func_before stringlengths 10 482k | func_after stringlengths 14 484k | cve_id stringlengths 13 28 ⌀ | cwe_id stringclasses 776
values | cve_description stringlengths 30 3.31k ⌀ | commit_link stringlengths 48 164 ⌀ | commit_message stringlengths 1 30.3k ⌀ | file_name stringlengths 4 244 ⌀ | extension stringclasses 20
values | datetime stringdate 1999-11-10 02:42:49 2024-01-29 16:00:57 ⌀ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CreateTrigger(CreateTrigStmt *stmt, const char *queryString,
Oid constraintOid, Oid indexOid,
bool isInternal)
{
int16 tgtype;
int ncolumns;
int16 *columns;
int2vector *tgattr;
Node *whenClause;
List *whenRtable;
char *qual;
Datum values[Natts_pg_trigger];
bool nulls[Natts_pg_trigger... | CreateTrigger(CreateTrigStmt *stmt, const char *queryString,
Oid relOid, Oid refRelOid, Oid constraintOid, Oid indexOid,
bool isInternal)
{
int16 tgtype;
int ncolumns;
int16 *columns;
int2vector *tgattr;
Node *whenClause;
List *whenRtable;
char *qual;
Datum values[Natts_pg_trigger];
b... | CVE-2014-0062 | CWE-362 | Race condition in the (1) CREATE INDEX and (2) unspecified ALTER TABLE commands in PostgreSQL before 8.4.20, 9.0.x before 9.0.16, 9.1.x before 9.1.12, 9.2.x before 9.2.7, and 9.3.x before 9.3.3 allows remote authenticated users to create an unauthorized index or read portions of unauthorized tables by creating or delet... | https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/5f173040e324f6c2eebb90d86cf1b0cdb5890f0a | Avoid repeated name lookups during table and index DDL.
If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
than other parts. At least in the case of CREATE INDEX, this can be
used to cause the permissions checks to be performed aga... | null | null | 2014-02-17T14:33:31Z |
void zunionInterGenericCommand(client *c, robj *dstkey, int op) {
int i, j;
long setnum;
int aggregate = REDIS_AGGR_SUM;
zsetopsrc *src;
zsetopval zval;
sds tmp;
size_t maxelelen = 0;
robj *dstobj;
zset *dstzset;
zskiplistNode *znode;
int touched = 0;
/* expect setnum in... | void zunionInterGenericCommand(client *c, robj *dstkey, int op) {
int i, j;
long setnum;
int aggregate = REDIS_AGGR_SUM;
zsetopsrc *src;
zsetopval zval;
sds tmp;
size_t maxelelen = 0, totelelen = 0;
robj *dstobj;
zset *dstzset;
zskiplistNode *znode;
int touched = 0;
/* e... | CVE-2021-32628 | CWE-190 | Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. An integer overflow bug in the ziplist data structure used by all versions of Redis can be exploited to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote code execution. The vulnerability involves modifying the default ziplist configuration parameters... | https://github.com/redis/redis/commit/f6a40570fa63d5afdd596c78083d754081d80ae3 | Fix ziplist and listpack overflows and truncations (CVE-2021-32627, CVE-2021-32628)
- fix possible heap corruption in ziplist and listpack resulting by trying to
allocate more than the maximum size of 4GB.
- prevent ziplist (hash and zset) from reaching size of above 1GB, will be
converted to HT encoding, that's n... | null | null | 2021-06-03T09:10:02Z |
static ExprList *exprListAppendList(
Parse *pParse, /* Parsing context */
ExprList *pList, /* List to which to append. Might be NULL */
ExprList *pAppend, /* List of values to append. Might be NULL */
int bIntToNull
){
if( pAppend ){
int i;
int nInit = pList ? pList->nExpr : 0;
... | static ExprList *exprListAppendList(
Parse *pParse, /* Parsing context */
ExprList *pList, /* List to which to append. Might be NULL */
ExprList *pAppend, /* List of values to append. Might be NULL */
int bIntToNull
){
if( pAppend ){
int i;
int nInit = pList ? pList->nExpr : 0;
... | null | cwe-476 | null | github.com/sqlite/sqlite/commit/75e95e1fcd52d3ec8282edb75ac8cd0814095d54 | null | src/window.c | c | 2019-12-18T00:05:50Z |
static void ip6_rt_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu)
{
struct rt6_info *rt6 = (struct rt6_info *)dst;
dst_confirm(dst);
if (mtu < dst_mtu(dst) && rt6->rt6i_dst.plen == 128) {
struct net *net = dev_net(dst->dev);
rt6->rt6i_flags |= RTF_MODIFIED;
if (mt... | static void ip6_rt_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu)
{
struct rt6_info *rt6 = (struct rt6_info *)dst;
dst_confirm(dst);
if (mtu < dst_mtu(dst) && rt6->rt6i_dst.plen == 128) {
struct net *net = dev_net(dst->dev);
rt6->rt6i_flags |= RTF_MODIFIED;
if (mt... | CVE-2016-10142 | CWE-17 | An issue was discovered in the IPv6 protocol specification, related to ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB) messages. (The scope of this CVE is all affected IPv6 implementations from all vendors.) The security implications of IP fragmentation have been discussed at length in [RFC6274] and [RFC7739]. An attacker can leverage the g... | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9d289715eb5c252ae15bd547cb252ca547a3c4f2 | ipv6: stop sending PTB packets for MTU < 1280
Reduce the attack vector and stop generating IPv6 Fragment Header for
paths with an MTU smaller than the minimum required IPv6 MTU
size (1280 byte) - called atomic fragments.
