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instruction.jsonl

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-{"text": "Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> B : A, {Na}Kab \n 2. B -> A : {succNa, Nb}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {succNb}Kab \n 4. B -> A : {K'ab, N'b}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of the new shared key K’ab: in every session, the value of K’ab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A and B. The protocol must guaranty the authenticity of K’ab: in every session, on reception of message 4, A must be ensured that the key K’ab in the message has been created by A in the same session."}
-{"text": "BAN modified Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> B : A, {Na}Kab \n 2. B -> A : {succNa, Nb}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {succNb}Kab \n 4. B -> A : {K'ab, N'b, Na}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of the new shared key K’ab: in every session, the value of K’ab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A and B. The protocol must guaranty the authenticity of K’ab: in every session, on reception of message 4, A must be ensured that the key K’ab in the message has been created by A in the same session."}
-{"text": "BAN concrete Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> A : {Na, K'ab}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {Na}K'ab \n 4. B -> A : Nb\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of the new shared key K’ab: in every session, the value of K’ab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A and B. The protocol must guaranty the authenticity of K’ab: in every session, on reception of message 4, A must be ensured that the key K’ab in the message has been created by A in the same session."}
-{"text": "Lowe modified BAN concrete Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> A : {Na, K'ab, B}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {Na}K'ab \n 4. B -> A : Nb\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of the new shared key K’ab: in every session, the value of K’ab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A and B. The protocol must guaranty the authenticity of K’ab: in every session, on reception of message 4, A must be ensured that the key K’ab in the message has been created by A in the same session."}
-{"text": "Bull's Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B, C, S : principal \n Kab, Kbc : fresh symkey \n Na, Nb, Nc : fresh number \n Kas, Kbs, Kcs : symkey \n h : message, symkey -> message \n A computes Xa = h((A,B,Na),Kas), (A,B,Na) \n 1. A -> B : Xa \n B computes Xb = h((B,C,Nb,Xa),Kbs), (B,C,Nb,Xa)\n 2. B -> C : Xb \n C computes Xc = h((C,S,Nc,Xb),Kcs), (C,S,Nc,Xb)\n 3. C -> S : Xc \n 4. S -> C : A, B, Kab xor h(Na,Kas), {A,B,Na}Kab, \n B, A, Kab xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,A,Nb}Kab, \n B, C, Kbc xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,C,Nb}Kbc, \n C, B, Kbc xor h(Nc,Kcs), {C,B,Nc}Kbc \n 5. C -> B : A, B, Kab xor h(Na,Kas), {A,B,Na}Kab, \n B, A, Kab xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,A,Nb}Kab, \n B, C, Kbc xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,C,Nb}Kbc \n 6. B -> A : A, B, Kab xor h(Na,Kas), {A,B,Na}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kxy. Each key Kxy should be known to exactly x and y (and also S), even if some nodes other than x and y are malicious."}
-{"text": "CAM\n\nM,C : principal \n Tm : timestamp \n PK,SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n HoA : principal -> address \n CoA : principal -> address \n i : salt \n 1. M -> C : CoA(M), HoA(C), HoA(M), PK(M), i, Tm, \n {H(CoA(M), HoA(C), HoA(M), Tm)}SK(M) \n HostPart(HoA(M)) = H(PK(M), i)\n\nThere is a time interval DeltaT such that if CoA(M) has not changed within the last DeltaT seconds, and both C and M are following the protocol, then either C’s table does not contain an entry for HoA(M) or C’s table contains (HoA(M), CoA(M))."}
-{"text": "CCITT X.509 (1)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ta, Tb : timestamp \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. A -> B : A, {Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Ya}PK(B)}SK(A)\n\nThe protocol must ensure the confidentiality of Ya: if A and B follow the protocol, then an attacker should not be able to obtain Ya. The protocol must ensure the recipient B of the message that the data Xa and Ya originate from A."}
-{"text": "CCITT X.509 (1c)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ta, Tb : timestamp \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n h : userdata -> userdata (one-way) \n 1. A -> B : A, {Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Ya, {h(Ya)}SK(A)}PK(B)}SK(A)\n\nThe protocol must ensure the recipient B of the message that the data Xa and Ya originate from A."}
-{"text": "CCITT X.509 (3)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ta, Tb : timestamp \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. A -> B : A, {Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Ya}PK(B)}SK(A) \n 2. B -> A : B, {Tb, Nb, A, Na, Xb, {Yb}PK(A)}SK(B) \n 3. A -> B : A, {Nb}SK(A)\n\nThe protocol must ensure the confidentiality of Ya and Yb: if A and B follow the protocol, then an attacker should not be able to obtain Ya or Yb. The protocol must ensure the recipient B of the message 1 that the data Xa and Ya originate from A. The protocol must ensure the recipient A of the message 2 that the data Xb and Yb originate from B."}
-{"text": "BAN modified version of CCITT X.509 (3)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. A -> B : A, {Na, B, Xa, {Ya}PK(B)}SK(A) \n 2. B -> A : B, {Nb, A, Na, Xb, {Yb}PK(A)}SK(B) \n 3. A -> B : A, {B, Nb}SK(A)\n\nThe protocol must ensure the confidentiality of Ya and Yb: if A and B follow the protocol, then an attacker should not be able to obtain Ya or Yb. The protocol must ensure the recipient B of the message 1 that the data Xa and Ya originate from A. The protocol must ensure the recipient A of the message 2 that the data Xb and Yb originate from B."}
-{"text": "Denning-Sacco shared key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n T : timestamp \n 1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : {B, Kab, T, {Kab, A, T}Kbs}Kas \n 3. A -> B : {Kab,A, T}Kbs\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S in that session. If the participant playing B accepts the last message 3, then Kab has been sent in message 2. by A (whose identity is included in the cipher of message 2)."}
-{"text": "Lowe modified Denning-Sacco shared key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n T : timestamp \n dec : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : {B, Kab, T, {Kab, A, T}Kbs}Kas \n 3. A -> B : {Kab,A, T}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {dec(Nb)}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S in that session. If the participant playing B accepts the last message 5, then Kab has been sent in message 3. by A (whose identity is included in the cipher of message 3)."}
-{"text": "Diffie Helman\n\nA, B : principal \n P, G, Xa, Xb : number \n one : -> number \n kap : number, number, number -> number \n 1. A -> B : P, G \n 2. A -> B : kap(P, G, Xa) \n 3. B -> A : kap(P, G, Xb) \n 4. A -> B : {one()}kap(P, kap(P, G, Xb), Xa)\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of the fresh key. The protocol must guaranty the authenticity of the participants."}
-{"text": "GJM\n\nA,B,T : principal \n C : msg \n PCS : (principal,msg,principal,principal):msg \n S-SIG : (principal,msg):msg \n TP-SIG : (principal,msg):msg \n resolved,aborted : bool \n abort : msg \n Exchange-1. A -> B : PCS(A,C,B,T) \n Exchange-2. B -> A : PCS(B,C,A,T) \n Exchange-3. A -> B : S-SIG(A,C) \n Exchange-4. B -> A : S-SIG(B,C) \n Abort-1. A -> T : S-SIG(A,[C,A,B,abort]) \n Abort-2. T -> A : if (resolved) then S-SIG(B,C) else\nS-SIG(T,S-SIG(A,[C,A,B,abort])) \n Resolve-A-1. A -> T : [PCS(B,C,A,T),S-SIG(A,C)] \n Resolve-A-2. T -> A : if (aborted) then\nS-SIG(T,S-SIG(A,[C,A,B,abort])) else if (resolved) S-SIG(B,C) else\nTP-SIG(B,C) \n Resolve-B-1. B -> T : [PCS(A,C,B,T),S-SIG(B,C)] \n Resolve-B-2. T -> B : if (aborted) then\nS-SIG(T,S-SIG(A,[C,A,B,abort])) else if (resolved) S-SIG(A,C) else\nTP-SIG(A,C)\n\nThis protocol was designed in order to satisfy the following properties: completeness: an adversary (submitted to some restrictions) cannot prevent two honest participants from obtaining a valid signature on a contractual text, fairness: it is impossible for a corrupted participant to obtain a valid contract without allowing the remaining participant to do the same. Moreover, once an honest participant has obtained an abort confirmation from the TTP, it is impossible for any other participant to obtain a valid contract. Finally, every honest participant is able to complete the protocol. abuse-freeness: it is impossible for a (possible corrupted) participant, at any point of the protocol, to be able to prove to an external observer that he has the power to determine the outcome of the protocol (validate or invalidate the contract)."}
-{"text": "Gong\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb, Ns : number \n Pa, Pb : number \n K, Ha, Hb : number \n f1 : number, number, number, number -> number \n f2 : number, number, number, number -> number \n f3 : number, number, number, number -> number \n g : number, number, number, number -> number \n xor : number,number -> number \n alias K = f1(Ns,Na,B,Pa) \n alias Ha = f2(Ns,Na,B,Pa) \n alias Hb = f3(Ns,Na,B,Pa) \n 1. A -> B : A, B, Na \n 2. B -> S : A, B, Na, Nb \n 3. S -> B : Ns, xor(f1(Ns, Nb, A, Pb), K), \n xor(f2(Ns, Nb, A, Pb), Ha), \n xor(f3(Ns, Nb, A, Pb), Hb), \n g(K, Ha, Hb, Pb) \n 4. B -> A : Ns, Hb \n 5. A -> B : Ha\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of K: in every session, the value of K must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S in that session. The protocol must also ensure mutual authentication of A and B."}
-{"text": "Kao Chow Authentication v.1\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kab, Kbs, Kas : key \n 1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> B : {A, B, Na, Kab}Kas, {A, B, Na, Kab}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : {A, B, Na, Kab}Kas, {Na}Kab, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {Nb}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S. When A, resp. B, receives the key Kab in message 3, resp. 2, this key must have been issued in the same session by the server S with whom A has started to communicate in message 1. The protocol must also ensures mutual authentication of A and B."}
-{"text": "Kao Chow Authentication v.2\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kab, Kbs, Kas : key \n 1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> B : {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : B, {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {Na, Kab}Kt, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {Nb, Kab}Kt\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S. When A, resp. B, receives the key Kab in message 3, resp. 2, this key must have been issued in the same session by the server S with whom A has started to communicate in message 1. The protocol must also ensures mutual authentication of A and B."}
-{"text": "Kao Chow Authentication v.3\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kab, Kbs, Kas : key \n 1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> B : {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {Na, Kab}Kt, Nb, {A, B, Ta,\nKab}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {Nb, Kab}Kt, {A, B, Ta, Kab}Kbs\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S. When A, resp. B, receives the key Kab in message 3, resp. 2, this key must have been issued in the same session by the server S with whom A has started to communicate in message 1. The protocol must also ensures mutual authentication of A and B."}
