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conversation.jsonl

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nOtway Rees\n\nA, B, S : principal \n M, Na, Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n\n1. A -> B : M, A, B, {Na, M, A, B}Kas \n 2. B -> S : M, A, B, {Na, M, A, B}Kas , {Nb, M, A, B}Kbs \n 3. S -> B : M, {Na, Kab}Kas, {Nb, Kab}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : M, {Na, Kab}Kas"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nSchnorr's Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : fresh number \n Sa : private key \n Pa = exp(g,Sa) : public key \n A chooses Na and computes a = exp(g,Na) \n\n1. A -> B : a \n B chooses Nb \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n A computes r = Na + Nb Sa \n 3. A -> B : r \n B checks that exp(g, r) = a exp(Pa,Nb)"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nShamir-Rivest-Adleman Three Pass Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n M : fresh number \n\n1. A -> B : {M}Ka \n 2. B -> A : {{M}Ka}Kb \n 3. A -> B : {M}Kb"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
-{"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nSK3\n\nA, B, S, Ca, Cb : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n Kac, Kbc : symkey \n Na, Nb : nonce \n 0,1,2 : number \n alias Kab = {A, 0}Kb \n alias Pab = Kab + {B, 1}Ka \n\n1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka \n 3. A -> Ca : A \n 4. Ca -> A : Na, {Na, 1, 1}Kac \n 5. A -> B : A, Na \n 6. B -> Cb : A, Na \n 7. Cb -> B : Nb, {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 8. B -> A : Nb, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab \n 9. A -> Ca : B, Na, Nb, Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab,\n{Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n\n10. Ca -> A : {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n\n11. A -> B : {Nb, 0, 1}Kab"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
+{"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nSK3\n\nA, B, S, Ca, Cb : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n Kac, Kbc : symkey \n Na, Nb : nonce \n 0,1,2 : number \n alias Kab = {A, 0}Kb \n alias Pab = Kab + {B, 1}Ka \n\n1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka \n 3. A -> Ca : A \n 4. Ca -> A : Na, {Na, 1, 1}Kac \n 5. A -> B : A, Na \n 6. B -> Cb : A, Na \n 7. Cb -> B : Nb, {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 8. B -> A : Nb, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab \n 9. A -> Ca : B, Na, Nb, Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab,\n{Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n10. Ca -> A : {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n11. A -> B : {Nb, 0, 1}Kab"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nSmartRight view-only\n\nCC, TC : principal \n VoKey, VoR, VoRi, CW : number \n Kc : key \n h : number -> number \n\n1. CC -> TC : {VoKey, CW+VoR}Kc \n 2. TC -> CC : VoRi \n 3. CC -> TC : VoR, {h(VoRi)}VoKey"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nSPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n\n1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {S, inc(N2)}pk(C)"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nHwang and Chen modified SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n\n1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {S, inc(N2)}pk(C)"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nEAP-TLS\n\nP, S : principal\nKp, Ks, Kca : public_key\nNp, Ns, PMS : nonce\nVersion, SessionID, CipherSuite, Cipher : text\nSke, Shd, Ccs : text\nH, KeyGen, PRF : hash_func\nalias ClientK = KeyGen(P, Np, Ns, PRF(PMS, Np, Ns))\nalias ServerK = KeyGen(S, Np, Ns, PRF(PMS, Np, Ns))\nalias Finished = H(PRF(PMS, Np, Ns), P, S, Np, Cipher, SessionID)\n\n1. S -> P : request_id\n2. P -> S : respond_id, P\n3. S -> P : start_tls\n4. P -> S : Version, SessionID, Np, CipherSuite\n5. S -> P : Version, SessionID, Ns, Cipher, {S, Ks}inv(Kca), Ske, Shd\n6. P -> S : {P, Kp}inv(Kca), {PMS}Ks, {H(Np, Ns, S, PMS)}inv(Kp), Ccs, {Finished}ClientK\n7. S -> P : Ccs, {Finished}ServerK"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nEAP-TTLS with Tunneled CHAP\n\nP, S : principal\nKs, Kca : public_key\nNp, Ns, PMS : nonce\nVersion, SessionID, CipherSuite, Cipher : text\nShd, Ccs, Txt : text\nUName, ChapRs : text\nH, PRF, CHAP_PRF, Tranc, KeyGen : hash_func\nalias MS = PRF(PMS, Np, Ns)\nalias ClientK = KeyGen(P, Np, Ns, MS)\nalias ServerK = KeyGen(S, Np, Ns, MS)\nalias Finished = H(MS, P, S, Np, Cipher, SessionID)\nalias CHAP_challenge = Tranc(CHAP_PRF(MS, Txt, Np, Ns), 1, 16)\nalias ChapId = Tranc(CHAP_PRF(MS, Txt, Np, Ns), 17, 17)\n\n1. S -> P : request_id\n2. P -> S : respond_id, P\n3. S -> P : start_ttls\n4. P -> S : Version, SessionID, Np, CipherSuite\n5. S -> P : Version, SessionID, Ns, Cipher, {S, Ks}inv(Kca), Shd\n6. P -> S : {PMS}Ks, Ccs, {Finished}ClientK\n7. S -> P : Ccs, {Finished}ServerK\n8. P -> S : {UName, CHAP_challenge, ChapId, ChapRs}ClientK\n9. S -> P : success"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nPEAP with MS-CHAP\n\nP, S : principal\nKs, Kca : public_key\nPw : symmetric_key\nNp, Ns, PMS : nonce\nSessionID, CipherSuite : text\nCcs : text\nH1, H2, PRF, KeyGen : hash_func\nalias M = PRF(PMS, Np, Ns)\nalias ClientK = KeyGen(P, Np, Ns, M)\nalias ServerK = KeyGen(S, Np, Ns, M)\nalias Finished = H1(M, P, S, Np, CipherSuite, SessionID)\n\n1. S -> P : id_request\n2. P -> S : P\n3. S -> P : start_peap\n4. P -> S : Np, SessionID, CipherSuite\n5. S -> P : Ns, SessionID, CipherSuite, {S, Ks}inv(Kca)\n6. P -> S : {PMS}Ks, Ccs\n7. S -> P : Ccs, {Finished}ServerK\n8. P -> S : {P}ClientK\n9. S -> P : {Ns}ServerK\n10. P -> S : {Np, H2(Pw, Np, Ns, P)}ClientK\n11. S -> P : {H2(Pw, Np)}ServerK\n12. P -> S : ack_message\n13. S -> P : eap_success"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
-{"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nRADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service\n\nC, S : principal\nKcs : symkey\nNAS_ID, NAS_PORT : text\nChall_Message : text\nSuccess, Failure, Access_accept, Access_reject : text\nMD5 : hash_func\n\n1. C -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n2. S -> C : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n3. C -> S : NAS_ID, Success\n\nAlternatively (with challenge):\n1. C -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n2. S -> C : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n3. C -> S : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n4. S -> C : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n5. C -> S : NAS_ID, Success"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
+{"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nRADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service\n\nC, S : principal\nKcs : symkey\nNAS_ID, NAS_PORT : text\nSuccess, Failure, Access_accept, Access_reject : text\nMD5 : hash_func\n\n1. C -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n2. S -> C : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n3. C -> S : NAS_ID, Success"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