See IETF I-D "Deprecating the Generation of IPv6 Atomic Fragments" [1]
for more information and h... | route.c | c | null |
def new_category(category_name):
try:
conn = check_heroku_db()
cur = conn.cursor()
cur.execute('''INSERT INTO categories (cat_name) VALUES (%s)''', (category_name,))
conn.commit()
conn.close()
except psycopg2.DatabaseError as e:
print('Error %s' % e)
sys.... | def new_category(category_name):
try:
conn = check_heroku_db()
cur = conn.cursor()
query = "INSERT INTO categories (cat_name) VALUES (%s);"
data = (category_name,)
cur.execute(query, data)
conn.commit()
conn.close()
except psycopg2.DatabaseError as e:
... | null | cwe-089 | null | github.com/leeorb321/expenses/commit/f93c0fa4d30787ef16420bfefc52565b98bc7fcf | null | db.py | py | 2016-08-26T02:18:44Z |
int do_migrate(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict, QObject **ret_data)
{
MigrationState *s = NULL;
const char *p;
int detach = qdict_get_try_bool(qdict, "detach", 0);
int blk = qdict_get_try_bool(qdict, "blk", 0);
int inc = qdict_get_try_bool(qdict, "inc", 0);
const char *uri = qdict_get_str(qdict... | int do_migrate(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict, QObject **ret_data)
{
MigrationState *s = NULL;
const char *p;
int detach = qdict_get_try_bool(qdict, "detach", 0);
int blk = qdict_get_try_bool(qdict, "blk", 0);
int inc = qdict_get_try_bool(qdict, "inc", 0);
const char *uri = qdict_get_str(qdict... | null | null | null | qemu/commit/dc9121210eaf34e768901ffc6992dd13062c743a | savevm: Fix no_migrate
The no_migrate save state flag is currently only checked in the
last phase of migration. This means that we potentially waste
a lot of time and bandwidth with the live state handlers before
we ever check the no_migrate flags. The error message printed
when we catch a non-migratable device does... | ./qemu/migration.c | c | 2011-01-11T21:39:43Z |
void remap_struct(unsigned int gtypes_nr[], unsigned int ftypes_nr[],
void *ps, unsigned int f_size, unsigned int g_size)
{
int d;
/* Sanity check */
if (MAP_SIZE(ftypes_nr) > f_size)
return;
/* Remap [unsigned] long fields */
d = gtypes_nr[0] - ftypes_nr[0];
if (d) {
memmove(((char *) ps) + gtypes_nr[0... | void remap_struct(unsigned int gtypes_nr[], unsigned int ftypes_nr[],
void *ps, unsigned int f_size, unsigned int g_size, size_t b_size)
{
int d;
size_t n;
/* Sanity check */
if (MAP_SIZE(ftypes_nr) > f_size)
return;
/* Remap [unsigned] long fields */
d = gtypes_nr[0] - ftypes_nr[0];
if (d) {
n = MINIM... | CVE-2018-19416 | CWE-125 | An issue was discovered in sysstat 12.1.1. The remap_struct function in sa_common.c has an out-of-bounds read during a memmove call, as demonstrated by sadf. | https://github.com/sysstat/sysstat/commit/fbc691eaaa10d0bcea6741d5a223dc3906106548 | Fix #196 and #199: Out of bound reads security issues
Check args before calling memmove() and memset() in remap_struct()
function to avoid out of bound reads which would possibly lead to
unknown code execution and/or sadf command crash.
Signed-off-by: Sebastien GODARD <sysstat@users.noreply.github.com> | sa_common.c | c | 2018-11-26T13:32:05Z |
@Override
public GenericResultsetData retrieveGenericResultset(final String name, final String type, final Map<String, String> queryParams,
final boolean isSelfServiceUserReport) {
final long startTime = System.currentTimeMillis();
LOG.info("STARTING REPORT: {} Type: {}", name, type);... | @Override
public GenericResultsetData retrieveGenericResultset(final String name, final String type, final Map<String, String> queryParams,
final boolean isSelfServiceUserReport) {
final long startTime = System.currentTimeMillis();
if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
log.debug("STAR... | null | null | null | https://github.com/apache/fineract/commit/665bd0f6fbdbbb772087f11c5b599e51df5c2b64 | FINERACT-1483: fix Sonar vulnerabilities with `Minor` severity | fineract-provider/src/main/java/org/apache/fineract/infrastructure/dataqueries/service/ReadReportingServiceImpl.java | java | 2022-04-29T12:34:59Z |
static BROTLI_INLINE double FastLog2(size_t v) {
if (v < sizeof(kLog2Table) / sizeof(kLog2Table[0])) {
return kLog2Table[v];
}
#if !(BROTLI_HAVE_LOG2)
return log((double)v) * LOG_2_INV;
#else
return log2((double)v);
#endif
} | static BROTLI_INLINE double FastLog2(size_t v) {
if (v < BROTLI_LOG2_TABLE_SIZE) {
return kBrotliLog2Table[v];
}
#if !(BROTLI_HAVE_LOG2)
return log((double)v) * LOG_2_INV;
#else
return log2((double)v);
#endif
} | CVE-2020-8927 | CWE-120 | A buffer overflow exists in the Brotli library versions prior to 1.0.8 where an attacker controlling the input length of a "one-shot" decompression request to a script can trigger a crash, which happens when copying over chunks of data larger than 2 GiB. It is recommended to update your Brotli library to 1.0.8 or later... | https://github.com/google/brotli/commit/223d80cfbec8fd346e32906c732c8ede21f0cea6 | Update (#826)
* IMPORTANT: decoder: fix potential overflow when input chunk is >2GiB
* simplify max Huffman table size calculation
* eliminate symbol duplicates (static arrays in .h files)
* minor combing in research/ code | null | null | 2020-08-26T10:32:27Z |
static void *spapr_create_fdt_skel(const char *cpu_model,
hwaddr initrd_base,
hwaddr initrd_size,
hwaddr kernel_size,
const char *boot_device,
co... | static void *spapr_create_fdt_skel(const char *cpu_model,
hwaddr initrd_base,
hwaddr initrd_size,
hwaddr kernel_size,
const char *boot_device,
co... | null | null | null | qemu/commit/2c9ee0291f8ca7e18f8e96a34e8f4be7867219d2 | pseries: set no default boot order
This patch removes the default boot order for pseries machine. This allows
the machine to handle a NULL boot order in case no -boot option is provided.
