idx int64 | project string | commit_id string | project_url string | commit_url string | commit_message string | target int64 | func string | func_hash float64 | file_name string | file_hash float64 | cwe list | cve string | cve_desc string | nvd_url string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
514,691 | openssl | 7d56a74a96828985db7354a55227a511615f732b | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7d56a74a96828985db7354a55227a511615f732b | Fix the RC4-MD5 cipher
A copy&paste error meant that the RC4-MD5 cipher (used in TLS) used the TLS
AAD data as the MAC key.
CVE-2022-1434
Fixes #18112
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 0 | const OSSL_PARAM *rc4_hmac_md5_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *cctx,
ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
return rc4_hmac_md5_known_gettable_ctx_params;
} | 270,201,462,360,325,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1434 | The OpenSSL 3.0 implementation of the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite incorrectly uses the AAD data as the MAC key. This makes the MAC key trivially predictable. An attacker could exploit this issue by performing a man-in-the-middle attack to modify data being sent from one endpoint to an OpenSSL 3.0 recipient such that the modifi... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1434 |
514,692 | openssl | 7d56a74a96828985db7354a55227a511615f732b | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7d56a74a96828985db7354a55227a511615f732b | Fix the RC4-MD5 cipher
A copy&paste error meant that the RC4-MD5 cipher (used in TLS) used the TLS
AAD data as the MAC key.
CVE-2022-1434
Fixes #18112
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 0 | static int rc4_hmac_md5_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
PROV_RC4_HMAC_MD5_CTX *ctx = (PROV_RC4_HMAC_MD5_CTX *)vctx;
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
size_t sz;
if (params == NULL)
return 1;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN);
if (p != NULL) {
... | 296,719,071,926,124,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1434 | The OpenSSL 3.0 implementation of the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite incorrectly uses the AAD data as the MAC key. This makes the MAC key trivially predictable. An attacker could exploit this issue by performing a man-in-the-middle attack to modify data being sent from one endpoint to an OpenSSL 3.0 recipient such that the modifi... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1434 |
514,693 | openssl | 7d56a74a96828985db7354a55227a511615f732b | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7d56a74a96828985db7354a55227a511615f732b | Fix the RC4-MD5 cipher
A copy&paste error meant that the RC4-MD5 cipher (used in TLS) used the TLS
AAD data as the MAC key.
CVE-2022-1434
Fixes #18112
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 0 | static int rc4_hmac_md5_get_params(OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
return ossl_cipher_generic_get_params(params, RC4_HMAC_MD5_MODE,
RC4_HMAC_MD5_FLAGS,
RC4_HMAC_MD5_KEY_BITS,
RC4_HMAC_MD5_BLOCK_BITS,... | 121,734,832,042,584,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1434 | The OpenSSL 3.0 implementation of the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite incorrectly uses the AAD data as the MAC key. This makes the MAC key trivially predictable. An attacker could exploit this issue by performing a man-in-the-middle attack to modify data being sent from one endpoint to an OpenSSL 3.0 recipient such that the modifi... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1434 |
514,694 | openssl | 7d56a74a96828985db7354a55227a511615f732b | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7d56a74a96828985db7354a55227a511615f732b | Fix the RC4-MD5 cipher
A copy&paste error meant that the RC4-MD5 cipher (used in TLS) used the TLS
AAD data as the MAC key.
CVE-2022-1434
Fixes #18112
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 0 | static int rc4_hmac_md5_dinit(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen, const unsigned char *iv,
size_t ivlen, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
if (!ossl_cipher_generic_dinit(ctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, NULL))
return 0;
return rc4_hmac_m... | 122,336,090,894,041,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1434 | The OpenSSL 3.0 implementation of the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite incorrectly uses the AAD data as the MAC key. This makes the MAC key trivially predictable. An attacker could exploit this issue by performing a man-in-the-middle attack to modify data being sent from one endpoint to an OpenSSL 3.0 recipient such that the modifi... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1434 |
514,695 | openssl | 7d56a74a96828985db7354a55227a511615f732b | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7d56a74a96828985db7354a55227a511615f732b | Fix the RC4-MD5 cipher
A copy&paste error meant that the RC4-MD5 cipher (used in TLS) used the TLS
AAD data as the MAC key.
CVE-2022-1434
Fixes #18112
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 0 | static int rc4_hmac_md5_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
PROV_RC4_HMAC_MD5_CTX *ctx = (PROV_RC4_HMAC_MD5_CTX *)vctx;
OSSL_PARAM *p;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN);
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->base.keylen)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, P... | 23,245,424,119,559,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1434 | The OpenSSL 3.0 implementation of the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite incorrectly uses the AAD data as the MAC key. This makes the MAC key trivially predictable. An attacker could exploit this issue by performing a man-in-the-middle attack to modify data being sent from one endpoint to an OpenSSL 3.0 recipient such that the modifi... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1434 |
514,696 | openssl | 7d56a74a96828985db7354a55227a511615f732b | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7d56a74a96828985db7354a55227a511615f732b | Fix the RC4-MD5 cipher
A copy&paste error meant that the RC4-MD5 cipher (used in TLS) used the TLS
AAD data as the MAC key.