-{"text": "Kerberos V5\n\nA, G, C, S, U : principal \n N1, N2 : nonce \n L1, L2 : nonce \n T1start, T1expire : timestamp \n T2start, T2expire : timestamp \n Kcg, Kcs, Kag, Ku, Kgs : key \n 1. C -> A : U, G, L1, N1 \n 2. A -> C : U, {U, C, G, Kcg, T1start, T1expire}Kag, \n {G, Kcg, T1start, T1expire}Ku \n 3. C -> G : S, L2, N2, {U, C, G, Kcg, T1start, T1expire}Kag, \n {C, T1}Kcg \n 4. G -> C : U, {U, C, S, Kcs, T2start, T2expire}Kgs, \n {S, Kcs, T2start, T2expire, N2}Kcg \n 5. C -> S : {U, C, S, Kcs, T2start, T2expire}Kgs, \n {C, T2}Kcs \n 6. S -> C : {T2}Kcs\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kcs: in every session, the value of K must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S in that session. A and C must agree on the values of T1start and T1expire. G and C must agree on the values of T2start and T2expire and T1. C and S must agree on the value of T2."}
-{"text": "KSL\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb, Nc, Ma, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab, Kbb : key \n Tb : generalizedTimestamp \n 1. A -> B : Na, A \n 2. B -> S : Na, A, Nb, B \n 3. S -> B : {Nb, A, Kab}Kbs, {Na, B, Kab}Kas \n 4. B -> A : {Na, B, Kab}Kas, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb, Nc, {Na}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {Nc}Kab \n 6. A -> B : Ma, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb \n 7. B -> A : Mb, {Ma}Kab \n 8. A -> B : {Mb}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S in that session. The protocol must also ensures mutual authentication of A and B."}
-{"text": "Lowe modified KSL\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb, Nc, Ma, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab, Kbb : key \n Tb : generalizedTimestamp \n 1. A -> B : Na, A \n 2. B -> S : Na, A, Nb, B \n 3. S -> B : {A, Nb Kab}Kbs, {Na, B, Kab}Kas \n 4. B -> A : {Na, B, Kab}Kas, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb, Nc, {B, Na}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {Nc}Kab \n 6. A -> B : Ma, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb \n 7. B -> A : Mb, {Ma, B}Kab \n 8. A -> B : {A, Mb}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S in that session. The protocol must also ensures mutual authentication of A and B."}
-{"text": "Neumann Stubblebine\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Ma, Nb, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n Ta, Tb : time \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, {A, Na, Tb}Kbs, Nb \n 3. S -> A : {B, Na, Kab, Tb}Kas, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : Ma, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs \n 6. B -> A : Mb, {Ma}Kab \n 7. A -> B : {Mb}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S in that session. The protocol must also ensures mutual authentication of A and B."}
-{"text": "Hwang modified version of Neumann Stubblebine\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Ma, Nb, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n Ta, Tb : time \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, {A, Na, Tb, Nb}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : {B, Na, Kab, Tb}Kas, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : Ma, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs \n 6. B -> A : Mb, {Mb}Kab \n 7. A -> B : {Mb}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S in that session. The protocol must also ensures mutual authentication of A and B."}
-{"text": "Needham-Schroeder Public Key\n\nA,B,S : Principal \n Na,Nb : Nonce \n KPa,KPb,KPs,KSa,KSb,KSs : Key \n KPa,KSa : is a key pair \n KPb,KSb : is a key pair \n KPs,KSs : is a key pair \n 1. A -> S : A,B \n 2. S -> A : {KPb, B}KSs \n 3. A -> B : {Na, A}KPb \n 4. B -> S : B,A \n 5. S -> B : {KPa, A}KSs \n 6. B -> A : {Na, Nb}KPa \n 7. A -> B : {Nb}KPb\n\nAfter completion of the protocol, the two principals A and B should be convinced about the identity of their respective correspondent."}
-{"text": "Lowe's fixed version of Needham-Schroder Public Key\n\nA,B,S : Principal \n Na,Nb : Nonce \n KPa,KPb,KPs,KSa,KSb,KSs : Key \n KPa,KSa : is a key pair \n KPb,KSb : is a key pair \n KPs,KSs : is a key pair \n 1. A -> S : A,B \n 2. S -> A : {KPb, B}KSs \n 3. A -> B : {Na, A}KPb \n 4. B -> S : B,A \n 5. S -> B : {KPa, A}KSs \n 6. B -> A : {Na, Nb, B}KPa \n 7. A -> B : {Nb}KPb\n\nAfter completion of the protocol, the two principals A and B should be convinced about the identity of their respective correspondent."}
-{"text": "Needham Schroeder Symmetric Key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n dec : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> A : {Na, B, Kab, {Kab, A}Kbs}Kas \n 3. A -> B : {Kab,A}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {dec(Nb)}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S in that session. If the participant playing B accepts the last message 5, then Kab has been sent in message 3. by A (whose identity is included in the cipher of message 3)."}
-{"text": "Amended Needham Schroeder Symmetric Key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n dec : number -> number \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : {A, Nb}Kbs \n 3. A -> S : A, B, Na, {A, Nb}Kbs \n 4. S -> A : {Na, B, Kab, {Kab, Nb, A}Kbs}Kas \n 5. A -> B : {Kab, Nb, A}Kbs \n 6. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 7. A -> B : {dec(Nb)}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S in that session. If the participant playing B accepts the last message 7, then Kab has been sent in message 5. by A (whose identity is included in the cipher of message 5)."}
-{"text": "Otway Rees\n\nA, B, S : principal \n M, Na, Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n 1. A -> B : M, A, B, {Na, M, A, B}Kas \n 2. B -> S : M, A, B, {Na, M, A, B}Kas , {Nb, M, A, B}Kbs \n 3. S -> B : M, {Na, Kab}Kas, {Nb, Kab}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : M, {Na, Kab}Kas\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S. When A, resp. B, receives the key Kab in message 3, resp. 2, this key must have been issued in the same session by the server S with whom B has started to communicate in message 2."}
-{"text": "Schnorr's Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : fresh number \n Sa : private key \n Pa = exp(g,Sa) : public key \n A chooses Na and computes a = exp(g,Na) \n 1. A -> B : a \n B chooses Nb \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n A computes r = Na + Nb Sa \n 3. A -> B : r \n B checks that exp(g, r) = a exp(Pa,Nb)\n\nA wants to prove his identity to B by showing him that he knows Sa without revealing it."}
-{"text": "Shamir-Rivest-Adleman Three Pass Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n M : fresh number \n 1. A -> B : {M}Ka \n 2. B -> A : {{M}Ka}Kb \n 3. A -> B : {M}Kb\n\nNo requirements specified."}
-{"text": "SK3\n\nA, B, S, Ca, Cb : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n Kac, Kbc : symkey \n Na, Nb : nonce \n 0,1,2 : number \n alias Kab = {A, 0}Kb \n alias Pab = Kab + {B, 1}Ka \n 1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka \n 3. A -> Ca : A \n 4. Ca -> A : Na, {Na, 1, 1}Kac \n 5. A -> B : A, Na \n 6. B -> Cb : A, Na \n 7. Cb -> B : Nb, {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 8. B -> A : Nb, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab \n 9. A -> Ca : B, Na, Nb, Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab,\n{Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 10. Ca -> A : {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 11. A -> B : {Nb, 0, 1}Kab\n\nThe session key {Nb, 0, 0}Kb must remain secret."}
-{"text": "SmartRight view-only\n\nCC, TC : principal \n VoKey, VoR, VoRi, CW : number \n Kc : key \n h : number -> number \n 1. CC -> TC : {VoKey, CW+VoR}Kc \n 2. TC -> CC : VoRi \n 3. CC -> TC : VoR, {h(VoRi)}VoKey\n\nThe control word CW may be extracted by TC only once at the time where the protocol is played."}
-{"text": "SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {S, inc(N2)}pk(C)\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of N2: in every session, the value of N2 must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C, S. The protocol must also ensure C that S has received N2 and S that the N2 he has received in message 3 originated from C."}
-{"text": "Hwang and Chen modified SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {S, inc(N2)}pk(C)\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of N2: in every session, the value of N2 must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C, S. The protocol must also ensure C that S has received N2 and S that the N2 he has received in message 3 originated from C."}
-{"text": "Clark and Jacob modified Hwang and Chen modified SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {T, L, {C, N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {inc(N2)}pk(C)\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of N2: in every session, the value of N2 must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C, S. The protocol must also ensure C that S has received N2 and S that the N2 he has received in message 3 originated from C."}
-{"text": "TMN\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Ka, Kb : key \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. A -> S : B, {Ka}PK(S) \n 2. S -> B : A \n 3. B -> S : A, {Kb}PK(S) \n 4. S -> A : B, {Kb}Ka\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of the new shared key Kb: in every session, the value of Kb must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A and B in that session. The protocol must guaranty the secrecy of the auxiliary fresh key Ka: in every session, the value of Ka must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A and S in that session."}
-{"text": "Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab : symkey \n RC4 : message, symkey -> message \n C : message -> message \n 1. A -> B : v, ((M,C(M)) xor RC4(v,Kab))\n\nNo requirements specified."}
-{"text": "Wide Mouthed Frog\n\nA, S : principal \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : symkey \n Ta, Ts : timestamp \n 1. A -> S : A, {Ta, B, Kab}Kas \n 2. S -> B : {Ts, A, Kab}Kbs\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of the new shared key Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A and B and S. The protocol must guaranty the authenticity of Kab: in every session, on reception of message 2, B must be ensured that the key Kab in the message has been created by S in the same session on behalf of A."}
-{"text": "Lowe modified Wide Mouthed Frog\n\nA, S : principal \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : symkey \n Nb : nonce \n Ta, Ts : timestamp \n suc : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> S : A, {Ta, B, Kab}Kas \n 2. S -> B : {Ts, A, Kab}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 4. A -> B : {succ(Nb)}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of the new shared key Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A and B and S. The protocol must guaranty the authenticity of Kab: in every session, on reception of message 2, B must be ensured that the key Kab in the message has been created by S in the same session on behalf of A."}
-{"text": "Woo and Lam Mutual Authentication\n\nP, Q, S : principal \n Kps, Kqs, Kpq : key \n N1, N2 : number \n 1. P -> Q : P, N1 \n 2. Q -> P : Q, N2 \n 3. P -> Q : {P, Q, N1, N2}Kps \n 4. Q -> S : {P, Q, N1, N2}Kps, {P, Q, N1, N2}Kqs \n 5. S -> Q : {Q, N1, N2, Kpq}Kps, {P, N1, N2,Kpq}Kqs \n 6. Q -> P : {Q, N1, N2, Kpq}Kps, {N1, N2}Kpq \n 7. P -> Q : {N2}Kpq\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kpq: in every session, the value of Kpq must be known only by the participants playing the roles of P, Q and S. The protocol must also ensures mutual authentication of P and Q."}