Thus it helps SLOF firmware to verify if boot order is specified in command
line or not. If no boot order is provided SLOF tries to ... | ./qemu/hw/spapr.c | c | 2013-01-08T07:06:31Z |
static __u8 *nci_extract_rf_params_nfca_passive_poll(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfca_poll *nfca_poll,
__u8 *data)
{
nfca_poll->sens_res = __le16_to_cpu(*((__u16 *)data));
data += 2;
nfca_poll->nfcid1_len = *data++;
pr_debug("sens_res 0x%x, nfcid1_len %d\n",
nfca_poll->se... | static __u8 *nci_extract_rf_params_nfca_passive_poll(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfca_poll *nfca_poll,
__u8 *data)
{
nfca_poll->sens_res = __le16_to_cpu(*((__u16 *)data));
data += 2;
nfca_poll->nfcid1_len = min_t(__u8, *data++, NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE);
pr_debug("sens_res 0x%x, n... | CVE-2012-3364 | CWE-119 | Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in the Near Field Communication Controller Interface (NCI) in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via incoming frames with crafted length fields. | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/67de956ff5dc1d4f321e16cfbd63f5be3b691b43 | NFC: Prevent multiple buffer overflows in NCI
Fix multiple remotely-exploitable stack-based buffer overflows due to
the NCI code pulling length fields directly from incoming frames and
copying too much data into statically-sized arrays.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc... | ntf.c | c | 2012-06-25T14:05:27Z |
@Override
public void renderForeground(PoseStack matrix, int mouseX, int mouseY) {
switch (activeSubPage) {
case CHILDREN:
childrenBreeding.get(activePage).draw(matrix);
break;
case ENTITY_MUTATIONS:
entityMutationBreeding.get(activePag... | @Override
public void renderForeground(PoseStack matrix, int mouseX, int mouseY) {
if (activeSubPage == null) return;
switch (activeSubPage) {
case CHILDREN:
childrenBreeding.get(activePage).draw(matrix);
break;
case ENTITY_MUTATIONS:
... | null | null | null | https://github.com/Team-Resourceful/ResourcefulBees/commit/d413a8c6ab35f70a70f38eed9268796aeb86474b | beepedia now shows an empty page rather than crashing with a broken family tree
also made the beePage class constructor easier to read | forge/src/main/java/com/teamresourceful/resourcefulbees/client/gui/screen/beepedia/pages/BreedingPage.java | java | 2021-05-21T22:03:50Z |
@Override
public RedisResponse executeCommand(Command command, ExecutionHandlerContext context) {
List<byte[]> commandElems = command.getProcessedCommand();
RedisStringCommands stringCommands = context.getStringCommands();
RedisKey key = command.getKey();
long offset;
int value;
try {
b... | @Override
public RedisResponse executeCommand(Command command, ExecutionHandlerContext context) {
List<byte[]> commandElems = command.getProcessedCommand();
RedisStringCommands stringCommands = context.getStringCommands();
RedisKey key = command.getKey();
long offset;
int value;
try {
b... | null | null | null | https://github.com/apache/geode/commit/970497912dec5af43605842195bc8a7dd1479851 | GEODE-9424: Accept Long arguments for Redis commands (#6698)
- Do not return errors when arguments are specified that are less than
Integer.MIN_VALUE or less than Integer.MAX_VALE
- Convert long arguments outside the above range to Integer.MIN_VALUE
or Integer.MAX_VALUE to be used internally
- Add tests for new Co... | geode-apis-compatible-with-redis/src/main/java/org/apache/geode/redis/internal/executor/string/SetBitExecutor.java | java | 2021-07-15T18:04:14Z |
static int ogg_read_page(AVFormatContext *s, int *sid)
{
AVIOContext *bc = s->pb;
struct ogg *ogg = s->priv_data;
struct ogg_stream *os;
int ret, i = 0;
int flags, nsegs;
uint64_t gp;
uint32_t serial;
int size, idx;
uint8_t sync[4];
int sp = 0;
ret = avio_read(bc, sync, 4);
... | static int ogg_read_page(AVFormatContext *s, int *sid)
{
AVIOContext *bc = s->pb;
struct ogg *ogg = s->priv_data;
struct ogg_stream *os;
int ret, i = 0;
int flags, nsegs;
uint64_t gp;
uint32_t serial;
int size, idx;
uint8_t sync[4];
int sp = 0;
ret = avio_read(bc, sync, 4);
... | null | null | null | FFmpeg/commit/9b8152bf047bbebe4495b993258591687bcdd36d | avformat/oggdec: Check for av_malloc() failure and forward the error code
Fixes CID1257805
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | ./ffmpeg/libavformat/oggdec.c | c | 2015-02-22T16:52:59Z |
av_cold int ff_dvvideo_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
DVVideoContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
DSPContext dsp;
static int done = 0;
int i, j;
if (!done) {
VLC dv_vlc;
uint16_t new_dv_vlc_bits[NB_DV_VLC*2];
uint8_t new_dv_vlc_len[NB_DV_VLC*2];
uint8_t new_dv_vlc_run[NB_D... | av_cold int ff_dvvideo_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
DVVideoContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
DSPContext dsp;
static int done = 0;
int i, j;
if (!done) {
VLC dv_vlc;
uint16_t new_dv_vlc_bits[NB_DV_VLC*2];
uint8_t new_dv_vlc_len[NB_DV_VLC*2];
uint8_t new_dv_vlc_run[NB_D... | null | null | null | FFmpeg/commit/5e689b65ce9c945c61d0f07394541a0440316757 | dv: zero dsp before init, this fixes use of uninitialized dct_bits
Fixes CID732292
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | ./ffmpeg/libavcodec/dv.c | c | 2012-10-11T23:43:11Z |
@Override
public <T> T executeTemplate(String template, HttpRequest request, Class<? extends DTO<T>> dtoClass) {
T result = null;
String script = wrapTemplate(template);
try {
if (engine != null) {
Compilable compilable = (Compilable) engine;
// Ht... | @Override
public <T> T executeTemplate(String template, HttpRequest request, Class<? extends DTO<T>> dtoClass) {
T result = null;
String script = wrapTemplate(template);
try {
if (!validateTemplate(template)) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("Invalid temp... | null | null | null | https://github.com/mock-server/mockserver/commit/0edf52983230257fb61562d5dd8890be0924a017 | # Issue ID: CVE-2021-32827
# Issue Description: MockServer is open source software which enables easy mocking of any system you integrate with via HTTP or HTTPS. An attacker that can trick a victim into visiting a malicious site while running MockServer locally, will be able to run arbitrary code on the MockServer mac... | mockserver-core/src/main/java/org/mockserver/templates/engine/javascript/JavaScriptTemplateEngine.java | java | 2022-08-31T23:00:05Z |
struct nfs_client *nfs4_alloc_client(const struct nfs_client_initdata *cl_init)
{
int err;
struct nfs_client *clp = nfs_alloc_client(cl_init);
if (IS_ERR(clp))
return clp;
err = nfs_get_cb_ident_idr(clp, cl_init->minorversion);
if (err)
goto error;
if (cl_init->minorversion > NFS4_MAX_MINOR_VERSION) {
err... | struct nfs_client *nfs4_alloc_client(const struct nfs_client_initdata *cl_init)
{
char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 1];
const char *ip_addr = cl_init->ip_addr;
struct nfs_client *clp = nfs_alloc_client(cl_init);
int err;
if (IS_ERR(clp))
return clp;
err = nfs_get_cb_ident_idr(clp, cl_init->minorversion);
if (err)
... | null | CWE-703 | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dd99e9f98fbf423ff6d365b37a98e8879170f17c | NFSv4: Initialise connection to the server in nfs4_alloc_client()
Set up the connection to the NFSv4 server in nfs4_alloc_client(), before
we've added the struct nfs_client to the net-namespace's nfs_client_list
so that a downed server won't cause other mounts to hang in the trunking
detection code.
