Update instruction.jsonl

instruction.jsonl

@@ -1,52 +1,52 @@
-{"text": "Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> B : A, {Na}Kab \n 2. B -> A : {succNa, Nb}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {succNb}Kab \n 4. B -> A : {K'ab, N'b}Kab"}
-{"text": "BAN modified Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> B : A, {Na}Kab \n 2. B -> A : {succNa, Nb}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {succNb}Kab \n 4. B -> A : {K'ab, N'b, Na}Kab"}
-{"text": "BAN concrete Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> A : {Na, K'ab}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {Na}K'ab \n 4. B -> A : Nb"}
-{"text": "Lowe modified BAN concrete Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> A : {Na, K'ab, B}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {Na}K'ab \n 4. B -> A : Nb"}
-{"text": "Bull's Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B, C, S : principal \n Kab, Kbc : fresh symkey \n Na, Nb, Nc : fresh number \n Kas, Kbs, Kcs : symkey \n h : message, symkey -> message \n A computes Xa = h((A,B,Na),Kas), (A,B,Na) \n 1. A -> B : Xa \n B computes Xb = h((B,C,Nb,Xa),Kbs), (B,C,Nb,Xa)\n 2. B -> C : Xb \n C computes Xc = h((C,S,Nc,Xb),Kcs), (C,S,Nc,Xb)\n 3. C -> S : Xc \n 4. S -> C : A, B, Kab xor h(Na,Kas), {A,B,Na}Kab, \n B, A, Kab xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,A,Nb}Kab, \n B, C, Kbc xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,C,Nb}Kbc, \n C, B, Kbc xor h(Nc,Kcs), {C,B,Nc}Kbc \n 5. C -> B : A, B, Kab xor h(Na,Kas), {A,B,Na}Kab, \n B, A, Kab xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,A,Nb}Kab, \n B, C, Kbc xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,C,Nb}Kbc \n 6. B -> A : A, B, Kab xor h(Na,Kas), {A,B,Na}Kab"}
-{"text": "CAM\n\nM,C : principal \n Tm : timestamp \n PK,SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n HoA : principal -> address \n CoA : principal -> address \n i : salt \n 1. M -> C : CoA(M), HoA(C), HoA(M), PK(M), i, Tm, \n {H(CoA(M), HoA(C), HoA(M), Tm)}SK(M) \n HostPart(HoA(M)) = H(PK(M), i)"}
-{"text": "CCITT X.509 (1)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ta, Tb : timestamp \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. A -> B : A, {Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Ya}PK(B)}SK(A)"}
-{"text": "CCITT X.509 (1c)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ta, Tb : timestamp \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n h : userdata -> userdata (one-way) \n 1. A -> B : A, {Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Ya, {h(Ya)}SK(A)}PK(B)}SK(A)"}
-{"text": "CCITT X.509 (3)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ta, Tb : timestamp \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. A -> B : A, {Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Ya}PK(B)}SK(A) \n 2. B -> A : B, {Tb, Nb, A, Na, Xb, {Yb}PK(A)}SK(B) \n 3. A -> B : A, {Nb}SK(A)"}
-{"text": "BAN modified version of CCITT X.509 (3)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. A -> B : A, {Na, B, Xa, {Ya}PK(B)}SK(A) \n 2. B -> A : B, {Nb, A, Na, Xb, {Yb}PK(A)}SK(B) \n 3. A -> B : A, {B, Nb}SK(A)"}
-{"text": "Denning-Sacco shared key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n T : timestamp \n 1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : {B, Kab, T, {Kab, A, T}Kbs}Kas \n 3. A -> B : {Kab,A, T}Kbs"}
-{"text": "Lowe modified Denning-Sacco shared key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n T : timestamp \n dec : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : {B, Kab, T, {Kab, A, T}Kbs}Kas \n 3. A -> B : {Kab,A, T}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {dec(Nb)}Kab"}
-{"text": "Diffie Helman\n\nA, B : principal \n P, G, Xa, Xb : number \n one : -> number \n kap : number, number, number -> number \n 1. A -> B : P, G \n 2. A -> B : kap(P, G, Xa) \n 3. B -> A : kap(P, G, Xb) \n 4. A -> B : {one()}kap(P, kap(P, G, Xb), Xa)"}
+{"text": "Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n\n1. A -> B : A, {Na}Kab \n 2. B -> A : {succNa, Nb}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {succNb}Kab \n 4. B -> A : {K'ab, N'b}Kab"}