-{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, {Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {Nb}Kbs\n\nWhenever the principal B finishes the execution of the protocol, the initiator of the protocol execution is in fact the principal A claimed in message 1."}
-{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi 1\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {A,B,Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, B, {A, B, Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {A, B, Nb}Kbs\n\nWhenever the principal B finishes the execution of the protocol, the initiator of the protocol execution is in fact the principal A claimed in message 1."}
-{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi 2\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {A,Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, {A, Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {A, Nb}Kbs\n\nWhenever the principal B finishes the execution of the protocol, the initiator of the protocol execution is in fact the principal A claimed in message 1."}
-{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi 3\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, {Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {A, Nb}Kbs\n\nWhenever the principal B finishes the execution of the protocol, the initiator of the protocol execution is in fact the principal A claimed in message 1."}
-{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi f\n\nA, B, S : principal \n shared : (principal, principal):key \n Nb : nonce \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {A,B,Nb}shared(A, S) \n 4. B -> S : {A, B, Nb, {A, B, Nb}shared(A, S)}shared(B, S) \n 5. S -> B : {A, B, Nb}shared(B, S)\n\nWhenever the principal B finishes the execution of the protocol, the initiator of the protocol execution is in fact the principal A claimed in message 1."}
-{"text": "Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, {A, Na, Nb}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : {B, Kab, Na, Nb}Kas, {A, Kab}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab}Kbs, {Nb}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S. A must be also properly authentified to B."}
-{"text": "BAN simplified version of Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, Nb, {A, Na}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : Nb, {B, Kab, Na}Kas, {A, Kab, Nb}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab, Nb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S. A must be also properly authentified to B."}
-{"text": "Lowe's modified version of Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : {A, Na, Nb}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : {B, Kab, Na, Nb}Kas \n 4. S -> B : {A, Kab}Kbs \n 5. A -> B : {A, B, S, Nb}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S. A must be also properly authentified to B."}
-{"text": "Paulson's strengthened version of Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, Nb, {A, Na}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : Nb, {B, Kab, Na}Kas, {A, B, Kab, Nb}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {A, B, Kab, Nb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guaranty the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A, B and S. A must be also properly authentified to B."}
-{"text": "ISO Symmetric Key One-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : symkey\nNa : nonce\ntext1, text2 : text\n\n1. A -> B : text2, {Ta | Na, B, text1}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A and B. The protocol must also ensure that B can authenticate A based on the knowledge of Kab and the nonce Na."}
-{"text": "ISO Symmetric Key Two-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : symkey\nRb : nonce\ntext1, text2, text3 : text\n\n1. B -> A : Rb, text1\n2. A -> B : text3, {Rb, B, text2}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A and B. The protocol must also ensure that B can authenticate A based on the encrypted challenge Rb, thereby providing unilateral authentication of A."}
-{"text": "ISO Symmetric Key Two-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : symkey\nNa, Nb : nonce\ntext1, text2, text3, text4 : text\n\n1. A -> B : text2, {Na, B, text1}Kab\n2. B -> A : text4, {Nb, A, text3}Kab\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Kab: in every session, the value of Kab must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A and B. The protocol must also ensure mutual authentication: upon receiving the encrypted messages, A can verify B is operational, and B can verify A is operational, using the respective nonces Na and Nb."}
-{"text": "ISO Symmetric Key Three-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : symkey\nRa, Rb : nonce\ntext1, text2, text3, text4, text5 : text\n\n1. B -> A : Rb, text1\n2. A -> B : text3, {Ra, Rb, B, text2}Kab\n3. B -> A : text5, {Ra, Rb, text4}Kab\n\nSecrecy of Kab: only A and B know the shared key. Mutual authentication: B verifies Ra and Rb in message 2, and A verifies Ra and Rb in message 3. Nonces Ra and Rb ensure freshness and prevent replay attacks."}
-{"text": "Using Non-reversible Function Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKab, K : symkey\nRa, Rb : nonce\nf : randomNo -> msg\n\n1. B -> A : B, Rb\n2. A -> B : A, {f(Rb), Ra, A, K}Kab\n3. B -> A : B, {f(Ra)}K\n\nSecrecy of K and Kab: only A and B know the keys. Mutual authentication: B verifies f(Ra) in message 3, and A verifies f(Rb) in message 2. Nonces Ra and Rb ensure freshness and prevent replay attacks. Function f being non-reversible ensures one-way verification of random numbers."}
-{"text": "ISO Five-Pass Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B, S : principal\nKab : session symkey\nKas, Kbs : long-term symkeys\nRa, Rb, R'b : nonce\nText1, Text2, Text3, Text4, Text5, Text6, Text7, Text8, Text9 : text\n\n1. A -> B : Ra, Text1\n2. B -> S : R'b, Ra, A, Text2\n3. S -> B : Text5, {B, Kab, Ra, Text3}Kas, {A, Kab, R'b, Text4}Kbs\n4. B -> A : Text7, {B, Kab, Ra, Text3}Kas, {Ra, Rb, Text6}Kab\n5. A -> B : Text9, {Ra, Rb, Text8}Kab\n\nSecrecy: Only A, B, and S know the respective keys (Kab, Kas, Kbs). Authentication: B and A verify the freshness of nonces Ra and Rb. Session key Kab is securely distributed by the server. Nonces prevent replay attacks and ensure message freshness."}
-{"text": "ISO Public Key One-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKa-1 : private key of A\nNa : nonce\nCertA : certificate of A\ntext1, text2 : text\n\n1. A -> B : CertA, [Ta|Na], B, text2, E(Ka-1: [Ta|Na], B, text1)\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the authenticity of A: in every session, on reception of the message, B must be ensured that the message was created by A. The protocol must guarantee freshness: in every session, the nonce Na must be unique to prevent replay attacks."}
-{"text": "ISO Public Key Two-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKa-1 : private key of A\nrA, rB : random numbers (nonces)\nCertA : certificate of A\ntext1, text2, text3 : text\n\n1. B -> A : rB, text1\n2. A -> B : CertA, rA, rB, B, text3, E(Ka-1: rB, rA, B, text2)\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the authenticity of A: in every session, on reception of the message, B must be ensured that the message was created by A. The protocol must guarantee freshness: in every session, the nonces rA and rB must be unique to prevent replay attacks."}
-{"text": "ISO Public Key Two-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKa-1, Kb-1 : private keys of A and B\nTa, Tb : timestamps\nNa, Nb : nonces\nCertA, CertB : certificates of A and B\ntext1, text2, text3, text4 : text\n\n1. A -> B : CertA, [Ta|Na], B, text2, E(Ka-1: [Ta|Na], B, text1)\n2. B -> A : CertB, [Tb|Nb], A, text4, E(Kb-1: [Tb|Nb], A, text3)\n\nThe protocol must guarantee mutual authentication: in every session, A must be ensured that B is genuine and B must be ensured that A is genuine. The protocol must guarantee freshness: nonces Na and Nb, and timestamps Ta and Tb, must be unique for each session to prevent replay attacks. The protocol must guarantee secrecy of any session data contained in text1, text2, text3, text4."}
-{"text": "ISO Public Key Three-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKa-1, Kb-1 : private keys of A and B\nRa, Rb : nonces\nCertA, CertB : certificates of A and B\ntext1, text2, text3, text4, text5 : text\n\n1. B -> A : Rb, text1\n2. A -> B : CertA, Ra, Rb, B, text3, E(Ka-1: Rb, Ra, B, text2)\n3. B -> A : CertB, Rb, Ra, A, text5, E(Kb-1: Rb, Ra, A, text4)\n\nThe protocol must guarantee mutual authentication: both A and B must be assured of each other's identity. Nonces Ra and Rb ensure freshness and prevent replay attacks. All encrypted messages (E(Ka-1:..) and E(Kb-1:..)) guarantee integrity and authenticity. Text messages may contain session-specific data whose secrecy must be protected."}
-{"text": "ISO Public Key Two-Pass Parallel Mutual Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKa-1, Kb-1 : private keys of A and B\nRa, Rb : nonces\nCertA, CertB : certificates of A and B\ntext1, text2, text3, text4, text5, text6 : text\n\n1. A -> B : CertA, Ra, text1\n2. B -> A : Rb, Ra, A, text6, E(Kb-1: Rb, Ra, A, text5)\n3. B -> A : CertB, Rb, text2\n4. A -> B : Ra, Rb, B, text4, E(Ka-1: Rb, Ra, B, text3)\n\nMessages 1 and 2, 3 and 4 are sent in parallel.\nThe protocol ensures mutual authentication: each party verifies the identity of the other.\nNonces Ra and Rb ensure freshness and prevent replay attacks.\nEncrypted messages E(Kb-1:..) and E(Ka-1:..) guarantee integrity, authenticity, and secrecy of the exchanged data."}
-{"text": "Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nP : password (symmetric key)\nKa : A's randomly generated public key\nR : randomly generated session key\nNa, Nb : nonces\n\n1. A -> B : E(P : Ka)\n2. B -> A : E(P : E(Ka : R))\n3. A -> B : E(R : Na)\n4. B -> A : E(R : Na, Nb)\n5. A -> B : E(R : Nb)\n\nSecrecy of the session key R. Authentication of both parties through encryption and nonces. Protection against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks."}
-{"text": "Davis Swick Private Key Certificates Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nT : trusted translator\nKbt : shared key between B and T\nKat : shared key between A and T\nmsg : message\n\n1. B -> A : E(Kbt : A, msg)\n2. A -> T : E(Kbt : A, msg), B\n3. T -> A : E(Kat : msg, B)\n\nConfidentiality of the message from B to A through T. Authentication of the message via the shared keys. Ensures only the intended recipient (A) can read the message from T."}
-{"text": "Bilateral Key Exchange with Public Key Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKa, Kb : public key of A and B\nK : shared symmetric key\nNa, Nb : nonce\nf : nonce -> msg\n\n1. B -> A : B, E(Ka : Nb, B)\n2. A -> B : E(Kb : f(Nb), Na, A, K)\n3. B -> A : E(Kb : f(Na))\n\nSecrecy of the shared key K: only A and B know K after the protocol. Authenticity of exchanged nonces: f(Nb) and f(Na) verify the freshness and identity of participants. Mutual verification of public keys."}
-{"text": "ISO One-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol with CCFs\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : shared key between A and B\nNa : nonce\nfKab : keyed cryptographic check function\ntext1, text2 : text messages\n\n1. A -> B : [Ta|Na], B, text2, fKab([Ta|Na], B, text1)\n\nAuthenticity: B can verify that the message originated from A. Integrity: The contents [Ta|Na], B, text1 are protected by the cryptographic check function. Freshness: Na ensures that the message is unique to this session and protects against replay attacks."}