CVE-2022-1434
Fixes #18112
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 0 | static void rc4_hmac_md5_freectx(void *vctx)
{
PROV_RC4_HMAC_MD5_CTX *ctx = (PROV_RC4_HMAC_MD5_CTX *)vctx;
ossl_cipher_generic_reset_ctx((PROV_CIPHER_CTX *)vctx);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
} | 303,092,935,905,120,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1434 | The OpenSSL 3.0 implementation of the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite incorrectly uses the AAD data as the MAC key. This makes the MAC key trivially predictable. An attacker could exploit this issue by performing a man-in-the-middle attack to modify data being sent from one endpoint to an OpenSSL 3.0 recipient such that the modifi... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1434 |
514,697 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | static void contract(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh)
{
OPENSSL_LH_NODE **n, *n1, *np;
np = lh->b[lh->p + lh->pmax - 1];
lh->b[lh->p + lh->pmax - 1] = NULL; /* 24/07-92 - eay - weird but :-( */
if (lh->p == 0) {
n = OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b,
(unsigned int)(sizeof(OPENSSL_LH_NODE *) *... | 77,806,960,801,770,115,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,698 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_num_items(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh)
{
return lh ? lh->num_items : 0;
} | 59,002,465,877,969,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,699 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_get_down_load(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh)
{
return lh->down_load;
} | 95,148,560,049,328,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,700 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | void OPENSSL_LH_doall(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC func)
{
doall_util_fn(lh, 0, func, (OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG)0, NULL);
} | 110,038,925,150,181,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,701 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | void OPENSSL_LH_doall_arg(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG func, void *arg)
{
doall_util_fn(lh, 1, (OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC)0, func, arg);
} | 16,442,025,475,446,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,702 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_strhash(const char *c)
{
unsigned long ret = 0;
long n;
unsigned long v;
int r;
if ((c == NULL) || (*c == '\0'))
return ret;
n = 0x100;
while (*c) {
v = n | (*c);
n += 0x100;
r = (int)((v >> 2) ^ v) & 0x0f;
/* cast to uint64_... | 269,017,975,823,598,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,703 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | OPENSSL_LHASH *OPENSSL_LH_new(OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC h, OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC c)
{
OPENSSL_LHASH *ret;
if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
/*
* Do not set the error code, because the ERR code uses LHASH
* and we want to avoid possible endless error loop.
* ERR_rais... | 34,115,470,325,176,865,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,704 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | static int expand(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh)
{
OPENSSL_LH_NODE **n, **n1, **n2, *np;
unsigned int p, pmax, nni, j;
unsigned long hash;
nni = lh->num_alloc_nodes;
p = lh->p;
pmax = lh->pmax;
if (p + 1 >= pmax) {
j = nni * 2;
n = OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b, sizeof(OPENSSL_LH_NODE *) * j);
... | 220,394,363,615,583,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,705 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | void OPENSSL_LH_flush(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh)
{
unsigned int i;
OPENSSL_LH_NODE *n, *nn;
if (lh == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < lh->num_nodes; i++) {
n = lh->b[i];
while (n != NULL) {
nn = n->next;
OPENSSL_free(n);
n = nn;
}
lh->b... | 214,555,667,680,418,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,706 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | int OPENSSL_LH_error(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh)
{
return lh->error;
} | 217,462,876,094,383,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,707 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | void *OPENSSL_LH_retrieve(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data)
{
unsigned long hash;
OPENSSL_LH_NODE **rn;
if (lh->error != 0)
lh->error = 0;
rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash);
return *rn == NULL ? NULL : (*rn)->data;
} | 121,250,596,275,862,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,708 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | void *OPENSSL_LH_insert(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, void *data)
{
unsigned long hash;
OPENSSL_LH_NODE *nn, **rn;
void *ret;
lh->error = 0;
if ((lh->up_load <= (lh->num_items * LH_LOAD_MULT / lh->num_nodes)) && !expand(lh))
return NULL; /* 'lh->error++' already done in 'expand' */
rn = ge... | 273,928,792,873,145,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,709 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | static void doall_util_fn(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, int use_arg,
OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC func,
OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG func_arg, void *arg)
{
int i;
OPENSSL_LH_NODE *a, *n;
if (lh == NULL)
return;
/*
* reverse the order so we search from 'top to... | 25,892,512,125,184,210,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,710 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | static OPENSSL_LH_NODE **getrn(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh,
const void *data, unsigned long *rhash)
{
OPENSSL_LH_NODE **ret, *n1;
unsigned long hash, nn;
OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC cf;
hash = (*(lh->hash)) (data);
*rhash = hash;
nn = hash % lh->pmax;
if (nn < lh->p)
n... | 95,637,060,905,910,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,711 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | unsigned long ossl_lh_strcasehash(const char *c)
{
unsigned long ret = 0;
long n;
unsigned long v;
int r;
if (c == NULL || *c == '\0')
return ret;
for (n = 0x100; *c != '\0'; n += 0x100) {
v = n | ossl_tolower(*c);
r = (int)((v >> 2) ^ v) & 0x0f;
/* cast to uint... | 99,527,101,482,995,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,712 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | void OPENSSL_LH_free(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh)
{
if (lh == NULL)
return;
OPENSSL_LH_flush(lh);
OPENSSL_free(lh->b);
OPENSSL_free(lh);
} | 263,910,867,662,403,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,713 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | void *OPENSSL_LH_delete(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data)
{
unsigned long hash;
OPENSSL_LH_NODE *nn, **rn;
void *ret;
lh->error = 0;
rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash);
if (*rn == NULL) {
return NULL;
} else {
nn = *rn;
*rn = nn->next;
ret = nn->data;
