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| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
| Before the |
| SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION |
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| SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 |
| Release No. 90875 / January 8, 2021 |
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| ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT |
| Release No. 4201 / January 8, 2021 |
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| ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING |
| File No. 3-20200 |
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| In the Matter of |
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| DEUTSCHE BANK AG |
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| Respondent. |
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| ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE-AND- |
| DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO |
| SECTION 21C OF THE SECURITIES |
| EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING |
| FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING A CEASE- |
| AND-DESIST ORDER |
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| I. |
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| The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that cease- |
| and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities |
| Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), against Deutsche Bank AG (“Deutsche Bank” or |
| “Respondent”). |
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| II. |
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| In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Deutsche Bank has submitted an |
| Offer of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the |
| purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the |
| Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, Respondent admits the Commission’s |
| jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these proceedings, and consents to the entry of this |
| Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities |
| Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set |
| forth below. |
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| III. |
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| On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds1 that: |
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| SUMMARY |
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| 1. This matter concerns the improper use, from at least 2009 through 2016, by Deutsche Bank |
| of third-party intermediaries, business development consultants, and finders (collectively “BDCs”) |
| to obtain and retain global business. Hundreds of BDCs were used during this timeframe, and their |
| use was approved by past members of Deutsche Bank’s senior management and various regional |
| committees.2 Among those engaged were foreign officials, their relatives and associates in |
| circumstances where bribery risks were neither assessed nor sufficient steps taken to mitigate |
| bribery risks posed by such engagements. |
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| 2. Deutsche Bank lacked sufficient internal accounting controls related to the use and |
| payment of BDCs during this time period, resulting in payments to BDCs that were actually bribe |
| payments as well as payments made for unknown, undocumented or unauthorized services. The |
| payments in those circumstances were inaccurately recorded as legitimate business expenses in |
| Deutsche Bank’s books and records, and involved invoices and documentation falsified by its |
| employees. During this period, certain now-former members of senior management, including |
| members of the Management Board, were aware that these internal accounting controls were |
| insufficient to provide reasonable assurance that transactions with BDCs were executed in |
| accordance with management authorization and to provide reasonable assurance that payments |
| were accurately recorded in Deutsche Bank’s books and records. Deutsche Bank failed to take |
| sufficient steps to address and remediate these known internal accounting control failures until |
| 2016. |
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| 3. As a result of this conduct, Deutsche Bank violated the internal accounting control and |
| books and records provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. During this period |
| approximately $7 million in payments to BDC’s were improperly booked as legitimate expenses, |
| and Deutsche Bank was unjustly enriched by approximately $35 million. |
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| RESPONDENT |
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| 4. Deutsche Bank AG (“Deutsche Bank” or “the Bank”) is a multinational financial |
| services corporation incorporated and domiciled in Germany. The company issues and maintains a |
| class of publicly traded securities registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and is |
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| 1 The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent's Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any |
| other person or entity in this or any other proceeding. |
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| 2 All of the relevant Management Board members and most members of senior management referenced in |
| this Order are former employees of the Bank. |
| 3 |