-{"text": "ISO Two-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol with CCFs\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : shared key between A and B\nRb : random nonce generated by B\nfKab : keyed cryptographic check function\ntext1, text2, text3 : text messages\n\n1. B -> A : Rb, text1\n2. A -> B : text3, fKab(Rb, B, text2)\n\nAuthenticity: B can verify that the response originated from A. Integrity: The contents Rb, B, text2 are protected by the cryptographic check function. Freshness: Rb ensures that the response is tied to the current session and prevents replay attacks."}
-{"text": "ISO Two-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol with CCFs\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : shared key between A and B\nNa, Nb : nonces generated by A and B respectively\nfKab : keyed cryptographic check function\ntext1, text2, text3, text4 : text messages\n\n1. A -> B : [Ta|Na], text2, fKab([Ta|Na], B, text1)\n2. B -> A : [Ta|Na], text4, fKab([Tb|Nb], A, text3)\n\n Authenticity: Both parties can verify that messages originated from the expected principal. Integrity: Contents of the messages are protected by the cryptographic check function. Freshness: Nonces Na and Nb ensure uniqueness of each session and prevent replay attacks."}
-{"text": "ISO Three-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol with CCFs\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : shared key between A and B\nRa, Rb : nonces generated by A and B respectively\nfKab : keyed cryptographic check function\ntext1, text2, text3, text4, text5 : text messages\n\n1. B -> A : Rb, text1\n2. A -> B : Ra, text3, fKab(Ra, Rb, B, text2)\n3. B -> A : text5, fKab(Rb, Ra, A, text4)\n\nAuthenticity: Both parties can verify that messages originated from the expected principal. Integrity: Contents of the messages are protected by the cryptographic check function. Freshness: Nonces Ra and Rb ensure uniqueness of each session and prevent replay attacks."}
-{"text": "AAA Mobile IP\n\nMN, FA, AAAL, AAAH, HA : principal\nN_FA : nonce\nK_MnAAAH, K_FaAAAL, K_AAAHAAAL, K_AAAHHa : symkey\nK_MnFa, K_MnHa, K_FaHa : fresh symkey\n\n1. FA   -> MN   : FA, N_FA\n2. MN   -> FA   : N_FA, MN, AAAH, {N_FA, MN, AAAH}K_MnAAAH\n3. FA   -> AAAL : N_FA, MN, AAAH, {N_FA, MN, AAAH}K_MnAAAH\n4. AAAL -> AAAH : N_FA, MN, AAAH, {N_FA, MN, AAAH}K_MnAAAH\n5. AAAH -> HA   : MN, {K_MnHa, K_FaHa}K_AAAHHa, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {MN, {K_MnHa, K_FaHa}K_AAAHHa, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_AAAHHa\n6. HA   -> AAAH : {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa}K_AAAHHa\n7. AAAH -> AAAL : N_FA, {K_MnFa, K_FaHa}K_AAAHAAAL, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa, {N_FA, {K_MnFa, K_FaHa}K_AAAHAAAL, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa}K_AAAHAAAL\n8. AAAL -> FA   : N_FA, {K_MnFa, K_FaHa}K_FaAAAL, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa, {N_FA, {K_MnFa, K_FaHa}K_FaAAAL, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa}K_FaAAAL\n9. FA   -> MN   : {K_MnFa, K_FaHa}K_FaAAAL, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of K_FaHa, K_MnFa, and K_MnHa: in every session, these keys must be known only by the appropriate participants. The protocol must also provide weak authentication for the distributed session keys between the respective parties."}
-{"text": "SIP Diameter Session Initiation Protocol\n\nUAC, SS1, SS2, DS : principal\nNonce : nonce\nPWD : text\nDest : protocol_id\nH : hash_func\nsipregister, sip401, sip200 : protocol_id\n\n1.  UAC -> SS1 : sipregister, UAC, Dest\n2.  SS1 -> DS  : UAC, Dest\n3.  DS  -> SS1 : UAC, SS2\n4.  SS1 -> SS2 : sipregister, UAC, Dest\n5.  SS2 -> DS  : Dest, UAC\n6.  DS  -> SS2 : Nonce, UAC\n7.  SS2 -> SS1 : sip401, Nonce\n8.  SS1 -> UAC : sip401, Nonce\n9.  UAC -> SS1 : sipregister, UAC, Dest, Nonce, H(Nonce, H(UAC, PWD), H(Dest))\n10. SS1 -> DS  : UAC, Dest\n11. DS  -> SS1 : UAC, SS2\n12. SS1 -> SS2 : sipregister, UAC, Dest, Nonce, H(Nonce, H(UAC, PWD), H(Dest))\n13. SS2 -> DS  : Dest, UAC, Nonce, H(Nonce, H(UAC, PWD), H(Dest))\n14. DS  -> SS2 : UAC, success\n15. SS2 -> SS1 : sip200\n16. SS1 -> UAC : sip200\n\nThe protocol must guarantee strong authentication of the UAC to the Diameter Server based on the password PWD and the challenge Nonce. The hash function H is used to implement HTTP Digest authentication."}
-{"text": "H.530 Symmetric Security for H.323 Mobility (Original)\n\nMT, VGK, AuF : principal\nZZ, ZZ_VA : symkey\nX, Y : nonce\nCH1, CH2, CH3, CH4 : nonce\nNIL, G : text\nF : hash_func\nexp : text, nonce -> message\nalias M1 = MT, VGK, NIL, CH1, exp(G, X)\nalias M2 = M1, F(ZZ, M1), VGK, xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y))\nalias M3 = VGK, MT, F(ZZ, VGK), F(ZZ, xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y)))\nalias M4 = VGK, MT, CH1, CH2, exp(G, Y), F(ZZ, xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y))), F(ZZ, VGK)\nalias M5 = MT, VGK, CH2, CH3\nalias M6 = VGK, MT, CH3, CH4\n\n1. MT  -> VGK : M1, F(ZZ, M1)\n2. VGK -> AuF : M2, F(ZZ_VA, M2)\n3. AuF -> VGK : M3, F(ZZ_VA, M3)\n4. VGK -> MT  : M4, F(exp(exp(G, X), Y), M4)\n5. MT  -> VGK : M5, F(exp(exp(G, X), Y), M5)\n6. VGK -> MT  : M6, F(exp(exp(G, X), Y), M6)\n\nThe protocol must guarantee strong authentication of the shared Diffie-Hellman key exp(exp(G, X), Y) between MT and VGK. The protocol must guarantee the secrecy of the session key: it must be known only by MT and VGK."}
-{"text": "H.530 Symmetric Security for H.323 Mobility (Fixed)\n\nMT, VGK, AuF : principal\nZZ, ZZ_VA : symkey\nX, Y : nonce\nCH1, CH2, CH3, CH4 : nonce\nNIL, G : text\nF : hash_func\nexp : text, nonce -> message\nalias M1 = MT, VGK, NIL, CH1, exp(G, X)\nalias M2 = M1, F(ZZ, M1), VGK, xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y))\nalias M3 = VGK, MT, F(ZZ, VGK), F(ZZ, xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y))), xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y))\nalias M4 = VGK, MT, CH1, CH2, exp(G, Y), F(ZZ, xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y))), F(ZZ, VGK)\nalias M5 = MT, VGK, CH2, CH3\nalias M6 = VGK, MT, CH3, CH4\n\n1. MT  -> VGK : M1, F(ZZ, M1)\n2. VGK -> AuF : M2, F(ZZ_VA, M2)\n3. AuF -> VGK : M3, F(ZZ_VA, M3)\n4. VGK -> MT  : M4, F(exp(exp(G, X), Y), M4)\n5. MT  -> VGK : M5, F(exp(exp(G, X), Y), M5)\n6. VGK -> MT  : M6, F(exp(exp(G, X), Y), M6)\n\nThe protocol must guarantee strong authentication of the shared Diffie-Hellman key exp(exp(G, X), Y) between MT and VGK. The protocol must guarantee the secrecy of the session key: it must be known only by MT and VGK. This fixed version includes the XOR term in message 3 to prevent replay attacks."}
-{"text": "Geopriv with pseudonym for Location Recipient only\n\nT, LR, LS : principal\nK_T_LR, K_T_LS : symkey\nK_LS : public_key\nN_LR : text\nPsi_LR, PW_LR : text\nK_LR : symkey\nLI : text\nPR : hash_func\n\n1. LR -> T  : LR, {LR, N_LR}K_T_LR\n2. LR <- T  : Psi_LR, {PW_LR, N_LR}K_T_LR\n3. LS <- T  : T, Psi_LR, {PW_LR, T, PR}K_T_LS\n4. LR -> LS : Psi_LR, {PW_LR, K_LR, T}K_LS\n5. LR <- LS : {PR(LI), T}K_LR\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of the location information LI, the filtered location information PR(LI), the password PW_LR, and the temporary key K_LR. The Location Recipient LR is anonymous to the Location Server LS through the use of pseudonym Psi_LR. The protocol must provide strong authentication of the filtered location information from LS to LR, weak authentication of the password from LR to LS, weak authentication of the privacy rule from T to LS, and strong authentication of the nonce from T to LR. The Target T authorizes LR to receive location information via LS."}
-{"text": "Geopriv with pseudonyms for Location Recipient and Target\n\nT, LR, LS : principal\nK_T_LR : symkey\nK_LS : public_key\nN_LR : text\nPsi_LR, Psi_T : text\nK_LR : symkey\nLI : text\nPR : hash_func\n\n1. LR -> T  : LR, {LR, K_LR, N_LR}K_T_LR\n2. LR <- T  : {Psi_LR, Psi_T, N_LR}K_T_LR\n3. LS <- T  : {Psi_LR, Psi_T, PR, LI, K_LR}K_LS\n4. LR -> LS : {Psi_LR, Psi_T}K_LS\n5. LR <- LS : {PR(LI), Psi_T}K_LR\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of the location information LI, the filtered location information PR(LI), and the temporary key K_LR. Both the Location Recipient LR and the Target T are anonymous to the Location Server LS through the use of pseudonyms Psi_LR and Psi_T respectively. The protocol must provide strong authentication of the filtered location information from T to LR, strong authentication of the nonce from T to LR, and weak authentication of the Location Recipient's identity from LR to T. The Target T authorizes LR to receive location information via LS. The Location Server cannot authenticate the Target since the real identity is hidden by the pseudonym."}
-{"text": "EAP-TLS\n\nP, S : principal\nKp, Ks, Kca : public_key\nNp, Ns, PMS : nonce\nVersion, SessionID, CipherSuite, Cipher : text\nSke, Shd, Ccs : text\nH, KeyGen, PRF : hash_func\nalias ClientK = KeyGen(P, Np, Ns, PRF(PMS, Np, Ns))\nalias ServerK = KeyGen(S, Np, Ns, PRF(PMS, Np, Ns))\nalias Finished = H(PRF(PMS, Np, Ns), P, S, Np, Cipher, SessionID)\n\n1. S -> P : request_id\n2. P -> S : respond_id, P\n3. S -> P : start_tls\n4. P -> S : Version, SessionID, Np, CipherSuite\n5. S -> P : Version, SessionID, Ns, Cipher, {S, Ks}inv(Kca), Ske, Shd\n6. P -> S : {P, Kp}inv(Kca), {PMS}Ks, {H(Np, Ns, S, PMS)}inv(Kp), Ccs, {Finished}ClientK\n7. S -> P : Ccs, {Finished}ServerK\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of ClientK and ServerK: in every session, these session keys must be known only by P and S. The protocol must provide strong mutual authentication: P authenticates S on the nonces Np and Ns, and S authenticates P on the nonces Np and Ns. EAP-TLS uses the TLS handshake to establish mutual authentication and derive session keys for future encryption and data integrity."}
-{"text": "EAP-TTLS with Tunneled CHAP\n\nP, S : principal\nKs, Kca : public_key\nNp, Ns, PMS : nonce\nVersion, SessionID, CipherSuite, Cipher : text\nShd, Ccs, Txt : text\nUName, ChapRs : text\nH, PRF, CHAP_PRF, Tranc, KeyGen : hash_func\nalias MS = PRF(PMS, Np, Ns)\nalias ClientK = KeyGen(P, Np, Ns, MS)\nalias ServerK = KeyGen(S, Np, Ns, MS)\nalias Finished = H(MS, P, S, Np, Cipher, SessionID)\nalias CHAP_challenge = Tranc(CHAP_PRF(MS, Txt, Np, Ns), 1, 16)\nalias ChapId = Tranc(CHAP_PRF(MS, Txt, Np, Ns), 17, 17)\n\n1. S -> P : request_id\n2. P -> S : respond_id, P\n3. S -> P : start_ttls\n4. P -> S : Version, SessionID, Np, CipherSuite\n5. S -> P : Version, SessionID, Ns, Cipher, {S, Ks}inv(Kca), Shd\n6. P -> S : {PMS}Ks, Ccs, {Finished}ClientK\n7. S -> P : Ccs, {Finished}ServerK\n8. P -> S : {UName, CHAP_challenge, ChapId, ChapRs}ClientK\n9. S -> P : success\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of ClientK, ServerK, and UName: in every session, these values must be known only by P and S. The protocol must provide strong mutual authentication: P authenticates S on Ns, and S authenticates P on Np. EAP-TTLS extends EAP-TLS by establishing a secure TLS tunnel and then performing legacy authentication protocols like CHAP inside the tunnel, protecting against eavesdropping and dictionary attacks."}
-{"text": "PEAP with MS-CHAP\n\nP, S : principal\nKs, Kca : public_key\nPw : symmetric_key\nNp, Ns, PMS : nonce\nSessionID, CipherSuite : text\nCcs : text\nH1, H2, PRF, KeyGen : hash_func\nalias M = PRF(PMS, Np, Ns)\nalias ClientK = KeyGen(P, Np, Ns, M)\nalias ServerK = KeyGen(S, Np, Ns, M)\nalias Finished = H1(M, P, S, Np, CipherSuite, SessionID)\n\n1. S -> P : id_request\n2. P -> S : P\n3. S -> P : start_peap\n4. P -> S : Np, SessionID, CipherSuite\n5. S -> P : Ns, SessionID, CipherSuite, {S, Ks}inv(Kca)\n6. P -> S : {PMS}Ks, Ccs\n7. S -> P : Ccs, {Finished}ServerK\n8. P -> S : {P}ClientK\n9. S -> P : {Ns}ServerK\n10. P -> S : {Np, H2(Pw, Np, Ns, P)}ClientK\n11. S -> P : {H2(Pw, Np)}ServerK\n12. P -> S : ack_message\n13. S -> P : eap_success\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of ClientK and ServerK: in every session, these session keys must be known only by P and S. The protocol must provide strong mutual authentication: P authenticates S on the nonces Np and Ns, and S authenticates P on Ns. PEAP performs authentication in two phases: first establishing a TLS secure channel with server authentication, then performing complete EAP authentication securely inside the TLS tunnel using methods like MS-CHAP."}