+{"text": "BAN modified Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n\n1. A -> B : A, {Na}Kab \n 2. B -> A : {succNa, Nb}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {succNb}Kab \n 4. B -> A : {K'ab, N'b, Na}Kab"}
+{"text": "BAN concrete Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n\n1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> A : {Na, K'ab}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {Na}K'ab \n 4. B -> A : Nb"}
+{"text": "Lowe modified BAN concrete Andrew Secure RPC\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab, K'ab : symkey \n Na, Nb, N'b : nonce \n succ : nonce -> nonce \n\n1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> A : {Na, K'ab, B}Kab \n 3. A -> B : {Na}K'ab \n 4. B -> A : Nb"}
+{"text": "Bull's Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B, C, S : principal \n Kab, Kbc : fresh symkey \n Na, Nb, Nc : fresh number \n Kas, Kbs, Kcs : symkey \n h : message, symkey -> message \n A computes Xa = h((A,B,Na),Kas), (A,B,Na) \n\n1. A -> B : Xa \n B computes Xb = h((B,C,Nb,Xa),Kbs), (B,C,Nb,Xa)\n 2. B -> C : Xb \n C computes Xc = h((C,S,Nc,Xb),Kcs), (C,S,Nc,Xb)\n 3. C -> S : Xc \n 4. S -> C : A, B, Kab xor h(Na,Kas), {A,B,Na}Kab, \n B, A, Kab xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,A,Nb}Kab, \n B, C, Kbc xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,C,Nb}Kbc, \n C, B, Kbc xor h(Nc,Kcs), {C,B,Nc}Kbc \n 5. C -> B : A, B, Kab xor h(Na,Kas), {A,B,Na}Kab, \n B, A, Kab xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,A,Nb}Kab, \n B, C, Kbc xor h(Nb,Kbs), {B,C,Nb}Kbc \n 6. B -> A : A, B, Kab xor h(Na,Kas), {A,B,Na}Kab"}
+{"text": "CAM\n\nM,C : principal \n Tm : timestamp \n PK,SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n HoA : principal -> address \n CoA : principal -> address \n i : salt \n\n1. M -> C : CoA(M), HoA(C), HoA(M), PK(M), i, Tm, \n {H(CoA(M), HoA(C), HoA(M), Tm)}SK(M) \n HostPart(HoA(M)) = H(PK(M), i)"}
+{"text": "CCITT X.509 (1)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ta, Tb : timestamp \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n\n1. A -> B : A, {Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Ya}PK(B)}SK(A)"}
+{"text": "CCITT X.509 (1c)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ta, Tb : timestamp \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n h : userdata -> userdata (one-way) \n\n1. A -> B : A, {Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Ya, {h(Ya)}SK(A)}PK(B)}SK(A)"}
+{"text": "CCITT X.509 (3)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ta, Tb : timestamp \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n\n1. A -> B : A, {Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Ya}PK(B)}SK(A) \n 2. B -> A : B, {Tb, Nb, A, Na, Xb, {Yb}PK(A)}SK(B) \n 3. A -> B : A, {Nb}SK(A)"}
+{"text": "BAN modified version of CCITT X.509 (3)\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Ya, Yb : userdata \n Xa, Xb : userdata \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n\n1. A -> B : A, {Na, B, Xa, {Ya}PK(B)}SK(A) \n 2. B -> A : B, {Nb, A, Na, Xb, {Yb}PK(A)}SK(B) \n 3. A -> B : A, {B, Nb}SK(A)"}
+{"text": "Denning-Sacco shared key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n T : timestamp \n\n1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : {B, Kab, T, {Kab, A, T}Kbs}Kas \n 3. A -> B : {Kab,A, T}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Lowe modified Denning-Sacco shared key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n T : timestamp \n dec : nonce -> nonce \n\n1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : {B, Kab, T, {Kab, A, T}Kbs}Kas \n 3. A -> B : {Kab,A, T}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {dec(Nb)}Kab"}
+{"text": "Diffie Helman\n\nA, B : principal \n P, G, Xa, Xb : number \n one : -> number \n kap : number, number, number -> number \n\n1. A -> B : P, G \n 2. A -> B : kap(P, G, Xa) \n 3. B -> A : kap(P, G, Xb) \n 4. A -> B : {one()}kap(P, kap(P, G, Xb), Xa)"}