OP... | 119,342,498,901,669,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,714 | openssl | 64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64c85430f95200b6b51fe9475bd5203f7c19daf1 | Fix bug in OPENSSL_LH_flush
Fixes #18139.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18141)
(cherry picked from commit e5da68183410c06f7b350a0721bc2bd6057e438e) | 0 | void OPENSSL_LH_set_down_load(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, unsigned long down_load)
{
lh->down_load = down_load;
} | 323,057,752,339,262,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [] | CVE-2022-1473 | The OPENSSL_LH_flush() function, which empties a hash table, contains a bug that breaks reuse of the memory occuppied by the removed hash table entries. This function is used when decoding certificates or keys. If a long lived process periodically decodes certificates or keys its memory usage will expand without bounds... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1473 |
514,715 | server | b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | MDEV-26574 An improper locking bug due to unreleased lock in the ds_xbstream.cc
release lock in all as cases n xbstream_open, also fix the case where malloc would return NULL. | 0 | xbstream_open(ds_ctxt_t *ctxt, const char *path, MY_STAT *mystat)
{
ds_file_t *file;
ds_stream_file_t *stream_file;
ds_stream_ctxt_t *stream_ctxt;
ds_ctxt_t *dest_ctxt;
xb_wstream_t *xbstream;
xb_wstream_file_t *xbstream_file;
xb_ad(ctxt->pipe_ctxt != NULL);
dest_ctxt = ctxt->pipe_ctxt;
stream_ctxt = (ds... | 109,927,311,295,173,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2022-31621 | MariaDB Server before 10.7 is vulnerable to Denial of Service. In extra/mariabackup/ds_xbstream.cc, when an error occurs (stream_ctxt->dest_file == NULL) while executing the method xbstream_open, the held lock is not released correctly, which allows local users to trigger a denial of service due to the deadlock. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31621 |
514,716 | server | b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | MDEV-26574 An improper locking bug due to unreleased lock in the ds_xbstream.cc
release lock in all as cases n xbstream_open, also fix the case where malloc would return NULL. | 0 | xbstream_write(ds_file_t *file, const uchar *buf, size_t len)
{
ds_stream_file_t *stream_file;
xb_wstream_file_t *xbstream_file;
stream_file = (ds_stream_file_t *) file->ptr;
xbstream_file = stream_file->xbstream_file;
if (xb_stream_write_data(xbstream_file, buf, len)) {
msg("xb_stream_write_data() failed.")... | 303,994,061,470,614,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2022-31621 | MariaDB Server before 10.7 is vulnerable to Denial of Service. In extra/mariabackup/ds_xbstream.cc, when an error occurs (stream_ctxt->dest_file == NULL) while executing the method xbstream_open, the held lock is not released correctly, which allows local users to trigger a denial of service due to the deadlock. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31621 |
514,717 | server | b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | MDEV-26574 An improper locking bug due to unreleased lock in the ds_xbstream.cc
release lock in all as cases n xbstream_open, also fix the case where malloc would return NULL. | 0 | my_xbstream_write_callback(xb_wstream_file_t *f __attribute__((unused)),
void *userdata, const void *buf, size_t len)
{
ds_stream_ctxt_t *stream_ctxt;
stream_ctxt = (ds_stream_ctxt_t *) userdata;
xb_ad(stream_ctxt != NULL);
xb_ad(stream_ctxt->dest_file != NULL);
if (!ds_write(stream_ctxt->dest_file, bu... | 116,436,431,637,879,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2022-31621 | MariaDB Server before 10.7 is vulnerable to Denial of Service. In extra/mariabackup/ds_xbstream.cc, when an error occurs (stream_ctxt->dest_file == NULL) while executing the method xbstream_open, the held lock is not released correctly, which allows local users to trigger a denial of service due to the deadlock. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31621 |
514,718 | server | b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | MDEV-26574 An improper locking bug due to unreleased lock in the ds_xbstream.cc
release lock in all as cases n xbstream_open, also fix the case where malloc would return NULL. | 0 | xbstream_init(const char *root __attribute__((unused)))
{
ds_ctxt_t *ctxt;
ds_stream_ctxt_t *stream_ctxt;
xb_wstream_t *xbstream;
ctxt = (ds_ctxt_t *)my_malloc(sizeof(ds_ctxt_t) + sizeof(ds_stream_ctxt_t),
MYF(MY_FAE));
stream_ctxt = (ds_stream_ctxt_t *)(ctxt + 1);
if (pthread_mutex_init(&stream_ctxt->mute... | 221,261,608,562,092,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2022-31621 | MariaDB Server before 10.7 is vulnerable to Denial of Service. In extra/mariabackup/ds_xbstream.cc, when an error occurs (stream_ctxt->dest_file == NULL) while executing the method xbstream_open, the held lock is not released correctly, which allows local users to trigger a denial of service due to the deadlock. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31621 |
514,719 | server | b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | MDEV-26574 An improper locking bug due to unreleased lock in the ds_xbstream.cc
release lock in all as cases n xbstream_open, also fix the case where malloc would return NULL. | 0 | xbstream_close(ds_file_t *file)
{
ds_stream_file_t *stream_file;
int rc = 0;
stream_file = (ds_stream_file_t *)file->ptr;
rc = xb_stream_write_close(stream_file->xbstream_file);
my_free(file);
return rc;
} | 216,633,968,107,563,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2022-31621 | MariaDB Server before 10.7 is vulnerable to Denial of Service. In extra/mariabackup/ds_xbstream.cc, when an error occurs (stream_ctxt->dest_file == NULL) while executing the method xbstream_open, the held lock is not released correctly, which allows local users to trigger a denial of service due to the deadlock. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31621 |
514,720 | server | b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/b1351c15946349f9daa7e5297fb2ac6f3139e4a8 | MDEV-26574 An improper locking bug due to unreleased lock in the ds_xbstream.cc
release lock in all as cases n xbstream_open, also fix the case where malloc would return NULL. | 0 | xbstream_deinit(ds_ctxt_t *ctxt)
{
ds_stream_ctxt_t *stream_ctxt;
stream_ctxt = (ds_stream_ctxt_t *) ctxt->ptr;
if (xb_stream_write_done(stream_ctxt->xbstream)) {
msg("xb_stream_done() failed.");
}
if (stream_ctxt->dest_file) {
ds_close(stream_ctxt->dest_file);
stream_ctxt->dest_file = NULL;
}
pthread_... | 76,492,420,945,704,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2022-31621 | MariaDB Server before 10.7 is vulnerable to Denial of Service. In extra/mariabackup/ds_xbstream.cc, when an error occurs (stream_ctxt->dest_file == NULL) while executing the method xbstream_open, the held lock is not released correctly, which allows local users to trigger a denial of service due to the deadlock. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31621 |
514,724 | server | 7c30bc38a588b22b01f11130cfe99e7f36accf94 | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/7c30bc38a588b22b01f11130cfe99e7f36accf94 | MDEV-26561 mariabackup release locks
The previous threads locked need to be released too.