-{"text": "RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service\n\nC, S : principal\nKcs : symkey\nNAS_ID, NAS_PORT : text\nChall_Message : text\nSuccess, Failure, Access_accept, Access_reject : text\nMD5 : hash_func\n\n1. C -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n2. S -> C : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n3. C -> S : NAS_ID, Success\n\nAlternatively (with challenge):\n1. C -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n2. S -> C : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n3. C -> S : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n4. S -> C : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n5. C -> S : NAS_ID, Success\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Kcs: in every session, the shared secret key must be known only by C and S. The protocol must provide strong authentication of the Client to the Server on Kcs. RADIUS is used for carrying authentication, authorization, and configuration information between a Network Access Server and a shared Authentication Server."}
-{"text": "IEEE 802.1X EAPOL over RADIUS\n\nC, A, S : principal\nKcs : symkey\nNAS_ID, NAS_PORT : text\nChall_Message : text\nSuccess : text\nEAPOL_Start, EAPOL_Req_Identity, EAPOL_Success, Access_accept : text\nMD5 : hash_func\n\n1. C -> A : EAPOL_Start\n2. A -> C : EAPOL_Req_Identity\n3. C -> A : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n4. A -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n5. S -> A : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n6. A -> C : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n7. C -> A : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n8. A -> S : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n9. S -> A : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n10. A -> C : EAPOL_Success\n11. C -> A : NAS_ID, Success\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Kcs: in every session, the shared secret key must be known only by C and S. The protocol must provide strong authentication of the Client to the Server on Kcs. IEEE 802.1X provides effective authentication for LAN access and can implement dynamic key exchange where the authentication server returns session keys to the access point along with the accept message."}
-{"text": "TSIG Transaction Signature\n\nC, S : principal\nK : symkey\nN1, N2 : nonce\nM1, M2 : text\nTAG1, TAG2 : text\nH : hash_func\n\n1. C -> S : TAG1, M1, {H(TAG1, M1), N1}K\n2. S -> C : TAG2, M1, M2, {H(TAG2, M1, M2), N2}K\n\nThe protocol must provide weak authentication of the Client to the Server and weak authentication of the Server to the Client. TSIG allows for transaction level authentication using shared secrets and one-way hashing. It can be used to authenticate dynamic DNS updates as coming from an approved client, or to authenticate responses as coming from an approved recursive name server. M1 represents a DNS request from the client and M2 is the corresponding response. The timestamps N1 and N2 ensure freshness of messages."}
-{"text": "TESLA: Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication\n\nS, R: principal\nK_N: random symmetric key generated by S\nK_i: keys derived from K_N using a one-way function F\nM_i: messages broadcast by S\nN: total number of messages\nF: one-way hash function\ntext: generic message content\n\n1. S -> R: {N, K_0}inv(K_S) where K_0 = F^N(K_N)\n2. For i = 1 to N-1, S -> R: M_i, hash(K_i, M_i), K{i-1}\n\nAuthenticity: Receiver R can verify that messages originate from sender S using the keyed hash and one-way function chain.\nIntegrity: Contents of each message are protected by the keyed hash function.\nFreshness: The chain of keys K_i derived from K_N ensures that each message can be verified in order and prevents replay attacks."}
-{"text": "UMTS-AKA: Authentication and Key Agreement\n\nS, M: principal (Server, Mobile)\nk(M): shared secret key between S and M\nseq: sequence number maintained by both S and M\nr: random nonce generated by S\nF1, F2, F3, F4, F5: cryptographic hash or one-way functions\nCK, IK, KA: session keys derived from k(M) and r\nAUTN: authentication token\n\n1. M -> S: M\n2. S -> M: r; {seq}_Ka; F1(k(M); seq; r)\n3. M computes KA, seq, and verifies F1(k(M); seq; r); if valid, increments seq\n4. M -> S: F2(k(M); r)\n\nAuthenticity: Both S and M can verify each other’s identity using cryptographic functions and sequence numbers.\nIntegrity: Messages are protected by keyed hashes ensuring they have not been modified.\nFreshness: The nonce r and sequence numbers prevent replay attacks and ensure messages are fresh.\nSecrecy: CK and IK are shared securely between S and M for subsequent secure communication."}
-{"text": "SRP: Secure Remote Passwords\n\nA, B: principal (Client, Server)\nPassword: shared secret between A and B\nSalt: random value known to server, used to prevent dictionary attacks\nG: generator for Diffie-Hellman exponentiation\nNa, Nb: nonces generated by A and B respectively\nV: password verifier = g^x mod N, with x = SHA(salt | SHA(A | ':' | Password))\nDHX, DHY: Diffie-Hellman public values\nK: session key derived from DH values and verifier\nM: proof of key, H(A,B,K,...)\n\n1. A -> B: A, G^Na\n2. B -> A: Salt, {G^Nb}_V\n3. A -> B: M\n4. B -> A: H(G^Na, M, K)\n\nAuthenticity: Both parties authenticate each other via M and H(G^Na, M, K).\nIntegrity: Messages are protected by cryptographic hashes.\nSecrecy: The session key K remains secret; password is never transmitted.\nReplay Protection: Nonces Na and Nb ensure freshness and prevent replay attacks."}
-{"text": "SAML-based SSO for Google Apps (SP-initiated, Google unsafe variant)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nID, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> SP : URI\n2. SP -> C : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n3. C -> IdP : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n4. IdP -> C : SP, {C, IdP}inv(KIdP), URI\n5. C -> SP : SP, {C, IdP}inv(KIdP), URI\n6. SP -> C : Resource\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Resource: in every session, the value of Resource must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C and SP. The protocol must ensure authentication: SP must verify that the URI originates from C, and C must verify that Resource originates from SP. This is a Single Sign-On protocol where the Identity Provider (IdP) authenticates the client to the Service Provider using signed assertions."}
-{"text": "SAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (IdP-initiated with back channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDaa, IDresolve, Resource, REF : text\n\n1. C -> IdP : C, URI, SP\n2. IdP -> C : SP, IdP, REF\n3. C -> SP : IdP, REF\n4. SP -> IdP : IDresolve, SP, IdP, REF\n5. IdP -> SP : IDresolve, IdP, URI, IDaa, SP, IdP, C, URI\n6. SP -> C : URI, Resource\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Resource: in every session, the value of Resource must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C and SP. The protocol must ensure authentication: SP must verify that the URI originates from C, and C must verify that Resource originates from SP. The protocol uses artifact references (REF) and back channels between SP and IdP for secure assertion resolution. The IdP maintains a set of artifacts that are consumed once to prevent replay attacks. This is an Identity Provider-initiated Single Sign-On protocol where the IdP creates authentication assertions that are resolved through a secure back channel."}
-{"text": "SAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (IdP-initiated with front channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDaa, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> IdP : C, URI, SP\n2. IdP -> C : IdP, URI, IDaa, SP, IdP, C, URI\n3. C -> SP : IDaa, IdP, URI, SP, C\n4. SP -> C : URI, Resource\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Resource: in every session, the value of Resource must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C and SP. The protocol must ensure authentication: SP must verify that the URI originates from C, and C must verify that Resource originates from SP. This is an Identity Provider-initiated Single Sign-On protocol where the IdP creates an authentication assertion (IDaa) without a prior request from SP. The SP maintains a set of consumed assertions to prevent replay attacks. All communications use front channels through the client browser."}
-{"text": "SAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (SP-initiated with back channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDar, IDaa, IDresolve_1, IDresolve_2, Resource, REF_1, REF_2 : text\n\n1. C -> SP : C, URI\n2. SP -> C : IdP, SP, REF_1\n3. C -> IdP : C, SP, REF_1\n4. IdP -> SP : IDresolve_1, IdP, SP, REF_1\n5. SP -> IdP : IDresolve_1, SP, IdP, IDar, URI\n6. IdP -> C : SP, IdP, REF_2\n7. C -> SP : IdP, REF_2\n8. SP -> IdP : IDresolve_2, SP, IdP, REF_2\n9. IdP -> SP : IDresolve_2, IdP, URI, IDar, {SP, IdP, C, IDaa, URI}inv(KIdP)\n10. SP -> C : URI, Resource\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Resource: in every session, the value of Resource must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C and SP. The protocol must ensure authentication: SP must verify that the URI originates from C, and C must verify that Resource originates from SP. This is a Service Provider-initiated Single Sign-On protocol using the artifact binding profile with back channels. Authentication requests and responses are not sent directly through the client but are instead referenced by artifacts (REF_1, REF_2) which are resolved through secure back channels between SP and IdP. The signed assertion {SP, IdP, C, IDaa, URI}inv(KIdP) ensures the authenticity and integrity of the authentication information. The SP maintains a set of consumed assertions (IDaa) to prevent replay attacks."}
-{"text": "SAML-based SSO for Google Apps (SP-initiated with front channels, fixed variant)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nID, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> SP : URI\n2. SP -> C : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n3. C -> IdP : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n4. IdP -> C : SP, {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP), URI\n5. C -> SP : SP, {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP), URI\n6. SP -> C : Resource\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Resource: in every session, the value of Resource must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C and SP. The protocol must ensure authentication: SP must verify that the URI originates from C, and C must verify that Resource originates from SP. This is a Service Provider-initiated Single Sign-On protocol using only front channels through the client browser. The SP generates a unique authentication request identifier (ID) and verifies it upon receiving the signed assertion from the IdP. The signed assertion {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP) includes the SP identifier to prevent the assertion from being used at a different service provider, fixing a vulnerability in the original Google Apps implementation where assertions did not bind to specific service providers."}