Reported-by: Mich... | null | null | 2021-06-09T14:04:46Z |
ExecCreateTableAs(ParseState *pstate, CreateTableAsStmt *stmt,
ParamListInfo params, QueryEnvironment *queryEnv,
QueryCompletion *qc)
{
Query *query = castNode(Query, stmt->query);
IntoClause *into = stmt->into;
bool is_matview = (into->viewQuery != NULL);
DestReceiver *dest;
Oid save_userid = In... | ExecCreateTableAs(ParseState *pstate, CreateTableAsStmt *stmt,
ParamListInfo params, QueryEnvironment *queryEnv,
QueryCompletion *qc)
{
Query *query = castNode(Query, stmt->query);
IntoClause *into = stmt->into;
bool is_matview = (into->viewQuery != NULL);
DestReceiver *dest;
Oid save_userid = In... | null | CWE-94 | null | https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/7e92f78abe80e4b30e648a40073abb59057e21f8 | In extensions, don't replace objects not belonging to the extension.
Previously, if an extension script did CREATE OR REPLACE and there was
an existing object not belonging to the extension, it would overwrite
the object and adopt it into the extension. This is problematic, first
because the overwrite is probably uni... | null | null | 2022-08-08T15:12:31Z |
private ResponseEntity<GenericVulnerabilityResponseBean<String>> readFile(
Supplier<Boolean> condition, String fileName) {
if (condition.get()) {
try {
File infoFile =
new File(
this.getClass().getResource("/").toURI... | private ResponseEntity<GenericVulnerabilityResponseBean<String>> readFile(
Supplier<Boolean> condition, String fileName) {
if (condition.get()) {
InputStream infoFileStream =
this.getClass().getResourceAsStream("/scripts/PathTraversal/" + fileName);
if (in... | null | null | null | https://github.com/SasanLabs/VulnerableApp/commit/8ba6d8a37fcab02e0242816bf5f197ff485b6072 | Fixing Path Traversal Vulnerability (#376) | src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/pathTraversal/PathTraversalVulnerability.java | java | 2022-07-24T02:55:46Z |
public async Task<ReadingListDto> GetReadingListDtoByTitleAsync(string title)
{
return await _context.ReadingList
.Where(r => r.Title.Equals(title))
.ProjectTo<ReadingListDto>(_mapper.ConfigurationProvider)
.SingleOrDefaultAsync();
} | public async Task<ReadingListDto> GetReadingListDtoByTitleAsync(int userId, string title)
{
return await _context.ReadingList
.Where(r => r.Title.Equals(title) && r.AppUserId == userId)
.ProjectTo<ReadingListDto>(_mapper.ConfigurationProvider)
.SingleOrDefaultAsync();
... | CVE-2022-2756 | CWE-918 | Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository kareadita/kavita prior to 0.5.4.1. | https://github.com/kareadita/kavita/commit/9c31f7e7c81b919923cb2e3857439ec0d16243e4 | v0.5.4.1 - Security Hotfix (#1414)
* Updated our security file with our Huntr.
* Fixed a security vulnerability where through the API, an unauthorized user could delete/modify reading lists that did not belong to them.
Fixed a bug where when creating a reading list with the name of another users, the API would throw... | ReadingListController.cs | cs | 2022-08-10T16:15:00Z |
static void qtrle_decode_8bpp(QtrleContext *s, int stream_ptr, int row_ptr, int lines_to_change)
{
int rle_code;
int pixel_ptr;
int row_inc = s->frame.linesize[0];
unsigned char pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4;
unsigned char *rgb = s->frame.data[0];
int pixel_limit = s->frame.linesize[0] * s->avctx->height... | static void qtrle_decode_8bpp(QtrleContext *s, int stream_ptr, int row_ptr, int lines_to_change)
{
int rle_code;
int pixel_ptr;
int row_inc = s->frame.linesize[0];
unsigned char pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4;
unsigned char *rgb = s->frame.data[0];
int pixel_limit = s->frame.linesize[0] * s->avctx->height... | null | null | null | FFmpeg/commit/7fb92be7e50ea4ba5712804326c6814ae02dd190 | qtrle: check for out of bound writes.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | ./ffmpeg/libavcodec/qtrle.c | c | 2011-10-08T21:40:36Z |
static void conn_free(struct connectdata *conn)
{
DEBUGASSERT(conn);
Curl_free_idnconverted_hostname(&conn->host);
Curl_free_idnconverted_hostname(&conn->conn_to_host);
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
Curl_free_idnconverted_hostname(&conn->http_proxy.host);
Curl_free_idnconverted_hostname(&conn->socks_proxy.host)... | static void conn_free(struct connectdata *conn)
{
DEBUGASSERT(conn);
Curl_free_idnconverted_hostname(&conn->host);
Curl_free_idnconverted_hostname(&conn->conn_to_host);
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
Curl_free_idnconverted_hostname(&conn->http_proxy.host);
Curl_free_idnconverted_hostname(&conn->socks_proxy.host)... | null | null | null | null | url: check sasl additional parameters for connection reuse.
Also move static function safecmp() as non-static Curl_safecmp() since
its purpose is needed at several places.
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-22576.html
CVE-2022-22576
Closes #8746 | null | null | null |
int mlx4_register_vlan(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port, u16 vlan, int *index)
{
struct mlx4_vlan_table *table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->port[port].vlan_table;
int i, err = 0;
int free = -1;
mutex_lock(&table->mutex);
for (i = MLX4_VLAN_REGULAR; i < MLX4_MAX_VLAN_NUM; i++) {
if (free < 0 && (table->refs[i] == 0)) {
fr... | int mlx4_register_vlan(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port, u16 vlan, int *index)
{
struct mlx4_vlan_table *table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->port[port].vlan_table;
int i, err = 0;
int free = -1;
mutex_lock(&table->mutex);
for (i = MLX4_VLAN_REGULAR; i < MLX4_MAX_VLAN_NUM; i++) {
if (free < 0 && (table->refs[i] == 0)) {
fr... | CVE-2010-5332 | CWE-119 | In the Linux kernel before 2.6.37, an out of bounds array access happened in drivers/net/mlx4/port.c. When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0926f91083f34d047abc74f1ca4fa6a9c161f7db | mlx4_en: Fix out of bounds array access
When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or
mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without
updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. Fix
this by adding a proper check outside the loop.