This occurs if the initialization of any of the non-first
mutex/conditition variables errors occurs. | 0 | create_worker_threads(uint n)
{
comp_thread_ctxt_t *threads;
uint i;
threads = (comp_thread_ctxt_t *)
my_malloc(sizeof(comp_thread_ctxt_t) * n, MYF(MY_FAE));
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
comp_thread_ctxt_t *thd = threads + i;
thd->num = i + 1;
thd->started = FALSE;
thd->cancelled = FALSE;
thd->data_a... | 40,328,221,301,176,333,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2022-31623 | MariaDB Server before 10.7 is vulnerable to Denial of Service. In extra/mariabackup/ds_compress.cc, when an error occurs (i.e., going to the err label) while executing the method create_worker_threads, the held lock thd->ctrl_mutex is not released correctly, which allows local users to trigger a denial of service due t... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31623 |
514,725 | openssl | 4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | static ossl_inline void put_digit(uint8_t *out, int out_len, uint64_t digit)
{
assert(out != NULL);
assert(out_len <= 8);
for (; out_len > 0; out_len--) {
*out++ = (uint8_t)(digit & 0xFF);
digit >>= 8;
}
} | 323,679,416,794,811,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2022-2274 | The OpenSSL 3.0.4 release introduced a serious bug in the RSA implementation for X86_64 CPUs supporting the AVX512IFMA instructions. This issue makes the RSA implementation with 2048 bit private keys incorrect on such machines and memory corruption will happen during the computation. As a consequence of the memory corr... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2274 |
514,726 | openssl | 4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | static ossl_inline uint64_t get_digit(const uint8_t *in, int in_len)
{
uint64_t digit = 0;
assert(in != NULL);
assert(in_len <= 8);
for (; in_len > 0; in_len--) {
digit <<= 8;
digit += (uint64_t)(in[in_len - 1]);
}
return digit;
} | 292,239,296,411,866,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2022-2274 | The OpenSSL 3.0.4 release introduced a serious bug in the RSA implementation for X86_64 CPUs supporting the AVX512IFMA instructions. This issue makes the RSA implementation with 2048 bit private keys incorrect on such machines and memory corruption will happen during the computation. As a consequence of the memory corr... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2274 |
514,727 | openssl | 4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | int ossl_rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2(BN_ULONG *res1,
const BN_ULONG *base1,
const BN_ULONG *exp1,
const BN_ULONG *m1,
const BN_ULONG *rr1,
BN_ULONG k0_1,
... | 22,144,793,980,359,746,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2022-2274 | The OpenSSL 3.0.4 release introduced a serious bug in the RSA implementation for X86_64 CPUs supporting the AVX512IFMA instructions. This issue makes the RSA implementation with 2048 bit private keys incorrect on such machines and memory corruption will happen during the computation. As a consequence of the memory corr... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2274 |
514,728 | openssl | 4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | static void to_words52(BN_ULONG *out, int out_len,
const BN_ULONG *in, int in_bitsize)
{
uint8_t *in_str = NULL;
assert(out != NULL);
assert(in != NULL);
/* Check destination buffer capacity */
assert(out_len >= number_of_digits(in_bitsize, DIGIT_SIZE));
in_str = (uint8_... | 303,880,108,353,077,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2022-2274 | The OpenSSL 3.0.4 release introduced a serious bug in the RSA implementation for X86_64 CPUs supporting the AVX512IFMA instructions. This issue makes the RSA implementation with 2048 bit private keys incorrect on such machines and memory corruption will happen during the computation. As a consequence of the memory corr... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2274 |
514,729 | openssl | 4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | int RSAZ_mod_exp_x2_ifma256(BN_ULONG *out,
const BN_ULONG *base,
const BN_ULONG *exp[2],
const BN_ULONG *m,
const BN_ULONG *rr,
const BN_ULONG k0[2],
in... | 126,065,859,340,163,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2022-2274 | The OpenSSL 3.0.4 release introduced a serious bug in the RSA implementation for X86_64 CPUs supporting the AVX512IFMA instructions. This issue makes the RSA implementation with 2048 bit private keys incorrect on such machines and memory corruption will happen during the computation. As a consequence of the memory corr... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2274 |
514,730 | openssl | 4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | static ossl_inline int number_of_digits(int bitsize, int digit_size)
{
return (bitsize + digit_size - 1) / digit_size;
} | 45,381,611,407,597,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2022-2274 | The OpenSSL 3.0.4 release introduced a serious bug in the RSA implementation for X86_64 CPUs supporting the AVX512IFMA instructions. This issue makes the RSA implementation with 2048 bit private keys incorrect on such machines and memory corruption will happen during the computation. As a consequence of the memory corr... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2274 |
514,731 | openssl | 4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | static ossl_inline void set_bit(BN_ULONG *a, int idx)
{
assert(a != NULL);
{
int i, j;
i = idx / BN_BITS2;
j = idx % BN_BITS2;
a[i] |= (((BN_ULONG)1) << j);
}
} | 251,902,667,379,205,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2022-2274 | The OpenSSL 3.0.4 release introduced a serious bug in the RSA implementation for X86_64 CPUs supporting the AVX512IFMA instructions. This issue makes the RSA implementation with 2048 bit private keys incorrect on such machines and memory corruption will happen during the computation. As a consequence of the memory corr... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2274 |
514,732 | openssl | 4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4d8a88c134df634ba610ff8db1eb8478ac5fd345 | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | static void from_words52(BN_ULONG *out, int out_bitsize, const BN_ULONG *in)
{
int i;
int out_len = BITS2WORD64_SIZE(out_bitsize);
assert(out != NULL);
assert(in != NULL);
for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++)
out[i] = 0;
{
uint8_t *out_str = (uint8_t *)out;
for (; out_bitsiz... | 166,049,812,679,205,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | CVE-2022-2274 | The OpenSSL 3.0.4 release introduced a serious bug in the RSA implementation for X86_64 CPUs supporting the AVX512IFMA instructions. This issue makes the RSA implementation with 2048 bit private keys incorrect on such machines and memory corruption will happen during the computation. As a consequence of the memory corr... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2274 |
514,744 | server | 942a9791b2231273ba20649a658c856641268fae | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/942a9791b2231273ba20649a658c856641268fae | MDEV-15208: server crashed, when using ORDER BY with window function and UNION
SELECTs inside a UNION can have window function but not the global ORDER BY clause of the UNION. | 0 | JOIN::create_postjoin_aggr_table(JOIN_TAB *tab, List<Item> *table_fields,
ORDER *table_group,
bool save_sum_fields,
bool distinct,
bool keep_row_order)
{
DBUG_ENTER("JOIN::create_postjoi... | 70,549,336,226,757,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"NVD-CWE-noinfo"
] | CVE-2022-32088 | MariaDB v10.2 to v10.7 was discovered to contain a segmentation fault via the component Exec_time_tracker::get_loops/Filesort_tracker::report_use/filesort. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32088 |
514,745 | server | 942a9791b2231273ba20649a658c856641268fae | https://github.com/MariaDB/server | https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/942a9791b2231273ba20649a658c856641268fae | MDEV-15208: server crashed, when using ORDER BY with window function and UNION
SELECTs inside a UNION can have window function but not the global ORDER BY clause of the UNION. | 0 | bool mysql_explain_union(THD *thd, SELECT_LEX_UNIT *unit, select_result *result)
{
DBUG_ENTER("mysql_explain_union");
bool res= 0;
SELECT_LEX *first= unit->first_select();
for (SELECT_LEX *sl= first; sl; sl= sl->next_select())
{
sl->set_explain_type(FALSE);
sl->options|= SELECT_DESCRIBE;
}
if (u... | 286,789,602,125,666,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"NVD-CWE-noinfo"
] | CVE-2022-32088 | MariaDB v10.2 to v10.7 was discovered to contain a segmentation fault via the component Exec_time_tracker::get_loops/Filesort_tracker::report_use/filesort. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32088 |
514,807 | openssl | fb8d9ddb9dc19d84dffa84932f75e607c8a3ffe6 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=fb8d9ddb9dc19d84dffa84932f75e607c8a3ffe6 | Make tls_session_secret_cb work with CVE-2014-0224 fix.