+{"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nRADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (with challenge)\n\nC, S : principal\nKcs : symkey\nNAS_ID, NAS_PORT : text\nChall_Message : text\nSuccess, Failure, Access_accept, Access_reject : text\nMD5 : hash_func\n\n1. C -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n2. S -> C : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n3. C -> S : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n4. S -> C : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n5. C -> S : NAS_ID, Success"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nIEEE 802.1X EAPOL over RADIUS\n\nC, A, S : principal\nKcs : symkey\nNAS_ID, NAS_PORT : text\nChall_Message : text\nSuccess : text\nEAPOL_Start, EAPOL_Req_Identity, EAPOL_Success, Access_accept : text\nMD5 : hash_func\n\n1. C -> A : EAPOL_Start\n2. A -> C : EAPOL_Req_Identity\n3. C -> A : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n4. A -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n5. S -> A : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n6. A -> C : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n7. C -> A : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n8. A -> S : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n9. S -> A : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n10. A -> C : EAPOL_Success\n11. C -> A : NAS_ID, Success"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nTSIG Transaction Signature\n\nC, S : principal\nK : symkey\nN1, N2 : nonce\nM1, M2 : text\nTAG1, TAG2 : text\nH : hash_func\n\n1. C -> S : TAG1, M1, {H(TAG1, M1), N1}K\n2. S -> C : TAG2, M1, M2, {H(TAG2, M1, M2), N2}K"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nTESLA: Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication\n\nS, R: principal\nK_N: random symmetric key generated by S\nK_i: keys derived from K_N using a one-way function F\nM_i: messages broadcast by S\nN: total number of messages\nF: one-way hash function\ntext: generic message content\n\n1. S -> R: {N, K_0}inv(K_S) where K_0 = F^N(K_N)\n2. For i = 1 to N-1, S -> R: M_i, hash(K_i, M_i), K{i-1}"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
@@ -85,4 +86,4 @@
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nSAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (IdP-initiated with front channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDaa, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> IdP : C, URI, SP\n2. IdP -> C : IdP, URI, IDaa, SP, IdP, C, URI\n3. C -> SP : IDaa, IdP, URI, SP, C\n4. SP -> C : URI, Resource"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nSAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (SP-initiated with back channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDar, IDaa, IDresolve_1, IDresolve_2, Resource, REF_1, REF_2 : text\n\n1. C -> SP : C, URI\n2. SP -> C : IdP, SP, REF_1\n3. C -> IdP : C, SP, REF_1\n4. IdP -> SP : IDresolve_1, IdP, SP, REF_1\n5. SP -> IdP : IDresolve_1, SP, IdP, IDar, URI\n6. IdP -> C : SP, IdP, REF_2\n7. C -> SP : IdP, REF_2\n8. SP -> IdP : IDresolve_2, SP, IdP, REF_2\n9. IdP -> SP : IDresolve_2, IdP, URI, IDar, {SP, IdP, C, IDaa, URI}inv(KIdP)\n10. SP -> C : URI, Resource"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
 {"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nSAML-based SSO for Google Apps (SP-initiated with front channels, fixed variant)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nID, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> SP : URI\n2. SP -> C : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n3. C -> IdP : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n4. IdP -> C : SP, {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP), URI\n5. C -> SP : SP, {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP), URI\n6. SP -> C : Resource"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
-{"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nIdemix Anonymous Credential\n\nUser, Issuer, Verifier : principal\nNu, Ns, NuPrime, NsPrime : nonce\nmasec : master_secret\nK_ptag, K_spk : fresh symkey\n\n1. User -> Issuer : commit(masec, Issuer, Nu)\n2. Issuer -> User : credential(Issuer, ptag(masec, Issuer, Nu, Ns), attributes)\n3. User -> Verifier : ptag(masec, Verifier, NuPrime, NsPrime), spk(masec, public_values, statement, message)"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}