Signed-of... | port.c | c | 2010-10-25T02:56:47Z |
public function getUsersByJSON() {
$modelname = $this->basemodel_name;
$results = 25; // default get 25
$startIndex = 0; // default start at 0
$sort = null; // default don't sort
$dir = 'asc'; // default sort dir is asc
$sort_dir = SORT_ASC;
// How many records t... | public function getUsersByJSON() {
$modelname = $this->basemodel_name;
$results = 25; // default get 25
$startIndex = 0; // default start at 0
$sort = null; // default don't sort
$dir = 'asc'; // default sort dir is asc
$sort_dir = SORT_ASC;
// How many records t... | CVE-2016-7780 | CWE-89 | SQL injection vulnerability in cron/find_help.php in Exponent CMS 2.3.9 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the version parameter. | https://github.com/exponentcms/exponent-cms/commit/a8efd9ca71fc9b8b843ad0910d435d237482ee31 | second effort to greatly enhance system security (xss, sql inject, file exploit, rce, etc...), thanks to felixk3y | storeController.php | php | 2017-03-07T16:59:00Z |
search_memslots(struct kvm_memslots *slots, gfn_t gfn)
{
int start = 0, end = slots->used_slots;
int slot = atomic_read(&slots->lru_slot);
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslots = slots->memslots;
if (gfn >= memslots[slot].base_gfn &&
gfn < memslots[slot].base_gfn + memslots[slot].npages)
return &memslots[slot];
... | search_memslots(struct kvm_memslots *slots, gfn_t gfn)
{
int start = 0, end = slots->used_slots;
int slot = atomic_read(&slots->lru_slot);
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslots = slots->memslots;
if (unlikely(!slots->used_slots))
return NULL;
if (gfn >= memslots[slot].base_gfn &&
gfn < memslots[slot].base_gfn ... | CVE-2020-36313 | CWE-416 | An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.7. The KVM subsystem allows out-of-range access to memslots after a deletion, aka CID-0774a964ef56. This affects arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c, include/linux/kvm_host.h, and virt/kvm/kvm_main.c. | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=0774a964ef561b7170d8d1b1bfe6f88002b6d219 | KVM: Fix out of range accesses to memslots
Reset the LRU slot if it becomes invalid when deleting a memslot to fix
an out-of-bounds/use-after-free access when searching through memslots.
Explicitly check for there being no used slots in search_memslots(), and
in the caller of s390's approximation variant.
Fixes: 369... | kvm_host.h | h | null |
static int phar_build(zend_object_iterator *iter, void *puser) /* {{{ */
{
zval *value;
zend_bool close_fp = 1;
struct _phar_t *p_obj = (struct _phar_t*) puser;
uint32_t str_key_len, base_len = p_obj->l;
phar_entry_data *data;
php_stream *fp;
size_t fname_len;
size_t contents_len;
char *fname, *error = NULL, *... | static int phar_build(zend_object_iterator *iter, void *puser) /* {{{ */
{
zval *value;
zend_bool close_fp = 1;
struct _phar_t *p_obj = (struct _phar_t*) puser;
uint32_t str_key_len, base_len = p_obj->l;
phar_entry_data *data;
php_stream *fp;
size_t fname_len;
size_t contents_len;
char *fname, *error = NULL, *... | CVE-2020-7063 | CWE-281 | In PHP versions 7.2.x below 7.2.28, 7.3.x below 7.3.15 and 7.4.x below 7.4.3, when creating PHAR archive using PharData::buildFromIterator() function, the files are added with default permissions (0666, or all access) even if the original files on the filesystem were with more restrictive permissions. This may result i... | http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=e5c95234d87fcb8f6b7569a96a89d1e1544749a6 | Fix bug #79082 - Files added to tar with Phar::buildFromIterator have all-access permissions | phar_object.c | c | null |
public boolean areEdgePointsOk() {
return (level!=null && level.isClientSide) ? clientInfo.edgePointsOk : edgePointsOk;
} | public boolean areEdgePointsOk() {
return (level!=null && level.isClientSide && clientInfo != null) ? clientInfo.edgePointsOk : edgePointsOk;
} | null | null | null | https://github.com/Layers-of-Railways/Railway/commit/ced7c2419b72942738ab6a10a7dd8347d9dcd1b0 | Better wording, fix crash | src/main/java/com/railwayteam/railways/content/coupling/coupler/TrackCouplerTileEntity.java | java | 2023-01-03T00:00:06Z |
void yajl_string_decode(yajl_buf buf, const unsigned char * str,
unsigned int len)
{
unsigned int beg = 0;
unsigned int end = 0;
while (end < len) {
if (str[end] == '\\') {
char utf8Buf[5];
const char * unescaped = "?";
yajl_buf_append... | void yajl_string_decode(yajl_buf buf, const unsigned char * str,
unsigned int len)
{
unsigned int beg = 0;
unsigned int end = 0;
while (end < len) {
if (str[end] == '\\') {
char utf8Buf[5];
const char * unescaped = "?";
yajl_buf_append... | CVE-2017-16516 | CWE-134 | In the yajl-ruby gem 1.3.0 for Ruby, when a crafted JSON file is supplied to Yajl::Parser.new.parse, the whole ruby process crashes with a SIGABRT in the yajl_string_decode function in yajl_encode.c. This results in the whole ruby process terminating and potentially a denial of service. | https://github.com/brianmario/yajl-ruby/commit/a8ca8f476655adaa187eedc60bdc770fff3c51ce | Don't advance our end pointer until we've checked we have enough
buffer left and have peeked ahead to see that a unicode escape
is approaching.