 {"text": "GJM\n\nA,B,T : principal \n C : msg \n PCS : (principal,msg,principal,principal):msg \n S-SIG : (principal,msg):msg \n TP-SIG : (principal,msg):msg \n resolved,aborted : bool \n abort : msg \n Exchange-1. A -> B : PCS(A,C,B,T) \n Exchange-2. B -> A : PCS(B,C,A,T) \n Exchange-3. A -> B : S-SIG(A,C) \n Exchange-4. B -> A : S-SIG(B,C) \n Abort-1. A -> T : S-SIG(A,[C,A,B,abort]) \n Abort-2. T -> A : if (resolved) then S-SIG(B,C) else\nS-SIG(T,S-SIG(A,[C,A,B,abort])) \n Resolve-A-1. A -> T : [PCS(B,C,A,T),S-SIG(A,C)] \n Resolve-A-2. T -> A : if (aborted) then\nS-SIG(T,S-SIG(A,[C,A,B,abort])) else if (resolved) S-SIG(B,C) else\nTP-SIG(B,C) \n Resolve-B-1. B -> T : [PCS(A,C,B,T),S-SIG(B,C)] \n Resolve-B-2. T -> B : if (aborted) then\nS-SIG(T,S-SIG(A,[C,A,B,abort])) else if (resolved) S-SIG(A,C) else\nTP-SIG(A,C)"}
-{"text": "Gong\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb, Ns : number \n Pa, Pb : number \n K, Ha, Hb : number \n f1 : number, number, number, number -> number \n f2 : number, number, number, number -> number \n f3 : number, number, number, number -> number \n g : number, number, number, number -> number \n xor : number,number -> number \n alias K = f1(Ns,Na,B,Pa) \n alias Ha = f2(Ns,Na,B,Pa) \n alias Hb = f3(Ns,Na,B,Pa) \n 1. A -> B : A, B, Na \n 2. B -> S : A, B, Na, Nb \n 3. S -> B : Ns, xor(f1(Ns, Nb, A, Pb), K), \n xor(f2(Ns, Nb, A, Pb), Ha), \n xor(f3(Ns, Nb, A, Pb), Hb), \n g(K, Ha, Hb, Pb) \n 4. B -> A : Ns, Hb \n 5. A -> B : Ha"}
-{"text": "Kao Chow Authentication v.1\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kab, Kbs, Kas : key \n 1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> B : {A, B, Na, Kab}Kas, {A, B, Na, Kab}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : {A, B, Na, Kab}Kas, {Na}Kab, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {Nb}Kab"}
-{"text": "Kao Chow Authentication v.2\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kab, Kbs, Kas : key \n 1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> B : {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : B, {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {Na, Kab}Kt, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {Nb, Kab}Kt"}
-{"text": "Kao Chow Authentication v.3\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kab, Kbs, Kas : key \n 1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> B : {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {Na, Kab}Kt, Nb, {A, B, Ta,\nKab}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {Nb, Kab}Kt, {A, B, Ta, Kab}Kbs"}
-{"text": "Kerberos V5\n\nA, G, C, S, U : principal \n N1, N2 : nonce \n L1, L2 : nonce \n T1start, T1expire : timestamp \n T2start, T2expire : timestamp \n Kcg, Kcs, Kag, Ku, Kgs : key \n 1. C -> A : U, G, L1, N1 \n 2. A -> C : U, {U, C, G, Kcg, T1start, T1expire}Kag, \n {G, Kcg, T1start, T1expire}Ku \n 3. C -> G : S, L2, N2, {U, C, G, Kcg, T1start, T1expire}Kag, \n {C, T1}Kcg \n 4. G -> C : U, {U, C, S, Kcs, T2start, T2expire}Kgs, \n {S, Kcs, T2start, T2expire, N2}Kcg \n 5. C -> S : {U, C, S, Kcs, T2start, T2expire}Kgs, \n {C, T2}Kcs \n 6. S -> C : {T2}Kcs"}
-{"text": "KSL\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb, Nc, Ma, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab, Kbb : key \n Tb : generalizedTimestamp \n 1. A -> B : Na, A \n 2. B -> S : Na, A, Nb, B \n 3. S -> B : {Nb, A, Kab}Kbs, {Na, B, Kab}Kas \n 4. B -> A : {Na, B, Kab}Kas, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb, Nc, {Na}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {Nc}Kab \n 6. A -> B : Ma, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb \n 7. B -> A : Mb, {Ma}Kab \n 8. A -> B : {Mb}Kab"}
-{"text": "Lowe modified KSL\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb, Nc, Ma, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab, Kbb : key \n Tb : generalizedTimestamp \n 1. A -> B : Na, A \n 2. B -> S : Na, A, Nb, B \n 3. S -> B : {A, Nb Kab}Kbs, {Na, B, Kab}Kas \n 4. B -> A : {Na, B, Kab}Kas, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb, Nc, {B, Na}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {Nc}Kab \n 6. A -> B : Ma, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb \n 7. B -> A : Mb, {Ma, B}Kab \n 8. A -> B : {A, Mb}Kab"}
-{"text": "Neumann Stubblebine\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Ma, Nb, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n Ta, Tb : time \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, {A, Na, Tb}Kbs, Nb \n 3. S -> A : {B, Na, Kab, Tb}Kas, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : Ma, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs \n 6. B -> A : Mb, {Ma}Kab \n 7. A -> B : {Mb}Kab"}