+{"messages": [{"role": "system", "content": "You are an expert in formal verification of security protocols."}, {"role": "user", "content": "Analyze the following protocol:\n\nIdemix Anonymous Credential\n\nUser, Issuer, Verifier : principal\nNu, Ns, NuPrime, NsPrime : nonce\nmasec : master_secret\nK_ptag, K_spk : fresh symkey\n\n1. User -> Issuer : commit(masec, Issuer, Nu)\n2. Issuer -> User : credential(Issuer, ptag(masec, Issuer, Nu, Ns), attributes)\n3. User -> Verifier : ptag(masec, Verifier, NuPrime, NsPrime), spk(masec, public_values, statement, message)"}, {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}]}

instruction.jsonl

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 {"text": "Otway Rees\n\nA, B, S : principal \n M, Na, Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n\n1. A -> B : M, A, B, {Na, M, A, B}Kas \n 2. B -> S : M, A, B, {Na, M, A, B}Kas , {Nb, M, A, B}Kbs \n 3. S -> B : M, {Na, Kab}Kas, {Nb, Kab}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : M, {Na, Kab}Kas"}
 {"text": "Schnorr's Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : fresh number \n Sa : private key \n Pa = exp(g,Sa) : public key \n A chooses Na and computes a = exp(g,Na) \n\n1. A -> B : a \n B chooses Nb \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n A computes r = Na + Nb Sa \n 3. A -> B : r \n B checks that exp(g, r) = a exp(Pa,Nb)"}
 {"text": "Shamir-Rivest-Adleman Three Pass Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n M : fresh number \n\n1. A -> B : {M}Ka \n 2. B -> A : {{M}Ka}Kb \n 3. A -> B : {M}Kb"}
-{"text": "SK3\n\nA, B, S, Ca, Cb : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n Kac, Kbc : symkey \n Na, Nb : nonce \n 0,1,2 : number \n alias Kab = {A, 0}Kb \n alias Pab = Kab + {B, 1}Ka \n\n1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka \n 3. A -> Ca : A \n 4. Ca -> A : Na, {Na, 1, 1}Kac \n 5. A -> B : A, Na \n 6. B -> Cb : A, Na \n 7. Cb -> B : Nb, {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 8. B -> A : Nb, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab \n 9. A -> Ca : B, Na, Nb, Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab,\n{Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n\n10. Ca -> A : {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n\n11. A -> B : {Nb, 0, 1}Kab"}
+{"text": "SK3\n\nA, B, S, Ca, Cb : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n Kac, Kbc : symkey \n Na, Nb : nonce \n 0,1,2 : number \n alias Kab = {A, 0}Kb \n alias Pab = Kab + {B, 1}Ka \n\n1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka \n 3. A -> Ca : A \n 4. Ca -> A : Na, {Na, 1, 1}Kac \n 5. A -> B : A, Na \n 6. B -> Cb : A, Na \n 7. Cb -> B : Nb, {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 8. B -> A : Nb, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab \n 9. A -> Ca : B, Na, Nb, Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab,\n{Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n10. Ca -> A : {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n11. A -> B : {Nb, 0, 1}Kab"}
 {"text": "SmartRight view-only\n\nCC, TC : principal \n VoKey, VoR, VoRi, CW : number \n Kc : key \n h : number -> number \n\n1. CC -> TC : {VoKey, CW+VoR}Kc \n 2. TC -> CC : VoRi \n 3. CC -> TC : VoR, {h(VoRi)}VoKey"}
 {"text": "SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n\n1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {S, inc(N2)}pk(C)"}
 {"text": "Hwang and Chen modified SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n\n1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {S, inc(N2)}pk(C)"}
