Update spore_dataset.jsonl

spore_dataset.jsonl

@@ -79,4 +79,9 @@
 {"text": "TSIG Transaction Signature\n\nC, S : principal\nK : symkey\nN1, N2 : nonce\nM1, M2 : text\nTAG1, TAG2 : text\nH : hash_func\n\n1. C -> S : TAG1, M1, {H(TAG1, M1), N1}K\n2. S -> C : TAG2, M1, M2, {H(TAG2, M1, M2), N2}K\n\nThe protocol must provide weak authentication of the Client to the Server and weak authentication of the Server to the Client. TSIG allows for transaction level authentication using shared secrets and one-way hashing. It can be used to authenticate dynamic DNS updates as coming from an approved client, or to authenticate responses as coming from an approved recursive name server. M1 represents a DNS request from the client and M2 is the corresponding response. The timestamps N1 and N2 ensure freshness of messages."}
 {"text": "TESLA: Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication\n\nS, R: principal\nK_N: random symmetric key generated by S\nK_i: keys derived from K_N using a one-way function F\nM_i: messages broadcast by S\nN: total number of messages\nF: one-way hash function\ntext: generic message content\n\n1. S -> R: {N, K_0}inv(K_S) where K_0 = F^N(K_N)\n2. For i = 1 to N-1, S -> R: M_i, hash(K_i, M_i), K{i-1}\n\nAuthenticity: Receiver R can verify that messages originate from sender S using the keyed hash and one-way function chain.\nIntegrity: Contents of each message are protected by the keyed hash function.\nFreshness: The chain of keys K_i derived from K_N ensures that each message can be verified in order and prevents replay attacks."}
 {"text": "UMTS-AKA: Authentication and Key Agreement\n\nS, M: principal (Server, Mobile)\nk(M): shared secret key between S and M\nseq: sequence number maintained by both S and M\nr: random nonce generated by S\nF1, F2, F3, F4, F5: cryptographic hash or one-way functions\nCK, IK, KA: session keys derived from k(M) and r\nAUTN: authentication token\n\n1. M -> S: M\n2. S -> M: r; {seq}_Ka; F1(k(M); seq; r)\n3. M computes KA, seq, and verifies F1(k(M); seq; r); if valid, increments seq\n4. M -> S: F2(k(M); r)\n\nAuthenticity: Both S and M can verify each other’s identity using cryptographic functions and sequence numbers.\nIntegrity: Messages are protected by keyed hashes ensuring they have not been modified.\nFreshness: The nonce r and sequence numbers prevent replay attacks and ensure messages are fresh.\nSecrecy: CK and IK are shared securely between S and M for subsequent secure communication."}
-{"text": "SRP: Secure Remote Passwords\n\nA, B: principal (Client, Server)\nPassword: shared secret between A and B\nSalt: random value known to server, used to prevent dictionary attacks\nG: generator for Diffie-Hellman exponentiation\nNa, Nb: nonces generated by A and B respectively\nV: password verifier = g^x mod N, with x = SHA(salt | SHA(A | ':' | Password))\nDHX, DHY: Diffie-Hellman public values\nK: session key derived from DH values and verifier\nM: proof of key, H(A,B,K,...)\n\n1. A -> B: A, G^Na\n2. B -> A: Salt, {G^Nb}_V\n3. A -> B: M\n4. B -> A: H(G^Na, M, K)\n\nAuthenticity: Both parties authenticate each other via M and H(G^Na, M, K).\nIntegrity: Messages are protected by cryptographic hashes.\nSecrecy: The session key K remains secret; password is never transmitted.\nReplay Protection: Nonces Na and Nb ensure freshness and prevent replay attacks."}
+{"text": "SRP: Secure Remote Passwords\n\nA, B: principal (Client, Server)\nPassword: shared secret between A and B\nSalt: random value known to server, used to prevent dictionary attacks\nG: generator for Diffie-Hellman exponentiation\nNa, Nb: nonces generated by A and B respectively\nV: password verifier = g^x mod N, with x = SHA(salt | SHA(A | ':' | Password))\nDHX, DHY: Diffie-Hellman public values\nK: session key derived from DH values and verifier\nM: proof of key, H(A,B,K,...)\n\n1. A -> B: A, G^Na\n2. B -> A: Salt, {G^Nb}_V\n3. A -> B: M\n4. B -> A: H(G^Na, M, K)\n\nAuthenticity: Both parties authenticate each other via M and H(G^Na, M, K).\nIntegrity: Messages are protected by cryptographic hashes.\nSecrecy: The session key K remains secret; password is never transmitted.\nReplay Protection: Nonces Na and Nb ensure freshness and prevent replay attacks."}
+{"text": "SAML-based SSO for Google Apps (SP-initiated, Google unsafe variant)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nID, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> SP : URI\n2. SP -> C : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n3. C -> IdP : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n4. IdP -> C : SP, {C, IdP}inv(KIdP), URI\n5. C -> SP : SP, {C, IdP}inv(KIdP), URI\n6. SP -> C : Resource\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Resource: in every session, the value of Resource must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C and SP. The protocol must ensure authentication: SP must verify that the URI originates from C, and C must verify that Resource originates from SP. This is a Single Sign-On protocol where the Identity Provider (IdP) authenticates the client to the Service Provider using signed assertions."}