-{"text": "Hwang modified version of Neumann Stubblebine\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Ma, Nb, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n Ta, Tb : time \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, {A, Na, Tb, Nb}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : {B, Na, Kab, Tb}Kas, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : Ma, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs \n 6. B -> A : Mb, {Mb}Kab \n 7. A -> B : {Mb}Kab"}
-{"text": "Needham-Schroeder Public Key\n\nA,B,S : Principal \n Na,Nb : Nonce \n KPa,KPb,KPs,KSa,KSb,KSs : Key \n KPa,KSa : is a key pair \n KPb,KSb : is a key pair \n KPs,KSs : is a key pair \n 1. A -> S : A,B \n 2. S -> A : {KPb, B}KSs \n 3. A -> B : {Na, A}KPb \n 4. B -> S : B,A \n 5. S -> B : {KPa, A}KSs \n 6. B -> A : {Na, Nb}KPa \n 7. A -> B : {Nb}KPb"}
-{"text": "Lowe's fixed version of Needham-Schroder Public Key\n\nA,B,S : Principal \n Na,Nb : Nonce \n KPa,KPb,KPs,KSa,KSb,KSs : Key \n KPa,KSa : is a key pair \n KPb,KSb : is a key pair \n KPs,KSs : is a key pair \n 1. A -> S : A,B \n 2. S -> A : {KPb, B}KSs \n 3. A -> B : {Na, A}KPb \n 4. B -> S : B,A \n 5. S -> B : {KPa, A}KSs \n 6. B -> A : {Na, Nb, B}KPa \n 7. A -> B : {Nb}KPb"}
-{"text": "Needham Schroeder Symmetric Key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n dec : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> A : {Na, B, Kab, {Kab, A}Kbs}Kas \n 3. A -> B : {Kab,A}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {dec(Nb)}Kab"}
-{"text": "Amended Needham Schroeder Symmetric Key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n dec : number -> number \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : {A, Nb}Kbs \n 3. A -> S : A, B, Na, {A, Nb}Kbs \n 4. S -> A : {Na, B, Kab, {Kab, Nb, A}Kbs}Kas \n 5. A -> B : {Kab, Nb, A}Kbs \n 6. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 7. A -> B : {dec(Nb)}Kab"}
-{"text": "Otway Rees\n\nA, B, S : principal \n M, Na, Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n 1. A -> B : M, A, B, {Na, M, A, B}Kas \n 2. B -> S : M, A, B, {Na, M, A, B}Kas , {Nb, M, A, B}Kbs \n 3. S -> B : M, {Na, Kab}Kas, {Nb, Kab}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : M, {Na, Kab}Kas"}
-{"text": "Schnorr's Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : fresh number \n Sa : private key \n Pa = exp(g,Sa) : public key \n A chooses Na and computes a = exp(g,Na) \n 1. A -> B : a \n B chooses Nb \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n A computes r = Na + Nb Sa \n 3. A -> B : r \n B checks that exp(g, r) = a exp(Pa,Nb)"}
-{"text": "Shamir-Rivest-Adleman Three Pass Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n M : fresh number \n 1. A -> B : {M}Ka \n 2. B -> A : {{M}Ka}Kb \n 3. A -> B : {M}Kb"}
-{"text": "SK3\n\nA, B, S, Ca, Cb : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n Kac, Kbc : symkey \n Na, Nb : nonce \n 0,1,2 : number \n alias Kab = {A, 0}Kb \n alias Pab = Kab + {B, 1}Ka \n 1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka \n 3. A -> Ca : A \n 4. Ca -> A : Na, {Na, 1, 1}Kac \n 5. A -> B : A, Na \n 6. B -> Cb : A, Na \n 7. Cb -> B : Nb, {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 8. B -> A : Nb, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab \n 9. A -> Ca : B, Na, Nb, Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab,\n{Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 10. Ca -> A : {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 11. A -> B : {Nb, 0, 1}Kab"}
-{"text": "SmartRight view-only\n\nCC, TC : principal \n VoKey, VoR, VoRi, CW : number \n Kc : key \n h : number -> number \n 1. CC -> TC : {VoKey, CW+VoR}Kc \n 2. TC -> CC : VoRi \n 3. CC -> TC : VoR, {h(VoRi)}VoKey"}
-{"text": "SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {S, inc(N2)}pk(C)"}
-{"text": "Hwang and Chen modified SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {S, inc(N2)}pk(C)"}