@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@
 {"text": "EAP-TLS\n\nP, S : principal\nKp, Ks, Kca : public_key\nNp, Ns, PMS : nonce\nVersion, SessionID, CipherSuite, Cipher : text\nSke, Shd, Ccs : text\nH, KeyGen, PRF : hash_func\nalias ClientK = KeyGen(P, Np, Ns, PRF(PMS, Np, Ns))\nalias ServerK = KeyGen(S, Np, Ns, PRF(PMS, Np, Ns))\nalias Finished = H(PRF(PMS, Np, Ns), P, S, Np, Cipher, SessionID)\n\n1. S -> P : request_id\n2. P -> S : respond_id, P\n3. S -> P : start_tls\n4. P -> S : Version, SessionID, Np, CipherSuite\n5. S -> P : Version, SessionID, Ns, Cipher, {S, Ks}inv(Kca), Ske, Shd\n6. P -> S : {P, Kp}inv(Kca), {PMS}Ks, {H(Np, Ns, S, PMS)}inv(Kp), Ccs, {Finished}ClientK\n7. S -> P : Ccs, {Finished}ServerK"}
 {"text": "EAP-TTLS with Tunneled CHAP\n\nP, S : principal\nKs, Kca : public_key\nNp, Ns, PMS : nonce\nVersion, SessionID, CipherSuite, Cipher : text\nShd, Ccs, Txt : text\nUName, ChapRs : text\nH, PRF, CHAP_PRF, Tranc, KeyGen : hash_func\nalias MS = PRF(PMS, Np, Ns)\nalias ClientK = KeyGen(P, Np, Ns, MS)\nalias ServerK = KeyGen(S, Np, Ns, MS)\nalias Finished = H(MS, P, S, Np, Cipher, SessionID)\nalias CHAP_challenge = Tranc(CHAP_PRF(MS, Txt, Np, Ns), 1, 16)\nalias ChapId = Tranc(CHAP_PRF(MS, Txt, Np, Ns), 17, 17)\n\n1. S -> P : request_id\n2. P -> S : respond_id, P\n3. S -> P : start_ttls\n4. P -> S : Version, SessionID, Np, CipherSuite\n5. S -> P : Version, SessionID, Ns, Cipher, {S, Ks}inv(Kca), Shd\n6. P -> S : {PMS}Ks, Ccs, {Finished}ClientK\n7. S -> P : Ccs, {Finished}ServerK\n8. P -> S : {UName, CHAP_challenge, ChapId, ChapRs}ClientK\n9. S -> P : success"}
 {"text": "PEAP with MS-CHAP\n\nP, S : principal\nKs, Kca : public_key\nPw : symmetric_key\nNp, Ns, PMS : nonce\nSessionID, CipherSuite : text\nCcs : text\nH1, H2, PRF, KeyGen : hash_func\nalias M = PRF(PMS, Np, Ns)\nalias ClientK = KeyGen(P, Np, Ns, M)\nalias ServerK = KeyGen(S, Np, Ns, M)\nalias Finished = H1(M, P, S, Np, CipherSuite, SessionID)\n\n1. S -> P : id_request\n2. P -> S : P\n3. S -> P : start_peap\n4. P -> S : Np, SessionID, CipherSuite\n5. S -> P : Ns, SessionID, CipherSuite, {S, Ks}inv(Kca)\n6. P -> S : {PMS}Ks, Ccs\n7. S -> P : Ccs, {Finished}ServerK\n8. P -> S : {P}ClientK\n9. S -> P : {Ns}ServerK\n10. P -> S : {Np, H2(Pw, Np, Ns, P)}ClientK\n11. S -> P : {H2(Pw, Np)}ServerK\n12. P -> S : ack_message\n13. S -> P : eap_success"}
-{"text": "RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service\n\nC, S : principal\nKcs : symkey\nNAS_ID, NAS_PORT : text\nChall_Message : text\nSuccess, Failure, Access_accept, Access_reject : text\nMD5 : hash_func\n\n1. C -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n2. S -> C : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n3. C -> S : NAS_ID, Success\n\nAlternatively (with challenge):\n1. C -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n2. S -> C : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n3. C -> S : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n4. S -> C : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n5. C -> S : NAS_ID, Success"}
+{"text": "RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service\n\nC, S : principal\nKcs : symkey\nNAS_ID, NAS_PORT : text\nSuccess, Failure, Access_accept, Access_reject : text\nMD5 : hash_func\n\n1. C -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n2. S -> C : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n3. C -> S : NAS_ID, Success"}
+{"text": "RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (with challenge)\n\nC, S : principal\nKcs : symkey\nNAS_ID, NAS_PORT : text\nChall_Message : text\nSuccess, Failure, Access_accept, Access_reject : text\nMD5 : hash_func\n\n1. C -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n2. S -> C : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n3. C -> S : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n4. S -> C : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n5. C -> S : NAS_ID, Success"}