+{"text": "SAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (IdP-initiated with back channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDaa, IDresolve, Resource, REF : text\n\n1. C -> IdP : C, URI, SP\n2. IdP -> C : SP, IdP, REF\n3. C -> SP : IdP, REF\n4. SP -> IdP : IDresolve, SP, IdP, REF\n5. IdP -> SP : IDresolve, IdP, URI, IDaa, SP, IdP, C, URI\n6. SP -> C : URI, Resource\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Resource: in every session, the value of Resource must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C and SP. The protocol must ensure authentication: SP must verify that the URI originates from C, and C must verify that Resource originates from SP. The protocol uses artifact references (REF) and back channels between SP and IdP for secure assertion resolution. The IdP maintains a set of artifacts that are consumed once to prevent replay attacks. This is an Identity Provider-initiated Single Sign-On protocol where the IdP creates authentication assertions that are resolved through a secure back channel."}
+{"text": "SAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (IdP-initiated with front channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDaa, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> IdP : C, URI, SP\n2. IdP -> C : IdP, URI, IDaa, SP, IdP, C, URI\n3. C -> SP : IDaa, IdP, URI, SP, C\n4. SP -> C : URI, Resource\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Resource: in every session, the value of Resource must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C and SP. The protocol must ensure authentication: SP must verify that the URI originates from C, and C must verify that Resource originates from SP. This is an Identity Provider-initiated Single Sign-On protocol where the IdP creates an authentication assertion (IDaa) without a prior request from SP. The SP maintains a set of consumed assertions to prevent replay attacks. All communications use front channels through the client browser."}
+{"text": "SAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (SP-initiated with back channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDar, IDaa, IDresolve_1, IDresolve_2, Resource, REF_1, REF_2 : text\n\n1. C -> SP : C, URI\n2. SP -> C : IdP, SP, REF_1\n3. C -> IdP : C, SP, REF_1\n4. IdP -> SP : IDresolve_1, IdP, SP, REF_1\n5. SP -> IdP : IDresolve_1, SP, IdP, IDar, URI\n6. IdP -> C : SP, IdP, REF_2\n7. C -> SP : IdP, REF_2\n8. SP -> IdP : IDresolve_2, SP, IdP, REF_2\n9. IdP -> SP : IDresolve_2, IdP, URI, IDar, {SP, IdP, C, IDaa, URI}inv(KIdP)\n10. SP -> C : URI, Resource\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Resource: in every session, the value of Resource must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C and SP. The protocol must ensure authentication: SP must verify that the URI originates from C, and C must verify that Resource originates from SP. This is a Service Provider-initiated Single Sign-On protocol using the artifact binding profile with back channels. Authentication requests and responses are not sent directly through the client but are instead referenced by artifacts (REF_1, REF_2) which are resolved through secure back channels between SP and IdP. The signed assertion {SP, IdP, C, IDaa, URI}inv(KIdP) ensures the authenticity and integrity of the authentication information. The SP maintains a set of consumed assertions (IDaa) to prevent replay attacks."}
+{"text": "SAML-based SSO for Google Apps (SP-initiated with front channels, fixed variant)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nID, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> SP : URI\n2. SP -> C : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n3. C -> IdP : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n4. IdP -> C : SP, {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP), URI\n5. C -> SP : SP, {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP), URI\n6. SP -> C : Resource\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Resource: in every session, the value of Resource must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C and SP. The protocol must ensure authentication: SP must verify that the URI originates from C, and C must verify that Resource originates from SP. This is a Service Provider-initiated Single Sign-On protocol using only front channels through the client browser. The SP generates a unique authentication request identifier (ID) and verifies it upon receiving the signed assertion from the IdP. The signed assertion {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP) includes the SP identifier to prevent the assertion from being used at a different service provider, fixing a vulnerability in the original Google Apps implementation where assertions did not bind to specific service providers."}