If application uses tls_session_secret_cb for session resumption
set the CCS_OK flag. | 0 | int tls1_get_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
{
int al = 0;
int ok;
long n;
const unsigned char *p, *d;
unsigned short supp_data_entry_type = 0;
unsigned short supp_data_entry_len = 0;
unsigned long supp_data_len = 0;
size_t i;
int cb_retval = 0;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SUPPLEMEN... | 287,420,764,078,397,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-326"
] | CVE-2014-0224 | OpenSSL before 0.9.8za, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0m, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1h does not properly restrict processing of ChangeCipherSpec messages, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to trigger use of a zero-length master key in certain OpenSSL-to-OpenSSL communications, and consequently hijack sessions or obtain sensitive ... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0224 |
514,808 | openssl | fb8d9ddb9dc19d84dffa84932f75e607c8a3ffe6 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=fb8d9ddb9dc19d84dffa84932f75e607c8a3ffe6 | Make tls_session_secret_cb work with CVE-2014-0224 fix.
If application uses tls_session_secret_cb for session resumption
set the CCS_OK flag. | 0 | int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
{
int ok;
long n;
/* Read the message to see if it is supplemental data,
* regardless if there is a session ticket this function is
* called when we really expect a Certificate message, so
* permit appropriate message length */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CER... | 28,110,641,791,561,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-326"
] | CVE-2014-0224 | OpenSSL before 0.9.8za, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0m, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1h does not properly restrict processing of ChangeCipherSpec messages, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to trigger use of a zero-length master key in certain OpenSSL-to-OpenSSL communications, and consequently hijack sessions or obtain sensitive ... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0224 |
514,809 | openssl | fb8d9ddb9dc19d84dffa84932f75e607c8a3ffe6 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=fb8d9ddb9dc19d84dffa84932f75e607c8a3ffe6 | Make tls_session_secret_cb work with CVE-2014-0224 fix.
If application uses tls_session_secret_cb for session resumption
set the CCS_OK flag. | 0 | int tls1_send_client_supplemental_data(SSL *s, int *skip)
{
int al = 0;
if (s->ctx->cli_supp_data_records_count)
{
unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned char *size_loc = NULL;
cli_supp_data_record *record = NULL;
size_t length = 0;
size_t i = 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->cli_supp_data_records_count; i++)
... | 76,759,483,687,231,690,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-326"
] | CVE-2014-0224 | OpenSSL before 0.9.8za, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0m, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1h does not properly restrict processing of ChangeCipherSpec messages, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to trigger use of a zero-length master key in certain OpenSSL-to-OpenSSL communications, and consequently hijack sessions or obtain sensitive ... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0224 |
514,810 | openssl | fb8d9ddb9dc19d84dffa84932f75e607c8a3ffe6 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=fb8d9ddb9dc19d84dffa84932f75e607c8a3ffe6 | Make tls_session_secret_cb work with CVE-2014-0224 fix.
If application uses tls_session_secret_cb for session resumption
set the CCS_OK flag. | 0 | int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
e... | 84,969,491,356,897,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-326"
] | CVE-2014-0224 | OpenSSL before 0.9.8za, 1.0.0 before 1.0.0m, and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1h does not properly restrict processing of ChangeCipherSpec messages, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to trigger use of a zero-length master key in certain OpenSSL-to-OpenSSL communications, and consequently hijack sessions or obtain sensitive ... | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0224 |
515,532 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int pptp_echo_rply(struct pptp_conn_t *conn)
{
struct pptp_echo_rply *msg = (struct pptp_echo_rply *)conn->in_buf;
if (conf_verbose)
log_ppp_debug("recv [PPTP Echo-Reply <Identifier %x>]\n", msg->identifier);
conn->echo_sent = 0;
return 0;
} | 111,026,004,320,312,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,533 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int send_pptp_stop_ctrl_conn_rply(struct pptp_conn_t *conn, int reason, int err_code)
{
struct pptp_stop_ctrl_conn msg = {
.header = PPTP_HEADER_CTRL(PPTP_STOP_CTRL_CONN_RPLY),
.reason_result = hton8(reason),
.error_code = hton8(err_code),
};
if (conf_verbose)
log_ppp_info2("send [PPTP Stop-Ctrl-Conn... | 211,842,561,651,086,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,534 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int post_msg(struct pptp_conn_t *conn, void *buf, int size)
{
int n;
if (conn->out_size) {
log_error("pptp: buffer is not empty\n");
return -1;
}
again:
n=write(conn->hnd.fd, buf, size);
if (n < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR)
goto again;
else if (errno == EAGAIN)
n = 0;
else {
if (errno != EPI... | 12,163,862,978,787,326,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,535 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static void pptp_ctx_switch(struct triton_context_t *ctx, void *arg)
{
if (arg) {
struct ap_session *s = arg;
net = s->net;
} else
net = def_net;
log_switch(ctx, arg);
} | 4,931,768,854,929,573,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,536 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static void disconnect(struct pptp_conn_t *conn)
{
log_ppp_debug("pptp: disconnect\n");
triton_md_unregister_handler(&conn->hnd, 1);
if (conn->timeout_timer.tpd)
triton_timer_del(&conn->timeout_timer);
if (conn->echo_timer.tpd)
triton_timer_del(&conn->echo_timer);
if (conn->state == STATE_PPP) {
__sync_s... | 25,878,171,468,685,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,537 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static void pptp_serv_close(struct triton_context_t *ctx)
{