Thanks @kivikakk for helping me track down the actual bug here! | yajl_encode.c | c | 2017-11-07T05:46:42Z |
text : Ext.util.Format.htmlEncode(this.app.i18n._hidden(attr.name)),
qtip : Tine.Tinebase.common.doubleEncode(attr.description ? this.app.i18n._hidden(attr.description) + ' ' + addText : addText),
selected : attr.id === this.selectedFilterId,
id : ... | text: Ext.util.Format.htmlEncode(nodeName),
path: nodeData.path,
name: nodeData.name,
nodeRecord: newNodeRecord,
account_grants: nodeData.account_grants,
id: nodeData.id
});
newNode.attributes.nodeRecord.beginEdit();
newNode.at... | CVE-2017-14921 | CWE-79 | Stored XSS vulnerability via IMG element at "Filename" of Filemanager in Tine 2.0 Community Edition before 2017.08.4 allows an authenticated user to inject JavaScript, which is mishandled during rendering by the application administrator and other users. | https://github.com/tine20/Tine-2.0-Open-Source-Groupware-and-CRM/commit/bc8a6fbd3128cf5ef27d808f6c6ba869fdc2262b | name might not be displayed correctly
Change-Id: I949c7a80b5356f393d269d3004bd6800772ac63b
Reviewed-on: http://gerrit.tine20.com/customers/5618
Reviewed-by: Cornelius Weiss <c.weiss@metaways.de>
Tested-by: Cornelius Weiss <c.weiss@metaways.de> | GridRenderer.js | js | 2017-09-30T01:29:00Z |
def real_download(self, filename, info_dict):
self.report_destination(filename)
tmpfilename = self.temp_name(filename)
try:
started = time.time()
retval = self._call_downloader(tmpfilename, info_dict)
except KeyboardInterrupt:
if not info_dict.get('is... | def real_download(self, filename, info_dict):
self.report_destination(filename)
tmpfilename = self.temp_name(filename)
self._cookies_tempfile = None
try:
started = time.time()
retval = self._call_downloader(tmpfilename, info_dict)
except KeyboardInterrupt... | null | null | null | https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/1ceb657bdd254ad961489e5060f2ccc7d556b729 | [fd/external] Scope cookies
- ffmpeg: Calculate cookies from cookiejar and pass with `-cookies` arg instead of `-headers`
- aria2c, curl, wget: Write cookiejar to file and use external FD built-in cookiejar support
- httpie: Calculate cookies from cookiejar instead of `http_headers`
- axel: Calculate cookies from cook... | yt_dlp/downloader/external.py | py | 2023-07-05T20:16:28Z |
static int RsaUnPad(const byte *pkcsBlock, unsigned int pkcsBlockLen,
byte **output, byte padValue)
{
word32 maxOutputLen = (pkcsBlockLen > 10) ? (pkcsBlockLen - 10) : 0;
word32 invalid = 0;
word32 i = 1;
word32 outputLen;
if (output == NULL || pkcsBlo... | static int RsaUnPad(const byte *pkcsBlock, unsigned int pkcsBlockLen,
byte **output, byte padValue)
{
int ret;
word32 i;
byte invalid = 0;
if (output == NULL || pkcsBlockLen == 0) {
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
if (padValue == RSA_BLOCK_TYPE_1) {
/* First byt... | null | null | null | https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/commit/ab03f9291b040269ae21d33b9f01529ed8311728 | Make RsaUnPad constant time when Block Type 2 message | wolfcrypt/src/rsa.c | c | 2018-08-27T00:16:40Z |
RenderWidgetHostView* RenderFrameHostManager::GetRenderWidgetHostView() const {
if (interstitial_page_)
return interstitial_page_->GetView();
if (render_frame_host_)
return render_frame_host_->GetView();
return nullptr;
} | RenderWidgetHostView* RenderFrameHostManager::GetRenderWidgetHostView() const {
if (delegate_->GetInterstitialForRenderManager())
return delegate_->GetInterstitialForRenderManager()->GetView();
if (render_frame_host_)
return render_frame_host_->GetView();
return nullptr;
} | CVE-2017-5104 | CWE-20 | Inappropriate implementation in interstitials in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the omnibox via a crafted HTML page. | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/adca986a53b31b6da4cb22f8e755f6856daea89a | Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug... | content/browser/frame_host/render_frame_host_manager.cc | cc | 2017-06-16T19:12:11Z |
func TestInvalidPaddingOpen(t *testing.T) {
key := make([]byte, 32)
nonce := make([]byte, 16)
// Plaintext with invalid padding
plaintext := padBuffer(make([]byte, 28), aes.BlockSize)
plaintext[len(plaintext)-1] = 0xFF
io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, key)
io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, nonce)
block, _ := aes.NewCipher(ke... | func TestInvalidPaddingOpen(t *testing.T) {
key := make([]byte, 32)
nonce := make([]byte, 16)
// Plaintext with invalid padding
plaintext := padBuffer(make([]byte, 28), aes.BlockSize)
plaintext[len(plaintext)-1] = 0xFF
io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, key)
io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, nonce)
block, _ := aes.NewCipher(ke... | CVE-2016-9123 | CWE-190 | go-jose before 1.0.5 suffers from a CBC-HMAC integer overflow on 32-bit architectures. An integer overflow could lead to authentication bypass for CBC-HMAC encrypted ciphertexts on 32-bit architectures. | https://github.com/square/go-jose/commit/789a4c4bd4c118f7564954f441b29c153ccd6a96 | Use uint64 for all size calculations, size checks | cbc_hmac.go | go | 2017-03-28T02:59:00Z |
public void close() {
Opus.INSTANCE.opus_encoder_destroy(opusEncoder);
} | public void close() {
if(this.closed) {
return;
}
this.closed = true;
VoiceClient.LOGGER.info("Close opus encoder");
Opus.INSTANCE.opus_encoder_destroy(opusEncoder);
} | null | null | null | https://github.com/plasmoapp/plasmo-voice/commit/ef59404b15e45005a230bfe64972e26dcc87341c | Improved Icons.
Bugs fixed:
- Microphone audio breaks If you close voice settings during a microphone test
- Clicking on an empty space in the social menu causes crash
- Probably fixed crashes caused by decoders and encoders not closing properly
- Client can freeze after leaving a server | src/main/java/su/plo/voice/sound/OpusEncoder.java | java | 2021-04-20T06:54:53Z |
bool ParamTraits<AudioParameters>::Read(const Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter,
AudioParameters* r) {
int format, channel_layout, sample_rate, bits_per_sample,
frames_per_buffer, channels;
if (!m->ReadInt(iter, &format) ||
... | bool ParamTraits<AudioParameters>::Read(const Message* m,
PickleIterator* iter,
AudioParameters* r) {
int format, channel_layout, sample_rate, bits_per_sample,
frames_per_buffer, channels;
if (!m->ReadInt(iter, &format) ||
... | CVE-2012-5149 | CWE-189 | Integer overflow in the audio IPC layer in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors. | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/503bea2643350c6378de5f7a268b85cf2480e1ac | Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | content/common/media/audio_param_traits.cc | cc | 2012-12-19T20:26:16Z |
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::fill_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
unsigned nPortIndex = 0;
if (dynamic_buf_mode) {
private_handle_t *handle = NULL;
struct VideoDecoderOutputMetaData *meta;
unsigned int nPortIndex = 0;
if (!buffer || !buffer->... | OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::fill_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
if (m_state != OMX_StateExecuting &&
m_state != OMX_StatePause &&
m_state != OMX_StateIdle) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("FTB in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIn... | CVE-2016-3746 | NVD-CWE-Other | Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 vdec component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal b... | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf | DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug... | mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp | cpp | null |
int vm_stop(RunState state)
{
if (qemu_in_vcpu_thread()) {
qemu_system_vmstop_request(state);
cpu_stop_current();
return 0;
}
return do_vm_stop(state);
} | int vm_stop(RunState state)
{
if (qemu_in_vcpu_thread()) {
qemu_system_vmstop_request_prepare();
qemu_system_vmstop_request(state);
cpu_stop_current();
return 0;
}
return do_vm_stop(state);
} | null | null | null | qemu/commit/74892d2468b9f0c56b915ce94848d6f7fac39740 | vl: allow other threads to do qemu_system_vmstop_request
There patch protects vmstop_requested with a lock and introduces
qemu_system_vmstop_request_prepare.