| listed on the New York Stock Exchange (ticker: DB). Deutsche Bank files periodic reports, |
| including Forms 20-F, with the Commission. Deutsche Bank operates in more than 70 countries |
| worldwide and is the direct or indirect holding company for Deutsche Bank’s subsidiaries. |
| Deutsche Bank employees in various parts of the world engaged in the conduct discussed herein.3 |
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| FACTS |
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| 5. Throughout the relevant time period, Deutsche Bank’s Global Anti-Corruption Policy |
| (“Anti-Corruption Policy”) prohibited the payment of bribes, both directly and indirectly, to obtain |
| an improper personal or business advantage in both the public and private sectors. Deutsche Bank |
| prohibited the offer of anything of value which may be deemed to influence any act or decision of |
| a public official and also prohibited the use of BDCs to improperly obtain confidential information |
| about business opportunities. Under Deutsche Bank’s relevant policies, third-party representatives |
| could only be engaged in circumstances where: 1) there was documented pre-contractual due |
| diligence; 2) a written contract which set out the representative’s role and/or services was provided |
| in a form approved by the Bank’s Legal department (“Legal”); 3) the contract contained a |
| documented description of services to be performed, amount to be paid, and other material terms of |
| the engagement; 4) the payment was proportionate to the value of the services rendered; and 5) |
| appropriate review and approval was obtained before the engagement began. Additionally, |
| Deutsche Bank prohibited any undocumented payments or bribes. |
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| 6. Since at least 2008, Deutsche Bank’s Use of Business Development Consultants Policy |
| (“BDC Policy”), its global policy governing the use of consultants and finders, required that the |
| Bank conduct thorough due diligence prior to retaining and paying a BDC to determine, among |
| other things, whether the BDC, or their immediate family members and close associates, had any |
| political or governmental affiliations or exposures. A BDC with a “political or governmental |
| affiliation” was classified as a politically exposed person (“PEP”) and required enhanced due |
| diligence; this person could not be engaged without additional vetting and approval by senior |
| management, Legal, and the Bank’s compliance function (“Compliance”) to provide reasonable |
| assurance that potential conflicts of interest were identified and addressed. The BDC Policy also |
| required that prospective BDCs have “sufficient expertise and qualifications” to perform the |
| contemplated services. Payments were required to be proportionate to the services rendered and |
| made only in circumstances where the supporting invoice contained “sufficient detail regarding the |
| services or matters to which such invoice relates.” |
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| 7. While the BDC Policy required that regional and divisional management approve and |
| oversee the use of BDCs, in practice, the implementation and oversight of the Policy fell to the |
| BDC’s “business sponsor.” Business sponsors were responsible for generating business for |
| Deutsche Bank and were compensated, in part, based on the revenue earned by Deutsche Bank. |
| The business sponsors recommended the engagement of the identified BDC, determined whether |
| payments to the BDCs complied with both the terms of the BDC contract and the Bank’s policies, |
| and maintained records concerning the services provided by the BDC, including invoices. |
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| 3 Deutsche Bank employees referenced in this Order may have worked for one or more Deutsche Bank legal |
| entities during the relevant time. Deutsche Bank is required to make and keep accurate books and records |
| and sufficient internal accounting controls within its subsidiaries. |
| 4 |
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| Deutsche Bank Identified Internal Accounting Control Failures in 2009 but Failed to |
| Remediate Until 2016 |
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| 8. In approximately 2008, as part of the Bank’s anti-corruption program, a group within |
| Deutsche Bank’s internal audit function conducted a review of business arrangements in its Asia- |
| Pacific region in order to assess the integrity and legitimacy of certain transactions. In 2009, the |
| internal audit group issued a report (“2009 Report”) in which it identified certain concerns with the |
| Bank’s use of one BDC including insufficient oversight over that BDC engagement to ensure it |
| was not being used for corrupt purposes and a lack of documentation detailing what actual services |
| were rendered by the BDC. The 2009 Report recommended that Deutsche Bank’s global BDC |
| Policy be revised and that the internal accounting controls around BDCs be enhanced to include |
| centralized and thoroughly documented due diligence to demonstrate that a BDC was qualified to |
| perform the services for which it was contracted, maintenance of detailed records of all work |
| performed by the BDC, and a requirement that BDC engagements include books and |
| recordkeeping provisions giving Deutsche Bank inspection rights. The 2009 Report was provided |
| to senior management at Deutsche Bank, including members of the Management Board; however, |