-{"text": "Clark and Jacob modified Hwang and Chen modified SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {T, L, {C, N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {inc(N2)}pk(C)"}
-{"text": "TMN\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Ka, Kb : key \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n 1. A -> S : B, {Ka}PK(S) \n 2. S -> B : A \n 3. B -> S : A, {Kb}PK(S) \n 4. S -> A : B, {Kb}Ka"}
-{"text": "Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab : symkey \n RC4 : message, symkey -> message \n C : message -> message \n 1. A -> B : v, ((M,C(M)) xor RC4(v,Kab))"}
-{"text": "Wide Mouthed Frog\n\nA, S : principal \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : symkey \n Ta, Ts : timestamp \n 1. A -> S : A, {Ta, B, Kab}Kas \n 2. S -> B : {Ts, A, Kab}Kbs"}
-{"text": "Lowe modified Wide Mouthed Frog\n\nA, S : principal \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : symkey \n Nb : nonce \n Ta, Ts : timestamp \n suc : nonce -> nonce \n 1. A -> S : A, {Ta, B, Kab}Kas \n 2. S -> B : {Ts, A, Kab}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 4. A -> B : {succ(Nb)}Kab"}
-{"text": "Woo and Lam Mutual Authentication\n\nP, Q, S : principal \n Kps, Kqs, Kpq : key \n N1, N2 : number \n 1. P -> Q : P, N1 \n 2. Q -> P : Q, N2 \n 3. P -> Q : {P, Q, N1, N2}Kps \n 4. Q -> S : {P, Q, N1, N2}Kps, {P, Q, N1, N2}Kqs \n 5. S -> Q : {Q, N1, N2, Kpq}Kps, {P, N1, N2,Kpq}Kqs \n 6. Q -> P : {Q, N1, N2, Kpq}Kps, {N1, N2}Kpq \n 7. P -> Q : {N2}Kpq"}
-{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, {Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {Nb}Kbs"}
-{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi 1\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {A,B,Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, B, {A, B, Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {A, B, Nb}Kbs"}
-{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi 2\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {A,Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, {A, Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {A, Nb}Kbs"}
-{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi 3\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, {Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {A, Nb}Kbs"}
-{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi f\n\nA, B, S : principal \n shared : (principal, principal):key \n Nb : nonce \n 1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {A,B,Nb}shared(A, S) \n 4. B -> S : {A, B, Nb, {A, B, Nb}shared(A, S)}shared(B, S) \n 5. S -> B : {A, B, Nb}shared(B, S)"}
-{"text": "Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, {A, Na, Nb}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : {B, Kab, Na, Nb}Kas, {A, Kab}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab}Kbs, {Nb}Kab"}
-{"text": "BAN simplified version of Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, Nb, {A, Na}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : Nb, {B, Kab, Na}Kas, {A, Kab, Nb}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab, Nb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab"}
-{"text": "Lowe's modified version of Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : {A, Na, Nb}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : {B, Kab, Na, Nb}Kas \n 4. S -> B : {A, Kab}Kbs \n 5. A -> B : {A, B, S, Nb}Kab"}
-{"text": "Paulson's strengthened version of Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n 1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, Nb, {A, Na}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : Nb, {B, Kab, Na}Kas, {A, B, Kab, Nb}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {A, B, Kab, Nb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Gong\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb, Ns : number \n Pa, Pb : number \n K, Ha, Hb : number \n f1 : number, number, number, number -> number \n f2 : number, number, number, number -> number \n f3 : number, number, number, number -> number \n g : number, number, number, number -> number \n xor : number,number -> number \n alias K = f1(Ns,Na,B,Pa) \n alias Ha = f2(Ns,Na,B,Pa) \n alias Hb = f3(Ns,Na,B,Pa) \n\n1. A -> B : A, B, Na \n 2. B -> S : A, B, Na, Nb \n 3. S -> B : Ns, xor(f1(Ns, Nb, A, Pb), K), \n xor(f2(Ns, Nb, A, Pb), Ha), \n xor(f3(Ns, Nb, A, Pb), Hb), \n g(K, Ha, Hb, Pb) \n 4. B -> A : Ns, Hb \n 5. A -> B : Ha"}
