| # Security Policy |
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| **Do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.** |
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| **Please use the [Private Vulnerability Disclosure](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories/guidance-on-reporting-and-writing-information-about-vulnerabilities/privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability#privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability) feature of GitHub.** |
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| Include as much of the following information: |
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| - Type of issue (e.g. improper input parsing, privilege escalation, etc.) |
| - The location of the affected source code (tag/branch/commit or direct URL) |
| - Any special configuration required to reproduce the issue |
| - The distribution affected or used to help us with reproduction of the issue |
| - Step-by-step instructions to reproduce the issue |
| - Ideally a reproduction repository |
| - Impact of the issue, including how an attacker might exploit the issue |
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| We prefer to receive reports in English. |
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| ## Contact |
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| Please disclose a vulnerability or security relevant issue here: [https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/security/advisories/new](https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/security/advisories/new). |
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| Alternatively, you can also contact us by email via [security@tauri.app](mailto:security@tauri.app). |
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| ## Threat Model |
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| As there are only the `scan` and `cancel` commands exposed to the frontend, |
| there is no additional risk or exposure of additional information. |
| Only barcodes are passed and no raw camera access is used, which means no images are available to the frontend. |
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| The application is only usable on iOS and Android and therefore the specific mobile operating system security boundaries need to be considered. |
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| ### Security Assumptions |
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| - The QR code parsing into a link/text is trusted and correctly handled by the mobile operating system |
| - The link itself is untrusted and additional validation/sanitization needs to be handled by the app developer |
| - The camera is not passing images to the app |
| - The camera permission is granted at first use by the user and can be revoked at any time |
| - The Android manifest also states that the camera permission is required |
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| ### Threats |
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| #### Silent Interaction |
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| ##### When is it possible? |
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| The following threat is either caused by a malicious developer, which has further implications and should be considered as a full compromise of an application or system, or by |
| compromise of the application frontend. In the second case there are several impact minimization methods (e.g. the CSP) and if all of these fail the possible risk could occur. |
| Therefore it is unlikely to occur in most cases but should be considered when using this plugin. |
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| ##### What is possible? |
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| The camera has two modes. The first one is where the user can see the background camera image and no further interaction is possible. |
| The second mode allows the developer to assist the user and add a transparent overlay to the image, providing hints or additional information (like a link preview). |
| The overlay could be made non-transparent by the application frontend and as long as the app is open (and in some cases) it could read QR codes in range of the camera lense. |
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| #### Out Of Scope |
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| - Exploits in the operating system QR code parsing functionality |
| - Exploits based on the string passed to the application using this plugin |
| - Continous camera/QR scan usage even when application is in background |
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| ## Best Practices |
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| There is no additional exposure aside from reading barcodes in the webview and there are no specific best practices for secure usage. |
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