| only limited steps were taken in response. |
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| 9. In 2011, the same group conducted another internal investigation into the Bank’s BDC |
| relationships and identified numerous internal accounting control failures. Those failures were |
| identified in a report (“2011 Report”) and included: problems related to specific BDC |
| engagements; lack of due diligence; general lack of training and awareness of Deutsche Bank’s |
| BDC Policy and due diligence requirements among employees; failure by business sponsors to |
| appropriately assess, document, and mitigate corruption risks and conflicts of interests; and failure |
| to document the proportionality and justification for certain BDC payments. The 2011 Report was |
| also distributed to senior management at Deutsche Bank, including members of the Management |
| Board, and again only limited steps were taken in response. |
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| 10. Contrary to its internal policies and with known failures in its relevant internal accounting |
| controls, between 2009 and 2016, Deutsche Bank engaged some BDCs: 1) with no demonstrated |
| expertise or qualifications; 2) who simultaneously worked for a government entity from which |
| Deutsche Bank sought business; 3) without a written agreement; 4) using form agreements with no |
| substantive description of the services to be performed and/or provisions calling for “success fee” |
| payments; 5) at rates that were unreasonably high as compared to the work allegedly being |
| performed; and 6) in circumstances where either adequate due diligence was not performed or |
| where due diligence was conducted more than a year after the BDC was retained and paid. |
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| 11. As a result of its lack of sufficient internal accounting controls relating to BDCs, Deutsche |
| Bank paid certain BDCs in circumstances where no invoices were submitted and where invoices |
| contained insufficient documentation to detail what services were performed. In certain instances, |
| when invoices were submitted, they were vague and inadequate, making it nearly impossible to |
| determine what, if any, services were performed or to determine the purpose for the payment. In |
| 5 |
| some instances, BDCs were paid in excess of what was provided for pursuant to their contract with |
| Deutsche Bank and some BDCs were paid even though they had no contract at the time certain of |
| the services were purportedly performed. Amongst the BDC payments made in these |
| circumstances were those that were bribes. |
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| Consultant A – Chinese BDC |
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| 12. Deutsche Bank retained Consultant A to help the Bank establish a clean energy |
| investment fund with a Chinese government entity. Prior to entering into a BDC relationship, |
| Consultant A introduced himself and provided certain Deutsche Bank employees with a |
| curriculum vitae indicating that he “is currently the senior advisor to [the regional Chinese] . . . |
| Government” with which the Bank sought to establish the investment fund. Deutsche Bank |
| employees working to establish the investment fund knew that in addition to potentially being a |
| government official or otherwise acting in an official capacity, Consultant A was also “a close |
| friend of” a foreign government official whose approval was needed for the establishment of the |
| investment fund. Notably, that same government official required that Deutsche Bank work |
| through Consultant A to establish the investment fund. |
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| 13. Despite these facts, Consultant A was retained as a BDC without due diligence review |
| being conducted as required. |
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| 14. Between April 2011 and May 2013, Consultant A was paid at least $1.6 million. This |
| included payments for services purportedly performed before he was engaged. Consultant A |
| submitted invoices for gifts and entertainment provided to foreign government officials that were |
| reimbursed without adequate review or advance approval by Compliance, as required under |
| Deutsche Bank’s policies. Moreover, Deutsche Bank did not fully document the services |
| Consultant A purportedly performed and paid him without appropriate documentation. For |
| example, although Deutsche Bank paid him for purported reimbursements of “out-of-pocket |
| expenses” or “client-related expenses,” Consultant A provided little verifiable support for the |
| purported expenses. |
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| 15. In addition to these payments, Consultant A was given a partnership interest in the |
| investment fund that required little or no upfront capital and entitled him to a large potential |
| profit share. One Deutsche Bank employee explained contemporaneously, “[Consultant A] has |
| acted as an advisor and facilitator to this initiative and it is a requirement of [the government |
| entity] that he is included as both an equity (very small) participant and also part of the |
| investment committee.” This agreement was executed without Legal and Compliance having |
| full information about the circumstances of Consultant A’s relationship with the government |
| entity. |
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| 16. In early 2017, Deutsche Bank began the dissolution of the investment fund because it |