+{"text": "Kao Chow Authentication v.1\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kab, Kbs, Kas : key \n\n1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> B : {A, B, Na, Kab}Kas, {A, B, Na, Kab}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : {A, B, Na, Kab}Kas, {Na}Kab, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {Nb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Kao Chow Authentication v.2\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kab, Kbs, Kas : key \n\n1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> B : {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : B, {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {Na, Kab}Kt, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {Nb, Kab}Kt"}
+{"text": "Kao Chow Authentication v.3\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kab, Kbs, Kas : key \n\n1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> B : {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : {A, B, Na, Kab, Kt}Kas, {Na, Kab}Kt, Nb, {A, B, Ta,\nKab}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {Nb, Kab}Kt, {A, B, Ta, Kab}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Kerberos V5\n\nA, G, C, S, U : principal \n N1, N2 : nonce \n L1, L2 : nonce \n T1start, T1expire : timestamp \n T2start, T2expire : timestamp \n Kcg, Kcs, Kag, Ku, Kgs : key \n\n1. C -> A : U, G, L1, N1 \n 2. A -> C : U, {U, C, G, Kcg, T1start, T1expire}Kag, \n {G, Kcg, T1start, T1expire}Ku \n 3. C -> G : S, L2, N2, {U, C, G, Kcg, T1start, T1expire}Kag, \n {C, T1}Kcg \n 4. G -> C : U, {U, C, S, Kcs, T2start, T2expire}Kgs, \n {S, Kcs, T2start, T2expire, N2}Kcg \n 5. C -> S : {U, C, S, Kcs, T2start, T2expire}Kgs, \n {C, T2}Kcs \n 6. S -> C : {T2}Kcs"}
+{"text": "KSL\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb, Nc, Ma, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab, Kbb : key \n Tb : generalizedTimestamp \n\n1. A -> B : Na, A \n 2. B -> S : Na, A, Nb, B \n 3. S -> B : {Nb, A, Kab}Kbs, {Na, B, Kab}Kas \n 4. B -> A : {Na, B, Kab}Kas, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb, Nc, {Na}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {Nc}Kab \n 6. A -> B : Ma, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb \n 7. B -> A : Mb, {Ma}Kab \n 8. A -> B : {Mb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Lowe modified KSL\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb, Nc, Ma, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab, Kbb : key \n Tb : generalizedTimestamp \n\n1. A -> B : Na, A \n 2. B -> S : Na, A, Nb, B \n 3. S -> B : {A, Nb Kab}Kbs, {Na, B, Kab}Kas \n 4. B -> A : {Na, B, Kab}Kas, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb, Nc, {B, Na}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {Nc}Kab \n 6. A -> B : Ma, {Tb, A, Kab}Kbb \n 7. B -> A : Mb, {Ma, B}Kab \n 8. A -> B : {A, Mb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Neumann Stubblebine\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Ma, Nb, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n Ta, Tb : time \n\n1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, {A, Na, Tb}Kbs, Nb \n 3. S -> A : {B, Na, Kab, Tb}Kas, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : Ma, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs \n 6. B -> A : Mb, {Ma}Kab \n 7. A -> B : {Mb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Hwang modified version of Neumann Stubblebine\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Ma, Nb, Mb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n Ta, Tb : time \n\n1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, {A, Na, Tb, Nb}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : {B, Na, Kab, Tb}Kas, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, Nb \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : Ma, {A, Kab, Tb}Kbs \n 6. B -> A : Mb, {Mb}Kab \n 7. A -> B : {Mb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Needham-Schroeder Public Key\n\nA,B,S : Principal \n Na,Nb : Nonce \n KPa,KPb,KPs,KSa,KSb,KSs : Key \n KPa,KSa : is a key pair \n KPb,KSb : is a key pair \n KPs,KSs : is a key pair \n\n1. A -> S : A,B \n 2. S -> A : {KPb, B}KSs \n 3. A -> B : {Na, A}KPb \n 4. B -> S : B,A \n 5. S -> B : {KPa, A}KSs \n 6. B -> A : {Na, Nb}KPa \n 7. A -> B : {Nb}KPb"}