-{"text": "Idemix Anonymous Credential\n\nUser, Issuer, Verifier : principal\nNu, Ns, NuPrime, NsPrime : nonce\nmasec : master_secret\nK_ptag, K_spk : fresh symkey\n\n1. User -> Issuer : commit(masec, Issuer, Nu)\n2. Issuer -> User : credential(Issuer, ptag(masec, Issuer, Nu, Ns), attributes)\n3. User -> Verifier : ptag(masec, Verifier, NuPrime, NsPrime), spk(masec, public_values, statement, message)\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of masec: in every session, masec must be known only to the User. It must ensure unlinkability: different pseudonyms created by the same user cannot be linked by verifiers or issuers. The protocol must provide selective disclosure: the user can prove possession of credentials while revealing only selected attributes. Zero-knowledge proofs (spk) and pseudonym tags (ptag) ensure credentials are bound to the user's master secret while maintaining anonymity."}
+{"text": "Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> B : A, {Na}Kab \n 2. B -> A : {succNa, Nb}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {succNb}Kab \n 4. B -> A : {K'ab, N'b}Kab"}
+{"text": "BAN modified Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> B : A, {Na}Kab \n 2. B -> A : {succNa, Nb}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {succNb}Kab \n 4. B -> A : {K'ab, N'b, Na}Kab"}
+{"text": "BAN concrete Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> A : {Na, K'ab}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {Na}K'ab \n 4. B -> A : Nb"}
+{"text": "Lowe modified BAN concrete Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> A : {Na, K'ab, B}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {Na}K'ab \n 4. B -> A : Nb"}
+{"text": "Bull's Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B, C, S : principal \n Kab, Kbc : fresh symkey \n Na, Nb, Nc : fresh number \n Kas, Kbs, Kcs : symkey \n h : message, symkey -> message \n A computes Xa = h((A,B,Na),Kas), (A,B,Na) \n 1. A -> B : Xa \n B computes Xb = h((B,C,Nb,Xa),Kbs), (B,C,Nb,Xa)\n 2. B -> C : Xb \n C computes Xc = h((C,S,Nc,Xb),Kcs), (C,S,Nc,Xb)\n 3. C -> S : Xc \n 4. S -> C : A, B, Kab xor h(Na,Kas), {A,B,Na}Kab, \n B, A, Kab xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,A,Nb}Kab, \n B, C, Kbc xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,C,Nb}Kbc, \n C, B, Kbc xor h(Nc,Kcs), {C,B,Nc}Kbc \n 5. C -> B : A, B, Kab xor h(Na,Kas), {A,B,Na}Kab, \n B, A, Kab xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,A,Nb}Kab, \n B, C, Kbc xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,C,Nb}Kbc \n 6. B -> A : A, B, Kab xor h(Na,Kas), {A,B,Na}Kab"}
+{"text": "CAM\n\nM,C : principal \n Tm : timestamp \n PK,SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n HoA : principal -> address \n CoA : principal -> address \n i : salt \n 1. M -> C : CoA(M), HoA(C), HoA(M), PK(M), i, Tm, \n {H(CoA(M), HoA(C), HoA(M), Tm)}SK(M) \n HostPart(HoA(M)) = H(PK(M), i)"}
+{"text": "CCITT X.509 (1)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ta, Tb : timestamp \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. A -> B : A, {Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Ya}PK(B)}SK(A)"}
+{"text": "CCITT X.509 (1c)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ta, Tb : timestamp \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n h : userdata -> userdata (one-way) \n 1. A -> B : A, {Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Ya, {h(Ya)}SK(A)}PK(B)}SK(A)"}
+{"text": "CCITT X.509 (3)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ta, Tb : timestamp \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. A -> B : A, {Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Ya}PK(B)}SK(A) \n 2. B -> A : B, {Tb, Nb, A, Na, Xb, {Yb}PK(A)}SK(B) \n 3. A -> B : A, {Nb}SK(A)"}
+{"text": "BAN modified version of CCITT X.509 (3)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. A -> B : A, {Na, B, Xa, {Ya}PK(B)}SK(A) \n 2. B -> A : B, {Nb, A, Na, Xb, {Yb}PK(A)}SK(B) \n 3. A -> B : A, {B, Nb}SK(A)"}
+{"text": "Denning-Sacco shared key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n T : timestamp \n 1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : {B, Kab, T, {Kab, A, T}Kbs}Kas \n 3. A -> B : {Kab,A, T}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Lowe modified Denning-Sacco shared key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n T : timestamp \n dec : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : {B, Kab, T, {Kab, A, T}Kbs}Kas \n 3. A -> B : {Kab,A, T}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {dec(Nb)}Kab"}
+{"text": "Diffie Helman\n\nA, B : principal \n P, G, Xa, Xb : number \n one : -> number \n kap : number, number, number -> number \n 1. A -> B : P, G \n 2. A -> B : kap(P, G, Xa) \n 3. B -> A : kap(P, G, Xb) \n 4. A -> B : {one()}kap(P, kap(P, G, Xb), Xa)"}
+{"text": "GJM\n\nA,B,T : principal \n C : msg \n PCS : (principal,msg,principal,principal):msg \n S-SIG : (principal,msg):msg \n TP-SIG : (principal,msg):msg \n resolved,aborted : bool \n abort : msg \n Exchange-1. A -> B : PCS(A,C,B,T) \n Exchange-2. B -> A : PCS(B,C,A,T) \n Exchange-3. A -> B : S-SIG(A,C) \n Exchange-4. B -> A : S-SIG(B,C) \n Abort-1. A -> T : S-SIG(A,[C,A,B,abort]) \n Abort-2. T -> A : if (resolved) then S-SIG(B,C) else\nS-SIG(T,S-SIG(A,[C,A,B,abort])) \n Resolve-A-1. A -> T : [PCS(B,C,A,T),S-SIG(A,C)] \n Resolve-A-2. T -> A : if (aborted) then\nS-SIG(T,S-SIG(A,[C,A,B,abort])) else if (resolved) S-SIG(B,C) else\nTP-SIG(B,C) \n Resolve-B-1. B -> T : [PCS(A,C,B,T),S-SIG(B,C)] \n Resolve-B-2. T -> B : if (aborted) then\nS-SIG(T,S-SIG(A,[C,A,B,abort])) else if (resolved) S-SIG(A,C) else\nTP-SIG(A,C)"}
+{"text": "Gong\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb, Ns : number \n Pa, Pb : number \n K, Ha, Hb : number \n f1 : number, number, number, number -> number \n f2 : number, number, number, number -> number \n f3 : number, number, number, number -> number \n g : number, number, number, number -> number \n xor : number,number -> number \n alias K = f1(Ns,Na,B,Pa) \n alias Ha = f2(Ns,Na,B,Pa) \n alias Hb = f3(Ns,Na,B,Pa) \n 1. A -> B : A, B, Na \n 2. B -> S : A, B, Na, Nb \n 3. S -> B : Ns, xor(f1(Ns, Nb, A, Pb), K), \n xor(f2(Ns, Nb, A, Pb), Ha), \n xor(f3(Ns, Nb, A, Pb), Hb), \n g(K, Ha, Hb, Pb) \n 4. B -> A : Ns, Hb \n 5. A -> B : Ha"}
+{"text": "Kao Chow Authentication v.1\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kab, Kbs, Kas : key \n 1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> B : {A, B, Na, Kab}Kas, {A, B, Na, Kab}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : {A, B, Na, Kab}Kas, {Na}Kab, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {Nb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Kao Chow Authentication v.2\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kab, Kbs, Kas : key \n 1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> B : {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : B, {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {Na, Kab}Kt, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {Nb, Kab}Kt"}
+{"text": "Kao Chow Authentication v.3\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kab, Kbs, Kas : key \n 1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> B : {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {Na, Kab}Kt, Nb, {A, B, Ta,\nKab}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {Nb, Kab}Kt, {A, B, Ta, Kab}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Kerberos V5\n\nA, G, C, S, U : principal \n N1, N2 : nonce \n L1, L2 : nonce \n T1start, T1expire : timestamp \n T2start, T2expire : timestamp \n Kcg, Kcs, Kag, Ku, Kgs : key \n 1. C -> A : U, G, L1, N1 \n 2. A -> C : U, {U, C, G, Kcg, T1start, T1expire}Kag, \n {G, Kcg, T1start, T1expire}Ku \n 3. C -> G : S, L2, N2, {U, C, G, Kcg, T1start, T1expire}Kag, \n {C, T1}Kcg \n 4. G -> C : U, {U, C, S, Kcs, T2start, T2expire}Kgs, \n {S, Kcs, T2start, T2expire, N2}Kcg \n 5. C -> S : {U, C, S, Kcs, T2start, T2expire}Kgs, \n {C, T2}Kcs \n 6. S -> C : {T2}Kcs"}
+{"text": "KSL\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb, Nc, Ma, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab, Kbb : key \n Tb : generalizedTimestamp \n 1. A -> B : Na, A \n 2. B -> S : Na, A, Nb, B \n 3. S -> B : {Nb, A, Kab}Kbs, {Na, B, Kab}Kas \n 4. B -> A : {Na, B, Kab}Kas, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb, Nc, {Na}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {Nc}Kab \n 6. A -> B : Ma, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb \n 7. B -> A : Mb, {Ma}Kab \n 8. A -> B : {Mb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Lowe modified KSL\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb, Nc, Ma, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab, Kbb : key \n Tb : generalizedTimestamp \n 1. A -> B : Na, A \n 2. B -> S : Na, A, Nb, B \n 3. S -> B : {A, Nb Kab}Kbs, {Na, B, Kab}Kas \n 4. B -> A : {Na, B, Kab}Kas, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb, Nc, {B, Na}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {Nc}Kab \n 6. A -> B : Ma, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb \n 7. B -> A : Mb, {Ma, B}Kab \n 8. A -> B : {A, Mb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Neumann Stubblebine\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Ma, Nb, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n Ta, Tb : time \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, {A, Na, Tb}Kbs, Nb \n 3. S -> A : {B, Na, Kab, Tb}Kas, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : Ma, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs \n 6. B -> A : Mb, {Ma}Kab \n 7. A -> B : {Mb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Hwang modified version of Neumann Stubblebine\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Ma, Nb, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n Ta, Tb : time \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, {A, Na, Tb, Nb}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : {B, Na, Kab, Tb}Kas, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : Ma, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs \n 6. B -> A : Mb, {Mb}Kab \n 7. A -> B : {Mb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Needham-Schroeder Public Key\n\nA,B,S : Principal \n Na,Nb : Nonce \n KPa,KPb,KPs,KSa,KSb,KSs : Key \n KPa,KSa : is a key pair \n KPb,KSb : is a key pair \n KPs,KSs : is a key pair \n 1. A -> S : A,B \n 2. S -> A : {KPb, B}KSs \n 3. A -> B : {Na, A}KPb \n 4. B -> S : B,A \n 5. S -> B : {KPa, A}KSs \n 6. B -> A : {Na, Nb}KPa \n 7. A -> B : {Nb}KPb"}
+{"text": "Lowe's fixed version of Needham-Schroder Public Key\n\nA,B,S : Principal \n Na,Nb : Nonce \n KPa,KPb,KPs,KSa,KSb,KSs : Key \n KPa,KSa : is a key pair \n KPb,KSb : is a key pair \n KPs,KSs : is a key pair \n 1. A -> S : A,B \n 2. S -> A : {KPb, B}KSs \n 3. A -> B : {Na, A}KPb \n 4. B -> S : B,A \n 5. S -> B : {KPa, A}KSs \n 6. B -> A : {Na, Nb, B}KPa \n 7. A -> B : {Nb}KPb"}
+{"text": "Needham Schroeder Symmetric Key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n dec : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> A : {Na, B, Kab, {Kab, A}Kbs}Kas \n 3. A -> B : {Kab,A}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {dec(Nb)}Kab"}
+{"text": "Amended Needham Schroeder Symmetric Key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n dec : number -> number \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : {A, Nb}Kbs \n 3. A -> S : A, B, Na, {A, Nb}Kbs \n 4. S -> A : {Na, B, Kab, {Kab, Nb, A}Kbs}Kas \n 5. A -> B : {Kab, Nb, A}Kbs \n 6. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 7. A -> B : {dec(Nb)}Kab"}
+{"text": "Otway Rees\n\nA, B, S : principal \n M, Na, Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n 1. A -> B : M, A, B, {Na, M, A, B}Kas \n 2. B -> S : M, A, B, {Na, M, A, B}Kas , {Nb, M, A, B}Kbs \n 3. S -> B : M, {Na, Kab}Kas, {Nb, Kab}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : M, {Na, Kab}Kas"}