| failed to raise capital; the Bank earned no profits from this arrangement. |
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| Consultant B – Abu Dhabi BDC |
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| 17. Between 2010 and 2011, Deutsche Bank retained and paid Consultant B to obtain a |
| specific deal (“Project X”) with an Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund (“Abu Dhabi SOE”). |
| Consultant B approached Deutsche Bank about Project X and within weeks of that meeting, |
| Deutsche Bank employees understood that Consultant B’s brother would also be involved in the |
| proposed BDC engagement, although Deutsche Bank did not immediately engage either of them. |
| |
| 18. During this same time period, an Abu Dhabi SOE Official with authority to influence the |
| award of Project X was pressuring Deutsche Bank to finance a mega-yacht. One email from an |
| Abu Dhabi SOE official read: |
| |
| “[Abu Dhabi SOE Official] has asked me to get in touch with DB: reputationally, this |
| financing is regarded as absolutely crucial, and [Abu Dhabi SOE Official] made the point |
| very forcefully that those institutions which participate in it can expect in future to enjoy |
| ‘most favoured status’ with [the Abu Dhabi SOE].” |
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| 19. Deutsche Bank employees working on Project X encouraged the Bank to finance the mega- |
| yacht in order to influence the Abu Dhabi SOE Official and better position Deutsche Bank to |
| obtain Project X. The Bank agreed to do so. Despite that, a banker working to obtain Project X |
| expressed concern that there was still “no guaranty” that Deutsche Bank would win Project X and |
| told a senior executive at Deutsche Bank, “We need to close the [Consultant B and brother] angle |
| within the next 48hrs. Need ur [sic] leadership and influence on getting it thru GMRAC.” The |
| senior executive agreed to sponsor the BDC arrangement, but expressed concern about entering |
| into a BDC arrangement shortly before Project X would be awarded. |
| |
| 20. At the time Consultant B was retained as a BDC, Deutsche Bank knew Consultant B was a |
| relative of the Abu Dhabi SOE Official, a high ranking official of and key decision maker for the |
| Abu Dhabi SOE. Deutsche Bank knew that Consultant B was a proxy for the Abu Dhabi SOE |
| Official and that it needed to pay Consultant B to obtain the Abu Dhabi SOE’s business. A |
| Deutsche Bank employee described Consultant B as a “gatekeeper” to the Abu Dhabi SOE Official |
| who expected to be paid for his services. At the time Consultant B was retained as a BDC, the |
| Regional Head of Compliance, the banker acting as business sponsor, and the senior executive |
| each knew that Consultant B’s brother would be working with Consultant B, but did not disclose |
| the role of Consultant B’s brother in the BDC arrangement and Consultant B’s brother did not sign |
| a BDC contract with Deutsche Bank. |
| |
| 21. Consultant B’s engagement was approved by the then-Global Markets Risk Assessment |
| Committee (“GMRAC”), which included senior-level Deutsche Bank executives. Despite the |
| requirements of the BDC Policy, the GMRAC at the time approved the engagement despite the |
| lack of due diligence on Consultant B, and without assessing or mitigating corruption risks and |
| conflicts of interest related to the retention which included: 1) Consultant B was related to the Abu |
| Dhabi SOE Official, a key decision maker at the SOE from which Deutsche Bank sought business; |
| 2) Consultant B had no known qualifications for the role; and 3) the fact that the Abu Dhabi SOE |
| 7 |
| Official had made repeated requests to Deutsche Bank to finance a mega-yacht as a means to help |
| position Deutsche Bank to obtain Project X. |
| |
| 22. Deutsche Bank was awarded Project X shortly after it retained Consultant B. Within a |
| week after Consultant B was retained as a BDC, Deutsche Bank paid him more than $2 million for |
| his purported legitimate services. |
| 23. Consultant B was paid approximately $3.5 million without invoices or other documentation |
| to support the payments; the agreement itself did not call for Consultant B to perform any services |
| other than to provide generic advice and introductions; and the payments were not proportionate to |
| any legitimately rendered services. Despite this, a senior Deutsche Bank executive approved the |
| payments. As a result, Deutsche Bank was unjustly enriched by approximately $30 million. |
| Consultant C – Italian BDC |
| |
| 24. Deutsche Bank retained Consultant C from approximately February 2007 through |
| December 2015 to refer high net worth clients to Deutsche Bank. Reasonable due diligence was |
| not done prior to the engagement of Consultant C, who was a regional tax judge in Italy and, |
| therefore, a current government official during his BDC engagement. Contemporaneous email and |
| documents show that Consultant C’s business sponsor was aware of this fact when sponsoring |
| Consultant C. |
| |
| 25. Numerous payments were made to Consultant C that exceeded the commission rate in his |
| contract and included payments outside the terms of his contract. Consultant C was paid more |
| frequently than permitted by contract and was paid despite not performing some of the services for |
| which invoices were issued. Deutsche Bank employees were aware that payments were made to |
| him on the basis of inaccurate invoices. For example, he received payments for at least three |