+{"text": "Lowe's fixed version of Needham-Schroder Public Key\n\nA,B,S : Principal \n Na,Nb : Nonce \n KPa,KPb,KPs,KSa,KSb,KSs : Key \n KPa,KSa : is a key pair \n KPb,KSb : is a key pair \n KPs,KSs : is a key pair \n\n1. A -> S : A,B \n 2. S -> A : {KPb, B}KSs \n 3. A -> B : {Na, A}KPb \n 4. B -> S : B,A \n 5. S -> B : {KPa, A}KSs \n 6. B -> A : {Na, Nb, B}KPa \n 7. A -> B : {Nb}KPb"}
+{"text": "Needham Schroeder Symmetric Key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n dec : nonce -> nonce \n\n1. A -> S : A, B, Na \n 2. S -> A : {Na, B, Kab, {Kab, A}Kbs}Kas \n 3. A -> B : {Kab,A}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 5. A -> B : {dec(Nb)}Kab"}
+{"text": "Amended Needham Schroeder Symmetric Key\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n dec : number -> number \n\n1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : {A, Nb}Kbs \n 3. A -> S : A, B, Na, {A, Nb}Kbs \n 4. S -> A : {Na, B, Kab, {Kab, Nb, A}Kbs}Kas \n 5. A -> B : {Kab, Nb, A}Kbs \n 6. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 7. A -> B : {dec(Nb)}Kab"}
+{"text": "Otway Rees\n\nA, B, S : principal \n M, Na, Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n\n1. A -> B : M, A, B, {Na, M, A, B}Kas \n 2. B -> S : M, A, B, {Na, M, A, B}Kas , {Nb, M, A, B}Kbs \n 3. S -> B : M, {Na, Kab}Kas, {Nb, Kab}Kbs \n 4. B -> A : M, {Na, Kab}Kas"}
+{"text": "Schnorr's Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Na, Nb : fresh number \n Sa : private key \n Pa = exp(g,Sa) : public key \n A chooses Na and computes a = exp(g,Na) \n\n1. A -> B : a \n B chooses Nb \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n A computes r = Na + Nb Sa \n 3. A -> B : r \n B checks that exp(g, r) = a exp(Pa,Nb)"}
+{"text": "Shamir-Rivest-Adleman Three Pass Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n M : fresh number \n\n1. A -> B : {M}Ka \n 2. B -> A : {{M}Ka}Kb \n 3. A -> B : {M}Kb"}
+{"text": "SK3\n\nA, B, S, Ca, Cb : principal \n Ka, Kb : symkey \n Kac, Kbc : symkey \n Na, Nb : nonce \n 0,1,2 : number \n alias Kab = {A, 0}Kb \n alias Pab = Kab + {B, 1}Ka \n\n1. A -> S : A, B \n 2. S -> A : Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka \n 3. A -> Ca : A \n 4. Ca -> A : Na, {Na, 1, 1}Kac \n 5. A -> B : A, Na \n 6. B -> Cb : A, Na \n 7. Cb -> B : Nb, {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n 8. B -> A : Nb, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab \n 9. A -> Ca : B, Na, Nb, Pab, {Pab, B, 2}Ka, {Na, Nb, 1}Kab,\n{Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n\n10. Ca -> A : {Nb, 0, 0}Kab, {Nb, 0, 1}Kab \n\n11. A -> B : {Nb, 0, 1}Kab"}
+{"text": "SmartRight view-only\n\nCC, TC : principal \n VoKey, VoR, VoRi, CW : number \n Kc : key \n h : number -> number \n\n1. CC -> TC : {VoKey, CW+VoR}Kc \n 2. TC -> CC : VoRi \n 3. CC -> TC : VoR, {h(VoRi)}VoKey"}
+{"text": "SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n\n1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {S, inc(N2)}pk(C)"}
+{"text": "Hwang and Chen modified SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n\n1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {S, inc(N2)}pk(C)"}
+{"text": "Clark and Jacob modified Hwang and Chen modified SPLICE/AS\n\nS, C, AS : principal \n N1, N2, N3 : nonce \n T : timestamp \n L : lifetime \n pk, sk : principal -> key (keypair) \n\n1. C -> AS : C, S, N1 \n 2. AS -> C : AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) \n 3. C -> S : C, S, {T, L, {C, N2}pk(S)}sk(C) \n 4. S -> AS : S, C, N3 \n 5. AS -> S : AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) \n 6. S -> C : S, C, {inc(N2)}pk(C)"}
+{"text": "TMN\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Ka, Kb : key \n PK, SK : principal -> key (keypair) \n\n1. A -> S : B, {Ka}PK(S) \n 2. S -> B : A \n 3. B -> S : A, {Kb}PK(S) \n 4. S -> A : B, {Kb}Ka"}
+{"text": "Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol\n\nA, B : principal \n Kab : symkey \n RC4 : message, symkey -> message \n C : message -> message \n\n1. A -> B : v, ((M,C(M)) xor RC4(v,Kab))"}
