Update instruction.jsonl

instruction.jsonl

@@ -85,4 +85,4 @@
 {"text": "SAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (IdP-initiated with front channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDaa, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> IdP : C, URI, SP\n2. IdP -> C : IdP, URI, IDaa, SP, IdP, C, URI\n3. C -> SP : IDaa, IdP, URI, SP, C\n4. SP -> C : URI, Resource\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Resource: in every session, the value of Resource must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C and SP. The protocol must ensure authentication: SP must verify that the URI originates from C, and C must verify that Resource originates from SP. This is an Identity Provider-initiated Single Sign-On protocol where the IdP creates an authentication assertion (IDaa) without a prior request from SP. The SP maintains a set of consumed assertions to prevent replay attacks. All communications use front channels through the client browser."}
 {"text": "SAML v.2 Web SSO Profile (SP-initiated with back channels)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nIDar, IDaa, IDresolve_1, IDresolve_2, Resource, REF_1, REF_2 : text\n\n1. C -> SP : C, URI\n2. SP -> C : IdP, SP, REF_1\n3. C -> IdP : C, SP, REF_1\n4. IdP -> SP : IDresolve_1, IdP, SP, REF_1\n5. SP -> IdP : IDresolve_1, SP, IdP, IDar, URI\n6. IdP -> C : SP, IdP, REF_2\n7. C -> SP : IdP, REF_2\n8. SP -> IdP : IDresolve_2, SP, IdP, REF_2\n9. IdP -> SP : IDresolve_2, IdP, URI, IDar, {SP, IdP, C, IDaa, URI}inv(KIdP)\n10. SP -> C : URI, Resource\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Resource: in every session, the value of Resource must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C and SP. The protocol must ensure authentication: SP must verify that the URI originates from C, and C must verify that Resource originates from SP. This is a Service Provider-initiated Single Sign-On protocol using the artifact binding profile with back channels. Authentication requests and responses are not sent directly through the client but are instead referenced by artifacts (REF_1, REF_2) which are resolved through secure back channels between SP and IdP. The signed assertion {SP, IdP, C, IDaa, URI}inv(KIdP) ensures the authenticity and integrity of the authentication information. The SP maintains a set of consumed assertions (IDaa) to prevent replay attacks."}
 {"text": "SAML-based SSO for Google Apps (SP-initiated with front channels, fixed variant)\n\nC, IdP, SP : principal\nKIdP : public_key\nURI : protocol_id\nID, Resource : text\n\n1. C -> SP : URI\n2. SP -> C : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n3. C -> IdP : C, IdP, (ID, SP), URI\n4. IdP -> C : SP, {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP), URI\n5. C -> SP : SP, {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP), URI\n6. SP -> C : Resource\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of Resource: in every session, the value of Resource must be known only by the participants playing the roles of C and SP. The protocol must ensure authentication: SP must verify that the URI originates from C, and C must verify that Resource originates from SP. This is a Service Provider-initiated Single Sign-On protocol using only front channels through the client browser. The SP generates a unique authentication request identifier (ID) and verifies it upon receiving the signed assertion from the IdP. The signed assertion {SP, C, IdP, ID}inv(KIdP) includes the SP identifier to prevent the assertion from being used at a different service provider, fixing a vulnerability in the original Google Apps implementation where assertions did not bind to specific service providers."}
-{"text": "Idemix Anonymous Credential\n\nUser, Issuer, Verifier : principal\nNu, Ns, NuPrime, NsPrime : nonce\nmasec : master_secret\nK_ptag, K_spk : fresh symkey\n\n1. User -> Issuer : commit(masec, Issuer, Nu)\n2. Issuer -> User : credential(Issuer, ptag(masec, Issuer, Nu, Ns), attributes)\n3. User -> Verifier : ptag(masec, Verifier, NuPrime, NsPrime), spk(masec, public_values, statement, message)\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of masec: in every session, masec must be known only to the User. It must ensure unlinkability: different pseudonyms created by the same user cannot be linked by verifiers or issuers. The protocol must provide selective disclosure: the user can prove possession of credentials while revealing only selected attributes. Zero-knowledge proofs (spk) and pseudonym tags (ptag) ensure credentials are bound to the user's master secret while maintaining anonymity."}
+{"text": "Idemix Anonymous Credential\n\nUser, Issuer, Verifier : principal\nNu, Ns, NuPrime, NsPrime : nonce\nmasec : master_secret\nK_ptag, K_spk : fresh symkey\n\n1. User -> Issuer : commit(masec, Issuer, Nu)\n2. Issuer -> User : credential(Issuer, ptag(masec, Issuer, Nu, Ns), attributes)\n3. User -> Verifier : ptag(masec, Verifier, NuPrime, NsPrime), spk(masec, public_values, statement, message)\n\nThe protocol must guarantee the secrecy of masec: in every session, masec must be known only to the User. It must ensure unlinkability: different pseudonyms created by the same user cannot be linked by verifiers or issuers. The protocol must provide selective disclosure: the user can prove possession of credentials while revealing only selected attributes. Zero-knowledge proofs (spk) and pseudonym tags (ptag) ensure credentials are bound to the user's master secret while maintaining anonymity."}