 {"text": "IEEE 802.1X EAPOL over RADIUS\n\nC, A, S : principal\nKcs : symkey\nNAS_ID, NAS_PORT : text\nChall_Message : text\nSuccess : text\nEAPOL_Start, EAPOL_Req_Identity, EAPOL_Success, Access_accept : text\nMD5 : hash_func\n\n1. C -> A : EAPOL_Start\n2. A -> C : EAPOL_Req_Identity\n3. C -> A : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n4. A -> S : NAS_ID, NAS_PORT, MD5(Kcs)\n5. S -> A : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n6. A -> C : NAS_ID, Chall_Message\n7. C -> A : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n8. A -> S : NAS_ID, {Chall_Message}Kcs\n9. S -> A : NAS_ID, Access_accept\n10. A -> C : EAPOL_Success\n11. C -> A : NAS_ID, Success"}
 {"text": "TSIG Transaction Signature\n\nC, S : principal\nK : symkey\nN1, N2 : nonce\nM1, M2 : text\nTAG1, TAG2 : text\nH : hash_func\n\n1. C -> S : TAG1, M1, {H(TAG1, M1), N1}K\n2. S -> C : TAG2, M1, M2, {H(TAG2, M1, M2), N2}K"}
 {"text": "TESLA: Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication\n\nS, R: principal\nK_N: random symmetric key generated by S\nK_i: keys derived from K_N using a one-way function F\nM_i: messages broadcast by S\nN: total number of messages\nF: one-way hash function\ntext: generic message content\n\n1. S -> R: {N, K_0}inv(K_S) where K_0 = F^N(K_N)\n2. For i = 1 to N-1, S -> R: M_i, hash(K_i, M_i), K{i-1}"}
@@ -85,4 +86,4 @@
 {"text": "SAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (IdP-initiated with front channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDaa, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> IdP : C, URI, SP\n2. IdP -> C : IdP, URI, IDaa, SP, IdP, C, URI\n3. C -> SP : IDaa, IdP, URI, SP, C\n4. SP -> C : URI, Resource"}
 {"text": "SAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (SP-initiated with back channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDar, IDaa, IDresolve_1, IDresolve_2, Resource, REF_1, REF_2 : text\n\n1. C -> SP : C, URI\n2. SP -> C : IdP, SP, REF_1\n3. C -> IdP : C, SP, REF_1\n4. IdP -> SP : IDresolve_1, IdP, SP, REF_1\n5. SP -> IdP : IDresolve_1, SP, IdP, IDar, URI\n6. IdP -> C : SP, IdP, REF_2\n7. C -> SP : IdP, REF_2\n8. SP -> IdP : IDresolve_2, SP, IdP, REF_2\n9. IdP -> SP : IDresolve_2, IdP, URI, IDar, {SP, IdP, C, IDaa, URI}inv(KIdP)\n10. SP -> C : URI, Resource"}
 {"text": "SAML-based SSO for Google Apps (SP-initiated with front channels, fixed variant)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nID, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> SP : URI\n2. SP -> C : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n3. C -> IdP : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n4. IdP -> C : SP, {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP), URI\n5. C -> SP : SP, {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP), URI\n6. SP -> C : Resource"}
-{"text": "Idemix Anonymous Credential\n\nUser, Issuer, Verifier : principal\nNu, Ns, NuPrime, NsPrime : nonce\nmasec : master_secret\nK_ptag, K_spk : fresh symkey\n\n1. User -> Issuer : commit(masec, Issuer, Nu)\n2. Issuer -> User : credential(Issuer, ptag(masec, Issuer, Nu, Ns), attributes)\n3. User -> Verifier : ptag(masec, Verifier, NuPrime, NsPrime), spk(masec, public_values, statement, message)"}
+{"text": "Idemix Anonymous Credential\n\nUser, Issuer, Verifier : principal\nNu, Ns, NuPrime, NsPrime : nonce\nmasec : master_secret\nK_ptag, K_spk : fresh symkey\n\n1. User -> Issuer : commit(masec, Issuer, Nu)\n2. Issuer -> User : credential(Issuer, ptag(masec, Issuer, Nu, Ns), attributes)\n3. User -> Verifier : ptag(masec, Verifier, NuPrime, NsPrime), spk(masec, public_values, statement, message)"}