Together with the new call to qemu_vmstop_requested in vm_start,
qemu_system_vmstop_request_prepare avoids a race where the VM could remain
stopped even though ... | ./qemu/cpus.c | c | 2014-06-05T12:53:58Z |
recv_and_process_client_pkt(void /*int fd*/)
{
ssize_t size;
len_and_sockaddr *to;
struct sockaddr *from;
msg_t msg;
uint8_t query_status;
l_fixedpt_t query_xmttime;
to = get_sock_lsa(G_listen_fd);
from = xzalloc(to->len);
size = recv_from_to(G_listen_fd, &msg, sizeof(msg),... | recv_and_process_client_pkt(void /*int fd*/)
{
ssize_t size;
len_and_sockaddr *to;
struct sockaddr *from;
msg_t msg;
uint8_t query_status;
l_fixedpt_t query_xmttime;
to = get_sock_lsa(G_listen_fd);
from = xzalloc(to->len);
size = recv_from_to(G_listen_fd, &msg, sizeof(msg),... | CVE-2016-6301 | CWE-399 | The recv_and_process_client_pkt function in networking/ntpd.c in busybox allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU and bandwidth consumption) via a forged NTP packet, which triggers a communication loop. | https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=150dc7a2b483b8338a3e185c478b4b23ee884e71 | ntpd: respond only to client and symmetric active packets
The busybox NTP implementation doesn't check the NTP mode of packets
received on the server port and responds to any packet with the right
size. This includes responses from another NTP server. An attacker can
send a packet with a spoofed source address in orde... | null | null | null |
static void append_options(DBusMessageIter *iter, void *user_data)
{
struct pending_op *op = user_data;
const char *path = device_get_path(op->device);
struct bt_gatt_server *server;
const char *link;
uint16_t mtu;
switch (op->link_type) {
case BT_ATT_BREDR:
link = "BR/EDR";
break;
case BT_ATT_LE:
link =... | static void append_options(DBusMessageIter *iter, void *user_data)
{
struct pending_op *op = user_data;
struct btd_device *device = att_get_device(op->att);
const char *path = device_get_path(device);
struct bt_gatt_server *server;
const char *link;
uint16_t mtu;
switch (op->link_type) {
case BT_ATT_BREDR:
l... | CVE-2021-43400 | CWE-416 | An issue was discovered in gatt-database.c in BlueZ 5.61. A use-after-free can occur when a client disconnects during D-Bus processing of a WriteValue call. | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/bluetooth/bluez.git/commit/?id=838c0dc7641e1c991c0f3027bf94bee4606012f8 | gatt: Fix not cleaning up when disconnected
There is a current use after free possible on a gatt server if a client
disconnects while a WriteValue call is being processed with dbus.
This patch includes the addition of a pending disconnect callback to handle
cleanup better if a disconnect occurs during a write, an acq... | null | null | null |
public static void finish(List<Option> options) {
ConfigSpec spec = new ConfigSpec();
for (Option o : options) {
spec.define(o.getName(), o.getDefaultValue());
}
CommentedFileConfig configData = read(Paths.get("config", Constants.MODID + "-mixin.toml"));
for (Option o... | public static void finish(List<Option> options) {
ConfigSpec spec = new ConfigSpec();
for (Option o : options) {
spec.define(o.getName(), o.getDefaultValue());
}
CommentedFileConfig configData = read(
FMLPaths.CONFIGDIR.get().resolve(Constants.MODID + "-mixin.... | null | null | null | https://github.com/malte0811/FerriteCore/commit/069524ff876e17da7c06d4de2137f95ed70b6e27 | Forge: Fix crash when CWD does not match instance directory | Forge/src/main/java/malte0811/ferritecore/mixin/platform/ConfigFileHandler.java | java | 2022-11-08T08:12:17Z |
static int coroutine_fn bdrv_co_do_pwrite_zeroes(BlockDriverState *bs,
int64_t offset, int count, BdrvRequestFlags flags)
{
BlockDriver *drv = bs->drv;
QEMUIOVector qiov;
struct iovec iov = {0};
int ret = 0;
bool need_flush = false;
int head = 0;
int tail = 0;
int max_write_zeroes = ... | static int coroutine_fn bdrv_co_do_pwrite_zeroes(BlockDriverState *bs,
int64_t offset, int count, BdrvRequestFlags flags)
{
BlockDriver *drv = bs->drv;
QEMUIOVector qiov;
struct iovec iov = {0};
int ret = 0;
bool need_flush = false;
int head = 0;
int tail = 0;
int max_write_zeroes = ... | null | null | null | qemu/commit/b2f95feec5e4d546b932848dd421ec3361e8ef77 | block: Let write zeroes fallback work even with small max_transfer
Commit 443668ca rewrote the write_zeroes logic to guarantee that
an unaligned request never crosses a cluster boundary. But
in the rewrite, the new code assumed that at most one iteration
would be needed to get to an alignment boundary.