+{"text": "Wide Mouthed Frog\n\nA, S : principal \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : symkey \n Ta, Ts : timestamp \n\n1. A -> S : A, {Ta, B, Kab}Kas \n 2. S -> B : {Ts, A, Kab}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Lowe modified Wide Mouthed Frog\n\nA, S : principal \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : symkey \n Nb : nonce \n Ta, Ts : timestamp \n suc : nonce -> nonce \n\n1. A -> S : A, {Ta, B, Kab}Kas \n 2. S -> B : {Ts, A, Kab}Kbs \n 3. B -> A : {Nb}Kab \n 4. A -> B : {succ(Nb)}Kab"}
+{"text": "Woo and Lam Mutual Authentication\n\nP, Q, S : principal \n Kps, Kqs, Kpq : key \n N1, N2 : number \n\n1. P -> Q : P, N1 \n 2. Q -> P : Q, N2 \n 3. P -> Q : {P, Q, N1, N2}Kps \n 4. Q -> S : {P, Q, N1, N2}Kps, {P, Q, N1, N2}Kqs \n 5. S -> Q : {Q, N1, N2, Kpq}Kps, {P, N1, N2,Kpq}Kqs \n 6. Q -> P : {Q, N1, N2, Kpq}Kps, {N1, N2}Kpq \n 7. P -> Q : {N2}Kpq"}
+{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n\n1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, {Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {Nb}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi 1\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n\n1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {A,B,Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, B, {A, B, Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {A, B, Nb}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi 2\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n\n1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {A,Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, {A, Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {A, Nb}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi 3\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Nb : nonce \n Kas, Kbs : skey \n\n1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {Nb}Kas \n 4. B -> S : {A, {Nb}Kas}Kbs \n 5. S -> B : {A, Nb}Kbs"}
+{"text": "Woo and Lam Pi f\n\nA, B, S : principal \n shared : (principal, principal):key \n Nb : nonce \n\n1. A -> B : A \n 2. B -> A : Nb \n 3. A -> B : {A,B,Nb}shared(A, S) \n 4. B -> S : {A, B, Nb, {A, B, Nb}shared(A, S)}shared(B, S) \n 5. S -> B : {A, B, Nb}shared(B, S)"}
+{"text": "Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n\n1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, {A, Na, Nb}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : {B, Kab, Na, Nb}Kas, {A, Kab}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab}Kbs, {Nb}Kab"}
+{"text": "BAN simplified version of Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n\n1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, Nb, {A, Na}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : Nb, {B, Kab, Na}Kas, {A, Kab, Nb}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {A, Kab, Nb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Lowe's modified version of Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n\n1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : {A, Na, Nb}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : {B, Kab, Na, Nb}Kas \n 4. S -> B : {A, Kab}Kbs \n 5. A -> B : {A, B, S, Nb}Kab"}
+{"text": "Paulson's strengthened version of Yahalom\n\nA, B, S : principal \n Na, Nb : number fresh \n Kas, Kbs, Kab : key \n A knows : A, B, S, Kas \n B knows : B, S, Kbs \n S knows : S, A, B, Kas, Kbs \n\n1. A -> B : A, Na \n 2. B -> S : B, Nb, {A, Na}Kbs \n 3. S -> A : Nb, {B, Kab, Na}Kas, {A, B, Kab, Nb}Kbs \n 4. A -> B : {A, B, Kab, Nb}Kbs, {Nb}Kab"}
 {"text": "ISO Symmetric Key One-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : symkey\nNa : nonce\ntext1, text2 : text\n\n1. A -> B : text2, {Ta | Na, B, text1}Kab"}
 {"text": "ISO Symmetric Key Two-Pass Unilateral Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : symkey\nRb : nonce\ntext1, text2, text3 : text\n\n1. B -> A : Rb, text1\n2. A -> B : text3, {Rb, B, text2}Kab"}
 {"text": "ISO Symmetric Key Two-Pass Mutual Authentication Protocol\n\nA, B : principal\nKab : symkey\nNa, Nb : nonce\ntext1, text2, text3, text4 : text\n\n1. A -> B : text2, {Na, B, text1}Kab\n2. B -> A : text4, {Nb, A, text3}Kab"}