| purported client introductions despite not having introduced those clients to the Bank. When he |
| made demands for payments outside the scope of his contract, he received additional payments and |
| was paid for research reports and advisory information that were of no value to the Bank. |
| |
| 26. Although Consultant C’s contract ended in December 2015, Consultant C was paid beyond |
| the period required by the BDC agreement. Per the contract, the commission on those client assets |
| should have ceased in December 2015. |
| |
| 27. As a result, Deutsche Bank was unjustly enriched by approximately $1 million. |
| |
| Consultant D – Middle Eastern BDC |
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| 28. From 2011 through the end of 2012, Deutsche Bank paid bribes to one of two General |
| Managers (“Consultant D”) of the Family Office (“FO”) of a senior member of a Middle Eastern |
| Royal Family in order to obtain and retain the FO’s lucrative banking business. Consultant D |
| made investment decisions for the FO and managed hundreds of millions of dollars in investments |
| on behalf of the FO. To make the payments, Deutsche Bank entered into a BDC contract with, and |
| made these payments to, a shell company (“BVI Company”) owned by Consultant D’s wife. |
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| 8 |
| 29. Although the FO was a preexisting client of Deutsche Bank, the employees who managed |
| that relationship at Deutsche Bank believed that Consultant D would take the FO business to |
| another bank if they did not pay him. A Deutsche Bank employee stated, “We are faced with the |
| serious potential of the client withdrawing and closing his relationship, putting at risk a potential |
| €5-6m revenue in 2013. Unless we manage to resolve this (and confirm payment by close of week |
| 1 in December) we are highly likely to lose the entire relationship.” Deutsche Bank employees |
| justified the payments based both on the amount of revenue Deutsche Bank had already earned |
| from the FO’s assets and the expectation that Consultant D would provide the bank with future |
| business. One senior Deutsche Bank employee stated that the FO business was the Bank’s “single |
| largest relationship” in the Middle East and Africa and “also a top 3 revenue” relationship. |
| |
| 30. Deutsche Bank employees managing the FO account inaccurately portrayed that Consultant |
| D’s wife, represented by the BVI Company, was the source of the business. Neither Compliance |
| nor the committee members approving the arrangement verified this claim. Deutsche Bank did not |
| negotiate the terms of the contract or conduct any business with Consultant D’s wife, and email |
| clearly indicated that “[Consultant D] has approved the Finder agreement.” The agreement was |
| supported by Deutsche Bank executives and various others on the approval committee including |
| some who were aware that there was an inherent conflict of interest in paying the wife of the |
| decision maker for the client. |
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| 31. Although there is no evidence that either the BVI Company or Consultant D’s wife ever |
| provided any services to Deutsche Bank, the payments were authorized and paid. Because |
| Deutsche Bank helped establish the BVI Company and managed its bank account, Deutsche Bank |
| employees were aware that Consultant D was the real beneficiary of the payments. Deutsche Bank |
| made at least four payments totaling approximately $1.1 million to the BVI Company to induce |
| and “incentivize” Consultant D to invest and maintain the FO’s substantial assets with Deutsche |
| Bank. Deutsche Bank made two payments to the BVI Company under the BDC contract and two |
| additional extra-contractual payments: a $150,000 “exceptional payment” that cleared through |
| New York and a €220,000 “goodwill payment.” In one request for approval for an extra- |
| contractual payment, a senior level Deutsche Bank employee explained that payment was needed |
| to “secure the retention” and “future … contribution of the relationship” and “urgently” requested |
| that the payment be approved. |
| |
| 32. The payments to Consultant D were inaccurately recorded in Deutsche Bank’s books and |
| records as legitimate payments, and as a result, Deutsche Bank was unjustly enriched by |
| approximately $3 million. |
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| LEGAL STANDARDS AND VIOLATIONS |
| |
| 33. Under Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act, the Commission may impose a cease-and- |
| desist order upon any person who is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision of |
| the Exchange Act or any rule or regulation thereunder, and upon any other person that is, was, or |
| would be a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known |
| would contribute to such violation. |
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| 9 |
| Deutsche Bank Violated Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(A) |
| |
| 34. The books and records provision of the FCPA, Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, |
| requires every issuer with a class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange |
| Act to make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and |
| fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § |
| 78m(b)(2)(A). |
| |
| 35. As a result of the conduct described above, Deutsche Bank violated Section 13(b)(2)(A) of |
| the Exchange Act. |
| |