However, it i... | ./qemu/block/io.c | c | 2016-11-17T20:13:56Z |
WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo *image_info,
const int argc,const char **argv,Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
ImageInfo
*mogrify_info;
MagickStatusType
status;
PixelInterpolateMethod
interpolate_method;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info... | WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo *image_info,
const int argc,const char **argv,Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
ImageInfo
*mogrify_info;
MagickStatusType
status;
PixelInterpolateMethod
interpolate_method;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info... | CVE-2017-18252 | CWE-617 | An issue was discovered in ImageMagick 7.0.7. The MogrifyImageList function in MagickWand/mogrify.c allows attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure and application exit in ReplaceImageInList) via a crafted file. | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/12f34b60564de1cbec08e23e2413dab5b64daeb7 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/802 | mogrify.c | c | 2017-09-30T14:15:29Z |
static int sh_op(RAnal *anal, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *data, int len) {
ut8 op_MSB,op_LSB;
int ret;
if (!data)
return 0;
memset (op, '\0', sizeof (RAnalOp));
op->addr = addr;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK;
op->jump = op->fail = -1;
op->ptr = op->val = -1;
op->size = 2;
op_MSB = anal->big_e... | static int sh_op(RAnal *anal, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *data, int len) {
ut8 op_MSB,op_LSB;
int ret;
if (!data || len < 2) {
return 0;
}
memset (op, '\0', sizeof (RAnalOp));
op->addr = addr;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK;
op->jump = op->fail = -1;
op->ptr = op->val = -1;
op->size = 2;
op_M... | CVE-2018-11384 | CWE-125 | The sh_op() function in radare2 2.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted ELF file. | https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/77c47cf873dd55b396da60baa2ca83bbd39e4add | Fix #9903 - oobread in RAnal.sh | anal_sh.c | c | 2018-04-18T11:26:49Z |
int amqp_handle_input(amqp_connection_state_t state, amqp_bytes_t received_data,
amqp_frame_t *decoded_frame) {
size_t bytes_consumed;
void *raw_frame;
/* Returning frame_type of zero indicates either insufficient input,
or a complete, ignored frame was read. */
decoded_frame->frame_... | int amqp_handle_input(amqp_connection_state_t state, amqp_bytes_t received_data,
amqp_frame_t *decoded_frame) {
size_t bytes_consumed;
void *raw_frame;
/* Returning frame_type of zero indicates either insufficient input,
or a complete, ignored frame was read. */
decoded_frame->frame_... | CVE-2019-18609 | CWE-20 | An issue was discovered in amqp_handle_input in amqp_connection.c in rabbitmq-c 0.9.0. There is an integer overflow that leads to heap memory corruption in the handling of CONNECTION_STATE_HEADER. A rogue server could return a malicious frame header that leads to a smaller target_size value than needed. This condition ... | https://github.com/alanxz/rabbitmq-c/commit/fc85be7123050b91b054e45b91c78d3241a5047a | lib: check frame_size is >= INT32_MAX
When parsing a frame header, validate that the frame_size is less than
or equal to INT32_MAX. Given frame_max is limited between 0 and
INT32_MAX in amqp_login and friends, this does not change the API.
This prevents a potential buffer overflow when a malicious client sends
a fram... | amqp_connection.c | c | 2019-11-04T07:50:07Z |
static int bcm_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net;
struct bcm_sock *bo;
struct bcm_op *op, *next;
if (!sk)
return 0;
net = sock_net(sk);
bo = bcm_sk(sk);
/* remove bcm_ops, timer, rx_unregister(), etc. */
spin_lock(&bcm_notifier_lock);
while (bcm_busy_notifier == ... | static int bcm_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net;
struct bcm_sock *bo;
struct bcm_op *op, *next;
if (!sk)
return 0;
net = sock_net(sk);
bo = bcm_sk(sk);
/* remove bcm_ops, timer, rx_unregister(), etc. */
spin_lock(&bcm_notifier_lock);
while (bcm_busy_notifier == ... | null | CWE-362 | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d5f9023fa61ee8b94f37a93f08e94b136cf1e463 | can: bcm: delay release of struct bcm_op after synchronize_rcu()
can_rx_register() callbacks may be called concurrently to the call to
can_rx_unregister(). The callbacks and callback data, though, are
protected by RCU and the struct sock reference count.
So the callback data is really attached to the life of sk, mean... | null | null | 2021-06-19T16:18:13Z |
static void gen_check_sr(DisasContext *dc, uint32_t sr)
{
if (!xtensa_option_bits_enabled(dc->config, sregnames[sr].opt_bits)) {
if (sregnames[sr].name) {
qemu_log("SR %s is not configured\n", sregnames[sr].name);
} else {
qemu_log("SR %d is not implemented\n", sr);
}... | static void gen_check_sr(DisasContext *dc, uint32_t sr, unsigned access)
{
if (!xtensa_option_bits_enabled(dc->config, sregnames[sr].opt_bits)) {
if (sregnames[sr].name) {
qemu_log("SR %s is not configured\n", sregnames[sr].name);
} else {
qemu_log("SR %d is not implemented\n... | null | null | null | qemu/commit/53593e90d13264dc88b3281ddf75ceaa641df05a | target-xtensa: better control rsr/wsr/xsr access to SRs
There are read-only (DEBUGCAUSE, PRID) and write-only (INTCLEAR) SRs,
and INTERRUPT/INTSET SR allows rsr/wsr, but not xsr. Raise illeagal
opcode exception on illegal access to these SRs.
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Blue Swirl ... | ./qemu/target-xtensa/translate.c | c | 2012-12-05T03:15:23Z |
static void blend_frame(AVFilterContext *ctx,
AVFrame *top_buf,
AVFrame *bottom_buf,
AVFrame *dst_buf)
{
BlendContext *b = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *inlink = ctx->inputs[0];
FilterParams *param;
int plane;
for (plane = 0; dst_buf... | static void blend_frame(AVFilterContext *ctx,
AVFrame *top_buf,
AVFrame *bottom_buf,
AVFrame *dst_buf)
{
BlendContext *b = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *inlink = ctx->inputs[0];
FilterParams *param;
int plane;
for (plane = 0; plane <... | null | null | null | FFmpeg/commit/990b13806d38f51201afb4e5048c61bf3e1c576e | lavfi/blend: use correct way to check number of planes
This fix crash with gray, as its marked as pseudopal,
and thus have extra plane.
Signed-off-by: Paul B Mahol <onemda@gmail.com> | ./ffmpeg/libavfilter/vf_blend.c | c | 2013-05-02T12:09:28Z |
static File createTempDir(String prefix) throws IOException {
File dir;
for (int i = 0; i < maxTempFileAttempts; i++) {
dir = File.createTempFile(prefix, "");
if (dir.delete() && dir.mkdirs()) {
return dir;
}
}
throw new RuntimeExceptio... | static File createTempDir(String prefix) throws IOException {
File dir;
for (int i = 0; i < maxTempFileAttempts; i++) {
dir = Files.createTempDirectory(prefix).toFile();
if (true) {
return dir;
}
}
throw new RuntimeException("Failed to ... | null | null | null | https://github.com/nativelibs4java/BridJ/commit/c539f97cfdf2e5fd844bd225cfb402658e2c2cb9 | vuln-fix: Temporary Directory Hijacking or Information Disclosure
This fixes either Temporary Directory Hijacking, or Temporary Directory Local Information Disclosure.
Weakness: CWE-379: Creation of Temporary File in Directory with Insecure Permissions
Severity: High
CVSSS: 7.3
Detection: CodeQL & OpenRewrite (https:... | src/main/java/org/bridj/Platform.java | java | 2022-07-27T16:35:22Z |
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