+{"text": "Schnorr's Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : fresh number \n Sa : private key \n Pa = exp(g,Sa) : public key \n A chooses Na and computes a = exp(g,Na) \n 1. A -> B : a \n B chooses Nb \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n A computes r = Na + Nb Sa \n 3. A -> B : r \n B checks that exp(g, r) = a exp(Pa,Nb)"}
+{"text": "Shamir-Rivest-Adleman Three Pass Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n M : fresh number \n 1. A -> B : {M}Ka \n 2. B -> A : {{M}Ka}Kb \n 3. A -> B : {M}Kb"}
+{"text": "SK3\n\nA, B, S, Ca, Cb : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n Kac, Kbc : symkey \n Na, Nb : nonce \n 0,1,2 : number \n alias Kab = {A, 0}Kb \n alias Pab = Kab + {B, 1}Ka \n 1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka \n 3. A -> Ca : A \n 4. Ca -> A : Na, {Na, 1, 1}Kac \n 5. A -> B : A, Na \n 6. B -> Cb : A, Na \n 7. Cb -> B : Nb, {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 8. B -> A : Nb, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab \n 9. A -> Ca : B, Na, Nb, Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab,\n{Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 10. Ca -> A : {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 11. A -> B : {Nb, 0, 1}Kab"}
+{"text": "SmartRight view-only\n\nCC, TC : principal \n VoKey, VoR, VoRi, CW : number \n Kc : key \n h : number -> number \n 1. CC -> TC : {VoKey, CW+VoR}Kc \n 2. TC -> CC : VoRi \n 3. CC -> TC : VoR, {h(VoRi)}VoKey"}
+{"text": "SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {S, inc(N2)}pk(C)"}
+{"text": "Hwang and Chen modified SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {S, inc(N2)}pk(C)"}
+{"text": "Clark and Jacob modified Hwang and Chen modified SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {T, L, {C, N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {inc(N2)}pk(C)"}
+{"text": "TMN\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Ka, Kb : key \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. A -> S : B, {Ka}PK(S) \n 2. S -> B : A \n 3. B -> S : A, {Kb}PK(S) \n 4. S -> A : B, {Kb}Ka"}
+{"text": "Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab : symkey \n RC4 : message, symkey -> message \n C : message -> message \n 1. A -> B : v, ((M,C(M)) xor RC4(v,Kab))"}
+{"text": "Wide Mouthed Frog\n\nA, S : principal \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : symkey \n Ta, Ts : timestamp \n 1. A -> S : A, {Ta, B, Kab}Kas \n 2. S -> B : {Ts, A, Kab}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Lowe modified Wide Mouthed Frog\n\nA, S : principal \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : symkey \n Nb : nonce \n Ta, Ts : timestamp \n suc : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> S : A, {Ta, B, Kab}Kas \n 2. S -> B : {Ts, A, Kab}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 4. A -> B : {succ(Nb)}Kab"}
+{"text": "Woo and Lam Mutual Authentication\n\nP, Q, S : principal \n Kps, Kqs, Kpq : key \n N1, N2 : number \n 1. P -> Q : P, N1 \n 2. Q -> P : Q, N2 \n 3. P -> Q : {P, Q, N1, N2}Kps \n 4. Q -> S : {P, Q, N1, N2}Kps, {P, Q, N1, N2}Kqs \n 5. S -> Q : {Q, N1, N2, Kpq}Kps, {P, N1, N2,Kpq}Kqs \n 6. Q -> P : {Q, N1, N2, Kpq}Kps, {N1, N2}Kpq \n 7. P -> Q : {N2}Kpq"}
+{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, {Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {Nb}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi 1\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {A,B,Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, B, {A, B, Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {A, B, Nb}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi 2\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {A,Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, {A, Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {A, Nb}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi 3\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, {Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {A, Nb}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi f\n\nA, B, S : principal \n shared : (principal, principal):key \n Nb : nonce \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {A,B,Nb}shared(A, S) \n 4. B -> S : {A, B, Nb, {A, B, Nb}shared(A, S)}shared(B, S) \n 5. S -> B : {A, B, Nb}shared(B, S)"}
+{"text": "Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, {A, Na, Nb}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : {B, Kab, Na, Nb}Kas, {A, Kab}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab}Kbs, {Nb}Kab"}
+{"text": "BAN simplified version of Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, Nb, {A, Na}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : Nb, {B, Kab, Na}Kas, {A, Kab, Nb}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab, Nb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Lowe's modified version of Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : {A, Na, Nb}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : {B, Kab, Na, Nb}Kas \n 4. S -> B : {A, Kab}Kbs \n 5. A -> B : {A, B, S, Nb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Paulson's strengthened version of Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, Nb, {A, Na}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : Nb, {B, Kab, Na}Kas, {A, B, Kab, Nb}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {A, B, Kab, Nb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab"}
+{"text": "ISO Symmetric Key One-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : symkey\nNa : nonce\ntext1, text2 : text\n\n1. A -> B : text2, {Ta | Na, B, text1}Kab"}
+{"text": "ISO Symmetric Key Two-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : symkey\nRb : nonce\ntext1, text2, text3 : text\n\n1. B -> A : Rb, text1\n2. A -> B : text3, {Rb, B, text2}Kab"}
+{"text": "ISO Symmetric Key Two-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : symkey\nNa, Nb : nonce\ntext1, text2, text3, text4 : text\n\n1. A -> B : text2, {Na, B, text1}Kab\n2. B -> A : text4, {Nb, A, text3}Kab"}
+{"text": "ISO Symmetric Key Three-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : symkey\nRa, Rb : nonce\ntext1, text2, text3, text4, text5 : text\n\n1. B -> A : Rb, text1\n2. A -> B : text3, {Ra, Rb, B, text2}Kab\n3. B -> A : text5, {Ra, Rb, text4}Kab"}
+{"text": "Using Non-reversible Function Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKab, K : symkey\nRa, Rb : nonce\nf : randomNo -> msg\n\n1. B -> A : B, Rb\n2. A -> B : A, {f(Rb), Ra, A, K}Kab\n3. B -> A : B, {f(Ra)}K"}
+{"text": "ISO Five-Pass Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B, S : principal\nKab : session symkey\nKas, Kbs : long-term symkeys\nRa, Rb, R'b : nonce\nText1, Text2, Text3, Text4, Text5, Text6, Text7, Text8, Text9 : text\n\n1. A -> B : Ra, Text1\n2. B -> S : R'b, Ra, A, Text2\n3. S -> B : Text5, {B, Kab, Ra, Text3}Kas, {A, Kab, R'b, Text4}Kbs\n4. B -> A : Text7, {B, Kab, Ra, Text3}Kas, {Ra, Rb, Text6}Kab\n5. A -> B : Text9, {Ra, Rb, Text8}Kab"}
+{"text": "ISO Public Key One-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKa-1 : private key of A\nNa : nonce\nCertA : certificate of A\ntext1, text2 : text\n\n1. A -> B : CertA, [Ta|Na], B, text2, E(Ka-1: [Ta|Na], B, text1)"}
+{"text": "ISO Public Key Two-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKa-1 : private key of A\nrA, rB : random numbers (nonces)\nCertA : certificate of A\ntext1, text2, text3 : text\n\n1. B -> A : rB, text1\n2. A -> B : CertA, rA, rB, B, text3, E(Ka-1: rB, rA, B, text2)"}
+{"text": "ISO Public Key Two-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKa-1, Kb-1 : private keys of A and B\nTa, Tb : timestamps\nNa, Nb : nonces\nCertA, CertB : certificates of A and B\ntext1, text2, text3, text4 : text\n\n1. A -> B : CertA, [Ta|Na], B, text2, E(Ka-1: [Ta|Na], B, text1)\n2. B -> A : CertB, [Tb|Nb], A, text4, E(Kb-1: [Tb|Nb], A, text3)"}
+{"text": "ISO Public Key Three-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKa-1, Kb-1 : private keys of A and B\nRa, Rb : nonces\nCertA, CertB : certificates of A and B\ntext1, text2, text3, text4, text5 : text\n\n1. B -> A : Rb, text1\n2. A -> B : CertA, Ra, Rb, B, text3, E(Ka-1: Rb, Ra, B, text2)\n3. B -> A : CertB, Rb, Ra, A, text5, E(Kb-1: Rb, Ra, A, text4)"}
+{"text": "ISO Public Key Two-Pass Parallel Mutual Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKa-1, Kb-1 : private keys of A and B\nRa, Rb : nonces\nCertA, CertB : certificates of A and B\ntext1, text2, text3, text4, text5, text6 : text\n\n1. A -> B : CertA, Ra, text1\n2. B -> A : Rb, Ra, A, text6, E(Kb-1: Rb, Ra, A, text5)\n3. B -> A : CertB, Rb, text2\n4. A -> B : Ra, Rb, B, text4, E(Ka-1: Rb, Ra, B, text3)"}
+{"text": "Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nP : password (symmetric key)\nKa : A's randomly generated public key\nR : randomly generated session key\nNa, Nb : nonces\n\n1. A -> B : E(P : Ka)\n2. B -> A : E(P : E(Ka : R))\n3. A -> B : E(R : Na)\n4. B -> A : E(R : Na, Nb)\n5. A -> B : E(R : Nb)"}
+{"text": "Davis Swick Private Key Certificates Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nT : trusted translator\nKbt : shared key between B and T\nKat : shared key between A and T\nmsg : message\n\n1. B -> A : E(Kbt : A, msg)\n2. A -> T : E(Kbt : A, msg), B\n3. T -> A : E(Kat : msg, B)"}
+{"text": "Bilateral Key Exchange with Public Key Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKa, Kb : public key of A and B\nK : shared symmetric key\nNa, Nb : nonce\nf : nonce -> msg\n\n1. B -> A : B, E(Ka : Nb, B)\n2. A -> B : E(Kb : f(Nb), Na, A, K)\n3. B -> A : E(Kb : f(Na))"}
+{"text": "ISO One-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol with CCFs\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : shared key between A and B\nNa : nonce\nfKab : keyed cryptographic check function\ntext1, text2 : text messages\n\n1. A -> B : [Ta|Na], B, text2, fKab([Ta|Na], B, text1)"}
+{"text": "ISO Two-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol with CCFs\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : shared key between A and B\nRb : random nonce generated by B\nfKab : keyed cryptographic check function\ntext1, text2, text3 : text messages\n\n1. B -> A : Rb, text1\n2. A -> B : text3, fKab(Rb, B, text2)"}
+{"text": "ISO Two-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol with CCFs\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : shared key between A and B\nNa, Nb : nonces generated by A and B respectively\nfKab : keyed cryptographic check function\ntext1, text2, text3, text4 : text messages\n\n1. A -> B : [Ta|Na], text2, fKab([Ta|Na], B, text1)\n2. B -> A : [Ta|Na], text4, fKab([Tb|Nb], A, text3)"}
+{"text": "ISO Three-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol with CCFs\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : shared key between A and B\nRa, Rb : nonces generated by A and B respectively\nfKab : keyed cryptographic check function\ntext1, text2, text3, text4, text5 : text messages\n\n1. B -> A : Rb, text1\n2. A -> B : Ra, text3, fKab(Ra, Rb, B, text2)\n3. B -> A : text5, fKab(Rb, Ra, A, text4)"}
+{"text": "AAA Mobile IP\n\nMN, FA, AAAL, AAAH, HA : principal\nN_FA : nonce\nK_MnAAAH, K_FaAAAL, K_AAAHAAAL, K_AAAHHa : symkey\nK_MnFa, K_MnHa, K_FaHa : fresh symkey\n\n1. FA   -> MN   : FA, N_FA\n2. MN   -> FA   : N_FA, MN, AAAH, {N_FA, MN, AAAH}K_MnAAAH\n3. FA   -> AAAL : N_FA, MN, AAAH, {N_FA, MN, AAAH}K_MnAAAH\n4. AAAL -> AAAH : N_FA, MN, AAAH, {N_FA, MN, AAAH}K_MnAAAH\n5. AAAH -> HA   : MN, {K_MnHa, K_FaHa}K_AAAHHa, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {MN, {K_MnHa, K_FaHa}K_AAAHHa, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_AAAHHa\n6. HA   -> AAAH : {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa}K_AAAHHa\n7. AAAH -> AAAL : N_FA, {K_MnFa, K_FaHa}K_AAAHAAAL, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa, {N_FA, {K_MnFa, K_FaHa}K_AAAHAAAL, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa}K_AAAHAAAL\n8. AAAL -> FA   : N_FA, {K_MnFa, K_FaHa}K_FaAAAL, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa, {N_FA, {K_MnFa, K_FaHa}K_FaAAAL, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa}K_FaAAAL\n9. FA   -> MN   : {K_MnFa, K_FaHa}K_FaAAAL, {K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH, {{K_MnFa, K_MnHa}K_MnAAAH}K_MnHa"}