| Deutsche Bank Violated Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(B) |
| |
| 36. Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act requires companies with a class of securities |
| registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act to devise and maintain a system of internal |
| accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that (i) transactions are executed in |
| accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as |
| necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted |
| accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain |
| accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s |
| general or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with |
| the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any |
| differences. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). |
| |
| 37. As described above, Deutsche Bank failed to devise and maintain a system of internal |
| accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions were executed in |
| accordance with management’s general or specific authorization and that access to assets was |
| permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization. By this |
| conduct, Deutsche Bank violated Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(B). |
| |
| Commission Consideration of Deutsche Bank’s Cooperation and Remedial Efforts |
| |
| 38. In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission considered Deutsche Bank’s |
| cooperation and remedial efforts. |
| |
| 39. Deutsche Bank’s cooperation included: responding promptly to the Commission’s requests |
| for information and documents; identifying issues and facts that would likely be of interest to the |
| Commission’s staff; providing regular updates of factual findings developed during the course of |
| its own internal investigation; making employees and now-former employees located outside the |
| United States available for interviews; and identifying key documents and providing factual |
| chronologies to the Commission’s staff. |
| |
| 40. Deutsche Bank’s remedial measures included: enhancements to its internal accounting |
| controls; enhancements to its Anti-Bribery & Corruption Framework and policies concerning |
| BDCs on a global basis; the significant reduction of the number of BDCs used by the Bank; the |
| 10 |
| institution of enhanced procedures and practices to monitor and control BDC engagements; |
| increasing the Bank’s anti-corruption compliance staff; and increased and regular anti-bribery |
| training specifically addressing the use of third parties to obtain and retain business. Deutsche |
| Bank also undertook employment actions based upon its findings regarding the underlying |
| conduct, including separating certain employees. |
| |
| Criminal Disposition |
| |
| 41. Deutsche Bank has entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the United States |
| Department of Justice that acknowledges responsibility for criminal conduct relating to certain |
| findings in the Order. |
| |
| Non-Imposition of a Civil Penalty |
| |
| 42. Respondent acknowledges that the Commission is not imposing a civil penalty based upon |
| the imposition of a $79,561,206 criminal penalty for the same misconduct as part of Deutsche |
| Bank’s above referenced resolution with the United States Department of Justice. |
| |
| |
| IV. |
| |
| In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions |
| agreed to in Respondent’s Offer. |
| |
| Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: |
| |
| A. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Deutsche Bank cease and desist from |
| committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and |
| 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act. |
| |
| B. Respondent shall, within 20 days of the entry of this Order, pay disgorgement of |
| $35,145,619 and prejudgment interest of $8,184,003, for a total payment of $43,329,622, to the |
| Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to the general fund of the United States |
| Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3). If timely payment is not made, additional |
| interest shall accrue pursuant to SEC Rule of Practice 600. Payment must be made in one of the |
| following ways: |
| |
| (1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will |
| provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request; |
| |
| (2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through the |
| SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or |
| |
| 11 |
| (3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States |
| postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and |
| hand-delivered or mailed to: |
| |
| Enterprise Services Center |
| Accounts Receivable Branch |
| HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341 |
| 6500 South MacArthur Boulevard |
| Oklahoma City, OK 73169 |
| |
| Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying |
| Deutsche Bank as a Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a |
| copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Daniel J. Wadley, Director, Salt |
| Lake Regional Office, Securities and Exchange Commission, 351 S. West Temple, Suite 6.100, |
| Salt Lake City, UT 84101. |
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| |
| By the Commission. |
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| |
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| Vanessa A. Countryman |
| Secretary |
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