struct pptp_serv_t *s=container_of(ctx,typeof(*s),ctx);
triton_md_unregister_handler(&s->hnd, 1);
triton_context_unregister(ctx);
} | 315,032,115,252,180,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,538 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int send_pptp_stop_ctrl_conn_rqst(struct pptp_conn_t *conn, int reason)
{
struct pptp_stop_ctrl_conn msg = {
.header = PPTP_HEADER_CTRL(PPTP_STOP_CTRL_CONN_RQST),
.reason_result = hton8(reason),
};
if (conf_verbose)
log_ppp_info2("send [PPTP Stop-Ctrl-Conn-Request <Reason %i>]\n", reason);
return pos... | 262,451,151,518,646,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,539 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static void pptp_close(struct triton_context_t *ctx)
{
struct pptp_conn_t *conn = container_of(ctx, typeof(*conn), ctx);
if (conn->state == STATE_PPP) {
__sync_sub_and_fetch(&stat_active, 1);
conn->state = STATE_CLOSE;
ap_session_terminate(&conn->ppp.ses, TERM_ADMIN_RESET, 1);
if (send_pptp_call_disconnect_no... | 113,594,594,252,656,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,540 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static void pptp_init(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in addr;
char *opt;
int fd;
fd = socket(AF_PPPOX, SOCK_STREAM, PX_PROTO_PPTP);
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
else if (system("modprobe -q pptp"))
log_warn("failed to load pptp kernel module\n");
serv.hnd.fd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (serv.hnd.fd < 0) {
... | 86,465,417,270,453,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,541 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int send_pptp_start_ctrl_conn_rply(struct pptp_conn_t *conn, int res_code, int err_code)
{
struct pptp_start_ctrl_conn msg = {
.header = PPTP_HEADER_CTRL(PPTP_START_CTRL_CONN_RPLY),
.version = htons(PPTP_VERSION),
.result_code = res_code,
.error_code = err_code,
.framing_cap = htonl(PPTP_FRAME_ANY),
... | 101,996,486,636,503,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,542 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int pptp_stop_ctrl_conn_rply(struct pptp_conn_t *conn)
{
struct pptp_stop_ctrl_conn *msg = (struct pptp_stop_ctrl_conn*)conn->in_buf;
if (conf_verbose)
log_ppp_info2("recv [PPTP Stop-Ctrl-Conn-Reply <Result %i> <Error %i>]\n", msg->reason_result, msg->error_code);
return -1;
} | 290,846,751,796,198,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,543 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int pptp_out_call_rqst(struct pptp_conn_t *conn)
{
struct pptp_out_call_rqst *msg = (struct pptp_out_call_rqst *)conn->in_buf;
struct sockaddr_pppox src_addr, dst_addr;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
socklen_t addrlen;
int pptp_sock;
if (conf_verbose)
log_ppp_info2("recv [PPTP Outgoing-Call-Request <Call-ID ... | 157,232,487,722,845,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,544 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int pptp_write(struct triton_md_handler_t *h)
{
struct pptp_conn_t *conn = container_of(h, typeof(*conn), hnd);
int n;
while (1) {
n = write(h->fd, conn->out_buf+conn->out_pos, conn->out_size-conn->out_pos);
if (n < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
if (errno == EAGAIN)
n = 0;
else {
... | 324,839,204,981,882,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,545 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int pptp_read(struct triton_md_handler_t *h)
{
struct pptp_conn_t *conn=container_of(h,typeof(*conn),hnd);
struct pptp_header *hdr=(struct pptp_header *)conn->in_buf;
int n;
while(1) {
n = read(h->fd, conn->in_buf + conn->in_size, PPTP_CTRL_SIZE_MAX - conn->in_size);
if (n < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR)
... | 209,949,038,788,348,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,546 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int process_packet(struct pptp_conn_t *conn)
{
struct pptp_header *hdr = (struct pptp_header *)conn->in_buf;
switch(ntohs(hdr->ctrl_type))
{
case PPTP_START_CTRL_CONN_RQST:
return pptp_start_ctrl_conn_rqst(conn);
case PPTP_STOP_CTRL_CONN_RQST:
return pptp_stop_ctrl_conn_rqst(conn);
case PPTP_STOP_... | 163,425,745,140,716,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,547 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int send_pptp_out_call_rply(struct pptp_conn_t *conn, struct pptp_out_call_rqst *rqst, int call_id, int res_code, int err_code)
{
struct pptp_out_call_rply msg = {
.header = PPTP_HEADER_CTRL(PPTP_OUT_CALL_RPLY),
.call_id = htons(call_id),
.call_id_peer = rqst->call_id,
.result_code = res_code,
.error_... | 229,919,131,861,463,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,548 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int show_stat_exec(const char *cmd, char * const *fields, int fields_cnt, void *client)
{
cli_send(client, "pptp:\r\n");
cli_sendv(client," starting: %u\r\n", stat_starting);
cli_sendv(client," active: %u\r\n", stat_active);
return CLI_CMD_OK;
} | 10,385,800,070,020,546,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,549 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int pptp_call_clear_rqst(struct pptp_conn_t *conn)
{
struct pptp_call_clear_rqst *rqst = (struct pptp_call_clear_rqst *)conn->in_buf;
if (conf_verbose)
log_ppp_info2("recv [PPTP Call-Clear-Request <Call-ID %x>]\n", ntohs(rqst->call_id));
if (conn->echo_timer.tpd)
triton_timer_del(&conn->echo_timer);
i... | 180,577,625,294,124,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,550 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static void ppp_finished(struct ap_session *ses)
{
struct ppp_t *ppp = container_of(ses, typeof(*ppp), ses);
struct pptp_conn_t *conn = container_of(ppp, typeof(*conn), ppp);
if (conn->state != STATE_CLOSE) {
log_ppp_debug("pptp: ppp finished\n");
conn->state = STATE_CLOSE;
__sync_sub_and_fetch(&stat_active, ... | 243,955,534,226,248,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,551 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int pptp_start_ctrl_conn_rqst(struct pptp_conn_t *conn)
{
struct pptp_start_ctrl_conn *msg = (struct pptp_start_ctrl_conn *)conn->in_buf;
if (conf_verbose)
log_ppp_info2("recv [PPTP Start-Ctrl-Conn-Request <Version %i> <Framing %x> <Bearer %x> <Max-Chan %i>]\n", msg->version, ntohl(msg->framing_cap), ntohl(... | 4,281,615,466,396,863,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,552 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static void pptp_timeout(struct triton_timer_t *t)