+{"text": "SIP Diameter Session Initiation Protocol\n\nUAC, SS1, SS2, DS : principal\nNonce : nonce\nPWD : text\nDest : protocol_id\nH : hash_func\nsipregister, sip401, sip200 : protocol_id\n\n1.  UAC -> SS1 : sipregister, UAC, Dest\n2.  SS1 -> DS  : UAC, Dest\n3.  DS  -> SS1 : UAC, SS2\n4.  SS1 -> SS2 : sipregister, UAC, Dest\n5.  SS2 -> DS  : Dest, UAC\n6.  DS  -> SS2 : Nonce, UAC\n7.  SS2 -> SS1 : sip401, Nonce\n8.  SS1 -> UAC : sip401, Nonce\n9.  UAC -> SS1 : sipregister, UAC, Dest, Nonce, H(Nonce, H(UAC, PWD), H(Dest))\n10. SS1 -> DS  : UAC, Dest\n11. DS  -> SS1 : UAC, SS2\n12. SS1 -> SS2 : sipregister, UAC, Dest, Nonce, H(Nonce, H(UAC, PWD), H(Dest))\n13. SS2 -> DS  : Dest, UAC, Nonce, H(Nonce, H(UAC, PWD), H(Dest))\n14. DS  -> SS2 : UAC, success\n15. SS2 -> SS1 : sip200\n16. SS1 -> UAC : sip200"}
+{"text": "H.530 Symmetric Security for H.323 Mobility (Original)\n\nMT, VGK, AuF : principal\nZZ, ZZ_VA : symkey\nX, Y : nonce\nCH1, CH2, CH3, CH4 : nonce\nNIL, G : text\nF : hash_func\nexp : text, nonce -> message\nalias M1 = MT, VGK, NIL, CH1, exp(G, X)\nalias M2 = M1, F(ZZ, M1), VGK, xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y))\nalias M3 = VGK, MT, F(ZZ, VGK), F(ZZ, xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y)))\nalias M4 = VGK, MT, CH1, CH2, exp(G, Y), F(ZZ, xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y))), F(ZZ, VGK)\nalias M5 = MT, VGK, CH2, CH3\nalias M6 = VGK, MT, CH3, CH4\n\n1. MT  -> VGK : M1, F(ZZ, M1)\n2. VGK -> AuF : M2, F(ZZ_VA, M2)\n3. AuF -> VGK : M3, F(ZZ_VA, M3)\n4. VGK -> MT  : M4, F(exp(exp(G, X), Y), M4)\n5. MT  -> VGK : M5, F(exp(exp(G, X), Y), M5)\n6. VGK -> MT  : M6, F(exp(exp(G, X), Y), M6)"}
+{"text": "H.530 Symmetric Security for H.323 Mobility (Fixed)\n\nMT, VGK, AuF : principal\nZZ, ZZ_VA : symkey\nX, Y : nonce\nCH1, CH2, CH3, CH4 : nonce\nNIL, G : text\nF : hash_func\nexp : text, nonce -> message\nalias M1 = MT, VGK, NIL, CH1, exp(G, X)\nalias M2 = M1, F(ZZ, M1), VGK, xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y))\nalias M3 = VGK, MT, F(ZZ, VGK), F(ZZ, xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y))), xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y))\nalias M4 = VGK, MT, CH1, CH2, exp(G, Y), F(ZZ, xor(exp(G, X), exp(G, Y))), F(ZZ, VGK)\nalias M5 = MT, VGK, CH2, CH3\nalias M6 = VGK, MT, CH3, CH4\n\n1. MT  -> VGK : M1, F(ZZ, M1)\n2. VGK -> AuF : M2, F(ZZ_VA, M2)\n3. AuF -> VGK : M3, F(ZZ_VA, M3)\n4. VGK -> MT  : M4, F(exp(exp(G, X), Y), M4)\n5. MT  -> VGK : M5, F(exp(exp(G, X), Y), M5)\n6. VGK -> MT  : M6, F(exp(exp(G, X), Y), M6)"}
+{"text": "Geopriv with pseudonym for Location Recipient only\n\nT, LR, LS : principal\nK_T_LR, K_T_LS : symkey\nK_LS : public_key\nN_LR : text\nPsi_LR, PW_LR : text\nK_LR : symkey\nLI : text\nPR : hash_func\n\n1. LR -> T  : LR, {LR, N_LR}K_T_LR\n2. LR <- T  : Psi_LR, {PW_LR, N_LR}K_T_LR\n3. LS <- T  : T, Psi_LR, {PW_LR, T, PR}K_T_LS\n4. LR -> LS : Psi_LR, {PW_LR, K_LR, T}K_LS\n5. LR <- LS : {PR(LI), T}K_LR"}
+{"text": "Geopriv with pseudonyms for Location Recipient and Target\n\nT, LR, LS : principal\nK_T_LR : symkey\nK_LS : public_key\nN_LR : text\nPsi_LR, Psi_T : text\nK_LR : symkey\nLI : text\nPR : hash_func\n\n1. LR -> T  : LR, {LR, K_LR, N_LR}K_T_LR\n2. LR <- T  : {Psi_LR, Psi_T, N_LR}K_T_LR\n3. LS <- T  : {Psi_LR, Psi_T, PR, LI, K_LR}K_LS\n4. LR -> LS : {Psi_LR, Psi_T}K_LS\n5. LR <- LS : {PR(LI), Psi_T}K_LR"}
+{"text": "EAP-TLS\n\nP, S : principal\nKp, Ks, Kca : public_key\nNp, Ns, PMS : nonce\nVersion, SessionID, CipherSuite, Cipher : text\nSke, Shd, Ccs : text\nH, KeyGen, PRF : hash_func\nalias ClientK = KeyGen(P, Np, Ns, PRF(PMS, Np, Ns))\nalias ServerK = KeyGen(S, Np, Ns, PRF(PMS, Np, Ns))\nalias Finished = H(PRF(PMS, Np, Ns), P, S, Np, Cipher, SessionID)\n\n1. S -> P : request_id\n2. P -> S : respond_id, P\n3. S -> P : start_tls\n4. P -> S : Version, SessionID, Np, CipherSuite\n5. S -> P : Version, SessionID, Ns, Cipher, {S, Ks}inv(Kca), Ske, Shd\n6. P -> S : {P, Kp}inv(Kca), {PMS}Ks, {H(Np, Ns, S, PMS)}inv(Kp), Ccs, {Finished}ClientK\n7. S -> P : Ccs, {Finished}ServerK"}
+{"text": "EAP-TTLS with Tunneled CHAP\n\nP, S : principal\nKs, Kca : public_key\nNp, Ns, PMS : nonce\nVersion, SessionID, CipherSuite, Cipher : text\nShd, Ccs, Txt : text\nUName, ChapRs : text\nH, PRF, CHAP_PRF, Tranc, KeyGen : hash_func\nalias MS = PRF(PMS, Np, Ns)\nalias ClientK = KeyGen(P, Np, Ns, MS)\nalias ServerK = KeyGen(S, Np, Ns, MS)\nalias Finished = H(MS, P, S, Np, Cipher, SessionID)\nalias CHAP_challenge = Tranc(CHAP_PRF(MS, Txt, Np, Ns), 1, 16)\nalias ChapId = Tranc(CHAP_PRF(MS, Txt, Np, Ns), 17, 17)\n\n1. S -> P : request_id\n2. P -> S : respond_id, P\n3. S -> P : start_ttls\n4. P -> S : Version, SessionID, Np, CipherSuite\n5. S -> P : Version, SessionID, Ns, Cipher, {S, Ks}inv(Kca), Shd\n6. P -> S : {PMS}Ks, Ccs, {Finished}ClientK\n7. S -> P : Ccs, {Finished}ServerK\n8. P -> S : {UName, CHAP_challenge, ChapId, ChapRs}ClientK\n9. S -> P : success"}
+{"text": "PEAP with MS-CHAP\n\nP, S : principal\nKs, Kca : public_key\nPw : symmetric_key\nNp, Ns, PMS : nonce\nSessionID, CipherSuite : text\nCcs : text\nH1, H2, PRF, KeyGen : hash_func\nalias M = PRF(PMS, Np, Ns)\nalias ClientK = KeyGen(P, Np, Ns, M)\nalias ServerK = KeyGen(S, Np, Ns, M)\nalias Finished = H1(M, P, S, Np, CipherSuite, SessionID)\n\n1. S -> P : id_request\n2. P -> S : P\n3. S -> P : start_peap\n4. P -> S : Np, SessionID, CipherSuite\n5. S -> P : Ns, SessionID, CipherSuite, {S, Ks}inv(Kca)\n6. P -> S : {PMS}Ks, Ccs\n7. S -> P : Ccs, {Finished}ServerK\n8. P -> S : {P}ClientK\n9. S -> P : {Ns}ServerK\n10. P -> S : {Np, H2(Pw, Np, Ns, P)}ClientK\n11. S -> P : {H2(Pw, Np)}ServerK\n12. P -> S : ack_message\n13. S -> P : eap_success"}
+{"text": "RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service\n\nC, S : principal\nKcs : symkey\nNAS_ID, NAS_PORT : text\nChall_Message : text\nSuccess, Failure, Access_accept, Access_reject : text\nMD5 : hash_func\n\n1. C -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n2. S -> C : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n3. C -> S : NAS_ID, Success\n\nAlternatively (with challenge):\n1. C -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n2. S -> C : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n3. C -> S : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n4. S -> C : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n5. C -> S : NAS_ID, Success"}
+{"text": "IEEE 802.1X EAPOL over RADIUS\n\nC, A, S : principal\nKcs : symkey\nNAS_ID, NAS_PORT : text\nChall_Message : text\nSuccess : text\nEAPOL_Start, EAPOL_Req_Identity, EAPOL_Success, Access_accept : text\nMD5 : hash_func\n\n1. C -> A : EAPOL_Start\n2. A -> C : EAPOL_Req_Identity\n3. C -> A : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n4. A -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n5. S -> A : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n6. A -> C : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n7. C -> A : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n8. A -> S : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n9. S -> A : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n10. A -> C : EAPOL_Success\n11. C -> A : NAS_ID, Success"}
+{"text": "TSIG Transaction Signature\n\nC, S : principal\nK : symkey\nN1, N2 : nonce\nM1, M2 : text\nTAG1, TAG2 : text\nH : hash_func\n\n1. C -> S : TAG1, M1, {H(TAG1, M1), N1}K\n2. S -> C : TAG2, M1, M2, {H(TAG2, M1, M2), N2}K"}
+{"text": "TESLA: Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication\n\nS, R: principal\nK_N: random symmetric key generated by S\nK_i: keys derived from K_N using a one-way function F\nM_i: messages broadcast by S\nN: total number of messages\nF: one-way hash function\ntext: generic message content\n\n1. S -> R: {N, K_0}inv(K_S) where K_0 = F^N(K_N)\n2. For i = 1 to N-1, S -> R: M_i, hash(K_i, M_i), K{i-1}"}
+{"text": "UMTS-AKA: Authentication and Key Agreement\n\nS, M: principal (Server, Mobile)\nk(M): shared secret key between S and M\nseq: sequence number maintained by both S and M\nr: random nonce generated by S\nF1, F2, F3, F4, F5: cryptographic hash or one-way functions\nCK, IK, KA: session keys derived from k(M) and r\nAUTN: authentication token\n\n1. M -> S: M\n2. S -> M: r; {seq}_Ka; F1(k(M); seq; r)\n3. M computes KA, seq, and verifies F1(k(M); seq; r); if valid, increments seq\n4. M -> S: F2(k(M); r)"}
+{"text": "SRP: Secure Remote Passwords\n\nA, B: principal (Client, Server)\nPassword: shared secret between A and B\nSalt: random value known to server, used to prevent dictionary attacks\nG: generator for Diffie-Hellman exponentiation\nNa, Nb: nonces generated by A and B respectively\nV: password verifier = g^x mod N, with x = SHA(salt | SHA(A | ':' | Password))\nDHX, DHY: Diffie-Hellman public values\nK: session key derived from DH values and verifier\nM: proof of key, H(A,B,K,...)\n\n1. A -> B: A, G^Na\n2. B -> A: Salt, {G^Nb}_V\n3. A -> B: M\n4. B -> A: H(G^Na, M, K)"}
+{"text": "SAML-based SSO for Google Apps (SP-initiated, Google unsafe variant)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nID, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> SP : URI\n2. SP -> C : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n3. C -> IdP : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n4. IdP -> C : SP, {C, IdP}inv(KIdP), URI\n5. C -> SP : SP, {C, IdP}inv(KIdP), URI\n6. SP -> C : Resource"}
+{"text": "SAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (IdP-initiated with back channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDaa, IDresolve, Resource, REF : text\n\n1. C -> IdP : C, URI, SP\n2. IdP -> C : SP, IdP, REF\n3. C -> SP : IdP, REF\n4. SP -> IdP : IDresolve, SP, IdP, REF\n5. IdP -> SP : IDresolve, IdP, URI, IDaa, SP, IdP, C, URI\n6. SP -> C : URI, Resource"}
+{"text": "SAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (IdP-initiated with front channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDaa, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> IdP : C, URI, SP\n2. IdP -> C : IdP, URI, IDaa, SP, IdP, C, URI\n3. C -> SP : IDaa, IdP, URI, SP, C\n4. SP -> C : URI, Resource"}
+{"text": "SAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (SP-initiated with back channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDar, IDaa, IDresolve_1, IDresolve_2, Resource, REF_1, REF_2 : text\n\n1. C -> SP : C, URI\n2. SP -> C : IdP, SP, REF_1\n3. C -> IdP : C, SP, REF_1\n4. IdP -> SP : IDresolve_1, IdP, SP, REF_1\n5. SP -> IdP : IDresolve_1, SP, IdP, IDar, URI\n6. IdP -> C : SP, IdP, REF_2\n7. C -> SP : IdP, REF_2\n8. SP -> IdP : IDresolve_2, SP, IdP, REF_2\n9. IdP -> SP : IDresolve_2, IdP, URI, IDar, {SP, IdP, C, IDaa, URI}inv(KIdP)\n10. SP -> C : URI, Resource"}
+{"text": "SAML-based SSO for Google Apps (SP-initiated with front channels, fixed variant)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nID, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> SP : URI\n2. SP -> C : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n3. C -> IdP : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n4. IdP -> C : SP, {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP), URI\n5. C -> SP : SP, {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP), URI\n6. SP -> C : Resource"}
+{"text": "Idemix Anonymous Credential\n\nUser, Issuer, Verifier : principal\nNu, Ns, NuPrime, NsPrime : nonce\nmasec : master_secret\nK_ptag, K_spk : fresh symkey\n\n1. User -> Issuer : commit(masec, Issuer, Nu)\n2. Issuer -> User : credential(Issuer, ptag(masec, Issuer, Nu, Ns), attributes)\n3. User -> Verifier : ptag(masec, Verifier, NuPrime, NsPrime), spk(masec, public_values, statement, message)"}