing.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate has been signed with stolen digital certificates.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has used macros in Excel documents to download and deploy the malware on the user’s machine.[334] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Kevin can sleep for a time interval between C2 communication attempts.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0545
ATT&CK Technique Name:TERRACOTTA
TERRACOTTA checks whether its call stack has been modified, an indication that it is running in an analysis environment, and if so, does not decrypt its obfuscated strings[11]. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0569
ATT&CK Technique Name:Explosive
Explosive has collected the MAC address from the victim's machine.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1417
ATT&CK Technique Name:Input Capture
Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal device usage, users often provide credentials to various locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be tran... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity has been executed via compromised installation files for legitimate software including compression applications, security software, browsers, file recovery applications, and other tools and utilities.[188][189] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. [18] [19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their ~/.bash_history or ConsoleHost_history.txt files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0242
ATT&CK Technique Name:SynAck
SynAck checks its directory location in an attempt to avoid launching in a sandbox.[56][57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro can execute malicious VBA macros embedded in .xlsm files.[53] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Mining and Exploiting (Mobile) Payment Credential Leaks in the Wild
Over the past decade, an increasing number of mobile apps have integrated the third-party payment function from service providers or so-called Cashiers. Thus, end-users can perform the payment within the smartphone through these C... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY can enumerate files and directories on a compromised host.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian can create a remote shell and execute commands using cmd.[338] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to identify the MAC address on an infected host.[228] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can enumerate the IP and domain of a target system.[98] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.