{
struct pptp_conn_t *conn = container_of(t, typeof(*conn), timeout_timer);
disconnect(conn);
} | 251,149,045,579,319,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,553 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static void ppp_started(struct ap_session *ses)
{
log_ppp_debug("pptp: ppp started\n");
} | 150,668,093,301,083,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,554 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static void load_config(void)
{
char *opt;
opt = conf_get_opt("pptp", "timeout");
if (opt && atoi(opt) > 0)
conf_timeout = atoi(opt);
opt = conf_get_opt("pptp", "echo-interval");
if (opt && atoi(opt) >= 0)
conf_echo_interval = atoi(opt);
opt = conf_get_opt("pptp", "echo-failure");
if (opt && atoi(opt) >= ... | 197,692,269,150,041,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,555 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int pptp_stop_ctrl_conn_rqst(struct pptp_conn_t *conn)
{
struct pptp_stop_ctrl_conn *msg = (struct pptp_stop_ctrl_conn *)conn->in_buf;
if (conf_verbose)
log_ppp_info2("recv [PPTP Stop-Ctrl-Conn-Request <Reason %i>]\n", msg->reason_result);
send_pptp_stop_ctrl_conn_rply(conn, PPTP_CONN_STOP_OK, 0);
return... | 127,004,082,250,911,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,556 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int pptp_connect(struct triton_md_handler_t *h)
{
struct sockaddr_in addr;
socklen_t size = sizeof(addr);
int sock;
struct pptp_conn_t *conn;
while(1) {
sock = accept(h->fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &size);
if (sock < 0) {
if (errno == EAGAIN)
return 0;
log_error("pptp: accept failed: %s\n"... | 185,319,386,348,985,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,557 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | void __export pptp_get_stat(unsigned int **starting, unsigned int **active)
{
*starting = &stat_starting;
*active = &stat_active;
} | 173,350,508,244,180,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,558 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int pptp_echo_rqst(struct pptp_conn_t *conn)
{
struct pptp_echo_rqst *in_msg = (struct pptp_echo_rqst *)conn->in_buf;
struct pptp_echo_rply out_msg = {
.header = PPTP_HEADER_CTRL(PPTP_ECHO_RPLY),
.identifier = in_msg->identifier,
.result_code = 1,
};
if (conf_verbose) {
log_ppp_debug("recv [PPTP Ech... | 91,418,249,357,728,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,559 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static void pptp_send_echo(struct triton_timer_t *t)
{
struct pptp_conn_t *conn = container_of(t, typeof(*conn), echo_timer);
struct pptp_echo_rqst msg = {
.header = PPTP_HEADER_CTRL(PPTP_ECHO_RQST),
};
if (++conn->echo_sent == conf_echo_failure) {
log_ppp_warn("pptp: no echo reply\n");
disconnect(conn);
r... | 267,492,091,749,612,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,560 | accel-ppp | a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | https://github.com/accel-ppp/accel-ppp | https://github.com/grandnew/accel-ppp/commit/a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f | Fix post_msg implementation bug
I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`:
https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L57... | 0 | static int send_pptp_call_disconnect_notify(struct pptp_conn_t *conn, int result)
{
struct pptp_call_clear_ntfy msg = {
.header = PPTP_HEADER_CTRL(PPTP_CALL_CLEAR_NTFY),
.call_id = htons(conn->peer_call_id),
.result_code = result,
.error_code = 0,
.cause_code = 0,
};
if (conf_verbose)
log_ppp_info2("sen... | 247,350,092,286,576,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,561 | openssl | a1f7034bbd8f0730d360211f5ba0feeaef0b7b2c | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a1f7034bbd8f0730d360211f5ba0feeaef0b7b2c | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | static void RSAZ_exp52x20_x2_256(BN_ULONG *out, /* [2][20] */
const BN_ULONG *base, /* [2][20] */
const BN_ULONG *exp[2], /* 2x16 */
const BN_ULONG *m, /* [2][20] */
con... | 97,341,931,771,706,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,562 | openssl | a1f7034bbd8f0730d360211f5ba0feeaef0b7b2c | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a1f7034bbd8f0730d360211f5ba0feeaef0b7b2c | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | int ossl_rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2(BN_ULONG *res1,
const BN_ULONG *base1,
const BN_ULONG *exp1,
const BN_ULONG *m1,
const BN_ULONG *rr1,
BN_ULONG k0_1,
... | 307,021,548,801,776,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,563 | openssl | a1f7034bbd8f0730d360211f5ba0feeaef0b7b2c | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a1f7034bbd8f0730d360211f5ba0feeaef0b7b2c | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | static void from_words52(BN_ULONG *out, int out_bitsize, const BN_ULONG *in)
{
int i;
int out_len = BITS2WORD64_SIZE(out_bitsize);
assert(out != NULL);
assert(in != NULL);
for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++)
out[i] = 0;
{
uint8_t *out_str = (uint8_t *)out;
for (; out_bitsiz... | 336,805,129,549,000,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,564 | openssl | a1f7034bbd8f0730d360211f5ba0feeaef0b7b2c | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a1f7034bbd8f0730d360211f5ba0feeaef0b7b2c | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | static ossl_inline uint64_t get_digit52(const uint8_t *in, int in_len)
{
uint64_t digit = 0;
assert(in != NULL);
for (; in_len > 0; in_len--) {
digit <<= 8;
digit += (uint64_t)(in[in_len - 1]);
}
return digit;
} | 31,869,082,547,066,247,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,565 | openssl | a1f7034bbd8f0730d360211f5ba0feeaef0b7b2c | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a1f7034bbd8f0730d360211f5ba0feeaef0b7b2c | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | static ossl_inline void put_digit52(uint8_t *pStr, int strLen, uint64_t digit)
{
assert(pStr != NULL);
for (; strLen > 0; strLen--) {
*pStr++ = (uint8_t)(digit & 0xFF);
digit >>= 8;
}
} | 286,246,753,770,526,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,566 | openssl | a1f7034bbd8f0730d360211f5ba0feeaef0b7b2c | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a1f7034bbd8f0730d360211f5ba0feeaef0b7b2c | rsa: fix bn_reduce_once_in_place call for rsaz_mod_exp_avx512_x2
bn_reduce_once_in_place expects the number of BN_ULONG, but factor_size
is moduli bit size.
Fixes #18625.
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from... | 0 | static void to_words52(BN_ULONG *out, int out_len,
const BN_ULONG *in, int in_bitsize)
{
uint8_t *in_str = NULL;
assert(out != NULL);
assert(in != NULL);
/* Check destination buffer capacity */
assert(out_len >= number_of_digits(in_bitsize, DIGIT_SIZE));
in_str = (uint8_... | 157,212,821,591,200,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-787"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,631 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | void bn_init(BIGNUM *a)
{
static BIGNUM nilbn;
*a = nilbn;
bn_check_top(a);
} | 33,002,113,070,550,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,632 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | BIGNUM *BN_new(void)
{
BIGNUM *ret;
if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (NULL);
}
ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED;
bn_check_top(ret);
return (ret);
} | 25,275,844,396,664,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,633 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a)
{
return (a->neg != 0);
} | 210,675,162,021,579,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,634 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | BIGNUM *BN_lebin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret)
{
unsigned int i, m;
unsigned int n;
BN_ULONG l;
BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
if (ret == NULL)
ret = bn = BN_new();
if (ret == NULL)
return (NULL);
bn_check_top(ret);
s += len;
/* Skip trailing zeroes. */
fo... | 155,374,380,199,812,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,635 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | int BN_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
{
int i;
BN_ULONG l;
bn_check_top(a);
i = BN_num_bytes(a);
if (tolen < i)
return -1;
/* Add trailing zeroes if necessary */
if (tolen > i)
memset(to + i, 0, tolen - i);
to += i;
while (i--) {
l ... | 158,013,510,267,588,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,636 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words)
{
bn_check_top(b);
if (words > b->dmax) {
BN_ULONG *a = bn_expand_internal(b, words);
if (!a)
return NULL;
if (b->d) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(b->d, b->dmax * sizeof(b->d[0]));
bn_free_d(b);
}
b->d = a;... | 158,471,251,841,762,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,637 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | int BN_security_bits(int L, int N)
{
int secbits, bits;
if (L >= 15360)
secbits = 256;
else if (L >= 7680)
secbits = 192;
else if (L >= 3072)
secbits = 128;
else if (L >= 2048)
secbits = 112;
else if (L >= 1024)
secbits = 80;
else
return 0;
... | 309,890,880,216,248,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,638 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
{
BN_ULONG t;
int i;
bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
assert(a != b);
assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
condition = ((condition - 1) >> ... | 69,250,329,066,000,890,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,639 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
{
int i;
BN_ULONG *A;
const BN_ULONG *B;
bn_check_top(b);
if (a == b)
return (a);
if (bn_wexpand(a, b->top) == NULL)
return (NULL);
#if 1
A = a->d;
B = b->d;
for (i = b->top >> 2; i > 0; i--, A += 4, B += 4) {
BN_... | 151,857,039,713,158,110,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,640 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a)
{
bn_check_top(a);
if (a->d != NULL)
OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, sizeof(*a->d) * a->dmax);
a->top = 0;
a->neg = 0;
} | 90,847,929,509,379,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,641 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret)
{
unsigned int i, m;
unsigned int n;
BN_ULONG l;
BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
if (ret == NULL)
ret = bn = BN_new();
if (ret == NULL)
return (NULL);
bn_check_top(ret);
/* Skip leading zero's. */
for ( ; len > 0 && ... | 11,940,228,988,672,354,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,642 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | int BN_is_word(const BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG w)
{
return BN_abs_is_word(a, w) && (!w || !a->neg);
} | 255,673,064,020,315,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,643 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *b, int flags)
{
dest->d = b->d;
dest->top = b->top;
dest->dmax = b->dmax;
dest->neg = b->neg;
dest->flags = ((dest->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
| (b->flags & ~BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
| BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA | flags);
} | 253,707,885,449,632,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,645 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
if ((scalar != NULL) && (num == 0)) {
/* In this case we want to compute scalar * GeneratorPoint:
* this codepath i... | 238,964,486,921,711,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,646 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | int BN_get_flags(const BIGNUM *b, int n)
{
return b->flags & n;
} | 24,053,427,052,763,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,647 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words)
{
BN_ULONG *A, *a = NULL;
const BN_ULONG *B;
int i;
bn_check_top(b);
if (words > (INT_MAX / (4 * BN_BITS2))) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL, BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG);
return NULL;
}
if (BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_STA... | 231,615,200,418,516,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,648 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to)
{
return bn2binpad(a, to, -1);
} | 90,445,582,799,868,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,649 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | static void bn_free_d(BIGNUM *a)
{
if (BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_SECURE))
OPENSSL_secure_free(a->d);
else
OPENSSL_free(a->d);
} | 5,942,724,533,722,951,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,650 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | void BN_free(BIGNUM *a)
{
if (a == NULL)
return;
bn_check_top(a);
if (!BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA))
bn_free_d(a);
if (a->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
OPENSSL_free(a);
else {
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x00908000L
a->flags |= BN_FLG_FREE;
#endif
a->d = NULL;
... | 147,131,480,746,307,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
515,651 | openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt... | 0 | BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *a)
{
BIGNUM *t;
if (a == NULL)
return NULL;
bn_check_top(a);
t = BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_SECURE) ? BN_secure_new() : BN_new();
if (t == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!BN_copy(t, a)) {
BN_free(t);
return NULL;
}
bn_check_top(t);
r... | 107,062,637,438,976,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | None | None | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/None |
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